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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Regulation inside government: a definition for an almost unexplored field of 
research 
 
The dissertation pertains to the literature on regulation inside government. Public 
administration as field of regulation has not been systematically studied in a national 
or cross-national perspective by scholars, whereas it is characterised by particularities 
that makes it distinct from business regulation. Following Hood’s et al. definition 
(1999), regulating government refers to processes where government regulates itself 
beyond the two classical primary regulators, i.e., the courts, and the elected members 
of the legislature. More specifically, the so-called secondary  regulation is effected by 
public bodies operating at arm’s-length from the direct line of command and takes the 
form of a steering or control system – in a cybernetic perspective - that combines 
standard setting (the “director” element), information-gathering (the “detector” 
element), and behaviour modification (the “effector” element). Three features of 
regulation inside government can be identified and must all be present (Hood et al., 
1999):    
 
(i) “one public bureaucracy in the role of an overseer aiming to shape the 
activities of another; 
(ii) an organisational separation between the “regulating” bureaucracy and the 
“regulatee”, with the regulator outside the direct line of command (this 
feature distinguishes intra-organisational controls from arm’s-length 
oversight by another organisation); 
(iii) some official “mandate” for the regulator organization to scrutinize the 
behaviour of the “regulatee” and seek to change it”.  
 
Regulation inside government is carried out by organisations, a typology of which is 
suggested by Christopher Hood (Hood et al., 2004). These bodies are classified into 
seven different types: “i) international public overseers (bodies monitoring treaty 
obligations on torture and other human rights issues), ii) agents of legislators (auditors 
or Special Prosecutor), iii) independent or semi-independent grievance handlers, iv) 
officers or bodies relatively independent both of the legislature and the regular 
executive structure (independent commissions against corruption), v) arm’s-length 
monitoring and standard-setting units within the executive government structure, vi) 
bodies overseeing public and private sector organizations alike (regulators of data 
privacy), vii) various private or independent overseers of government (private audit 
firms auditing public bodies, Transparency International)”. 
 
1.2 Assessing the de facto independence of the Greek constitutional independent 
authorities regulating public administration  
 
It has been argued that the complexity of social and economic phenomena, the need to 
protect human rights, and the public interest in general led to the delegation of policy 
decision-making powers “to institutions, which by design, are not directly 
accountable to voters or to their elected representatives, in other words, delegation to 
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non-majoritarian institutions1” (Majone, 1996). Legitimising political action through 
the detachment of a significant part of the governmental activity from the traditional 
command-and-control techniques of government bureaucracy gave rise to the so-
called regulatory state that runs parallel to the administrative state. A depoliticised 
bureaucracy based on specialist expertise becomes the main feature of the new 
institutional apparatus. The diffusion of specialised agencies covering a wide range of 
sectors2, and under various names3 in literature and legislation, has been remarkable 
in the past thirty years in almost all countries. Greece makes no exception. The Greek 
Independent Administrative Authorities, as they are officially called in legislative 
texts following the French paradigm, seem to have first appeared in 19894, although 
some may have pre-existed with a different legal status (Venizelos, 1999). Since the 
early 1980s’ two categories of independent authorities emerged: those protecting 
human rights, and those regulating the market and the utility sectors (OECD, 2005). 
 
The revised Greek Constitution of 2001 gave constitutional backing to five 
“independent authorities”5 regulating, exclusively or additionally6, public 
administration: the Hellenic Data Protection Authority (Article 9A), the National 
Council for Radio and Television7 (Article 15), the Hellenic Authority for 
Communications, Security, and Privacy (Article 19A), the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel (article 103, par. 7), and the Greek Ombudsman (Article 103, 
par. 9). It should be noted that all these authorities, with the exception of the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel, were established as a result of the international 
legal obligations of the country (Venizelos, 2007). Karkatsoulis (OECD, 2005) 
explains why they enjoy a constitutional guarantee of independence.  
 
The rationale of the constitutional legislator is quite clear: the 
answer to the proposal for a constitutional guarantee for all the 
IAs [Independent Authorities], was the expression of his explicit 
will to include only those related to the enhancement of human 
rights and not the others, operating within the market sector. 
 
Therefore, the constitutional guarantee of independence was only reserved for the 
regulators assuming the role of citizens’ protectors against the encroachment of their 
constitutional-human rights by the state. The relevance of the mission of these 
constitutionally consolidated authorities, as well as the fact that little academic 
research has evaluated the effectiveness of regulatory processes inside government 
                                                 
1 Courts are not included since they represent the judicial branch in the classical tripartite system of the 
separation of powers. 
2 Economic regulation, social regulation, political regulation, and human rights regulation. 
3 Terms such as Independent Administrative Agencies, non-majoritarian institutions, autonomous 
bodies or organisms, quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (QUANGOS), non 
departmental public bodies, extra-governmental organisations, subsidiary organisations are in usage in 
the literature and legislation. 
4 The National Council for Radio and Television regulating public and private broadcasters. 
5 The term “constitutional independent authorities” will be used hereinafter. 
6 The Hellenic Data Protection Authority, the Greek National Council for Radio and Television, and 
the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy regulate public and private 
organizations alike. 
7 The National Council for Radio and Television will not be included in our study since the regulation 
of private radio and television -due to their predominant position and influence- rather than that of the 
public broadcasting seems to be more crucial in the evaluation of the authority’s relationship and 
degree of independence from the private broadcasting industry.  
 12
(Boyne et al., 2002), gave the inspiration to assess through a qualitative analysis the 
degree of the de facto independence of IRAs from public administration8.  
 
But how is the concept of the de facto independence defined?  According to literature 
on regulation, the Independent Regulatory Agencies are based upon the agency model 
combining expertise, autonomy, specialisation of tasks, and including a variety of 
activities, objectives, and institutional designs. Therefore, the degree of their 
autonomy from their regulatees in regulation inside government, that is, public 
administration, is a precondition for the success or failure of regulation. We could 
further argue that regulatory failure has greater impact when it fails to effectively 
protect the citizens’ human rights provided for in the Constitution and international 
treaties. According to Nordlinger (1987) autonomy means to be able to translate one’s 
own preferences into authoritative actions without external constraints. It should be 
taken into consideration that the concept of autonomy encompasses the formal-legal 
level of autonomy and de facto autonomy. According to Olsen (2009), de facto 
autonomy combines the absence of external interference and the capability of an 
agency or institution to exploit available spaces to manoeuvre. Subtracting from 
Nordlinger’s concept of autonomy the dimension of states’ self-rule and strength, 
Maggetti (2007), following Majone (2001), uses the term “independence” in the sense 
of separateness and makes the distinction between formal and de facto independence.  
 
Formal independence corresponds to the guarantees of independence from the 
political decision-makers as stamped on a series of prescriptions enshrined in the 
constitutions of the agencies (Gilardi, 2002), whereas de facto independence is viewed 
as a way to assess the independence of the agencies’ day-to-day regulatory action 
from the political decision-makers and the regulatees (Maggetti, 2007). We may argue 
that the study of independent authorities, as regulators inside government, presents the 
particularity that the regulatees coincide with bureaucrats and public functionaries, 
who, in turn, are either hierarchically subordinated to the political decision-makers or 
indirectly linked to them (e.g. university professors). This special aspect of regulation 
inside government, namely, the same regulatee in a double role, makes the research 
on the de facto independence of the Greek constitutional independent authorities from 
public administration challenging.  
 
Taking this particularity into consideration, the concepts of formal and de facto 
independence are interrelated. More specifically, certain aspects of the formal 
independence, that is, the institutional design concerning i) the selection mechanisms 
provided for the members of the authorities, ii) the recruitment strategies for the 
personnel’s selection, and iii) the adoption of immunity arrangements for the 
members of the authorities, are theoretically challenged and empirically assessed. 
Thus, high or low levels of formal independence resulting from the empirical 
evidence on the construction and implementation of the institutional design as well as 
the profile of the members and the personnel of the authorities facilitate the 
assessment of their impact on the de facto independence. These parameters inevitably 
formulate the actors’ preferences and choices in the performance of their regulatory 
functions. In other words, the dissertation attempts to evaluate whether the relevant 
levels of formal independence as defined by theoretical perspectives and empirical 
                                                 
8 In our research we use the expression “the de facto independence of IRAs from public administration” 
since the study refers to regulators overseeing the executive and not other branches of government.  
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evidence might undermine the independence of the agencies’ day-to-day regulatory 
action towards the regulatees in their double role. The presentation and analysis of 
cases of regulatory failure also tries to reveal the regulators’ psychology and tactics 
towards public administration, thus facilitating the assessment of their de facto 
independence through real action. Thus, the main research question that this 
dissertation attempts to address lies in the detection of signs of regulatory capture 
through the autonomous study of each one of the dyadic presentations, and the 
subsequent impact of their interaction on the de facto independence of the Greek 
human rights regulators from public administration. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and contribution 
 
The study of interactions among actors in delegatory, hierarchical, and accountability 
relationships, and their relevance for organisations and institutions are central in 
rational choice approaches in political science and economics. Neo-institutional 
economics focus on the constraints posed by institutions on the preferences and 
decisions of individuals. The principal-agent branch of neo-institutional economics, or 
agency theory, integrates aspects of the property rights theory and transaction costs 
theory, and uses them in order to construct principal-agent relationships (Groenendijk, 
1997). The basic assumption of the standard principal-agent model lies in the concepts 
of information asymmetry and goal conflict: agents have informational advantages 
over their principals (information asymmetry), whereas agents’ and principals’ 
interests diverge (goal conflict). Principals counterbalance agency losses (agents’ 
shirking) by imposing ex ante and ex post controls.  
 
Mitnick (as cited in Moe 1984; Waterman and Meier, 1998) was the first to apply 
organisational economics to public bureaucracy, and introduced the principal-agent 
model for the study of the relationship between agents in the regulatory bureaucracy 
and their political principals. Since then relevant studies have greatly expanded and 
empirical evidence has shed more light on bureaucratic politics (as cited in Waterman, 
Rouse, Wright, 1998). Moe (1984) created a chain of principal-agent relationships in 
democratic politics, and argued that:  
 
Democratic politics is easily viewed in principal-agent terms.  Citizens 
are principals, politicians are their agents. Politicians are principals, 
bureaucrats are their agents. Bureaucratic superiors are principals, 
bureaucratic subordinates are their agents. The whole of politics is 
therefore structured by a chain of principal-agent relationships, from 
citizen to politician to bureaucratic superior to bureaucratic subordinate 
and on down the hierarchy of government to the lowest-level 
bureaucrats who actually deliver services directly to citizens. Aside 
from the ultimate agent, each actor in the hierarchy occupies a dual 
role in which he serves both as principal and as agent. The formal 
apparatus and deductive power of the principal-agent model are 
applicable to each of these hierarchical stages of government, and 
might usefully be employed in investigating even the most basic 
questions of democratic control and performance.   
 
 
We apply a new version of Moe’s schema to our study on regulation inside 
government. Moe’s chain of principal-agent relationships will be altered in three 
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respects: first, politicians and regulators develop a delegatory relationship instead of a 
hierarchical one; second, we insert the external at arm’s-length relationship where 
regulators become at arm’s-length principals of the political decision-makers who, in 
turn, are the regulatees representing public administration (political decision-makers 
act simultaneously in reversed roles); third, we introduce the external accountability 
relationship, where citizens, as principals, control regulators-agents in terms of their 
members’ personal legal responsibility, namely, the presence or absence of immunity 
provisions in the discharge of their duties.  
 
Moreover, four points should be clarified. First, we examine principal-agent 
relationships in dyadic presentations despite the fact that we fully acknowledge the 
existence of multiple principals. The inclusion of the multiple principals’ version does 
not serve our purpose. Second, principals and agents are conceived of as single 
unitary actors, and not as individuals in legislatures or bureaucracies with a variety of 
personal interests and preferences. Third, we adopt Waterman’s and Meier’s (1998) 
proposal on an alternative principal-agent model that is dynamic. In their paradigm, 
they argue that “information and goal conflict are not constants, but rather 
continuous variables in a bureaucratic model”. In other words, they identify multiple 
combinations between information and goal conflict. The dyad information 
asymmetry and goal conflict is not the only possible combination in relationships, and 
we should “see information and goal conflict/consensus as operating on a continuum” 
(Waterman and Meier, 1998). Fourth, in delegatory relationships, Majone (2001) 
argues that the principal-agent model does not apply in cases when full delegation of 
powers is transferred to an agent-trustee. Despite the fact that delegation in regulatory 
agencies is linked to the concept of independence, central banks seem most likely to 
support the assumption of the trustee relationship. The credibility of policy 
commitment is strong in monetary policy. Therefore, regulatory agencies in our 
paradigm should be conceived of as agents since they lack a full transfer of political 
property rights, and thus exercise implementing powers rather than initiative powers 
such as legislative ones.  
 
Within this context, four principal-agent dyads are constructed: 
 
i) The delegatory relationship:  
The political decision-makers (principals) and the members of the constitutional 
independent authorities (agents),  
ii) The internal hierarchical relationship: 
The members of the constitutional independent authorities (bureaucratic superiors-
principals) and their personnel (bureaucratic subordinates-agents),  
iii) The external-at arm’s-length relationship: 
The independent authorities-principals and public administration (agents-regulatees), 
iv) The external accountability relationship: 
The citizens as external principals and the constitutional independent authorities as 
their agents 
 
Therefore, Moe’s schema on the chain of principal-agent relationships in democratic 
politics served as a model for the construction of an analogous chain in regulation 
inside government. The four principal-agent dyadic presentations, as a theoretical 
construction, unravel and frame the intra- and inter-relationships among actors in 
regulation inside government. Thus, each dyad autonomously and in its interaction 
 15
with the others constitutes a control mechanism that enables us to assess qualitatively 
the de facto independence of IRAs from public administration.  
 
The adaption of Moe’s schema based on principal-agent relationships served as a 
theoretical vehicle that facilitated the imaging of the actors’ selection mechanisms, 
identification, involvement in public life, responsibility, and interaction within the 
system of regulation inside government. Yet empirical evidence led the way in the 
sense that it was first located, elaborated, and assessed, and then it was embedded into 
a theoretical construct. Taleb (2009) in his foreword on Pablo Triana’s book 
“Lecturing birds on flying” states on the relationship between theory and practice: 
 
The biggest myth I encountered in my life is as follows: that the road 
from practical know-how to theoretical knowledge is reversible – in 
other words, that theoretical knowledge can lead to practical 
applications, just as practical applications can lead to theoretical 
knowledge . . .  
 
Yet the strange thing is that it is very hard to realize that knowledge 
cannot travel equally in both directions. It flows better from practice to 
theory – but to understand it you have to have theoretical knowledge. 
And people who have nontheoretical knowledge don’t think of these 
things.  
 
Indeed if knowledge flowed equally in both directions, the theory 
without experience should be equivalent to experience without theory – 
which is not the case . . . 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Contrary to economists or political scientists applying sophisticated methods in 
agency theory, we were oriented towards the study, analysis, and application of the 
institutional design in the four principal-agent dyads, as reflected in the legal 
framework on the one hand, and the use of raw, qualitative data derived from the 
minutes of Parliament, the Government Gazette, jurisprudence, annual reports, 
agencies’ websites, legal opinions, and texts issued by international organisations on 
the other. The selection of these not trendy methodological tools applied in our 
research brings back to the discussion the debate over the legitimacy for scholarship. 
Moynihan states (2009) on the issue: 
 
For scholarship, it is also unlikely that the legitimacy of public 
administration can be built on a legal perspective. . . 
 
In contemporary times, scholarly legitimacy is also tied to the 
standards of social science. Critics of public administration have 
argued that it has failed to offer strong theories and methodologically 
defensible research (e.g., Lynn 1982; Moe 1994). A common 
recommendation is to adopt methods and theories derived from 
economics. While some have criticized this trend, the field as a whole 
has been unable to ignore it. The creation of newer public affairs 
schools was partly the result of the perception that traditional public 
administration programs were characterized by “insufficient rigor 
and an affinity for institutional description rather than analysis of 
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choice and action” (Lynn 2001, 146). These schools defined scholarly 
ideals (if not always practice) in terms of social science standards. 
Similar to traditional public administration, legal scholarship has been 
criticized as lacking rigor. As long as administrative scholarship is 
defined by the standards of social science, it is the normative and 
methodological framework of economics, and not law, that will form 
the ideal for intellectual training. The content of PhD training in top 
public affairs programs reflects this fact.  
 
Indeed, in recent years social scientists seem to have been suffering from a syndrome, 
probably attributable to an unjustifiable inferiority complex, urging them to imitate 
methods applied in science. Plurality in research methods is desirable. However, there 
are limitations since it seems hard to model human action. Taleb (2009) states on the 
issue:  
 
Economics, of course, is not physics. For one very simple, yet 
inevitably powerful reason: In one case the laws are immutably God-
made and thus permanently exact (all one has to do is go find them 
and, with luck, express their structure down on paper) in the other, the 
rules are dictated not by God, but by his creatures, as humble humans. 
 
Therefore, social scientists should accept the fact that they observe phenomena of a 
world created by humans, namely, a world that is inevitably, and constantly under 
change. Taking these into consideration, the dissertation mixes old-fashioned, 
conventional methodological tools with a theory derived from economics. A pure 
qualitative analysis is the method applied, whereas case study corresponds to the 
research strategy. Van Maanen (1999) argues that there is no clear definition and no 
universal agreement on what a case study is. His perception of the concept refers to 
“in-depth investigations of some particular social setting with a focus on the events 
that occur in and over time in that arena . . .Case studies are in short close readings –
put in writing- of certain, tightly located social settings and mix descriptive 
(representational) and analytic (interpretive) elements into the stories told . . . 
Generally speaking, they contrast most starkly with the ahistorical and non-event 
framework associated with most forms of variable analysis”. According to Yin 
(1981b), case study is a research strategy that parallels the work of a detective whose 
concern revolves around building inferences about what has happened, why and in 
what circumstances. Case studies can involve i) either single or multiple cases, ii) the 
collection and analysis of many sources of information (archives, interviews, 
questionnaires etc), iii) multiple levels of analysis. Regarding the accomplishment of 
various aims, they may provide description, test theory or generate theory. 
 
In our research we have selected four cases of regulators inside government fulfilling 
Hood’s criteria. The research is based on the qualitative data mentioned earlier. 
However, sources of information, such as interviews or questionnaires, were excluded 
from the toolkit of empirical evidence. In our view, they give an indirect and 
subjective glimpse of reality. Gillham (2000) states in relation to interviews:  
 
A common discrepancy is between what people say about themselves 
and what they actually do. In an interview people can be very 
convincing because they are sincere. But as G. K. Chesterton observed 
in the “Return of Don Quixote” “people are never more mistaken about 
themselves than when they are speaking sincerely and from the heart”. 
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They’re not lying, they’re just not accurate. In a sense they don’t know 
themselves. So if teachers in a school express a high level of 
satisfaction in their job, you need to check whether staff turnover, and 
staff absences corroborate that what you’re dealing with here are two 
things that are quite different: what people believe (and it is a fact that 
they believe what they’re saying) and what they actually do. To expect 
them to be the same is to misunderstand how people function. 
 
On the contrary the selected categories of qualitative data offer a high degree of 
credibility since they are inherently objective. We could argue that they are valid and 
solid, albeit they do not dispose of the accuracy of numbers. The role of the 
institutional design, that is, law as a legal framework, is also crucial since its validity 
is tested through its compatibility with the constitution, administrative law, 
jurisprudence and legal theory. In other words, formulating laws presupposes the 
respect of these compatibilities against which the law is finally tested. As Woodrow 
Wilson (1887) famously proclaimed “It is getting harder to run a constitution than to 
frame one”. Therefore, the adoption of distorted clauses might be considered as a 
signal of legislative manipulation. Moreover, the legal framework is assessed through 
cross-national comparative research. Thus, law becomes a means to assess and 
interpret reality, a complementary tool in political science. 
 
According to Yin (as cited in Thomas, Nelson, Silverman 2005), analysis of case 
study data seems the least developed and codified part of this research strategy. Our 
analysis is two-level. First, we proceed to a diachronic, within-case analysis involving 
description which is crucial for the generation of insight. Second, within-case analysis 
is complemented by cross-case analysis. The tactic to be followed is to trace within-
group similarities coupled with intergroup differences (Eisenhardt, 1999). The chain 
of principal-agent relationships in regulation inside government is unfolded using 
what Yin calls a chain of evidence where “all of this evidence needs to be woven into 
a narrative account . . . i.e., each key element or link in your account supported by or 
related to evidence of different kinds” (Gillham, 2000). Finally, qualitative analysis 
based upon description and interpretation provides a straightforward approach to 
reality since in Yin’s view (2003) the scope of the case study is defined as “an 
empirical inquiry that (1) investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when, (2) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident”.  
 
4. The argument of the dissertation 
 
Contrary to economic or social regulation, the implementation of the principal-agent 
model in regulation inside government reflects two sides of the same coin: principals 
in the delegatory dyad, namely political decision-makers, are simultaneously agents in 
the external at arm’s-length relationship. Therefore, the independent authorities in 
regulation inside government cannot be conceived of as intermediary organizations 
(Braun, 1993) between two different external actors since we simply notice one 
protagonist keeping a double role at the same time.  Indeed, this simultaneous double 
role of the political decision-makers in regulation inside government puts enormous 
pressure on regulators that find themselves in the middle of a linear and simultaneous 
double relationship with the same actor, that is, political decision-makers as principals 
(legislators, government) and agent (political supervisors of the bureaucracies). 
Empirical research on economic regulation where actors’ relationships are more 
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complex since regulatees come from the private sector has proved that “formal 
independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to explain variations in 
the de facto independence of agencies” (Maggetti, 2007, 2009). In such relationships 
formal independence seems irrelevant.  
 
In regulation inside government, the rules of the game, that is, the institutional design 
of the independent authorities is formulated by the political decision-makers, and this, 
in turn, will affect them in their role as agents at the other end of their relationship 
with their principals-regulators. In other words, state interests become the field of 
regulation. This particularity of the PA model in regulation inside government 
motivated us to further investigate and re-interpret certain aspects of the formal 
independence of the independent authorities from the political decision-makers since 
they seem to have a decisive impact on the regulators’ de facto independence from 
public administration. In other words, our intention was to challenge theoretically and 
empirically prevailing views regarding some aspects of the formal independence of 
the independent authorities. The qualitative approach was facilitated by the small 
number of cases, the high degree of credibility of the data, and the familiarity with the 
politico-administrative framework of the country. More specifically, the selection of 
the members of the IAs by the Conference of the Presidents of the Greek Parliament, 
the selection of the personnel by the independent authorities (IAs), and immunity 
provisions enjoyed by the members of the IAs, as aspects of high formal 
independence from political decision-makers, are questioned. Therefore, we further 
investigated and assessed their repercussions on the de facto independence of the IAs 
with respect to the actors’ preferences and choices in the performance of their 
regulatory functions. These three aspects equally correspond to the first, second and 
fourth dyadic presentations of the chain of the principal-agent relationships in 
regulation inside government. 
 
The inspiration for the research is based upon the U.S. literature on bureaucratic 
politics and the main assumption of agency theory that “political control is possible 
because elected institutions create bureaucracies” (Wood and Waterman, 1991). 
Indeed, the institutional design (i.e., the above mentioned aspects of formal 
independence) may facilitate the control of the so-called depoliticised independent 
agencies. This, in turn, impacts on the quality of the agencies’ regulatory action –
inertia included- and affects the degree of their de facto independence from public 
administration. Discussions in Greek parliament regarding IAs reveal a rather 
reserved stance towards these agencies, and this might better explain the inclination to 
control them through the appropriate legal framework.  
 
Indeed, the theoretical discussion of the first dyad on the members’ selection 
mechanisms leads to the conclusion that the final appointments clause could be 
considered as flawed in terms of constitutionality and transparency. The Conference 
of the Presidents, a small in number legislative organ constituted by the MPs of the 
political parties represented in parliament, that is, the political system in its entirety, 
assumes a peculiar form of collective responsibility in democracy in relation to the 
selection of the members of the IAs. The deadlocks of the parliamentary review of the 
IAs and the precondition for almost unanimous decisions for the members’ selection 
seem to create a tautological and autistic mechanism in the delegatory relationship 
with inevitable repercussions to the other dyads.  On the other hand, the empirical part 
of the delegatory relationship regarding the identification of the finally appointed 
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members reveals signs of informal party representativeness in the composition of the 
IAs. This finding confirms that “most governments are reluctant to admit patronage 
practices due to the negative connotation the notion of partitocracy has in public 
opinion” (Kopecky and Scherlis, 2008). However, in our case, it is not governments 
but the whole political system participating in patronage practices. But even if we 
accept the widespread view that the members of the IAs do not represent their 
respective parties, or even if there is no evidence of party affiliation, most of them 
have broad and intense involvement in public life.  
 
The institutional design of the selection mechanisms in the internal hierarchical 
relationship contains signs of bureaucratic clientelism either in terms of flawed 
clauses or close relational distance from public administration. Furthermore, flawed 
selection clauses permit to test the legality of the members’ administrative action. On 
the other hand, the selection procedures in cases of direct hiring of the personnel of 
the IAs are not systematized compared to the ones provided for in the general 
recruitment system in the public sector. The significant number of negation of 
appointments and resignations on the part of the scientific personnel for other 
positions in the public sector probably prove that the independent authorities are not 
highly esteemed. The paradigms of regulatory failure in the external at arm’s length 
relationship are indicative of the regulators’ behaviour that gives the impression of not 
exceeding the limits of what would be acceptable by the regulatees, namely public 
administration-political decision-makers.  
 
The external accountability relationship challenges the widespread view that 
immunity provisions enjoyed by the members of the IAs enhance their independence 
from political decision-makers, and ultimately public administration. We approached 
the issue from a different perspective. The fourth dyad, that is, citizens-independent 
authorities, is based upon the idea of connecting regulation inside government and 
human rights. The topic is original since, for the first time in regulatory literature, it 
discusses the impact of the violation of the right of access to court under article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights on the independence of these authorities 
from public administration.  
 
5. The structure of the dissertation 
 
Each chapter is linked to one dyadic presentation. A brief analysis of the content of 
each dyad is presented hereafter.  
 
i) The first dyadic presentation: the delegatory relationship 
 
Two chapters are dedicated to this dyadic presentation. The first chapter presents the 
formal institutional mechanisms established by the principals-political decision-
makers in order to reduce agency losses. These are ex ante controls that safeguard 
against adverse selection and moral hazard. Kaare Strom (2000) describes these 
concepts and their implications as follows:  
 
Agency problems are likely to be exacerbated under hidden 
information (principals do not fully know the competences or 
preferences of their agents or the exact demands of the task at hand) or 
hidden action (principals cannot fully observe  
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the actions of their agents). The former of these parameters can give 
rise to problems of adverse selection, the latter to moral hazard. The 
former of these problems may lead principals to systematically select 
the “wrong” agents, agents that do not have the most appropriate skills 
or preferences. The problem of moral hazard, on the other hand, arises 
when agents, once selected have incentives and opportunity to take 
unobservable action that is contrary to the interests of the principal.  
 
These ex ante controls correspond to the selection mechanisms that are devised before 
regulatory action takes place. The relevance of the delegatory dyad might be crucial 
to the operation of the chain of principal-agent relationships in regulatory politics 
inside government. It represents the starting point that defines the interactions with 
the other dyads. Under certain circumstances, it may lead to the domino principle 
situation, that is, regulatory failure. Therefore, the institutional design regarding the 
appointments clauses of the members of the constitutional independent authorities is 
presented and analysed in a diachronic perspective. The qualitative assessment of the 
institutional design attempts to test its constitutionality and transparency, and their 
impact on the de facto independence of the independent authorities from public 
administration. 
 
The second chapter corresponds to the empirical part of the delegatory relationship, 
that is, the identification and profile of the members-agents of the four independent 
constitutional authorities finally selected and appointed by the principals-political 
decision-makers. The chapter is divided into two units. The first unit presents the 
institutional design and its implementation in relation to the members’ professional 
status, relational distance from public administration, length of tenure, 
reappointments, and functional accumulation status accompanied by the relevant 
empirical data in a diachronic perspective. The issue of the members’ resignations is 
also presented and discussed based on empirical evidence. The tactics followed by the 
political decision-makers regarding the members’ replacements and reappointments 
in terms of institutional design and its application might also be part of the political 
decision-makers’ control mechanisms over the authorities.   
 
The second unit images the members’ overall involvement in public life through the 
construction of an involvement in public life index containing their career paths in the 
public sector. A second index focuses on the evolution of their career paths in the 
public sector in a diachronic perspective, that is, before, during, and after their term of 
office on the independent authorities. Furthermore, both indexes serve as a tool to 
examine the broadness and intensity of the members’ involvement in public life, and 
locate cases of functional accumulation. The purpose of the unit is to explore the 
appointees’ profiles and career paths in the public sector, and therefore test their 
degree of involvement in public life. Thus, a high degree of involvement in public life 
could inevitably be a sign of low degree of independence from the political decision-
makers and public administration. 
 
ii) The second dyadic presentation: the internal hierarchical relationship 
 
The third chapter is divided into two units. The first unit examines in a diachronic 
perspective the ex ante controls applied by the political decision-makers in relation to 
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the recruitment strategies for the selection of the administrative and scientific 
personnel of the independent authorities, that is, transfers, secondments and direct 
hirings. Furthermore, the institutional design of the appointments clauses is 
qualitatively assessed through a test of its compatibility with the constitution, 
administrative law, and jurisprudence. Cases of distortions in the recruitment clauses 
could be interpreted as legislative manipulation. In other words, a distorted 
institutional design drafted by the political decision-makers serves as an ex ante 
control of the personnel of the authorities, thus diminishing their de facto 
independence from public administration. Under such circumstances, the burden of its 
application falls on the members of the authorities.  
 
The second unit comprises the presentation of the empirical data regarding the 
personnel’s profiles in relation to the following aspects: level of education, 
specialization, grades, agencies of provenance in the case of transfers and 
secondments, previous appointments in the public sector, gender distribution, in-
service mobility, resignations or revocation of appointments, new appointments, 
secondments and transfers in the public sector, involvement in public life and 
functional accumulation. Furthermore, two indexes were constructed for the scientific 
personnel following the members’ paradigm, that is, i) an involvement in public life 
index, and ii) a time-dimension involvement in public life index. They serve as source 
of information in order to detect the scientific personnel’s involvement in public life, 
and locate their career paths through time, namely, before their appointment, while in 
service, and after their resignation or revocation of their appointment, if such cases 
exist. In cases of direct hiring, the public announcements published in the government 
gazette or those still available on the internet permit us approach the credibility and 
impartiality of the autonomous selection system through the assessment of the 
selection criteria, and the application of grading systems for the evaluation and 
classification of the candidates.  
 
iii) The third dyadic presentation: the external at arm’s-length relationship 
 
The external at arm’s-length relationship seeks to identify cases of regulatory failure, 
a term we use to define the management of cases by the regulator in a way that 
safeguards the regulatee’s interests, thus failing to serve the public interest. This, in 
turn, could finally be the result of regulatory capture, thus implying a straightforward 
collusion between regulator and regulatee, the latter in the double role of public 
administration-political decision-makers. Different approaches and tools were applied 
for each independent constitutional authority in order to highlight indicative instances 
of regulatory failure.  
 
In the case of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, a simulative control 
of the constitutionality of laws relating to the regulatory field of the authority serves 
as a tool to assess the members’ own initiative omissions. In the case of the Greek 
Ombudsman, regulatory failure is tested indirectly through the assessment of the 
exhaustion of its statutory powers of a deterrent character and in relation to high 
levels of corruption in the country. Two case studies of regulatory failure attempt to 
present how the Greek Ombudsman approaches and fulfills his institutional role. In 
the case of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, the Decision 27/2007, which 
prevented the uploading of the university professors’ selection minutes in the internet, 
apart from their publication in a freely accessed special volume explicitly provided for 
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in the law 2083/1992, was selected as a characteristic paradigm of regulatory capture, 
that is, a probable collusion between regulator and regulatee. In the case of the 
Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy, the research simply 
failed to detect incidents of regulatory failure as the regulatory action remains 
incomplete in two respects. First, the authority ex ante fails to audit its main public 
sector regulatee, that is, the National Intelligence Service. Second, a flawed clause 
deprives the authority of having recourse to legal remedies in the exercise of the 
control of the legality of the rulings and ordinances relating to the terms and 
conditions of the procedure for the waiver of the confidentiality of communications. 
 
iv) The fourth dyadic presentation: the external accountability relationship 
 
The external accountability relationship between citizens-principals and regulators-
agents is inspired by Dieter Kerwer’s principal-agent model applied in the concept of 
the external accountability in global regulation (2005). Internal accountability 
relationships are developed between actors when principals delegate powers and 
resources to agents (e.g., parliamentary review) or in hierarchical relationships (within 
an organization). In external accountability relationships an actor becomes a 
stakeholder when choices of another actor affect him in the sense that these choices 
are rules with a coercive character. As a result, legality matters arise. Thus, 
stakeholders-agents inevitably become principals and seek ways to impose sanctions 
to their agents. The judicial review of the decisions of the agencies is one aspect of 
external accountability. The legal responsibility of bureaucrats is another. Yet, 
immunity arrangements for the members of the five constitutional independent 
authorities in Greece create a human rights paradox and violate the right of access to 
court under article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
Our analysis proceeds as follows: First, we present the legal framework regarding the 
legal responsibility of civil servants in Greece and relevant jurisprudence of the 
Council of State. Then, we comment on the introduction of immunity provisions for 
the high-ranking public functionaries of the five constitutionally consolidated 
independent administrative authorities, and on the relevant discussions in parliament. 
Next, a brief history is presented of the evolution of the ombudsman and the main 
immunity regimes in the institution since it appears that the French version served as a 
model for the Greek Ombudsman and became the justificatory basis for the extension 
of immunity provisions to the other authorities in Greece. A fourth step concerns a 
discussion on the sources of inspiration for the immunity regime in the institution of 
the ombudsman, that is, parliamentary immunity, immunity enjoyed by the officials of 
international organisations, theoretical approaches, and legal opinions. Then, we 
propose a typology of immunity in the institution of the ombudsman derived from the 
study of relevant provisions in the legislation of Council of Europe member states. 
Finally, we assess whether the regulatory agency of these authorities justifies the 
measure, on the one hand, and we discuss the relationship between expertise and legal 
responsibility, on the other. We conclude that the extension of immunity provisions 
beyond “the degree necessary for a democratic society”9 traumatizes the polity and 
                                                 
9 The part of the sentence in quotation marks is a citation from Principle 6 of Resolution (97)24 of the Council of 
Europe Committee of Ministers on the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight Against Corruption: ‘to limit 
immunity from investigation, prosecution or adjudication of corruption offences to the degree necessary in a 
democratic society”. Available at: 
http://www.anticorruzione.it/Portals/altocommissario/Documents/Atti%20internazionali/risoluzione%20(97)%202
4%20COE.pdf, date of access: 06.01.2010. 
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citizens’ trust in government. In the Greek case, immunity provisions for the members 
of the five constitutionally consolidated independent administrative authorities restrict 
the de facto independence of these agencies from public administration through the 
violation of the citizens’ human rights. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Delegatory Relationship:  
The Political Decision-Makers  
and the Members of the Constitutional Independent Authorities  
  
A qualitative, diachronic assessment of the institutional design of the 
appointments clauses of the members  
of the Greek constitutional independent authorities: 
                             A test of constitutionality and transparency 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The diachronic presentation and the subsequent qualitative assessment of the 
institutional design of the selection mechanisms for the appointment of the members 
of the constitutional independent authorities10, both before and after their 
constitutional consolidation in 2001, pertains to the first principal-agent dyad, namely, 
the delegatory relationship. The qualitative assessment of the institutional design 
presupposes that two research procedures have to be fulfilled:  first, a test of the 
constitutionality of the clauses, and second, a test of their transparency. The 
methodology to be implemented for these tests is two-fold.  The first stage, which 
serves as the fundamental source for the analysis, consists of the selection of the 
relevant appointments clauses, as prescribed in national legislation as well as 
legislation of Council of Europe member states, minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, 
jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State and the United States Supreme Court, the 
European Court of Justice, recommendations of the Council of Europe, and theory. 
The second stage comprises the elaboration of the raw data of the first stage in a 
sophisticated manner. First, we approach the issue of the test of constitutionality 
through the lenses of a scholarly critic inspired by a court simulation. The contrasting 
methods of formalism11 and functionalism12 applied by judges as means to approach 
                                                 
10 Our research studies the selection mechanisms of the following constitutionally consolidated Greek 
independent authorities: the National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV), the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel, the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, the Greek Ombudsman, 
and the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy. The National Council for Radio 
and Television will not be included in our study since the regulation of the private radio and television -
due to their predominant position and influence- rather than that of the public broadcasting seems to be 
more crucial in the evaluation of the authority’s relationship and degree of independence from the 
private broadcasting industry. Nevertheless, the appointments clauses of the NCRTV, the first greek 
independent authority established in 1989, served as a model of inspiration for the formulation of the 
relevant clauses in the other authorities. Moreover, the argumentation of a number of MPs who 
supported certain selection mechanisms was based on appointment practices previously implemented in 
the case of the NCRTV. Finally, there will be no analysis of the appointments clause of the members of 
the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy since the agency was established in 
2003, that is, after the constitutional revision of 2001. Consequently, the appointment provision 101A, 
par. 2, as provided for by the revised constitution of 2001, also applies in the case of the Hellenic 
Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy. 
11 Formalism is a "theory that law is a set of rules and principles independent of other political and 
social institutions” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1999). The defenders of legal formalism argue that 
judges and other public officials in their interpretation of legal texts should be guided by what the law 
does say rather than by what the law should be. Otherwise, there would be a violation of the separation 
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separation of powers problems are equally used as the appropriate yardstick for the 
test of constitutionality through comment and interpretation of the discussions in 
Parliament, and the variations of the appointments clauses. In other words, 
discussions13 (preliminary stage) and clauses14 (final stage) of the selection 
mechanism for each authority are considered as separate cases where formalist and 
functionalist argumentation in relation to the separation of powers principle is 
contrasted.  Second, the test of transparency is assessed in two ways: first, through the 
conformation or non conformation of the appointments clauses to relevant 
transparency recommendations issued by the Council of Europe; second, through a 
short comparative analysis regarding relevant selection mechanisms15 in the other 
Council of Europe member states. We should clarify that the test of transparency is 
implemented in the final convergent appointments clause as provided for in the 
revised constitution of 2001. This unit is structured as follows: first, we present, for 
each authority, the final appointments clause as prescribed in legislation; second, we 
cite discussions in parliament based on the relevant minutes; and third, we comment 
on the MPs’ argumentation and analyze those issues that demand further clarification. 
Fourth, we test the constitutionality of the appointments clauses through the formalist 
and functionalist approaches with respect to the issue of the separation of powers.  
 
The purpose of this section is to explore and interpret the first part of the chain of 
principal-agent relationships in regulation inside government, namely, the delegatory 
relationship. The conclusions regarding the tests of the diptych constitutionality-
transparency may further serve as points of reference for the evaluation of their 
impact on the de facto independence of the authorities from public administration. 
The final assessment of the degree of influence of the delegatory relationship on the 
degree of the de facto independence of the authorities from public administration will 
be complemented by the empirical data regarding the members’ professional 
background, possible party affiliations, provenance (public or private sector-relational 
                                                                                                                                            
of powers. Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court, a fervent defender of formalism, 
which actually is a synonym of textualism, argued in A Matter of Interpretation that:  “Of all the 
criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is formalist. The answer to that is, of 
course it's formalist! The rule of law is about form . . . A murderer has been caught with blood on his 
hands, bending over the body of his victim; a neighbour with a video camera has filmed the crime and 
the murderer has confessed in writing and on videotape. We nonetheless insist that before the state can 
punish this miscreant, it must conduct a full-dress criminal trial that results in a verdict of guilty. Is 
that not formalism? Long live formalism! It is what makes us a government of laws and not of men” 
(Scalia, 1997). 
12 Legal functionalism or legal realism is contrasted to legal formalism in the sense that realists 
“instead of the generation of legal entitlements from the germ of a legal idea or concept, they proposed 
a pragmatic, empirically grounded analysis of the relationship between legal rules and the social 
world in which they operated and which they helped to construct and a frank balancing of the rights 
and interests at stake in the choices on offer . . . Functionalism began as an antidote to a conceptualism 
that attempted to divorce legal reasoning from context in adjudication”. (Rittich, 2005).  In other 
words, the defenders of functionalism argue that legal texts should be interpreted in a creative manner 
that ensures the promotion of good public policy and social interests.  
13 See Appendix 2 for abstracts from discussions in Parliament on the appointments clauses of the 
members of the constitutional independent authorities. 
14 See Appendix 3 for the full texts of the appointments clauses. 
15 We selected and codified appointments clauses of the heads and members of the management boards 
of i) the national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field, ii) the national regulatory authorities 
for the protection of personal data, and iii) the national offices of Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen 
in Council of Europe member states (see Appendices 4, 5 and 6). 
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distance), and frequency of appointments in various governmental committees or 
boards in the public sector, or consultancy positions in government.   
 
An explanatory text on the formalist-functionalist approaches applied by the judges of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in the separation of powers problems as those raised by 
relevant appointments clauses in independent agencies is presented in Appendix 1. 
We considered that it would be impossible for the reader to follow the test of 
constitutionality without prior reference to the issue. Furthermore, the issue of the 
separation of powers is inevitably linked to the perennial theoretical confusion over 
whether independent agencies are part of the executive branch of government or they 
should be considered a fourth branch of government. Nevertheless, some scholars in 
the U.S. argue that such a dilemma is irrelevant since there should be a shift from 
considerations of locating independent agencies in government to concerns over 
understanding agency structure in checks and balances terms (Strauss, 1984). 
Therefore, we will briefly present the evolution of the formulation of the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court on the issue, the trend towards a unitary 
administration in the U.S. since the advent of the Reagan Administration, and relevant 
theoretical approaches of scholars in the U.S and in Greece. The heretic opinion of the 
Advocate General Mazak on the independent authorities’ place in government in 
Case-518/07 of the European Court of Justice, which was rejected in the final 
judgement of the Court16, is also taken into consideration. On the other hand, 
functionalism, as reflected in commitments to International Governmental 
Organisations regarding a series of appointments clauses relating to human rights 
regulators, seems to strengthen and legitimize the views of the Greek scholars. 
Nevertheless, contrary to these functionalist approaches and applications, the 
presentation of the case of Rhode Island that restored the checks and balances 
tradition in appointments proves the strong commitment of the U.S. to its own 
separation of powers orthodoxy even at State level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of March 9, 2010, Case C-518/07, European Commission 
(supported by the European Data Protection Supervisor) v. Federal Republic of Germany. 
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2. Appointments Clauses in the independent agencies: Theoretical approaches, 
policies, and jurisprudence 
 
i. The United States Supreme Court: Formalism v. Functionalism in the concept of the 
separation of powers  
 
The modes of argumentation deployed in the constitutional decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in a diachronic perspective are, in practice, an alternation of 
formalist and functionalist approaches depending on the outcomes that each time had 
to be achieved (Rittich, 2005). These contrasting methods become the basic 
mechanism used by judges of the Supreme Court when problems of separation of 
powers emerge. More specifically, institutional innovations, namely, the creation of 
innovative structures in government, through Congress legislation, raise concerns over 
the principle of the separation of powers. The text of the Constitution explicitly names 
and ascribes functions at the apex of the governmental structure (Congress, President 
and the Supreme Court), whereas it does not provide for a precise outline of the 
structure at the lower levels of government, that is, agencies. Therefore, judges and 
scholars face the challenge of implementing the appropriate approach in order to give 
an answer to the issue of the constitutionality of an innovative structure.  
 
Formalists, the defenders of the first approach, base their arguments on the 
inescapable constraints that the text and context of the constitution create (for 
example, the Appointments clause, Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses) on the 
one hand, and the clear definition of powers (executive, legislative, judicial) which 
can only be exercised by the President, the Congress, and the judiciary, respectively, 
as prescribed in the Constitution, on the other. Functionalists, the defenders of the 
second approach, argue that the complexity of the issues a modern government has to 
confront, that is, new economic and social realities and technological advancements, 
and their implications for the principle of the separation of powers, could not have 
been anticipated in the text of the Constitution by the time of its elaboration. 
Consequently, they recommend that courts should be more holistic in their approach 
provided that the creation of innovative structures in government guarantees the 
conservation of balance among the branches of government, namely, no branch may 
become too powerful at the expense of the others.   
ii. The inescapable constraints of the constitution:  a formalist approach of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 
The case Buckley v. Valeo17 challenged certain amendments of the Federal Election 
Act promulgated in 197418.  The act created the Federal Election Commission, and a 
                                                 
17 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
18 “In 1974, over the veto of President Gerald R. Ford, the Congress, passed significant amendments to 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, creating the first comprehensive effort by the federal 
government to regulate campaign contributions and spending. . . .” Among other amendments it 
“created and fixed the method of appointing members to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
(formerly 2 U.S.C. §437c(a) (1)(A-C)). A lawsuit was filed in the District Court for the D.C., on 
January 2, 1975, by Senator James L. Buckley of New York, former Senator, 1968 presidential 
candidate Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, and others. The suit was filed against Francis R. Valeo, the 
Secretary of the Senate and ex officio member of the FEC who represented the U.S. Federal 
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separation of powers problem was raised in relation to the appointments clause of the 
members of the Commission19. The Supreme Court had to decide on whether a direct 
legislative appointment of some of the members of the Commission was 
constitutionally permissible or all members should have to be appointed in accordance 
with the Appointments Clause20. The judgement of the Court proved that the checks-
and-balances21 approach prevailed over considerations related to the formal structure 
of the agency in question, that is, “the necessity of maintaining the desired sharing of 
authority among the named actors of the Constitution” (Strauss, 1984). Consequently, 
Buckley rejected an exception to the Appointments Clause22, namely, the 
empowerment of an extra-constitutional procedure legitimated by a functionalist alibi 
for independence. Interestingly enough, the Court, in the analysis of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Government.  The court denied plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs then 
appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The petitioners sought for the district to overturn key provisions of 
the Act, the appointments clause among others”. Source Wikipedia, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buckley_v._Valeo, date of access: 26.09.2010 
19 The appointments clause read as follows: “The body in which this authority is reposed consists of 
eight members. The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives are ex 
officio members of the Commission without the right to vote. Two members are appointed by the 
President pro tempore of the Senate "upon the recommendations of the majority leader of the Senate 
and the minority leader of the Senate." Two more are to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, likewise upon the recommendations of its respective majority and minority leaders. 
The remaining two members are appointed by the President. Each of the six voting members of the 
Commission must be confirmed by the majority of both Houses of Congress, and each of the three 
appointing authorities is forbidden to choose both of their appointees from the same political party”. 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 113 (1976), available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/424/1/case.html, date 
of access: 27.09.2010.  
20 The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article II. par. 2, cl.2  reads as follows: “[The 
President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers 
of the United States whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as 
they think proper in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments”. 
21 “. . .Unless their [officers of the United States] selection is elsewhere provided for, all officers of the 
United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause. Principal Officers are selected by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Inferior officers Congress may allow to be 
appointed by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary. No class or type of 
officer is excluded because of its special functions. The President appoints judicial, as well as 
executive, officers. Neither has it been disputed -- and apparently it is not now disputed -- that the 
Clause controls the appointment of the members of a typical administrative agency even though its 
functions, as this Court recognized in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 295 U. S. 
624 (1935), may be "predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative," rather than executive. The 
Court in that case carefully emphasized that, although the members of such agencies were to be 
independent of the Executive in their day-to-day operations, the Executive was not excluded from 
selecting them. Id. at 295 U. S. 625-626”. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 132-133 (1976), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/424/1/case.html, date of access: 27.09.2010.  
22 In the final formulation of its judgement, the Court concluded “. . .Finally, we hold that most of the 
powers conferred by the Act upon the Federal Election Commission can be exercised only by "Officers 
of the United States," appointed in conformity with Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, and therefore 
cannot be exercised by the Commission as presently constituted”. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 143 
(1976), available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/424/1/case.html, date of access: 27.09.2010. 
 
 29
Commission’s powers, acknowledged that if the Commission were only entrusted 
with powers of an investigative and informative nature, as those powers Congress 
might delegate to one of its own committees, the appointment provisions would have 
been acceptable23. All other functions, rulemaking included, “represent the 
performance of a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law. . 
.and may therefore be exercised only by persons who are “Officers of the United 
States24” (Buckley v. Valeo, 424, U.S. 141,1976). This part of the judgement is 
puzzling. It rather seems to defend a view that a Committee of Congress might exist 
outside the legislature carrying out in practice statutory delegations. Nevertheless, Mr. 
Justice White expressed his dissent25, arguing that the separation of powers principle 
prevented Congress from appointing federal officers, “except for the power of each 
House to appoint its own officers serving in the strictly legislative processes and for 
the confirming power of the Senate alone” (Buckley v. Valeo, 424, U.S. 271-272, 
1976).  
That part of the Court’s judgement which allowed for a direct appointment 
competence of Congress, actually constitutes a partial deviation from the strict and 
absolute interpretation of the Appointments Clause, and probably encouraged 
Congress to vest in itself appointment power for agencies not performing “a 
                                                 
23 “Insofar as the powers confided in the Commission are essentially of an investigative and 
informative nature, falling in the same general category as those powers which Congress might 
delegate to one of its own committees, there can be no question that the Commission as presently 
constituted may exercise them. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881); @ 273 U. S. 175: “A 
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the 
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not 
itself possess the requisite information -- which not infrequently is true -- recourse must be had to 
others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are 
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some 
means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before and when the 
Constitution was framed and adopted. In that period, the power of inquiry -- with enforcing process -- 
was regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate -- 
indeed, was treated as inhering in it”. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 139 (1976), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/424/1/case.html, date of access: 27.09.2010. 
24 In Buckley v. Valeo the Court, for the first time through the appointments clause of the members of 
the FEC, recognised that the Commissioners of independent agencies were “Officers of the United 
States” since they exercised “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States…and must, 
therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by par. 2, cl. 2 of that article [the Appointments 
Clause of the Constitution]”. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 126 (1976), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/424/1/case.html, date of access: 27.09.2010. 
25 “I thus find singularly unpersuasive the proposition that, because the FEC is implementing statutory 
policies with respect to the conduct of elections, which policies Congress has the power to propound, 
its members may be appointed by Congress. One might as well argue that the exclusive and plenary 
power of Congress over interstate commerce authorizes Congress to appoint the members of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and of many other regulatory commissions; that its exclusive power 
to provide for patents and copyrights would permit the administration of the patent laws to be carried 
out by a congressional committee; or that the exclusive power of the Federal Government to establish 
post offices authorizes Congress itself or the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the 
Senate to appoint postmasters and to enforce the postal laws. Congress clearly has the power to create 
federal offices and to define the powers and duties of those offices, Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 
52, 272 U. S. 129 (1926), but no case in this Court even remotely supports the power of Congress to 
appoint an officer of the United States aside from those officers each House is authorized by Art. I to 
appoint to assist in the legislative processes”. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 274-275 (1976), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/424/1/case.html, date of access: 27.09.2010. 
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significant governmental duty”. Thus, the new form of the United States Civil Rights 
Commission, promulgated under the relevant Act of 198326 provided for a direct 
appointment competence of Congress27, whereas the functions of the agency were 
strictly limited to conducting investigations and making reports28. Nevertheless, the 
new arrangement, (irrespective of whether it properly interpreted the Buckley dicta) 
violates the checks and balances principle since “the President and Congress may 
now each select half the membership of the Commission free of any need to secure the 
approval of the other, in other words, has produced a significantly diminished check 
on the outcome as a whole” (Strauss, 1985).  
In Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme Court avoided the formulation of a judgement which 
could have been based on the functionalist grounds that the status of the Federal 
Elections Commission, as an independent agency, operating under the guarantees of 
impartiality and expertise could justify its exemption from the constitutional rule of 
the Appointments Clause. Nevertheless, the Court held constitutional the appointment 
procedure of the FEC in the hypothetical case where the agency would only exercise 
powers of an investigative and informative nature as those assigned to the Committees 
of Congress. The justificatory basis for a hypothesis which came true with the 
appointments clause of the United States Civil Rights Commission was in a sense 
functional. In other words, it disregarded the formalist constraints of the delegatory 
relationship between the principal-Congress and the agent-the United States Civil 
Rights Commission through statutory arrangements on the one hand, and the 
exclusiveness of the constitutional Appointments Clause built upon the principle of 
checks and balances, on the other. 
Interestingly enough, the issue of the possibility and permissibility of a direct role of 
Congress in the appointment of the members of independent agencies, and 
bureaucrats in general, also emerged in theory. McCarty (2004), was inspired by the 
ongoing debates in comparative politics on the separation of powers in presidential 
and parliamentary systems, and thus sought to explore the possible negative impact of 
dual sovereignties over the appointments system in the U.S. More specifically, he 
created a model which observed the interactions of three players - legislature, 
executive and agency- in order to assess how “bureaucratic accountability and 
                                                 
26 The act was actually a compromise legislation that put an end to the intense confrontation between 
President Reagan and Congress due to disagreements upon the removal and appointment of some of the 
members of the Commission. Thus, the institutional design of the clause inevitably circumvented the 
dicta of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 
27  Section 2 (b) of the United States Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983, as amended, reads as 
follows “The Commission shall be composed of eight members . . .(1) 4 members of the Commission 
shall be appointed by the President. "(2) 2 members of the Commission shall be appointed by the 
President pro tempore of the Senate, upon the recommendations of the majority leader and the minority 
leader, and of the members appointed not more than one shall be appointed from the same political 
party. "(3) 2 members of the Commission shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives upon the recommendations of the majority leader and the minority leader, and of the 
members appointed not more than one shall be appointed from the same political party”. Available at: 
http://www.usccr.gov/, date of access: 27.09.2010. 
28 Strauss (1985) notices that: “While investigating and reporting are distinctly auxiliary functions that 
might be performed by any of the three branches in pursuit of its own functions, the Civil Rights 
Commission was to perform them as ends in themselves, carrying out statutory delegations. Inevitably 
the simple fact of such activities and their results can affect the lives of private citizens in important 
ways”.  
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performance can be undermined by dividing power”. Therefore, he argues that the 
theoretical rationale of the checks and balances system where the branches are 
competitive and simultaneously constrained to their legitimate authority, disregards 
considerations of possible conflicting policy goals and preferences between the 
executive and the legislature towards bureaucracies. It is due to the constitutional 
constraints that both branches have failed to achieve coordination of appointments and 
controls of the bureaucracy. In his opinion, appointment, removal and legislative 
powers29 should be centralized “as is the case in many parliamentary systems” in 
order to address bureaucratic inefficiency. On the other hand, he acknowledges the 
constitutional barriers posed by the Appointments Clause and the judicial reluctance 
in Buckley v. Valeo to accept legislative appointment. Consequently, in our view, such 
a scheme for centralisation would require not only the amendment of the Constitution, 
but also would cancel the checks and balances system. Moreover, it is far from clear 
who will finally have the prerogative of the appointments power in the author’s 
opinion. Yet, what is really interesting in the discussion is that he leaves open the 
possibility that the authority might be allocated to Congress. Finally, we should 
emphasize that the issue is not central in his paper since the results from the 
application of his model proved that other counterbalancing factors in presidential 
systems might mitigate the impact of dividing power over bureaucratic performance.  
iii. Independent agencies’ place in government: from the fourth branch back to the 
executive? The swaying jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court in separation of 
powers cases, the emerging presidential dogma for a unitary administration in the 
U.S. and its theoretical legitimisation 
 
Since the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, the first 
independent agency in the U.S., analogous idiosyncratic governmental structures 
created by Congress still lack firm underpinnings in the constitutional text. 
Nevertheless, the theory of expertise, originally formulated by James Landis30 and 
other theorists31 in the thirties, promoted the idea of the New Deal’s innovative organs 
with blended powers based upon the functionalist argumentation for independence, 
thus disregarding the formalist doctrine of the strict separation of powers. In 1935, the 
Supreme Court in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States32 implemented a 
functionalist approach to the principle of the separation of powers since it held that 
the President had no power of removal33 at will over Humphrey, a member of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), due to the distinctive character of the agency 
which performed both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions34. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
29 Congress has the power to allocate resources to bureaucracies through legislative budgetary 
proposals. The President has only veto power over them.  
30 J. Landis, The Administrative Process 111, 1938. 
31 John Willis, (1935), Three Approaches to Administrative Law: the Judicial, the Conceptual, and the 
Functional, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 53-81.  
32 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
33 The U.S. Constitution contains no special clause or reference to the President’s power to remove 
from office. 
34 Excerpt from the Court’s judgement: “2. This construction of the Act is confirmed by a consideration 
of the character of the Commission -- an independent, nonpartisan body of experts, charged with duties 
neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative, and by the 
legislative history of the Act” Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), available at:  
http://supreme.justia.com/us/295/602/case.html, date of access: 30.09.2010.  
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the Court did not overrule its judgement in Myers v. United States35 since it restricted 
the illimitable removal power of the President over purely executive officers. Thus, 
the scope of the President’s illimitable power of removal was linked to the functions 
exercised by the officials at issue, that is, whether they served as officials in executive 
departments or independent agencies. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the 
Congress disposed of the necessary authority when creating such new agencies to  
 
fix the period during which they shall continue in office, and to 
forbid their removal except for cause in the meantime. For it is quite 
evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of 
another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of 
independence against the latter’s will. . . . 
 
In 1958, the Court once more supported the functional distinction, a prerequisite for 
the independent exercise of the officials’ duties from the executive control, in Wiener 
v. United States36, the second presidential removal case since Humphrey’s Executor. 
This relaxed view of the Court towards a strict compartmentalisation of the powers 
was further elaborated by Justice Jackson in Youngstone & Tube Co. v. Sawyer37 since 
“changing times” demanded more functional approaches to the issues at stake38.  
 
Nevertheless, the glorious days of functionalist enthusiasm, both in theory and 
jurisprudence, towards the so-called “fourth branch of government39” came to an end 
                                                 
35 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
36 357 U.S. 349 (1958). The Court stated reaffirming the functional precondition “The most reliable 
factor for drawing an inference regarding the President’s power of removal in our case is the nature of 
the function that Congress vested in the War Claims Commission”. Id. at 353. The Court clearly 
focused on the nature of the function, thus rejecting “the claim that the President could remove a 
member of an adjudicatory body like the War Claims Commission”. Id at 356. Wiener v. United States, 
available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/357/349/case.html, date of access: 01.10.2010.  
37 343 U. S. 640 (1952).   
38 Justice Jackson stated: “The purpose of the Constitution was not only to grant power, but to keep it 
from getting out of hand. However, because the President does not enjoy unmentioned powers does not 
mean that the mentioned ones should be narrowed by a niggardly construction. Some clauses could be 
made almost unworkable, as well as immutable, by refusal to indulge some latitude of interpretation 
for changing times. I have heretofore, and do now, give to the enumerated powers the scope and 
elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications, instead of the rigidity 
dictated by a doctrinaire textualism”. Youngstone & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U. S. 640 (1952), 
available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/343/579/case.html, date of access: 30.09.2010. 
39 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952). Justice JACKSON, J., dissenting: “The 
constitutional independence of the administrative tribunal presupposes that it will perform the function 
of completing unfinished law. The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant 
legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their decisions than by 
those of all the courts, review of administrative decisions apart. They also have begun to have 
important consequences on personal rights. Cf. United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169. They have 
become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal 
theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking. Courts 
have differed in assigning a place to these seemingly necessary bodies in our constitutional system. 
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the 
occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the separation-of-powers scheme of the 
Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying "quasi" is implicit with confession that all recognized 
classifications have broken [343 U.S.470,488] down, and "quasi" is a smooth cover which we draw 
over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed”. Available at:  
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=343&invol=470, date of access: 
24.09.2010 
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in the eighties. Interestingly enough, the emerging theoretical trend, which substituted 
independence for considerations regarding the control of the independent agencies 
through accountability schemes and policy coordination, coincided with the advent of 
the Reagan Administration40. As early as 1979, Bruff proposed that the presidential 
control should be expanded over independent agencies simply because the distinction 
between executive and independent agencies “is belied by practice41”. Therefore, all 
scholars who endorsed similar views based their argumentation for control on the 
substantial commonalities between executive and independent agencies in relation to 
function, internal structure, and procedure. Consequently, it was essential for them to 
deconstruct the myth of radical distinction between agencies since they both “operate 
in a complex field of political forces, including pressures from the President, the 
relevant congressional committees, the regulated industries, and other interest 
groups” (Foote cited in Miller, 1988). Such approaches clearly devaluated and 
doubted the substantial relevance of independence “in light of the important powers 
retained by the President and the executive branch, including powers of appointment, 
budget and litigating authority” (Morrison cited in Miller, 1988).  
 
Stauss (1984) was among the scholars who early supported the theory of shared 
control over independent agencies. He argued that the constitutional lacuna in relation 
to the clear allocation of authority to bureaucracies locate them below the apex of the 
governmental structure which is constitutionally occupied by the Congress, the 
President, and the Supreme Court. He supported that, “the theory of separation-of-
powers breaks down when attempting to locate administrative and regulatory 
agencies within one of the three branches”. Therefore, agencies, either executive or 
independent, simply join judicial, legislative, and executive functions, as prescribed in 
their statutes. Under such arrangements, political accountability, and the principle of 
checks and balances should be guaranteed and respected42.  
Swire (1985) advocated the incorporation of independent agencies into the executive 
branch.  He linked the promotion of agency independence to the rise of functionalism, 
and argued that expertise, the justificatory basis for the special status of independent 
agencies, underwent severe criticism. In his opinion, political critics for regulatory 
capture, reports concluding that the agencies had actually failed to attract expert 
personnel, the lack of impartiality in decision-making even in strictly technical 
matters, and the violation of the principle of the separation of functions within 
agencies led to the demise of the ideals of expertise and independence from political 
control. He supported that the rise of a new formalism in the jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court strengthened tripartitism, namely, “permission for only 
three branches created by the Constitution”. He concluded that the new formalism 
                                                 
40 Foote (1988) claimed that the emergence of fervent criticisms against the independence of agencies 
were a result of the political controversy between the opponents of the independent agencies who were 
affiliated with the Reagan Administration, and the defenders of these hybrid organs who could be 
classified as political liberals.  
41 H. H. Bruff (1979), Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, Yale Law Journal, 88, 451 
42 Strauss stated that: “The remainder of government was left undefined, in the expectation that 
congressional judgements about appropriate structure would serve so long as they observed the two 
prescriptive judgements embodied in the Constitution: that the work of law-administration be under the 
supervision of a unitary, politically accountable chief executive; and that the structures chosen permit, 
even encourage, the continuation of rivalries and tensions among the three named heads of 
government, in order that no one body become irreversibly dominant and thus threaten to deprive the 
people themselves of their voice and control”. 
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could affect the incorporation of the independent agencies into the executive in four 
ways: i) the removal power of the President could be applied to independent agencies; 
ii) the litigating authority43 of the independent agencies could be exclusively assigned 
to the President; iii) the President’s power to issue binding executive orders44 could be 
applied to independent agencies; and iv) the possibility for the legitimate creation of 
purely investigatory agencies outside the executive branch45. 
The new formalism endorsed by the judges of the Supreme Court was clearly 
reflected in Buckley v. Valeo, decided in 1976. In 1983, the Supreme Court in INS v. 
Ghadha46 held unconstitutional the one-house legislative veto47. Once more since 
                                                 
43 In 1977, a study on federal regulation effectuated by the Senate Commission on governmental affairs 
contained a description of the supervision of the Justice Department over independent agency litigation 
(civil lawsuits brought by the agencies in courts). According to the study “Three independent 
regulatory commissions –the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – have complete or near complete 
authority to initiate and conduct lawsuits independent of the Justice Department; five others – the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), 
the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) – have only partial or doubtful authority; and the remaining agencies 
(the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) may not sue in their own name without the approval of the Attorney 
General”. (cited in Swire, 1985). In relation to the litigation autonomy of independent agencies, Devins 
(1994) states that: “. . . Some independent agencies have no litigating authority. Moreover, with only 
three clear exceptions [the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), and the Federal Election Commission (FEC)], Congress has left it to the Solicitor General to 
represent agency interests before the Supreme Court. . . . the current system does allow for a 
reasonable degree of cooperation between independent agencies and the Solicitor General. 
Independent agencies typically have the final say in litigation until a case reaches the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, the Solicitor General usually defends the agency’s position when a case is before the 
Supreme Court. When he does not, the agency is often allowed to present its views through separate 
filings. Indeed, even when the Solicitor General refuses to seek certiorari at an independent agency’s 
behest, the agency will typically have the opportunity to relitigate the issue in another case. In such 
cases, Supreme Court adjudication is merely delayed not foreclosed”. Nevertheless, Swire (1985) 
argues that the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the 
provisions regarding the allocation of litigation authority to independent agencies. The Court stated: “it 
is clear that all such suits, so far as the interests of the United States are concerned, are subject to the 
direction, and within the control of the Attorney General” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 139 (1976) . . . 
“The Commission’s enforcement power, exemplified by its discretionary power to seek judicial relief, is 
authority that cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress. A 
lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the 
Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 138 (1976), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/424/1/case.html, date of access: 02.10.2010. 
44 Presidents Reagan, Carter, and Ford issued executive orders according to which executive agencies 
were bound to submit cost/benefit analysis of their proposed regulations (Swire, 1985). 
45 See supra the judgement of the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo over the permissibility of creating 
agencies which would only exercise powers of an investigative and informative nature as those 
assigned to the Committees of Congress. 
46 The Court had to decide upon the constitutionality of a provision according to which: “Section 
244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) authorizes either House of Congress, by 
resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by 
Congress to the Attorney General, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United 
States”. INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), Syllabus, 
available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/462/919/case.html, date of access: 02.10.2010. 
47 Since 1932, when the first legislative veto provision was enacted in federal legislation, Congress has 
included relevant provisions in more than 200 statutes. The usefulness and constitutionality of the 
arrangement has repeatedly been challenged by legal literature, Congress and Presidential statements. It 
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Buckley the judgement confirmed the Court’s formalist approach to the doctrines of 
the separation of powers, and checks and balances. The Court judged that the 
legislative veto at issue was legislative in nature48, and opined that Congress could not 
statutorily grant to itself a one-House legislative veto, thus violating the procedural 
rules as prescribed in the U.S. Constitution, namely, the bicameralism principle and 
the Presentment Clause49. Moreover, the Court expressly promoted the principle of 
tripartitism50, whereas it avoided the linguistic distinction between executive and 
administrative sorts of agencies. Instead, the term “administrative agency51” was 
systematically used52, thus blurring the boundaries among agencies. As for Congress’s 
pressures for the need to hold independent agencies accountable53, the Court invoked 
two recent cases invalidating legislative vetoes of independent agency action. 
Nevertheless, Justice White, dissenting54, supported that: “It [the legislative veto] is 
                                                                                                                                            
has been defined as “a clause in a statute, which says that a particular executive action will take effect 
only if Congress does not nullify it by resolution within a specified period of time” (Breyer, 1984). 
Congress considered the measure as essential to controlling the executive.  
48 Justice Powell acknowledged the unconstitutionality of the provision despite the fact that he 
approved of its practical necessity. Nevertheless, contrary to the view of the majority, he argued that 
Congress’s action was adjudicative in character, and thus violated the anti-aggrantizement principle.   
49 According to the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3): 
“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it 
become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States . . . Every Order, Resolution, or Vote 
to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a 
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States”. 
50 “The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three 
defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each 
branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure 
inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to 
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted. Although not "hermetically" sealed from one 
another, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U.S. 121, the powers delegated to the three Branches are 
functionally identifiable. When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the 
Constitution has delegated to it. See J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 276 U.S. 
406 (1928). When the Executive acts, he presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity 
as defined in Art. II. And when, as here Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on 
Chadha's deportation -- that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha -- no less than Congress' original 
choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determinations 
of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to 
the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively 
altered or revoked”. INS v. Ghadha 462 U.S. at 954 & 955 (1983), 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/462/919/case.html, date of access :02.10.2010 
51 According to Swire (1985) the term: “Administrative agency” has historically been synonymous with 
“independent agency”. 
52 Contrary to the majority of the Court, Justice White, dissenting, made a clear distinction among 
agencies, and systematically used the terms “executive department” and “independent agency”. 
53 “Indeed it is ironic that Congressional amici attempt to place great significance on the 
Commission’s independence and on the need for having a politically accountable check on the 
agency’s decision. The fundamental justification for making agencies independent is that. . .political 
interference is undesirable” Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F. 2d 425, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
54 “For all these reasons, the apparent sweep of the Court's decision today is regrettable. The Court's 
Art. I analysis appears to invalidate all legislative vetoes, irrespective of form or subject. Because the 
legislative veto is commonly found as a check upon rulemaking by administrative agencies and upon 
broad-based policy decisions of the Executive Branch, it is particularly unfortunate that the Court 
reaches its decision in cases involving the exercise of a veto over deportation decisions regarding 
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an important, if not indispensable, political invention that allows the President and 
Congress to resolve major constitutional and policy differences, assures the 
accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress' control 
over lawmaking. . . In the trade regulation area, the veto preserved congressional 
authority over the Federal Trade Commission's broad mandate to make rules to 
prevent businesses from engaging in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
commerce” (INS v. Ghadha, Page 462 U. S. 972 & 973, (1983). Consequently, the 
Court reached its decision based upon formalist criteria, namely, the constraints of the 
Constitution. Moreover, it rejected any linguistic and substantial distinction between 
executive and independent agencies. 
Morrison v. Olson55, was the third case in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court 
dealing with the scope of the President’s removal power. The Court’s judgement 
could be characterized as a dynamic comeback to functionalism. Nevertheless, it 
would not last. According to the Court, despite the fact that the functions exercised by 
the independent counsel, an office established by the Ethics in Government Act in 
1978,  were executive, the removal power of the President, through the Attorney 
General, was not illimitable. Hence, the distinction between the functions of the 
officials at issue, as defined in Myers and Humphrey’s Executor, was not applicable 
since “the real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that 
they impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the 
functions of the officials in question must be analysed in that light”. In Morrison, the 
Court rather set a common removal power framework between officials of the 
executive branch and those of independent agencies in the sense that Congress may 
statutorily “impose a good cause-type restriction” on the President’s or another 
appointing authority’s56 power to remove (Tatelman, 2010). In other words, the Court 
seemed to accept removal limitations in certain offices of the executive in order to 
guarantee the necessary independence of the officials in the discharge of their duties.  
Nevertheless, the opinion of the Court equally implied that Congress had no such 
discretion in cases where limits on the President’s removal power would be 
constitutionally impermissible.  
                                                                                                                                            
particular individuals. Courts should always be wary of striking statutes as unconstitutional; to strike 
an entire class of statutes based on consideration of a somewhat atypical and more readily indictable 
exemplar of the class is irresponsible. It was for cases such as these that Justice Brandeis wrote: "The 
Court has frequently called attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon 
the validity of an act of Congress. . .” INS v. Ghadha 462 U. S. 974 (1983), 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/462/919/case.html, date of access: 02.10.2010 
55 In the aftermath of the Watergate case, Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act (1978) which 
provided for the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute 
certain high ranking Government officials for violations of federal criminal laws. These officials 
include the President, the Vice-President, cabinet officers, high-level officials in the Executive Office 
of the President, senior Assistant Attorneys General and Department of Justice personnel, the Director 
of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, as well as senior, national level officers in the President’s principal campaign election 
committee (see 28 U.S.C. Section 591(b) (1) – (8) (1994). According to Section 596(a)(1) of the Act 
the counsel could be removed by the Attorney General “only for good cause, physical disability, mental 
incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent 
counsel’s duties”. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/487/654/case.html, date of access: 02.10.2010. 
56 Inferior officers may either be appointed by the President, the Courts of Law, or the Heads of 
Departments. 
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On the other hand, the Court’s functionalist approach raised criticisms challenging the 
constitutionality of the Act’s appointments clause in particular, and, generally, the Act 
itself57. The Act provided that a “Special Division” of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia should appoint the independent counsel 
following a specific request submitted to the Court by the Attorney General. The 
Court concluded that the creation of the post of an independent counsel with 
prosecutorial power outside of the executive branch in order to avoid conflict of 
interest, and the allocation of the appointment authority to a court were not 
unconstitutional. More specifically, the Court based the constitutionality of the Act’s 
appointments clause on a functionalist balancing test that would classify the 
independent counsel either as a principal officer or as an inferior officer as prescribed 
in the Appointments Clause of the Constitution58. To this end, the Court identified 
four factors that should be taken into account in the classification process, that is, the 
officer’s removability by a superior executive branch official, the scope of the 
officer’s duties, the scope of the officer’s jurisdictions, and the tenure of office. The 
judges found that the independent counsel was an inferior officer59, and thus held the 
Appointments Clause constitutional. The functionalist four-factor test and the relevant 
argumentation were rather misleading, and the Court reversed the we-know-it-when-
we-see-it approach in Edmond v. United States60 in the mid-1990s.  
Formalism in Edmond v. United States was reconstituted. Justice Scalia, who authored 
the opinion, stressed the significance of the text of the Appointments Clause of the 
Constitution61, on the one hand, and deconstructed the functionalist logic in Morrison 
v. Olson, on the other. He applied a straightforward test, that is, the one-factor binary 
test in order to classify the judges. More specifically, the test was based on a single 
factor, that is, supervision, which was actually a combination of Morrison’s first two 
factors – removability, and scope of duties. The Court concluded that the judges were 
“inferior Officers” since they were supervised by the Judge Advocate General and the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, on the one hand, and the Judge Advocate 
                                                 
57 Apart from innumerable commentators who have criticised the Court’s judgement since, Justice 
Scalia, the only dissenting judge, stated: “By its shortsighted action today, I fear the Court has 
permanently encumbered the Republic with an institution that will do it great harm”. Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988), available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/487/654/case.html, date of 
access: 02.10.2010. 
58 If it were proved by the four-factor test that the independent counsel was a principal officer, the Act’s 
Appointments Clause should be held unconstitutional since the independent counsel should be 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, that is, according to the Appointments Clause 
of Article II of the Constitution.  
59 The Court stated: “We need not attempt here to decide exactly where the line falls between the two 
types of officers, because in our view [the independent counsel] clearly falls on the “inferior officer” 
side of that line”. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 671 (1988), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/487/654/case.html, date of access: 02.10.2010. 
60 520 U.S. 651 (1997). The petitioners challenged the validity of the constitution of the Coast Guard 
Court of Criminal Appeals, an intermediate court within the military justice system. The Court had to 
decide upon the officer status of two civilian judges of the Appeals Court appointed by the Secretary of 
Transportation. Available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/520/651/index.html, date of access: 
02.10.2010 
61 He stressed that the Appointments Clause was a “significant structural safeguard of the constitutional 
scheme” which assured “a higher quality of appointments” and ensured “public accountability”. 
Edmond v. United States 520 U.S. 651 (1997). Available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/520/651/index.html, date of access: 02.10.2010 
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General had removal power without cause, on the other. Moreover, the Appeals Court 
decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. 
Consequently, the clause did not violate Article II, section 2 of the Constitution 
“Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments”. 
Consequently, if the one-factor test were applied in Morrison, that is, supervision62, 
the Appointments Clause would be held unconstitutional since the independent 
counsel would have been classified as a principal officer63.  
Congress’s considerations for the necessity to enact an independent counsel statute led 
to the violation of the principle of the separation of powers through the removal, 
appointment, and operation clauses64. The Supreme Court, in turn, approached the 
case through functionalism in order to hold the Act constitutional. Nevertheless, the 
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act regarding the office of the independent 
counsel expired in 1999 since there was no congressional support for its continuation, 
thus confirming Justice Scalia’s statement that the institution would do harm to the 
Republic65. 
The invigoration of the executive as formulated in theory and jurisprudence in the 
eighties was rather harmonized with the ideal of the “unitary executive”66 envisioned 
                                                 
62 “Whether one is an “inferior” officer depends on whether he has a superior. It is not enough that 
other officers may be identified who formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a 
greater magnitude. If that were the intention, the Constitution might have used the phrase “lesser 
officer”. Rather, in the context of a clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to 
important government assignments, we think it evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work 
is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with 
the advice and consent of the Senate”. Edmond v. United States 520 U.S. 651 (1997). Available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/520/651/index.html, date of access: 02.10.2010 
63 Regarding removability, Justice Scalia dissenting in Morrison stated: “if [the independent counsel] 
were removable at will by the Attorney General, then she would be subordinate to him and thus 
properly designated as inferior . . .” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 716 (1988), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/487/654/case.html, date of access: 02.10.2010. 
64 Bravin (1998) supported that: “. . .an independent office composed of commissioners subject to the 
nomination and confirmation process could better achieve the practical objective of providing 
unbiased prosecutors without threatening the broader liberty and accountability principles embodied 
in the Constitution”. 
65 Justice Scalia, dissenting, expressed his deep concern in Morrison: “What if [the judges appointing 
an independent counsel] are politically partisan, . . . and select a prosecutor antagonistic to the 
administration . . . ?”. Regarding the issue of accountability he argued that “if there is anything wrong 
with [a] selection, there is effectively no one to blame”. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. (1988), available 
at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/487/654/case.html, date of access: 02.10.2010. 
 
66 Theories of executive power, that is, separation of powers and presidential authority analysis are 
divided in two camps in the U.S.: the “traditional view”, and the “unitary theory of the executive”. 
Justice Kagan’s 2001 Harvard Law Review article Presidential Administration suggests a third way in 
theory. These theories discuss “the scope of presidential power and Congress’s control with respect to 
the powers and duties of executive departments and agencies” (Tatelman, 2010). Tatelman (2010) 
describes the theories as follows: “Adherents to the “traditional” view of separation of powers and 
presidential authority generally assert that Congress possesses the constitutional authority to vest 
discretionary decision-making authority directly in the heads of the departments and agencies that it 
creates. Thus, while traditionalists accept that the President can supervise and guide agency 
policymaking, they argue that where Congress has, by statute, specifically vested the decision-making 
authority in the agency head, the President cannot “go so far as to displace the agency head’s 
discretion to make decisions vested in that officer by law. . . In contrast to traditionalists, advocates of 
the “unitary theory of the executive” or “unitarians” generally ascribe to a view of presidential 
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by the Reagan Administration. In practice, this trend for presidential control of all 
governmental agencies deeply affected future administration in the U.S. Reagan 
implemented three methods in order to centralize power in the presidency, and thus 
coordinate policymaking. First, signing statements67 were considered as a safe way to 
block congressional influence over the administrative apparatus, and thus their issue 
“was crucial for the administration to give the executive branch direction top-down 
on inevitable interpretation” (Kelley and Marshall cited in Devins and Lewis, 2008).  
Second, the regulatory review initiative through Executive Orders enabled “the 
president and his principal aides to exercise a much greater degree of influence over 
executive branch regulation than had existed previously” (Eads and Fix, cited in 
Devins and Lewis, 2008). Third, the appointment of agency heads was based upon the 
“ideological consistency and intensity” of the nominees68 (Kirschten, cited in Devins 
and Lewis, 2008). Nevertheless, independent agencies were exempted from the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) regulatory review, a decision that seems to have 
taken into consideration political and legal barriers. Thus, the control of independent 
agencies could only be achieved through appointments, and judicial filings. Since 
then, Presidents69 have used ideological loyalty as the basic criterion for 
nominations70, thus keeping the tradition of the Reagan Administration (Flynn, 2000).  
                                                                                                                                            
authority that has three prongs: First, unitarians often argue that the President has a constitutionally 
based duty to provide policy direction to officers of the United States; second, unitarians claim that the 
President possesses the unfettered power to remove from office any officer who does not comply with 
the President’s policy directives; and finally, unitarians generally assert that Congress cannot 
constitutionally assign executive powers to agencies or other entities that are independent or outside 
the scope of the President’s control”. Elena Kagan, who served as President Clinton’s Associate White 
House Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy and Deputy Director of the 
Domestic Policy Council (1995-1999), describes in her article the new administrative profile President 
Clinton adopted during his mandate. This new model of administration was actually a sophisticated 
evolution of the Reagan administrative tradition. Tatelman (2010) states: “Professor Kagan’s article 
posits that it was President Clinton’s “articulation and use of directive authority over regulatory 
agencies, as well as his assertion of personal ownership over regulatory product” that led to the 
development of a new and distinctive form of administrative control. This new form of administrative 
control includes two parts. First, the use of “directive authority,” which Kagan defines as “commands 
to executive branch officials to take specified actions within their statutorily delegated discretion.” The 
second component is what Professor Kagan termed “Presidential ownership,” and includes, for 
example, the public announcement of many regulatory decisions and accomplishments directly by the 
White House rather than by the responsible agency officials. . . According to Professor Kagan, at the 
core of the legal framework for “presidential administration” is a re-conceptualization of how 
congressional delegations are to be interpreted. Specifically, under her theory of “presidential 
administration,” delegations by Congress granting discretion to executive branch officials should be 
read and interpreted as leaving ultimate decision-making authority with the President. Similar 
delegations to independent agencies, however, are not to be interpreted in the same manner, and, thus, 
Congress can retain oversight and control over the decisions of those entities”.  
67 “A signing statement is a written pronouncement issued by the President of the United States upon 
the signing of a bill into law. They are usually printed along with the bill in the United States Code 
Congressional and Administrative News (USCCAN)”. Source Wikipedia, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signing_statement, date of access: 03.10.2010. 
68 The statutes of independent agencies contain clauses providing for partisan requirements. 
69 Moe (cited in Devins and Lewis, 2008) states: “Future Presidents presumably would have every 
reason to learn from and build upon the Reagan example in seeking to enhance their own institutional 
capacities for leadership”. 
70 “The one constant in Clinton’s appointments (including to federal judgeships) was relatively strong 
confidence in the nominee’s fidelity to the president’s agenda” (Gerhardt cited in Devins and Lewis, 
2008). 
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Yet, the increasing ideological gap between Democrats and Republicans shortly 
before Ronald Reagan assumed office, and the subsequent party polarization in 
Congress, made the confirmation process of the presidential nominees conflict 
seeking rather than conflict avoiding. Moreover, periods of divided government, 
which became the rule rather than the exception in the past fifty years, the multiple 
membership of independent agencies, and staggered terms of office seem to have 
complicated the situation. Nevertheless, even those considerable barriers were 
overcome since ideology-loyalty was primordial. Therefore, the nomination of party 
loyalists –so precious now for both camps- to slots held by opposition-party members 
made opposition senators devise various strategies71 to put pressure on the President. 
As a result, the predominance of ideology in appointment politics affected agency 
decision-making (Wood and Waterman, 1991). Ho (cited in Devins and Lewis, 2008), 
in his study of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) voting patterns from 
1965 to 2006, concluded that “commissioner partisan affiliation exhibits robust and 
large predictive power over votes, even holding constant the party of the appointing 
president. This [finding] . . . rejects the notion that expertise exclusively drives 
decision-making”.  
The invigoration of the executive through the “unitary” ideal also affected litigation 
conflicts between the independent agencies and the Solicitor General’s72 office. 
Presidential control over the agencies through appointments, the dogma that the 
Solicitor General’s office should represent the official view of the government rather 
than the agency’s position in courts, and direct political pressure put an end to public 
disagreements, conflicts, and competing filings (Devins and Lewis, 2008).  
iv. The principle of the separation of powers and independent agencies’ place in 
government in Greek theory: new incarnations of functionalism 
Rittich (2005) argues that “functionalism is now being used to transform the state and 
dismantle many of its institutions”. Irrespective of whether someone disagrees with 
the statement on substance or perceives it as exaggerated, functionalist approaches 
have prevailed in Greek theory since the end of the eighties. The emergence of 
independent authorities in the Greek legal order triggered the discussion around the 
dilemma of whether to consider these organs as part of the executive or a fourth 
branch of government. It was a debate that reiterated the one that had taken place in 
the U.S. in the thirties, albeit opening new horizons to functionalist argumentation. 
Nevertheless, as Dimoulis (2002) claims “the discussion ostensibly doubts 
tripartitism. In substance, such an approach seeks to question state monopoly over 
                                                 
71 According to the statement of an official of both Bush administrations: “Nominees are now treated 
like pieces of legislation, facing the full array of parliamentary weapons such as delayed hearings or 
floor votes, filibusters and so-called “holds” (Andres, cited in Devins and Lewis, 2008). Regarding the 
practice of “batching”, Devins and Lewis (2008) state: “Opposition-party success stems from the fact 
that the President often makes multiple nominations to the same commission simultaneously because 
some commissioners decide not to complete terms at the very time that other commissioners’ terms 
expire. This situation allows for “batching”: the opposition party demands that the President nominate 
a party loyalist to an opposition-party slot in exchange for the opposition party supporting the 
President’s same-party nominations. For better or worse, batching has become a common tactic in the 
modern appointment process”. 
72 The United States Solicitor General is appointed to represent the Government of the United States 
before the Supreme Court of the United States.  
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certain areas with a view to give the impression that we have entered a period of 
“extra governmental-consensual” resolution of conflicts based upon the schemata of 
the “night watchman state73” and “multicentrism74” of power. Thus, there is an 
attempt to veil the unity of state power – and, strictly speaking, the autarchic 
character of imposing its decisions- through the ideological constructs of pluralism 
and independent functioning of administrative organs, something that is considered 
as “a product of the eternal movement of the market” . . .The debate around 
independent authorities is inspired by the legal neo-liberalism proving that the 
attempts to change the schema of the separation of powers are instigated by 
sociopolitical views that struggle to be imposed upon a predated legal framework”.  
As a result, the functionalism endorsed by Greek scholars of constitutional law 
becomes rather politicized. It moves a step further from the functionalist argument 
that the need for expert decision-making and impartiality justified the creation of 
independent agencies, thus proposing “a separation of powers doctrine premised on 
flexibility, practicality, and judicial reluctance to enforce the doctrine based on 
isolated parts of the Constitution” (Swire, 1985). In other words, the argumentation 
goes beyond interpretative considerations for the Constitution. The scholars’ approach 
is oriented towards a proposal for the reconceptualisation of the separation of powers 
principle in a multicentric landscape (Oikonomou, 1999; Voutsakis, 2000) or even a 
deconstruction of the principle itself since “it cannot be applied to modern reality”, 
that is, “neither does it fit to the institutional reality of the country, nor to the legal 
nature of the independent authorities” (Kamtsidou, 1999). In their view, independent 
authorities should be integrated into “the innovative category of regulatory 
authorities” which “are organs that undertake the exercise of the supremacy in the 
field of their competence” (Kamtsidou, 1999).  Nevertheless, criticism was raised. 
Dimoulis (2002) claimed that “the legal-political evaluation of the author as to what 
is reality of the country, what is just, and who has the right to exercise the political 
power becomes the criterion for the formulation of state organization while rejecting 
the separation of powers as “inapplicable”.  
A minority of scholars and Greek jurisprudence75 support the view that independent 
authorities are part of the executive branch. Akalides and Moschopoulos (2008), argue 
that “we should take into consideration that the principle of the separation of powers, 
which aims at the mutual control of the functions of the state, is relevant. An organ 
may exercise different functions from those pertaining to the power it belongs to76 
(e.g. Parliament is an organ of the legislative power which also exercises judicial 
functions77). Consequently, an organ, even if it exercises functions falling within the 
                                                 
73 A night watchman state or minimal state is a term used in political philosophy to describe a form of 
government –the minarchist system - where the government's responsibilities are so minimal that they 
cannot be reduced much further without becoming a form of anarchy. 
74 The term refers to the development of multiple and autonomous centres of power. 
75 The Greek jurisprudence supported this view in the nineties. Relevant decisions of the Greek courts: 
Council of State (E’ Division/Section) 944/1999, Council of State (D’ Division/Section) 2543/1999, 
Athens Administrative Court of Appeals 4431/1998.  
76 He refers to the system of the intersection of functions according to which, through a special 
constitutional provision, a competence, extrinsic to the main mission of an organ –namely, its judicial, 
executive or legislative nature- is conceded to that organ. 
77 Article 68, par. 2 reads as follows: “2. Parliament shall set up investigation committees from among 
its members by a resolution supported by two-fifths of the total number of members, on the proposal of 
one-fifth of the total number of members. A parliamentary resolution adopted by an absolute majority 
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scope of more than one power should be integrated into one power only. Independent 
agencies are not part of the legislative branch since their rulemaking competence is 
restricted and delegated by the legislative power. Moreover, independent authorities 
are subject to parliamentary review. Neither are they part of the judicial branch since 
their enforceable acts are subject to judicial review. Consequently, they do not 
constitute a fourth branch of government since article 26 of the Constitution78 cannot 
be revised79.  They are part of the executive branch for the following reasons: i) since 
the enforceable acts of the independent authorities are subject to judicial review, 
these acts can only be administrative according to article 95 par. 1 of the 
Constitution80, and ii) it is not incidental that all relevant provisions regarding the 
independent authorities are contained in the sixth section of the Constitution (101-
105) entitled “Administration” which pertains to the third part (26-105) entitled 
“Organization of the Administration”. 
The theoretical discussion over the appointments clauses of the members of the 
independent authorities and their implications for the separation of powers was of 
prime interest before the revision of the Constitution in 2001. This theoretical debate 
was triggered by the decision 944/1999 of the Council of State -which will be 
analysed later on-, whereas there were no conflicting views on the part of the scholars 
who participated in this . . . monologue. The Greek scholars promoted the idea that the 
power of the selection of the members of the independent authorities should be 
assigned to Parliament (Kamtsidou, 1999; Oikonomou, 1999; Iliadou, 2000). They 
rather sought to legitimize the view that vesting Parliament with the authority to 
nominate and select the members of those authorities was not against the doctrine of 
the separation of powers.  
Kamtsidou (1999), acknowledged that “within the classical liberal democracies 
Parliament abstains from the selection of the officials in public administration. Such a 
practice corresponds to the traditional structure of state machineries, and coincides 
with the archaic version of parliamentarianism. Within the context of this system, the 
limitation and the counterbalance of the political power are achieved through its 
division in various state organs, thus expressing different social forces. Thus, the 
executive retains the monopoly in the selection of the administrative employees since 
the latter act under the orders and with the political responsibility of the government 
which, in turn, assumes the political responsibility. As a counterbalance, Parliament 
has the possibility to check on the government in relation to the work of the public 
services, and hold it responsible on a personal or collective basis”. In her opinion, the 
development of the phenomenon of the parties, and the political homogeneity between 
                                                                                                                                            
of the total number of members shall be required in order to set up investigation committees on matters 
related to foreign policy and national defence. Details pertaining to the composition and operation of 
such committees shall be provided by the Standing Orders”. 
78 “Article 26: 1. The legislative powers shall be exercised by the Parliament and the President of the 
Republic. 2. The executive powers shall be exercised by the President of the Republic and the 
Government. 3. The judicial powers shall be exercised by courts of law, the decisions of which shall be 
executed in the name of the Greek People”. 
79 “Article 110: 1. The provisions of the Constitution shall be subject to revision with the exception of 
those which determine the form of government as a Parliamentary Republic and those of articles 2 
paragraph 1, 4 paragraphs 1, 4 and 7 , 5 paragraphs 1 and 3, 13 paragraph 1, and 26”. 
80 According to article Article 95, par. 1 of the Constitution: “The jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Administrative Court (Council of State) pertains mainly to a) The annulment upon petition of 
enforceable acts of the administrative authorities for excess of power or violation of the law”. 
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the government and the majority in parliament actually annulled that old dogma. 
Consequently, “the separation of powers does not impose the isolation, but rather 
enhances the cooperation and the mutual counterbalance between the executive and 
the legislative function”. Moreover, she claimed that article 26 of the Constitution 
should not be read in a strict manner since the three powers, the executive, the 
legislative, the judicial, are not substantially distinct state functions. On the other 
hand, she stressed that the principle of the intersection of functions, which was not 
contrary to the Constitution, relativized the organic dimension of the separation of 
powers.  
Another important argument applied in this theoretical legitimizing process of the role 
of Parliament in the selection mechanism was based on the democratic principle of the 
popular sovereignty (Kamtsidou, 1999; Iliadou, 2000). According to this view, the 
popular Assembly expresses and reflects the popular will, and thus the link of the 
administrative authorities with the representative democratic institutions guarantees 
the necessary consensus among the relevant actors (Kamtsidou, 1999). 
v. The opinion of the Advocate General Mazak in Case-518/07 of the European Court 
of Justice and the independent authorities’ place in government: back to the 
executive?  
 
On March 9, 2010, the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) ruled81 that the 
Federal Republic of Germany “failed to fulfil its obligations under the second 
subparagraph of Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data” since the 
authorities  “responsible for monitoring the processing of personal data by non-public 
bodies and undertakings governed by public law which compete on the market 
(öffentlich-rechtliche Wettbewerbsunternehmen) in the different Länder” were 
“subject to State scrutiny82”. Thus, the Court opined that the Federal Republic of 
Germany incorrectly transposed “the requirement that those authorities perform their 
functions ‘with complete independence”.  
 
                                                 
81 Official Journal the European Union, C 113/3, 1.5.2010, Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:113:0003:0004:EN:PDF. Full text of the 
judgement of the Court available at: http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/gettext.pl?where=&lang=en&num=79899690C19070518&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET, 
date of access: 06.10.2010. 
82 According to points 9 and 10 of the text of the judgement: “9. The processing of data by public 
bodies is supervised, at Federal level, by the Federal representative responsible for the protection of 
personal data and freedom of information and, at regional level, by the representatives responsible for 
the protection of regional data. Those representatives are solely responsible to their respective 
parliament and are not normally subject to any scrutiny, instruction or other influence from the public 
bodies which are the subjects of their supervision. 10.  On the other hand, the organisation of the 
authorities responsible for supervising the processing of data by non-public bodies varies among the 
Lander. However, all the laws at Lander level expressly subject those supervisory authorities to State 
scrutiny”.  
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It was the Commission83 that had requested the Court to decide on the infringement of 
the second subparagraph of Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46/EC. The interested 
parties had to interpret what was the context of the requirement of the Directive “with 
complete independence”. The Commission and the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) supported a broad interpretation of the wording of the provision 
according to which “the term “independence”, in relation to a public body, normally 
means a status which ensures that the body concerned can act completely freely, 
without taking any instructions or being put under any pressure”. Moreover, “the 
concept of independence is complemented by the adjective “complete”, which implies 
a decision-making power independent of any direct or indirect influence on the 
supervisory authority.  For that purpose they must remain free from any external 
influence, including the direct or indirect influence of the State or the Länder, and not 
of the influence only of the supervised bodies”. On the contrary, the Federal Republic 
of Germany proposed a narrow interpretation of the wording arguing that “the term 
concerns the functional independence of those authorities, meaning their institutional 
independence in respect of organisational matters solely in relation to the entities that 
are being supervised”.  
 
Interestingly enough, Advocate General Mazak in his opinion delivered on October 
22, 2009 partly supported the views of the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
extended his arguments. First, he referred to the term “independence” which “is 
frequently used, not only in relation to the public authorities but also in relation to 
particular groups of persons who are required to act with independence in exercising 
their functions within the social system or subsystem”. Nevertheless, contrary to the 
statement of the European Data Protection Supervisor, he expressly rejected the 
connection of the term with the independence of the courts as derived from case-law 
of the Court. In his view, “those criteria cannot be used in the present case, since the 
Court when it laid them down defined the judiciary in relation to the other branches 
of the State. In the present case, we are concerned with the supervisory authorities 
and there is no denying that those authorities are administrative structures and, by 
dint of this, that they belong in the sphere of the executive. Therefore, the requirement 
that they should act with complete independence in exercising their functions must be 
defined only in the context of the executive and not in relation to the other branches of 
the State”. He stressed that the directive neither required that the authorities should be 
hierarchically separated from the administrative system nor prevented such an 
arrangement. Moreover he explained that “independence should not be confused with 
the lack of opportunity for supervision. In my view, State oversight is one of the ways 
in which monitoring may be carried out. . .If it were to emerge that the data 
protection supervisory authorities do not act in a rational, lawful and proportionate 
manner, protection of the rights of individuals and, consequently, achievement of the 
objective of directive 95/46 would be jeopardized84”. In other words, he supported the 
                                                 
83 The European Commission acted pursuant to Article 226 EC for failure of a member state to fulfil its 
obligations. 
84 The full argumentation in relation to the compatibility of State oversight with the requirement of 
complete independence of the authorities in the exercise of their functions, is deployed in point 30 of 
the Advocate’s General opinion: “In order to answer the question whether State oversight is 
compatible with the requirement that the data protection supervisory authorities must act with 
complete independence in the exercise of their functions, it is important to take into consideration the 
purpose of such oversight. It is apparent from the description of the oversight given by the Commission 
that such oversight is designed to establish whether the monitoring carried out by the data protection 
supervisory authorities is rational, lawful and proportionate. From that point of view, it seems to me 
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view that State oversight did not prevent the supervisory authorities from exercising 
their functions in complete independence. On the contrary, he claimed that it was a 
necessary means to examine whether the authorities themselves complied with the 
fulfillment of the objective of the Directive, that is, compliance with strict law 
enforcement. In practice, the argumentation, indirectly, brings the discussion back to 
the democratic legitimacy of the authorities, namely, the political responsibility of the 
government85, a doctrine which has prevailed not only in the theoretical debate, but 
also served as a legitimizing feature of the political orientation in the U.S. since the 
eighties. Finally, the Advocate General argued that the Commission only presumed 
that “supervision hinders the data protection supervisory authorities in exercising 
their functions with complete independence”, thus without satisfying “the burden of 
proof imposed on it86”. 
 
Interestingly enough, the judgement of the Court does not make any direct link 
between the independence of the supervisory authorities and the necessity of 
allocating the authority over the appointment of their members to Parliament. It rather 
adopts a compromising and discrete stance on the issue compared to the radical 
position of the Greek scholars for the exclusive role of Parliament in the selection 
mechanism. Thus, the judgement states: “Admittedly, the absence of any 
parliamentary influence over those authorities is inconceivable. However, it should be 
pointed out that Directive 95/46 in no way makes such an absence of any 
parliamentary influence obligatory for the Member States. Thus, first, the 
management of the supervisory authorities may be appointed by the parliament or the 
government”.  
 
We could argue that the unwillingness of the European Court to openly support the 
view that the exclusive authority for the appointment of the members of the 
supervisory authorities should be allocated to parliament might possibly insinuate an 
effort to avoid interfering with the principle of the separation of powers in different 
member states of the European Union.  However, pressure for exclusive legislative 
appointment would be dictated by the International Governmental Organisations 
through the binding commitments for their member states.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
that State oversight contributes to the functioning of the system of monitoring the application of the 
provisions adopted pursuant to Directive 95/46. If it were to emerge that the data protection 
supervisory authorities do not act in a rational, lawful and proportionate manner, protection of the 
rights of individuals and, consequently, achievement of the objective of Directive 95/46 would be 
jeopardised”.  
85 The Court rejected the democratic principle argument, and emphasized that data protection 
supervisory authorities could function outside the classic hierarchical administration since control and 
accountability are guaranteed through judicial review and annual reports to Parliament.   
86 According to points 33 and 34 of the General Advocate’s opinion: “According to the case-law of the 
Court, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations brought under article 226 EC it is for the 
Commission to prove that the obligation has not been fulfilled without being able to rely on any 
presumption . . .[The Commission] has not proved either the failure of the system of oversight nor the 
existence of a consistent practice on the part of the overseeing authorities of abusing their powers and 
thus hindering the data protection supervisory authorities in the exercise of their functions with 
complete independence”.  
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vi. Functionalism as reflected in commitments to International Governmental 
Organizations  
The Greek scholars’ functionalist views are further legitimized by the commitments to 
International Governmental Organizations supporting the appointment of the 
members of human rights independent authorities exclusively by Parliament by a 
qualified majority of votes. The Council of Europe’s Recommendation 1615 (2003) 
regarding the institution of the Ombudsman links the effective operation of the 
institution, among others, to legislative appointment87. Dean Gottehrer,88 an 
international Ombudsman consultant, in his briefing on the Ombudsman institution in 
the countries of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that 
took place in Washington in 1998, suggested that the Ombudsman should be 
appointed by parliament89. Gottehrer in his text on the “Ombusman Legislative 
Resource Document” quotes, among others, the model provisions accompanied by 
commentaries on the justificatory basis regarding the appointment process for the 
Office of the Ombudsman90.  
                                                 
87 Paragraph 7, point iii. of the Recommendation 1615 (2003) reads as follows: “iii. exclusive and 
transparent procedures for appointment and dismissal by parliament by a qualified majority of votes 
sufficiently large as to imply support from parties outside government, according to strict criteria 
which unquestionably establish the ombudsman as a suitably qualified and experienced individual of 
high moral standing and political independence, for renewable mandates at least equal in duration to 
the parliamentary term of office;”. Source: The official website of the Council of Europe, available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/documents/adoptedtext/TA03/EREC1615.htm, date of access: 27.01.2012. 
88 At the time the briefing on the Ombudsmen in the OSCE took place in December 2, 1998 in 
Washington DC, he was consultant on ombudsmen in human rights institutions for the United Nations 
Development Programme, the UNDP, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United States Information Agency. He 
had also served as President of the United States Ombudsmen’ Association from 1993 to 1995. He was 
also author of the “Ombudsmen and Human Rights Institutions in OSCE Participating States” 1998 
report for the OSCE, and the International Ombudsmen Legislative Reference document for the 
International Ombudsmen Institute.  
89 Gottehrer D., The Ombudsman in the OSCE: An American Perspective, December 2, Briefing of the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington 2002, available at: 
http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=UserGroups.Home&ContentRecord_id=164&ContentType=B&
ContentRecordType=B&UserGroup_id=62&Subaction=ByDate&CFID=24766971&CFTOKEN=1355
1851, date of access: 27.01.2012. 
90 An abstract from the text referring to the appointment process and its justificatory basis follows: 
“Principle 2. The Ombudsman is an officer of the legislative branch of government.  
Sample language: The Ombudsman is appointed by the legislative body to exercise the powers and 
perform the duties assigned under this law.  
Commentary: The Ombudsman’s independence is strengthened by being an officer of the legislative 
body. Ombudsmen generally do not investigate those who appoint them because of the conflict 
inherent in such an arrangement.  
Appointment process, qualifications, term, benefits, removal process  
(Note: The appointment process described is placed in the legislative body and is an example in detail 
of how such a process works. Most acts do not contain this much detail. Some jurisdictions specify that 
the Ombudsman is appointed solely by the head of state, either on the advice of leaders of all parties in 
the legislative body or one or more other commissions or advisers or with the concurrence of the 
legislative body.)  
Principle 3. The process for nomination and appointment of the Ombudsman is designed to foster the 
office’s independence and create a broad base of support in the legislative body.  
Sample language: An Ombudsman Selection Committee of three members of each house of (the 
legislative body) will be appointed by the presiding officers of the respective bodies with  
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Following the Swedish prototype, the Ombudsman is an officer of the legislative 
branch of government. Therefore, appointment by the legislative body provides 
independence from the executive-regulatee. Likewise, the relevant provision of the 
Model Ombudsman Act for State Governments drafted by the Model Ombudsman 
Act Committee of the United States Ombudsman Association91 provides that the 
“legislative body shall elect the Ombudsman by a two-thirds vote of the members of 
each house present and voting”. In the comment part of the model act on the relevant 
provision, it was argued that the principle of the separation of powers was not violated 
“since the Ombudsman may only make recommendations, and may not compel the 
executive and judicial agencies to take substantive actions”. However, the 
argumentation is simplistic since the executive functions are not necessarily or 
exclusively linked to taking-up repressive action. In our opinion, the office of the 
Ombudsman carries out statutory delegations. Within this framework, and beyond the 
self-management competences undertaken by any agency of the executive, it provides 
direct service to citizens, whereas the results of the investigating and reporting 
activities might affect the lives of citizens in important ways. In other words, these 
functions of the agency pertain to the executive branch of government even if they 
serve a purpose similar to that of the parliamentary review undertaken by the 
parliamentary committees. It should be reminded that the Offices of the Inspectors 
General of Public Administration supervising executive action, a mission similar to 
that of parliamentary review, are not incorporated into the legislative branch of 
government. 
                                                                                                                                            
at least one member of each body coming from a minority party. The committee will advertise for 
applicants for the position. The names and résumés of all applicants are open to the public.  
Commentary: Unicameral legislative bodies could appoint a six-member committee. The process of 
choosing the Ombudsman is one of the important controls the legislative body has over the office. 
Choosing the right person is important to the success of an Ombudsman’s office. Public advertising and 
review of the qualifications of candidates is one means to foster strength in the final candidate for the 
office.  
Principle 4. Any legislative committee that recommends a candidate to be Ombudsman shall select one 
candidate and make the recommendation by a majority vote of at least two-thirds of the committee’s 
members.  
Sample language: The Ombudsman Selection Committee shall examine persons to serve as 
Ombudsman regarding their qualifications and ability, shall choose by at least a two-thirds vote the 
name of the person selected and place that name in nomination.  
Commentary: A large majority-and one candidate increases-the likelihood of choosing a well-
respected, fair and impartial person with broad support and diminishes the chances of choosing a 
candidate with a political agenda.  
Principle 5. A majority vote of at least two-thirds of the full legislative body is required to nominate or 
elect the Ombudsman.  
Sample language: The appointment of the Ombudsman is effective if the nomination is approved by a 
roll call vote of two-thirds of the members of (the legislative body) and approved by the executive. 
Commentary: A large majority increases the likelihood of choosing a well-respected, fair and impartial 
person with broad support and diminishes the chances of choosing a candidate with a political agenda. 
In some jurisdictions, the Ombudsman is appointed by the head of state—the President, Lieutenant-
Governor, Governor or other authority—on the recommendation of a two-thirds or unanimous vote of 
the legislative body. While a two-thirds vote is the most common requirement, some jurisdictions 
require a three-fifths or three-fourths vote to appoint. Some jurisdictions place time limits on how long 
after a nomination is submitted the appointment must take place”. Source: The official website of the 
International Ombudsman Institute, available at: http://www.theioi.org/publications/occasional-papers-
archives, date of access: 27.01.2012. 
91 The official website of the United States Ombudsman Association, Model Ombudsman Act for State 
Governments, February 1997, available at: 
http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/PDF/References/USOA_MODEL_ACT.pdf, date of access: 
27.01.2012. 
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On the contrary, the American Bar Association in its Standards for the Establishment 
and Operation of Ombudsoffices, as revised in February 200492, proposes a moderate 
appointment version, thus taking into consideration the limitations of the U.S. 
Constitution. Therefore, the legislative Ombusdman93 “should be appointed by the 
legislative body or . . . by the executive with confirmation by the designated 
proportion of the legislative body, preferably more than a majority, such as two 
thirds”. In a previous text94, the American Bar Association stated on the issue: “In 
foreign countries the ombudsman has been elected by the legislature. The 
governmental structure in those countries differs, however, from the American 
pattern. Appointive officials, whatever their nature, are customarily chosen in 
American jurisdictions by the Chief Executive, subject sometimes to legislative 
confirmation. The present proposal contemplates confirmation by an unusually 
substantial vote in both chambers (if two exist) rather than in the Senate alone. This is 
intended to stress the “non-political” nature of the appointment and to reflect the 
need for the general acceptability of the person chosen. Whether the required 
majority be two-thirds of those voting or some other figure can, of course, be fixed in 
accord with local preference or precedent. Some persons favour direct legislative 
selection, without participation by the Executive”. The text also cited paradigms of 
exclusive selection by the legislative in Florida, Connecticut, and California 
pinpointing that “all the plans emphasize the desirability of “de-politicalizing” the 
selection process”.  
 
The American Bar Association and the United States Ombudsman Association are not 
International Governmental Organisations. However, we invoked their model acts on 
the institution of the Ombudsman for one reason. Those who drafted them, with the 
exception of the Council of Europe’s Recommendation where there is no relevant 
reference, argue that the institution of the Ombudsman was first created in Sweden in 
1809. However, its origins go back to the eighteenth century, in 1714 when King 
Charles XII of Sweden instituted the office of His Majesty’s Supreme Ombudsman, 
                                                 
92 The Official Website of the American Bar Association, Standards for the Establishment and 
Operation of Ombudsoffices adopted by the House of Delegates, February 9, 2004, available at: 
http://www2.americanbar.org/child_migrated/PublicDocuments/ombudsmen-1.pdf, date of access: 
27.01.2012. 
93 The American Bar Association discerns four categories of Ombudsoffices: i) the legislative 
Ombudsman, ii) the executive Ombudsman, iii) the Organisational Ombudsman, and iv) the Advocate 
Ombudsman. The legislative Ombudsman coincides with the Classical Ombudsman. Therefore, he 
“addresses issues raised by the general public or internally, usually concerning the actions or policies of 
government entities, individuals or contractors with respect to holding agencies accountable to the 
Public”. The Executive Ombudsman is defined as follows: “An executive ombuds may be located in 
either the public or private sector and receives complaints from the general public or internally and 
addresses actions and failures to act of the entity, its officials, employees, and contractors. . . if located 
in government, an executive ombuds should not have general jurisdiction over more than one agency, 
but may have jurisdiction over a subject matter that involves multiple agencies”. 
94 The Official Website of the American Bar Association, available at: 
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/american.html, date of access: 10.09.2010 
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which soon became the Chancellor of Justice95. In 1766, during the period of 
parliamentary sovereignty96 (the Period of Liberty: 1719-1772), the Parliament, the 
Riksdag, for the first time elected the Chancellor of Justice97. In 1772 the election 
became once more a royal-executive prerogative. In 1809 the Instrument of 
Government divided power between the King and the Riksdag. The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman98 was then established and elected by Parliament based on the model of 
the Chancellor of Justice that continued operating as the royal Ombudsman appointed 
by the King99. In other words, the Ombudsman was initially created as an organ of the 
executive. It seems that the establishment of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, 
                                                 
95 “In 1713 King Charles XII, preoccupied with fighting the Great Northern War, was residing in 
Bendery and had not set foot in Sweden in over a decade. In order to reestablish the domestic 
administration, which had fallen into disarray, he instituted the office of His Majesty's Supreme 
Ombudsman, which soon became the Chancellor of Justice. The office commenced operation on 
October 23, 1714 and the role of the official was to ensure that judges and public officials acted in 
accordance with the laws, proficiently discharged their tasks, and if not he could initiate legal 
proceedings for dereliction of duty”. Source: Wikipedia, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chancellor_of_Justice, date of access: 26.01.2012. 
96 “The death of the unmarried Charles XII without an heir leaves the Swedish monarchy in as weak a 
state as the nation. Charles's brother-in-law is elected to the throne in 1720, as Frederick I, but the 
political effect of the change is to give more power to Sweden's parliament, the riksdag. This ancient 
institution now evolves along lines similar to the British pattern, with policy contested between 
organized parties. Here, the equivalents of Whigs and Tories go by equally strange descriptions. The 
two parties are the Hats and the Caps. The Hats take their name from military headgear; they believe in 
an aggressive policy to recover Sweden's empire. The Caps, more peacefully inclined, are named from 
nightcaps. At the riksdag of 1738 the Hats become the dominant party, and they hold power until 1765. 
Their military policy does little good to Sweden, which becomes increasingly subservient to Russia. 
Their main achievement is progressively to weaken the power of the monarch. Indeed during the reign 
of Adolphus Frederick, the elected heir of Frederick I, the ruling senate makes use of a stamp 
duplicating the king's signature to avoid his personal involvement in the nation's business. Foreign 
powers attempt to influence Sweden's policy, by paying large subsidies to help either the Hats or Caps 
into power. The bribing of Sweden's political parties becomes part of a wider European conflict. France 
supports the Hats, hoping to win the alliance of a militant Sweden. France's enemies (in particular 
Britain, Prussia and Russia) subsidise the Caps with the intention of keeping an inert Sweden on the 
sidelines. The two squabbling and corrupt factions damage Sweden both at home and abroad. The 
situation is not resolved until Gustavus III succeeds his father Adolphus Frederick in 1771. He is as 
forceful as his father was feeble. In a coup d'état of 1772 he persuades the Stockholm garrison to arrest 
all the members of the ruling council of state. He then presents the riksdag with a new constitution 
bringing executive power back into royal hands. It is unanimously accepted”. Abstract from the History 
World Net, available at: 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=mkn, date of access: 
26.01.2012. 
97 Source: The Official Website of the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman, available at: 
http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?MenuId=20&MainmenuId=12&ObjectClass=DynamX_Documents&Lang
uage=en, date of access: 25.01.2012. 
98 According to the Official Website of the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman: “At that time Sweden 
was ruled by the King and therefore the Riksdag, which then represented the Four Estates, considered 
that some institution that was independent of the King was needed in order to ensure that laws and 
statutes were obeyed”. Information available at: 
http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?MenuId=12&ObjectClass=DynamX_Documents&Language=en, date of 
access: 28.01.2012. 
99 The Office of the Chancellor of Justice is an independent authority whereas the Chancellor is 
appointed by the government. According to the Official Website of the Swedish Chancellor of Justice, 
“The Chancellor of Justice is free to raise issues on the supervision of authorities of his or her own 
motion. The majority of cases are however initiated by private parties by means of submitting a written 
complaint, thus drawing the Chancellor’s attention to malpractice or abuse of powers within the public 
administration”. Information available at: http://www.jk.se/sv-SE/Languages/English.aspx, date of 
access: 25.01.2012. 
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operating in parallel with the Chancellor of Justice, was rather the result of 
antagonism and compromise between the King and the Parliament. The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman is considered as an instrument of parliamentary control assisting the 
Riksdag in this task. The relevant section of the website of the Swedish Parliament 
states: “It is the task of the Parliamentary Ombudsman to ensure that all members of 
the public are treated in compliance with existing laws in their dealings with public 
agencies. The Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsmen is an authority under the 
Riksdag100”. Therefore, it is interesting to see, as is the case with the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman in Sweden, the legislative Ombudsman at state level in the U.S., the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman in the U.K., how parliaments create 
independent agencies under their authority101. 
 
International Governmental Organisations (UN, OSCE, CoE) link legislative 
appointment process for the members of the boards of the media regulatory authorities 
and public broadcasters to the promotion of freedom of expression as prescribed in 
article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
appointment process for the members of the boards of the relevant regulatory 
authorities and public broadcasters should be unfettered by the predominance of the 
governing party, thus safeguarding political plurality. The Recommendation  (2000)23 
of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the independence and functions of 
regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector102 states that “. .  . rules should 
guarantee that the members of these authorities are appointed in a democratic and 
transparent manner”. According to the Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on 
the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector103 
democratic manner is conceived of as legislative appointment since “In most Council 
of Europe member states, the members of regulatory authorities are appointed by the 
parliament or by the head of state at the proposal of parliament”.  
 
                                                 
100 Source: the Official Website of the Swedish Parliament, available at: 
http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/R_Page____4394.aspx, date of access: 25.01.2012. 
101 In all the above cases Parliament decides on the budget of the Offices of the Ombudsmen. However, 
in the case of the U.K. it was the executive that selected the Ombudsman until 2011. Sources: The 
official website of the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsmen, available at: 
http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?MenuId=12&ObjectClass=DynamX_Documents&Language=en, date of 
access: 28.01.2012. The Office of the Ombudsman, Hawaii, Chapter 96-3 Hawaii Revised Statutes, 
The Official Website of the Office of the Ombudsman, State of Hawaii, available at: 
http://www.ombudsman.hawaii.gov/chapter-96, date of access: 29.12.2009. Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act 1967, Chapter 13, Section 3. The Official Website of Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/13/crossheading/the-parliamentary-
commissioner-for-administration, date of access: 30.01.2012. 
102 Recommendation  (2000)23 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the independence 
and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, available at:  
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=393649&Lang=en, date of access: 26.01.2012. 
103 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory 
authorities for the broadcasting sector (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 26 March 2008at 
the 1022nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Decl(26.03.2008)&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackC
olorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75, date of access: 
29.01.2012. 
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Likewise, according to the Joint Declaration by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the 
Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression regarding the 
Regulation of the Media104 “All public authorities which exercise formal regulatory 
powers over the media should be protected against interference, particularly of a 
political or economic nature, including by an appointments process for members 
which is transparent, allows for public input and is not controlled by any particular 
political party”.  Therefore, according to international standards, appointment by the 
executive “gives the Government considerable control over the actions of the 
Authority, and seriously undermines its independence. A better approach would be for 
none of the members to be nominated or appointed by political figures and for 
appointments to be made instead by Parliament, a multiparty body105”. Therefore, the 
participation of the executive in the appointments process in media regulation and 
public broadcasting is not in line with the international standards on freedom of 
expression.  
 
The Representative of the OSCE on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović, in her 
Regular Report to the Permanent Council dated July 29, 2010 severely criticized 
President Sarkozy for the adoption of an audiovisual law106 permitting executive 
appointment with legislative confirmation in the selection of the new head of the 
public service broadcaster, France Televisions107. France abolished the executive 
prerogative in appointments for certain public posts relating to the safeguard of rights 
and liberties or the economic and social life of the Nation. Article 13 of the 
Constitution108 was revised, thus adopting a system similar to the Appointments 
                                                 
104 International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression, Joint Declaration by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of 
the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/fom/28235, date of access: 30.01.2012. 
105 Note on the Draft Broadcasting Authority Act for the Commonwealth of Dominica drafted by 
Article 19: Global Campaign for Free Expression, an NGO established in 1987. It has worked and 
partnered with IGOs like the UN and OSCE. Available at: 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/dominica-draft-broadcasting-authority-act.pdf, date of 
access: 30.01.2012. 
106 Organic Law n° 2009-257 of March 5, 2009 regarding the nomination of the presidents of the 
enterprises France Télévisions and Radio France and the enterprise responsible for the broadcasting of 
France abroad. Available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=C9F558F1ADF88C2CB50D033373C05153.t
pdjo13v_3?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020352069&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id, 
date of access: 30.01.2012. 
107 Dunja Mijatović stated in the report: “On 5 July, President Nicolas Sarkozy nominated a new head 
of the public service broadcaster, France Television, following a new selection procedure approved in 
March 2009 as part of a reform of audiovisual laws. Although this nomination by the President comes 
with extensive approval guaranties by the regulatory authority and requires approval by three-fifths of 
the relevant Parliamentary Commission, I would like to restate that it is the position of my Office that 
the presidential nomination of the head of a country’s public service broadcaster is an obstacle to its 
independence and contradicts OSCE commitments. This concern was already expressed by my 
predecessor, Miklós Haraszti, in a letter sent to the President on 16 December 2008”. Source: Regular 
Report to the Permanent Council dated July 29, 2010, OSCE, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/fom/74949, date of access: 31.01.2012. 
108 According to Article 13, par. 5 of the French Constitution as revised by the constitutional law no 
2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on the modernisation of the institutions of the 5th Republic, a law may 
determine the employments or functions that, due to their importance for the guarantee of the rights and 
liberties or the economic and social life of the Nation, the nominating power of the President of the 
Republic is exercised upon the public opinion of the competent permanent standing committee of each 
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Clause provided for in the U.S. Constitution. If the Representative’s severe statement is 
correctly understood, France should revise once more its Constitution providing for 
exclusive legislative appointment109. Indeed, following Article 19’s model public service 
broadcasting law110, the members of the Board should be exclusively appointed by 
parliament. Dunja Mijatović, in her Regular Report to the Permanent Council of the 
OSCE dated December 16, 2010111, pinpointed the reluctance of the OSCE member 
states to comply with their commitments stating: “The OSCE commitments are 
universally applicable to all 56 participating States. The tendency to apply them with 
the proviso “in accordance with national legislation and tradition” is undermining 
this universality. My role is to uphold the principle and to call for nations to adapt 
their laws to come into compliance with media-freedom commitments”. It is obvious 
that the functionalist approach is at odds with the separation of powers orthodoxy as 
far as the appointments clauses are concerned. 
 
The tables in the Appendices 4, 5, and 6 contain a cross-national presentation of the 
appointments clauses of the Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen, as well as the 
heads and members of the boards of the national regulatory authorities in the 
                                                                                                                                            
legislative chamber. The President of the Republic may not proceed to a nomination, if the addition of 
the negative votes in each committee represents at least three-fifths of the votes expressed in these two 
committees. The organic law no 2010-837 of July 2010 regarding the application of the fifth paragraph 
of the French Constitution contains a list of 48 public sector agencies whose heads are appointed 
according to the said provision.  
Available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=AA7A39FB2A9764489E806236F3DF
5A36.tpdjo13v_3?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000571356&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006527475&dateTe
xte=&categorieLien=cid, date of access: 31.01.2012. 
109 François Holland, the candidate of the French Socialist Party, who finally won the presidential 
elections of 2012, promised to settle the issue as set out in his pre-election platform. The following 
translated abstract from the newspaper Le Monde Diplomatique (April 2012, p. 23) gives the relevant 
information: ““I will be a President guaranteeing the independence of justice and media”, declared in 
October 2011 Mr François Holland, socialist candidate in the French presidential elections. Indeed, the 
Socialist Party (PS) proposes in its programme that the appointment of those in charge of the public 
broadcasters should be exercised by an independent authority, and not by the Head of State. “The next 
President will establish a new regulatory body in the broadcasting field”, he declared in his speech in 
Dijon, on March 3. “The members will be nominated by the committees of Cultural Affairs of the 
National Assembly and the Senate with a qualified majority of three-fifths. It will put an end to that 
power that only one enjoyed in relation to the nomination of the presidents of the public broadcasting 
companies. It will be this body that will elect the future heads of the public channels, control their 
specifications, and reinforce the particularity of these channels, that is, the public service”. 
110 The model clause on the Appointment of the Board reads as follows: “Members of the Board shall 
be appointed by the [insert name of (lower chamber of) parliament], in accordance with the following:  
(a) the process shall be open and transparent; 
(b) only candidates nominated by civil society and professional organisations shall be considered for 
appointment; 
(c) a shortlist of candidates shall be published in advance and the public shall be given an opportunity 
to make representations concerning these candidates; 
(d) a candidate shall be appointed only if he or she receives two-thirds of the votes cast; 
(e) membership of the Board as a whole shall, to the extent that this is reasonably possible, represent a 
broad cross-section of [insert name of State] society; 
Source: A Model Public Service Broadcasting Law, Article 19, International Standards Series, June 
2005, London, available at:http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/modelpsblaw.pdf, date of 
access: 31.01.2012. 
111 Regular Report to the Permanent Council of the OSCE dated December 16, 2010, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/fom/74598, date of access: 31.01.2012. 
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broadcasting field, and in the field of the protection of personal data. The selection 
mechanisms are codified in relation to the branch of government competent for the 
nomination, selection, and appointment. In most cases, the legislative bodies participate 
in the selection mechanisms either through confirmation of the executive nomination, or 
through autonomous processes. The paradigm of France is characteristic since the 
traditional executive prerogative of appointing the heads of independent administrative 
authorities was complemented by legislative checks. Moreover, the new system was 
extended to the appointment of the heads of the most prominent public sector posts. It 
seems that established democracies112 pushed by functionalist visions gradually abandon 
their constitutional separation of powers traditions, either through adopting the American 
paradigm or even moving beyond the formalist permissible limits, that is, autonomous 
legislative appointment power. 
 
vii. An instructive story from the State of Rhode Island: From the legislature’s 
appointive prerogative back to the separation of powers orthodoxy 
 
The United States seems to remain faithful to its own constitutional orthodoxy since it 
continues to insist on the formalist approach of the separation of powers in relation to 
its checks and balances appointive tradition even in the case of the independent 
regulatory agencies113. The battle for the separation of powers in the state of Rhode 
Island might prove to be instructive. It ended up with the amendment of the state 
constitution providing for the abolition of the legislature’s appointment power which 
had remained unchecked for over two centuries. Interestingly enough, it was not the 
legislature that proposed the amendment. On the contrary, good government groups 
launched “a concerted campaign of nine years” that succeeded in convincing public 
opinion over the need to restore through constitutional amendment an “abstract 
concept of political science” (Bogus, 2004). The first attempt to pass the amendment 
on April 11, 2002 failed as the “House leadership surprised them with a sudden 
parliamentary maneuver that killed the measure without either a debate or a vote”114 
(Bogus, 2004). The episode triggered tremendous reaction, and the amendment 
became a top priority issue in the state legislative elections of fall 2002. As a result, 
all candidates, incumbents and challengers alike, regardless of prior positions, were 
asked by a group called the Rhode Island Separation of Powers Committee (RISOP) 
“to sign a pledge promising to support separation of powers in the future” (Bogus, 
2004). Indeed, both State legislatures, the Senate and the House, unanimously 
approved the constitutional amendment on July 30, 2003. 
Rhode Island constituted a deviating case among the states in relation to the powers of 
the legislature. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in its decisions in 1999 and 2000 
judged that the doctrine of the separation of powers was not part of the state 
constitution, and supported the view that Rhode Island government was rather a 
                                                 
112 Contrary to established democracies, Biezen and Kopecky (2007) consider all countries that started 
to democratize during or after 1974 as new democracies. 
113 Whitehouse (1996) states: “For over a century, the United States Supreme Court has forbidden 
Congress from making appointments to offices outside the legislative branch of government. James 
Madison said: The power of the legislature to appoint any other than their own officers, departs too far 
from the theory which requires a separation of the great Departments of Government”. 
114 Edward Fitzpatrick (as cited in Bogus, 2004) explains that “had both legislative chambers passed the 
bill, it would have placed the proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot at the next general 
election for ratification by the voters. House leaders orchestrated a vote, which passed 49-38, to 
recommit the bill to the House Judiciary Committee, which had previously rejected the amendment”. 
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“quintessential system of parliamentary supremacy” (Bogus, 2004). Indeed, the 
legislature retained unchecked appointment powers over the executive and regulatory 
agencies115. The Rhode Island Constitution, also called the Algerine Constitution, 
(1842), that, in the main, was still in force until its amendment in 2003, included a 
clause explicitly providing for the separation of powers116. Nevertheless, another 
clause provided that “The general assembly shall continue to exercise the powers it 
has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited by this constitution”. Thus, the General 
Assembly traced its powers back to those contained in the Charter of 1663 granted by 
King Charles II of England. The Charter was drafted before Locke’s and 
Montesquieu’s works on the separation of powers, and thus placed all power, that is, 
the legislative, executive, and judicial in the colonial legislature. The amended clauses 
of the state Constitution on the separation of powers  provide for the following: i) the 
members of the legislature are excluded from appointment to any office, board, 
commission or other state or quasi public entity exercising executive power, ii) the 
clause on the continuation of legislative powers contained in the Charter of 1663 is 
repealed, iii) the three branches of government are “separate and distinct”, and iv) the 
adoption of a provision similar to the appointments clause of the U.S. Constitution117. 
But why was it considered necessary to abolish the legislature’s appointive 
prerogative? Beyond the theoretical formalistic argumentation on the separation of 
powers exhaustively analyzed in Whitehouse’s (1996) and Bogus’s (2004) papers, the 
authors also invoke the negative aspects of the system and raise practical concerns. In 
Bogus’s view the unusual concentration of power in the legislature enhanced 
corruption in the sense of perversion of public decision-making. However, 
irrespective of the development of state-specific conditions and relationships 
facilitating distortions, the obstruction of the proper operation of the mechanism of 
legislative oversight seems to be crucial in the authors’ view. Bogus states: “Agencies 
may become improperly politicized under executive control, of course, but legislative 
oversight provides some check when that occurs. When the legislature both operates 
and oversees agency operation, however, that safeguard is gone”. Likewise, 
Whitehouse supports the view that even if the terms “liberty”, “tyranny” and 
“corruption” used in the 18th century political discourse “may not resonate for all of us 
. . . we also have a clear example of one of the most practical of the checks and 
balances, legislative oversight, that is a sacrifice to these legislative appointments. . . 
                                                 
115 The Brayton Act of 1901, passed by the General Assembly, “gave the legislature the power of 
appointment over not only judicial appointments but executive appointment as well, thereby reducing 
the governor to the mere figurehead of the executive branch” (Bogus, 2004). Moreover, Bogus (2004) 
states that “Presently, the legislature appoints a total of 234 members on the governing boards of these 
seventy-three agencies, in some instances by filling these seats with members of the General Assembly 
themselves”. 
116 Article V of the Rhode Island Constitution read: “The powers of the government shall be distributed 
into departments: the legislative, executive and judicial”. 
117 Section 5 of Article IX entitled “Of the executive power” reads as follows: “Powers of appointment. 
--  The governor shall, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appoint all officers of the state 
whose appointment is not herein otherwise provided for and all members of any board, commission or 
other state or quasi-public entity which exercises executive power under the laws of this state; but the 
general assembly may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they deem proper, in the 
governor, or within their respective departments in the other general officers, the judiciary or in the 
heads of departments”. Available at: http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/C09.html, date of 
access: 31.01.2012. 
 55
Although legislative inquiries have been and can be abused, they are an important 
mechanism in our checks and balances of government. Where legislative appointees 
lead and oversee the departments and agencies of the other branches of government, 
this mechanism is compromised”. It should be noted that the unchecked and 
concentrated power of the American state legislatures provoked the abandonment of 
the Articles of Confederation and led to the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. 
Any violation of the constitutional constraints which actually formulate the profile of 
the polity of a country with respect to the separation of powers principle could lead to 
the distortion of the political system itself. The ambition of this section is to make an 
attempt to approach the issue of formalism and functionalism beyond their operation 
on law. In other words, this part of the study rather seeks to justify how the visions of 
formalism and functionalism in the doctrine of the separation of powers impact on 
regulatory politics.   
 
3. The first generation of the selection mechanisms before the constitutional 
revision of 2001: A test of constitutionality 
 
a. The National Council for Radio and Television, Law 1866/1989-Phase I118: Direct 
nomination by the political parties and the relevant societal groups  
i. The Appointments Clause 
 
The National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV) was established under the 
law 1866/1989 as an independent organ. According to article 1, par. 3, its mission was 
to guarantee freedom of expression and polyphony, that is, plurality of opinions, 
safeguard journalistic deontology, and promote the quality of the programmes of 
broadcasters, as prescribed in the constitution. Article 2 of the law provided for the 
selection mechanism and the candidates’ profile. The appointments clause constituted 
a composite act, comprising two phases: direct nomination by the political parties and 
the relevant societal groups, and official appointment with an executive veto by the 
competent Minister. The Minister had the discretion to scrutinize the nominations, 
thus rejecting any proposal that was contrary to the preconditions set forth in article 2, 
par. 1 of the law, that is, “individuals of high standing in the field of literature, arts, 
science, technology, and politics”. Finally, the official appointment act should be a 
presidential decree and not a ministerial decision since according to the Code of Civil 
Servants as in force by the time of the promulgation of the law “high ranking civil 
servants shall be appointed by presidential decree”.  
 
ii. The political juncture, discussions in Parliament, comments and interpretation 
 
The discussions and debates of the draft law119 “Establishment of the National 
Council for Radio and Television, and grant of licenses for the foundation and 
                                                 
118 The legislative evolution of the appointments clauses of the members of the National Council for 
Radio and Television (NCRTV) is divided in three phases. Thus, we cite all the stages of their 
amendment until the final converging appointments clause established by the revision of the 
Constitution in 2001. 
119 See Appendix 2, 1 for abstracts from the discussions. 
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function of broadcasters” in principal and in particulars in the Greek Parliament120, 
despite minor reservations on the part of the MPs of the socialist party, Pasok121, 
reveal the beginning of a new era of consensual approach to politics in the country122. 
The paradigm of the composition of the board of the National Council for Radio and 
Television, and the selection mechanism provided for the appointment of its members 
proves this point. The political juncture rather enhanced new practices of interparty 
relationships, and set the basis for further future cooperation at institutional level.  
Nevertheless, the political tension of that period probably does not explain/justify 
such a claim at first sight. The cases of the “Sale of the Century” or Warplanes 
Kickback123, the Telephone-Tapping Racket124, the Yugoslave Maize Fraud125, and 
the scandal with the young banker Koskotas, which shook Greece in mid-1988, forced 
the socialist government of Pasok to call elections on June 1989. Koskotas was a 
young banker and publisher who came from nowhere. He bought the Bank of Crete 
and owned a publishing empire that operated five magazines, three newspapers and a 
radio station. He also bought Greece’s most popular football team, Olympiakos. On 
October 19, 1988 Koskotas was prosecuted for abuse of billions of drachmas from the 
Bank of Crete. Extradition to Greece was awaited since he had already fled and been 
arrested in the USA126. The opposition and the press were highly critical against the 
Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, and Deputy Prime Minister, Agamemnon 
Koutsogiorgas since there were allegations of bribery127. The electoral law in force in 
                                                 
120 Minutes of Parliament, First Assembly, Sessions 37 and 38 discussion and debate in principal 
September 14th, and September 18th , 1989, and Session 42, discussion and debate in particulars 
September 21st , 1989. 
121 Party of the minority. On September 3, 1974, Andreas Papandreou announced the creation of the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). The party won the national elections in 1981, 1985, 1993, 
1996, 2000, and 2009. 
122 The law 1866/1999 was unanimously adopted. 
123 The case concerned the excessive cost of purchases from French and American suppliers.  
124 There were allegations of telephone tapping against the Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou. He 
was accused of having tapped the home and business telephones of his rivals, such as the head of the 
opposition, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, and unfriendly publishers.  
125 The case concerned the sale of illegally imported Yugoslavian corn –presented as Greek- to 
European countries by a state-owned company. The European Commission discovered the fraud and 
the court of the European Communities convicted Greece. On August 11, 1990 former Minister of 
Finance, Nikos Athanassopoulos, was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment by the 
Special Court.  
126 Koskotas was extradited to Greece in June 1991. He was sentenced to twenty five years 
imprisonment and served twelve years of his sentence. 
127 Abstract from Koskotas prison interviews with Time regarding the allegations of bribery: “Koskotas 
charges that millions of dollars missing from his bank were actually payoffs that went directly to the 
head of the government, Andreas Papandreou, and PASOK officials. The Prime Minister, says the 
banker, personally authorized the plan to loot the Bank of Crete. Koskotas describes as well his own 
illegal complicity in the huge swindle, one that involves enormous sums hard to account for 
adequately. The plot was an audacious one. To create the pool of crooked money, PASOK leaders had 
for three years ordered state-managed corporations such as the Post Office, the Organization of Urban 
Transportation and the State Pharmaceutical Co. to transfer large bank deposits -- the country's 
money, in effect -- out of the big national banks into the Bank of Crete, then the / smallest private bank 
in the country. There, Koskotas says, he arranged for the government deposits to draw an exceptionally 
low rate of interest, only 2% or 3%. Bank savings accounts in Greece routinely draw 15% interest. The 
excess interest earned on the government deposits was siphoned off and went straight to the politicians, 
he says. In addition, protected and encouraged by Papandreou, Koskotas secretly plowed Bank of 
Crete funds into his magazines and newspapers.In the past year, says Koskotas, some 40 shipments of 
money, in blue briefcases stuffed with 5,000-drachma notes, were carted out of the Bank of Crete and 
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the elections of June 1989 made it hard for the first party to form a government on its 
own128. New Democracy129, the right wing party, won the elections but was forced to 
form a coalition government with the left wing party, Coalition130. It was agreed that 
                                                                                                                                            
taken first to his own residence. There the banker handed the money over to a Papandreou confidant, 
Georgios Louvaris, who Koskotas says made the deliveries to the Prime Minister. Pickups occurred 
weekly and amounted over the year to more than 3 billion drachmas ($20 million at today's rates). In 
addition, Koskotas claims he personally carried a total of half a billion drachmas ($3.3 million) to the 
home of a Deputy Prime Minister, Menios Koutsogiorgas. At the Bank of Crete half a dozen other 
PASOK leaders twice a month received briefcases filled with money totaling 1.5 billion drachmas ($10 
million). There was little danger of interference. Fifty different national audits of the Bank of Crete that 
might have uncovered the scheme were squelched over the years by PASOK officials, says Koskotas, 
twice by direct calls from Papandreou. In the summer of 1988, the government muscled through a 
special Secrecy Act that had the effect of guaranteeing its overdrawn banker financial confidentiality. 
Koskotas says he was directed to pay an additional $2 million to then Deputy Prime Minister 
Koutsogiorgas as a reward for managing the legislation”. Time Magazine, article entitled “Scandals 
the looting of Greece”, by Robert Ajemian, Available at: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957221-2,00.html, date of access: 03.07.2010. 
According to New York Times: “Andreas Papandreou described Time as ''the organ of the American 
establishment'' and the contents of the article as a ''historically unique collection of despicable 
allegations.'' He said he had instructed his lawyers to sue the magazine for libel and defamation both 
in Greece and abroad”, by Paul Anastasi, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/09/world/papandreou-linked-to-scandal-charges-plot.html, date of 
access: 03.07.2010 
128 Verney (1990) states: “Meanwhile towards the end of Pasok’s second term in office, it became 
apparent that the party could not expect another independent majority . . .Therefore, following a long-
established Greek government tradition, Pasok passed a new electoral law designed to maintain its 
own grip on government. The new law aimed to avert a New Democracy electoral victory while 
continuing to favour the two major parties at the expense of the third. The former reinforced 
proportional system would have given ND a straight parliamentary majority in June 1989, resulting in 
a simple alteration in power between the two major parties without upsetting the tradition of one-party 
government. In contrast, “pure” PR would have made a one-party majority almost unattainable. The 
new law created a hybrid system, somewhere between the two, which, according to Synaspismos 
(Coalition) deputy and psephologist, Manolis Drettakis, deprived the left-wing coalition of 13 
parliamentary seats in June, 12 in November and 10 in April. This was due to the controversial “plus 
one” clause, which based the first distribution in each constituency on the number of parliamentary 
seats to be shared out plus one. Because of this clause, a one-party government could be formed with a 
majority of a little over 46.5 per cent”.  
129 It is a liberal right political party, and was founded in October 4th 1974 by Konstantinos Karamanlis. 
The party won the national elections in 1990, 2004 and 2007. 
130 The Coalition (Synaspismos) was an electoral alliance between the Communist Party of Greece 
(Charilaos Florakis) and EAR (Greek Left led by Leonidas Kirkos) created before the national elections 
of June 1989. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was founded in 1918. It was one of the few 
European communist parties that did not follow the line of Eurocommunism, and managed to survive 
the ideological crisis created by the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe during 1989-1991. 
On the other hand, the party of the Greek Left (EAR) was formed in 1987 following the self-dissolution 
of the Eurocommunist party (KKE-Esoterikou). Other small left-oriented parties, groups and 
personalities also participated in the new party.  Thus, the Coalition (Synaspismos) became the 
regulator of the political situation after the elections of 1989 since no party could form a government 
on its own.  The Coalition faced a dilemma: either support the proclamation of new elections and take 
political responsibility for the avoidance of indictment of the defendants for the scandals to the Special 
Court or cooperate with the party of the right. The final decision of the leaders of the left was based 
upon moral necessity, and political calculation. They felt that they had the moral obligation to proceed 
to political cleansing, whereas prosecution of their political rivals would create an internal crisis to 
PASOK and, therefore, strengthen their own party in future elections.  The Coalition was accused of 
having facilitated the access of the party of the right to power in 1990. That was one of the main issues 
that caused the split within the Communist Party of Greece in 1991. The ideological crisis created by 
the fall of the communist regimes was undoubtedly another major reason for that split. A significant 
number of its members (15 members of the Central Committee and dozens of executives) joined the 
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the Tzannetakis government, as it was called from the name of the prime minister, 
would have a limited term - three months - and only two responsibilities: first, to 
launch a criminal investigation over the scandals131 that had forced the previous 
socialist government to call elections on June 1989 and, second, to prepare fair 
elections under the current electoral law132. The Politburo of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party, in a statement on July 4, 1989 announced that cohabitation 
"was the only possible solution to promote in a certain period of time the political 
cleansing, the democratic functioning of institutions, the reduction of partisanship in 
the public sector, the limitation of state repression, the regulation of the broadcasting 
sector in order to steer the country towards fair elections”.  
According to article 1, par. 1 of the Constitution of Greece the form of government is 
that of a parliamentary republic. Head of the State is the President of the Republic 
who is elected by Parliament, and has no real political power133. Lijphart (1984; 1999) 
applies a two dimensional classification of democracies based upon the majoritarian-
consensual dichotomy134. Greece not only pertains to the majoritarian model of 
                                                                                                                                            
party of the Greek Left and created a united party under the name of the former electoral alliance, 
Coalition. The split between the parties of the left was irrevocable.  
131 On August 23, 1989 Parliament dealt with the scandal of the Yugoslavian corn, and former Minister 
of Finance, Nikos Athanassopoulos, was indicted in the Special Court. On September 21, 1989, 
Andreas Papandreou was indicted by Parliament in the Special Court for the case of telephone tapping. 
On September 27, 1989, Andreas Papandreou together with four ex-ministers of his government, 
Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas, Georgios Petsos, Dimitris Tsovolas and Panagiotis Roumeliotis were 
indicted by Parliament in the Special Court for the Koskotas scandal. Witnesses did not provide any 
evidence sufficient for the conviction of the ex-Prime Minister. Panagiotis Roumeliotis was a member 
of the European Parliament at the time of the trial and the European Parliament denied the waiver of his 
immunity. Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas died after a stroke suffered in the courtroom. On January 16, 
1992 the Special Court declared Andreas Papandreou innocent regarding the Koskotas scandal. 
Dimitris Tsovolas was sentenced to two years and six months imprisonment and was deprived of his 
political rights for three years. Georgios Petsos was sentenced to ten months imprisonment and was 
deprived of his political rights for two years. On May 15, 1992 Parliament suspended the prosecution 
of Andreas Papandreou for the case of telephone tapping. On November 26, 1993 parliament consented 
to grant an act of grace and the waiver of the legal consequences for the conviction of Dimitris 
Tsovolas. The period called “dirty ‘89” or “clearance” (katharsis) typically ended on January 17, 1994 
when Parliament consented to the waiver of the legal consequences for the conviction of Nikos 
Athanassopoulos for the case of the Yugoslavian corn.  
132 The coalition of the parties of the Left and Right ended on October, 7 1989 after completion of the 
indictments to the Special Court. No party could form a government after the elections of November 5, 
1989. Unsuccessful exploratory mandates led to the agreement of the three parties, PASOK, New 
Democracy, and Coalition, to form the “ecumenical government”, as it was called, under eminent 
economist and academic Xenophon Zolotas. That cooperation severely damaged the credibility of 
politicians. Moreover, it was assumed that the crusade for “cleansing” was simply a political invention 
of the adversaries of PASOK in order to gain power. The head of  New Democracy, the right wing 
party, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, undermined the alliance, and shortly thereafter  the government fell 
when it failed to elect the President of the Republic. The party of the right won once again the elections 
of April 8, 1990 but still could not form a government. One seat was missing, and Theodoros Katsikis, 
the only elected deputy from the party of Democratic Renewal (DIANA), joined the parliamentary 
group of New Democracy. 
133 The constitutional amendments in 1986 eliminated all of the special powers of the President, thus 
transforming the political system into a pure form of parliamentary democracy. In practice, this transfer 
of power signalled the beginning of an era where the Prime Minister became a “parliamentary 
autocrat”, thus further enhancing the traditional predominant role of the executive in relation to the 
legislature (Lijphart, Bruneau, Diamandouros, 1988; Pridham and Verney, 1991). 
134 Lijphart (1999) states: “Defining democracy as “government by and for the people” raises a 
fundamental question: who will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be 
responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences? One answer to this 
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democracy, but also represents one of its purest forms after New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. Moreover, it is “literally the most eccentric” case among the group 
of the Southern European Democracies, that is, Italy, Spain and Portugal (Lijphart, 
Bruneau, Diamandouros, 1988)135. The coalition governments of 1989-1990136 
represent a short interval of consensual governance which was actually the result of a 
crisis. The majoritarian model was reconstituted by the electoral system of the 
reinforced proportional representation passed by the Mitsotakis government shortly 
after its rise to power by the law 1907/1990.  
 
Within this context, Greece pertains to the group of the classical liberal democracies 
where Parliament abstains from the selection of the officials in public administration. 
The executive exclusively appoints high ranking public officials and civil servants. 
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution 1975/1986 (article 46) provided that 
“The President of the Republic shall appoint and dismiss public servants, in 
accordance with the law, except in cases specified by law137”, whereas article 26 par 1 
and 2, establishing the principle of the separation of powers, provide that “the 
                                                                                                                                            
dilemma is: the majority of the people. This is the essence of the majoritarian model of democracy. . . 
The alternative answer to the dilemma is: as many people as possible. This is the crux of the consensus 
model.  . . The majoritarian model concentrates political power in the hands of a bare majority – and 
often even merely a plurality instead of a majority, whereas the consensus model tries to share, 
disperse and limit power in a variety of ways. A closely related difference is that the majoritarian 
model of democracy is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is 
characterised by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise; for this reason, consensus democracy 
could also be termed “negotiation democracy” (Kaiser 1997, 434)”. 
135 In their Comparative Empirical Analysis, both models, that is, the majoritarian and the consensual, 
cluster along two dimensions: a. the executives-parties dimension, which comprises five variables 
pertaining to the party and electoral systems and of the arrangement of executive power, and b. the 
federal-unitary dimension, which consists of three variables related to government centralisation, 
constitutional flexibility, and bicameralism versus unicameralism. The analysis for Greece covers the 
period from 1974, when the first regular parliamentary elections took place after the fall of the 
authoritarian regime (junta), to 1986. The profile of Greece in the first dimension is “clearly 
majoritarian”. The findings of the research show that Greece has minimal winning and durable 
cabinets. It has a near two-party system (an average of 2.1 effective parties) due to the Greek electoral 
law that implements a “reinforced Proportional Representation” which, in turn, ends up in electoral 
disproportionality (7.6 per cent). With regard to the fifth characteristic, which refers to the dimensions 
of the programmatic differences among the two major parties, Greece deviates from straight 
majoritarianism since partisan conflict is not restricted to socio-economic policy. Other issue 
dimensions come also into play (regime support, foreign policy, post-materialist issues) that in the 
authors’ opinion would rather be attenuated in the future, especially the dimension of foreign policy. 
Such an evolution would strengthen even more the majoritarian orientation of the system. On the 
second dimension, the federal-unitary, Greece’s profile is equally majoritarian. It is unitary and 
centralised (government centralisation percentage of 96 per cent). It has a unicameral parliament and a 
rigid constitution since it may only be revised by a qualified majority. The profile of the majoritarian 
system, as presented in the study, corresponds to the current political and institutional reality.   
136 Pridham and Verney (1991) state: “Both coalitions were unorthodox in composition. The 
Tzannetakis government, from July to October 1989, united two parties from opposite ends of the 
political spectrum, the conservative New Democracy (ND) and the communist-dominated Coalition of 
the Forces of the Left and Progress, (known as Synaspismos or more simply Syn), thus bypassing the 
left-of centre PASOK. This governmental alliance was all the more surprising, since the ideological 
distance between ND and Synaspismos has been described as the widest Left/Right divide among the 
12 European Community member-states. The second coalition, the 'ecumenical' cabinet led by Zolotas, 
in government from November 1989 to February 1990, consisted of all three major parties, which 
between them controlled 98 per cent of the vote and 298 out of 300 parliamentary seats. This suggests 
that it was one of the most broadly based governments in the annals of contemporary West European 
politics”. 
137 The power of appointment is allocated to the Cabinet or the competent Minister. 
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legislative powers shall be exercised by the Parliament and the President of the 
Republic” and “the executive powers shall be exercised by the President of the 
Republic and the Government”. If we apply a formalist approach, Article 26 may be 
interpreted as a clause where expressio unius est excludio alterius (the expression of 
one thing is the exclusion of the other). Moreover, there were no exceptions, thus 
allocating the power of selection to other organs inside government, in the sense of 
the intersection of functions, or outside government. Finally, Article 52, par. 1, and 2 
of the Code of Civil Servants, Presidential Decree 611/1977, provided that “high 
ranking civil servants shall be appointed by presidential decree, whereas all other 
civil servants shall be appointed by ministerial decision. Clauses providing for an/the 
appointment by decision of another organ are kept in force. Civil servants working for 
legal persons of public 1aw are appointed by an act of the Board, whereas clauses 
providing for the appointment by an act of another organ of the legal person, or by 
presidential decree or by an act of the Cabinet, or the Ministers are kept in force”.  
 
The discussions in Parliament prove that there were no objections or considerations 
regarding the constitutionality of the appointments clause138, that is, the members’ 
nomination and appointment by the executive.  On the contrary, the Rapporteur of the 
Majority clearly stated that the draft law sought to disconnect the new authority from 
the government, and thus the power of the selection was allocated to the political 
parties and representatives from relevant societal groups. The Rapporteur’s 
argumentation was functionalist since it insinuated that the need for independence 
from the executive justified the violation of the principle of the separation of powers. 
The concerns expressed by the MPs were rather superficial, and had a bargaining 
character in relation to which societal groups should be represented in the Council. 
Another disagreement concerned the issue of the members’ impartiality in the 
discharge of their duties. Some MPs from Pasok supported that the guarantees of 
personal and functional independence were violated since the members of the Council 
would follow orders and instructions from their respective political parties or social 
groups139.  Hence, the MPs of the majority claimed that the political parties could 
select individuals of high standing who were not their members. Moreover, in their 
opinion, the appointed members would not act as mandataries of the political parties. 
This view was also popular in theory since “the intervention of the latter [the political 
parties] starts and ends at the stage of the nomination” (Oikonomou, 1999). 
Nevertheless, in his speech, Manolis Drettakis from the Coalition disclosed 
information since he claimed that eventually all the political parties had agreed upon 
the idea of an interparty committee.  
 
With regard to the sources of inspiration of the appointments clause, the Rapporteur 
of the Majority made reference to relevant paradigms from France, Germany, and the 
U.K. stating that in all European countries there was an effort to avoid the interference 
of the government in the constitution of the authorities. Nevertheless, this was not 
quite true. On the other hand, despite the fact that the reference to the case of 
                                                 
138 Only Theodoros Pangalos (Pasok) doubted the compatibility of the corporatist character of the 
composition of the board with the current political system, thus indirectly posing a problem of 
constitutionality of the selection mechanism. 
139 Most of the time, the representatives of societal groups are simultaneously members of political 
parties. 
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Germany did not provide any detailed information on the selection mechanism140, the 
appointments clause was in practice inspired by the German model141. We could argue 
that the selection mechanism provided for in the German legislation could be 
described as an outlier in the late eighties. Indeed, in many jurisdictions, such as the 
United States142, Canada143, the Netherlands144, the United Kingdom145, and 
                                                 
140 The case of Germany is invoked twice in the discussions. The first time, it was the Rapporteur of the 
Majority who stated: “In Germany bodies of the Polity participate in a relevant committee representing 
the minority in the organ”. The second time, the Minister of the Presidency of the Government, stated: 
“In Western Germany, state participation represents the minority [in the organ], something that almost 
tends to happen in our case too”. These references are vague, and not easily understood in case 
someone is not acquainted with the German legislation.  
141 The German Constitution establishes a dual system of broadcasting – public as well as commercial- 
operating under the jurisdiction of the German Länder. This decentralised system was the result of an 
all-round consensus justified by the need to avoid the use of the media for propaganda purposes by a 
one-party government as in the period of the Nazi dictatorship. Furthermore, separate authorities 
regulate the public and private broadcasters at the Länder level. There are fourteen State Media 
Authorities monitoring commercial radio and television at State level, whereas State laws provide for 
the composition of their boards and the selection mechanism. They are pluralistically composed 
councils nominated by societal groups – the political parties included-, specified in the media laws, and 
state parliaments. Nevertheless, the representatives of the political parties and state parliaments 
constitute a minority in the organs. The public broadcasters are monitored by internal pluralistic bodies 
composed of elected representatives from the federal legislature, political parties, trade unions, 
religious communities and business and cultural organisations. Yet, according to the Independent Study 
on “indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States – towards a risk based approach”, “there has 
repeatedly been criticism as well as legal challenges against the inclusion of party representatives” 
since there seems to be an “incompatibility of political mandate with membership in media advisory or 
regulatory bodies” (Preliminary Final Report prepared for the European Commission, 2009). Available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/pfr_report.pdf, date of 
access: 01.07.2010. There is a continuing debate over the reform of broadcasting regulation in 
Germany. More specifically, there are reform proposals suggesting that the regulation of the 
commercial and public broadcasting should be transferred to the State Media Authorities, whereas the 
representative character of the boards should be substituted for expert councils (Expertenräte). 
Information available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/public-service-broadcasters-under-pressure-
german-broadcasters-face-convergence, date of access: 01.07.2010, Television across Europe: 
Regulation, Policy and Independence, Open Society Institute, Monitoring Reports, 2005, available at: 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/media/articles_publications/publications/eurotv_20051011/summary_2
0051011.pdf, date of access: 01.07.2010, The Official Website of the State Media Authorities for 
Broadcasting in Germany, available at: http://www.alm.de/338.html, date of access: 01.07.2010, 
European Platform of Regulatory Authorities, available at: www.epra.org, date of access: 01.07.2010, 
Information note on Public Service Broadcasting in Germany, available at: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/sec/library/0506in27e.pdf, date of access: 1.07.2010 
142 According to its official website “the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an 
independent agency established by the Communications Act of 1934, and is charged with regulating 
interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. It is directed 
by five Commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for 5-year terms”. 
Consequently, the appointments clause is consistent with Article 2, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. 
Information available at: http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html, date of access: 14.10.2010. 
143 According to the Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission Act, (R.S., 1985, 
c. C-22) “3. (1) There is hereby established a commission, to be known as the Canadian 
Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission, consisting of not more than thirteen fulltime 
members and not more than six part-time members, to be appointed by the Governor in Council”. 
Available at: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/C/C-22.pdf , date of access: 14.10.2010. The clause 
follows the common practice applied to all appointments in the executive, as described hereafter: 
“Officials from the sponsoring Minister's Office must consult with the Director of Appointments in the 
Prime Minister's Office prior to transmitting a recommendation for appointment to the Governor in 
Council.  Officials preparing a recommendation must also consult their legal advisor to ensure that the 
recommendation meets the requirements of the law. Governor in Council appointments are made by the 
Governor General, on the advice of the Queen's Privy Council of Canada.  Information available at: 
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Ireland146, relevant legislation allocated the power of the nomination and appointment 
to the executive, or to put it differently, the legislative texts did not violate the 
respective constitutional constraints regarding the appointment of public officials, as 
was the case with Greece. The Greek legislator147 was inspired by an unfamiliar 
appointments system deriving from the German corporatist tradition combined with 
the specific historical conditions in Germany after World War II. Moreover, the 
appointments clause claimed pan-European originality in the sense that the majority 
of the members of the board were directly nominated by the political parties148. 
 
b. The National Council for Radio and Television, Law 2173/1993:  Phase II – 
Embrangling the organ of the Conference of Presidents of Parliament in the selection 
mechanism  
i. The Appointments Clause 
Shortly after the victory of the socialist party (PASOK) in the premature elections of 
October 10, 1993149, the newly elected government amended article 2 of the law 
1866/1999. The amended appointments clause constituted a composite act, 
comprising two phases: i) direct nomination of the members and their alternates by 
the political parties, and nomination of the President and his alternate by the Speaker 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.pco bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=secretariats&sub=oic-ddc&doc=procedure-
processus-eng.htm#n11, date of access: 14.10.2010. 
144 The Media Act of 1987 in Netherlands provided that “The Media Authority shall consist of a 
chairperson and two or four other members. They shall be appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree 
upon the recommendation of Our Minister”. Available at: 
http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/eur/arch/ned/mediaact.pdf, date of access: 14.10.2010. 
145 According to the Official Website of OFCOM, the all-encompassing Communications Regulator in 
the U.K., “the Independent Television Commission (ITC) was formed by the Broadcasting Act of 1990 
to replace the television regulation functions of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (formed by the 
Broadcasting Act 1954) and Cable Authority”. In both regulators the members of the boards were 
appointed by the competent Ministers.  Available at: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/about_the_itc/the_structure/index.html, date of access: 
14.10.2010. 
146 According to the Radio and Television Act, of 1988 “There shall stand established, on such day as 
the Minister by order appoints a body to be known as An Coimisiún Um Raidio agus Telefís 
Neamhspleách [the Independent Radio and Television Commission]”. Information available at: 
http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/NR/rdonlyres/5614BA26-80E0-4C8C-A36E-
45A0C9B4008A/0/RadioandTelevisionAct1988.pdf, date of access: 14.10.2010 
147 As early as the mid-1970s, Greek scholars were influenced and acquainted with the German model. 
With regard to the monitoring of public broadcasting, Georgios Koumandos stated: “The proposed 
solution is: the constitution of a broad council for radio and television where various s o c i a l  g r o u 
p s could be represented, groups of different structure and function. This council would purposely be 
multimember and heterogeneous – this would precisely serve the purposes of internal 
representativeness and polyphony in order to reduce to the greatest possible extent any chance of 
effective governmental pressures” (Koumandos, 1975).  
148 In Germany as well as in other jurisdictions, which partly adopted the system of party representation 
in the boards of relevant authorities in the 1990s, the political parties indirectly participated in the 
nomination of their representatives, that is, through parliamentary procedure (Robillard cited in 
Oikonomou, 1999). The MP of Pasok Nikolaos Sifounakis, in his speech, supported this option instead 
of the system of direct nomination.   
149 On September 9, 1993, Georgios Simpilidis, Member of Parliament with the parliamentary group of 
New Democracy, declared himself independent, and the Mitsotakis government lost parliamentary 
majority.  
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of Parliament upon proposal of the Conference of Presidents, and ii) official 
appointment with an executive veto by the competent Minister150.  
 
ii. Discussions in Parliament, comments and interpretation 
The discussions and debates of the draft law151 “Reconstitution of the National 
Council for Radio and Television, establishment of the National Committee for 
Electronic Mass Media152” in principal and in particulars in the Greek Parliament153, 
proved that the political parties in Parliament succeeded in achieving a co-decisional 
procedure for  the appointment of the president of the National Council for Radio and 
Television and his alternate, through the collective parliamentary organ of the 
Conference of Presidents. The initial proposal of the government regarding the 
appointment of the President and his alternate provided that it was the Speaker of 
Parliament who would nominate them. However, many MPs of the major opposition, 
as well as some MPs from the governing party disagreed with the measure. They 
argued that any weaknesses of the Council would be assigned to the Speaker whose 
high prestige should be protected against party antagonisms and confrontations. As 
for criticisms expressed against the members’ direct nomination by the political 
parties, the Rapporteur of the Majority, Dimitrios Palaiothodoros (PASOK), blamed 
the major opposition for hypocrisy.  
The first amendment of the appointments clause of the National Council for Radio 
and Television proved to be even more innovative and original compared to its initial 
version. First, it diverged from its German prototype in the sense that the socially 
relevant groups, with the exception of the political parties, were excluded from the 
selection mechanism. Second, the power of the nomination of the President of the 
authority and his alternate was initially allocated to the Speaker of Parliament, and 
                                                 
150 The Minister had the discretion to scrutinize the nominations, thus rejecting any proposal that was 
contrary to the preconditions set forth in article 2, par. 4 of the law.  Finally, the official act of the 
appointment should be a presidential decree and not a ministerial decision since according to the Code 
of Civil Servants in force “high ranking civil servants shall be appointed by presidential decree”.  
151 See Appendix 2, 2 for abstracts from the discussions. 
152 Art. 2 of law 2173/1993 transferred the representatives of the socially relevant groups provided for 
in the law 1866/1999 to the newly established National Committee for Electronic Mass Media. It was a 
broad collective organ constituted by the members of the National Council for Radio and Television 
and the members of social groups under a common president, that of the NCRTV. Its competences 
were rather vague since it was the NCRTV that would decide whether issues of major interest 
pertaining to its competences should be relegated to the National Committee for Electronic Mass 
Media. The inactivity of the organ led to its disbandment (Law 2644/1998, art. 23), and, instead, the 
NCRTV could occasionally take the opinion of the socially relevant groups (Law 2644/1998, art. 15, 
par. 4).  
153 Minutes of Parliament, 8th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, 
Session 24 discussion and debate in principal February 8, 1993, and Session 25, discussion and debate 
in particulars February 9, 1993 available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-
Olomeleias?search=on&DateFrom=07%2F12%2F1993&DateTo=10%2F12%2F1993, date of access: 
07.07.2010. The draft law was marked as urgent by the Government. According to the Minutes of the 
Standing Committee on Public Administration, Public Order and Justice, the Rapporteur of the Major 
Opposition, Vasilis Magginas, criticised the government for its practice to urgently pass legislation of 
such relevance. Available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-
Nomothetikou-Ergou?law_id=0a73af1a-5ea7-4626-83e3-5ab4fe997f6d, date of access: 07.07.2010. 
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finally to the collective organ of the Conference of Presidents of Parliament. 
Nevertheless, such nomination competences were not provided for in the Constitution.  
 
The Scientific Report of Parliament expressed no reservations in relation to the 
constitutionality of the appointments clause. It simply restricted itself to comments of 
a purely theoretical value revolving around the abolition of the internal plurality of the 
organ, on the one hand, and the enhancement of the arithmetic predominance of the 
party of the majority through the allocation of the nomination power to the Speaker of 
Parliament. More specifically, the text of the report rather sought to stigmatise the 
legislator’s inconsistency with theoretical views154 which emphasized that the need 
for the internal plurality of the organ was a constitutional demand.  
 
The Rapporteur of the majority acknowledged the fact that the authority was not 
constitutionally consolidated, and, in our opinion, that remark was indirectly linked 
not only to accountability considerations, but also to the issue of the selection 
mechanism. Nevertheless, a functionalist approach was once more applied to justify 
the governmental choices. Thus, the idea of a joint participation of all the political 
parties and the Speaker of Parliament in the nomination-selection procedure created a 
new perception of the actors who would be accountable to the people. A principle of 
collective accountability incorporating the whole political system is introduced, thus 
substituting the classical idea of the political responsibility of the elected government 
for this new perception of political accountability. Moreover, the independence of the 
authority from the government was further guaranteed by allocating the authority of 
nomination-selection to the Speaker of Parliament.  
 
Interestingly enough, the special speaker of the Political Spring (Polan), suggested 
that the Parliament should elect the members of the authority by a qualified majority 
of three-fifths. The proposal was equally unconstitutional, but it reflected the 
emerging functionalist theoretical views and trends which constituted the new 
orthodoxy of appointments in the case of independent authorities. On the other hand, 
opposition MPs as well as majority MPs put pressure to achieve interparty 
participation in the process of the nomination of the president and his alternate. With 
regard to the tension created with respect to the enhancement of partisanship in the 
Council, and the exclusion of the social groups from its composition, the Rapporteur 
of the majority disclosed information. He claimed that they had reached consensus on 
those issues during the discussions in the Standing Committee.  
 
Finally, the deputy Minister of the Presidency of the Government, Evangelos 
Venizelos, satisfied the camouflaged demand of the MPs to create an interparty 
nomination procedure for the president and his alternate. He proposed the interference 
of the collective organ of the Conference of Presidents of Parliament in the selection 
mechanism. All MPs welcomed the new proposal. Moreover, the MP of the major 
                                                 
154 The Scientific Report cites relevant references to prove that many Greek scholars had supported 
such views.  The legislator himself, the deputy Minister of the Presidency of the Government, Professor 
Evangelos Venizelos, stated in an article which made reference to the appointments clause of the law 
1866/1989 that: “The constitution of that organ [the National Council for Radio and Television] and 
the selection mechanism of its members do not positively predispose for the degree of the de facto 
personal and functional independence of their members. On the other hand, this internal plurality 
regarding the constitution of the organ is in itself a positive evolution and a considerable safeguard” 
(Venizelos, 1989).  
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opposition, Vassilios Magginas, tried to decode the exact procedure they had to adopt 
since the appointments clause was not transparent on the issue. He suggested that, 
after consultation among representatives of the political parties, their proposals would 
be submitted to the Conference of Presidents, which, in turn, would formulate an 
opinion, and the Speaker of Parliament would finally decide.  
 
iii. The organ of the Conference of Presidents  
 
One of the major innovations of the Standing Orders of 1987 was the introduction of 
the collective interparty organ of the Conference of Presidents of Parliament155. The 
main duties assigned to it under the Standing Orders were to take decisions on the 
organization of Parliament’s work and issues of legislative planning and 
parliamentary review. At the time of the discussions of the draft law, the body was 
composed of the Speaker of Parliament, as President, the Deputy Speakers of 
Parliament, the Presidents of the standing and special committees, the Presidents of 
the Parliamentary Groups156, and one independent MP as representative of the 
independents. The organ took its decisions by the absolute majority of the present 
members, unless otherwise specified by other provisions of the Standing Orders. In 
the case of a tie vote, a casting vote is given to the president of the body, that is, the 
Speaker of Parliament.  
 
The amendment of the Standing Orders in 1987 represented a wide reform in the 
whole operation of the Hellenic Parliament. The innovative institutions of the 
interparty Chair and the Conference of Presidents introduced the perception of a 
consensual approach in the organisation and function of Parliament. The 
establishment of the organ of the Conference of Presidents157, which intervenes in the 
organisation of the discussions in Parliament in relation to the legislative work and 
parliamentary review, was inspired by relevant institutions in the European 
Parliament, France, Belgium, and other jurisdictions. With regard to its composition, 
the legislator imitated the French paradigm158, at least at this introductory phase of the 
                                                 
155 Standing Orders of the Greek Parliament, Chapter 4, article 13 entitled “Composition-convocation”, 
and article 14 entitled “Competences” (Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 106/24.06.1987). 
156 During the discussions held in Parliament on the amendment of the Standing Orders in 1987, 
Athanasios Kanellopoulos, MP of New Democracy, clarified the term “Presidents of the Parliamentary 
Groups” by stating that: “The President of the parliamentary section or the parliamentary group is not 
the President of the party. The President of the party is a broader concept which covers both 
parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians. The President of the parliamentary group is identified 
with the Parliamentary Representative. He is the one the Germans call “Fraktionsvorsitzender”. That 
is its characteristic. We call the President of the party, President of the parliamentary group”. Minutes 
of Parliament in Plenary, Session 131, June 3, 1987, p. 6659. 
157 Virginia Tsouderou, an independent MP who collaborated with the right wing party of New 
Democracy in the national elections of 1985, was against the system of organised discussions in 
Parliament. She stated that: “When most discussions in Parliament shall be held according to the 
system of organised discussion following the decisions of the Conference of Presidents, the 
backbenchers will have no possibility to speak; they will be even more dependent on their parties, on 
the allocation that their parties will do. If an MP has a different opinion on an issue, an opinion which 
creates a problem for his party, he will not be able to express it since he will not be assigned to give a 
speech. Thus, the independence of the backbencher is even more degraded, and progress is harmed 
since in essence original-unorthodox opinions will not be heard”. Minutes of Parliament in Plenary, 
Session 129, June 1, 1987, p. 6594. 
158 The Conference of Presidents was created in 1911. According to the Standing Orders of the French 
National Assembly: “The following are members by right: the President of the National Assembly, who 
convenes the Conference and presides over it; the six Vice Presidents; the Chairmen of the six standing 
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institution. Nevertheless, the voting system adopted by the organ followed the normal 
parliamentary procedure, which assumes that each member's vote carries equal 
weight, and thus was differentiated from the French model or the one adopted by the 
relevant organ of the European Parliament. Despite the fact that voting is rare at the 
Conference of Presidents in France, the Presidents of the Parliamentary Groups, in 
case there is a voting process, are allocated “a number of votes equal to the number of 
members of the group” according to Rule 48, par. 7 of the Standing Orders. A similar 
weighted voting system based on the number of members in each political group is 
adopted by the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament159.  
 
Yet, the Conference of Presidents of the Hellenic Parliament was not constitutionally 
consolidated, and thus its fluctuating composition could be amended by the Standing 
Orders. Moreover, it did not have the representative character of the other 
parliamentary committees, in the sense that it was not established in proportion to the 
strength of parties, groups and independents in Parliament, as prescribed in article 68, 
par. 3 of the Constitution160. Thus, the governing party on its own had the majority of 
the three-fifths in the organ161. However, the allocation of a competence regarding the 
formulation of an opinion for the selection of high ranking public functionaries in the 
organ of the Conference of Presidents constituted, and still constitutes a worldwide 
originality.  
 
iv. The jurisprudence of the Council of State  
 
Not surprisingly, the appointments clause was challenged in court. The Decision No 
944 of the year 1999 of the Division E of the Council of State162 is of great interest 
since the Court applied a formalist approach on separation of powers issues. However, 
the Division E referred the case to the Plenary Session of the Court due to its 
relevance. The Decision No 656 of the year 2000163 of the Council of State in Plenum 
reversed the decision of the Division E based on a purely functionalist approach.  
                                                                                                                                            
committees and, where applicable, of a special committee; the chairmen of the groups. In addition 
there is the general Rapporteur of the Finance Committee and, since 1995, the Chairman of the 
Delegation for the European Union, a sign of the influence acquired by this body. The Government is 
represented on the Chairmen’s Conference by one of its members, customarily the minister tasked with 
relations with Parliament”. Available at: http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/english/main_bodies.asp#1_4_3, date of access: 17.10.2010. 
159 According to Rule 24, par. 1, 3 and 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament: “The 
Conference of Presidents shall consist of the President of Parliament and the Chairs of the political 
groups. The Chair of a political group may arrange to be represented by a member of that group. The 
Conference of Presidents shall endeavour to reach a consensus on matters referred to it. Where a 
consensus cannot be reached, the matter shall be put to a vote subject to a weighting based on the 
number of Members in each political group”. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+RULES-EP+20100705+RULE-
024+DOC+XML+V0//EN, date of access: 17.10.2010. 
160 Article 68, par. 3 of the Constitution 1975/1986 read as follows: “Parliamentary and investigation 
committees, as well as Sections of Parliament specified in articles 70 and 71 shall be established in pro 
portion to the strength of parties, groups and independents, as specified by the Standing Orders”. 
161 Many MPs of the major opposition, the right wing party, had stressed the lack of representativeness 
of the organ during the discussions on the amendment of the Standing Orders in 1987. Minutes of 
Parliament in Plenary, Session 131, June 1, 1987, pp 6659.  
162 Decision 944/1999, E Division of the Council of State, available at: 
http://www.dsanet.gr/1024x768Auth.htm, date of access: 18.10.2010.  
163 Decision 656/2000 of the Council of State in Plenum, available at: 
http://www.dsanet.gr/1024x768Auth.htm, date of access: 18.10.2010.  
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More specifically, the party of the Democratic Social Movement submitted a request 
for annulment of the ministerial decision regarding the constitution of the National 
Council for Radio and Television since it was not represented in the Council despite 
the fact that it had entered Parliament, and obtained nine seats164 in the national 
elections of 1996. The Court judged that a major constitutional issue was raised in 
relation to the nomination of the members of the Council by the political parties, and 
exercised an incidental review irrespective of the reasons invoked in the request for 
annulment165. The majority of the Court opined that: “. . . The fulfilment of the 
purposes of state scrutiny over radio and television, that is, the safeguard of the 
impartiality and the level of the quality of their programmes, is directly linked to the 
proper structure of the state organ where the scrutiny of the programmes is assigned. 
The nature of this scrutiny is demonstrably administrative, and consequently the 
organ pertains to the executive power according to the constitutional demand, and 
irrespective of whether it pertains to the administrative hierarchy. On the other hand, 
under the current system of impartial and professional Administration, the 
supervisory organ, if it is collective, should be constituted, by majority, by public 
functionaries having acquired the relevant qualifications, and appointed through a 
procedure guaranteeing their personal independence. Moreover, according to the 
principle of the separation of functions, the appointment, and generally the 
nomination of the administrative organs takes place within the state, and through a 
selection assigned to its organs. The participation of the parties or other private 
organizations in this procedure is constitutionally impermissible. The parties are 
political organizations clearly distinct from the state, and therefore, it cannot be 
considered that they may express its will. Consequently, the political parties cannot 
nominate members of collective administrative organs of the state”.   
 
It is obvious that the Court interpreted the Constitution in a strict manner, and invoked 
the principle of the separation of powers, thus applying a formalist approach towards 
the constitutionality of the appointments clause. Thus, the Council was considered as 
a collective administrative organ166 pertaining to the executive branch of government, 
irrespective of the existence or lack of hierarchical oversight. Consequently, the 
nomination and appointment of its members should only be assigned to organs of the 
state, that is, individual or collective organs of the executive167. Therefore, the Court 
                                                 
164 The party took 4,43% of the votes and occupied the fifth place in Parliament. Nevertheless, the law 
2173/1993 did not provide for the representation of a fifth party in the constitution of the National 
Council for Radio and Television. The MP of Pasok, Nikolaos Sifounakis, had already expressed his 
concern regarding the numerus clausus of the political parties that could nominate their representatives 
in the Council during the discussions of the initial appointments clause of the law 1866/1989. 
Moreover, the Scientific Report of Parliament on the draft law “Reconstitution of the National Council 
for Radio and Television, establishment of the National Committee for Electronic Mass Media” had 
equally stressed the impact of future electoral results on the nomination procedure by the political 
parties.  
165 The majority of the Court equally opined that the ministerial decision should be annulled since the 
Appointments Clause was unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the principle of the equal 
treatment of the political parties.   
166 However, the Council of State in its Decision 872/1992 in Plenum opined that the National Council 
for Radio and Television was not a collective administrative organ pursuant to article 40, par. 1 of the 
law 1884/1990. The Court concluded that the Council was an independent administrative authority, 
which “could not be submitted to any hierarchical oversight or state supervision in the exercise of the 
work assigned to it”.  
167 The Court held that the appointments clause violated art. 15 par. 2 and art. 26 par. 2 of the 
Constitution of 1975/1986. Art. 15 par. 2 read as follows: “Radio and television shall be under the 
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held that the participation of the political parties or other private organizations in such 
nominating procedures was unconstitutional168. Interestingly enough, the majority of 
the Court within the formulation of its decision avoided to explicitly express any 
opinion on the constitutionality of the Speaker’s competence to nominate the 
President of the Council and his alternate upon the proposal of the Conference of 
Presidents.  Nevertheless, we could assume that when the Court judged that “the 
nomination of the administrative organs takes place within the state, and through a 
selection assigned to its organs” it indirectly implied that the nomination of the 
President by the Speaker of Parliament upon proposal of the Conference of Presidents, 
namely, organs of the legislative power, was constitutionally permissible. In our view, 
the Court avoided making a direct reference on the issue, since any further 
argumentation would have led to functionalist improvisations.  
 
On the contrary, two judges, Randos and Mantzouranis dissenting, held that the 
appointments clause was constitutional based on a functionalist argumentation. They 
distanced themselves from the strict interpretation of the principle of the separation of 
powers twice. First, they argued that the Constitution did not expressly exempt the 
political parties from the nomination procedure. Second, they claimed that the 
Constitution did not expressly exempt the Speaker of Parliament upon proposal of the 
Conference of Presidents from the nomination of the President. The justificatory basis 
for both arguments was inevitably functionalist. In their opinion, the nomination of 
the members by the political parties, which constituted fundamental factors/aspects of 
the representative system, could guarantee the constitutional demands for the 
observance of the principles of impartiality and equal treatment in the transmission of 
information and news reports, as well as of works of literature and art, and, in general, 
the fulfilment of the social mission of radio and television. On the other hand, they 
claimed that the special institutional role of the Speaker of Parliament justified the 
allocation of the power of nomination. Nevertheless, the expression “the Constitution 
did not expressly exempt” either the political parties or the Speaker of Parliament 
from the nomination procedure seemed to disregard the formalist rule of construction 
“espressio unius est excludio alterius” (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
the other).  
 
The decision 944/1999 of the Council of State provoked tremendous reactions on the 
part of the Greek scholars, thus receiving negative comments (Oikonomou, 1999; 
Kamtsidou, 1999; Iliadou, 2000; Voutsakis, 2000;). They applied a functionalist 
approach in order to defend their views. Therefore, they argued that the institution of 
the independent authorities constituted an institutional novum exercising 
simultaneously multiple functions -executive, legislative and adjudicatory-, and thus 
concluded that they did not pertain to the executive branch of government. The 
complexity of those functions imposed the nomination of individuals who possessed 
expertise or previous experience in the broadcasting field. Consequently, they rejected 
                                                                                                                                            
direct control of the State, and their aim shall be the objective and on equal terms transmission of 
information and news reports, as well as of works of literature and art; however, the quality level of 
programs mandated by the social mission of radio and television and by the cultural development of 
the Country, should be guaranteed”. Art. 26 par. 2 read as follows: “The executive powers shall be 
exercised by the President of the Republic and the Government”. 
168 The term “other private organisations” might raise issues of constitutionality in relation to those 
clauses which permit the nomination of members of collective administrative organs by trade unions or 
other non state organisations.   
 69
the Court’s view that the members of the Council should be selected among serving 
high ranking public functionaries since that principle could jeopardise the functional 
and personal independence of its members. In other words, they supported that the 
differentiation of the selection criteria and the participation of the political parties in 
the nomination procedure contributed to a large extent to the disconnection of the 
organ from the governmental majority169, thus providing for a broader legitimising 
basis. They emphasized the fact that the political organisations participate in public 
activities as well as in society, and thus they pertain to the public sphere, not the 
private one.  It is evident that the Greek scholars were clearly influenced by the 
primordial role of the political parties in the German constitutional system.  Finally, 
they praised the view of the two dissenting judges in relation to the role of Parliament 
and its organs in the nomination of the members of the National Council for Radio 
and Television.  
Did these theoretical views and the dissenting opinions of the judges pave the way for 
the reversal of the decision 944/1999 of the Council of State? Indeed, the Court in 
Plenum rejected the request for annulment, and held that the appointments clause was 
constitutional. The decision 656/2000170 of the Council of State was purely 
functionalist in its approach. Interestingly enough, there were no dissenting opinions 
with regard to the constitutionality of the nomination procedure provided for in the 
appointments clause171. Therefore, the Court unanimously opined that “. . .the 
legislator in order to fulfil the targets set by article 15 par. 2 of the Constitution, 
foresaw the constitution of that institutional organ by personalities of the public life 
nominated by the political parties based upon appropriate for the exercise of state 
scrutiny formal and substantial qualifications, which the parties compulsorily take 
into consideration in the formulation of their proposal to the Minister of Press and 
Mass Media. This proposal of the parties is submitted, within the meaning of the law, 
to a legality review by the Minister, who is not obliged to accept the proposal of an 
                                                 
169 Kamtsidou (2000) states “the pluralistic composition of the authority enhances its independence 
from the governmental apparatus, even if it does not ease the fears over the substitution of politics for 
partisan dependence”. 
170 The Conference was held in Athens, on November 5, 1999 and the decision was published in the 
public session of February 4, 2000. Christos Geraris, then President of the Council of State, was 
appointed President of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority in 2008 (Government Gazette, vol. 
Y.O.D.D., no 125/20.03.2008) 
171 On the contrary, five judges, dissenting, with regard to the issue of the equal treatment of the 
political parties, opined that “the provision of the law, which allows only four political parties 
represented in Parliament to participate in the nomination procedure of the members of the National 
Council for Radio and Television, violates the principal of equality. The law should have foreseen a 
system of participation in the procedure for the proposal of the constitution of the NCRTV that would 
permit the participation of all the political parties currently elected in Parliament according to their 
strength. Moreover, the mandate of the members of the organ should be appropriately formulated in 
accordance with the four-year mandate of the Parliament. This is justified by the important 
competences of the NCRTV within the scrutiny of radio and television, on the one hand, and the 
considerable influence of the media in the formulation of the public opinion, and thus the empowerment 
or the enfeeblement of the political parties, on the other”. On the contrary, the majority of the Court 
held that the clause was constitutional since the legislator judged abstractly and in advance that the 
right for the proposal of the members of the NCRTV is allocated to the four biggest in number of 
parliamentary seats political parties, whereas he took into account the possibility of parliamentary 
representation by fewer political parties than the four initially anticipated. Moreover, the Court 
estimated that the disturbance of the proper operation of the NCRTV due to political changes should be 
avoided, and thus opted for a stable number of political parties which could participate in the 
nomination procedure.  Available at: http://www.dsanet.gr/1024x768Auth.htm, date of access: 
18.10.2010.  
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individual that does not fulfil the preconditions of the law. . .The Council exercises 
these functions under a status of independence not only towards the political parties 
that nominated its members, but also towards the government, which does not possess 
the power of hierarchical control. . .Thus, the National Council for Radio and 
Television is constituted by the common legislator as an independent administrative 
authority destined to fulfil the function provided for in article 15 par. 2 of the 
Constitution, and, consequently, it is, in principal, consistent with it”. 
 
The opinion obviously distanced itself from any considerations regarding the principle 
of the separation of powers, and directly held as constitutional the allocation of state 
control provided for in article 15 par. 2 of the Constitution to an independent 
administrative authority. Consequently, the legislator had the discretion to specify the 
nomination and appointment procedure unfettered by separation of powers 
considerations since the authority did not pertain to the classical type of an agency of 
the executive. In other words, it was the special nature of the independent authorities 
which permitted deviation from the strict implementation of the appointments clause 
of the Constitution, and the principle of the separation of powers. The functionalist 
approach of the Court was neither enough elaborated nor contrasted to opposing 
views in order to reach and fully justify its final decision. On the other hand, the Court 
seemed to mitigate or degrade the responsibility of the political parties in the selection 
mechanism since the executive veto of the Minister and the issue of the formal 
appointment act by an organ of the state gave the impression that the appointments 
clause was consistent with the demands of the constitution. Nevertheless, the spirit of 
the law seemed to assign the responsibility for the selection of the members of the 
Council to the political parties (Oikonomou, 1999).  
 
c. The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, Law 2190/1994: Implementing 
multiple selection mechanisms  
 
i. The Appointments Clause 
 
The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel (ASEP) was established under 
the law 2190/1994 as an independent authority to guarantee i) transparency in the 
public servants’ selection process, ii) the application of merit criteria combined with 
the fulfillment of specific national and social needs, and iii) the avoidance of 
redundant expenses, thus reducing public spending. Article 4 of the said law provided 
for the selection mechanism and the members’ –Councillors’- profile. The 
appointments clause provided for two distinct selection mechanisms. The first process 
would be applied only once, that is, during the first constitution of the organ, whereas 
the second would be permanently implemented. Both selection mechanisms consisted 
of two phases: i) the selection of the President and Vice-President, and ii) the 
selection of the Councillors. Each phase constituted a composite act. The first phase 
of the first selection mechanism comprised i) nomination by the competent Minister, 
ii) legislative confirmation –partly with legislative veto- by the Conference of 
Presidents,  and iii) official appointment by presidential decree upon proposal of the 
competent Minister. The second phase comprised i) nomination by the heads of the 
authority, ii) selection by the competent Minister, and iii) official appointment by 
presidential decree upon proposal of the competent Minister. The first phase of the 
second selection mechanism comprised i) selection of the heads of the board among 
the members of the Council (cooptation), and iii) official appointment by presidential 
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decree upon proposal of the competent Minister. The Minister had the discretion to 
scrutinize the selected individuals, thus rejecting any proposal that was contrary to the 
procedure set forth in the ministerial decision of article 4, par. 5 of the law. The 
second phase of the second selection mechanism comprised i) selection of the 
Councillors by the Council in plenum through public announcement (cooptation), and 
ii) official appointment by presidential decree upon proposal of the competent 
Minister with an executive veto. The Minister had the discretion to scrutinize the 
selected individuals, thus rejecting any proposal that was contrary to the procedure set 
forth in the ministerial decision of article 4, par. 5 of the law172.  
 
ii. Discussions in Parliament, comments, and interpretation  
 
The discussions and debates of the draft law173 “Establishment of an independent 
authority for the selection of personnel and regulation of public administration 
issues” in principal and in particulars in the Greek Parliament174 provoked tension 
among the MPs in relation to the composition of the Council, and the relevant 
selection mechanisms. Nomination by the executive and the cooptation system were 
the main controversial issues. The Explanatory Report175 stated on the issue of 
cooptation: “Functional independence is guaranteed through the autonomy of the 
board hereafter to select the president, vice-president, and its members on its own, 
thus to be self-reproduced without any governmental interference with the exception 
of its first constitution”. 
 
The Scientific Report of Parliament176 expressed no reservations on the 
constitutionality of the cooptation system for the selection of the members of the 
board of the authority. Cooptation is a selection model according to which the 
members of an organ or committee decide on the appointment of new members or 
colleagues. The procedure is implemented in the election and/or promotion of judges, 
university professors, and members of academies. In his speech, the Minister of the 
Presidency of the Government explained that the Council of State was the source of 
inspiration for the proposed selection mechanism, and thus erroneously, in our 
                                                 
172 Article 4, par. 5 of the law 2190/1994, provided for “a regulative ministerial decision issued upon 
proposal of the Council in plenum and published in the Government Gazette specifying the procedure 
for the submission of candidacies and selection and any other necessary detail for the implementation 
of the previous paragraphs 3 and 4”. 
 
173 See Appendix 2, 3 for abstracts from the discussions. 
174 Minutes of Parliament, 8th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, 
Sessions 53 and 54 discussion and debate in principal February 2nd, and February 3rd , 1994, and 
Session 57, discussion and debate in particulars February 8th, 1994 available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-
Olomeleias?search=on&DateFrom=01%2F02%2F1994&DateTo=10%2F02%2F1994&SessionPeriod=
92766fef-d4d2-4a56-a754-3081dfb67589, date of access: 25/06/2010. 
175 The Explanatory Report of January 12th, 1994 that accompanied the draft law “Establishment of an 
independent authority for the selection of personnel and regulation of public administration issues” 
available at:http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-
Ergou?law_id=8a98f188-db06-4992-b959-92ebac1856e8, date of access: 25/06/2010. 
176 The Scientific Report of Parliament of 01.02.1994 on the draft law “Establishment of an 
independent authority for the selection of personnel and regulation of public administration issues”.  
Available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-
Ergou?law_id=8a98f188-db06-4992-b959-92ebac1856e8, date of access: 20.10.2010. 
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opinion, equated the new authority with a court of justice. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledged that the cooptation model, as applied in the supreme courts, did not 
represent a pure version of the model since the Presidents and Vice-Presidents were 
appointed by the executive. Thus, the common legislator conceded to an independent 
authority, which was not consolidated in the Constitution, a pure self-reproducing 
selection mechanism that the constitutional legislator had systematically denied to the 
judicial branch of government, that is, the judges within the separation of powers 
system177.   
Interestingly enough, with regard to the selection process regarding the first 
constitution of the organ, many MPs from the parties of New Democracy, the 
Communist Party, and Pasok expressed their disagreement with the nomination and 
appointment of the members by the executive based on the functionalist argument that 
the independence of the organ would be jeopardised by the interference of the 
government in the selection mechanism. Thus, they proposed that the political parties 
and/or trade unions should nominate their representatives in the organ, obviously 
inspired by the relevant appointments clause of the National Council for Radio and 
Television. Only the MP from the party of the Political Spring (POLAN) brought 
back to the discussion the case of the National Council for Radio and Television, 
namely the equally unconstitutional proposal that Parliament should select the 
members of the authority by a qualified majority of two-thirds. Under the pressure of 
the agreement of the majority of the MPs on the issue, the Minister of the Presidency 
of the Government made a compromising suggestion, and substituted the MPs’ 
demand for a selection mechanism which combined party nomination with 
representativeness for the Conference of Presidents interparty confirmation. We 
should remind that neither the Constitution nor the Standing Orders of Parliament 
provided for the assignment of such competence to that organ. On the other hand, the 
Conference of Presidents took its decisions by the absolute majority of the present 
members, unless otherwise specified by other provisions of the Standing Orders. 
Consequently, the legislator could not provide for qualified majorities since the 
Standing Orders exclusively specified such special cases. Finally, the part of the 
discussion with regard to the proposed two candidacies for the posts of the President 
and Vice-President of the authority represents a characteristic paradigm of interparty 
bargaining, despite its failure for obvious reasons, that is, the publicity of the session 
in Parliament.  
 
 
                                                 
177 Greek constitutionalists consider the allocation of the authority of appointing the Presidents and 
Vice Presidents of the Greek Supreme Courts and the Prosecutor of the Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law to the executive (art. 90, par. 5 of the Constitution) as a deviation from the 
principle of independence (Dimoulis, 2002). According to that principle “the organs of each function 
should possess substantial autonomy in the elaboration and issue of the acts of their function, that is, 
they should not be subordinated to the control of organs of other functions, which could render the 
separation of functions context empty” (Dimoulis, 2002). However, Skouris (cited in Gogos, 2006) 
justifies the violation of the principle stating that justice should not be completely cut off from the 
legitimising mechanisms of state power since its apex should be legitimised, through the politically 
responsible government, by the popular mandate. 
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d. The Hellenic Data Protection Authority, Law 2472/1997: the MPs’ demand for an 
enhanced role of Parliament in the selection mechanism of the members of the 
authority 
i. The Appointments Clause 
The Hellenic Data Protection Authority (HDPA) was founded under the law 
2472/1997 as an independent public authority. Its mission is to supervise the 
implementation of the said law, and all regulations regarding the protection of 
personal data and privacy of individuals in Greece.  Article 16 provided for the 
members’ profile and the selection mechanism. The appointments clause consisted of 
two distinct procedures: i) the selection of the President, and his alternate, and ii) the 
selection of the members of the organ. The first procedure provided for the selection 
of the President and his alternate by the Cabinet upon proposal of the Minister of 
Justice. On the contrary, the second procedure, constituted a composite act, 
comprising three phases i) proposal of a double number of nominees in relation to the 
posts to be covered submitted by the Minister of Justice, ii) legislative confirmation in 
two stages, that is, formulation of an opinion by the permanent committee on 
Institutions and Transparency (legislative confirmation without veto power), on the 
one hand, and final selection by the Conference of Presidents with the absolute 
majority vote of the members present (legislative confirmation without veto power), 
on the other, and iii) official appointment by the competent Minister. 
ii. Discussions in Parliament, comments, and interpretation 
The discussions and debates of the draft law178 “Protection of the individual against 
the processing of personal data” in principal and in particulars in the Greek 
Parliament179, revealed the demand of the MPs for the enhancement of the role of 
Parliament in the selection mechanism of the heads and members of the data 
protection authority. The Scientific Report of Parliament180 expressed no reservations 
on the constitutionality of the appointments clause with regard to the selection of the 
members of the authority. We should note that the President and his alternate were 
selected by the Cabinet upon proposal of the Minister of Justice. According to the 
formalist rule of the separation of powers and the appointments clause of the 
constitution, that part of the clause was consistent with the Constitution, whereas the 
one pertaining to the selection of the members was unconstitutional. The initial text of 
the appointments clause of the draft law, as incorporated into the Explanatory Report 
                                                 
178 See Appendix 2, 4 for abstracts from the discussions. 
179 Minutes of Parliament, 9th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, 
Session 95 discussion and debate in principal, March 12, 1997, and Sessions 96, 99, and 100 discussion 
and debate in particulars, March 13, 18, and 19, 1997 available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/12_03_97.pdf, 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/13_03_97.pdf, 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/18_03_97.pdf, 
date of access: 10.07.2010 
180 The Scientific Report of Parliament of 21.02.1997 on the draft law “Protection of the individual 
against the processing of personal data”.  Available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-
Ergou?law_id=27da7e14-69cd-49f1-bd4f-742beb40060d, date of access: 21.10.2010 
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of Parliament181, was almost identical to the selection mechanism of the heads and 
members of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, and thus did not 
provide for the interference of the permanent special Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency in the selection procedure. Instead, the Speaker of Parliament directly 
communicated the proposal of the Minister of Justice to the Conference of Presidents 
for the final selection. It seems that the MPs finally discussed on a version of the 
appointments clause identical to the one finally adopted. 
Interestingly enough, the MPs of all the political parties supported the view that 
Parliament should nominate and select the heads and members of the authority, thus 
rejecting the interference of the executive in the nomination process. Nevertheless, the 
assignment of that competence to Parliament by the common legislator was obviously 
unconstitutional. Once more the MPs’ stance towards the issue had a functionalist 
orientation, and Anna Psarouda-Benaki was the one who introduced in the discussion 
the new theoretical trends supporting the nomination and selection of the heads and 
members of the independent authorities by Parliament. Thus, in her opinion, the 
parliamentary scrutiny of the authority inevitably legitimized the delegation of the 
selection mechanism to Parliament. On the other hand, it was the first time that an MP 
expressed her constitutional reservations relating to the participation of the 
Conference of Presidents182 in the selection process of the members of the 
independent authorities. Thus, she stressed that the organ had competences strictly 
related to the function of Parliament. Yet, she seemed to ignore that relevant 
appointment clauses already existed in Greek legislation183. Interestingly enough, the 
interference of the permanent special Committee on Institutions and Transparency in 
the selection procedure did not seem to raise any constitutional concerns on the part of 
Mrs Benaki. However, its powers were strictly limited to the parliamentary review of 
the independent authorities, on the one hand, and the collection of information and 
elaboration of proposals which would promote transparency in politics and public life, 
on the other184. Therefore, the new competence, that is, the formulation of an opinion, 
                                                 
181 The Explanatory Report of Parliament of 21.02.1997 on the draft law “Protection of the individual 
against the processing of personal data”.  Available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-
Ergou?law_id=27da7e14-69cd-49f1-bd4f-742beb40060d, date of access: 21.10.2010 
182 In 1996 the Standing Orders were amended (Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 151/08.07.1996). The 
provision regarding the composition of the Conference of Presidents provided that former Speakers of 
Parliament who were currently elected in Parliament participated in the organ by right, whereas  the 
presidents of the special committees were excluded from the organ. The President of the permanent 
Committee on Institutions and Transparency also participated in the organ. It seems that the idea of the 
inclusion of the former Speakers of Parliament in the organ came from the Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives. “There is also a Conference of Presidents, which is one of the most important bodies 
of the Chamber of Representatives. It consists of the President and the Vice-Presidents of the Chamber, 
former Presidents of the Chamber who are still members of the Chamber and the floor leader and a 
member of each fraction. A member of the Federal Government responsible for the relations with the 
Chamber attends the meetings of the Conference as well. The Conference meets weekly to discuss the 
day-to-day business and the work of the Chamber Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgian_Chamber_of_Representatives, date of access: 21.10.2010. 
183 See the appointments clause of the National Council for Radio and Television, and the clause of the 
first constitution of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel previously analysed.  
184 The establishment of the permanent special Committee on Institutions and Transparency was 
provided for in the amended Standing Orders of 1996 (article 43A). It consisted of thirteen MPs 
established in proportion to the strength of the parliamentary groups (Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 
151/08.07.1996).  
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assigned to the Committee was not in accordance with the principle of the separation 
of powers, and the Standing Orders as in force.  
The doubts expressed by Mrs Benaki in relation to the competences of the Conference 
of Presidents provoked the intervention of the Speaker of Parliament who rather 
unwittingly unravelled certain irregularities in the exercise of the legislative work. He 
admitted that Parliament passed legislation assigning competences to Parliament 
which were not included in the Standing Orders.  However, the procedural 
irregularities were not the alarming part of the statement. The view that the Standing 
Orders could assign competences to Parliament was a pure misunderstanding that 
simply disregarded the demands of the Constitution. Following these new 
competences delegated to the Conference of Presidents and the permanent committee 
on Institutions and Transparency, the Standing Orders were amended a few months 
later185. 
As for the jurisprudence, the Council of State in plenary session in the decision 
2279/2001186 held that the appointments clause of the law 2472/1997 was 
constitutional. Once more functionalism triumphed with updated theoretical support.   
More specifically, the plaintiffs submitted a request for annulment i) of the decision of 
the Hellenic Protection Data Authority for the part that concerned the prohibition of 
the collection and processing of the personal data of creed, and its indication on the 
identity cards, and ii) the oral statement of the Prime Minister in Parliament on May 
14, 2000 concerning the implementation of the said decision of the Authority. The 
Court exercised an incidental review of the constitutionality of the appointments 
clause irrespective of the reasons invoked in the request for annulment. The judges 
opined that “. . .the establishment of the Authority and its constitution are not 
contrary to any constitutional provision or principle.  Due to the special 
parliamentary review for the selection of the members of the Authority (with the 
exception of the President), its constitution stems from the principle of popular 
sovereignty”. Judges Douvas and Sakellariou, dissenting, opined that “. . .[these 
individuals] should be selected through transparent and objective procedures, not by 
the government, whose acts they control, or by any other organ, directly or indirectly 
controlled by the authority, but by an organ which disposes of the broadest possible 
acceptance in a democratic society, e.g. the Parliament. That said, the foreseen by the 
provisions of article 16 of the law 2472/1997 procedure of the constitution of the 
Authority which issued the appealed decision is not consistent with the Constitution187 
                                                 
185 As we have earlier stated such competences were not new for the Conference of Presidents, albeit 
not provided for in the Standing Orders. The amended Article 14 par. e of the Standing Orders read as 
follows: “[The Conference of Presidents] decides or formulates an opinion on those issues expressly 
provided for in the Standing Orders or the law”. Article 43A, par. 3 read as follows: “The special 
permanent committees or their subcommittees may formulate an opinion on those proposed for 
appointment in certain posts, if this is foreseen by the law. In such a case the provisions of articles 3, 4, 
and 5 of article 49A are applied”. (Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 258/17.12.1997). These 
paragraphs of Article 49A provide for the special procedure for the formulation of an opinion.   
186 The Conference was held in Athens, on January 25 and 26, February 9 and 19,   March 9, 16 and 20, 
2001 and the decision was published in the public session of June 27, 2001. The decision is available 
at: http://www.dsanet.gr/1024x768Auth.htm, date of access: 21.10.2001. 
Christos Geraris, then President of the Council of State, was appointed President of the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority in 2008 (Government Gazette, vol. Y.O.D.D., no 125/20.03.2008).  
187 At a previous stage of their opinion, they invoked article 2 and 9 of the Constitution. Article 2 of the 
1975/1986 Constitution reads as follows: “1. Respect and protection of the value of the human being 
constitute the primary obligations of the State”, whereas article 9 provides that “1. Every person’s 
home is a sanctuary. The private and family life of the individual is inviolable. No home search shall be 
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and the legislation of the European Community188, since all of the members of this 
Authority are not only nominated by the government (the Minister of Justice) but also 
selected by the Conference of Presidents of Parliament, that is, by an organ which, 
due to its constitution and appointment of its members (see article 13 of the Standing 
Orders of Parliament), is under the direct or indirect influence of the governmental 
majority, and thus serious doubts are raised with regard to the impartiality of the 
judgement concerning the individuals that are selected by that organ”.  
Despite the fact that both opinions applied a functionalist approach, they reached the 
opposite conclusion. The judgement of the majority, consistent with relevant 
theoretical views, legitimised the parliamentary selection procedure through the 
principle of popular sovereignty, whereas the interference of the executive was 
constitutionally permissible. On the other hand, the opinion of the dissenting judges 
linked the independence of the authority to the delegation of the selection of the heads 
and members to Parliament, thus rejecting any interference of the executive either 
through the nomination of the candidates or through the selection by organs where the 
government had the majority. However, that radical view against the interference of 
the executive seems as a false interpretation of article 28 of the Directive 46/95, and 
was contradicted by the European Court of Justice in its judgement in Case C-518-
07189 stating that “the management of the supervisory authorities may be appointed by 
the parliament or the government”. Moreover, in many member states of the 
European Union, the relevant appointments clauses of the national supervisory 
authorities for data protection provide for the exclusive nomination, selection, and 
appointment by the executive190.  Finally, we should also take into consideration that 
by the time the decision of the Court was released in June 2001, the Constitution had 
already been amended. The new appointments clause delegated the authority of the 
selection of the members of the five constitutional independent authorities to the 
Conference of Presidents. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
made, except when and as specified by law and always in the presence of representatives of the judicial 
power”.   
188 Article 28(1) of the Directive 95/46 provides that the national supervisory authorities for personal 
data shall act with complete independence in the exercise of the functions entrusted to them. 
189 Official Journal the European Union, C 113/3, 1.5.2010, Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:113:0003:0004:EN:PDF. Full text of the 
judgement of the Court available at: decision http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/gettext.pl?where=&lang=en&num=79899690C19070518&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET, 
date of access: 06.10.2010. 
190 See Appendix 6 containing the competent organs for the nomination, selection and appointment of 
the heads and members of the national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data in 
Council of Europe member states. Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, 
and the U.K. pertain to the group of countries of the European Union where the authority of 
nomination, selection, and appointment is allocated to the executive.  
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e. The Greek Ombudsman, Law 2477/1997: the debate over the constitutionality of 
the competence of Parliament in the selection mechanism of the Ombudsman  
i. The appointments clause  
The mission of the Greek Ombudsman, as defined in article 1 of its founding law, is 
to mediate between citizens and public services, local authorities, public 
organizations, as defined in article 3, par. 1 of the law, in order to protect citizens’ 
rights, combat maladministration, and ensure legality. Article 2 provided for the 
qualifications, selection mechanism, and term of office of the Ombudsman and his 
deputies. The appointments clause constituted a composite act, comprising three 
distinct procedures: i) nomination by the competent Minister, ii) committee on 
Institutions and Transparency confirmation without veto power, and iii) selection 
upon the Cabinet’s discretion.  
 
ii. Discussions in Parliament, comments and interpretation  
 
The initial text of the appointments clause contained in the Explanatory Report191 of 
the draft law submitted to Parliament for discussion, provided that the Ombudsman 
would be proposed and elected by Parliament according to its Standing Orders by a 
qualified majority of votes192. This initial version of the provision had already 
provoked reservations on the part of the opposition regarding its constitutionality 
during the preliminary discussions of the draft law in the Standing Committee on 
Public Administration, Public Order and Justice193. Moreover, the Scientific Report194 
on the draft law formulated an opinion on the selection mechanism that cast doubt on 
its constitutionality by raising certain questions, and thus expressing reservations 
about its implementation. Three major issues were highlighted in the report.  
 
First, the Standing Orders, as in force, did not contain any provision regarding the 
institution of the Ombudsman. Consequently, until the revision of the Standing Orders 
towards that direction, articles 1 to 5 could not be implemented. Second, the 
                                                 
191 Explanatory Report on the draft law “The Greek Ombudsman and the Corps of Inspectors – 
Controllers of Public Administration”, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-
Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-Ergou?law_id=7ab346ee-b1b7-48c1-a646-96c465579212, date of 
access: 30.07.2010 
192 The full text of the provision read as follows: “2. The Ombudsman shall be proposed and elected by 
Parliament according to its Standing Orders by a qualified majority of votes. The Deputy Ombudsmen, 
among whom the Ombudsman’s alternate, are elected by the Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency, upon recommendation of the Ombudsman, according to the majority of votes provided 
for in the Standing Orders of Parliament…3. The Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen elected 
according to the procedure of paragraph 2 of this article shall be officially appointed by presidential 
decree issued upon proposal of the Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation”.  
193 See Appendix 2, 5 for abstracts from the discussions. 
194 Scientific Report on the draft law “The Greek Ombudsman and the Corps of Inspectors – 
Controllers of Public Administration”, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-
Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-Ergou?law_id=7ab346ee-b1b7-48c1-a646-96c465579212, date of 
access: 30.07.2010 
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possibility to grant Parliament or any parliamentary committee through legislative act 
the power to “elect” organs that, as members of an independent administrative 
authority, pertained to the executive given that paragraph 3 of the same article 
provided that after their election the Minister was obliged by law to appoint the 
elected individuals, seemed problematic. The Rapporteurs of the report argued that 
any view which supported that such an option could be valid was contrary to the 
principle of the separation of functions, and consequently the separation of powers 
that constituted the fundamental canon of the Greek constitutional law.  
 
Third, the possibility to grant Parliament through legislative act and not through 
constitutional provision the power to provide for a qualified majority in its Standing 
Orders seemed equally problematic. The Rapporteurs argued that qualified majorities 
were provided for in the constitution in many cases and covered the whole range of 
the competences of Parliament (art. 27, par. 1 and 2, art. 28 par. 2 and 3, 32, 34 par. 2, 
44 par. 2, 47 par. 3, 48 par. 6, 49 par. 2, 68 par. 2, 70 par. 2, 72 par. 3 and 5, 84 par. 6, 
110 par. 2-4)195. In the Rapporteurs view, those cases introduced exceptions to the 
                                                 
195 Article 27, par. 1 and 2. of the constitution reads as follows: “1. No change in the boundaries of the 
Country can be made without a statute passed by an absolute majority of the total number of Members 
of Parliament. 2. Foreign military forces are not acceptable on Greek territory, nor may they remain in 
or traverse it, except as provided by law passed by an absolute majority of the total number of 
Members of Parliament”. Article 28, par. 2 and 3 reads as follows: “Authorities provided by the 
Constitution may by treaty or agreement be vested in agencies of international organizations, when this 
serves an important national interest and promotes cooperation with other States. A majority of three-
fifths of the total number of Members of Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law ratifying the 
treaty or agreement. 3. Greece shall freely proceed by law passed by an absolute majority of the total 
number of Members of Parliament to limit the exercise of national sovereignty, insofar as this is 
dictated by an important national interest, does not infringe upon the rights of man and the foundations 
of democratic government and is effected on the basis of the principles of equality and under the 
condition of reciprocity”. Article 32 provides for the special procedure regarding the election of the 
President of the Democracy. Article 44, par. 2 reads as follows: “2. The President of the Republic shall 
by decree proclaim a referendum on crucial national matters following a resolution voted by an 
absolute majority of the total number of Members of Parliament, taken upon proposal of the Cabinet. A 
referendum on Bills passed by Parliament regulating important social matters, with the exception of 
the fiscal ones shall be proclaimed by decree by the President of the Republic, if this is decided by 
three-fifths of the total number of its members, following a proposal of two-fifths of the total number of 
its members, and as the Standing Orders and the law for the application of the present paragraph 
provide. No more than two proposals to hold a referendum on a Bill can be introduced in the same 
parliamentary term. Should a Bill be voted, the time-limit stated in article 42 paragraph 1 begins the 
day the referendum is held”. Article 47 par. 3 reads as follows: “3. Amnesty may be granted only for 
political crimes, by statute passed by the Plenum of the Parliament with a majority of three-fifths of the 
total number of members”. Article 48 par. 6 refers to certain decisions taken by Parliament by qualified 
majorities when Parliament, by issuing a resolution upon proposal of the Cabinet, puts into effect 
throughout the State, or in parts thereof the statute on the state of siege. Article 49 par. 2 reads as 
follows: “2. A proposal to bring charges against and impeach the President of the Republic shall be 
submitted to Parliament signed by at least one third of its members and shall require for its adoption a 
resolution by two-thirds majority of the total number of its members”. Article 68, par. 2 reads as 
follows: “2. Parliament shall set up investigation committees from among its members by a resolution 
supported by two-fifths of the total number of members, on the proposal of one-fifth of the total number 
of members. A parliamentary resolution adopted by an absolute majority of the total number of 
members shall be required in order to set up investigation committees on matters related to foreign 
policy and national defence. Details pertaining to the composition and operation of such committees 
shall be provided by the Standing Orders”. Article 72, par. 3 and 4 reads as follows: “3. The standing 
parliamentary committee assuming the voting of a Bill or law proposal may, by resolution adopted by 
the absolute majority of its members, refer any dispute over its competence to the Plenum. The 
resolution of the Plenum shall be binding on the committees. At least one week must intervene between 
submission of a Bill or law proposal and its debate in the standing parliamentary committee”. . . 4. A 
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general rule of article 67 of the constitution that provided: “Parliament cannot resolve 
without an absolute majority of the members present, which in no case may be less 
than one-fourth of the total number of the Members of Parliament. In the case of a tie 
vote, the vote shall be repeated; in the case of a second tie the proposal shall be 
rejected”. Consequently, it would be possible to conclude that due to the lack of other 
explicit exceptions the general rule of article 67 of the constitution should be 
implemented in all other cases, at least as far as the introduction of a qualified 
majority with a common legislative act is concerned. Moreover, in the Rapporteurs 
view, a particular issue was raised when the special regulation was introduced through 
the Standing Orders. According to article 65 par. 1 of the Constitution “Parliament 
shall determine the manner of its free and democratic operation by adopting its own 
Standing Orders; these shall be adopted by the Plenum as specified in Article 76 and 
shall be published in the Government Gazette on the order of the Speaker”.  
 
The Rapporteurs argued that the article introduced the principle of the autonomy of 
Parliament and the special character of the Standing Orders as an idiomorphic act of 
the polity that regulated in an authoritative and exclusive manner all issues regarding 
the function of the Body, whilst all other matters pertained to the competence of the 
legislative organ according to article 26 par. 1 of the Constitution196. Furthermore, the 
Rapporteurs stressed that in certain cases the Constitution itself gave Parliament the 
power to foresee through its Standing Orders the details of the implementation of a 
regulation, thus allowing the Standing Orders to introduce new qualified majorities in 
case the regulated issue was linked to the internal function of Parliament. For 
example, they argued that on the basis of the authorising provision of par. 2 of article 
65 of the Constitution according to which “Parliament shall elect from among its 
members the Speaker and the other members of the Presidium as provided by the 
Standing Orders”, article 7, paragraph 3 of the Standing Orders provided for a 
qualified majority for that election. Furthermore, they claimed that it had been 
accepted that the Standing Orders might validly introduce qualified majorities 
regarding decision making procedures related to an internal issue of Parliament even 
without an explicit constitutional authorisation, as was the case with the election of 
the Presidents of the Standing Committees according to article 34 of the Standing 
Orders. Finally, they stated that the main issue raised by the draft law was the 
following: due to the lack of a special provision in the Constitution that would give 
Parliament the power to regulate through its Standing Orders the procedure and the 
probable qualified majority for the selection of the Ombudsman, could it be possible 
to consider that the said selection fell within the scope of issues related to the internal 
function of Parliament, and thus the Standing Orders could be exempted from the 
general rule of article 67 of the Constitution? 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Bill or law proposal debated and voted in the competent standing parliamentary committee is 
introduced in the Plenum in one session, as specified by the Standing Orders of the Parliament, and is 
debated and voted in principle, by article and as a whole. A Bill or law proposal voted in the committee 
by a majority of at least four fifths is debated and voted in the Plenum, as specified by the Standing 
Orders”. Article 84 par. 6 reads as follows: “6. A motion of confidence cannot be adopted unless it is 
approved by an absolute majority of the present Members of Parliament, which however cannot be less 
than the two-fifths of the total number of the members. A motion of censure shall be adopted only if it is 
approved by an absolute majority of the total number of Members of Parliament”. Article 110 par. 2-4 
refers to the special procedure regarding the revision of the constitution.  
196 Article 26 par. 1 of the Constitution reads as follows: “The legislative powers shall be exercised by 
the Parliament and the President of the Republic”. 
 80
For the first time, the MPs gave a battle197, at least ostensibly, over the 
constitutionality of the proposed appointments clause, that is, the election of the 
Ombudsman by Parliament in Plenum by a qualified majority. Likewise, the 
Rapporteurs of the Scientific Report of Parliament expressed serious doubts and 
concerns over the constitutionality of the clause.  Nevertheless, what is, 
simultaneously, impressive and incomprehensible is that, a few days before, during 
the discussions on the draft law “Protection of the individual against the processing of 
personal data”, the MPs from all the parties198 had fervently recommended and 
supported that the members of the data protection authority should be elected by 
Parliament in Plenum without expressing any constitutional hesitations. The Scientific 
Report of Parliament and the MPs who considered the clause unconstitutional applied 
the formalist rule of the separation of powers in their argumentation, whereas the 
Deputy Minister of the Interior, Public Administration, and Decentralisation used a 
purely functionalist approach. Despite the fact that the government finally retrieved 
from its position, the final formulation of the clause recommended by the adherents of 
the observance of constitutionality seemed to be equally puzzling and problematic on 
constitutional terms.  
 
The architect of the final formulation of the clause, the MP of Pasok, Anastasios 
Peponis, stated that the source of inspiration was article 49A of the Standing Orders. 
The article provided for the establishment of the Committee on Public Enterprises, 
Banks and Utilities which formulated an opinion on the appointment of those 
proposed for the post of head of board, secretariat governor or chief executive officer 
(CEO) or General Director, in case the post of a CEO was not foreseen, of certain 
public legal persons which were under the Committee’s jurisdiction199. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
197 See Appendix 2, 6 for abstracts from the discussions. 
198 The MPs of the Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI) retired from the discussions on the draft law 
“Protection of the individual against the processing of personal data” which were held on March 12, 
13, 18 and 19, 1997. 
199 According to article 49A, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Standing Orders as in force by the time the discussions 
took place (Government Gazette, vol. A, no 200/15.09.1989) the Committee consisted of fifteen 
members comprising the Speaker and Deputy Speakers of Parliament. The Committee is established in 
proportion to the strength of the parliamentary groups and independents, whereas the provenance of the 
members of the Chair is taken into consideration. The competent governmental organ, or Minister or 
the one who supervises the Public Enterprise, or Bank or Utility announces to the President of the 
Committee (the Speaker, or if absent, a Deputy Speaker in order of election) his intention to appoint a 
certain person as head of a public legal person, and simultaneously submits a Curriculum Vitae 
containing her formal and substantial qualifications. Within three days after the submission of the CV, 
the Committee holds a public hearing for the candidate, and within four days after the public hearing 
the Committee formulates its opinion through a written report addressed to the Minister who proposed 
the candidate. The report may contain the opinion of the minority, if there is one. The Minister may 
participate without vote to the session of the Committee. In case the said deadline of the seven days 
expires, the Minister proceeds to the submission of the proposal to the concerned organ or to the 
appointment of the candidate. A full list of the Public Enterprises, Banks and Utilities was given in 
paragraph 5. Since 1989, the list has been amended three times. The last amendment took place in 2008 
since many public banks, utilities and organisations were privatised. From 1989 until 1997, the list 
contained the following public legal entities: Bank of Greece, National Bank of Greece, Commercial 
Bank of Greece, Greek Bank of Industrial Development, Agricultural Bank of Greece, Real Estate 
Bank of Greece, Public Power Enterprise, Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation, Olympic 
Airways, Hellenic Railways Organisation, Urban Transport Organisation, Public Petroleum Enterprise 
SA, Aspropyrgos Hellenic Refineries, Hellenic Fuel-Mineral Oil SA, Social Insurance Institution, 
Agricultural Insurance Organisation, Manpower Employment Organisation, Greek Aerospace Industry, 
Greek Weapons Industry, Organisation for the Reconstruction of Enterprises, Workers’ Housing 
Organisation, Greek Post SA. The following entities were added to the list by the amended Standing 
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how constitutional was the final clause on the selection mechanism of the 
Ombudsman? The Committee on Institutions and Transparency was established in 
1996 by the Standing Orders, and had no authorisation to control cabinet 
appointments to the independent authorities. On the other hand, even if the issue were 
retrospectively settled by amendment of the Standing Orders, the allocation of a 
competence which was not related to the function of parliament would violate the 
principle of the separation of powers and the appointments clause of the Constitution. 
In other words, the MP proposed the adoption of a clause which was slightly 
differentiated from the one he considered as unconstitutional.  
 
But what was the logic of establishing a consultative stage, that is, the formulation of 
an opinion by a parliamentary committee before the final appointment of the 
nominees, and how constitutional was it? Scholars consider that the creation of the 
Committee on Public Enterprises, Banks and Utilities by the Tzannetakis’s 
government in 1989 was a measure “designed to weaken the close party-state 
relationship200” (Pridham and Verney, 1991). Moreover, there has been an expansion 
of legislative committee systems that sought to “redress the imbalance of power 
between the executive and legislature” in many jurisdictions by the end of the eighties 
(Pond, 2008). Indeed, during the discussions in Parliament “on the amendment and 
completion of the Standing Orders of Parliament201”, the Rapporteur, Dimitrios 
Fragos,  linked the establishment of the Committee on Public Enterprises, Banks and 
Utilities to the enhancement of parliamentary control over the executive, in the sense 
that the committee exercised a preventive-like parliamentary scrutiny on cabinet 
appointments. Nevertheless, he stressed that during the elaboration of the proposal in 
the competent Standing Committee on the Standing Orders the main concern was not 
to exceed the constitutional constraints in the design of that oversight mechanism. He 
explained that for that reason they rejected the idea of a legislative veto over 
ministerial nominations since in such a case, namely, the formulation of a negative 
opinion, the supervising Minister could not appoint the nominee. Under such 
circumstances the parliamentary committee would obtain direct and decisive 
competence over issues assigned to the executive branch of government. Thus, he 
clarified, the principle of the separation of powers established by article 26 of the 
Constitution would be violated, and that would lead to the distortion of the political 
system. Moreover, they did not intend to render the Minister unaccountable. 
Nevertheless, he stressed that it was not a simple formal procedure. He emphasized 
that the hearings and the Committee’s report, which might contain the opposing view 
of the minority, were publicized. Thus, in his opinion, the Minister’s responsibility 
                                                                                                                                            
Orders in 1996 (Government Gazette, vol. A, no 151/08.07.1996): Ionian and Popular Bank, General 
Bank, Greek Radio and Television, Electric Buses of Athens-Piraeus, Metro SA, Public Gas 
Corporation, National Welfare Agency, Hellenic Organisation of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
and Handcraft, National Organisation of Medicines, Public Real Estate Corporation, Organisation of 
Football Prognostics, National Telecommunications Commission, Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The following entities were added to the list by the amended Standing Orders in 1997 
(Government Gazette, vol. A, no 258/17.12.1997): the Athens Stock Exchange SA, and the Agency for 
Agricultural Professional Education, Training, and Employment “Demeter”.  
200 More specifically they state: “Meanwhile, the introduction of an all-party committee to screen 
candidates to head state enterprises was designed not only to prevent a repetition of the Koskotas affair, 
but also to strike a fundamental blow at the clientelist system. The assumption was that parliamentary 
scrutiny would eliminate the habit of appointing party “yes-men” and encourage the promotion of 
technocrats, who would be more likely to run the state sector along entrepreneurial lines and reject the 
mass hiring of unqualified party supporters”. 
201 Minutes of Parliament in Plenum, Session 36, September 13, 1989. 
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over the selection of a nominee was maximized since he would possibly face 
criticisms from the public opinion in case the proposed individual was considered as a 
weak candidacy. He explained that the basic criteria for the inclusion of legal public 
entities under the jurisdiction of the Committee were their financial relevance and 
impact over society. Maria Damanaki from the Coalition of the Left and Progress, 
despite the fact that she was aware of the constitutional constraints, supported the idea 
of the legislative veto since the simple formulation of an opinion gave government the 
discretion either to approve or reject. Finally, the Speaker of Parliament, Athanassios 
Tsaldaris202, in his speech, seemed anxious to reassure the MPs that the amendments 
were not unconstitutional since they did not assign executive power to parliament, 
thus transforming the polity in a directorial system.  
 
The party of the Coalition of the Left and Progress proposed the measure of the 
legislative control of cabinet appointments to the public service. The minutes of 
Parliament remain silent on the source of inspiration. Nevertheless, analogous 
oversight mechanisms were introduced to three Canadian legislatures203. The Standing 
Committee on Government agencies of the provincial legislature of Ontario was 
established in 1990, and represented the most characteristic case. That institutional 
innovation was a paradigm of policy transfer since the design of the review process 
was partly inspired by the US Senate confirmation process for presidential 
nominees204. Thus, the Procedural Affairs Committee of the legislature of Ontario 
visited three state legislatures as well as Washington DC to get acquainted with the 
US senatorial practice. Nevertheless, they decided to eliminate the legislative veto 
from the procedure since they concluded that it was incompatible with cabinet 
government and the philosophy of a Westminster-style legislature in general (Pond, 
2008). Likewise, the Greek legislator avoided the faithful implementation of the 
model of the US Senate confirmation process. Thus, the legislative veto was excluded 
from the oversight mechanism due to constitutional constraints.  
 
The major issue raised is whether the adoption of that composite selection mechanism 
without legislative veto either in the case of public enterprises, banks and utilities or 
in the case of independent authorities was constitutional. First, the insertion of a 
compulsory stage embrangling parliament in the appointments procedure, irrespective 
of its consultative nature, was not consistent with the separation of functions and the 
appointments clause of the constitution. The idea that links the formulation of an 
opinion over the nominees to the concept of parliamentary review seems problematic 
in itself. More specifically, the main argument that the Rapporteur of the coalition 
                                                 
202 More specifically he stated: “The second thing we tried to do was to avoid unconstitutional 
provisions. We had discussions about the issue during the sessions of the Committee. Many times Mr 
Stephanides raised issues of constitutionality. I can reassure you that we examined everything very 
attentively. . .These amendments simply aim at the enhancement of parliamentary scrutiny over 
government for the sake of the public interest and transparency that all the political parties promised 
and demand”. Source, Minutes of Parliament in Plenum, Session 36, September 13, 1989. 
203 These three Canadian legislatures were: the House of Commons, and the provincial legislatures of 
Nova Scotia and Ontario. 
204 Under the appointments clause of the U.S. Constitution, officers for certain high ranking federal 
positions are appointed by the President of the United States with the confirmation (advice and 
consent) of the United States Senate. The competent Senate Committee usually holds public hearings 
before a full vote by the Senate, that is, simple majority of 51 votes. If the nominee is rejected by the 
Senate, the President proceeds to the announcement of a new candidacy or nominates the same person 
for additional review. Likewise, state legislation provides that officers for certain state positions are 
appointed by the Governor with the confirmation (advice and consent) of the Senate. 
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government Dimitrios Fragos and the other MPs used to circumvent accusations for 
constitutional violation was that the procedure was part of the parliamentary scrutiny 
over the executive. He characteristically stated “a preventive-like Parliamentary 
Scrutiny”.  
 
Apart from the legislative work, Parliament historically performs a scrutinising role 
over the management of the administration by the executive in order to hold it 
accountable. Nevertheless, it is impossible to hold accountable the nominees 
summoned for interviews by a committee since they testify in their capacity as private 
citizens and not as public officials. Consequently, such a testimony without any 
insight on the work or policies applied to a certain agency is useless in the sense of 
challenging the competent ministers in the National Assembly. In other words, the US 
model was introduced in a distortive manner: confirmation by the Senate is an 
indispensible part of the appointments procedure, whereas the formulation of an 
opinion on a nominee by a committee became part of a preventive-like parliamentary 
review of the executive which, in turn, is nonexistent in parliamentary practice. Thus, 
the formulation of an opinion, even without a legislative veto, is part of the 
appointments procedure. Second, the elimination of the legislative veto created a 
pseudo-checks and balances system with the potential to end up on a pure checks and 
balances situation in a hypothetical case.  
 
We may discern two versions of this hypothetical case taking always into 
consideration the interpretation of the concept “formulation of an opinion without 
legislative veto” given by the MPs during discussions in Parliament. According to the 
first version, the most improbable to happen, some of the majority government MPs 
join with the opposition colleagues to vote against a nominee205. The Minister still has 
the discretion to proceed to the appointment. However, according to the minutes of 
Parliament, the MPs claimed that206, a negative publicity and exposure of a weak 
candidacy would impact on the Minister’s decision, and thus he would inevitably be 
compelled to withdraw it. According to the second version, the most probable to 
happen, if the minority disagreed with the candidacy, the government would not 
proceed to the appointment under the glare of public scrutiny. We argue that if 
publicity may serve as a deterrent against the appointment of a nominee by the 
                                                 
205 As earlier stated Greece pertains to a Westminster style of democracy, and thus the legislature is 
dominated by disciplined party caucuses. Consequently, the MPs do not exercise their independent 
judgement, and their votes are whipped.  
206 The Parliamentary Representative of the Coalition of the Left and Progress, Leonidas Kyrkos, 
stated: “However, there is no doubt, that a public hearing is an important safeguard. Let’s imagine, for 
example, that the candidate for the Banc of Greece is examined. It is indisputable, that during this 
public discussion, where there will be present not only MPs, but also representatives from trade unions 
of the employees of the bank, social groups etc, the formal and substantial qualifications will be 
examined. And it is undeniable that, in case of the formulation of a negative opinion, even if this 
opinion is not the one of the majority, no government would take the public cost to proceed to the 
appointment of a person which is under doubt”. Minutes of Parliament in Plenum, Session 36, 
September 13, 1989, p. 1058. The MP of the Coalition of the Left and Progress, Manolis Drettakis, also 
stated: “However, is the opinion of the Committee as unimportant as some like to present it? It is not. If 
we suppose that a candidacy is rejected by the Committee, which Minister will dare to appoint the 
rejected candidate? Let’s suppose that only the government majority supports a candidate, and the 
objection of the minority, which might be very powerful, is publicly formulated. Which Minister will put 
aside the comments of the Opposition? For these reasons I believe that the opinion without legislative 
veto should not be underestimated”. Minutes of Parliament in Plenum, Session 36, September 13, 1989, 
p. 1061. 
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Minister, then it becomes a substitute for the legislative veto. Thus, the Minister is not 
accountable for the appointment since the parliamentary committee informally 
exercises legislative veto power. In such a case, we have a pure checks and balances 
system that is not provided for in the Constitution.   
 
4. Towards the convergence of the appointments clause of the members of the 
constitutional independent authorities: the Constitution under revision. 
 
a1. The first round: Discussions of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution 
regarding the appointments clause (article 101A), comments and interpretation 
 
Four sessions207 of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution were dedicated 
to the discussion of article 101A regarding the selection mechanism to be established 
for the appointment of the members of the five constitutional independent 
authorities208. The contradiction among parties was rather intense since the 
formulation of the provision changed repeatedly during discussions. The final 
formulation submitted for voting provided that the members of the authorities would 
be selected by the Conference of Presidents with the intent to attain unanimity or by a 
qualified majority of the four-fifths. In case the attainment of the said majority failed, 
those individuals who gathered the majority of the three-fifths would be appointed. 
However, the procedure for the selection of those members who did not gather the 
qualified majority of the four-fifths would be repeated after six months.  
 
The discussions on the appointments clause, that is, the new article 101A, proved that 
there was tension among the MPs which finally led to an illegitimate voting209. The 
major issues of the dispute revolved around the competent parliamentary organ for the 
selection combined with the appropriate qualified majority voting, and the nomination 
process. The MPs of the right wing party (New Democracy) supported the option of 
the competent Standing Committee as the appropriate organ for the selection of the 
members of the authorities. Their approach was rather formalist since they invoked 
constitutional considerations in order to justify their option. In their view, the 
competent Standing Committees were miniatures of Parliament in Plenum due to their 
representative character and stable composition enshrined in the Constitution (art. 68, 
par. 3). On the contrary, the Conference of Presidents had no constitutional status and 
                                                 
207 See Appendix 2, 7i, ii, iii and iv for abstracts from the discussions. 
208 Minutes of Sessions and Report of the Committee on Revision of the Constitution, Seventh 
Revisional Parliament, Athens 2000. 
209 Before the end of the second evening session of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution 
on October 18, 2000, the President of the Committee, Phoibos Ioannides, stated: “It is true that the 
Committee, as you all may know, has achieved a remarkable work. However, we had some problems 
with the voting procedures tonight, and I am afraid that the impressions which will be publicised by the 
Press tomorrow will not correspond to reality. This is why I would like to say only one thing, and I am 
addressing myself especially to the journalists. Politics has always been a battle; it has never been a 
ritual. And when there are disputes, there may be tensions. Promoting only snapshots of tension does 
not wrong specific MPs, but it wrongs the whole functioning of the Committee and the procedures that 
have been applied until now. I shall not dictate to you what you will do. Each one of you will do his 
job, as he wishes. I felt the need, as President of the Committee, to say these things to the journalists 
and colleagues, thus expressing my regret for what happened earlier, . . .”. Minutes of Sessions and 
Report of the Committee on Revision of the Constitution, Seventh Revisional Parliament, Athens 2000, 
p. 585. 
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was competent for issues pertaining to the internal function of Parliament210. The 
fluctuating composition of the organ could be easily amended by the Standing Orders. 
Consequently, it was not a representative organ since the governing party had the 
majority of the three-fifths which in turn could be further distorted in case of an 
amendment of its composition. Finally, the role of the backbencher was degraded 
since the Conference of Presidents represented the omnipotence of the political 
parties.  
 
The General Rapporteur of the majority, Evangelos Venizelos (Pasok), and the MP 
Fotis Kouvelis, (Coalition) applied a functionalist approach, thus excluding any 
constitutional considerations. With regard to the issue of the constitutionality of the 
organ of the Conference of Presidents, Evangelos Venizelos, in our opinion, failed to 
be persuasive, and his argumentation had no legal support. He substituted trust 
between the MPs for the lawful procedures since he simply reassured the body that 
the government had no intention to change the composition of the organ. Moreover, 
he insisted that the mere reference in the Constitution that the members of the 
independent authorities were selected by the Conference of Presidents was adequate 
for the constitutionality of the organ. On the other hand, he used qualitative 
comparisons, thus emphasizing the aristocratic character of the Conference of 
Presidents which could lead more easily to consensual solutions.  
 
Only one MP, Ioannis Kefalogiannis from the right wing party supported the option of 
Parliament in Plenum. In the case of the appointments clause of the Greek 
Ombudsman, Parliament was excluded from the selection mechanism due to the 
unconstitutionality of the procedure. Nevertheless, it was substituted for an equally 
unconstitutional arrangement. The discussions of the Committee on the revision of the 
Constitution rather unravel the overall unwillingness of the legislative body to 
delegate such power to Parliament in Plenum. However, the real reasons still remain 
unclear. Apostolos Andreoulakos mentioned that Parliament “was overburdened”, 
whereas Prokopis Pavlopoulos stated that they rejected the body “for obvious 
reasons”. 
 
With regard to the appropriate qualified majority vote, it was obvious that it was 
linked to the appropriate parliamentary organ. The pressure of the leftist parties for an 
active role in the procedure finally led to the option of the Conference of Presidents 
by a qualified majority of four-fifths. Thus, the procedure guaranteed that one small 
party could regulate the final result. However, the nomination process combined with 
the organ of the Conference of Presidents lacked transparency. The MP from the 
Communist Party of Greece, Antonios Skyllakos insisted on the establishment of 
interparty authorities where the political parties should nominate their representatives. 
The MPs from New Democracy, Ioannis Varvitsiotis and Prokopis Pavlopoulos 
disagreed with the institutional exclusion of the political parties within the nomination 
procedure. On the contrary, the General Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos 
Venizelos, (Pasok), Anna Psarouda-Benaki (New Democracy), and Konstantinos 
Mitsotakis (New Mitsotakis) fervently suggested that the wording of the appointments 
                                                 
210 Despite the fact that the original competence of the organ was strictly related to issues of the internal 
function of Parliament according to international practice, the MPs seem to ignore that the amended 
Standing Orders in 1997 provided that the Conference of Presidents “decides or formulates an opinion 
on issues expressly provided for in the Standing Orders or the law” (Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 
258, 17.12.1997). 
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clause should remain silent on the nomination procedure. Moreover, they rejected the 
idea of public hearings to evaluate the candidates. However, they all admitted that 
there would be informal consultations among the political parties before the 
submission of the final proposal to the Conference of Presidents. It is obvious that 
they sought to give the impression of a neutral, nonpartisan procedure since the 
official interference of the political parties and party affiliation of the nominees sent 
the wrong message to the public opinion. Interestingly enough, Antonios Skyllakos 
(Communist Party of Greece), reacted with cynicism to these statements, and 
demystified the whole nonpartisan saga. He openly supported that there were no 
independent candidacies since the nominees were either members of the political 
parties or personalities of high standing closely related to the predominant ideological 
preferences and policies of the status quo and vulnerable to political pressure.  
 
a2. The third amendment on the selection mechanism of the members of the board of 
the National Council for Radio and Television, Law 2863/2000: the pilot selection 
mechanism for the members of the constitutional independent authorities four months 
before the revision of the Constitution of 2001 
 
i. The Appointments Clause 
 
Article 2, par. 1 and 2 of the Law 2863/2000 provided for the selection mechanism of 
the Council, as amended for the third time. The appointments clause constituted a 
composite act, comprising two distinct processes: i) selection by the Conference of 
Presidents by a qualified majority of the four-fifths upon proposal of the Speaker of 
Parliament (directorial system), ii) official appointment by the competent Minister.  
 
ii. Discussions in Parliament, comments and interpretation 
 
The discussions and debates of the draft law211 “National Council for Radio and 
Television and other authorities and organs of the sector of the provision of 
broadcasting services” in principal and in particulars in the Greek Parliament212, 
provoked intense controversy among the MPs regarding the selection mechanism of 
the heads and members of the board of the National Council for Radio and Television.  
In our opinion, the third amendment of the appointments clause of the NCRTV 
violated the principle of the separation of powers and the appointments clause of the 
Constitution. The MPs of the opposition unanimously asked for the withdrawal of the 
clause until the overall arrangement of the selection mechanism of the members of the 
independent authorities by the Constitution under revision that would be concluded by 
                                                 
211 See Appendix 2, 8 for abstracts from the discussions. 
212 Minutes of Parliament, 10th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, 
Sessions 44 and 46 discussion and debate in principal, November 1 and 3, 1997, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN-
1112000.pdf and http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-
09f4c564609d/SYN-31100.pdf, and Sessions 48 and 49, discussion and debate in particulars, 
November 7 and 8, 2000 available at:   
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN-71100.pdf,  
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN-81100.pdf, 
date of access: 20.08.2010 
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the end of March 2001. However, the Scientific Report of Parliament213 on the draft 
law, erroneously in our view, strictly limited the irregularity of the clause to the issue 
of the requirement of the qualified majority voting214. Yet the competence for the 
selection of high-ranking public functionaries by parliamentary organs was not 
provided for in the Constitution. The Scientific Report acknowledged the delegation 
of that power to the Conference of Presidents by the amended Standing Orders of 
1997. We should once more emphasize that the amendment was unconstitutional 
since the Standing Orders strictly provide for issues related to the internal function of 
Parliament.  
 
The MPs of the right wing party (New Democracy) accused government of irregular 
practices, namely, the introduction of such an important draft law to a Recess Section 
of Parliament215, on the one hand, and the irregular voting procedure that led to the 
substitution of the competent Standing Committee for the Conference of Presidents as 
the appropriate organ for the selection of the members of the authorities, on the other. 
More specifically, they informed Parliament of the voting procedure that took place 
during the discussions of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution regarding 
the appropriate parliamentary organ for the selection. Prokopis Pavlopoulos (New 
Democracy) openly characterized the voting as irregular, and put the blame on the 
President of the Committee who failed to protect the procedure. The nomination 
process seemed to puzzle many MPs who considered that it lacked transparency.  
 
In general, the government’s stance was influenced by functionalism, and exhibited a 
majority syndrome, which disregarded constraints and process, and an inclination for 
supporting non transparent procedures.  According to the minutes of the Recess 
Section of the Standing Committee on Public Administration, Public Order and 
Justice216, the Rapporteur of the Majority, Stephanos Manikas (Pasok) considered the 
idea of the selection of the members of NCRTV by a parliamentary organ as a means 
for the parliamentary review of the authorities. Nevertheless, as we have already 
stated, any selection procedure by a parliamentary organ corresponds to a preventive 
parliamentary review, thus constituting an unorthodox practice. The Parliamentary 
                                                 
213 Scientific Report of Parliament on the draft law “National Council for Radio and Television and 
other authorities and organs of the sector of the provision of broadcasting services”, Athens, 
11.10.2000.  
214 According to article 13 par. 5 of the Standing Orders the Conference of Presidents takes its 
decisions by the absolute majority of the present members, unless otherwise specified by other 
provisions of the Standing Orders. Consequently, the requirement of the qualified majority of the four-
fifths was not provided for in the Standing Orders, and thus the law had no authority to arrange the 
issue.  
215 According to Spyropoulos and Fortsakis (2009) “If Parliament is in recess, legislative business is 
conducted by a special Section comprising one-third of the total number of deputies (Article 71 and 
article 70, paragraph 6 of the Constitution). Parliamentary practice has been to divide the summer 
recess into three parts, with one Recess Section for each, so that all members of Parliament participate 
in the legislative work during recess. The membership of these sections reflects the proportion of 
parties and independent Members in the full Parliament, as decided by the Speaker. In principle the 
Recess Section meets during the summer period – but can also convene at any other time when 
Parliament is not sitting. This arrangement ensures continuity in the work of Parliament, allowing it to 
pursue its functions of legislation and control without interruption”.  
216 Minutes of the Recess Section of the Standing Committee on Public Administration, Public Order 
and Justice, Sessions of 26 and 28 (morning and evening) September, 2000.  
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Representative of Pasok, Alexandros Akrivakis, openly rejected multimember 
parliamentary organs and the subsequent publicity of their sessions, that is, the 
Competent Standing Committees. Moreover, he was opposed to the suspension of the 
discussion of the clause based on the right of the governmental majority, thus 
disregarding the constitutional constraints. According to the minutes of the Recess 
Section of the Standing Committee on Public Administration, Public Order and 
Justice, the Minister of Press and Mass Media rejected the proposal that the members 
of the authorities should be selected by Parliament in Plenum by a qualified majority 
since a qualified majority was provided for the election of the President of the 
Republic. The justificatory basis of the argument is not convincing, and simply sought 
to exclude Parliament in Plenum from the procedure. Moreover, faithful to theoretical 
views, he linked the independence of the NCRTV to the selection of their members by 
a parliamentary organ, a procedure which in turn enhanced its democratic legitimacy. 
Finally, he considered the appointments clause an institutional avant-garde since the 
members of relevant authorities in other jurisdictions were selected by the executive.   
 
5. Testing the constitutionality and transparency of the appointments clause of 
the revised constitution of 2001 (article 101A, par. 2).  
  
i. The second round of discussions217. Convergence of the selection mechanisms of the 
members of the five constitutional independent authorities through article 101A, par. 
2 of the revised Constitution of 2001: the triumph of the Conference of Presidents. 
 
The discussions of article 101A par. 2 that took place in the VII Revisionary 
Parliament218 regarding the selection mechanism to be established for the heads and 
members of the five constitutional independent authorities proved to be intense and 
controversial. Despite the predominance of a consensual spirit among the big two 
parties, a feature that sealed the works of the VII Revisionary Parliament, (Kaminis, 
2006), the final formulation of the clause219 was approved by the smallest majority (of 
votes) in relation to all the other revised provisions, that is, 152 votes220. The 
                                                 
217 See Appendix 2, 9 for abstracts from the discussions. 
218 Minutes of the VII Revisionary Parliament, 10th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), 
First Assembly, Session 144 (morning Session), March 21, 2001, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-
09f4c564609d/SYN032101p.pdf, and Minutes of the VII Revisionary Parliament, 10th Period (of 
Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, Session 145 (evening Session), March 21, 
2001, available at:  http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-
09f4c564609d/SYN032101a.pdf, date of access: 30.08.2010 
219 Article 101A, par. 2 reads as follows:  “. . . Their selection is made by decision of the Conference of 
Presidents seeking unanimity or in any case by the increased majority of four fifths of its members. 
Matters relating to the selection procedure are specified by the Standing Orders of the Parliament”. 
The initial draft clause approved by the Committee on the revision of the Constitution and introduced 
for discussion and approval at the VII Revisionary Parliament read as follows: “The members of the 
authorities are selected upon decision of the Conference of Presidents with the intent to attain 
unanimity, or in any case, by a qualified majority of four-fifths of its members. If the said qualified 
majority is not attained, it is considered that are selected and appointed those who gathered a qualified 
majority of three-fifths. Nevertheless, the selection procedure for those members who did not gather the 
qualified majority of the four-fifths is repeated after six months time. All relevant issues regarding the 
selection procedure are specified by the Standing Orders of Parliament”. Only the first part of the 
clause was voted since the alternative solution provided for by the second part was finally eliminated. 
220 The Hellenic Parliament is a unicameral legislature of 300 members. The present members at the 
155th Session of the VII Revisionary Parliament that was held on April 6, 2001, were 280, whereas 20 
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appointments clause for the selection of the members of the National Council for 
Radio and Television served as the prototype clause. The MPs repeated the views and 
arguments they had supported during the sessions of the Committee on the revision of 
the Constitution and discussions on the draft law “National Council for Radio and 
Television and other authorities and organs of the sector of the provision of 
broadcasting services”. The MPs of New Democracy and the Communist Party of 
Greece strongly rejected the idea of the Conference of Presidents. Interestingly 
enough, an MP from the party of New Democracy, Stephanos Manos221,  was the only 
who strongly challenged the proposed arrangement claiming that democratic 
legitimacy means that the government appoints and takes the responsibility for the 
selection. The Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos Venizelos, the man behind the 
idea of delegating such competences to the Conference of Presidents, strongly 
supported the neutrality of the organ, albeit based on a weak argumentation in our 
opinion. 
 
ii. The Appointments Clause of article 101A par. 2 of the Constitution: Is it 
constitutional and transparent? 
 
During the discussions held in Parliament under the Tzanettakis’s coalition 
government in 1989 on the establishment of the Committee on Public Enterprises, 
Banks and Utilities222, whose mission was to exercise parliamentary scrutiny on 
cabinet appointments, Konstantinos Mitsotakis (New Democracy) stated in relation to 
the permissibility of a legislative veto over the appointments procedure:  
 
“The Constitution cannot permit the directorial system223. The 
transformation of fundamental provisions of the Constitution is 
needed, something that is not permissible even under the ordinary 
procedure of the constitutional revision224. And we should not 
                                                                                                                                            
members were absent. According to the voting results (p. 6759 of the Minutes of Parliament), 152 MPs 
voted for article 101A, par. 2, 116 MPs voted against, and 12 voted absent. Minutes of the VII 
Revisionary Parliament, 10th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, 
Session 155, April 6, 2001, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-
4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/SYN040601.pdf,  date of access: 30.08.2010. 
221 He is a Greek politician and industrialist. He studied mechanical engineering (ETH Zurich), and 
received his MBA from Harvard University. He was elected MP in 1977, 1981, 1993, 1996, 2000, and 
2004. He served as Deputy Minister and Minister under the governments of New Democracy. In April 
1999 he founded the Liberal Party and cooperated with the party of New Democracy in the elections of 
2000. In the national elections of 2004 he was included as an independent candidate in the third 
position of the voting paper of the State with PASOK. On March 17, 2009 he was co-founder of a new 
political party, the “Action”. Source Wikipedia, available at: 
http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A3%CF%84%CE%AD%CF%86%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%BF%
CF%82_%CE%9C%CE%AC%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%82, date of access: 30.08.2010. 
222 Minutes of Parliament on the “Amendment and completion of the Standing Orders of Parliament”, 
Session 36, September 13, 1989, p. 1051. 
223 The directorial system draws its origins from the 1795 Constitution of the French Revolution. This 
model of democracy provides that “Parliament absorbs the executive power or, in other words, the 
executive is completely subordinated to the legislature” (Pantelis, 2005). 
224 Article 110, par.1  entitled “Revision of the Constitution” reads as follows: “The provisions of the 
Constitution shall be subject to revision with the exception of those which determine the form of 
government as a Parliamentary Republic and those of articles 2 paragraph 1, 4 paragraphs 1, 4 and 7 , 
5paragraphs 1 and 3, 13 paragraph 1, and 26”. Article 26 refers to the strict tripartite system of the 
separation of powers. 
 90
make the mistake to create such mechanisms in Parliament so as to 
finally hinder Government from governing. The Country should be 
governed, opposition should be exercised, and the established 
political system should be respected. And I believe that we have 
reached the ultimate boundaries permitted by the Constitution. It is 
certain that Parliament cannot take decisions on the individuals 
who will be appointed to the supreme public offices. This is 
certain. And even if that were not the case, if you ask me on purely 
theoretical grounds, hypothetically, I would say to you that it 
would be a mistake to let Parliament decide. Government must 
take the final responsibility since government selects. . . Three 
hundred people support a government, namely, the majority of 
those three hundred. And they scrutinise it, and government takes 
decisions. I would disagree, even if the Constitution did not 
completely exclude it”.  
 
Nevertheless, after twelve years, the Greek scholars, mainly constitutionalists, gave 
legislators the theoretical tools to overcome the constitutional constraints. The 
member of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution of 2001, Deputy 
Eleftherios Tziolas, in his speech on the appointments clause225, echoed the new 
incarnations of functionalism: 
 
As a necessary precondition to be useful to democracy, the said 
authorities shall be submitted to a regime of broad democratic 
legitimacy and extensive political scrutiny. This regime may only 
be safeguarded by their determinative constitution by Parliament . . 
. According to all those previously exposed226, Parliament has “the 
upper hand” in relation to Government, not only with regard to the 
development, but also with regard to the operational specialisation 
of the institution. According to one view, the proposed relationship 
of Parliament with the independent authorities reminds in 
miniature of the “directorial system” where the executive power is 
under the complete dependence on Parliament. Within this context, 
it is not the executive power – which falls under the ambit of the 
constitutionally consolidated parliamentary system – but 
idiosyncratic administrative and oversight institutions operating 
beyond its [the executive] known and established forms. In other 
words, these are institutions which, through broad functional 
independence, undertake certain key areas of state policy that, 
either directly through the Constitution, or based on constitutional 
authorisation by Parliament, are not entrusted to government and 
the traditional public administration.   
 
                                                 
225 Minutes of Sessions and Report of the Committee on Revision of the Constitution, Seventh 
Revisional Parliament, Athens 2000. Morning Session of October 18, 2000, p. 558. 
226 He made reference to the enhancement of the relationship between the independent authorities and 
Parliament through i) the selection mechanism of the members of the authorities, ii) parliamentary 
review of the authorities (e.g. the submission of annual reports), and iii) the revocation of the members’ 
mandate on extraordinary cases.  See also pages 221-222 in G. Sotirelis’s book “Constitution and 
Democracy in the era of “globalisation”, Editions Ant. N. Sakkoula, Athens-Komitini, 2000. 
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This excerpt from Tziolas’s speech is an abstract copied227 by Giorgos Sotirelis’s 
book entitled “Constitution and Democracy in the era of “globalisation” published the 
same year228. The views reflected in the text reiterated the well-known functional saga 
of the innovative administrative structures, namely, the independent authorities which 
are located beyond the tripartite system of the separation of powers. Thus, this unique 
institutional character of the authorities legitimised the revision of what was 
otherwise constitutionally impermissible, that is, article 26. In other words, the 
allocation of an autonomous selection power to Parliament through the phenomenon 
of the intersection of functions usurped the appointment prerogative of the executive.  
According to constitutional law, the concept of the intersection of functions creates 
exceptions in the principle of specialization of the three groups of state organs, that is, 
the organs of the legislative, the executive and the judicial power. The principle of 
specialisation within the separation of powers system enshrined in the Constitution 
provides that “each group of organs must only exercise the competences which are 
content-related to its function” (Dimoulis, 2002). Thus, the introduction of exceptions 
to the principle of specialisation corresponds to the procedure of “assigning the 
organs of one function competences which substantially pertain to the organs of 
another function” (Dimoulis, 2002). This process constitutes the intersection of 
functions. Some constitutionalists support that “in modern legal orders, intersection 
has become the rule and not the exception, whereas it brings about the mutual control 
and limitation of power in a more effective way than the specialization of the organs” 
(Vogel, Leisner, Seiler cited in Dimoulis, 2002). Within this context, the 
constitutional legislator justifies these exceptions on the basis of political and 
ideological reasons, or simply requirements of technical effectiveness that enhance 
the exercise of certain competences (Dimoulis, 2002).  
 
In the case of the appointing power of Parliament the justificatory basis originated 
from the idea that the independent authorities located outside the executive branch of 
government were created due to government distrust which, in turn, inevitably 
permitted the transition to a directorial system. With regard to the democratic 
principle of the political accountability of the executive, it was substituted for the 
principle of the popular sovereignty through the selection of the members of the 
authorities by an organ of the legislature as part of parliamentary review on the one 
hand, and consensual processes in decision-making, on the other. The Rapporteur of 
                                                 
227 The MP does not mention his source in the text of the Minutes of Parliament. See the copied 
abstract in pages 221-223 from G. Sotirelis’s book “Constitution and Democracy in the era of 
“globalisation”, Editions Ant. N. Sakkoula, Athens-Komitini, 2000. 
228 Giorgos Sotirelis obtained his Ph.D. degree with "excellent" in 1988. He was elected lecturer at the 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration (School of Law, Economics and Political 
Science-University of Athens) in 1988. He was elected as assistant Professor (1993-2000), associate 
professor (2001-2006), and professor in November 2006 at the same department. He is a lawyer. He 
has served as head of the Department of Parliamentary Studies and Research of the Greek Parliament 
since 1988. He was appointed Secretary General to the Ministry of Justice during 1994-1995 under 
Minister G. Kouvelakis. He became Advisor to the Prime Minister's Office (Konstantinos Simitis) 
during 1996-1997. He was candidate of the Socialist party (Pasok) for the European Parliament in the 
European elections of 2009. Information available at the official website of the Socialist party (Pasok): 
http://www.pasok.gr/portal/resource/contentObject/id/433a6aef-d31f-4908-97aa-8dd55b6e4e12, date 
of access: 04.11.2010. 
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the Majority, Evangelos Venizelos229, considered that “the scrutiny exercised by the 
independent authorities becomes complement and pillar of a strict and active 
parliamentary review”, thus giving the sense that the authorities are part of the 
legislative branch of government.  
 
Nevertheless, embrangling the concepts of parliamentary review and consensus in the 
selection of the members of the independent authorities by Parliament could lead a 
majoritarian democracy to a deadlock, thus making the adoption of the directorial 
system constitutionally impermissible. With regard to the parliamentary review of the 
independent authorities, it is obvious that the concept has been relativated230. 
Moreover, there is a tension between the concept of the parliamentary review of the 
authorities, as prescribed in article 101A par. 3 of the Constitution231, and the 
concepts of personal and functional independence232, as prescribed in article 2 par. 1 
and article 3 par. 3 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution (Chrysogonos, 
2000). The articles 14 par. e, 43A, par. 2a and 6, and 138A of the Standing Orders of 
Parliament provide for the parliamentary review of the independent authorities. 
Within this context, the concept of the parliamentary review inevitably takes the form 
of giving an account to the competent parliamentary organs233. The hearings of the 
members of the authorities, the annual reports, the probable discussions in Parliament 
in Plenum (without voting) may simply result in the removal of the confidence of 
Parliament in a certain individual with no further legally binding consequences for 
him234. Under such circumstances, the first deadlock is created since Parliament 
comes into conflict with its own selection, and thus a conflict of interest situation 
arises. In other words, as Koutsoumbinas (2006) argues “Parliament itself 
acknowledges that its selection decisions, taken with unanimity or extraordinary 
qualified majority vote, were erroneous”. Consequently, “the parliamentary review of 
the independent authorities is legally and politically problematic” since there is 
neither control of the governmental activity, nor a legally binding result 
(Koutsoumbinas, 2006).  
 
Consensus in the decision-making procedure creates the second deadlock. The 
constitutional demand for party bargaining and consensus transforms the 
                                                 
229 Minutes of Sessions and Report of the Committee on the Revision of the Constitution, Seventh 
Revisional Parliament, Athens 2000. The report of the Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos 
Venizelos, p. 651. 
230 The concept of parliamentary review is traditionally linked to the possibility of the attribution of 
political responsibility which takes the form of a motion of censure against government or against one 
of its members (Chrysogonos, 2000).  
231 “Matters concerning the relation between the independent authorities and the Parliament, and the 
manner, in which parliamentary review is exercised, are specified by the Standing Orders of the 
Parliament”.  
232 We refer to the personal and functional independence enjoyed by judges pursuant to article 87, par. 
1 of the Constitution. In other words, judges are not submitted to parliamentary review. 
233 Different parliamentary organs may interfere with the parliamentary review of the independent 
authorities: the Conference of Presidents, the Committee on Institutions and Transparency, the 
competent Standing Committee or an ad hoc created Committee.  
234 According to article 3 par. 6 of the law 3051/2002 the members of the constitutional independent 
authorities may only be dismissed after a final conviction. Moreover, they enjoy functional immunity. 
On the other hand, the competent Minister may not assume any legal or political responsibility for the 
acts of the members of the authorities. He simply issues the official appointment act of the members of 
the authorities within fifteen days after notification of their selection by the Conference of Presidents 
according to article 3, par. 2 of the executive law 3051/2002. 
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parliamentary review into a tautological system where controllers and controlled 
coincide235 (Koutsoubinas, 2006). Consequently, unanimity or broad consensus come 
into contradiction with the notion of control itself, thus levelling the concept of 
opposition in a majoritarian democracy. These deadlocks bar any respiratory exits 
incarnated in the concepts of control and opposition, disrupt the balances of the 
political system, and distort it through the aggrandizement of the legislative power.  
Thus, crucial areas of state policy rest in practice unchecked. Revising article 26 of 
the Constitution through the intersection of functions might dismantle the unity and 
balance of the political system itself in the sense that crucial institutions start 
operating under an exceptional regime, namely, the directorial system. However, 
functionalist arguments promoted by Greek scholars seem to have prevailed in the 
discussions, thus legitimising the constitutional revision of article 26.  
 
Interestingly enough, in 1997, during discussions in Parliament on the institution of 
the Ombudsman, Anastasios Peponis had pinpointed the inescapable constraints of 
the Constitution236:   
 
If there are political forces which wish,-or think, believe, and 
propose- that we should gradually be led to support the 
perception of the directorial system, this is an issue of major 
national and political relevance which is related to the form of 
the political system.  [These political forces] may propose it, and 
fight for it, but the current political system does not adopt the 
perception that Parliament has governmental competences since 
the principle of the separation of the basic functions of the Polity 
characterises the Greek political system. 
 
The allocation of the selection power to the organ of the Conference of Presidents is 
equally problematic in terms of constitutionality and transparency. With regard to the 
issue of constitutionality, the organ and its composition are not consolidated in the 
Constitution; they are only provided for in the Standing Orders of Parliament. The 
fluctuating composition of the organ might “enable a governmental majority deprived 
of constitutional sensitivity to amend the Standing Orders at will237, and thus ensure 
                                                 
235 In order to prove his point, Koutsoubinas (2006) took the hypothetical case where two parliamentary 
groups are represented in Parliament, and the Conference of Presidents consists of a minimum number 
of 15 members (with the exclusion of former Speakers of Parliament and independents), that is, the 
members of the Chair, the Presidents of the six Standing Committees, the President of the permanent 
Committee on Institutions and Transparency, and the two Presidents of the parliamentary groups. The 
majority of the organ, namely, the governmental majority may select on its own, with the qualified 
majority of the four-fifths, the members of the independent authorities, and thus the parliamentary 
review makes sense. Furthermore, Koutsoubinas supports the view that the term “parliamentary 
review” in article 101A par. 3 of the Constitution is unfortunate. In his opinion, it should be substituted 
for the term “parliamentary supervision” in a future constitutional revision. Yet, he acknowledges that 
the term is novel, as is the institution of the independent authorities and their constitutional 
consolidation. Finally, he defines the term “supervision” as means for continuously informing 
Parliament on the work of the authorities and the problems they may possibly encounter.  
236 Minutes of Parliament, 9th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, 
Session 101, discussion and debate in principal, March 20, 1997, p. 4993, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a 09f4c564609d/20_03_97.pdf, 
date of access: 6.11.2010. 
237 Interestingly enough, Kaminis (2006) supports the view that the qualified majority of the four-fifths 
enshrined in the Constitution on its own constitute a barrier against any attempt to amend the Standing 
Orders of Parliament. He claims that any change within the composition of the Conference of 
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the appropriate majority in the Conference of Presidents in order to proceed to the 
selection of the members of the authorities based on partisanship . . . Consequently, it 
should be preferable to allocate the authority of the selection to an organ with stable 
composition, such as Parliament in Plenum or at least a Standing Committee with a 
composition analogous to the strength of parties, and secret ballot, in order to mitigate 
whip vote”. (Chrysogonos, 2000). These criticisms and reservations were also 
expressed during discussions in Parliament mainly by the MPs of the right wing party 
(New Democracy) who were supported by the MPs of the Communist Party of 
Greece.  
 
The issue of transparency in the selection procedure of the members of the 
independent authorities seems to prevail in the recommendations of the Council of 
Europe238. However, the organ of the Conference of Presidents does not fulfil that 
requirement since its original mission and composition, its internal organisation and 
function are incompatible with such selection procedures. On the other hand, the 
amended article 14 of the Standing Orders of 2001 pursuant to the constitutional 
demand of article 101A par. 2 for the arrangement of all issues related to the selection 
procedure failed to satisfy a minimum standard of transparency. It simply provides 
that the Conference of Presidents selects upon proposal of the Speaker of Parliament 
which in a sense disregards the constitutional dictum itself. The clause of the 
Standing Orders remains silent on the procedure for the submission of candidacies, or 
the possibility of public hearings for the nominees. Therefore, the Speaker of 
Parliament disposes of a broad discretion in relation to the attainment of unanimity or, 
at least, the qualified majority of the four-fifths. Kaminis (2006) argues “It is obvious 
that, before the formulation of his [the Speaker’s] report towards the Conference of 
Presidents, he would have informally consulted with all the interested parties, mainly 
the government and the parliamentary groups represented in the Conference”.  
 
It is far from clear that the formulation of the clause of the Standing Orders reflects 
the politicians’ reluctance to typify and publicise the procedure. This unwillingness 
was clearly expressed during the discussions of the Committee on the Revision of the 
Constitution. Under such circumstances, the whole procedure takes place under 
secrecy. Therefore, the selection mechanism is incompatible with the democratic 
principle, since it lacks publicity (Kaminis, 2006). Since the first application of the 
appointments clause in 2003, the press releases of Parliament239 have revealed that all 
                                                                                                                                            
Presidents shall have to ensure that no parliamentary group may autonomously gather the majority of 
the four-fifths of its members. Furthermore, the basic purpose of the constitutional legislator was to 
ensure the broadest possible convergence of the parliamentary forces in relation to the candidates to be 
selected for the posts of the heads and members of the independent authorities.   
238 Recommendation Rec(2000)23 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector adopted on December 
20, 2000 states that: “. . . Furthermore, rules should guarantee that the members of these authorities are 
appointed in a democratic and transparent manner”. Available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=393649&Lang=en, date of access: 06.11.2010. Recommendation 
1615(2003)1 of the Parliamentary Assembly on the Institution of the Ombudsman states at point 7 iii) 
“. . . certain characteristics are essential for any institution of ombudsman to operate effectively, 
namely: exclusive and transparent procedures for appointment and dismissal. . .” Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/EREC1615.htm, date of access: 06.11.2010. 
239 See i) Press Release of Parliament on the new composition of the Hellenic Personal Data Authority, 
dated February 4, 2003. Available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Deltia-
Typou/?press=5ccc4fa9-31e2-4d61-af09-37270178f5bc, date of access: 07.11.2010, ii) Press Release 
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the decisions of the Conference of Presidents on the new selections and renewals of 
the mandates of the members of the independent authorities have been unanimous240. 
Nevertheless, they do not disclose information on the nomination procedure. The 
Press Releases of Parliament issued in 2008 simply stated that the constitution of the 
authorities was approved by the Conference of Presidents after consultation with the 
political parties. 
 
The Greek appointments clause seems to represent an outlier compared to relevant 
institutional designs in other jurisdictions. We have located and compared various 
selection mechanisms in Council of Europe member states241, namely, exclusive 
selection by the executive, shared power among the executive, the legislative and/or 
the judicial branches of government, checks and balances variations,242 and exclusive 
selection by the legislatures. Irrespective of the constitutionality of the clauses applied 
in the other jurisdictions, the lack of transparency and parliamentary 
representativeness of the Greek selection mechanism is confirmed since the organ of 
the Conference of Presidents constitutes a unique case among the Council of Europe 
member states. More specifically, in the other jurisdictions, in checks and balances 
variations, as well as in cases where the institutional design of the appointments 
clause delegates the exclusive selection power to the legislative branch of 
                                                                                                                                            
of Parliament on the selection of the members of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, 
dated, April 3, 2003. Available at:                                    
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Deltia-Typou/?press=33fdd293-b800-424c-b4cd-
4e7d0a31ee82, date of access: 07.11.2010, iii) Press Release of Parliament on the new composition of 
the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security, and Privacy, and the selection of new members of 
the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, and the Hellenic Authority of Personal Data, dated 
July 22, 2003, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Deltia-
Typou/?press=e25947c9-cedd-41d4-b758-98d2e757d08f, date of access: 07.11.2010, iv) Press Release 
of Parliament on the Election of the new National Radio and Television Council and the Greek 
Ombudsman, dated February 14, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Deltia-Typou/?press=d7d97e74-ec68-455f-b2b3-
099b12d88e73, date of access: 07.11.2010, v) Press Release of Parliament on the constitution of the 
Hellenic Personal Data Authority, dated March 11, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Deltia-Typou/?press=26c7d095-f772-4f6e-bf1d-
b5c8acecf2e5, date of access: 07.11.2010, vi) Press Release of Parliament on the constitution of the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, date May 16, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Deltia-Typou/?press=d5a53e67-2d83-4bd3-975f-
b6f00b7ef063, date of access: 07.11.2010, vii) Press Release of Parliament on the constitution of the 
Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security, and Privacy, dated May 30, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Deltia-Typou/?press=bb418843-d2a7-4779-bcb9-
84f8976606d8, date of access: 07.11.2010. 
240 Only once a political party rejected the proposal of the Speaker of Parliament. It was the party of the 
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), a party of the extreme right, whose representative stated that his party 
“disagrees with the procedure followed for the constitution of these two independent authorities [the 
National Council for Radio and Television and the Greek Ombudsman]”.  Press Release of Parliament 
on the Election of the new National Radio and Television Council and the Greek Ombudsman, dated 
February 14, 2008. Available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Deltia-
Typou/?press=d7d97e74-ec68-455f-b2b3-099b12d88e73, date of access: 07.11.2010. 
241 See index at the end. We have selected the appointments clauses of the national authorities 
regulating the fields of personal data, broadcasting, and ombudsmen institutions in Council of Europe 
member states.  These clauses are codified in relation to the state organs which are competent for the 
relevant selection mechanisms.  
242 It is not clear from the relevant appointments clauses whether the legislatures are granted a veto 
power. Further research is needed in order to clarify the issue. 
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government, it is Parliament in Plenum that takes the decision. Parliamentary 
committees are excluded from such procedures in the vast majority of cases243.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
243 In France pursuant to Article 13, par. 5 of the French Constitution as revised in 2008 the nominating 
power of the President of the Republic is exercised upon the public opinion of the competent 
permanent standing committee of each legislative chamber. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Since 1989, new incarnations of functionalism in separation of powers problems 
promoted by the Greek constitutionalists have served as a legitimising tool for passing 
legislation regarding the selection mechanisms of the members of the constitutional 
independent authorities that deviated from the formalistic interpretation of the 
constitutional dicta. Moreover, these functionalist approaches seem to have decisively 
influenced the jurisprudence of the Council of State in relation to the constitutionality 
of the relevant appointments clauses. The variations of the appointments clauses and 
the final convergent constitutional appointments clause of article 101A par. 2 moved 
irrevocably away from the exclusive appointing authority of the executive branch of 
government. The legal evolution of the appointments clauses, which were inspired by 
prototypes originating from other jurisdictions and adjusted to the Greek legal order, 
took multiple forms through time, that is, direct selection by the political parties and 
relevant societal groups,  cooptation, checks and balances, pseudo-checks and 
balances, and the directorial system through the intersection of functions.  
Each time the government proposed a new appointments clause, the Rapporteurs of 
the draft laws and competent Ministers praised the legislative initiative for its 
originality in relation to relevant practices in other jurisdictions. However, was it a 
misconceived institutional avant-garde which disregarded the constraints of the Greek 
Constitution? The paradigm of the U.S. proves our point. Scholars and the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court have always supported the view that the 
appointments clause of the Constitution applies for the selection of the heads and 
members of the boards of the independent agencies. Otherwise, the checks and 
balances principle, which is the essence of the U.S. Constitution, would be violated. 
In other words, even if there were an amendment of the U.S. Constitution delegating 
the exclusive appointing authority to Congress, this would inevitably harm the checks 
and balances principle as incorporated in the separation of powers system. In Buckley 
v. Valeo244 the Court stated: “The Framers regarded the checks and balances that they 
had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against 
the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other. As 
Madison put it in Federalist No. 51: "This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival 
interests, the defect of better motives might be traced through the whole system of 
human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the 
subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange 
the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that 
the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These 
inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme 
powers of the State”. Contrary to the U.S. paradigm, functionalist approaches 
regarding the appointments clauses in independent authorities as reflected in the 
commitments of member states to International Governmental Organisations seem to 
have partly violated the coherence, balance, and logic of the existent political systems 
in established and new democracies. 
Is the appointments clause of article 101A, par. 2 constitutional? The deadlocks of the 
parliamentary review and the precondition for almost unanimous decisions seem to 
create a tautological and autistic mechanism where the whole political system 
                                                 
244 Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 122 and 123, 1975 
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assumes a novel kind of collective responsibility which is unorthodox on its own. 
Under such circumstances, the concept of opposition vanishes, and phenomena of 
collusion and complicity might arise.  The constitutional revision of the principle of 
the separation of powers enshrined in article 26 of the Constitution without prior 
serious evaluation of its impact might easily lead to imbalances, and distortions. 
Indeed, the aggrandizement of the legislative branch of government through the 
phenomenon of the intersection of functions has created a directorial system, thus 
adding new types of political systems within the predominant majoritarian system. 
The analysis of the empirical data that follows might shed some light on whether the 
institutional design of the appointments clause could justify a fear of the legislative 
branch of government. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Delegatory Relationship: 
The Political Decision-Makers and 
 the Members of the Constitutional Independent Authorities 
 
Testing the Degree of the Members’ Involvement in Public Life 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The unit corresponds to the empirical part of the delegatory relationship, namely the 
identification of the agents-regulators who were finally appointed to the four 
constitutional independent authorities by their principals-political decision-makers. 
Principal-agent analyses consider appointments as one of the political decision-
makers’ formal ex ante controls over independent authorities. Thus, the degree of the 
de facto independence of these authorities from the political decision-makers may be 
decisively affected by the profile of the appointees. Moreover, contrary to economic 
or social regulation, political decision-makers have a double role in regulation inside 
government since they are simultaneously principals in the delegatory dyad, and 
agents in the external at arm’s-length dyad. Indeed, the regulators find themselves in 
the middle of a linear and simultaneous double relationship with the same actor 
(political decision-makers) as principal (legislature, government) and agent (political 
supervisors of the bureaucracies under regulation). In other words, the principals 
select the agents who will control them afterwards. Consequently, we could argue that 
the degree of the de facto independence of the authorities from the political decision-
makers should be equal to their de facto independence from public administration. 
 
The unit is divided into two parts, whereas an explanatory text on the applied 
methodology precedes the analysis.  The construction of four databases, one for each 
authority, serves as the main source of information regarding all the appointed 
members of the authorities from the date of their establishment until December 31, 
2010245. An innovative aspect of the research consists in the use of the government 
gazette since almost all the data are derived from this informational tool. More 
specifically, each database contains all necessary empirical data regarding the 
members’ appointment, resignation, end of mandate, and reappointment in the 
authority as well as their main occupation, possible functional accumulation status, 
and other appointments in the public sector before, during and after their term of 
office on the authority.  
 
The first part of the unit is partly inspired by Mark Thatcher’s paper (2005) analyzing 
among others the elected politicians’ formal controls over IRAs in a cross-national 
and cross-sectoral perspective. Thus, we present in detail the members’ professional 
status, relational distance from the regulatees (public or private sector), resignations, 
end of mandate, reappointments, length of tenure, and functional accumulation 
status246. However, our work is differentiated from that of Thatcher’s in two respects: 
first, the relevant legal framework regulating the issues under research precedes the 
empirical analysis. Indeed, testing how legislation was formulated and finally applied 
                                                 
245 Our research ends on December 31, 2010. 
246 See Index 5 for the full texts of the clauses relating to some of these parameters. 
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might lead to interesting conclusions regarding the legality of the principals’ action, 
and its consequences for the appointees’ career in the authorities. Second, we 
introduce the concept “functional accumulation” which was coined by J. 
Raadschelders (1994). “Functional accumulation” describes the phenomenon 
according to which career civil servants could occupy two or more public posts 
simultaneously or combine a public position with a private one. This situation was 
common in the Netherlands and elsewhere until the middle/late 19th century since 
bureaucratization was still weak. Thus, career civil servants were employed for two or 
three days a week due to low workload. Therefore, they were forced to supplement 
their income through employment in other positions. On the contrary, the grant of the 
privilege of functional accumulation seems rather paradoxical in the modern 
professionalized public administration, independent authorities included. It could be 
interpreted as favorable treatment of certain professional categories, and an indication 
of oligarchisation. On the other hand, functional accumulation impacts on the 
effective operation of the authorities leading inevitably to the paradox of de-
professionalization in an otherwise extremely professionalized world.  
 
In the second part of the unit, the four databases serve as summary curricula vitae 
containing the members’ career paths in the public sector in a diachronic perspective, 
namely before during, and after their term of office on the independent authorities. 
The four databases are, in turn, unified into an index imaging the members’ overall 
involvement in public life. The concept of involvement in public life is divided into 
six thematic dimensions, namely the members’ political involvement, institutional 
involvement, financial involvement, institutional and financial involvement, scientific 
involvement, and civil society involvement. Furthermore, a second index is 
constructed imaging the members’ time dimension involvement in public life. In other 
words, the index presents the members’ career paths by authority on a temporal basis, 
that is, before, during and after their term of office. The second index helps us follow 
the evolution of their careers, and locate cases of functional accumulation.  
 
The empirical data derived from the two indexes are analysed by authority and 
professional status in three stages. Thus, we examine the broadness and intensity of 
the members’ involvement in public life, and also cases of functional accumulation. 
Finally, important appointments in the members’ career paths on a temporal basis, 
namely before or after their mandate, are emphasized.  
   
The purpose of this unit is to explore the appointees’ profiles and career paths in the 
public sector, and therefore test their degree of involvement in public life. A high 
degree of involvement in public life could inevitably be a sign of low degree of 
independence from the political decision-makers and public administration. On the 
other hand, the tactics followed by the political decision-makers regarding the 
members’ replacements and reappointments might also be part of the political 
decision-makers’ control mechanisms over the authorities. 
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2. Methodology  
 
The Government Gazette, in print edition and uploaded on the official website of the 
National Printing Office, serves simultaneously as source of information and 
methodological tool in order to i) construct four databases containing information on 
the members of the four independent constitutional authorities, and ii) test the degree 
of the members’ involvement in public life, namely identify the total number of the 
members’ appointments to various posts in the public sector before, during, and after 
their term of office on the constitutional independent authorities.  
 
The idea of the Government Gazette draws inspiration from its application in the 
works of Moschopoulos and Prokopiadou (2003), and Vlissidou (2008). In the first 
case, the authors proceed to the mapping of the administration of the Greek state 
during 1833-1845247. The exploitation of the informational material of the 
Government Gazette permitted the imaging of the i) functions, structures, hierarchies, 
and the positions in the administration as defined in the organisational charts, ii) the 
administrative divisions of the territory (regional and local administrations), their 
seats and villages, and the iii) distribution of the public services of the territory, in 
combination with the positions of the organisational charts corresponding to these 
services. According to the authors, the scientific benefits of the database consist in 
“the preparation of historical reports on Greek Administration. In specific, it sheds 
light on the hidden depths of public administration during 1833-1847, which has not 
been overall documented due to the lack of information tools and sources (i.e. data on 
employee's status, organizational charts, etc.). Moreover, this database provides the 
necessary information material for the development of Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) on administrative and history issues, as well as biographical 
dictionaries on political and administrative officers of that time period248”. 
 
In the second case, Vlissidou in her postgraduate thesis captures the reclassifications 
and transfers of civil servants to the ministry of Economy and Finance and the 
ministry of Culture during 2001-2006. The goal of the research was to shed light on 
the procedures of transfers and reclassifications of civil servants through the 
identification of illegal cases which may be interpreted as a sign of clientelistic 
practices.  
 
Apart from the Government Gazette, we drew complementary information from other 
sources, namely the google search engine, and high circulation daily newspapers as 
uploaded on the internet. The period under research extends from January 1, 1992 
until December 31, 2010249. We searched for information regarding appointments to 
                                                 
247 The authors and a team of students of the Department of Archives and Library Science of the Ionian 
University, who collaborated on the collection of the data, used the print editions of the Government 
Gazette. The National Printing Office uploaded all the relevant issues of the Government Gazette on its 
official website in 2010. However, the electronic search of data through the words-key search engine of 
the Government Gazette is still not feasible for the period before the year 1991. Finally, Prokopiadou, 
Papatheodorou, and Moschopoulos (2004) analyse the methodology applied for the construction of the 
information tools regarding the mapping of the administration of the Greek state during 1833-1845. 
The full content of the relevant database is uploaded on the Official Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, Database: HELM – Official Gazette of Greece, 1833-1847, available at: 
http://argo.ekt.gr/opac2/Help/Databases/ENU/18_Doiaki_EN_.html, date of access: 12.6.2011. 
248 Abstract from the database HELM – Official Gazette of Greece, 1833-1847. See note above. 
249 We extended the research until the first trimester of 2011. 
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the public sector for the 130 members of the four authorities under study. In order to 
achieve this, we entered the members’ names to the words-key search engine of the 
Government Gazette. We managed to collect data for 111 members, distributed as 
follows: 43 of 56 members from the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, 
35 of 39 members from the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, 15 of 15 Ombudsmen 
and Deputy Ombudspersons from the Greek Ombudsman, and 18 of 20 members 
from the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy. However, the 
method of the search engine of the Government Gazette presents some limitations. 
First, the words-key search may only be applied for the year 1992 onwards, and for 
the volumes A, B, D, and AE-EPE. Consequently, we could not apply the words-key 
search to the volumes C and NPDD for the period 1992-1999. However, from the year 
2000 onwards, the method may be fully applied for all the issues of the Government 
Gazette. We should point out that these limitations did not deprive us of valuable 
information since issue B contains the regulatory decisions of ministers, or other 
organs of the Administration.  Our research shows that the establishment of the 
authorities by the end of the nineties and at the beginning of the 2000s, with the 
exception of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, coincides with the 
selection of members with rich career paths in the Greek public life during the decade 
2000-2010.  
 
At this point, we briefly present in Table 1 the content of the volumes of the 
Government Gazette which are related to appointments in the public sector. The 
content of the issues of the Government Gazette is regulated by articles 9 and 10 of 
the law 301/1976 as amended by articles 6 and 7 of the law 3469/2006. Since our 
research starts from 1992 and ends in 2010, any changes in the content of the issues, 
as incorporated in the amendment of 2006, should be noted. Therefore, Table 1 
presents the content of the volumes of the Government Gazette before and after the 
amendment of 2006.   
 
After the collection of all the data, we constructed four databases, one for each 
authority (see appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4), divided in nine dimensions containing 
various information on the total number of the 130 members, as appointed to each 
authority by chronological order. The first dimension comprises the initials of the 
names and surnames, whereas the members are identified through their codification 
and classification by professional status. We considered that the protection of personal 
data should be respected despite the fact that these data have already been published 
in the government gazette, the annual reports, and the newspapers. On the other hand, 
the codification facilitates the processing of information. The members’ professional 
status, that is, their main occupation, and their abbreviated codification are as follows: 
i) University Professors (U), ii) Judges (J), iii) High-ranking civil servants (CS), iv) 
Legal Councillors of State (LC), v) Free-lance Professionals, (FP), vi) Lawyers with a 
salary mandate in the public sector (LM). These abbreviations are accompanied by the 
serial number each member possesses in the relevant appendices.  
 
The second dimension refers to the members’ appointment to the authority as derived 
from the Government Gazette. It contains the number of the issue, the date of the 
publication, and the member’s position and title in the authority. Moreover, we 
provide information on their term of office, its renewal, and their replacements. The  
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Table 1. Content of the issues of the Government Gazette regarding appointments in the public sector (public 
administration) 
Law Content of Issues 
301/1976  
Issue   
A Presidential Decrees regarding  the Ministers’ or Deputy Ministers’ appointment, 
acceptance of resignation, or dismissal  
B All regulatory decisions of the Ministers or decision of  other organs of the administration 
C All acts regarding the appointment, promotion, demotion, transfer, acceptance of 
resignation and dismissal of public functionaries, political and military employees of all 
categories 
NPDD* All acts regarding the appointment, promotion, transfer, acceptance of resignation and 
dismissal of the employees of Public Law Legal Entities 
AE-EPE** The acts for the establishment of anonymous companies and limited liability companies 
with summaries of their statute  or its amendments, as well as any other act referring to 
the above mentioned companies and the public enterprises or organisations operating 
under the status of private law and its publication in the government gazette as provided 
for in the relevant legislation 
Law 3469/2006  
A, B Content as provided for in Law 301/1976 
C In summary, personal decrees and acts of appointment, transfer, demotion, acceptance of 
resignation and dismissal of public functionaries, public political or military employees of 
all categories, the personnel of independent administrative authorities, and the employees 
of public law legal entities 
NPDD The issue was abolished since all relevant acts were incorporated into Issue C 
YODD*** The issue contains i) acts of appointment, acceptance of resignation or replacement of the 
Secretary General of the Presidency of the Government, the Secretary General of 
Parliament, the Secretary General of the Government, the Secretaries General of 
Ministries, the Secretaries General who are heads of General Secretariats of Ministries 
and the Secretaries Special who are heads of the Unified Administrative Sectors of 
Ministries 
ii) the decrees and acts for the appointment, renewal, the acceptance of resignation or 
dismissal of the members of the independent administrative authorities 
iii) the decrees and acts for the appointment, renewal of mandate, acceptance of 
resignation or dismissal of single-headed or members of collective bodies of 
administration of public sector bodies, public law legal entities, private law legal entities, 
foundations and other bodies pertaining to the broader public sector, as is defined each 
time, and specifically the governors, deputy governors, directors, deputy directors, 
presidents, vice-presidents, CEOs and members of administrative boards and their 
alternates, 
iv) acts of constitution of any kind of committees, boards, working groups and similar 
organs of advisory or other competence, as long as their members receive any kind of 
remuneration or compensation 
v) summaries of the acts of appointment, acceptance of resignation, revocation of 
appointment and dismissal of the personnel of the Presidency of the Republic, the heads 
and directors, the special advisors, the special collaborators and revocable employees of 
the Political Bureau of the Prime Minister, the General Secretariat of the Government and 
the political bureaus of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers and those treated as revocable 
employees, the scientific collaborators of the members of Parliament and the European 
Parliament, as well as secondments and revocation of secondments of employees to the 
above mentioned bureaus, and to the bureaus of Secretaries General of ministries, 
Secretaries General who are heads of General Secretariats of Ministries and the 
Secretaries Special who are heads of the Unified Administrative Sectors of Ministries, and 
the bureaus of the members of Parliament and the European Parliament, 
vi) summaries of the decisions of the appointment of presidents, CEOs and members, as 
well as the constitutions of the Boards of Public Enterprises and Organisations of the First 
Chapter of the law 3429/2005 
A.E.-EPE-
GEMI 
Content as provided for in Law 301/1976 
 
* NPDD stands for: Public Law Legal Entities, ** AE-EPE stands for: Anonymous Companies-Limited Liability Companies 
*** YODD stands for: Employees of Special Positions and Organs of Administration of Bodies of the Public and Broader Public 
Sector**** A.E.-EPE-GEMI stands for: Anonymous Companies-Limited Liability Companies and General Commercial Registry 
 
 104
third dimension refers to the members’ retirement, that is, either cases where their 
mandate ended or the member submitted his or her resignation. On many occasions, 
the reasons for these resignations are also presented (e.g. new appealing posts in the 
public sector). The fourth dimension contains the members’ previous main occupation 
and title, as derived from the government gazette and the annual reports. This 
dimension serves as a source of information for the codification of their professional 
status.  
 
In the fifth dimension, we have tried to collect any direct or indirect information 
related to the members’ party affiliation as well as their participation in trade-unions, 
and NGOs. It is difficult to detect the members’ party affiliation. Even if all of them 
were card-carrying members, it would be impossible to obtain such information. 
However, some of the members have positions in political parties, and generally 
participate in their activities. This is publicly known through the official websites of 
the political parties. Other members of the authorities stood or held public office 
supported by certain political parties. On the other hand, trade-unionism in Greece is 
closely linked to the political parties represented in Parliament, and that could serve as 
indirect information for party affiliation. In other words, it is highly probable that an 
active trade-unionist may be a card-carrying member. Finally, an experimental 
research on the members’ participation in NGOs could help in detecting whether there 
are any links between high ranking public functionaries, as the members of the 
independent authorities, and civil society. As Baviskar (2005) states: “NGOs have 
been around for quite some time and they are likely to remain with us in the 
foreseeable future. Systematic studies250 are required to say anything with confidence 
about them. In the absence of such studies our understanding of NGOs will remain 
vague, superficial, and hazy”. Moreover, a sample of Greek politicians, who 
participated as interviewees in a research programme on corruption in Greece, 
expressed their reservations over the independence of NGOs, and therefore doubted 
their ability or intention to mitigate corrupt practices since they are funded by the 
state. They are considered either as “governmental armies” or “mouthpieces of extra-
institutional centres”. (Lambropoulou, Papamanolis, Ageli, Bakali, 2008). 
 
The sixth dimension refers to cases of functional accumulation in the sense that the 
members exercise another public function or occupy another public post during their 
term of office. The seventh, eighth, and ninth dimensions detect the members’ 
appointments in the public sector, that is, appointments to governmental positions, 
various public committees and commissions, and management boards of 
organizations, enterprises and public or private law legal entities of the public sector 
in Greece, as well as other appointments to regional or international organizations, 
                                                 
250 Baviskar (2005) explains the lack of serious research in the field as follows: “The literature on 
NGOs mainly consists of broad descriptive histories and sometimes globalised accounts of their 
achievements in the form of evaluation studies. One of the reasons for the absence of rigorous studies 
is perhaps the close collaboration between academics and the NGOs’ practical work. Other social 
scientists have close links with NGOs, and since many NGOs operate in the cross-disciplinary space 
between academic research and activist intervention (policy study and advocacy, training and capacity 
building, social work and service delivery etc.) they offer to academics many opportunities to pursue 
their work in the domain of non-academic practice. This collaboration has prevented many scholars 
from subjecting NGOs to the same scrutiny as other social institutions. Although NGOs claim to 
believe in openness and transparency, many of them are not open to scrutiny by outsiders. Those who 
have achieved a degree of success and fame are often hostile to any objective studies by outsiders not 
approved by them”. 
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before (eighth dimension), during (seventh dimension), and after their term on the 
authority (ninth dimension). Cases where members held or stood for public office 
(local, national, or European) are equally taken into consideration.  
 
The data derived from the fifth, seventh, eighth, and ninth dimensions of the four data 
bases, that is, any evidence for party affiliation or membership in trade unions and 
NGOs as well as the various appointments in the public sector without taking into 
consideration at this stage their temporal aspect, led to the construction of the 
members’ involvement in public life index. More specifically, the index contains the 
members’ career paths in public life, as derived from the sources, and is divided into 
six thematic dimensions, namely the members’ political involvement (P), institutional 
involvement (I), financial involvement (F), institutional and financial involvement 
(IF), scientific involvement (S), and civil society involvement (CS). In other words, 
the scattered data of the sources corresponding to political or civil society 
membership and a series of appointments in government and the public sector that 
shared common characteristics were grouped into thematic dimensions which, in turn, 
were further split into their initial components that is, the specific career paths.  
 
The first thematic dimension comprises appointments or participation in elections 
and/or membership in trade unions and political parties that may be considered as 
indicative of political involvement. The second dimension comprises the members’ 
involvement in aspects of public life with significant institutional impact. Thus, the 
members’ participation in the construction of the institutional design of public policies 
through various legislative drafting committees and various consultative groups, as 
well as in the implementation level of governance or the top of the hierarchy of the 
supreme courts constitutes the dimension of institutional involvement. The third 
dimension, that is, the financial dimension, exclusively refers to the members’ 
involvement in the management of public money. The fourth dimension combines 
aspects of the institutional and financial dimensions and refers to cases where the 
members are appointed either as heads or members of the management boards of 
public sector agencies. Those appointed to run these agencies are responsible not only 
for the creation and implementation of agency specific policies but also for the 
financial management of the sources available from the public budget. The fifth 
dimension seeks to identify the members’ involvement in the scientific life in Greece 
and abroad. Participating as special scientists in scientific committees, research 
centres or think tanks, being appointed to the management boards of research centres 
and institutes, teaching in higher education institutions and other specialized public 
schools constitute the main aspects of the dimension. The purpose of encompassing 
the last dimension entitled civil society involvement was two fold. First, we wanted to 
test whether high-ranking public functionaries participate in NGOs, thus 
simultaneously assuming double roles both inside and outside the state. Second, we 
could reach interesting conclusions, if membership in NGOs is combined with 
involvement in other dimensions of the index, especially the political one.  
 
In turn, these career paths are matched with the codified members by authority. In 
some cases the codifications are accompanied by numbers in parentheses. These 
numbers correspond to the number of appointments a member possesses in the 
various categories of the index, e.g., a member may have been appointed to legislative 
drafting committees six times. Such cases show the intensity of the members’ 
involvement. The index is presented in detail in Appendix 6. Furthermore, we 
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constructed another index (see appendix 7) imaging the members’ time-dimension 
involvement. In other words, the index presents the members’ career paths by 
authority on a temporal basis, that is, before, during, and after the members’ mandate. 
 
The empirical data derived from the Members’ Involvement in Public Life Index are 
analysed by authority and professional status in three stages. The first stage examines 
the variations of the members’ involvement, that is, the multiple combinations of the 
thematic dimensions of the index. The study of the first stage enables us to draw 
conclusions in relation to the broadness of the members’ involvement in public life. 
The second stage comprises the measurement of the intensity of the members’ 
involvement, namely how many times a member appears in the index, irrespective of 
the type of involvement. The intensity of the members’ involvement is divided in 
three scales: low (1-5 times), medium (6-10 times), and high (>11 times). The third 
stage detects the members’ functional accumulation status which has two facets. One 
facet refers to cases where the members occupy another public post or exercise a 
private profession, or even combine both, during their term of office. The other facet 
refers to cases where the members are appointed to the various posts of the public 
sector comprised in the index during their mandate. Both facets of the functional 
accumulation status may simultaneously take place. Finally, important phases and 
evolutions in the members’ career paths on a temporal basis, namely before or after 
their mandate, will be emphasized. 
 
Finally, in most cases, certain members are appointed to the various posts of the index 
when a certain political party is in power. However, cases where the same individuals 
are appointed to public posts by adversary political parties when in power are not rare.  
Table 2 shows the Greek Governments since 1981 in order to facilitate the reader in 
matching the dates of the members’ appointments, as published in the government 
gazette, with the political parties in power. 
 
Table 2 The Greek Governments since 1981 
Prime Minister 
 
Governing Party From  Until  
Andreas Papandreou Panhellenic Socialist Movement 21.10.1981 5.6.1985 
Andreas Papandreou Panhellenic Socialist Movement 5.6.1985 2.7.1989 
Tzannis Tzannetakis Coalition Government 2.7.1989 21.10.1989 
Ioannis Grivas Caretaker Government 12.10.1989 23.11.1989 
Xenophon Zolotas Oecumenical Government 23.11.1989 11.4.1990 
Konstantinos 
Mitsotakis 
New Democracy  
(right wing party) 
11.4.1990 13.10.1993 
Andreas Papandreou Panhellenic Socialist Movement 13.10.1993 22.1.1996 
Konstantinos Simitis Panhellenic Socialist Movement 22.1.1996 25.9.1996 
Konstantinos Simitis Panhellenic Socialist Movement 25.9.1996 13.4.2000 
Konstantinos Simitis Panhellenic Socialist Movement 13.4.2000 10.3.2004 
Konstantinos A. 
Karamanlis 
New Democracy  
(right wing party) 
10.3.2004 19.9.2007 
Konstantinos A. 
Karamanlis 
New Democracy  
(right wing party) 
19.9.2007 7.10.2009 
Georgios A. 
Papandreou 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 6.10.2009 Today 
 
Source: The Official Website of the General Secretariat of the Government, available at: 
http://www.ggk.gov.gr/?page_id=776, date of access: 24.5.2011 
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3. The institutional design and analysis of the empirical data  
 
a. The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
 
i. The institutional design regarding the members’ professional status, selection 
criteria, term of office, and functional accumulation  
 
• The legal framework before the constitutional revision of 2001 
 
The founding law 2190/1994251 of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
clearly defined the professional provenance of the appointed Councillors, namely, 
individuals who were currently serving or had served as high-ranking public 
functionaries or public servants, professors or associate professors in institutions of 
higher education, or high-ranking officials of the broader public sector. However, the 
criteria over the qualities of the appointees were general and vague since they should 
be “individuals of recognised standing, and professional sufficiency”. The law set 
appointment age limits252, and provided for a six year-term of office which could be 
renewed. Moreover, it set a quota over the number of the appointees who could enjoy 
the status of functional accumulation, that is, five of the appointed members could 
simultaneously occupy two public posts253 for a three-year period. The functional 
accumulation status was extended for two more years254.  However, the measure was 
abolished255 with the exception of those members who, by the time of the amended 
clause, already had two parallel public occupations, and, consequently, fell under the 
ambit of the previous legal framework which provided for the two-year extension. 
Therefore, the newly appointed Councillors, who were active public employees or 
functionaries, could not enjoy the functional accumulation status since they would fill 
the relevant post in the authority through the assignment of duties with a full six-year 
mandate.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
251 Article 4, par. 2 of the law 2190/1994. 
252 The clause provided that the “Councillor and President or Vice President shall be less than 70 or 75 
years of age, respectively, at the time of their appointment”. 
253 Article 104 of the Constitution provides that: “1. None of the employees mentioned in the preceding 
article (article 103 entitled administrative agents) may be appointed to another post of the civil service 
or of local government agencies or of other public law legal persons, or of public enterprises or public 
utility agencies. As an exception, appointment to a second post may be permitted by special statute, in 
compliance with the provisions of the following paragraph. 2. Additional salaries or emoluments of any 
kind of employees mentioned in the preceding article may not exceed the total salary received per 
month from their post which is provided by law”. The scientific report of Parliament that accompanied 
the draft law “Establishment of an independent authority for the selection of personnel and regulation 
of public administration issues” considered this clause as a special statute since article 81 of the Code 
of Civil Servants in force -Presidential Decree 611/1977- prohibited the occupation of a second post in 
the public sector, Source: The Official Website of the Hellenic Parliament, available 
at:http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-
Ergou?law_id=8a98f188-db06-4992-b959-92ebac1856e8, date of access: 25.06.2010. 
254 Article 24 of the law 2503/1997. 
255 Article 20, par. 1a of the law 2738/1999. 
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• The legal framework after the constitutional amendment of 2001: the executive 
law 3051/2002 of the Constitution on the constitutional independent 
authorities 
 
The professional provenance or criteria over the qualities of the appointees of the 
constitutional independent authorities are not specifically defined in the clause of 
article 3, par. 1 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. The qualifications 
of the appointees are described in a general manner256. The members serve a four-year 
mandate257, “renewed in a manner that ensures the continuity of the independent 
authorities, according to par. 3 article 5 of the law hereof”.  Thus, the new law 
introduced the mechanism of staggered terms in order to ensure continuity through the 
draw of lots258. Regarding the issue of the expiry of the members’ term of office, the 
President of the Authority notifies the Speaker of Parliament of the names of those 
members whose mandate ends. The notification takes place two months before the 
expiry of the members’ term. In case of death, resignation or removal of a member of 
an independent authority, a new member is appointed for the remainder of the 
mandate. However, the members may not be selected for more than two terms, 
consecutive or not. Their term of office is ipso jure extended until the appointment of 
new members. The formulation of the text of the last sentence of the clause seems 
rather problematic, and misleading. In reality, the ipso jure extension of the mandate 
until the appointment of new members is contradictory to the very essence of the 
concept of tenure which is time-limited. On the contrary, the clause sets no explicit 
time limits within which the new appointments have to take place. Moreover, par. 1, 
article 101A of the Constitution provides that “In cases where the establishment and 
functioning of an independent authority is provided by the Constitution, its members 
shall be appointed for a fixed tenure and shall enjoy personal and functional 
independence, as specified by law”. 
 
Regarding the functional accumulation status during their mandate, the members are 
suspended from the exercise of any public function as well as the exercise of duties in 
public services, public law legal entities, and legal entities of the broader public 
sector. They are allowed to exercise duties as members of a University faculty on a 
part-time basis. However, the President of the Authority cannot exercise any other 
professional activity, and fulfils his duties on a full-time basis. Specific provisions 
establishing the suspension of professional activities, barriers, and incompatible 
activities and capacities of the members during their mandate or after that remain in 
force.  
 
 
 
                                                 
256 The clause reads as follows: “As members of the independent authorities are selected persons of 
recognized standing and scientific training or professional experience in issues related to the mission 
and responsibilities of the authorities”. 
257 Article 3, par. 2 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. 
258 The process takes place immediately after the decision of their selection by the Conference of 
Presidents. To stagger the terms, half of the members shall begin with four-year terms, whereas the 
other half will serve two-year terms. The President of the Authority is excluded since he is appointed 
with full mandate. 
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ii. Analysis of the empirical data 
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the law 2190/1994 regarding the number of the members 
of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel has been amended four times 
since 1994259. The empirical data comprise 56 members, Presidents and Vice-
Presidents included, appointed during the period 1994 to December 31st, 2010.  
 
Table 3 shows the professional status, that is, the principal occupation, of the 56 
members. The overwhelming majority of them come from the public sector (95%, 53 
of 56), whereas judges and high-ranking civil servants260 represent 86% of those 
appointed during the period under research. As for gender distribution, men represent 
87% (49 of 56) of the total number of members, whereas women reach 13% (7 of 56). 
 
TABLE 3 
Professional Status of the Members of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel (1994-31.12.2010) 
 
 Judges High- 
ranking  
Civil Servants 
University 
Professors 
Legal Councillors 
of the Legal 
Council of State 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
% Members’ 
Professional 
Status 
54% (30 of 56) 27% (15 of 56) 
 
9% (5 of 56) 5% (3 of 56) 5% (3 of 56) 
 
Source: The Government Gazette and Annual Reports  
 
All the selected judges were retired from service. The judges’ ranks and titles, and the 
courts, where they had previously served, are as follows: 6 Vice-Presidents of the 
Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law, 3 Vice-Presidents of the Court of Audit, 1 
General Commissioner of the Administrative Courts, 2 Councillors of State, 11 judges 
of the Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law, 1 judge of the Court of Audit, 4 
Presidents of the Administrative Courts of Appeals, and 1 Court of Appeal President. 
It is noteworthy that 10261 of 27 judges were appointed Vice-Presidents of the 
Supreme Courts by the executive262.  
 
                                                 
259 Article 4, par. 1 of the law 2190/1994 provided for nine Councillors, a President and a Vice-
President; article 1 par. 7 of the law 2349/1995 increased the number of Councillors providing for 2 
more members; article 20 par. 1a of the law 2738/1999 provides that the Council is made up of a 
twenty-one member Board, that is, President, two Vice-Presidents and eighteen Councillors; article 16 
par. 1 of the law 3146/2003 provided for twenty-one Councillors; article 6 par. 1 of the law 3839/2010 
increased the number of Vice-Presidents and Councillors, that is,  three Vice-Presidents, and twenty-
four Councillors.  
260 We included in this category the 3 Legal Councillors of State (high-ranking public functionaries). 
261 Six of them were selected through the co-optation system, whereas two of six were reappointed after 
the constitutional revision of 2001.  
262 The promotions of judges to the posts of Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Courts are 
regulated by Article 90, par. 5 of the 1975/1986 Constitution, and article 49 par. 3 of the law 1756/1988 
as follows: “Promotion to the post of President and Vice-Presidents of the Council of State, the 
Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law, the President, Vice-Presidents and the General Commissioner 
of the Court of Audit, and [the General Commissioner of Administrative Courts: law 1756/1988] shall 
be effected by presidential decree issued on the proposal of the Cabinet, by selection from among the 
members of the respective supreme court, as specified by law”. 
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However, the practice of appointing retired judges has been severely criticised on 
many occasions263 in recent years. Furthermore, in 2010, the Special Permanent 
Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency in its report264 proposed that 
not only active judges but also retired ones should not be appointed to salaried state 
posts, except for legislative drafting committees. On the other hand, the report 
supported the widespread view in legal literature (Choromidis, 1980, 2001; 
Chryssanthakis, 2002; Brakoumatsos, 2008) that the promotion of judges to the 
highest ranks of the Supreme Courts by the Cabinet was arbitrary, thus creating 
aspirations for the candidates to gain partisan favouritism. As for the judicial officials, 
the report stated that on many occasions they “do not decide based on law and 
evidence, but rather act carried away by interventions and pressures exerted by 
external factors or based on their ideological and partisan preferences, thus 
calculating possible future prospects of promotion or employment after their 
retirement265”. Not surprisingly, these cynical statements came after the promulgation 
of the law 3841/2010 which guaranteed the participation of the Conference of 
Presidents in the promotion of judges to the highest ranks of the Supreme Courts266. 
However, the participation of the legislative in the selection process is not consistent 
with the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, that is, the independence 
of judges267. 
 
Table 4 shows the rank, and the public services of provenance of the high-ranking 
civil servants. The overwhelming majority of this professional category comes from 
the Ministry of the Interior (9 of 15). Moreover, 5 high-ranking civil servants have the 
rank of Director General, 3 that of Director, and 1 that of Assistant Director General. 
Only one pertains to the category of special scientists. At this point, it is considered 
relevant to briefly present the role and characteristics of high-ranking civil servants in 
the Greek public administration. Greece is a country with a weak administrative 
                                                 
263 During discussions in Parliament on the draft law,“Protection of the individual against the 
processing of personal data”, the MP Fotis Kouvelis (Coalition) stressed that his party was opposed to 
the participation of pensioners, either retired judges or university professors since it was common 
knowledge that it would be easier to control and manipulate someone retired. Moreover, he insisted 
that someone after his retirement identified himself more easily with a certain political perception. The 
MP Panagiotis Kouroumblis (PASOK) supported the view that the data protection authority should be 
constituted by judges on active service who may much more easily resist temptations for power 
compared to those retired. Minutes of Parliament, First Assembly, Session 100 discussion and debate in 
particulars, March 19, 1997 available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-
4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/19_03_97.pdf, date of access: 26.06.2010 
264 Report of the Special Permanent Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency, dated 
October 19, 2010. Source: The Official Website of the Hellenic Parliament, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/510129c4-d278-40e7-8009-
e77fc230adef/ΤΕΛΙΚΗ%20ΕΚΘΕΣΗ%20ΤΗΣ%20ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ%20ΘΕΣΜΩΝ%20ΚΑΙ%20∆ΙΑΦΑ
ΝΕΙΑΣ.doc, date of access: 19.5.2011 
265 Source: The Official Website of Newspaper Eleftherotypia, article entitled: “Parliament against 
Justice for Corruption”, written by Elena Varinou, p. 7, available at: 
http://enet.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/11/011110/EL01112010.pdf, date of access: 18.5.2011 
266 The law 3841/2010 guaranteed the participation of Parliament in the selection process of judges.  
The Cabinet preselects and proposes the candidates to the Conference of Presidents which, in turn, after 
a public hearing of the candidates, formulates a recommendation. The Cabinet takes the final decision, 
whereas the recommendation of the Conference of Presidents is not binding. 
267 The proposals regarding the selection mechanism of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the 
Supreme Courts which have been formulated at times by judges’ unions, Supreme Courts 
administrative Plenaries, and scientific bodies  may be classified into three categories: i) the provision 
for a special electoral body, ii) the system of judicial co-optation, and iii) selection by the President of 
the Republic (Brakamoutsos, 2008). 
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tradition, whereas it represents a case of “politicized bureaucracy, ridden by party 
patronage” (Sotiropoulos, 1994). The phenomenon of “bureaucratic clientelism268”, 
which dominated Greek politics after World War II, took its pure form in the post- 
junta era. Since 1981, career bureaucrats269 have not taken part in political decision-
making which has been entrusted to political appointees under temporary working 
status. This category comprises the ministerial advisors and collaborators, the 
positions of secretary general/secretary special of a ministry, and that of the director 
of the minister’s political bureau. The role of career bureaucrats could be described as 
auxiliary, and is limited to the implementation of policies as formulated by the upper 
tiers of the bureaucracy. In the eyes of their political supervisors career civil servants 
simply represent the memory of the service. Politicization of the civil service in 
Greece has taken two forms: i) control over nominations and careers, and ii) civil 
servants’ political involvement. Within this context, civil servants’ promotions to the 
grades of heads of departments, directors, and directors general are greatly influenced 
by ministers or appointed management boards, on the one hand, and trade unions 
which are simple annexes of the political parties represented in Parliament, on the 
other. However, as Spanou (2008) stated “civil service politicization has never been 
openly admitted by governments”. Interestingly enough, the Greek crisis which 
started in 2009 seems to have reversed the politicians’ reluctance to admit reality over 
the issue. The Minister of the Interior, Ioannis Ragoussis, claimed that the new 
promotions system in the public service introduced by law 3939/2010 is based on 
merit, and admitted that “In one word, clientelistic relationships in promotions killed 
the public service270”. 
 
Three members, that is, the members CS9 and CS11, enjoyed the privilege of 
functional accumulation for a certain period before their retirement from their main 
occupation. In other words, they served as Councillors of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel while exercising their duties as Director General in their 
respective services. The member CS18 also enjoyed the status of functional 
accumulation. However, it could be characterized as an extreme case since that 
member was simultaneously Councillor at the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel and Director General at the same independent authority. Moreover, in our 
                                                 
268 Lyrintzis (1984), who coined the term, defines the concept of bureaucratic clientelism as follows: 
“Bureaucratic clientelism is distinct form of clientelism and consists of systematic infiltration of the 
state machine by party devotees and the allocation of favours through it. It is characterised by an 
organised expansion of existing posts and departments in the public sector and the addition of new 
ones in an attempt to secure power and maintain a party’s electoral base. When the state has always 
played a central role in both economic and political development, it is very likely that the parties in 
government turn to the state as the only means for consolidating their power, and this further weakens 
their organisation and ideology. Such a political party becomes a collective patron, with the 
clientelistic networks based on and directed through an intricate combination of party mechanisms and 
the state apparatus. In a system such as this the public bureaucracy is orientated less towards the 
effective performance of public service than towards the provision of parasitic jobs for the political 
clientele of the ruling sectors, in exchange for their political support”. 
269 In 1982, the new PASOK Government abolished the post of director general assumed by career civil 
servants (Law 1262/1982). They were replaced by political appointees. Thus, the Director Generals’ 
cleansing eradicated the post war “right-wing State”. The grade of Director General was re-established 
by Law 2085/1992. However, it was a line position of middle-level management. Political appointees 
assumed the key positions in public administration. 
270 Source: The Official Website of the Ministry of the Interior, Declaration of the Minister of the 
Interior to the Newspaper to Vima, Athens April 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.ypes.gr/el/MediaCenter/Minister/Interviews/?id=7248ee33-c8e8-4d30-bfc1-ef47bf671434, 
date of access: 19.5.2011. 
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opinion, she kept that working status longer than provided for in the relevant 
legislation271.  
 
TABLE 4 
Rank and public service of provenance of the high-ranking civil servants  
 
Codified Case  Rank  Public Service of provenance 
CS9, CS17, 
CS38, CS39, 
CS51, CS52 
Director General Ministry of the Interior 
CS11 Director General  Ministry of the Environment 
CS18 Director General  Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel 
CS28 Director General  Ministry of Labour 
CS29 Director General  Secretariat of the Athens Court of 
First Instance 
CS41 Assistant Director General  Public Power Corporation 
CS10, CS42 Director Ministry of the Interior 
CS55 Director Treasury of State  
(Ministry of Finance) 
CS30 Special Scientist Ministry of the Interior 
 
The University Professors, as professional category, are weakly represented in the 
Board of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel (9%, 5 of 56). Their area 
of specialty is as follows: 3 Law Professors, 1 Mechanical Engineer, and 1 Rural and 
Surveying Engineer. Four of them were appointed through the co-optation system 
before the constitutional revision of 2001, whereas the three law professors served for 
short periods (2, 2.5, and 3 years) before their resignation. The member U6, a Rural 
and Surveying Engineer, was first appointed as member in 1994, and was elected 
Vice-President in 1999 through the co-optation system. He was selected as President 
of the Authority by the Conference of Presidents in 2003, whereas his mandate was 
renewed for four years in 2008. By the year 2012, when his term of office ends, he 
will have been serving for 18 years in the authority. One Professor Emeritus was 
appointed by the Conference of Presidents in 2006, whereas his mandate was renewed 
at the beginning of 2011. Finally, three University Professors obtained the functional 
accumulation status in the early days of operation of the authority (U6, U7, and U8). 
 
Regarding the three Legal Councillors of State, it should be pointed out that the two 
had the rank of Vice-President of the Legal Council of State, and were promoted by 
the executive, namely, the Cabinet272. Finally, the professional profile of the free-
lance professionals is as follows: 2 lawyers and 1 economist specialized in 
Management.  
 
The issue of the reappointment of many of the members of the authority after the 
constitutional revision of 2001 probably signifies both the coincidence of preferences 
                                                 
271 The Councillor CS18 was appointed as Councillor in 1998.  According to the text of her 
appointment as Councillor of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, she could also keep 
the position of Director General of the Secretariat of the same authority.  The functional accumulation 
status for a three-year period was consistent with article 4 of the law 2190/1994 since it was abolished 
one year after the member’s appointment. However, the member’s parallel working status was 
extended for three more years in 2000  despite the fact that the possibility of extending the functional 
accumulation status for a two-year period – not a three-year one- could only be applied to those 
members who already served when the legislative measure of the two-year extension took effect in 
1997. 
272 Article 16, par. 5 of the Royal Decree 6/1961 as amended by the Presidential Decree 282/1996. 
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between the political decision-makers and the members’ peers through the co-optation 
system273, and the will of the Conference of Presidents to appoint members with 
previous experience. Thus, 12 members, who had served during the period 1994-
2003, were reappointed after the constitutional revision of 2001, whereas their tenure 
ranges from 7.4 to 18 years as shown in table 5. In two cases (J27 and CS29) the 
mandates were not consecutive. However, it is quite awkward that they had already 
been awarded the title of Honorary Councillor274 before being once more reappointed. 
 
TABLE 5  
Reappointments after the Constitutional Revision of 2001 and duration of mandate 
Members Period Years 
U6 1994-2012 18 
CS10 1994-2007 13.3 
CS18  1998-2011 13 
CS30 1999-2012 12.4 
CS11 1994-2006 12.1 
J32 2001-2012 11.3 
J27 1999-2006, reappointed in 2011 (-2015) 10.7 
J13 1999-2010 10.5 
J15 1998-2008 10.3 
CS9 1994-2004 10 
CS29  1999-2003, reappointed in 2007 and 2008 (-2012) 8.5 
LC33 2001-2008 7.4 
 
Source: The Government Gazette 
 
Regarding premature departure from office, there is no indication of formal dismissal 
enacted by the political decision-makers. However, resignations are not rare. One 
category of resignations, that is, 9% of the members, consists of judges who left office 
due to age limit275. As for the resigned members pertaining to the second category 
(20%, 11 of 55), their principal occupation is as follows: 2 high-ranking Civil 
Servants, 3 University Professors, 1 Legal Councillor of State, and 5 Judges. 
However, three of the five judges (J23, J36, J46,) resigned when their mandate 
expired, whereas their replacement took place after eight months. The two high-
ranking civil servants (CS9 and CS52), both ex Director Generals at the Ministry of 
the Interior, resigned276 for professional reasons since they immediately took political 
positions. One member (CS9) was appointed Secretary General to the Ministry of the 
Interior when the party of New Democracy won the elections in 2004, and resigned 
when the party of PASOK became government in 2009. Interestingly enough, his 
successor in the position, appointed by the government of PASOK, was the other 
high-ranking civil servant (CS52), ex Director General at the same Ministry.  
 
The average length of tenure of the members is higher than that of a minister or a 
government (6.4 years). Three reasons justify the result: i) the long six-year mandate 
provided for in legislation before the constitutional revision of 2001, ii) the 
                                                 
273 The Ministerial Decision ∆ΙΠΠ/Φ.ΑΣ. 1/οικ. 17649 (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 616, 
13.7.1995) contained the Regulation regarding the procedure, submission of candidacies, and selection 
of the members of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel.  
274 The Councillor CS29, Government Gazette vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003 and the Councillor J27, 
Government Gazette, vol. C, no 209, 7.8.2006. 
275 Article 4 par. 2 of the law 2190/1994. The executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution regarding 
the constitutional independent authorities did not provide for age limits. 
276 Her resignation from the authority was never published in the Government Gazette. The information 
is available at the Annual Report of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel for the year 
2009 published in the Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 1096, 21.07.2010, p. 15223. 
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reappointment of many members, and iii) the long delays in the members’ 
replacement despite the expiry of their mandate. However, the third reason has raised 
judicial controversy. Indeed, article 3, par. 2 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the 
Constitution provides that “their [the members’] term of office is ipso jure extended 
until the appointment of new members”.  According to the Decision 1098/2011 of the 
Council of State, Division D277, the clause should be interpreted in accordance with 
the constitutional demand that the authorities continue to operate only for a reasonable 
period of time after the expiry of their members’ mandate. In the view of the majority 
of the judges, after the passage of a reasonable time that will be judged according to 
the relevant current circumstances, the Constitution no longer tolerates the extension 
of the members’ term of office in the authority. Thus, after that time onwards the 
authority is not legally constituted. On the contrary, the minority of the judges (three 
judges) judged that the extension of the term of office was not contrary to the 
demands of the Constitution and its executive law, irrespective of whether the 
reasonable time for the members’ replacement had already passed. Moreover, in the 
opinion of two judges of the minority, the subjective difficulties causing the delay of 
the members’ replacement should have also be taken into consideration, that is, the 
demand for a qualified majority of the four-fifths of the Conference of Presidents, a 
multi-member organ constituted by the total number of the parliamentary forces. 
 
Interestingly enough, the justificatory basis of the opinion expressed by the minority 
of the judges of the Council of State finds support in the situation experienced by an 
MP of the Greek Parliament in his capacity as member of the Conference of 
Presidents. In 2011, during discussions of the Special Standing Committee on 
Institutions and Transparency278, the MP Ioannis Tragakis (New Democracy) 
commented on the issue: “I participated for fully eight years in the Conference of 
Presidents and many times there were discussions and discussions and outside the 
Conference of Presidents regarding the persons that should be appointed to the 
independent authorities, and unfortunately I found that party entanglements prevented 
us from staffing the authorities even in cases where people had voluntarily retired”. 
Therefore, the quest for consensus opens the road for party bargaining. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
277 The Decision controlled for the legality of the constitution of the National Council for Radio and 
Television. Source: The Official Website of the Council of State, available at: 
http://www.ste.gr/portal/page/portal/StE/ProsfatesApofaseis#a177, date of access: 5.5.2011 
278 Minutes of the discussions on the draft law of the special legislative drafting committee, under the 
presidency of Mr. Christos Geraris, entitled “Amendment and completion of the legislation of the 
constitutional independent authorities” dated September 13, 2011. Source: The Official Website of the 
Hellenic Parliament, available on video at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-
Ellinon/ToKtirio/Fotografiko-Archeio/#c7adedc5-353f-46cd-9c71-f856d85885e7, date of access: 
15.05.2012. 
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b. The Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
 
i. The institutional design regarding the members’ professional status, selection 
criteria, term of office, and functional accumulation status 
 
The legal framework before and after the constitutional revision of 2001 
 
The founding law 2472/1997279 of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority defined the 
professional status and area of specialty of the members and alternate members of the 
authority. However, the profile –professional status and qualifications- of half of the 
members remains vague. Therefore, the authority was composed of a judge of a rank 
corresponding at least to that of a Conseiller d’État as President, and six members 
with their alternates as follows: a) A University, full or associate, professor 
specialized in law; b) A University, full or associate, professor specialized in 
information technology; c) A University, full or associate, professor; d) Three persons 
of high standing and experience in the field of the protection of personal data. 
 
The clause regarding the term of office280 provided for staggered terms. However, it 
was soon amended providing that all the members serve a four-year mandate in the 
first application of the law281. Judges and university professors on active service were 
permitted to have the status of functional accumulation282. Moreover, the law set out 
the impediments and incompatibilities of the members of the Authority283. Pursuant to 
that article, the authority decides upon such issues on a case by case basis after the 
hearing of the member.  
 
All relevant clauses of the executive law 3051/2002 of the revised Constitution of 
2001, as previously presented in the section regarding the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel, also apply to the Hellenic Data Protection Authority. 
Interestingly enough, par. 5 of article 3 of the executive law 3051/2002 providing that 
university professors are allowed to exercise duties as members of a University 
faculty on a part-time basis, would not apply to university professors appointed to the 
Hellenic Data Protection authority. More specifically, after the publication of the 
executive law 3051/2002 in the Government Gazette on September 20, 2002, four 
university professors of the Authority284, the members U4, U5, U7285, and U9, 
submitted their resignations to the President of the Authority. They protested against 
the new regulation which prohibited them from exercising their duties as members of 
                                                 
279 Article 16, par. 1 of the law 2472/1997 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data. 
280 Article 16, par. 4 of the law 2472/1997. 
281 Article 11, par. 3 of law 2683/1998. 
282 Article 16 par. 1 and 2. 
283 Article 17 of the law 2472/1997.  
284 Their four-year mandate had already expired on November 10, 2001.  
285 It should be pointed out that he was President of the Committee constituted by the Ministry of 
Justice regarding the transposition of the directive 95/46/EC in the Greek legal order on the processing 
of personal data and the establishment of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority. He also participated 
in the final elaboration of the draft law 2472/1997. Source: The Explanatory Report of June 17, 1996 
that accompanied the draft law “on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data”, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-
Nomothetikou-Ergou?law_id=27da7e14-69cd-49f1-bd4f-742beb40060d, date of access: 14.6.2011. 
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a university faculty on a full-time basis. They pointed out that they were above all 
university professors. The President of the authority, the member (J1), disapproved of 
the new measure which would lead to the replacement of the four of the six members, 
and would generally hamper the work of the authority. In relation to the resignations, 
he stated that he could not accept them, as long as another clause of the same law286 
provided that until the appointment of new members, they should continue to exercise 
their duties287.  
 
Almost a month later, the relevant clause of the executive law 3051/2002 of the 
Constitution regarding the working status of university professors would be bypassed 
through the amendment of the founding law of the Authority, that is, the law 
2472/1997. The amended clause, still in force, provides that “it is allowed for the 
members of the Data Protection Authority to exercise duties as members of a 
University faculty on a full or part-time basis”. The amendment was incorporated into 
the law 3068/2002 as article 14 in Chapter C, Other Provisions. It was published in 
the Government Gazette on November 14, 2002 (vol. A, no 274). Nevertheless, in our 
opinion, it is questionable whether the legislative procedure for the amendment was 
legitimate. Contrary to the demands of the Constitution 1975/1986/2001, as 
prescribed in article 74, par. 4 and 5288, the amendment was not related to the main 
subject matter of the law 3068/2002 entitled “Compliance of the Administration to 
Court decisions, promotions of the judges of the regular administrative courts to the 
rank of the Councillor of State and other provisions”. Moreover, the amendment was 
neither submitted as such by a Minister or a Deputy, nor contained in the 
accompanying explanatory report or the text of the draft law itself289. As for the 
university professors who had submitted their resignations, they continued exercising 
their duties290. However, their four-year mandate had already expired as early as 
November 2001.  
 
But why did the article of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution regarding 
the functional accumulation status of university professors appointed to the 
                                                 
286 The transitory provision par. 2 of article 5 of the law 3051/2002 provided that the mandate of the 
members, who were not elected according to the provisions in force after the revised constitution of 
2001, was considered terminated. These members continued to exercise their duties until the election of 
new members according to the procedure provided for in par. 2 of article 3 of the said law. 
287 Source: the Article of the newspaper “Eleftherotypia” “The President is protesting against the 
incompatibility that “ate” the four”, October 4, 2002, available at: 
http://archive.enet.gr/online/online_text/c=112,dt=04.10.2002,id=41755432, date of access: 18.5.2010. 
288 “4. A Bill or law proposal for the amendment of a provision of a statute shall not be introduced for 
debate if the accompanying explanatory report does not contain the full text of the provision to be 
amended and if the text of the Bill or law proposal does not contain the full text of the new provision as 
amended. 
5. . . A Bill or law proposal containing provisions not related to its main subject matter shall not be 
introduced for debate. No addition or amendment shall be introduced for debate if it is not related to 
the main subject matter of the Bill or law proposal. Additions or amendments by Ministers are debated 
only if they have been submitted at least three days prior to the commencement of the debate in the 
Plenum, to the Section specified in article 71 or to the competent standing parliamentary committee, as 
specified by the Standing Orders. The provisions of the two preceding sections shall also apply for 
additions or amendments submitted by Members of Parliament. Parliament shall resolve in case of 
contestation”. 
289 Explanatory report and draft law of the law 3068/2002, Source: The Official Website of the Hellenic 
Parliament, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/2f026f42-950c-4efc-b950-
340c4fb76a24/s-dikast-eisig.pdf, date of access: 10.5.2011. 
290 Two of them were replaced in 2003, whereas the other two were reappointed. 
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constitutional independent authorities raise such a protest? The introduced constraint, 
which only permitted the employment of university professors on a part-time basis in 
case they were appointed to a constitutional independent authority, actually 
overturned the previous working status established by article 2, par. 2x of the law 
2530/1997. The relevant clause provided that university professors could be members 
of the independent authorities while keeping the status of full-time employed faculty 
members291. Indeed, employment on a part-time basis had three main drawbacks: i) 
part-time university professors could not be elected Presidents or Alternate Presidents 
of Departments, Deans, Rectors, Vice-Rectors; they could not participate in the 
Senate, and be elected Directors of laboratories and clinics, ii) they could not be 
remunerated by research programmes financed by the Special Account for Research 
Grants established in the same or another Higher Education Institution, and iii) their 
monthly salary was equivalent to one-third (1/3) of the monthly income of a 
university professor with full-time employment (article 14 of the law 2530/1997)292.  
 
The case previously analysed reflects the reluctance of university professors to lose 
full-time employment since they enjoyed a privileged functional accumulation status 
pursuant to article 2, par. 2 of the law 2530/1997 regarding their service status and 
remuneration, as amended293. However, such privileged functional accumulation 
status for university professors does not exist in other jurisdictions. In Italy, Chapter 
1, section 153, par. 4 and 5 of the legislative decree no 196/2003 on the Personal Data 
Protection Code, provides that if the President and members of the Authority Garante 
per la Protezione dei Dati Personali294 “are faculty professors at a University, they 
shall be put on leave of absence with no allowances pursuant to Section 13 of the 
Presidential Decree no 382 of 11.07.1980 as subsequently amended . . . For the entire 
term of office, President and members shall not be allowed – under penalty of losing 
office – to carry out professional or advisory activities, manage or be employed by 
public or private entities or hold elective offices295”. Finally, it should be emphasized 
                                                 
291 University Professors appointed to independent authorities as Presidents were under suspension 
from duties. 
292 As for the members’ monthly salary, it was equivalent to 40% of the total monthly income of the 
President of the authority which corresponded to that of the President of the Legal Council of State. 
The remuneration of the President’s and the members’ alternates was equivalent to 1/3 of the monthly 
income of the President and the regular members, and were paid to them after confirmation of the 
President that they had offered their services beyond any participation in the sessions of the authority.   
293 More specifically, they are allowed to i) be paid from funded research programmes or Research 
Institutes or Centres under the supervision of the General Secretariat for Research and Technology or 
under the supervision of other Ministries or university research institutes under the supervision or co-
supervision of the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs, ii) be paid for any work, iii) 
practice a liberal profession (e.g. lawyers, doctors), iv) be paid for their literary and artistic rights, v) 
teach at the Greek Open University, public Schools, public Institutes of Professional Training and 
Centres of Professional Training or provide teaching or managerial work at the Pedagogical Institute 
and the Regional Training Centres, v) to participate as paid members up to a maximum of two 
committees and boards of the public and private sector, provided that this participation is specifically 
stipulated by the law, as well as in the Governing Boards of Higher Educational Institutions and as 
members of the Academy of Athens, as members or scientific collaborators of the Scientific Council, 
the Scientific Service and Committees of Parliament. The extra-university activity of the faculty 
members with full-time employment, as described in points ii and iii, may not exceed a total of eight 
hours per week, broken down into two days maximum. 
294 The Garante per la protezione dei dati personali is a collegiate body composed of four members. 
295 The legislative decree no 196/2003 on the Personal Data Protection Code, Source: the Official 
Website of the Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, available at: 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/document?ID=1219452, date of access: 16.5.2011 
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that the Hellenic Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education in its Annual 
Report for the year 2009296 noted that “the intense extra-university activity of faculty 
members in some university departments creates problems in their operation”.  
 
ii. Analysis of the empirical data 
 
The empirical data comprise 39 members and their alternates, Presidents and 
Alternate-Presidents included, appointed during the period 1997 to December 31st, 
2010. Table 6 shows the professional status, that is, the main occupation, of the 39 
members. Once more the overwhelming majority of them come from the public sector 
(85%, 33 of 39), whereas university professors and judges represent 82% of those 
appointed during the period under research. As for gender distribution, men represent 
92% (36 of 39) of the total number of members, whereas women reach 8% (3 of 39). 
 
TABLE 6 
Professional Status of the members and alternate members of the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority (1997-31.12.2010) 
 
 Judges University 
Professors 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Lawyer with a salary mandate 
in the public sector 
% Members’ 
Professional Status 
23% (9 of 39) 59% (23 of 39) 
 
15% (6 of 39) 3% (1 of 39) 
 
Source: The Government Gazette and Annual Reports  
 
All the selected judges were retired from service with the exception of two judges: the 
first members of the authority appointed as President and Alternate President. The 
Constitution 1975/1986 in force permitted the assignment of such duties to judges on 
active service. The President was suspended from his judicial duties as Vice-President 
of the Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law, whereas his alternate performed his 
duties in the authority on a part-time basis parallel with the exercise of his judicial 
duties as Vice-President of the Council of State. It is noteworthy that 4 of 9 judges 
had been appointed President and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Courts by the 
executive. The judges’ ranks and titles, and the courts, where they had previously 
served, are as follows: 1 President of the Council of State, 2 Vice-Presidents of the 
Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law, 1 Vice-President of the Council of State, 1 
Councillor of State, 3 judges of the Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law, and 1 
associate judge of the Court of Audit. The ex-President of the Council of State was 
appointed President of the authority in 2008, whereas the other ex-Vice-President of 
the Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law was appointed President in 2003. 
 
Contrary to the case of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, university 
professors are strongly represented in the board of the authority during the period 
under research (59%, 23 of 39). Their area of specialty is as follows: 12 Law 
Professors, 7 Informatics Professors, 2 Political Science Professors, 1 History 
Professor, and 1 Professor of Mathematics. The professional profile of the free-lance 
professionals is as follows: 5 lawyers, and 1 civil engineer. Finally, the lawyer with a 
salary mandate was a PhD holder specialised in Social Law. 
 
                                                 
296 The Hellenic Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education, Annual Report for the year 2009, 
http://www.adip.gr/data1/HQAA_REPORT_2009.pdf, date of access: 17.6.2011. 
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Reappointing part of the same members/alternate members after the constitutional 
revision of 2001 was also a common practice in the case of the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority. This preference could be explained not only as an indication of 
the need to appoint experienced members, but also as a sign of trust to certain persons. 
Thus, six members who had served during the period 1997-2003 were reappointed 
after the constitutional revision of 2001, whereas their tenure ranges from 6 to 10.2 
years as shown in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7 
Hellenic Data Protection Authority – Reappointments – Duration of term 
 
Members Period Years 
FP12 1997-2007 10.2 
U4, U9 1997-2005 8.1 
U17, U18 2002-31.12.2010* 8.1 
J2 1997-2003 6 
* Their tenure had already expired on October 10, 2009  
 
Source: Government Gazette and Annual Reports 
 
Premature departure from office was quite often, whereas the case of the C4I Cameras 
triggered a series of resignations in 2007. The President (J19), the Alternate President 
(J23), three members (FP12, U17, U31) and two alternate members (U21, FP24) 
resigned in protest against the decision of the Greek Police, which was supported by 
an opinion of the Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law, to 
ignore the decisions of the authority297 and use surveillance cameras to film the 
demonstration and protest march to commemorate the Athens Polytechnic uprising on 
November 17, 2007. The mandates of six of the seven members who submitted their 
resignations on November 19 and 20, 2007298 were about to expire. Interestingly 
enough, two of seven resigned members (J23, U21) were reappointed on March 20, 
2008, whereas one member (U17) proceeded to the revocation of his resignation299, 
and remained in the authority while his term of office would end on October 13, 2009. 
 
                                                 
297 On November 11, 2006 the Minister of Public Order and the Minister of Finance filed an appeal at 
the Council of State against the decision 57/2006 of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority. The 
authority imposed a fine of 3,000 Euros to the Greek Police for the violation of the terms set out in its 
decision 58/2005 which provided that the new large high-tech CCTV system in Athens could only be 
used to monitor traffic. Indeed, the decision put many restrictions on the use of that system which 
consisted of cameras, microphones, and video analysis software. Moreover, it forbade the use of the 
system for the collection and processing of data in order to constitute offences that were not related to 
the regulation of traffic. The Council of State in Plenary Session rejected the request for annulment 
submitted by the Ministry of Public Order in 2009 (Decision 1662/2009 of the Council of State in 
Plenum, Source: Legal Information Bank of the Athens Bar Association, available at: 
http://www.dsanet.gr/1024x768Auth.htm, date of access: 11.5.2011.    
298 Letters of resignation of the members dated November 19 and 20, November 2007. Source: The 
Official Website of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, available at: 
http://www.dpa.gr/portal/page?_pageid=33%2C15131&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&_piref33_2
4849_33_15131_15131.etos=2007&_piref33_24849_33_15131_15131.minas=11&_piref33_24849_33
_15131_15131.ananeosi=%CE%91%CE%BD%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%AD%CF%89%CF%83%CE
%B7, date of access: 11.5.2011. 
299 Source: in.gr, Internet portal of the Lambrakis Journalistic Organisation, article entitled “The Board 
of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority”, available at: 
http://www.in.gr/news/print.asp?IngEntityID=881344&IngDtrID=244, date of access: 24.5.2010 
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In general, 13 of 38 members300, that is, 34%, resigned. Their main occupation is as 
follows: two free-lance professionals (lawyers), seven university professors, and four 
judges. Resignations, with the exception of the Cameras Case, have often been for 
professional reasons since many members took other attractive posts right after their 
resignation: the President J1 was appointed as the first Inspector General of Public 
Administration; the alternate President (J2) was appointed member of the Board for 
the Management and Reformation of the river Kifissos of Attica and its torrents; the 
regular member U3 became Minister of Justice in 2000 under the PASOK 
Government; the alternate member U8 was selected as the first Greek Ombudsman in 
1997; the regular member U20 was appointed Secretary General at the Ministry of 
Development under the New Democracy Government in 2004; the alternate member 
U32 was appointed member of the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post 
Commission in 2009. The President (J33) submitted his resignation on February 8, 
2011 for personal reasons301. Nevertheless, he had one more year to serve.  
 
The average length of tenure is high (4.7 years), and exceeds that of a minister or a 
government despite the fact that the relevant laws before and after the constitutional 
revision provided for a four-year mandate. The reappointment of many members, as 
well as the long delays in the members’ replacement despite the expiry of their 
mandate may explain the high score. More specifically, the first constitution of the 
board was published in the Government Gazette in August and September 1997. 
Consequently, the members’ mandate should have ended four years later, that is, 
August and September 2001, respectively. Instead, they were replaced in February, 
2003, that is, 1.3 years after the expiry of their term of office. It should also be 
reminded that the law 2472/1997 contained no clause that the members’ “term of 
office is ipso jure extended until the appointment of new members” as is the case with 
the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution.  The situation probably reveals the 
reluctance of the political decision makers to proceed to new appointments, thus 
employing tactics to gain time due to the new Constitution on the constitutional 
independent authorities which took effect in April 2001. The executive law 3051/2002 
of the Constitution on the constitutional independent authorities was published in the 
Government Gazette on September 20, 2002. Contrary to the constitutional demand, a 
transitional provision of this law302 further permitted the extension of the mandate of 
those already appointed in the authority until the election of new members following 
the new selection mechanism.  
 
Another similar case is that of five members (U17, U18, U29, FP37, and U38) whose 
term of office ended on October 13, 2009, and they had still not been replaced by 
December 31, 2010. Moreover, the member U32, who resigned on 2.9.2009 after 
being appointed to the board of the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post 
Commission, had not been equally replaced by December 31, 2010. If we interpret all 
these cases within the context of the justificatory basis of the Decision 1098/2011 of 
the Council of State, it is rather evident that the authority was not legally constituted. 
Such practices, that is, long delays in replacements followed by the political decision-
                                                 
300 The three members who submitted their resignations in the Cameras Case, and were finally 
reappointed or revoked their resignation are not included. 
301 Source: Newspaper Express, Daily Economic Newspaper, available at: 
http://www.express.gr/news/ellada/466945oz_20110510466945.php3, date of access: 11.5.2011. 
302 See analysis on article 3, par. 2 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution in the section on 
the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. 
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makers, either through the institutional design or in practice, jeopardize the proper 
function, and the decisions of any authority. Thus, an authority, due to its illegal 
constitution, may become vulnerable to appeals against undesirable decisions and 
heavy fines303. 
 
c. The Greek Ombudsman 
 
i. The institutional design regarding the selection criteria for the Ombudsman and 
Deputy Ombudsmen, term of office, and functional accumulation status 
 
• The legal framework before the constitutional revision of 2001 
 
The formulation of the clause regarding the criteria over the appointees’ qualifications 
as prescribed in the founding law 2477/1997304 was abstract in the sense that these 
criteria were set at a general level. Therefore, “individuals of acknowledged prestige, 
who had superior educational qualifications and enjoyed broad social acceptance” 
would be selected for the posts. The lack of clarity of the clause over the 
qualifications, and the exact meaning of the term “social acceptance” had already 
been criticised by members of Parliament during the discussions of the draft law305.   
 
The initial legal framework regulating the issues of the mandate, and the functional 
accumulation status was strict and absolute: no renewal of the five-year term of office, 
no other professional activity in the public or private sector during the mandate. 
Moreover, the premature termination of the Ombudsman’s term of office, for any 
reason, entailed ipso jure the termination of office of the Deputy Ombudsmen. 
However, this severe regulation regarding the renewal of the mandate and the 
functional accumulation status will be partly overturned after the constitutional 
revision of 2001. 
 
• The legal framework after the constitutional revision of 2001 
 
Contrary to the amendment regarding the privileged functional accumulation status of 
university professors who are allowed to exercise duties as members of a University 
faculty on a full-time basis when appointed to the board of the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority, the provisions of the new law 3094/2003 on the Greek 
Ombudsman remained faithful to the demands of the executive law 3051/2002. 
Therefore, it only permitted part-time university employment for the Deputy 
                                                 
303 A private Greek channel appealed to the Council of State, and managed to annul the fine of 15,000 
Euros imposed by the National Council for Radio and Television. The Court judged that the 
constitution of the organ was illegitimate by the time it took the relevant decision (Council of State, 
Division D, Decision 1098/2011) . 
304 Article 2, par. 1 of the law 2477/1997. 
305 See the speeches of the MPs Leonidas Avdis (Communist Party of Greece), Styliani Alfieri (the 
Coalition), and Georgios Tsafoulias (Democratic Social Movement). Minutes of Parliament, 9th Period 
(of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, Session 102, discussion and debate in 
particulars, March 26, 1997, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-
4a83-b09a 09f4c564609d/20_03_97.pdf and http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-
61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/26_03_97.pdf, date of access: 02.08.2010. 
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Ombudsmen. In addition, the exercise of any other public office is suspended, as well 
as the exercise of any other duties in any position in the public sector306. 
 
Regarding their mandate, the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen are appointed 
for a four-year once-renewable term. However, the regulation of the issue of the 
replacement of the Deputy Ombudsmen in case the Ombudsman’s term of office is 
terminated for whatever reason is of special interest. The relevant clause provided for 
in the previous law was not abolished. The Deputy Ombudsmen shall continue to 
perform their duties until the appointment of the new Deputy Ombudsmen, and in any 
case not later than three months following the appointment of the new Ombudsman307. 
Thus, the expiry of the Ombudsman’s term of office for whatever reason directly 
impacts on the Deputy Ombudsmen’s mandate which is equally terminated. It is 
obvious from the above mentioned clause that their replacement does not fall under 
the ambit of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. The Deputy 
Ombudsmen are not considered members of a collective body (authority) since the 
law 3051/2002308 classifies the Greek Ombudsman as a single-headed (“monocratic”) 
authority. As a result, the Deputy Ombudsmen are appointed by decision of the 
Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization on the 
recommendation of the Ombudsman (art. 2 par. 1). 
 
ii. Analysis of the empirical data 
 
The empirical data comprise 2 Ombudsmen, and 13 Deputy Ombudspersons, 
appointed during the period 1997 to December 31st, 2010.  
 
Table 8 shows the professional status, that is, the principal occupation, of the 2 
Ombudsmen and the 13 Deputy Ombudsmen. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming 
majority of them come from the public sector (80%, 12 of 15), whereas high-ranking 
civil servants represent 40% (6 of 15) of those appointed during the period 1997 to 
December 31st, 2010. University professors represent 33% (5 of 15) of those 
appointed, that is, 2 Ombudsmen and three Deputy Ombudsmen. As for gender 
distribution, contrary to all the other constitutional independent authorities under 
research, there is almost equal sex representation in the authority. Indeed, men 
represent 47% (7 of 15) of the total number of Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen, 
whereas women slightly exceed them by 53% (8 of 15). 
 
TABLE 8 
Professional Status of the Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudspersons (1997-31.12.2010) 
 
 High-ranking 
Civil Servants 
University 
Professors 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Lawyer with a salary mandate 
in the public sector 
% Members’ 
Professional Status 
40% (6 of  15) 33% (5 of 15) 
 
7% (3 of 15) 7% (1 of 15) 
 
Source: The Government Gazette and Annual Reports  
 
                                                 
306 Article 2, par. 4 of the law 3094/2003, as amended by article 284 par. 5 of the law 3852/2010. 
307 Article 2 par. 3 of the law 3094/2003. 
308 Article 1, par. 2 of the law 3051/2002. 
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The rank, public services of provenance, and the level of education of the high-
ranking civil servants who were appointed as Deputy Ombudspersons are shown in 
Table 9. 
 
TABLE 9  
The rank, public services of provenance, and the level of education of the high-ranking 
civil servants appointed as Deputy Ombudspersons 
 
Codified Case  Rank or Position Level of Education Public Service of provenance 
CS5 Director General Postgraduate Studies in 
Administrative Law 
Ministry of the Interior 
CS4 Director of City Planning  PhD in City Planning The Greek National Mortgage Bank 
CS11 Special Scientific Staff Postgraduate Degree 
(DEA and LLM in Public 
Law) 
The Greek Ombudsman 
CS10 Special Scientific Staff Postgraduate Degree in 
Legal Theory. He obtained 
his PhD in 2006 (He was 
appointed Deputy 
Ombudsman in 2003) 
The Greek Ombudsman 
CS12 Scientific Collaborator  PhD in Labor Law The Economic and Social 
Committee 
CS15 Executive Officer  Postgraduate Degree in 
Urban and Regional 
Planning 
The Directorate of the Technical 
Services of the National Bank of 
Greece 
 
Source: The Government Gazette and Annual Reports  
 
The University Professors’ area of specialty is as follows: 2 Political Scientists, one of 
them was appointed Ombudsman, 1 Constitutionalist, who was appointed 
Ombudsman, 1 Criminologist, and 1 specialized in Economics of Labor and Social 
Policy. All the free-lance professionals were lawyers. Two of them are PhD holders, 
and one has a postgraduate degree.  Finally, the lawyer with a salary mandate is also a 
PhD holder. 
 
The reappointment of the Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsmen after the constitutional 
revision of 2001 was rare. Only one Deputy Ombudsman was reappointed to the 
Authority after the constitutional revision of 2001, and assumed the post of the Greek 
Ombudsman (U2). The mandate of the other Deputy Ombudsmen was not renewed. 
Premature departure from office is quite often compared with the small number of the 
persons involved in our analysis. More specifically, one third of them resigned for 
more attractive posts, which, in some cases (3 of 5), had a political character. Their 
main occupation is as follows: 1 university professor (U2), 1 lawyer with a salary 
mandate (LM6), 1 free-lance professional, and 2 members from the special scientific 
personnel of the Ombudsman. The Greek Ombudsman (U2), submitted his resignation 
on September 24, 2010 to run for Mayor of Athens in the municipal and regional 
elections of 2010. He was elected Mayor of Athens on November 14, 2010309.  The 
Deputy Ombudswomen, LM6 and FP8, followed an academic career (university 
                                                 
309 He was supported by four political parties: the Democratic Left, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK), Action, and the Ecologists-Greens, and was elected with 51,95% of the votes (Registered 
voters: 488.150, voted: 167.104 (34,23%), invalid votes: 5,44%, blank votes: 5,67%. Votes for the 
elected Mayor: 77.165 Source: Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and Electronic Governance, 
available at: http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/dn2010/public/index.html#{"page":"level","params":{"level":"dhm_d","id":9186
}}, date of access: 27.12.2010 
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professors). The Deputy Ombudsman, CS10, was appointed Secretary General for 
Migration Policy at the Ministry of the Interior under the PASOK Government in 
2009, whereas the Deputy Ombudswoman, CS11, was appointed Director at the 
Political Bureau of the Minister of Finance under the PASOK Government in 2009. 
 
The average length of tenure is high (4.8) which may be attributed to the fact that the 
founding law of the Greek Ombudsman provided for a five-year mandate. Moreover, 
one person (U2) served 12 years in total310, whereas the mandates of four Deputy 
Ombudsmen and Ombudswomen were renewed once after their initial appointment311.  
However, the resignation of the Greek Ombudsman in 2010 had an impact on how the 
length of tenure should be estimated from that period onwards. Thus, two parameters 
were taken into consideration: i) the deadline of the period under research, that is, 
December 31, 2010, and ii) the replacement of the Ombudsman by a Deputy 
Ombudswoman (U9). As for the Ombudsman’s replacement, the Deputy 
Ombudswoman (U9) assumed the duties of Alternate Ombudswoman after the 
announcement of the Ombudsman’s resignation312 to run for Mayor of Athens. She 
issued an announcement, dated September 15, 2010, stating that the resigned 
Ombudsman “is legally replaced by the Deputy Ombudswoman, Mrs . . .313”.  
However, in our opinion, the procedure of the replacement was irregular pursuant to 
article 2 of the Law 3094/2003 which reads as follows:  “The Ombudsman may be 
replaced when absent or temporarily unable to perform his duties for whatever 
reason. The Ombudsman shall appoint one of the Deputy Ombudsmen as his 
alternate”. However, in this case the Ombudsman resigned. Therefore, a new 
Ombudsman should have been selected by the Conference of Presidents, whereas the 
Deputy Ombudsmen should continue to perform their duties until the appointment of 
the new Deputy Ombudsmen, and, in any case, not later than three months following 
the appointment of the new Ombudsman (Article 2, par. 3, verse 2 of  the law 
3094/2003). Consequently, in order to estimate the Deputy Ombudsmen’s314 length of 
tenure, we considered January 13, 2011315, as the end of their mandate316. We are 
fully aware that the average length of tenure does not correspond to what actually 
happened317, but rather to what should have happened. Interestingly enough, in our 
                                                 
310 He served five years as Deputy Ombudsman (1998-2003), and seven years as Ombudsman (2003-
2010). 
311 The following Deputy Ombudspersons served in total: FP7, U9: 7.5 years, CS10: 6.4 years, and 
CS11:4.4years. It should also be noted that two Deputy Ombudspersons submitted their resignations in 
2009 before the expiration of their mandate. In other words, the average length of tenure would have 
been higher. 
312 He officially submitted his resignation to the Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament on September 24, 
2010. Source: the Official Website of the Greek Ombudsman, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/pdf_01/8769_1_24-9-10_paraithsh_kamini_fin.pdf, date of access: 12.5.2011. 
The Ombudsman’s resignation was published in the Government Gazette on October 13, 2010 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 333, 13.10.2010)  
313 Source: the Official Website of the Greek Ombudsman, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/pdf_01/8748_1_DELTIO_TYPOU_DIEYKRINISTIKO.pdf, date of access: 
27.12.2010. 
314 The Deputy Ombudsmen and Ombudswomen: FP7, U9, U13, U14, CS15. 
315 The date corresponds to the expiry of three-months after the publication of the Ombudsman’s 
resignation in the Government Gazette, that is, October 13, 2010. 
316 The date corresponds to the expiry of the three-month period corresponding to the maximum period 
for the extension of the Deputy Ombudsmen’s mandate after the appointment of the new Ombudsman.  
317 In May 2011, U9 was proposed and finally selected as the Greek Ombudswoman by the Conference 
of Presidents. She would serve for the remainder of the mandate of the resigned Ombudsman, that is, 
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opinion, that irregularity also affected the legality of the first constitution of the 
Special Council for the Selection of the Heads of public services established by the 
law 3839/2010318. U9 was finally selected as the Greek Ombudswoman by the 
Conference of Presidents on May 19, 2011. 
 
d. The Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security, and Privacy 
 
i. The institutional design regarding the members’ selection criteria, term of office, 
and functional accumulation status  
 
The founding law 3115/2003319 provides for the selection criteria, and the area of 
specialty of the members and alternate members of the authority. The persons 
selected shall enjoy broad social acceptance, and be distinguished for their scientific 
expertise and professional competence in the field of law or the technical field of 
communications. During discussions in Parliament on the relevant draft law, the term 
“broad social acceptance” was considered as general, and abstract320. On the other 
hand, the Minister of Transport and Communications, Christos Verelis (PASOK), 
who introduced the draft law, stated that the clause on the selection criteria could not 
be further specified. He explained that the government would be accused of intending 
to describe the qualifications of certain persons they had in mind for the appointments 
through the formulation of the clause. Furthermore, he claimed that detailed selection 
criteria prescribed in the clause would be extremely restrictive for the Conference of 
Presidents321.  
 
The clause regarding the term of office322 is consistent with the relevant clause of the 
executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution on the constitutional independent 
                                                                                                                                            
until 20.2.2012. Source: The Official Website of the Greek Ombudsman, available at: 
http://new.synigoros.gr/?i=stp.el.synigoros, date of access: 14.6.2011 
318 Article 2 of the said law provides that a Deputy Ombudsman with his alternate participate in the 
organ on the recommendation of the Ombudsman. The Ministerial Decision regarding the appointment 
of the members of that organ was issued on May 4, 2011. The Deputy Ombudswoman for Gender 
Equality (CS12), and the Deputy Ombudsman for Human Rights (U14) were respectively appointed 
member and alternate member of the organ. Nevertheless, all the procedures for the selection of the 
new Ombudsman, and the appointment of new Deputy Ombudsmen were still pending. Consequently, 
in our opinion, the constitution of the Special Council for the Selection of the Heads of public services 
was irregular since the term of office of the Deputy Ombudswoman and the Deputy Ombudsman had 
already expired. Finally, the Scientific Report of Parliament on the draft law “System for the selection 
of the Heads of organisational units under objective and merit criteria-Establishment of a Special 
Council for the Selection of Heads in public services and other provisions” considered that the 
Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsperson could not be members of the said Council since they could 
not exercise decisive competences, as was the case with the Special Council for the Selection of Heads 
in public services. In the Rapporteur’s view, the relevant legislation regarding the competences of the 
institution of the Ombudsman provides only for mediation, control, and advisory competences. 
319 Article 2, par. 3 of the law 3115/2003. 
320 See the speech of the MP of the Communist Party of Greece, Angelos Tzekis. Minutes of 
Parliament, 10th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), Third Assembly, Session 62, 
discussion and debate in particulars, January 29,  2003, available at: available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-
09f4c564609d/SYN20030129.pdf, date of access: 14.5.2011 
321 Minutes of Parliament, 10th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), Third Assembly, 
Session 61, discussion and debate in principal, p. 2394, January 28,  2003, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-
09f4c564609d/SYN20030128.pdf, available at: 14.5.2011 
322 , Article 2, par. 4 of the law 3115/2003. 
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authorities. Thus, it provides for a four-year mandate with staggered terms in the first 
application of the law. As for the functional accumulation status323, no other 
professional activity in the public or private sector is permitted during the mandate. 
The members of the Authority, with the exception of the President who works under 
conditions of full-time and exclusive employment, may, however, exercise duties as 
members of a University faculty on a part-time basis. 
 
Interestingly enough, the Member of Parliament, Kyriakos Spyriounis (PASOK) 
expressed his complete disagreement with the university professors’ functional 
accumulation status during the discussions of the relevant draft law in Parliament324. 
He pointed out that such exceptions constituted a continuous challenge towards other 
professional categories. He proposed that university professors should also work 
under conditions of full-time and exclusive employment, and thus be devoted to the 
sacred mission of the authority. Moreover, he stated that special remuneration could 
be foreseen for that purpose. 
  
However, the relevant clause on the university professors’ functional accumulation 
status would be amended in a few months time as was the case with the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority. The amendment325 was incorporated into the law 3213/2003 as 
article 11, untitled. It was published in the Government Gazette on December 31, 
2003 (vol. A, no 309). Nevertheless, in our opinion, it is questionable whether the 
legislative procedure for the amendment was legitimate. Contrary to the demands of 
the Constitution 1975/1986/2001, as prescribed in article 74, par. 4 and 5, the 
amendment was not related to the main subject matter of the law 3213/2003 entitled 
“Declaration and Control of Assets of  Members of Parliament, Public Officials and 
Employees, Mass Media Owners and other categories of persons”. This time, the text 
of the amendment was submitted and signed by the competent Ministers326 
accompanied by the special report of the General Accounting Office327.  
 
ii. Analysis of the empirical data 
 
The empirical data comprise 20 members with their alternates appointed during the 
period 2003 to December 31st, 2010.  
 
Table 10 shows the professional status, that is, the principal occupation, of the 20 
members. The overwhelming majority come from the public sector (75%, 15 of 20), 
whereas university professors represent 45% (9 of 20) of those appointed during the 
period 2003 to December 31st, 2010. Free-lance professionals represent 25% (5 of 20) 
                                                 
323 Article 4, par. 3 of the law 3115/2003. 
324 Minutes of Parliament, 10th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), Third Assembly, 
Session 62, discussion and debate in particulars, p. 2417, January 29,  2003, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-
09f4c564609d/SYN20030129.pdf, date of access: 14.5.2011 
325 The amended clause, as prescribed in article 11 of the law 3213/2002, provides that “. . .it is allowed 
[for the members of the Authority for Communication, Security, and Privacy] to exercise duties as 
members of a University faculty on a full or part-time basis”.  
326 Source: The official website of the Hellenic Parliament, Amendment on the draft law, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/bbb19498-1ec8-431f-82e6-023bb91713a9/d-property-
1.pdf, date of access: 17.5.2011. 
327 If a University Professor was elected as member of the authority, and opted for the full-time 
employment status, he was also entitled to receive full payment from the university. 
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of those appointed. As for gender distribution, the overwhelming majority of the 
appointed members are men, that is, 95% (19 of 20), whereas women represent 5% (1 
of 20).  
 
TABLE 10 
Professional Status of the members and alternate members of the Authority for 
Communication, Security, and Privacy (2003-31.12.2010) 
 University 
Professors 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
High-ranking 
Civil Servants 
Judges 
%Members’ 
Professional Status 
45% (9 of  20) 25% (5 of 20) 
 
20% (4 of  20) 10% (2 of 20) 
 
Source: The Government Gazette and Annual Reports  
 
The university professors’ area of specialty is as follows: 3 Professors of Electrical 
and Computer Engineering, and 6 Professors of Informatics. The professional profile 
of the free-lance professionals is as follows: 4 lawyers, and 1 Mechanical-Electrical 
Engineer, appointed as President in 2003, and reappointed in 2008. The category of 
high-ranking civil servants is represented by former executives from the broader 
public sector, that is, the Greek Telecommunications Organisation328. Their rank is as 
follows: 1 alternate Director General, and 4 Directors. Finally, judges are poorly 
represented (2 of 20). They were both retired from service, and their rank is as 
follows: 1 Judge of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law, 1 Councillor 
of the Court of Audit. 
 
Premature departure from office is not rare. There is no indication of formal dismissal, 
whereas resignations may be attributed either to personal reasons or the appointment 
to new, more attractive posts with a political character (2 of 5). More specifically, 
25% of the members resigned (5 of 20), whereas their principal occupation is as 
follows: 2 university professors (U9, U16), 2 free-lance professionals (FP3, FP18), 
and 1 judge (J5). The university professor U16 was appointed Secretary General at the 
Ministry of Infrastructures, Transports, and Networks under the Pasok Government in 
2009. The free-lance professional FP18 was appointed Director at the Political Bureau 
of the Caretaker Minister of the Interior, S. Flogaitis before the national elections of 
2009, whereas his mandate was ipso jure terminated on October 6, 2009. He was 
immediately appointed as Head of the Bureau for the Support of Good Legislation at 
the General Secretariat of the Government by the Prime Minister, Georgios 
Papandreou. However, the Prime Minister proceeded to the revocation of his 
appointment in June 2010. 
 
The average length of tenure is high (5.1) which may be attributed to the fact that the 
mandates of seven members (FP1, J4, U6, U8, FP10, FP11, CS12, CS13) were 
renewed once after their initial appointment in 2003. Their tenure ranges from 7.7 (J4, 
U8, FP10, FP11) to 8.8 years (FP1, U6, CS12, CS13), a remarkably high score. 
                                                 
328 The procedure of the privatization of the Greek Telecommunications Organisation started in 1996, 
whereas, in 2001, after the liberalisation of the telecommunications market in Greece (Law 2867/2000) 
private capital possessed the majority shares of the enterprise (OECD, 2002).The State retains 20% of 
the shares, a blocking minority shareholding. However, the privatization scheme of 2011 foresees the 
selling of another 10% of the state owned shares (Source: the Official Website of Newspaper 
Kathimerini, Privatizations: the spearhead, Article by Sotiris Nikas, available at: 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_3_17/04/2011_439345, date of access: 
17.4.2011.  
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However, the constitution of the authority has been irregular on many occasions. 
More specifically, in the first constitution of the authority, the replacement or the 
renewal of the mandate of 3 members (U8, J4, FP10) with their alternates (U9, J5, 
FP11), who had a two-year mandate which expired in 2005 according to the system of 
staggered terms, never took place. Instead, their term of office seems to have been 
silently extended, and finally renewed in 2007 for four years. Another case was that of 
the replacement of the alternate vice-president (FP3) who submitted his resignation on 
April 21, 2004. He was finally replaced in 2007, despite the fact that the President of 
the authority had notified the Speaker of Parliament of the issue multiple times329. 
Finally, the resigned members (U16 and FP18) were replaced almost a year after their 
resignation330.  
 
4. The Members’ Involvement in Public Life Index: variations and intensity of 
involvement, and functional accumulation status  
 
a. The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel  
 
i) Judges 
 
Retired judges (21 of 43 members for whom we have evidence), despite the fact that 
they represent the overwhelming majority of the members of the Supreme Council for 
the Selection of Personnel, are mainly institutionally involved in public life. This is 
not surprising since judges, when on active service, are subjected to constitutional 
constraints regarding the exercise of other public functions, and duties. However, we 
should also point out that the technical limitations of the words-key search system of 
the Government Gazette uploaded on the website of the National Printing Office 
dissuaded us from extending our research to the period 1980-1991.  
 
Thus, according to our findings, the judges’ institutional involvement consists of their 
participation in i) special courts and councils provided for in the Constitution331, ii) 
various committees and councils exclusively or partly constituted by judges as 
provided for in legislation, iii) the National Commission for Human Rights 
representing the respective Supreme Courts. Moreover, a number of judges were 
appointed as members of the permanent legislative drafting committee of the Ministry 
of Justice (J15, J23, J40), as members of working groups (J45, J53), as members of 
the Central Examination Committee of the National School of Public Administration 
for the entrance competition (J45, J47), and as Alternate Vice-President of the 
Permanent Expert Committee operating at the General Directorate for Public 
Procurement of the General Secretariat of Commerce (J54). Nevertheless, we should 
also remind that 10 of 27 judges had the rank of Vice-President of the Supreme 
                                                 
329 Information available at the Annual Report of 2006 
330 According to article 13 par. 5 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (law 2690/1999), a collective 
body may extend its function only for three months, in case some of its members disappear, or leave for 
whatever reason, or lose the capacity according to which they were appointed to the board, if, when in 
session, the rest of the members form a quorum. 
331 They may become members of Special Courts and Councils related to judges’ responsibility and 
judges’ disciplinary issues pursuant to articles 99 and 91 of the Constitution (Special Court for Mistrial, 
and Supreme Disciplinary Council). They may also become members of the Supreme Special Court 
pursuant to article 100 of the Constitution. All the members of these Courts are chosen by lot with the 
exception of their Presidents who participate ex officio, namely the Presidents of the Supreme Courts, 
as appropriate. 
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Courts, and thus were promoted by the executive. Under this perspective, their 
institutional involvement is relevant. 
 
Only two judges participate in the financial dimension: one was appointed as 
President of the Revisionary Council for the Property of Forests (J12), whereas the 
other was appointed as President of the Supervisory Council of the Body of Certified 
Appraisers (J2). Four judges are financially and institutionally involved. More 
specifically, after his retirement from the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel, J5 was appointed President of the National Council for Radio and 
Television, whereas J19 was a member of the Hellenic Competition Commission 
before assuming his duties as Councillor of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel. J23 was appointed President of the Hellenic Copyright Organisation but 
soon afterwards he submitted his resignation after his selection as Councillor of the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel.  J27, an ex judge, had served as legal 
advisor at the European Commission332, whereas he was appointed Vice-President of 
the Health Procurement Committee under the PASOK government in 2010. 
Interestingly enough, he submitted his resignation from the position of the Vice-
President after five months, and was reappointed Councillor of the Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel in 2011. Finally, the judges’ involvement in public life 
is not broad333. Indeed, they do not participate in more than two dimensions of the 
index (I, F, I+IF, I+F), whereas only 5 judges of 22 are involved in a combination of 
two dimensions. The intensity of the judges’ involvement in public life is low334. 
 
We have the cases of two judges with a functional accumulation status during their 
term of office335. J2, Vice-President of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel was appointed President of the Supervisory Council of the Body of 
Certified Appraisers on 14.4.1994 (term of office: 14.4.1994-21.10.1994), shortly 
after his appointment to the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
(5.4.1994). However, he submitted a declaration of abdication published in the 
Government Gazette on 7.9.1994. J15 was appointed member of the permanent 
legislative drafting committee of the Ministry of Justice while he was Councillor of 
the Authority. 
 
ii) University Professors 
 
University Professors are weakly represented in the authority. Nevertheless, three of 
five University Professors (U6, U7, and U8) present a broad involvement in public 
life as shown by the combinations of the dimensions of the index336. Indeed, their 
career paths are rich. U7 and U8 were politically involved. U7 was elected Member of 
the European Parliament with the party of PASOK in 1999.  U8 was appointed 
                                                 
332 Since January 16, 1983, he was a Permanent Employee at the Commission of the European Union – 
Legal Adviser, Grade A3 post. Source: 61998A0086 Judgement of the Court of First Instance (Second 
Chamber) of January 26, 2000, Dimitrios Gouloussis v Commission of the European Communities, 
Officials, Promotions-Grade A 2 post-Action for Annulment, Case T-86/98 Source: EUR-Lex, 
available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61998A0086:EL:HTML, 
date of access: 29.11.2010  
333 See Appendix 8, table 1. 
334 See Appendix 8, table 2. 
335 See Appendix 8, table 3. 
336 See Appendix 8, table 1. 
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President of the Central Legislative Drafting Committee337 in 1993. However, he 
submitted his resignation shortly before his appointment as Councillor in 1994. Their 
institutional involvement comprises appointments to legislative drafting committees 
(U7, U8), and various working groups (U8(2), U21). U6 was appointed President of 
the National Consultative Council for Research, whereas U7 was nominated judge for 
the European Court of Justice by the Greek Government in 1999338. U7 and U8 served 
as Ministers at the Grivas Caretaker Government339 in 1989, whereas U8 was 
appointed Minister of the Interior to the Simitis’ Caretaker Government before the 
National Elections of 1996. As for their institutional and financial involvement, U6 
was appointed President of the Hellenic Mapping and Cadastral Organisation 
(OKXE), U7 was twice appointed President of the Management Board of the 
Organisation for Mediation and Arbitration in 1994 and 1999340, and Vice-President 
of the Governing Board of the University of Thessaly. U8 was appointed President of 
the Economic and Social Committee in 1998341, and member of the Governing Board 
of the University of Crete where he served during 1983-1987. Finally, his scientific 
involvement is also remarkable since he was twice appointed President of the 
Management Board of the Centre for International and European Economic Law 
(1997-2001 and 2007-2009), and as member of the Scientific Council of the Hellenic 
Centre for European Studies -EKEM(1989-1991).  
 
The intensity of their involvement in public life is higher than that of judges since 
only one university professor pertain to the low scale, whereas two university 
professors pertain to the medium scale, and one to the high scale (14 times)342. 
 
Three University Professors (U6, U7, U8) fulfil the requirements for the functional 
accumulation status as set forth in our definition343. In other words, at a certain period, 
all three university professors are on active service, serve as Councillors in the 
authority, and are simultaneously appointed to other posts344. We should remind that 
they may be also privately employed (e.g. exercise a liberal profession such as lawyer, 
                                                 
337 The Central Legislative Drafting Committee (KENE) is a governmental service since it pertains to 
the group of public services which are under the direct jurisdiction of the Prime Minister (Law 
1558/1985). 
338 His mandate was renewed in 2006 and 2009. He has been President of the European Court of 
Justice since 2003, as he was elected twice by the judges of the Court. Regarding the appointment of 
judges and advocates general in the European Courts, the national governments simply nominated 
their candidates, whereas the representatives of the governments of the member states appointed 
them. However, the new procedure laid down in article 255 TFEU provides that “A panel shall be set 
up in order to give an opinion on candidates' suitability to perform the duties of Judge and Advocate-
General of the Court of Justice and the General Court before the governments of the Member States 
make the appointments referred to in Articles 253 and 254. The panel shall comprise seven persons 
chosen from among former members of the Court of Justice and the General Court, members of 
national supreme courts and lawyers of recognised competence, one of whom shall be proposed by 
the European Parliament. Official Journal 115 , 09/05/2008 P. 0159 – 0159, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E255:EN:HTML, date of access: 
26.5.2011 
339 The term is used to describe the government that operates in the interim period between the normal 
dissolution of Parliament for the purpose of holding an election and the formation of a new government 
after the election results are known. 
340 He submitted his resignation after his election as Member of the European Parliament.  
341 He submitted his resignation in 1999 after being appointed to the European Court of Justice. 
342 See Appendix 8, table 2. 
343 See Appendix 8, table 3. 
344 See Appendix 8, table 3, column 2. 
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engineer etc). More specifically, U6345 has a scientific involvement since he was 
appointed: i) President of the Geodetic and Geophysical Committee of the State 
(1996-1998), ii) President of the Scientific Council of the National Observatory of 
Athens with a three-year mandate), and iii) member of the Management Board of the 
Centre for Educational Research with a three year mandate346. U7 was President of 
the legislative drafting committee for the establishment of the Economic and Social 
Committee (Law 2232/1994). He was appointed President of the Economic and Social 
Committee on 14.12.1994, and  served as President of the Management Board of the 
Organisation for Mediation and Arbitration (1991-1999). U8 became Secretary of the 
Management Board of the Centre for International and European Economic Law 
(1993-1997), whereas U21 was appointed member of the Committee for the Study on 
the improvement of the legislation on National Endowments in 1999. 
 
iii) High-ranking civil servants 
 
Some high-ranking civil servants participate in important dimensions of the index, 
namely, the political and the institutional-financial, thus formulating interesting 
involvement combinations (P+I, I+IF)347. More specifically, top civil servants (CS9, 
CS10, CS52) are politically involved. A former Director General of the Ministry of 
the Interior (CS9) retired from the authority after his appointment as Secretary 
General at the Ministry of the Interior in 2004 under the New Democracy 
Government. A former Director General of the Ministry of the Interior (CS10) after 
his retirement from the service was appointed Special Advisor at the Political Bureau 
of the Minister of the Interior under the PASOK Government in 1993.  A former 
Director General of the Ministry of the Interior (CS52) retired from the authority after 
her appointment as Secretary General at the Ministry of the Interior in 2009 under the 
PASOK Government. As for the high-ranking civil servants’ institutional 
involvement, they were many times appointed as members of working groups and 
committees constituted by Ministries, (CS9(8), CS10(4), CS11, CS17(2), CS28, 
CS30(2), CS38(4), CS39, CS51(2), CS52(7)), members of advisory bodies in public 
administration (CS28(2), CS52(2)), members of the Central Examination Committee 
of the National School of Public Administration for the entrance competition (CS9(4), 
CS39, CS42(3)).  
 
Their financial and institutional involvement is important not only as an event on its 
own. In most cases such appointments to the management boards of organisations, 
enterprises, or legal persons of the public sector may conceal political affiliation. In 
other words, certain persons, who might be sympathisers of a party or party members, 
are appointed to such positions when a certain political party is in government. The 
following appointments pertain to the category of financial and institutional 
involvement: CS17 and CS39, former Director Generals at the Ministry of the Interior 
were appointed Alternate Member and member of the Management Board of the 
Organisation for the Administration of Public Material  (ODDY) in 1993; the former 
Assistant Director General of the Public Power Corporation (CS41) was appointed i) 
President of the Management Board of the Athens-Piraeus Electric Railways S.A. and 
                                                 
345 He retired from the National Technical University of Athens in 1997. Source: Official Website of 
the International Association of Geodesy, available at: http://www.gfy.ku.dk/~iag/HB2004/part3/32-
levalloir-price.pdf, date of access, 26.5.2011. 
346 He submitted his resignation on 6.2.1997 (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 193, 17.3.1997). 
347 See Appendix 8, table 1. 
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General Director348 of its services (1995-1997), ii) Member of the Management Board 
of the Athens Urban Transport Organisation with a five-year mandate in 1997, and iii) 
President349 of the Management Board of the Electric Railways S.A. representing the 
State in 1997 (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 1023, 20.11.1997); CS51, former 
Director General of the Ministry of the Interior was appointed as i) member of the 
Management Board of the Fund of Deposits and Loans in 1993, and ii) as member of 
the Administrative Board of the public S.A. “Themis Constructions”350 in 2004; 
CS55, a former Director of the General Accounting Office, was appointed i) member 
of the management board of the Hellenic Aerospace Industry S.A. in 2004, and ii) 
Member of the management board of the Public Power Corporation S.A. in 2005. 
 
The overwhelming majority of the high-ranking civil servants present low intensity 
involvement. Only two top civil servants (CS9, CS52) feature in the medium (10 
times) and high intensity scale (15 times), respectively351.  
 
We have the cases of three high-ranking civil servants (CS9, CS11, and CS18) with a 
functional accumulation status352 during their term of office, that is, they continued to 
perform their duties as Directors General at their respective services353 while they 
served as Councillors at the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. As we 
have already mentioned the case of the high-ranking civil servant CS18 is a striking 
one since she was simultaneously Councillor of the Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel, and Director General of its Secretariat. Moreover, as we have earlier 
stated, the renewal of her functional accumulation status was irregular. Finally, we 
have four cases where the Councillors CS9, CS10, CS39 and CS55 are appointed to 
various positions comprised in the involvement in public life index during their term 
of office. They participated in various working groups and committees constituted by 
Ministries (CS9, CS10, CS39), whereas CS55 was appointed as member of the 
management board of the Operator of the National Gas System S.A. 
 
iv) Legal Councillors of State 
 
The Legal Councillors of State represent a minority professional group in the 
authority. Therefore, both their involvement354 in the index and its intensity are 
low355. However, we should remind that two of the Legal Councillors of State had the 
rank of Vice-President of the Legal Council of State, and had been promoted by the 
executive. In other words, their institutional involvement is relevant. Moreover, the 
Councillor LC37 was politically involved since he was appointed as member of the 
Central Legislative Drafting Committee, namely a governmental position.  
                                                 
348 He submitted his resignation from the post of General Director (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 651, 
1.8.1997) 
349 He submitted his resignation on 30.7.2001 (Government Gazette, vol. B, no1029, 3.8.2001) 
350 The anonymous company was founded by law 2408/1996, and is operating in the public interest 
regarding the repair, design, expansion, construction, equipment and organization of the Judiciary 
Buildings. 
351 See Appendix 8, table 2. 
352 See Appendix 8, table 3. 
353 CS9 was Director General at the Ministry of the Interior, CS11 was Director General at the Ministry 
of Environment, Physical Planning, and Public Works, and CS18 was Director General at the 
Secretariat of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel.  
354 See Appendix 8, table 1.  
355 See Appendix 8, table 2. 
 133
 
v) Free-lance professionals 
 
The free-lance professionals also present poor involvement as far as broadness and 
intensity are concerned356. However, we have evidence that two of them are 
politically involved. The Councillor FP43, a lawyer, before his appointment to the 
authority in 2003, ran for Councillor with the left-wing faction “Democratic Fighting 
Rally-Fighting Lawyers” supported by the Greek Communist Party in the elections of 
the Athens Bar Association in 2002357.  Moreover, he was elected member of the 
Disciplinary Council358 of the Athens Bar Association in 2002. The Councillor FP56, 
an economist specialized in management, ran for parliament as member of the party 
of Popular Orthodox Rally, an extreme right-wing party, in the national elections of 
2007. Further evidence for his political affiliation is given by his appointment as 
member of the Committee for the procurement of goods of relevant financial or 
technological value of the Organisation of the Greek Railways S.A. (O.S.E). He was 
proposed by the political party of the Popular Orthodox Rally as its representative359. 
The appointment pertains to the financial dimension of the index, and took place four 
and a half months before his selection as Councillor in the authority. 
 
b. The Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
 
i) Judges 
 
According to our findings, the judges’ institutional involvement is relevant as was the 
case with the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. More specifically, 4 of 
9 judges (J1, J2, J19, J33) had the rank of President and Vice-President of the 
Supreme Courts and had been promoted by the executive. They participated in i) 
special courts and councils provided for in the Constitution (J1 (2), J2, J22(3)), and ii) 
various committees and councils exclusively or partly constituted by judges as 
provided for in legislation (J1, J19(2), J34). Moreover, a number of judges were 
appointed as President (J33(2)) and members of various legislative drafting 
committees (J2, J19(2), J34), as President of working groups (J2), and as President (in 
his capacity as Judge of a Court of Appeals) of the Secondary Council for the 
Selection of Medical and Dental Personnel (J27). Finally, the President-J19 was 
appointed Caretaker Minister of Justice before the national elections of 2000, whereas 
the President-J33 served as a judge of the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities (1989-1992) on the proposal of the Greek Government.   
 
Two judges have political involvement.  The Deputy President-J2 was appointed as 
member of the Central Legislative Drafting Committee (KENE) in 1993 and 1995, 
                                                 
356 See Appendix 8, tables 1 and 2.  
357 Source: Newspaper Rizospastis, issue of February 24, 2002, available at:  
http://www2.rizospastis.gr/story.do?id=1160857&publDate=24/2/2002, date of access: 1.3.2011 
358 According to the Code of the Greek Lawyers, the regular and alternate members of Disciplinary 
Councils of the Greek Bars Associations are selected by their management boards. Their term of office 
ends with the expiration of the mandate of the management board that appointed them (article 66 par. 1 
and 3). Source: Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union, The Code of Greek 
Lawyers, available at: www.ccbe.org/.../user.../code_grece_elpdf12_1187786105.pdf, date of access: 
27.5.2011.   
359 Document no. 5013/24.10.2007 of the Director General of the party of the Popular Orthodox Rally 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 11, 15.1.2008) 
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whereas the President-J19 was appointed President of the same committee and served 
during 1998-2003360.  As for their institutional and financial involvement, both J1 and 
J2 resigned from their positions as President and Alternate Vice-President of the 
authority since they were appointed to other appealing positions. J1 became the first 
Greek Inspector General of Public Administration, whereas J2 was appointed as 
member of the Board for the Management and Reformation of the river Kifissos of 
Attica and its torrents. Finally, J33 was a member of the teaching staff under contract 
of the National School of Public Administration, and the National School of Judicial 
Officers.  Finally, the judges’ involvement in public life is quite broad, that is, three of 
them participate in two dimensions of the index (I+IF, P+I, I+S), one participate in 
three (P+I+IF), and three are only institutionally involved361. 
 
The intensity of the judges’ involvement in public life ranges from low to medium362 
Regarding cases of functional accumulation status363, the Alternate Vice-President, J2, 
performed his duties in the authority on a part-time basis parallel with the exercise of 
his judicial duties as Vice-President of the Council of State. Moreover, while he 
served in the authority, he was institutionally involved as member of the permanent 
legislative drafting committee of the Ministry of Justice, and President of a working 
group. It is obvious that the positions of Alternate Vice-President of the authority and 
Vice-President of the Council of State are incompatible and violate the principle of 
the impartiality of the Judiciary. In other words, since the decisions of the authority 
may be appealed to the Council of State, there was high probability that J2 would 
have to rule on the lawfulness of a decision he had previously taken in his capacity as 
Alternate President of the authority. Indeed, the Constitution of 2001 abolished the 
appointment of judges to administrative positions while on active service. However, 
article 89, par. 2 of the Constitution provides that judges may sit on legislative 
drafting committees while on active service, thus ignoring the fact that the same 
judges may in turn decide on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the law 
they had previously elaborated as members of the competent legislative drafting 
committee. It is true that the experience of judges is valuable for the elaboration of a 
draft law. Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
held that the principle of the impartiality of the tribunal should not be violated364. 
                                                 
360 He submitted his resignation on 10.2.2003 (Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 191, 19.2.2003), three 
days before the publication of his appointment as President of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority. 
361 See Appendix 8, table 4. 
362 See Appendix 8, table 5. 
363 See Appendix 8, table 6. 
364 We cite the summary of the decision Procola v. Luxembourg (1995) as incorporated into the 
opinions of the Lords of Appeal for judgement in the cause Davidson (AP) (Original Respondent and 
Cross-appellant) v. Scottish Ministers (Original Appellants and Cross-respondents) [2004] UKHL 34 
“In Procola v Luxembourg (1995) 22 EHRR 193, a dairy association complained of four milk quota 
orders made with retrospective effect pursuant to a domestic regulation and a domestic statute. The 
regulation had been submitted in draft to the Conseil d'Etat, which had advised that a statute was 
necessary to give retrospective effect to the proposed new rules and had drafted a single clause bill 
which had been enacted as the statute. The association's challenge to the four orders, based on their 
retrospective effect among other things, came before the Judicial Committee of the Conseil d'Etat, four 
of whose five members had previously taken part in drawing up the Conseil d'Etat's opinion on the 
draft regulation and framing the bill. The association's challenge was dismissed, and it complained 
that the Judicial Committee was not an independent and impartial tribunal and that its rights under 
article 6 of the European Convention had been violated. A majority of the Commission held that there 
had been no violation of article 6, but a minority dissented, holding (page 203) that, having regard to 
the importance of appearances and the increased concern of the public that the fair administration of 
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Finally, the President J19 was ex officio member of the National Commission for 
Human Rights representing the Hellenic Data Protection Authority. 
 
ii) University Professors 
 
University Professors are the predominant professional category (59%, 23 of 39) in 
the authority. Their career paths are extremely rich with remarkable presence in public 
life. Their institutional involvement comprises intense participation in i) legislative 
drafting committees (U7(3), U9(5), U29(7), U30(3), U31(2)),  ii) various working 
groups, committees or councils constituted by Ministries or other legal persons of the 
public sector (U3(3), U4(3), U6(4), U7(7), U14(4), U16, U18, U25, U29, U30(4), 
U32, U38(3)), iii) advisory bodies in public administration (U8(2), U9, U20, U25(2), 
U28, U32), iv) examination or selection committees (U3, U29, U30(3), U32,  and v) 
special courts and councils provided for in the Constitution365 (U3, U4(4), U7, U9, 
U16(2), U29, U31(2)).  The member U4 was appointed Caretaker Minister of the 
Interior before the national elections of 2004.  
 
Their political involvement is important as we gathered information for 10 of 23 
university professors (U3, U4(3), U7, U9, U17(2), U20, U25, U26, U28, U29). The 
member (U3) submitted his resignation from the authority, and was appointed 
Minister of Justice (2000-2001) under the second Simitis’s Government (PASOK). 
                                                                                                                                            
justice should be guaranteed, the association could legitimately fear that its case would not be heard 
by an independent and impartial tribunal. The Court unanimously upheld this dissent. In paragraphs 
44-45 of its judgment it said: "44.  The only issue to be determined is whether the Judicial Committee 
satisfied the impartiality requirement of Article 6 of the Convention, regard being had to the fact that 
four of its five members had to rule on the lawfulness of a regulation which they had previously 
scrutinised in their advisory capacity. 45.  The Court notes that four members of the Conseil d'Etat 
carried out both advisory and judicial functions in the same case. In the context of an institution such 
as Luxembourg's Conseil d'Etat the mere fact that certain persons successively performed these two 
types of function in respect of the same decisions is capable of casting doubt on the institution's 
structural impartiality. In the instant case, Procola had legitimate grounds for fearing that the 
members of the Judicial Committee had felt bound by the opinion previously given. That doubt in itself, 
however slight its justification, is sufficient to vitiate the impartiality of the tribunal in question, and 
this makes it unnecessary for the Court to look into the other aspects of the complaint." Source: The 
Official Website of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd040715/david-1.htm, date of access: 
29.5.2011. However, the constitutional legislator of the Constitution of 2001 did not abolish the clause 
regarding the participation of judges on active service in legislative drafting committees. Thus, the 
Rapporteur of the majority of the Constitution of 2001, Evangelos Venizelos, admitted the possibility 
of conflict between the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the participation of judges in 
legislative drafting committees. He stated: “Article 88, par. 9, possibility of judges on active service to 
participate in legislative drafting committees. Indeed, there may be a problem with the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice or the Court of the European Communities. If this jurisprudence is 
stabilized, our Constitution will be implemented accordingly, but I consider improbable the 
international stabilization of such a jurisprudence that excludes the judges as scientists from the 
legislative drafting committees…Consequently, I think that the Constitution should permit the 
participation of judges on active service in legislative drafting committees, and if there is a problem we 
shall see how the relevant clause will be interpreted”. Minutes of Parliament, 7th Revisionary 
Parliament, 10th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, Session 133, 
discussion and debate in principal, p. 5735, March 7, 2001, afternoon session, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-
09f4c564609d/SYN030701a.pdf, date of access: 14.5.2011 
365 Apart from judges of the Supreme Courts, these special courts and councils are also constituted by 
law professors chosen by lot. 
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U4 served as Secretary of the Cabinet (1993-1996) under the second and third 
Andreas Papandreou Governments (1988-1989, and 1993-1996) whereas he is 
currently Secretary General of the Government366 (2009-) under the Georgios 
Papandreou’s Government (PASOK). The member U29 was appointed member of the 
Central Legislative Drafting Committee (KENE) by the Prime Minister Konstantinos 
Karamanlis.  
 
The members U7, U17, U20, U25, U26, and U28 also have party affiliation: U7 was 
appointed as member of the Group on migration Policy of the party of PASOK upon 
decision of the President of the party, Georgios Papandreou, regarding the constitution 
of a group on Migration Policy367. U17 ran for Municipal Councillor of the City of 
Athens in the Municipal and Prefectural Elections of 1998 with the Communist Party 
of Greece. Moreover, he ran for Member of the European Parliament with the 
Communist Party of Greece in the European Elections of 1999. The member U20 
resigned from the authority and was appointed Secretary General of Research and 
Technology at the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Development (2004-2008) 
under the New Democracy Government, whereas he was elected member of the 
European Parliament in the European Elections of 2009 with the party of New 
Democracy. The members U25 and U28 were members of the party of New 
Democracy since they were appointed as extra-parliamentary members of the Sector 
for Education and Religious Affairs of the Parliamentary Work of New Democracy 
with a two-year mandate by decision of the Secretary General of the Parliamentary 
Group Dimitrios Sioufas, upon recommendation of the Coordinators and Heads of the 
Sector of Education and Religious Affairs and approval of the President of the Party, 
Konstantinos Karamanlis.  
 
Regarding their financial involvement, the members U6(3), U14, U25, and U28 
participated in Procurement Committees, and other committees with a financial 
character (U32, U14). The institutional and financial involvement comprises 
appointments in various agencies of the public sector. More specifically, U8 resigned 
from the authority and became the first Greek Ombudsman, whereas the members U7, 
U9, U16, U32 were appointed before or after their term of office to the following 
independent authorities: the National Council for Radio and Television (U7), the 
National Authority for Medically Assisted Reproduction (U9), and the Hellenic 
Telecommunications and Post Commission (U16, U32). The members U7, U14, U25, 
and U35 were appointed, before or after their term of office, Presidents of the 
management boards of the following agencies of the public sector: the National 
Museum of Contemporary Art (U7), the Digital Aid S.A. (U14), the Industrial 
Property Organisation (U25), the Hellenic Radio and Television (U35). The members 
U3(3), U10, U16, U20, U30, and U31 were appointed,  before or after their term of 
office, as members of the management boards of the following agencies of the public 
sector: the Hellenic Copyright Organisation, the National Museum of Contemporary 
                                                 
366 The titles “Secretary of the Cabinet” and “Secretary General of the Government” refer to the same 
post. The Secretary General of the Cabinet is appointed and dismissed by decision of the Prime 
Minister, and is published in the Government Gazette. According to Flogaitis (1987) “the Secretary of 
the Cabinet [due to the nature of his duties becomes] a real participant in the exercise of political and 
legal power”.  
367 Source: the Official Website of Pasok, available at: 
http://www.pasok.gr/portal/resource/contentObject/id/5d943eb5-9c3d-4dfb-80e6-afd5ff2daa10, date of 
access: 4.5.2010 
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Art, the National Transplant Organisation (U3), the Ephorate of the General State 
Archives (U10), the State Scholarships Foundation (alternate member-U16), the 
Information Society S.A. (U20), the European Cultural Centre of Delphi (alternate 
member-U30), the Greek Mapping and Cadastre Organisation (U31). Finally, the 
member U25 was appointed as member of the Governing Board of the International 
University of Greece, whereas the member U3 was elected Rector of Athens 
University and served for eight years (1983-1991).  
 
The members’ scientific involvement is equally relevant. The members U6, U25, U35 
were appointed, before or after their term of office, Presidents to the following 
scientific-research institutions: the Research Academic Computer Technology 
Institute (U6), Director and President of the Board of the Centre of International and 
European Economic Law (U25), President of the National Centre for Social Research 
(U35). Finally, the member U20 was member of the Scientific Council of the National 
Centre for Scientific Research, whereas he was appointed as representative of Greece 
to the European Space Agency. 
 
Finally, three University Professors are involved in Civil Society organizations 
(U7(2), and U17). More specifically, U7 is a member of the Management Board of 
two NGOs: the Hellenic League for Human Rights (HLHR), and the Research Centre 
for Minority Groups (KEMO). U17 is a member of the Secretariat of the Greek 
Committee for International Detention and Peace. 
 
To summarize, the university professors’ career paths are rich, and thus their 
involvement in public life is broad since three of them participate in five dimensions 
of the index (P+I+IF+S+CS, P+I+F+IF+S), one participate in four dimensions 
(P+I+IF+SC), six participate in three dimensions (I+F+S, I+IF+S, I+F+IF, P+I+F), six 
participate in two dimensions (P+I, I+IF, P+SC, IF+SC), and only two in one 
dimension (I, P)368. Accordingly, the intensity of their involvement in public life is 
indeed remarkable.  Seven University Professors pertain to the low scale, eight pertain 
to the medium scale, and six pertain to the high scale. U7 and U30 appear in the 
involvement index 15 and 19 times, respectively369.  
 
The University Professors fulfil the requirements for the functional accumulation 
status as set forth in our definition. In other words, at a certain period, they are on 
active service, serve as regular or alternate members in the authority, and most of 
them are simultaneously appointed to other positions370. Moreover, the majority of the 
Law Professors, who are prominent lawyers in their field of specialization, have their 
own law offices. However, their professional capacity as lawyers in combination with 
their position in the authority might give rise to conflict of interest situations371. 
                                                 
368 See Appendix 8, table 4. 
369 See Appendix 8, table 5. 
370 See Appendix 8, table 6, column 3.  
371 The case of the University Professor U30 is a striking example of a conflict of interest situation. He 
was the lawyer of Michalis Christophorakos who was CEO of the Greek subsidiary of SIEMENS 
HELLAS from 1996 to 2007 and was suspected along with three German former directors of paying 
bribes to political parties, politicians, and high-ranking public officials in order to obtain contracts 
through public procurements programmes (e.g. the telecommunications operator OTE, the Greek 
Railways Organisation, medical equipment for hospitals, the Public Power Corporation, the armament 
programmes “Patriot”). Other kickbacks were allegedly paid to Greek politicians in exchange for 
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We should also point out that during their term of office on the authority they have the 
right to be elected Presidents or Alternate Presidents in their respective university 
departments since they are full-time employed university professors. Interestingly 
enough, two university professors (U4372 and U18373) were elected Alternate 
Presidents, and three university professors (U20374, U28375, U30376) were elected 
Presidents of their University Departments while they served in the authority. 
Therefore, they seem to assume multiple roles in public life, and simultaneously being 
powerful in their university departments.  
 
Even during their term of office the University Professors’ involvement is broad and 
intense377. More specifically, their institutional involvement comprises participation in 
i) legislative drafting committees ii) various working groups, committees, councils, or 
project management groups constituted by Ministries or other legal persons of the 
public sector iii) advisory bodies in public administration  iv) examination or selection 
committees and v) special courts and councils provided for in the Constitution. The 
                                                                                                                                            
Siemens being included in work on security systems (C4I) for the Athens Olympic Games in August 
2004. Sued deutsche Zeitung has estimated the illegal payments amounted to around 100 million euros. 
Athens News in an article regarding the Siemens Scandal, published on line on July 4, 2008 (available 
at: http://www.athensnews.gr/old_issue/13294/18055, date of access: 30.5.2011) states that: “The 
American legal giant [Debevoise and Plimpton] was picked by the German industrial giant to audit its 
"black" slush funds and appear lily-white for the American Security and Exchange Commission, which 
regulates the New York Stock Exchange, on which Siemens is traded”. Within the framework of the 
research of the law firm Debevoise and Plimpton in relation to the Siemens scandal in Greece, U30 and 
other lawyers formulated a text and in summer 2007 filed a request to the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority on the formulation of an opinion regarding the procedure that had to be followed for the 
provision of all necessary information to the law firm with respect to the issue of the protection of 
personal data. U30 was at the same time member of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority. Kostas 
Tzavaras, parliamentary representative of the party of New Democracy, and member of the 
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, which was set up by the Parliament on January 28, 2010 to 
investigate the Siemens Scandal, claimed that U30 and the other lawyers submitted the request to the 
Hellenic Data Protection Authority in order to block the law firm from investigating Christophorakos’s 
archive. Another member of the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, Panos Kammenos (New 
Democracy), claimed that U30 was the rapporteur for the elaboration of the request. However, the 
opinion of the authority was still pending by the time the investigation of the Parliamentary Inquiry 
Commission was taking place. Christophorakos was finally arrested in May 2009 in a house south of 
Munich where he was hiding. U30 testified to the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, that he had 
stopped representing M. Christophorakos in July 2008 due to the fact that his client refused to follow 
the legal line he had suggested. Finally, he testified that he had submitted his resignation from the 
Hellenic Data Protection Authority, the Public Power Corporation, and various committees of the 
ministry of Justice in July 2007 due to health problems. [The above mentioned information is based on 
various articles and comments in newspapers, websites, and the upload of the relevant minutes of the 
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on websites]. 
372 He was elected alternate President of the Department of Law, Athens University. Mandate: 
29.8.2002-31.8.2003 (G. G., vol. NPDD, no 193, 29.8.2002). 
373 She was elected Alternate President of the Department of General Law, Panteion University of 
Social and Political Sciences, mandate: 1.9.2010-31.8.2012 (G. G., vol. YODD, no 294, 2.9.2010) 
374 He was elected President of the   Department of Informatics at the University of Thessaloniki, 
mandate: 1.9.2003-31.8.2005 (Government Gazette, vol. NPDD, no 172, 18.7.2003) 
375 He was elected President of the   Department of Informatics at the University of Thessaloniki, 
mandate: 1.9.2007-31.8.2009 (Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 441, 15.10.2007) 
376 He was elected President of the   Department of Law at the University of Athens, mandate: 
1.9.2007-31.8.2009 (Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 362, 17.8.2007) 
377 See Appendix 8, table 6. 
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members U3, U4(2), U7, U8, U18 were ex officio members of the National 
Commission for Human Rights representing the Hellenic Data Protection Authority. 
Other noteworthy appointments pertaining to the dimension of institutional 
involvement of the index are presented hereafter: member of the Joint Supervisory 
Body of Europol378 representing Greece and Alternate Judge of the Administrative 
Tribunal of the Council of Europe (U4), member of the Management Board of the 
Greek National Committee of UNESCO (U7), member of the Greek-National Section 
of the International Commission on Civil Status (U9), President of the Scientific 
Council of the Hellenic Parliament (U16), member of the Committee for the 
examination of requests regarding the granting of a postponement of serving in the 
armed forces to PhD holders or those who excel at scientific work or research abroad 
(U38).   
 
As for cases of political involvement, the member U9 was appointed as member of the 
Central Legislative drafting committee by the Prime Minister Konstantinos Simitis 
(PASOK), whereas the member U29 was appointed member of the said committee by 
the Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis (New Democracy). Noteworthy cases of 
financial involvement comprise the following appointments: members of procurement 
committees U6(2), U14, member of the Technical Council of the National Technical 
University of Athens (U14), Alternate Member of the Committee for the supply of 
goods of relevant economic or technological value (the supply of informatics articles 
for the implementation of the project “Computer Equipment  for the participation of 
the Greek Police to the modernization of Public Administration with the use of 
Informatics (POLICE ON LINE), assigned to the “Information Society S.A.”) 
representing the party of New Democracy according to the as of 3.5.2004 document 
of the General Secretary of the Parliamentary Group of New Democracy (U28), 
President of the Regional Council of National Legacies of the Region of Central 
Macedonia (U28). 
 
As for their institutional and financial involvement, the members U3, U6, U18, U25, 
U30, U31, U32(2), and U35(2) were appointed to the management boards of the 
following agencies of the public sector: President of the Hellenic Copyright 
Organisation (U3), Alternate Members of the Management Board of the State 
Scholarships Foundation (U18 and U31), President of the Industrial Property 
Organisation (U25), Independent Non Executive Member of the Public Power 
Company S.A. (U30), Vice-President of the Professional Education and Training 
Organisation, Member of the National Commission for the definition of Professional 
Rights (U32), Member of the Management Board of the Peristeri Development SA 
and Member of the Governing Board of the University of Peloponnisos (U35).  
 
                                                 
378 According to the official website of the Europol Joint Supervisory Body “it is an independent entity 
set up to review the activities of Europol in order to ensure that the rights of the individual are 
safeguarded during the storage, processing and utilisation of personal data held by Europol. This body 
is composed of two representatives of each of the national Supervisory Bodies who are appointed for a 
period of five years by each Member State. Each delegation is entitled to one vote for decision making 
purposes. The Joint Supervisory Body also monitors the permissibility of the transmission of data 
originating from Europol”, Information available at:  
http://europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/about.aspx?lang=en, date of access: 30.5.2011. 
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Finally, their scientific involvement comprises appointments to the following public 
bodies: member of the Scientific Committee of the Institute for Language and Speech 
Processing and President of the Council of the Research Academic Computer 
Technology Institute (U6), member of the Scientific Council of the National Centre 
for Social Research (EKKE) (U7). 
 
 iii) Free-lance Professionals 
 
The overwhelming majority of free-lance professionals are lawyers (5 of 6), whereas 
this professional category represents 15% of the total number of the members of the 
authority. Their involvement in public life is quite broad, that is, one of them 
participates in three dimensions of the index (P+I+S), four participate in two 
dimensions (I+SC, P+I), and only one in one dimension (I)379. More specifically, their 
institutional involvement comprises participation in i) legislative drafting committees 
(FP12, FP15(5), FP24, FP37(3)), and ii) various working groups, committees, 
councils, or project management groups constituted by Ministries or other legal 
persons of the public sector (FP12, FP15, FP36(3)). Finally, the member FP12 was 
head of the Legal Service of the National Delegation of Greece in the European 
Communities in Brussels. Free-lance Professionals have no financial involvement. As 
for the scientific dimension, the member FP15 was elected Assistant Professor at the 
University of Aegean after her retirement from the authority. Finally, three members 
participate in NGOs: FP11 was President of the Greek Section of Amnesty 
International, whereas FP12 was a member of the Hellenic League for Human Rights. 
FP36 is scientific collaborator at the think-tank “Institute for Democracy Konstantinos 
Karamanlis”.  
 
It is noteworthy that half of the free-lance professionals are politically involved. The 
member FP36 seems to be systematically politically involved. He was appointed 
Scientific Collaborator of the Deputy of the First Constituency of Athens and 
Parliamentary Representative of the Party of New Democracy Professor, Prokopis 
Pavlopoulos (7/2002-2/2004). Moreover, immediately after the victory of the party of 
New Democracy in the national elections of 2004, Prokopis Pavlopoulos, who became 
Minister of the Interior, appointed him as Director of his Political Bureau to the 
Ministry (2004-24.8.2007). The member FP37 was a trade-unionist. He was elected 
Vice-President of the Athens Bar Association (1993-1996), and President of the 
Athens Bar Association (1996-2002). His candidacy was supported by the political 
party of the left: Synaspismos. 
 
The intensity of their involvement ranges from low (3 members) to medium (3 
members)380. 
 
As for their functional accumulation status, it is quite broad since we have located 
other appointments during their term of office381. We should also point out that they 
could additionally work as lawyers. Some noteworthy appointments pertaining to the 
dimension of institutional involvement of the index are presented hereafter: alternate 
member of the management board of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia upon proposal of the Greek Government (FP11, FP12), president of the 
                                                 
379 See Appendix 8, table 4.  
380 Appendix 8, table 5. 
381 Appendix 8, table 6. 
 141
European Commission against racism and intolerance upon proposal of the Greek 
Government (FP12) (ECRI, Strasbourg), Legal Adviser of PYRKAL (Hellenic 
Powder and Cartridge Company S.A.) (FP12). The member FP12 participated as 
member in a legislative drafting committee, and a special committee constituted by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Regarding the National Commission for Human 
Rights, the member FP11 became its member in his capacity as ex President of the 
Greek Section of Amnesty International, and was elected Vice-President, whereas the 
member FP12 also participated representing the Hellenic League for Human Rights 
(1999-2005). He was equally elected Vice-President during his first mandate. The 
member FP24 was appointed as Member of the National Commission for Human 
Rights by the Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis as prestigious person with 
expertise in the protection of human rights. The members (FP12, FP37) participated in 
the said Commission as ex officio members representing the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority. The member FP36 was a member of the teaching staff under contract at the 
Department of Political Science and International Relations, (University of 
Peloponnese), and the Department of Marketing and Communication, (Athens 
University of Economics and Business).  
 
The alternate member FP15382 was politically and institutionally and financially 
involved during her mandate in the authority. She served as special adviser on issues 
of Organisation and Management in the Political Bureau of the Prime Minister 
Konstantinos Simitis (First and Second Konstantinos Simitis Government 1.2.1996-
10.3.2004). Her appointment was revoked by the Prime Minister Konstantinos 
Karamanlis after the victory of the party of New Democracy in the national elections 
of 2004. She was also appointed i) as member of the management board of the 
Information Society S.A. in 2001, and ii) as member of the Working Group on 
International Issues constituted by the Ministry of Justice in 2000.  
 
iv)  Lawyers with a salary mandate383 
 
The lawyer with a salary mandate (LM39), alternate member in the authority, is a 
PhD holder specialised in Social Law. He represents a case of astonishing 
involvement in public life in relation to its intensity (13 times) and broadness 
(P+I+FI+S) which may only be compared with similar cases from the professional 
category of university professors. The findings from the government gazette and the 
annual reports of the Greek Ombudsman permit us to follow his career paths 
chronologically. He was first appointed as member of the special scientific staff of the 
Greek Ombudsman where he served from 2003-2007. In 2004 he was appointed Vice-
President of the management board of the National Centre for Social Emergency 
Assistance (2004-2006). The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman for the years 
2005 and 2006 mention that in 2005 and 2006 he was on secondment to another 
public service without giving any further information. According to indirect 
                                                 
382 It should be pointed out that she was member of the Committee constituted by the Ministry of 
Justice regarding the transposition of the directive 95/46/EC in the Greek legal order on the processing 
of personal data and the establishment of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority. She also participated 
in the final elaboration of the draft law 2472/1997. Source: The Explanatory Report of June 17, 1996 
that accompanied the draft law “on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data”, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-
Nomothetikou-Ergou?law_id=27da7e14-69cd-49f1-bd4f-742beb40060d, date of access: 14.6.2011. 
383 Lawyers who are appointed and paid by services and agencies of the public sector (ministries, public 
law legal entities, private law legal entities, local authorities, and public enterprises and organizations) 
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information from the government gazette, he served on secondment as Special 
Adviser of the Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, P. 
Pavlopoulos. In 2007 he resigned from the Greek Ombudsman, and was appointed as 
lawyer with a salary mandate to the General Hospital of Athens “Hippokrateion” on 
30.7.2007. Until his resignation from the Greek Ombudsman he was still on 
secondment as Special Adviser of the Minister of the Interior.  
 
For the period 24.8.2007-19.9.2007 he was appointed as Special Collaborator to the 
Political Bureau of the Caretaker Minister of the Interior, S. Flogaitis, with parallel 
exercise of his main duties as lawyer with a salary mandate at the General Hospital of 
Athens “Hippokrateion”. After the victory of the party of New Democracy in the 
national elections of 2007, he was appointed as Special Collaborator to the Political 
Bureau of the Minister of the Interior, P. Pavlopoulos, while exercising his main 
duties as lawyer with a salary mandate at the General Hospital of Athens 
“Hippokrateion”. He was also member of the teaching staff under contract at the 
Department of Social and Educative Policy of the University of Peloponnese for the 
academic year 2007-2008. He became alternate member of the authority on August 4, 
2008 while he was still Special Collaborator to the Political Bureau of the Minister of 
the Interior. He submitted his resignation from the post of Special Collaborator on 
February 3, 2009. During his mandate to the Ministry of the Interior (2005-2009), first 
on secondment, and then as a political appointee, he participated eight times in 
various working groups, committees and project management groups. 
 
c. The Greek Ombudsman 
 
i) High-ranking Civil Servants  
 
High-ranking Civil Servants represent 40% (6 of 15) of the Deputy Ombudspersons in 
the authority. Interestingly enough, the majority of the Ombudspersons coming from 
this professional category, that is, 4 of 6, (CS5, CS10(2), CS11(4), CS12) is 
politically involved. Moreover, we could indirectly assume that one more 
Ombudsperson (CS15) is politically involved. More specifically, the cases of the 
Deputy Ombudspersons CS10 and CS11 are of great interest. They were previously 
members of the special scientific personnel384 of the Greek Ombudsman, and 
possessed postgraduate degrees385 by the time of their appointment to the positions of 
Deputy Ombudspersons386. They both started their careers as special collaborators and 
advisers of Ministers and a Secretary General under the PASOK governments. More 
specifically, CS10 was appointed as expert legal adviser to the Political Bureau of the 
Minister of the Press and Mass Media (24.6.1996-1998). CS11 was appointed as 
special Collaborator of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice (1994-1995), 
and served as Special Collaborator of the Minister of Development and the Minister 
of the Interior from 1996 until 1999387.  CS10 was also a trade-unionist since she was 
elected President of the management board of the Association of the Personnel of the 
                                                 
384 CS10 was appointed as member of the scientific staff in 1998, whereas CS11 was appointed in 
1999. 
385 CS10 obtained his PhD in 2006, three years after his appointment. 
386 They were suspended from their duties as members of the special scientific personnel of the 
Ombudsman. 
387 Vassiliki Papandreou served as Minister of Development from 22.1.1996 until 18.2.1999, and as 
Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation from 19.2.1999 until 19.3.2000. 
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Greek Ombudsman (2001-2003), and member of the Service Council of the Authority 
(2001-2005). She was also member of the legislative drafting committee on the 
executive law of the constitution 3051/2002 regarding the constitutional independent 
authorities. 
 
Interestingly enough, they both submitted their resignations from the positions of 
Deputy Ombudspersons “for personal reasons”, as stated in the relevant act published 
in the Government Gazette, almost immediately after the victory of the party of 
PASOK in the national elections of October 2009.  CS10 was appointed as Secretary 
General for Migration Policy at the Ministry of the Interior, whereas CS11 served, on 
secondment, as Director of the Political Bureau of the Minister of Finance. While they 
served in these new positions, they were suspended from their duties as members of 
the special scientific personnel of the Ombudsman. However, CS10 was appointed as 
Assistant Professor of the Philosophy of Law at the University of Thessaloniki on 
December 31, 2010388. CS11, in parallel with her duties at the Political Bureau of the 
Minister of Finance, was appointed i) member of the State Lottery Administration 
Committee with a two-year mandate, and ii) non executive member of the 
management board of the Organisation of Football Prognostics S.A. (expiration of 
mandate in 2014). They were both members of NGOs: CS10 was member of the 
research Centre for Minority Groups (KEMO), whereas CS11 was member of the 
Hellenic League for Human Rights (HLHR).  
 
The Deputy Ombudswoman for the Department of State-Citizen Relationships (CS5), 
a former Director General at the Ministry of the Interior, was a trade-unionist. She 
was a founding member and ex-President of the Association of the Employees of the 
Ministry of the Presidency of the Government, and ex-President of the Federation of 
the Employees of the Ministry of the Presidency of the Government. The Deputy 
Ombudswoman CS12, was appointed special collaborator of the Secretary General for 
Equality in 2005 under the New Democracy Government. As for the Deputy 
Ombudswoman CS15, she was appointed in a short period of time to important posts 
under the New Democracy Government. More specifically, she was appointed as 
member of the management board of the National Centre for the Environment and 
Sustainable Development (2005-2006) by the Cabinet. In 2006 she submitted her 
resignation, and was immediately appointed as member of the Management Board of 
the Hellenic Mapping and Cadastral Organisation (OKXE), (2006-2007), and member 
of the management board of the Cadastre SA (2006-2007), whereas she was 
simultaneously Director and Head of the Regional Centre of the Cadastre SA in 
Thessaloniki.  
 
As for their institutional involvement, they participated in legislative drafting 
committees (CS5, CS11(2), CS12(2)), and various groups and committees constituted 
by ministries,  (CS5(4), CS11, CS12(2)) or carried out expert studies on behalf of a 
ministry (CS4). CS5 represented Greece in the Committee of Public Administration of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whereas 
                                                 
388 He was suspended from his duties at the University and kept serving as Secretary General at the 
Ministry of the Interior. He had already submitted his resignation from the position of the special 
scientific personne of the Greek Ombudsman on April 13, 2011 after his appointment as faculty 
member. Source: Decision of the Substitute Ombudswoman uploaded on the internet, dated April 13, 
2011, reg. no Φ.22.3/9490/2011, Diavgeia, available at: static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/4ΑΓΘΙΜ0-Υ, date 
of access: 1.7.2011. 
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CS10 was expert collaborator of the Council of Europe on matters of institutional 
guarantees for the protection of human rights. Regarding, their scientific involvement, 
CS5 was a member of the teaching staff under contract of the National Centre for 
Public Administration.  
 
Their involvement in public life is broad since two participate in four  dimensions of 
the index (P+I+FI+CS, P+I+S+CS), one participate in three dimensions (P+I+S), one 
in two dimensions (P+I), and two in one dimension dimension (I and FI)389. The 
intensity of their involvement ranges from low to medium, whereas CS11 pertains to 
the scale of high intensity (11 times)390. 
 
The functional accumulation status is incompatible with the exercise of the duties of 
the Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen with the exception of part-time University 
Professors. Some high-ranking civil servants appear in the involvement index during 
their term of office391. They participate in legislative drafting committees, sometimes 
representing the Greek Ombudsman, and various working groups. Finally, CS10 was 
twice appointed as alternate member of the National Committee for Human Rights 
representing the institution of the Greek Ombudsman. 
 
 
ii) University Professors 
 
Two University Professors were appointed as Ombudsmen. U1, a Professor of 
Political Science, became the first Greek Ombudsman in 1997. His scientific 
involvement comprises the following positions: member of the Scientific Council of 
the National Centre for Social Research (1993) with a three-year mandate and 
Director of the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE) (1995-1998). As for his 
institutional involvement he was member of the National Advisory Board of Research 
(1994-1998), whereas his appointment as alternate member of the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority in 1997 constitutes his institutional and financial involvement in 
public life. During his mandate, he was appointed as member of the management 
board of the Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece (1999-2005), 
member of the National Council on Public Administration Reform (2000), and ex 
officio member of the National Commission for Human Rights representing the 
institution of the Greek Ombudsman. As for his involvement in Civil Society, he was 
Director of the think tank Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 
(1988-1991). After his retirement from the authority, he became European 
Ombudsman in 2003, whereas his mandate to the position was renewed in 2005 and 
2010. 
 
U2, an Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, was appointed Deputy Ombudsman 
for Human Rights in 1998. In 2003, he was elected Ombudsman by the Conference of 
Presidents, whereas his mandate was renewed in 2008. Before his appointment as 
Deputy Ombudsman, in parallel with his academic duties392, he worked as Scientific 
Collaborator (research fellow) at the Department of Parliamentary Studies and 
                                                 
389 See Appendix 8, table 7. 
390 See Appendix 8, table 8. 
391 Appendix 8, table 9. 
392 He was appointed Lecturer in December 1990 at the Department of Law, Athens University, and 
became Assistant Professor at the same department in June 1998. 
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Research of the Directorate of Scientific Studies at the Scientific Service of the 
Hellenic Parliament393. In September 2010, he submitted his resignation from the 
authority in order to run for the municipality of Athens in the Regional and Municipal 
Elections of 2010. His candidacy was supported by four political parties: the 
Democratic Left, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), Action, and the 
Ecologists-Greens. He was finally elected Mayor of Athens on 14.11.2010 with 
51,95% of the votes. However, the elections were characterized by an extremely low 
voter turnout394. During his electoral campaign, he claimed that he was not involved 
in politics, and thus had no party affiliation. He simply stated that when he was a 
student he was a member of the Youth Organisation “Rigas Feraios” of the Internal 
Communist Party of Greece. Apart from any considerations regarding the direct 
entrance of technocrats into politics, what is interesting in this case is that the roles of 
the regulator and regulatee are reversed: the Ombudsman, the regulator, becomes the 
regulatee, that is, the Mayor of Athens. Moreover, holding a public office might hurt 
the prestige of the institution of the Ombudsman, thus facilitating certain criticisms. It 
is probable that the Ombudsman’s future political aspirations might impact on the 
exercise of his duties during his term of office. On the other hand, the relationship 
between the regulatee, Mayor, and the regulator, that is, his former subordinates in the 
authority, might lead to regulatory capture. 
 
The institutional involvement of the University Professors U9, U13 and U14 concerns 
their participation in legislative drafting committees and various working groups, 
project management teams, committees constituted by ministries. The case of U14 is 
interesting. He was appointed on January 23, 2002 as member of the Project 
Management Team constituted by the Ministries of the Interior and Public Order for 
the formulation of a framework of action for a policy against crime with mid-term and 
long-term targets. The work of the Team should be completed within 2 years with a 
maximum number of 50 sessions per year. The work of the team was extended for one 
more year on January 30, 2004. He was also appointed as member of the permanent 
legislative drafting committee of the Ministry of Public Order with a two-year 
mandate on May 17, 2002.  Interestingly enough, U14 was one of the defense lawyers 
of the Terrorist D. Koufondinas in the first and second-instance trials of the terrorist 
organization “November 17th” in 2003 and 2005.  
 
Other important appointments regarding their institutional involvement are as follows: 
advisor of the OECD, advisor of Studies at the National Centre for Public 
Administration (1989-1991), member of the Assessment Committee regarding the 
evaluation and the formulation of an opinion on the selection of the personnel of the 
special services for the management and implementation of Operational Programmes 
financed by the European Union (U9), alternate member of the Central Scientific 
Council of Prisons (U14). As for their scientific involvement, U13 was Director of the 
Institute for Social Policy of the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE) (five-
year mandate), and member of the Management Board of the National Centre for 
Social Research (EKKE). U9 was member of the teaching staff under contract of the 
                                                 
393 He was appointed as Scientific Collaborator in September 1989. 
394 Registered voters: 488.150, voted: 167.104 (34,23%), invalid votes: 5,44%, blank votes: 5,67%. 
Votes for U2: 77.165. Source: Source: Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and Electronic 
Governance, available at: http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/dn2010/public/index.html#{"page":"level","params":{"level":"dhm_d","id":9186
}}, date of access: 27.12.2010 
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National School of Public Administration. As for their institutional and financial 
involvement, U9 was appointed as member of the management board of the National 
Centre for Public Administration (1988), and member of the Management Board of 
the National Centre for the Environment and Sustainable Development (2001). 
However, she submitted her resignation on 2.4.2003 shortly before her appointment as 
Deputy Ombudswoman on 27.6.2003. U13 was alternate member of the management 
board of the Organisation against Drugs (OKANA) with a three-year mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 1711, 20.12.2001). After the victory of the party of 
New Democracy in the national elections of 2004, all the members of the 
management board of the Organisation against Drugs submitted their resignation on 
24.5.2004.  
 
The University Professors’ involvement in public life is not broad compared to that of 
the university professors appointed in the Hellenic Data Protection Authority. Two 
university professors participate in three dimensions of the index (I+FI+S), whereas 
the other three participate in two dimensions (P+I, I+S, I+FI)395. The intensity of their 
involvement ranges from low to medium with no case of high intensity396.  
 
According to the executive law of the constitution 3051/2002 on the constitutional 
independent authorities and the law 3094/2003, the Deputy Ombudsmen may exercise 
their academic duties on a part-time basis. Interestingly enough, there was no 
legislative initiative to extend the status of functional accumulation to full-time 
employed university professors as was the case with the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority and the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy. Some 
university professors appear in the involvement in public life index during their term 
of office, and their involvement is mainly institutional (U1, U9397, U14398) whereas 
U14 had financial and institutional involvement as alternate member of the 
management board of the Society for the Protection of Minors of Corinth.  
 
iii) Free-lance Professionals 
 
All the free-lance professionals are lawyers. Despite their small number, their 
involvement in public life is broad. One free-lance professional participates in four 
dimensions (P+I+S+SC), one participates in three dimensions ((I+S+SC), and one in 
one dimension (SC)399. Only one Deputy Ombudswoman is politically involved 
(FP8). She was special adviser of the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Security. 
As for their institutional involvement, the Deputy Ombudswoman FP3 participated in 
legislative drafting committees, and was expert of the European Commission in the 
health and welfare sector (1989-1998). Their scientific involvement is important since 
FP3 was a member of the teaching staff under contract at various departments of 
higher educational institutions (intensity: 7 times), and other public educational 
                                                 
395 See Appendix 8, table 7. 
396 See Appendix 8, table 8. 
397 During her mandate U9 was i) member of the Central Committee for the Simplification of 
Procedures representing the institution of the Ombudsman, and ii) Member of the Committee 
constituted by the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel for the examination of the Special 
Written Test- Test of General Knowledge and Skills. U14 was ex officio alternate member of the 
National Committee for Human Rights representing the institution of the Greek Ombudsman. 
398 During his mandate, U14 was ex officio alternate member of the National Committee for Human 
Rights representing the institution of the Greek Ombudsman. 
399 See Appendix 8, table 7. 
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Schools (intensity: 4 times). In 2010, she finally obtained a tenured position at the 
Technological Educational Institute of Athens. FP8 resigned from the position of 
Deputy Ombudswoman after her appointment as Assistant Professor at the 
Department of law, Athens University. The dimension of Civil Society seems to be 
the common denominator of their involvement in public life. FP3 was a member of 
NGOs in Greece and abroad. No further information is given in her CV regarding their 
title or field of activity. FP7 was a founding member (1992), and member of the 
management board of the NGO “ARSIS-Social Organisation for the Support of 
Youth”, whereas FP8 is a member of the Scientific Committee of the NGO “Union for 
the protection of Social Rights” founded in 2009. 
 
Despite the fact that the functional accumulation status is incompatible with the 
capacity of Deputy Ombudsperson, with the exception of university professors under 
part-time employment, the Deputy Ombudswoman FP8 was also a member of the 
teaching staff under contract at Athens University. More specifically, according to her 
summary Curriculum Vitae contained in the Annual Reports of the Greek 
Ombudsman for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006400, she was member of the 
teaching staff under contract corresponding to the academic rank of Lecturer at the 
Law Department of Athens University, and taught Law of Social Security. She was 
elected assistant professor at the same department in October 2007401, and submitted 
her resignation from the authority on January 14, 2008. 
 
iv) Lawyers with a salary mandate  
 
The lawyer with a salary mandate LM6 worked at the Ministry of Environment, 
Physical Planning, and Public Works, and was a PhD holder specialised in Law on 
spatial and urban planning. She was appointed Deputy Ombudswoman in June 27, 
2003. However, she submitted her resignation after her appointment as Associate 
Professor at the University of Thessaly in 2005. In 2009, she was appointed Associate 
Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of Athens 
University. Her institutional involvement comprises the following: Legal Collaborator 
at the Worker’s Housing Organisation (1988), member of the Scientific Council of the 
National Centre for Public Administration (1998-2003), member of the Committee of 
Experts of the Economic and Social Committee who contributed to the study 
“Environment, Spatial and Urban Planning” (2008). As for her scientific involvement, 
apart from the already mentioned tenured positions in Universities, she was member 
of the teaching staff under contract at the University of Thessaly (1994-1997), and 
Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences (post-graduate programme/1999-
2001 and undergraduate programme /2000-2001). She was also member of the 
teaching staff under contract at the Department of Local Authorities and Regional 
Development of the National School for Public Administration (1999-2003). As for 
her financial and institutional involvement, she was appointed President of the 
Management Board of the National Centre for the Environment and Sustainable 
                                                 
400 The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, available 
at: http://www.synigoros.gr/annual03/10pararthmata.pdf,  
http://new.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/618_09-parartimata-bios.pdf, 
http://new.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/634_10_parartima_bs.pdf, 
http://new.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/17_annual_p_biografika_06.pdf, date of access: 27.12.2010. 
401 The Annual Report of the Greek Ombudsman for the year 2007, available at: 
http://new.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/11bparartimataviografika.pdf, date of access: 4.6.2011.  
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Development (EKPAA) with a three-year mandate, in 2010. However, she submitted 
her resignation from the position of the President on 24.8.2010, and was reappointed 
as member of the management board (13.9.2010). Her involvement in public life is 
broad (I+FI+S)402, whereas the intensity of involvement is medium (10 times) almost 
reaching the high scale403.  
 
As for the functional accumulation status404, which is incompatible with the capacity 
of a Deputy Ombudsperson, LM6 was member of the management board405, 
representing the shareholders, of the Public Enterprise for Urban Planning and 
Housing – DEPOS S.A. during her mandate as Deputy Ombudswoman406. 
 
d. The Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy 
 
i) University Professors 
 
University Professors represent 45% (9 of 20) of the total number of the members in 
the authority, and their career paths are quite rich407. The case of the member U16 is 
characteristic in terms of broadness (P+I+F+FI) and intensity (16 times) of 
involvement. A short summary of his career path is presented hereafter. There is 
evidence for party affiliation. First, he was appointed alternate member of a 
Committee for the procurement of goods of important economic or technological 
value representing the party of PASOK. He was proposed by the President of PASOK 
following the document 122a/10.7.2000408. The committee was competent for the 
procurement of radio communications systems at the Greek Police. Moreover, on 
25.11.2007, by decision of the President of PASOK, Georgios Papandreou, he was 
appointed as member of the Working Group of Scientists of the Secretariat of the 
Central Organisational Committee for the preparation of the 8th Conference of 
PASOK that took place on March 13-16, 2008409. As for his academic career, he had a 
tenured position at the University of the Aegean. He was elected Vice-Rector 
(1.9.2000-31.8.2003), and Rector (1.9.2003-31.8.2006) of the said University, 
whereas on May 2, 2007 he was transferred to the University of Piraeus. He became 
regular member of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy 
on June 12, 2008, and submitted his resignation on November 18, 2009 after his 
appointment as Secretary General of the General Secretariat of Communications at the 
Ministry of Infrastructure, Transports, and Networks under the PASOK Government. 
As for his institutional and financial involvement, apart from the positions of Vice-
Rector and Rector of the University of the Aegean, he was appointed as member of 
the Hellenic Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education, an independent 
                                                 
402 See Appendix 8, table 7. 
403 See Appendix 8, table 8. 
404 See Appendix 8, table 9. 
405 Appointment published in the Government Gazette, vol. B, no 693, 6.6.2002, vol. B, no 547, 
7.5.2003. The anonymous public enterprise DEPOS S.A. was abolished (Law 3895/2010). 
 
407 See Appendix 8, table 10. 
408 G.G. vol. A, no 221, 13.10.2000. 
409 Source: The Official Website of PASOK-France, available at: http://ne.pasok.gr/negallias/?p=13, 
date of access: 17.6.2010  
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authority, representing the scientific field of Sciences and Informatics (1.9.2006-
12.6.2008)410.  
 
His institutional involvement comprises participation in the special legislative drafting 
committee regarding the strengthening of the institutional framework on the 
functioning of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy 
(ADAE), and the amendment of the law 3115/2003. Moreover, he played a key role in 
the general management of the Operational Programme for Education and Initial 
Vocational Training (EPAEK) of the Ministry of National Education and Religious 
Affairs411. Indeed, he was appointed many times as President of Advisory Committees 
and member of committees constituted by the Ministry of National Education and 
Religious Affairs under the New Democracy government. He was also member of 
committees and working groups constituted by other ministries. As for his financial 
involvement, he was President and member of procurement committees. 
 
The University Professors’ institutional involvement comprises participation in i) 
legislative drafting committees (U6, U17) ii) various working groups, committees or 
councils constituted by Ministries or other legal persons of the public sector (U8, 
U6(5), U7, U8, U9, U14, U17, U19), ii) members of advisory bodies in public 
administration (U6, U9(2), U17(2)). Their financial involvement is noteworthy, and 
mainly concerns participation in procurement committees as Presidents (U6, U9, U14 
U17) or members (U6, U7, U9(4), U14,U17). Moreover, the member U20 was 
member of the Technical Council of the University of the Aegean. The member U17 
was advisor of the management of the Public Power Corporation on the development 
of its telecommunications activities and the establishment of TELLAS during 2000-
2002.  
 
The institutional and financial involvement comprises appointments in various 
agencies of the public sector. The member U19 was appointed to the following 
positions: member of the Management Board of the Greek Productivity Centre (1994-
1996), member of the Management Board of the Hellenic Telecommunications and 
Post Commission 1995-2000, President of the Management Board of the National 
Accreditation Centre for Continuing Vocational Training and Accompanying 
Supportive Services 1997-2004, member of the Management Board of the 
Organisation for Vocational Education and Training 2001-2004. The member U9 was 
appointed President of the management board of the public anonymous company 
“Electronic Governance of Social Security (IDIKA S.A.) on April 21, 2008 under the 
New Democracy Government. According to the appointing ministerial decision there 
was no fixed mandate, and thus the appointment could be revoked by joint ministerial 
                                                 
410 He had a four-year mandate, but is seems that he resigned since, immediately afterwards, he was 
appointed as regular member at the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy. 
411 According to the Official Website of the Managing Authority of the Operational Programme, the 
Programme was “designed to aid Greece in meeting the challenges arising internationally due to the 
development of innovative technologies. This Programme aims at turning these challenges into 
opportunities for development and improvement of the quality of life. It is one of the Third Community 
Support Framework’s 24 Operational Programmes (2000-2006) in Greece, and is co-financed by the 
European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and national resources. The role of 
Managing Authority is to follow and apply Law 2860/2000, so that the efficiency, the rationality and 
the transparency of the operational programme during its implementation are ensured”. Information 
available at: http://www.epeaek.gr/epeaek/en/home.html, date of access: 5.6.2011. 
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decision. Indeed, after the national elections of 2009 there was revocation of his 
appointment by the joint ministerial decision no Φ.80350/18707/135412.  The member 
U17 was member of the Management Board of the Hellenic Telecommunications 
Organisation S.A (OTE) (1996-1999), and member of the management board of the 
anonymous company under the name “Anonymous Greek Company for the provision 
of internet products and  services” with the distinctive title “OTEnet”, a subsidiary 
company of the Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation,  (1998-1999). 
 
As for their scientific involvement, U9 was member of the Management Board of the 
Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, U14 adjunct professor at Athens 
University (2002-2005), and the University of Peloponnese (2002-2005) and U20 
gave courses at the National Centre of Public Administration. 
 
To summarize, the university professors’ career paths are rich, and thus their 
involvement in public life is quite broad since two of them participate in four 
dimensions of the index (I+F+FI+S, P+I+F+IF), two participate in three dimensions 
(I+F+S, I+F+IF), three participate in two dimensions (I+F, I+IF, F+S), and only one in 
one dimension (I)413. Accordingly, the intensity of their involvement in public life 
ranges from low to medium with only one case of high intensity414. 
 
As for their accumulation status, University Professors may be on active service, full-
time or part-time employed, and simultaneously serve as regular or alternate members 
in the authority. During their term of office the University Professors’ involvement is 
quite broad415. More specifically, their institutional involvement (U6(4), U9(3), U8, 
U16, U17) comprises participation in i) legislative drafting committees ii) various 
working groups, committees, councils, or project management groups constituted by 
Ministries or other legal persons of the public sector and iii) advisory bodies in public 
administration. The members U6 and U9 participate in procurement committees, 
whereas U20 gave courses at the National Centre of Public Administration. Finally, 
U6 was elected Alternate President of the Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering of the National Technical University of Athens (1.9.2004-31.8.2006) 
during his term of office. 
 
ii) Free-lance Professionals 
 
Free-lance professionals, who represent 25% (5 of 20) of the members, present great 
interest due to their direct or indirect political involvement. The President of the 
authority, FP1, was first appointed in 2003 whereas his appointment was renewed in 
2008. We have no direct evidence for party affiliation. He is a mechanical-electrical 
engineer, and his professional career before his appointment to the authority seems to 
be the typical case of a partisan appointee coming from the party of PASOK. He spent 
sixteen years of his professional life to positions in the public sector without taking 
into consideration his mandate in the Hellenic Authority for Communication Security 
and Privacy. More specifically, he was appointed President of the Management Board 
of the Hellenic Railways Organisation (OSE) during 1981-1985 and 1987-1989, 
                                                 
412 Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 241, 13.7.2010.  
413 See Appendix 8, table 10. 
414 See Appendix 8, table 11. 
415 See Appendix 8, table 12. 
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Governor (1981-1985) and Director General (1985-1988) of the said organisation416 
under the PASOK governments. In 1995 he became the first President of the 
Management Board of the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission 
appointed by ministerial decision under the PASOK government (1995-2000). 
Finally, he was once more appointed President of the Management Board of the 
Hellenic Railways Organisation (26.6.2000-30.1.2003) under the third Simitis’ 
government.  
 
Another characteristic case of political affiliation is that of the alternate Vice-
President FP3, who is a lawyer. He was elected three times Mayor of the Municipality 
of Nea Philadelphia – a suburb of Athens- supported by the party of PASOK, and 
served from 1990 until 2002. He also ran for Mayor in the Municipal Elections of 
2002, and was elected Municipal Councillor. By the time of his appointment to the 
authority on August 1, 2003, he was Municipal Councillor. However, he submitted his 
resignation from the authority almost a year after. He ran for Mayor in the Municipal 
elections of 2006, and was elected Municipal Councillor, whereas in the Municipal 
and Regional Elections of 2010 he ran for Municipal Councillor and succeeded in 
being elected. He became President of the Municipal Council. He was always 
supported by the party of PASOK. Finally, he was member of the management board 
of one of the biggest football teams in Greece, the Athletic Union of Constantinople, 
more commonly referred to as AEK (1995-1996, 2000-2001). 
 
We have direct and indirect information on the party affiliation of the regular member 
FP10, and his alternate, FP11, who are lawyers. The regular member FP10 is a 
sympathizer of the Communist Party of Greece since he signed, together with a group 
of lawyers of Athens417, the Declaration of Support to the Greek Communist Party in 
the National Elections of 2007.  As for his alternate, FP11, she ran for Prefectural 
Councillor in the Prefectural Department of Athens with the Communist Party of 
Greece in the Municipal and Prefectural Elections of 1998418. She also signed, 
together with a group of lawyers of Athens, the Declaration of Support to the Greek 
Communist Party in the National Elections of 2007. FP11 was member of an NGO. 
She was member of the Chair of the Greek Women Federation419 (OGE).  OGE420 was 
founded in 1976 and has a communist ideological orientation since “it is the only 
Women’s Organisation promoting the class character of women’s inequality” 
 
The career path of the alternate member FP18, a lawyer with a PhD in European Law, 
is interesting. He started his career as Legal Secretary421 (Clerk Referendaire) at the 
                                                 
416 Source: Prodromos Mantzaridis, Brief History of the Greek Railways, Second Edition, Greek 
Railways Organisation, 1996. 
417 The list of signatories was published in the Newspaper Rizospastis in the issue of August 5, 2007 
Source: Newspaper Rizospastis, available at: 
http://www1.rizospastis.gr/wwwengine/story.do?id=4155329, date of access: 17.5.2010 
418 Source: Newspaper Rizospastis, available at: 
http://www2.rizospastis.gr/wwwengine/story.do?id=3741391, date of access: 17.5.2010 
419 Source: Newspaper Rizospastis, available at: 
http://www2.rizospastis.gr/wwwengine/story.do?id=3741391, date of access: 17.5.2010 
420 Source: OGE, available 
at:http://www.oge.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=34, date of access: 
20.1.2011 
421 Schermers and Waelbroeck (2001) describe the post as follows: “Until 1979, each judge and 
advocate-general was supported by the legal secretary (or reférendaire), a qualified lawyer charged 
with helping “his” judge or advocate-general prepare the cases. During 1979, their number was 
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Court of First Instance (CFI) of the European Communities (renamed the General 
Court of the European Union), Luxembourg (2/2001-7/2004), and the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities -renamed the Court of Justice of the European Union- 
(7/2004-6/2008). He was elected alternate member of the authority on August 28, 
2008. Meanwhile, on April 2009 he became alternate member of the NATO Board of 
Appeals. According to his Curriculum Vitae422, he worked as a lawyer at the Law firm 
Vassilopoulos and Partners, Athens (7/2008 to 11/2009) which seems to be 
incompatible with his capacity as member of the authority according to article 4, par. 
3 of the law 3115/2003. He submitted his resignation from the authority on September 
11, 2009. A few days later, that is, on September 16, 2009 he was appointed Director 
of the Political Bureau of the Caretaker Minister of the Interior, S. Flogaitis, whereas 
his mandate expired ipso jure on October 6, 2009.  
 
On November 20, 2009 he was appointed Head of the Bureau for the Support of Good 
Legislation at the General Secretariat of the Government by the Prime Minister 
Georgios Papandreou. The Prime Minister revoked his appointment on June 2, 2010. 
Interestingly enough, the Greek Government proposed the appointment of FP18 as a 
member of the General Court of the EU on January 22, 2010423. According to the 
newspaper Eleftherotypia424, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already proceeded to 
an open procedure for the submission of candidacies for the position, and three 
candidates were selected. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally announced 
the candidacy of FP18 as a result of political pressure. The panel set up by article 255 
of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union gave a negative opinion on the 
Greek candidacy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once more proceeded to the 
announcement of the position. This time the Greek Government proposed Dimitrios 
Gratsias, Councillor at the Council of State. The panel of article 255 approved his 
candidacy and gave an opinion on his suitability to perform the duties of Judge of the 
General Court425. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
gradually increased so that since January 1980 all judges and advocates-general had two legal 
secretaries. In 1986, the Council has accepted the creation of a third post of legal secretary for each 
judge and advocate-general. The judges at the Court of First Instance on the other hand each have two 
legal secretaries., The role of these legal secretaries at the Court of Justice is similar to that of the law 
clerks at the United States Supreme Court. Some legal secretaries have been permanently been 
appointed from the early days of the Court. Recently, short-term appointments of about three to four 
years have become more customary. As the post offers an excellent training for younger lawyers, the 
member states profit from appointments of a short duration which brings back lawyers trained in 
European Law to their national states”.  
422 Source: Cover Note to the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union for the Greek 
candidacy to the General Court of the European Union, Curriculum Vitae of C.V. (FP18), 
Available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st06/st06125.en10.pdf, date of access: 
12.1.2011 
423 Cover Note of the Council of the European Union dated February 9, 2010 addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union containing the candidacy of FP18 to the 
General Court of the European Union, Curriculum Vitae of C. V. (FP18) , available at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st06/st06125.en10.pdf, date of access: 12.1.2011 
424 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, Saturday, October 16, 2010, available at: 
http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=214092, date of access, 12.1.2011. 
425 Gratsias’s appointment was published in the Official Journal of the EU (L278/29, 22.10.2010). 
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iii )High-ranking civil servants 
 
We have information only for two of four high-ranking civil servants. The members 
CS12 and CS15, former executives of the Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation 
(OTE), participate in the institutional-financial dimension.  CS12 was  appointed 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the anonymous company under the name 
“Anonymous Greek Company for the provision of internet products and  services” 
with the distinctive title “OTEnet426”, a subsidiary company of the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organisation, (1998-1999). CS15 was member of the 
Management Board of the Greek Company of Telecommunications through 
Submarine Cables SA (ELLTELKA)427, another subsidiary company of the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organisation (1994). 
 
iv) Judges 
 
Judges are the less represented professional category in the authority (2 of 20). Their 
involvement is neither broad nor intense428. J4 had institutional involvement since he 
participated as alternate member in the council for citizenship constituted by the 
ministry of the Interior, and was also alternate member of the Court for Mistrial for 
the year 1996. J5 had financial involvement since he was appointed as member of the 
Committee for the procurement of goods of significant financial or technological 
value. The Committee was competent for the procurement of railcars for the Greek 
Railways Organisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
426 The Company is supervised by the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks 
Source: Official Website of the Ministry, available at: http://www.yme.gr/index.php?tid=489, date of 
access: 20.1.2011 
427 The Company is supervised by the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks 
Source: Official Website of the Ministry, available at: http://www.yme.gr/index.php?tid=489, date of 
access: 20.1.2011 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Principal-agent theorists have always warned that the concepts of agency autonomy 
and control by political decision-makers may become tricky in the study of 
independent regulatory agencies (Thatcher, 2005). Indeed, this was a fact that we took 
seriously into consideration in our attempt to approach the issue of the degree of the 
control that may be exercised by the political decision-makers -in their double role as 
principals and agents- over the independent authorities in regulation inside 
government through the members’ appointments. Thatcher (2005) considers that 
political decision-makers may use party politicization of the appointments as a way to 
control IRAs. In his paper, he reached to the conclusion that the members appointed 
to the IRAs under research were not party activists. As for the provenance of the 
majority of the IRAs members he states that “. . . IRA members are drawn from 
similar groups to elected politicians – for example, the grands corps and ministerial 
cabinets in France and the professori in Italy. Many IRA members have had lengthy 
experience of public life, albeit outside elected office, having held senior posts in or 
close to government or served on public committees and commissions”.  
 
However, why should publicly known party partisans be considered more loyal and 
generally closer to the preferences of the political decision-makers than others who 
have assumed roles in public life as experts? Indeed, the idea of demonizing party 
politicization as a means of postdelegation control was rejected both in discussions in 
parliament on the draft law on the establishment of the National Council for Radio 
and Television, and theory. More specifically, the minister of the Presidency of the 
Government who introduced the draft law emphasized that the political parties 
nominated individuals without assigning their representation to them. He explained 
that the political parties would be judged upon their ability or disability to select 
individuals competent to operate under a high degree of independence. On the other 
hand, this view was also popular in theory “since the intervention of the latter [the 
political parties] starts and ends at the stage of nomination” (Oikonomou, 1999). 
Indeed, Nicolaos Alivizatos429, recalls: “I still remember how surprised were my 
perfectly benevolent interlocutors – the former high-ranking judge and then 
competent Minister of the Zolotas government included430- when, as a member of the 
first composition of the National Council for Radio and Television, I was claiming 
that I am neither a representative of the party that had nominated me, nor anybody 
else’s”.  
 
But if we excluded party patronage as a criterion for postdelegation control, what 
could substitute for it? The cynical statement of the MP of the Communist Party of 
Greece, A. Skyllakos, during discussions in Parliament431, might shed light on the 
                                                 
429 Abstract from N. Alivizatos’ s book “The uncertain modernisation and the blurry constitutional 
revision” p. 115 
430 He refers to Konstantinos Stamatis who was Prosecutor during the trial of the junta. He was a 
university professor specialised in penal law, and Prosecutor of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil 
and Penal Law. He was appointed Minister of Justice under the Grivas’ Caretaker Government 
(12.10.1989-23.11.1989), and the Zolotas’ Oecumenical Government (23.11.1989-11.4.1990). 
431 Minutes of the fourth Session of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution of 2001 
regarding article 101A. Source: Minutes of Sessions and Report of the Committee on the Revision of 
the Constitution, Seventh Revisional Parliament, Athens, 2000. 
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issue. More specifically, the MP stressed that the truth was that the two big political 
parties, PASOK and New Democracy, intended to cover their practices through the 
saga of personalities. He asked the MPs of the two big parties to tell him which 
personality did not possess a political identity. He addressed himself to the MPs of 
PASOK, and wondered whether their party had ever appointed as president or head of 
an independent authority a personality that they did not believe that he would support 
the predominant policy or, in any case, that he would be close to PASOK in most 
issues. He said that they should stop fooling each other since they clearly appointed 
either people from the political parties, or personalities with high standing whose 
views and resistance against pressures were well known to the politicians. He argued 
that they took into consideration all those issues, and then they proceeded to the final 
selection. This statement actually deconstructs the saga of independent-minded 
experts, and indirectly introduces the idea of trust of the political system in the 
appointees. 
 
The construction of the involvement in public life index serves this purpose. The main 
goal was to follow the members’ career paths through appointments in the public 
sector before, during, and after their term on the authorities. The results of the 
research prove that the members were not unknown to the political system. On the 
contrary, their presence in public life is intense and broad, thus covering various 
dimensions of the involvement in public life index. In other words, the same close 
circle of people that dominate public life colonised the authorities. It is noteworthy 
that on many occasions, when the members resigned from the authorities, they were 
immediately appointed to other important governmental or other public positions. 
Moreover, reappointments and lengthy tenures could also be interpreted as tactics 
indicating trust in certain appointees. As for the issue of the low relational distance 
between regulators and regulatees, that is, the members’ provenance from the public 
sector, we consider that it would be of minor relevance, if it were not combined with 
the members’ close ties to public life. On the other hand, if we intend to discuss party 
politicisation, the research shows that there are signs of all-party representation in the 
authorities. And this finding becomes the empirical proof of what all the MPs 
admitted during discussions of the committee on the revision of the Constitution432 
regarding the appointments clause, namely that there would be informal consultations 
among the political parties before the submission of the final proposal to the 
Conference of Presidents.  
 
A short article published in the Newspaper “Kathimerini” on April 4, 2011433, 
probably confirms the idea of interparty collusion. The article gave the information 
that the Prime Minister and the leader of the major opposition had agreed on the issue 
of the replacements of the resigned Ombudsman and the President of the Hellenic 
Data Protection Authority. According to their agreement, the new Ombudsman would 
be supported by the party of PASOK, whereas the President of the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority would be proposed by the party of New Democracy. Indeed, on 
                                                 
432 Minutes of the fourth Session of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution of 2001 
regarding article 101A. Source: Minutes of Sessions and Report of the Committee on the Revision of 
the Constitution, Seventh Revisional Parliament, Athens, 2000. 
433 Source: the Article of the newspaper “Kathimerini” “Conversation over the Greek Ombudsman”, 
April 2, 2011, available at: 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_02/04/2011_437928, date of access: 
12.6.2011. 
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May 19, 2011, the Deputy Ombudswoman U9 was proposed by the Speaker of 
Parliament, and was finally selected as the Greek Ombudswoman by the Conference 
of Presidents434. She would serve for the remainder of the mandate of the resigned 
Ombudsman, that is, until 20.2.2012. On July 14, 2011 the Conference of Presidents 
selected the new President of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority435, an Honorary 
Councillor of the Council of State who seems to have been affiliated with the party of 
new Democracy. He was twice appointed to political posts under the New Democracy 
Government. More specifically, he was appointed President of the Central Legislative 
Drafting Committee436 (2004-2005), and Head of the Legal Bureau of the General 
Secretariat of the Government437. Therefore, if the report is true, there are signs for 
cross party collusion regarding nominations in the authorities.  
 
The tactics followed by the political decision-makers regarding the replacement of the 
resigned members or new appointments due to the expiration of the members’ 
mandates are quite puzzling.  The phenomenon of long delays in replacements and 
new appointments might probably be attributed to the time-consuming consensual 
procedure among the parliamentary forces. Nevertheless, such practices jeopardize the 
proper function, and the legality of the decisions of an authority. Not incidentally, the 
Decision 1098/2011 of the Council of State judged that long delays in the members’ 
replacement were contrary to the demands of the Constitution438”. Interestingly 
enough, the members of the authorities never expressed concerns over practices that 
affected the legal constitution of an authority.  
 
The privileged double-faceted functional accumulation regime probably facilitates us 
to jump to the conclusion that the members of the four constitutional authorities under 
research constitute an ubiquitous elite. University professors, the predominant 
professional category in the authorities, enjoy the absolute form of the privilege, 
namely both of its facets. However, this favourable treatment might impact on the 
effectiveness of the authorities, and lead to the further oligarchisation of public life. 
Thus, in an era of expertise and professionalization of the bureaucracies, the 
constitutional independent authorities seem to undermine themselves, thus operating 
under de-professionalized conditions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
434 See appointment published in the Government Gazette vol. YODD, no 155, 2.6.2011. 
435 Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 255, 9.8.2011. 
436 Government Gazette vol. B, no 1490, 1.10.2004. He submitted his resignation in 2005 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1217, 31.8.2005. 
437 We have not located his appointment in the Government Gazette. However, we have indirect 
information that he has served as Head of the Legal Bureau of the General Secretariat of the 
Government (see Government Gazette, vol. B, no 373, 16.3.2007). 
438 The resigned President of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, J33, in his farewell speech on 
May 10, 2011, in his capacity as member of the legislative drafting committee on the amendment of the 
law 3051/2002 on the independent constitutional authorities, announced the intention of the committee 
to amend the relevant clause on the replacement of the members of the authorities after the expiration 
of their mandate. He proposed that the term of office would be ipso jure extended for six months until 
the appointment of the new member. Source: The Official Website of the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority, Press Releases, available at: 
http://www.dpa.gr/APDPXPortlets/htdocs/documentSDisplay.jsp?docid=155,237,78,111,56,180,39,14
8, date of access: 12.5.2011 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Internal Hierarchical Relationship: 
The Members of the Constitutional Independent Authorities  
and their Personnel 
 
Testing the Credibility and Transparency  
of the Personnel’s Recruitment Strategies 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The diachronic presentation and the subsequent qualitative assessment of the 
institutional design of the recruitment policies applied in the selection of the personnel 
of the four independent constitutional authorities as well as the identification of the 
agents-employees, who were finally selected to serve in these authorities by their 
principals-members, constitute the second principal-agent dyad, namely, the internal 
hierarchical relationship. Before the promulgation of the law 3812/2009 that 
incorporated all the independent authorities into the general recruitment system 
applied in the public sector, each one of the authorities under research enjoyed 
absolute autonomy in the selection of their personnel as prescribed in their founding 
laws, and the relevant general clause of the executive law 3051/2002 on the 
independent constitutional authorities.  
 
According to Gilardi’s independence index (2002), the autonomy of independent 
agencies in the selection of their personnel corresponds to a high degree of formal 
independence of the regulators from the political decision-makers. However, we 
considered that the parameter of the legal framework on the personnel’s recruitment 
as well as its application were crucial in the case of the four constitutional 
independent authorities. Indeed, the preliminary research on the legislation on 
recruitment policies and its application through empirical evidence proved the 
necessity of a closer study of the institutional design instead of directly proceeding to 
the simple elaboration and assessment of the collected data. The qualitative 
assessment of the institutional design presupposes a test of the compatibility of the 
recruitment clauses with the constitution, administrative law, and jurisprudence. Cases 
of distortions in the recruitment clauses could be interpreted as legislative 
manipulation. In other words, a distorted institutional design drafted by the political 
decision-makers serves as an ex ante control of the personnel of the authorities. Under 
such circumstances, the burden of its application falls on the members of the 
authorities. 
 
The unit is divided into two parts, whereas an explanatory text on the applied 
methodology precedes the analysis. The first part is dedicated to the presentation and 
qualitative assessment of the recruitment clauses. A short explanatory guide on some 
basic concepts and principles in Greek public administration, that is, the legal 
definition of the public sector, the categories of personnel in the public sector in 
relation to their working status, and the civil servants’ mobility rules (transfers, 
secondments, reclassifications) facilitates the understanding of the construction of the 
institutional design presented in the main theoretical part (Appendix 1). The 
recruitment policies adopted by the legislator in the four constitutional independent 
authorities are as follows: secondments, transfers, direct hirings, and transfers through 
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secondments. The personnel are divided into two main categories: administrative and 
scientific.  
 
The second part comprises the elaboration and final presentation of the empirical data.  
The construction of 12 databases by category of personnel and type of recruitment by 
authority, serve as the main source of information regarding the personnel of the 
authorities from the date of their establishment until December 31, 2010439 
(Appendices 2, 3, 4, and 5). The empirical data were mainly derived from the 
government gazette, the annual reports, the programme “Clarity” (diavgeia), and the 
google search engine. The content of each database is presented at the text on 
methodology. Furthermore, we constructed two indexes for the scientific personnel of 
the authorities following the technique we applied in the case of the members of the 
authorities in the delegatory relationship, that is,  i) an involvement in public life 
index, and ii) a time-dimension involvement in public life index. These indexes serve 
as a source of information in order to detect the scientific personnel’s involvement in 
public life, and locate their career paths through time, namely, before their 
appointment, while in service, and after their resignation or revocation of 
appointment, if such cases exist. In cases of direct hiring, the public announcements, 
which were published in the government gazette or were still available on the internet, 
are presented and commented in relation to the selection criteria, and the methods of 
the candidates’ assessment, that is, the implementation of grading systems440 for the 
classification of candidates. 
 
Three issues are discussed in this unit. First, we assess the credibility of the 
institutional design on the recruitment of the personnel in relation to the constitution, 
administrative law, and jurisprudence, and test its final implementation, a process 
which might lead to certain conclusions in relation to the legality of members’ 
administrative action. Second, we approach the credibility and impartiality of the 
autonomous selection system through the assessment of the selection criteria, and the 
application of grading systems for the evaluation and classification of candidates.  
Third, we explore the personnel’s profiles in relation to the following aspects: level of 
education, specialization, grades, agencies of provenance in the case of transfers and 
secondments, previous appointments in the public sector, gender distribution, in-
service mobility, resignations or revocation of appointments, new appointments, 
secondments, and transfers in the public sector, involvement in public life, and 
functional accumulation. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
439 Our research ends on December 31, 2010. 
440 We apply the term grading system in the sense of awarding points for each one of the selection 
criteria.  
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2. Methodology  
 
The Government Gazette, in print edition and uploaded on the official website of the 
National Printing Office, served as the main methodological tool for a comprehensive 
chronological reconstruction of a map of the recruited administrative and scientific 
personnel in the four constitutional independent authorities since their establishment. 
Apart from the Government Gazette, we drew complementary information from other 
sources, namely the annual reports, the “programme clarity (diavgeia)441”, and the 
google search engine. The period under research extends from the establishment of 
each constitutional independent authority until December 31, 2010.  
 
After the collection of all the data, we constructed databases in excel sheets by 
category of personnel, that is, administrative and scientific, and type of recruitment442 
for each one of the four constitutional independent authorities under research as 
shown in the Table hereafter. 
 
List of databases by category of personnel and type of recruitment by authority 
Constitutional 
Independent Authority 
Category of personnel and type of recruitment 
Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel 
Transferred administrative personnel 
Directly hired administrative personnel 
Directly hired scientific personnel 
Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority  
Transferred and directly hired administrative personnel 
Directly hired scientific personnel 
The Greek Ombudsman Seconded and transferred administrative personnel 
Directly hired administrative personnel 
Seconded and directly hired scientific personnel 
Personnel of the Secretariat of the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen 
Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, 
Security, and Privacy 
Directly hired administrative personnel 
Directly hired scientific personnel 
Directly hired heads of Directorates and the head of the  independent 
department of International Collaborations and Public Relations 
Directly hired personnel of the legal service 
 
More specifically, the databases on the transferred administrative personnel contain 
the following fields: the year of transfer, the volume and number of the issue of the 
government gazette, the date of publication, the initials of the names and surnames, 
the working status, grade, category and branch in the releasing agency, the name and 
legal status of the releasing agency, the supervising ministry, the employees’ working 
status, position in the organisational chart, grade, category and branch in the receiving 
agency, competent organs for the issue of the transfer decisions, assessment of the 
legality of the transfer, in-service mobility, previous positions in the public sector, 
membership in various committees of the public sector, transfers, secondments or new 
appointments in the public sector.  
 
                                                 
441 The law 3861/2010 provides that all the agencies of the public sector have the obligation to upload 
all their decisions and acts on the internet through the programme “Clarity” (Diavgeia) coordinated by 
the Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation, and Electronic Governance.  
442 We have identified four recruitment strategies: transfers, secondments, direct hiring, and transfers 
through secondments.  
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In the case of the administrative personnel of the Greek Ombudsman, the annual 
reports give also information on the seconded employees443, whereas some of them 
were afterwards transferred to the authority following relevant legislative regulations. 
Therefore, the relevant database contains the following additional fields: whether the 
employee is seconded, whether the secondment was converted to a transfer, the year 
of revocation of the secondment. The personnel of the Bureaus of the Ombudsman 
and the Deputy Ombudsmen constitute a special category of administrative personnel. 
They are either directly hired or seconded from other agencies of the public sector. 
The relevant database contains the following information: the year of secondment or 
direct hiring, the initials of the names and surnames, whether they are seconded or 
directly hired, their working status and agency of provenance, the Bureau where they 
serve, the year of retirement or revocation of the secondment, the level of education, 
previous positions in the public sector, new appointments after their retirement in the 
public sector. 
 
The databases on the directly hired administrative personnel contain the following 
fields: the year of appointment, the volume, the number of the issue of the 
government gazette, the date of publication, the initials of the names and surnames, 
the working status, level of education, grade, category and branch, the public 
announcement for the submission of candidacies, in-service mobility, previous 
position in the public sector, resignation and new positions in the public sector.  The 
database on the administrative personnel of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
unifies the transferred and newly hired personnel, whereas the fields are accordingly 
adjusted.     
 
Special databases are also constructed for i) the directly hired heads of the directorates 
and the independent department of international collaborations and public relations, 
and ii) the directly hired personnel of the legal service of the Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security, and Privacy. These databases contain the following fields: 
the year of appointment, the volume, the number of the issue of the government 
gazette, the date of publication, the initials of the names and surnames, the working 
status, the subject area of the position, the level of education, resignation or denial of 
appointment, replacement, previous position in the public sector, new appointment in 
the public or private sector, member of various committees of the public sector before, 
during or after the appointment, party affiliation, membership in NGOs.  
 
The empirical data on the scientific personnel were used for the creation of databases 
which were afterwards re-elaborated for the construction of an involvement in public 
life index, and a time-dimension involvement in public life index similar to those 
presented in the previous unit regarding the members of the authorities. The databases 
on the directly hired scientific personnel contain the following fields: the year of 
appointment, the volume, and number of the issue of the government gazette, the date 
of publication, the initials of the names and surnames, the working status, the 
specialty or the subject area of the position, the level of education, the grade, in-
service transfers, secondments to other agencies of the public sector or other European 
agencies, the number of the public announcement (if published in the government 
gazette), resignation or denial of appointment, previous post in the public sector, 
                                                 
443 Secondment decisions are not published in the government gazette with the exception of 
secondments to governmental organs.  
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membership in various committees of the public sector before, during or after the 
appointment, new appointment in the public sector, party affiliation, membership in 
NGOs.  
 
In the case of the special scientific and auxiliary scientific personnel of the Greek 
Ombudsman, all the data were derived from the annual reports since the appointment 
decisions were not published in the government gazette. Furthermore, the annual 
reports give also information on the seconded scientific personnel444 from other 
agencies of the public sector. Therefore, the relevant database contains the following 
additional fields: the department where the employee serves, transfers to another 
department, whether they are graduates of the National School of Public 
Administration, whether they serve on secondment, the agency of provenance, the 
supervising ministry.  
 
The involvement in public life index (Appendix 6) contains the scientific personnel’s 
career paths in public life, as derived from the sources, and is divided into six 
thematic dimensions: political involvement, institutional involvement, financial 
involvement, institutional and financial involvement, scientific involvement, and civil 
society involvement. On the other hand, the scientific personnel’s time-dimension in 
public life index (Appendix 7) constitutes a version of the involvement index 
presenting the career paths before, during, and after the personnel’s appointment, that 
is, after their resignation or denial of appointment.  
 
The empirical data contained in the databases and the indexes were appropriately 
processed and are presented in the empirical part of the unit.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
444 Secondment decisions are not published in the government gazette with the exception of 
secondments to governmental organs.  
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3. The institutional design of the recruitment policies adopted by the four 
constitutional independent authorities and analysis of the empirical data 
 
a. The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel  
 
A. The legal framework on the recruitment policies  
I. The administrative personnel  
 
The administrative personnel of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel are permanent civil servants. The Presidential Decree 124/1994 
regulated all issues related to the organization of the Secretariat, the competences of 
its services, the number of the personnel’s positions, and their distribution by category 
and branch (specialty). The Presidential Decree 124/1994 has been amended six 
times445 since 1994. It initially established 27 permanent positions, whereas the last 
amendment in 2009 provided for 261 permanent positions.  
 
Two strategies were adopted in relation to the recruitment of the administrative 
personnel of the Secretariat. The recruitment policy followed from the establishment 
of the authority in 1994 until 2004 was based on transfers, and secondments without 
time limitations. From 2004 onwards, a combination of recruitment policies was 
introduced, namely, transfers and secondments, and direct appointments. However, it 
should be noted that the last public announcement for transfers took place in 2004.  
 
i. Transfers and secondments 
 
The founding law 2190/1994446 of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
set the administrative personnel’s recruitment framework. Moreover, it introduced the 
innovation, uncommon with the rules set forth by the Civil Servants’ Code regarding 
promotions, which provided for the transfer of civil servants with grade A coming 
from public services, public law legal entities or local government authorities to fill 
the vacant positions of director general, directors, and heads of departments on first 
implementation of the law. These positions could also be filled by direct appointment, 
in case they were not filled by transfer. The authority proceeds to a public invitation 
for the submission of candidacies by the interested employees or individuals. The 
transferred or the directly appointed candidates are selected upon decision of the 
Council in Plenum447. The concurrent opinion of the service council of the releasing 
agency is required.  
 
On first implementation of the law, the same procedure was provided for the rest of 
the administrative personnel of the Secretariat, namely, either through transfers or 
direct appointments. However, according to the relevant clause, those who had 
                                                 
445 The following Presidential Decrees and Ministerial Decisions amended the initial Presidential 
Decree 124/1994 upon proposal of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel in Plenum: 
Presidential Decrees, 179/1995, 165/1997, 255/1998, 31/2000, Ministerial Decisions no 42799/2003 
and no 18983/2009.  
446 Article 7 of the law 2190/1994. 
447 The administrative act of the direct appointment is issued on the decision of the Minister of the 
Presidency of the Government, whereas transfers are issued upon a joint decision of the Minister of the 
Presidency of the Government, and the minister supervising the releasing agency.  
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experience especially in public services, local government agencies and public legal 
entities would be preferred448. In our opinion, it is far from clear that the clause is 
problematic, and raises legality issues in relation to its implementation. More 
specifically, the law 2190/1994 came to regulate the recruitment system in the public 
sector in general. On the other hand, the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel, as an independent authority, is a public service pertaining to the core of 
public administration.  Thus, the personnel of the Secretariat are permanent civil 
servants according to the Presidential Decree 187/1994, as amended, containing the 
organizational chart of the Secretariat. Consequently, transferring employees on 
private law contracts of indefinite time from private law legal entities of the public 
sector to fill permanent positions of the organizational chart of the Secretariat would 
convert their working status, a conversion which is not permissible. It would be 
equally irregular to transfer employees on private law contracts of indefinite time 
from public services or public law legal entities. Finally, the article set age limits on 
transfers, that is, only employees under forty years of age could be transferred or 
appointed449.  
 
A year after, the transfer system was amended450. The transfers were permitted 
without the concurrent opinion of the service council of the releasing agency, whereas 
the clause had retrospective force, namely, starting from the beginning of the 
operation of the authority on June 16, 1994. On the other hand, the transfers of 
judicial employees were equally permitted under the same preconditions. However, it 
set a limit on their number since no more than ten positions could be filled by judicial 
employees.  
 
This amendment raised controversy in discussions in Parliament451. The Civil 
Servants’ Union (ADEDY) expressed its intense disagreement with the proposed 
measures through an announcement. The MPs of the opposition supported and shared 
these reservations. More specifically, the Union claimed that “from this point of view 
we do not understand, and we are against regulations which seem to promote 
favouritism, bypass unified principles, and create a special regime of recruitment and 
operation, that is, transfers without the opinion of the releasing agency, secondments 
                                                 
448 Par. 1 of article 14 of the law 2190/1994 defines the scope of implementation of the law, namely 
which agencies of the public sector fall under the ambit of the new recruitment system in the public 
sector, as well as the exemptions from the law. The clause reads as follows: “1. The following fall 
under the ambit of the provisions of Chapters A, B, and the present Chapter C: a. the public services; b. 
the public law legal entities; c. the organizations of local self-administration of all levels, the Central 
Union of Municipalities and Communities of Greece and the local unions of municipalities and 
communities included; d. the public enterprises and public organizations; e. the private law legal 
entities pertaining to the state or regularly subsidized, according to the provisions in force, by state 
funds by at least 50% of their annual budget or the state possesses at least 51% of their share capital; 
the private law legal entities pertaining to the bodies under the points b, c, d, and e legal entities or 
regularly subsidized by them by at least 50% of their annual budget, according to the provisions in 
force or their relevant statutes, or the above mentioned legal entities possess at least 51% of their share 
capital”. The paragraph was supplemented by par. 1, article 1 of the law 2527/1997. The Banks, whose 
President or Governor was appointed pursuant to the provisions of article 49A of the Standing Orders 
of Parliament as well as their subsidiaries anonymous companies, also fell under the ambit of the law. 
449 The age limits were amended by article 20, par. 2 of the law 2738/1999, and thus the transferred or 
appointed should not exceed the age of forty-five. 
450 The clause was amended and supplemented by article 1, par. 1 and 6 of the law 2349/1995. 
451 Minutes of Parliament on the draft law “Regulation of issues of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel, and special issues on the personnel and function of public administration”. 
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without time limitations452, and transfers of judicial employees”. The Deputy Minister 
of the Interior, Charalambos Kastanides (PASOK), explained that it was the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel that proposed the amendment regarding the 
omission of the opinion of the service councils of the releasing agencies due to the 
workload, and the new competences assigned to the authority. In his opinion, the 
time-consuming transfer procedure in force hampered the effective operation of the 
authority. The MP Kyriakos Spyriounis (PASOK) argued that the transfer of an 
employee to the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel should not be set 
under bureaucratic procedures, and mentality systems that depended upon one’s 
ideology, opposition mood, and selfish tendencies453.  
 
The same regime of transfers, that is, without the opinion of the service council of the 
releasing agency, was also adopted in the case of the administrative personnel of the 
Greek Ombudsman454. Then, the Rapporteur of the Scientific Report of Parliament455 
expressed reservations over the consistency of the clause with article 3, par. 4 of the 
Constitution providing that “Civil servants may not be transferred456 without an 
opinion or lowered in rank or dismissed without a decision of a service council 
consisting of at least two-thirds of permanent civil servants”. The Rapporteur argued 
that the jurisprudence of the Council of State has consistently judged that the purpose 
of the constitutional legislator was to safeguard the civil servants’ service status and 
career, thus offering them the major protection in cases of transfers, lowering of 
grade, and dismissal, and consequently these service changes may only take place 
upon decision of the service councils consisting of at least two-thirds of permanent 
civil servants. He stressed that the transfer is an extraordinary way of filling existent 
vacant positions, and thus there is a change in the category in which the employee 
belongs since he is dismissed from the position he possesses in the organisational 
chart, and is appointed to another position. Finally, he argued that taking into 
consideration the fact that the said clause of the Constitution explicitly provides for 
the formulation of an opinion –even a simple one- of the service council of the 
releasing agency, it is doubtful whether the clause of the draft law is consistent with 
the relevant clause of the Constitution.  
 
Interestingly enough, two years before, the Scientific Report of Parliament457 on the 
draft law establishing the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel458, that is, 
                                                 
452 The issue of secondments will be discussed later. 
453 The MP insinuates that such behaviour is not unusual for the members of the service councils in 
public administration.  
454 Article 5, par. 4 of the law 2477/1997. 
455 The Scientific Report of Parliament on the draft law “The Greek Ombudsman and the Corps of 
Inspectors – Controllers of Public Administrative”, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-
Ergou?law_id=7ab346ee-b1b7-48c1-a646-96c465579212, date of access: 30.07.2010 
456 The term transfer here refers to transfers to and from regional offices within the same service. This 
was a common phenomenon in the past, and civil servants always feared of unfavorable transfers 
because of their political beliefs. 
457 The Scientific Report of Parliament on the draft law “Regulation of issues of the Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel and special issues of the personnel and operation of public 
administrative”. 
458 The draft law was entitled“Regulation of issues of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel and special issues of the personnel and operation of public administration”.  
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the law 2190/1994, was conducted by the same Rapporteur. This time he expressed no 
reservations over article 1, par. 1 of the draft law regarding the measure of transfers to 
the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel without the opinion of the service 
council of the releasing agency. Interestingly enough, he stated that “the transfer is a 
serious modification in the service status of a civil servant (theoretically it consists of 
two special acts, the dismissal of the employee from the position he possesses in the 
organisational chart  . . . and his appointment to another position), and for this 
reason, if the transfer is compulsory and is not induced by the employee’s own 
initiative, the decision of the service council of the agency to which he belongs is 
required. In the case of article 1 of the draft law (as well as in the case of article 9 of 
the law 2266/1994) the issue of the protection of the employee is not posed since the 
transfer takes place under the initiative of the transferred (who submits an application 
for the transfer – article 7 par. 3 of the law 2190/1994 and article 1 par. 1 of the draft 
law). On the other hand, the guarantee of the orderly functioning of the releasing 
agency is safeguarded by the issue of the joint ministerial decision of the Minister of 
the Interior, and the competent Minister supervising the releasing agency”. As for the 
Rapporteur’s last point about the ministers’ discretion to sign the joint ministerial 
decision in order to avoid disturbing the proper functioning of the releasing agency, 
the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel expressed a different view in its 
Annual Report for the year 2000459. It stated that the competent organ which decided 
upon the transfers was the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel in Plenum, 
and thus the joint ministerial decision simply vested the transfer decision with the 
formality of the administrative act which would be published in the government 
gazette. In other words, the transfer decision of the Council was binding for the 
competent Ministers who had no other option but to sign it.  
  
As for the regulation regarding the transfer of judicial employees to the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel, it might be considered as unconstitutional. The 
judicial power constitutes a separate and distinct branch of government, and thus the 
service status of the judicial employees is contained in a separate part of the 
Constitution, part E. According to article 92, par. 3 of the Constitution 1975/1986, 
“judicial employees’ promotions, assignments to positions, transfers, secondments, 
and reclassifications shall take place under the concurrent opinion of judicial 
councils”. Therefore, two issues are raised. First, the possibility of transferring 
personnel from the judicial branch to the executive and vice-versa since the judiciary 
is independent460. Indeed, according to the decision 773/52 of the Supreme Council of 
Public Services (ASDY): “A transfer may take place, under the constraints of the 
Civil Servants’ Code, only within the framework of the political public services.  On 
the other hand, neither is it provided for, nor could it be feasible to transfer someone 
from a position of the administrative services to a position of the judicial services and 
vice versa, taking into consideration the fact that these categories of public services 
are basically different, and pertain to the exercise of different powers, that is, the 
executive and the judicial (Jurisprudence of ASDY, 1970). Second, the concurrent 
                                                 
459 Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, Annual Report for the year 2000, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 286, 12.3.2003. 
460 Indeed, the Code for judicial employees according to articles 19 and 20 of the law 294/1976 as in 
force by the time of the promulgation of the law 2349/1995 provided only for in-service transfers and 
secondments, that is, among courts and prosecution offices, with the exception of secondments to the 
Ministry of Justice. In other words, there was no mobility to and from the executive branch of 
government.  
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opinion of judicial councils is compulsory for any change in the service status of the 
judicial employees. In other words no special regulation contained in a law, as that of 
article 1, par. 6, may bypass article 92, par. 3 of the Constitution (Decision of the 
Council of State 629/1996). 
 
Secondments, as a temporary recruitment policy, are provided for in the transitional 
provisions461 of the law 2190/1994. The clause reads as follows: “from the time of the 
appointment of its members and until the beginning of its functioning, the personnel of 
the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel shall be temporarily seconded to 
it according to the provisions in force”. Thus, the employees may be seconded from 
public services and public law legal entities pursuant to the provisions of the Civil 
Servants’ Code. However, a subsequent regulation462 provides that employees may be 
seconded to the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel from the public sector 
in general. All these secondments are compulsory for the employees and the releasing 
agencies, namely the employee is seconded without the concurrent opinion of the 
service council of the releasing agency. Furthermore, the law 2349/1995463 broadened 
the categories of the seconded employees with those serving in courts and prosecution 
offices. On the other hand, the clause provided that there were no time limitations for 
these secondments, whereas those which had already taken place were considered as 
secondments of indefinite time, if the secondment decision did not set time 
limitations.  
 
Nevertheless, these clauses seem problematic in three respects. First, the procedure is 
not transparent since there is no public announcement for the interested civil servants. 
Second, these secondments of indefinite time violate the concept of secondment itself, 
as described in administrative law and the Civil Servants’ Code, since it has a 
temporary character. Thus, secondments should not be used for the fulfillment of 
permanent service needs (Decision of the Council of State, 420/1991). Third, the 
clause regarding the secondments of judicial employees might be unconstitutional for 
the reasons earlier stated in relation to the transfers of judicial employees464.  
 
The transitional and final provisions465 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the 
Constitution provided that the permanent [sic] personnel of public services or public 
law legal entities or private law legal entities of the broader public sector that served 
on secondment in the constitutional independent authorities during the publication of 
the law could be transferred, upon application, to vacant positions of the 
organisational chart upon the recommendation of the relevant authority, on the 
decision of the competent ministers or the organs of administration of the releasing 
                                                 
461 Article 13, par. 5 of the law 2190/1994. 
462 Article 14, par. 2 of the law 2266/1994. 
463 Article 1, par. 1 of the law 2349/1995. 
464 As we have earlier stated on the issue of the permissibility of the transfers of the judicial employees, 
their service status is regulated by the Constitution since justice functions as a separate branch of 
government. According to article 92, par. 3 of the Constitution 1975/1986, “judicial employees’ 
promotions, assignments to posts, transfers, secondments, and reclassifications shall take place under 
the concurrent opinion of judicial councils”. However, secondments to the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel have a compulsory character according to article 14, par. 2 of the law 
2266/1994. Therefore, they take place without the (concurrent) opinion of the competent service 
councils. In this case, the secondments of the judicial employees may only take place upon decision of 
the competent judicial council (Decision of the Council of State 629/1996). 
465 Article 5, par. 8 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution on the constitutional 
independent authorities.  
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legal entities, without the opinion of  a service council, in derogation of the provisions 
in force. In other words, the clause gave the opportunity to employees from private 
law legal entities of the public sector or employees on private law contracts of 
indefinite time serving in public services or public law legal entities to fill permanent 
vacant positions of the organisational charts of the authorities, thus converting their 
working status. In our opinion, this legislative regulation violated article 103, par. 8 of 
the Constitution since conversion by law of private law contracts in the Public 
Administration and the broader public sector into contracts of unlimited duration 
(public law contracts) is prohibited. 
 
ii. Direct hirings 
 
The selection of the scientific and administrative personnel as well as the selection of 
lawyers with a salary mandate fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
constitutional independent authorities according to article 4, par. 1 of the executive 
law 3051/2002 of the Constitution466. It should be noted that the regulations and the 
organisational chart of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel do not 
provide for the criteria and the procedure for the selection of the personnel. The 
authority defines them each time in the relevant public announcements, that is, they 
are never uniform. However, article 1, par. 1d of the law 3812/2009 on the 
reformation of the recruitment system in the public sector abolished the autonomous 
recruitment regime of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. Thus, all the 
independent authorities, constitutional or not, are included in the group of public 
sector bodies of article 14, par. 1 and 2 of the law 2190/1994 that fall under the ambit 
of the general recruitment system provided for in the law 2190/1994 as in force.  
 
iii. Discussions in Parliament  
 
Despite the fact that the law 2190/1994 also provided for direct hirings, the 
formulation of the clause itself prevented the implementation of this recruitment 
policy. It clearly gave priority to those who had previous experience in the public 
sector, that is, the transfers system. On the other hand, even if the Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel opted for direct hirings, the recruitment lacked 
transparency since the criteria and the selection procedure were not set forth in the 
relevant article. During discussions and debates in Parliament467 on the draft law 
                                                 
466 Article 4, par. 1 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution reads as follows: “The scientific 
and the rest of the personnel of each authority are hired to positions provided for in its regulations and 
are selected by the authority following a public announcement with the criteria and the procedure as 
defined in it. If there is no relevant provision, the personnel are selected according to the criteria and 
the procedure that the authority defines in the public announcement, in accordance with the principles 
of publicity, transparency, objectivity, and merit. In any case, the public announcement precedes the 
selection, whereas the selection is assigned to a committee, whose composition and constitution is 
defined by decision of the independent authority. At least a member of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel, and a judge of the Supreme Courts participate in the Committee. Whenever an 
interview is provided for, it is public. The interview is compulsory for the selection of the special 
scientific or the auxiliary scientific personnel”.  
467 Minutes of Parliament on the draft law “Establishment of an independent authority for the selection 
of personnel and regulation of public administration issues”, 8th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary 
Democracy), First Assembly, Session 53, discussion and debate in principal, February 2nd, 1994, 
available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-
Olomeleias?search=on&DateFrom=01%2F02%2F1994&DateTo=10%2F02%2F1994&SessionPeriod=
92766fef-d4d2-4a56-a754-3081dfb67589, date of access: 25.06.2010. 
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establishing the authority, the MP Byron Polydoras (New Democracy) stated that 
despite the fact that the new law regulated the recruitment system in the public sector, 
the authority did not commit itself to set criteria and define a selection mechanism for 
its own personnel. The MP Vassilis Kedikoglou (PASOK) stressed that by the time 
the new authority established examinations for the recruitment of personnel in the 
public sector, it could be considered as a sign of disrespect not to hire its own 
personnel through examinations. In his view, there should be a special examination 
for the personnel of the authority, if they wanted to establish an independent organ as 
they claimed. He emphasized that the personnel of the authority should not be 
recruited through transfers. 
 
Three months after the promulgation of the law 2190/1994, the Minister of the 
Presidency of the Government, Anastassios Peponis (PASOK), who proposed and 
introduced the relevant law in Parliament468, admitted that they faced problems with 
the secondments of personnel to the authority. He stressed that there were no suitable 
employees to be seconded to the authority since such specialized agencies required 
special qualifications469. During discussions and debates in Parliament470 on the draft 
law “Regulation of issues of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel and 
special issues of personnel and operation of the public administration”, the MP 
Panagis Benetatos (PASOK), criticized the policy of the government to insist on the 
transfers regime. He claimed that if the government intended to establish an important 
institution, the recruitment policies of transfers and secondments showed its 
reluctance to move towards that direction. He stated that not only the number of the 
employees of the authority but also their quality was insufficient. He justified his view 
over the last point on the fact that the overwhelming majority of the civil servants 
currently serving in the public sector were not appointed on merit criteria. Therefore, 
he disagreed with the recruitment policies of transfers and secondments since the 
authority required personnel of high expertise, characterized by responsibility and 
maturity. He supported that there should be an examination in order to hire 
experienced, educated, and expert personnel specialized in the development of human 
resources. In his view, the authority should adopt the mentality of effectiveness and 
not that of legalistic and apparent legitimacy. 
 
The Deputy Minister of the Interior, Charalambos Kastanides (PASOK) agreed with 
the MP’s reservations. As for the small number of the positions of the organisational 
chart of the Secretariat provided for in the founding law, that is, 30 positions, he 
claimed that the budgetary discipline dissuaded the legislator from creating new 
positions in 1994. He also supported that it is right, and this happens to all the 
European countries, whenever the law provides for the establishment of an 
independent authority, to proceed to direct appointments of personnel with increased 
qualifications. On the other hand, he assured the MPs that the employees finally 
transferred were among the best, and of the highest level. He informed them that a 
                                                 
468 The law 2190/1994 is also known as “the Peponis’s law”. 
469 Minutes of Parliament on the draft law “For the protection of free correspondence and 
communication”, 8th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, Session 128,  
June 29, 1994. 
470 Minutes of Parliament on the draft law “Regulation of issues of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel and special issues of the personnel and operation of public administration” 
(1995). 
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few months ago 177 civil servants471 from the public sector had submitted their 
application following the first public announcement for transfers to the authority. He 
explained that after thorough examination of the candidacies, and based on strict 
criteria that the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel had internally 
formulated, the members of the authority had selected only 9472 of the 177 candidates.  
 
However, it seems that the nine employees, who were finally selected to be 
transferred, already served on secondment in the authority, according to the   
following abstract from the Annual Report for the year 1994: “In order to make 
feasible the beginning of the functioning of the body in time, secondments from other 
public services and legal entities of the public sector were realized pursuant to article 
13, par. 5, until the announced positions of its Secretariat get filled. Among the 
effected secondments are comprised and those of the selected employees to be 
transferred to the positions of the organisational chart until the procedure provided 
for in article 7 par. 3 and 4 gets realized”.  It should be reminded that these 
secondments took place pursuant to articles 13, par. 5 of the law 2190/1994 and 
article 14, par. 2 of the law 2266/1994, and were not transparent since no public 
announcement was foreseen. Consequently, the same employees who served on 
secondment were finally selected for the transfers after a public announcement. 
 
The argument of restricting public expenditure through the recruitment policy of 
transfers was invoked by the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel in its 
annual report for the year 1995473. However, the argumentation invoked by the 
Deputy Minister and the annual report that the small number of the positions of the 
organisational chart and the policy of transfers were unavoidable because of the 
                                                 
471 According to the Annual Report of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel for the year 
1994, the exact number of candidates was 155, distributed in categories and branches of specialisation 
as follows: UE Administration: 77, SE Administration: 61, UE Informatics: 5, TE Informatics: 2, SE 
Computer Operators: 7, SE Typist: 2, CE Auxiliary-Cleansing Personnel: 1. 
472 The agencies of provenance, categories and branch of specialisation of the nine transferred 
employees are as follows: Three employees were transferred from the Public Anonymous Company 
“Greek Technology and Constructions S.A.” a few months before its disbandment. Their categories and 
branch of specialisation were: UE Administration: 2, S.E. Administration: 1. Three employees were 
transferred from the General Navy Staff. Their categories and branch of specialisation were: U.E. 
Administration-Finance:1, U.E. Informatics: 1, S.E.: Administration-Accounting. One judicial 
employee was transferred from the Prosecution Office of the Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law, a 
University graduate whose branch of specialisation was not defined in the Government Gazette. One 
employee was transferred from the Pension Fund of Motorists of the Prefecture of Serres to the 
regional office of the authority in Thessaloniki. His category and branch of specialisation was U.E. 
Administration-Financial. It seems that he had strong party affiliation since he was elected Prefectural 
Councillor of Serres with the party of PASOK (2003-2010). He was also Collaborator of two 
parliamentarians of Serres from the party of PASOK (2000-2005). One employee was transferred from 
the Organisation for the Publishing of School Books. His category and branch of specialisation was 
U.E. Administration-Financial. Interestingly enough, three of them were promoted to the positions of 
Directors General of the Secretariat, whereas one of them was also appointed as Councillor of the 
authority.  
473 This argumentation will be repeated in the Annual Reports for the years 1996, 1997, 1998, and 
1999. The Annual Report for the year 1995 stated “The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
should serve as a model of high-level public service with respect to high performance, qualitative and 
quantitative” with zero, if possible, or otherwise minimal, expenditure of public money for the 
recruitment of its Secretariat. Based on this last position the Plenary of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel judged that the positions of the organisational chart of its Secretariat must be 
filled by transferring personnel from the broader public sector, where, as it well known, there is 
abundance of personnel of all categories”. (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 286, 12.3.2003, p. 3424) 
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budgetary discipline does not seem convincing. Within the same law that established 
the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, and introduced a recruitment 
system in the public sector based on merit, that is the law 2190/1994, there were 
articles that seem to make the argument of budgetary discipline crumble. More 
specifically, articles 25 and 27 of the law came to give permanent tenure or private 
law contracts of indefinite time to thousands of temporary employees, despite the 
reservations expressed over their constitutionality474. Spanou (1996) comments on the 
reform introduced by the law 2190/1994:  
 
However, despite its intentions, this reform, as many other 
before, contradicts itself by including provisions contrary to its 
rationalizing attempt. The most striking example is that it 
“legalizes” ex-post a Council of Ministers Act of May 1989, 
integrating into the civil service temporary employees. Through 
this procedure the government retroactively validates an 
unconstitutional act that had not been implemented because of 
the unfavourable electoral outcome of the time. For the rest it 
integrated into the civil service contract employees with three 
years of employment, and provided the possibility for temporary 
employees, dismissed by the New Democracy government in 
1990, to gradually return to the civil service. Their status was 
even upgraded, since they were appointed as permanent civil 
servants or long-term contract employees. In this sense, the 
PASOK government paid its debts towards a part of the 
electorate that contributed to its return to power.  
 
The selection criteria for the candidates of the transfers, as internally set by the 
authority, are described for the first time in the annual report for the year 1995: “As 
criteria for the selection of the employees to be transferred, the Plenary of the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel set and applied the absence of service 
disciplinary convictions, ethos (decent behaviour), and excellent performance in their 
previous service, as these result from their service files in combination with the 
feedback derived from their presentation and examination in front of the selection 
committee composed of members of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel”.  It is far from clear that these criteria are general, and most importantly no 
special formal qualifications are required for the positions. Therefore, the selection 
committees are inevitably granted wide discretion in assessing the candidates for 
transfers.  
 
II. The specialized scientific personnel of the Secretariat 
 
Interestingly enough, eight years after the establishment of the authority, the common 
legislator introduced forty positions of specialized scientific personnel in the 
organisational chart475. It is the only independent authority whose founding law does 
not provide for specialized scientific personnel. On the other hand, another crucial 
                                                 
474 The Scientific Report of Parliament expressed reservations over the constitutionality of article 25 of 
the draft law, whereas it created tensions during discussions in Parliament. Source: The Scientific 
Report of Parliament on the draft law “Establishment of an independent authority for the selection of 
personnel and regulation of public administrative issues” available at: The Official Website of the 
Hellenic Parliament, http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-
Ergou?law_id=8a98f188-db06-4992-b959-92ebac1856e8, date of access: 25.06.2010. 
475 Article 12 of the law 3051/2002. 
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point that differentiates the specialized scientific personnel of the authority in relation 
to that of the other independent authorities and public services in general is their 
working status since they are permanent civil servants. However, article 103, par. 3 of 
the Constitution provides that: “Positions of specialized scientific and technical or 
auxiliary personnel provided by law may be filled by personnel hired on private law 
contracts. The terms of employment, and the specific guarantees under which these 
personnel shall be employed, shall be specified by law”.  
 
Could this legislative regulation regarding the working status of the specialized 
scientific personnel of the authority be considered as unconstitutional? Article 3 of the 
Constitution clearly set the constitutional constraints that bind the common legislator 
in relation to the organisation of the administration on the one hand, and the legal 
position of its employees, on the other. The specialized scientific personnel on private 
law contract enjoy the guarantees of tenure, whereas their competences are clearly 
restricted to the provision of scientific work. The main reasons that favoured the  
option of private law working relationship were i) the possibility of increased 
remuneration compared to that of civil servants on a public law relationship, and ii) 
the flexibility of the working relationship476 (Bakoyiannis, 2000). It should be noted 
that lawyers may also be appointed to positions of the special scientific personnel of 
the constitutional independent authorities477. However, they are suspended from the 
exercise of the lawyer’s profession as long as they serve in the authority, despite the 
fact that they work on a private law contract of indefinite time. This limitation is 
completely justifiable since it is linked to the personnel’s independence in the 
discharge of their duties. 
 
But even if we accept that the common legislator has the option to create permanent 
positions in the organisational chart of the specialized scientific personnel, as is the 
case with the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, this would enhance the 
danger of unequal treatment among employees through the coexistence of positions 
with the same competences filled by two categories of personnel, namely on private 
law contract and permanent ones. Thus, they differ in their possibility for promotion, 
and other aspects of their service status despite the fact that they both enjoy 
guarantees of tenure. Indeed, under the authorization of article 12, par. 4 of the law 
3051/2002 establishing the specialized scientific staff of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel, the Plenary of the organ issued the decision 3/2006478 on the 
personnel’s promotion system through the classification of positions479, and the 
definition of their duties. Therefore, the specialized scientific personnel of the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel enjoys a unique, privileged working 
status in relation to the rest of the personnel of the same category in the Greek public 
administration. 
 
The selection criteria and formal qualifications of the specialized scientific 
personnel480, are defined as follows: a degree or diploma from a Greek University or, 
                                                 
476 For example, the exercise of the profession of the lawyer is incompatible with one’s capacity as a 
civil servant on public law relationship. 
477 Article 4, par. 7 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. 
478 Government Gazette, vol. B, no 539, 2.5.2006. 
479 The positions are classified as follows: Special Rapporteur of Third Order, Special Rapporteur of 
Second Order, Special Rapporteur of First Order, and Assistant. 
480 Article 12 par. 2 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. 
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its equivalent from a foreign educational institute, a diploma of postgraduate studies 
with duration of at least one year, and at least three years experience are required for 
the appointment. Excellent or very good knowledge of a foreign language shall be 
additionally taken into account for the assessment of the candidates. The article also 
provides that each time the public announcement for the filling of the positions further 
specifies the required by position degrees, basic and postgraduate, as well as the 
required experience, depending on the needs of the Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel. The selection of the specialized scientific personnel follows the same 
procedure as that provided for the administrative personnel of the constitutional 
independent authorities481. The interview is compulsory for this category of personnel. 
 
B. Analysis of the empirical data 
 
I. The administrative personnel  
i. Transfers: the flawed clause or testing the legality of transfers 
 
The empirical data on the two hundred (200) transferred personnel to the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel were derived from the relevant individual 
administrative acts, that is, the transfer decisions, published in the government 
gazette. These decisions cover the period from the first transfer decision published in 
February 1995 to the last transfer decision published in December 2007. In general, 
the information contained in the text of the individual administrative acts of transfers 
is divided in two parts: the first part describes the civil servant’s status in the releasing 
agency, that is, the legal aspect of the employment relationship, the category, branch, 
and grade he possesses482, whereas the second part contains the same information in 
                                                 
481 Article 4, par. 1 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. 
482 Article 34 of the law 2190/1994 in force by the time of the transfers, contains the scale of grades, 
the structure of positions, and promotions to these grades in the public service. The said article 
amended the relevant clause of the Civil Servants’ Code of 1977. The Civil Servants’ Code of 1999 did 
not alter the grades scale. There were only some internal alterations in relation to the time spent at each 
grade. The structure of grades is as follows: 
The positions of the categories of University Education (UE), Technological Education (TE), 
Secondary Education (SE), and Compulsory Education (CE) are classified in five grades in total as 
follows:  
Grade A 
Grade B 
Grade C 
Grade D 
Grade E 
The positions of the category of Special Positions (SP) are classified in grades 1st and 2nd. The positions 
of the categories UE, TE, and SE are classified in grades D, C, B, and A. D is the lower grade, and A is 
the higher grade. The positions of the category CE are classified in grades E, D, C, and B. E is the 
lower grade, and B is the higher grade. The entering grade of the categories UE, TE, and SE is grade D, 
whereas the entering grade of the category CE is grade E. For the graduates of the National School of 
Public Administration the entering grade is grade B. Among employees of the same grade there is no 
ancestry. 
The following are required for promotion from grade to grade: 
For the UE category: from grade D to grade C a two-year service at grade D, from grade C to grade B a 
six-year service at grade C, from grade B to grade A a six-yearn service at grade B, from grade A to the 
Director’s grade a six-year service at grade A. 
For the TE category: from grade D to grade C a two-year service at grade D, from grade C to grade B a 
seven-year service at grade C, from grade B to grade A a seven-year service at grade B.  
For the SE category: from grade D to grade C a two-year service at grade D, from grade C to grade B a 
nine-year service at grade C, from grade B to grade A a nine-year service at grade B.  
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relation to the civil servant’s status in the receiving agency. As we have earlier stated, 
we consider that the clause regulating the transfers of the administrative personnel, as 
well as the transitional clause of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution 
providing for the transfer of employees seconded to the constitutional independent 
authorities were both flawed. They actually permitted employees on private law 
contracts of indefinite time483 to fill vacant permanent positions of the organisational 
chart of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. The 
information contained in the transfer decisions, as earlier presented, combined with 
the legal status of the agencies of provenance are the main criteria to test the legality 
of transfers. Indeed, information gaps in the texts of the transfer decisions unravel the 
embarrassment regarding their formulation as well as their inconsistencies.  
 
Thus, we attempted to decode the texts of the transfer decisions in relation to the legal 
aspect of the employment relationship -public or private law contract- of the 
transferred personnel before (status in the releasing agency) and after their transfer 
(status in the receiving agency) as formulated in the text of the transfer decisions 
published in the Government Gazette. Two tables, each one divided in two parts based 
on the before transfer-after transfer employment relationship, were created. The first 
table describes the variations in the formulation of the two parts of the transfer 
decisions in relation to regular employees, whereas the second table describes these 
variations in relation to employees on private law contracts of indefinite time. The 
term “employees on private law contracts of indefinite time” refers to their working 
status before the transfer. This category of personnel raises the issue of the legality of 
the transfers. Following the structure of the second table, the personnel are divided 
into three subcategories sharing two common characteristics: i) all the releasing 
agencies are private law legal entities, and ii) all the employees do not possess grades 
in the first part of the transfer decisions. Therefore, private law legal entities and the 
absence of grade constitute the basic criteria to test the legality of the transfers. 
Appendix 8, text 1 contains the tables and full analysis of the decoded transfer 
decisions.  
 
As for the first criterion to test the legality of the transfers, that is, the legal status of 
the releasing agencies, Table 1 presents a comprehensive list of the releasing agencies 
of the transferred administrative personnel. The agencies signaled with italics were 
private law legal entities by the time each transfer occurred. Furthermore, Table 2 
presents the percentage of the transferred employees coming from public services, 
public law legal entities, and private law legal entities. According to the empirical 
data, half of the transferred employees come from private law legal entities (48%, 97 
of 200). More specifically, they come from public enterprises and organizations and 
other private law legal entities, whereas the proportion of those coming from social 
security-pension funds, the armed forces and the central services of Ministries is 
significant484. As for the supervising Ministries, the majority of the transferred  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
For the CE category: from grade E to grade D a two-year service at grade E, from grade D to grade C a 
ten-year service at grade D, from grade C to grade B a ten-year service at grade C. 
 
483 The employees under this working status could either come from private law legal entities of the 
public sector or public services and public law legal entities. 
484 See Appendix 8, table 1.  
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Table 1 List of the releasing agencies of the transferred administrative personnel  
Agencies by Supervising Ministry  Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of DevelopmentCentral 
Service  
Foundation of Social Work Centre of Innovation (KEKA) 
Greek Technology and Constructions SA Foundation of Social Security (IKA) Shipyards of Elefsina SA 
Greek Iron Mixtures SA Centre for Infectious Diseases Control 
(KEELPNO) 
Hellenic Shipyards SA 
Piraiki-Patraiki SA Organisation Against Drugs (OKANA) National Statistical Service of Greece 
Greek Company of Industrial and 
Mining Activities SA (ELEVME) 
Athens Hospital of Chronic Diseases for 
Children 
Export Credit Insurance Organisation 
Hellenic Organisation of Small and 
Medium Enterprises (EOMMEX) 
State Nursery Station of Rethymnon Economic and Social Committee 
General Mining and Metallurgical 
Company SA (LARCO) 
Ministry of National Education and 
Religious Affairs 
Hellenic Aerospace Industry SA 
Athens Paper Mill SA Organisation for the Publishing of 
School Books 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Public Power Corporation Technological Educational Institute of 
Athens 
Ministry of Employment and Social 
Protection 
Organisation for the Economic 
Reconstruction of Enterprises SA 
Athens School of Fine Arts Computer Centre for Social Services 
ETHNODATA SA (Public Bank 
subsidiary) 
National Youth Foundation Traders’ Insurance Fund 
Greek Salt Pits SA Ministry of National Defence Insurance Fund of Professionals and 
Craftsmen (TEVE) 
Hellenic Centre for Marine Research Central Service Auxiliary Security Fund for Employees 
of Pharmaceutical Operations 
Greek National Tourism Organisation 
(GNTO) 
General Army Staff Welfare Fund of Public Works 
Contractors 
Athens Business Chamber General Navy Staff Civil Servants' Welfare Fund 
Hellenic Competition Commission General Air Force Staff Ministry of Culture  
Ministry of Agriculture Greek Arms Industry SA Central Service 
Central Service Band Staff of the Minister of Defence 
(EPYETHA) 
Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
Company for Agricultural Development 
“Evritania SA” 
Army Pension Fund Hellenic Railways Organisation SA 
Agricultural Insurance (Public Bank 
subsidiary) 
General Secretariat of the 
Government  
under the jurisdiction of the Prime 
Minister 
Olympic Airways SA 
Pindos SA Ministry of the Interior  Olympic Aviation SA 
Organisation for the Payment and 
Control of the European Community 
Aid, Orientation and Guarantees 
Central Service  Olympic Catering SA 
Greek Agricultural Insurance 
Organisation (ELGA) 
National Intelligence Service Olympic Airways-Services SA 
Ministry of Development – Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Prefecture of Piraeus Thermal Bus Company SA (ETHEL) 
Organisation of the Central Market of 
Athens (OKAA) 
Prefectural Self-Administration of 
Thessaloniki 
Greek Post SA (ELTA) 
Ministry of Justice (Courts) Municipality of Egaleo Greek Postal Savings Bank SA 
Office of the Prosecutor of the Hellenic 
Supreme Court of Civil  and Penal Law 
Municipality Pylareon (Island of 
Kefallonia) 
Hellenic Telecommunications and Post 
Commission 
Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki Municipality of Loutropolis (Island of 
Lesvos) 
Ministry of Commercial Shipping 
Court of First Instance of Athens Municipality of Agioi Theodori 
(Prefecture of Corinth) 
Piraeus Port Authority SA 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Municipality of Athens Ministry of Environment, Planning, 
and Public Works 
Central Service  Municipality of Elliniko Anonymous Company for the 
Exploitation and Management of Greek 
Highways (TEO SA) 
National Foundation of Overseas 
Reception and Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated Expatriate Greeks 
Prefectural Self-Administrarion of 
Kefallonia-Ithaka 
Ministry of Public Order 
Ministry of Health and Welfare Prefecture of Athens Central Service  
Pension Fund of Motorists of the 
Prefecture of Serres 
National Centre of Public 
Administration 
Ministry of Culture and Ministry of 
Finance 
Tzaneio Regional General Hospital of 
Piraeus 
Centre for Vocational Training and 
Research of the Prefecture of Magnessia 
Foundation of Mediterranean Studies  
Third Athens Hospital of Chronic 
Diseases 
Ministry of Press and Mass Media  
Regional General Hospital of Thoracic 
(Chest) Diseases “The Salvation” 
Greek Radio and Television SA  
General Hospital Evangelismos   
*The agencies with italics were private law legal entities by the time the transfers took place.  
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TABLE 2 Legal Status of the releasing agencies  
 
 Public Services Public Law 
Legal Entities  
Private Law Legal Entities  
% Transferred personnel 
by legal status of the 
releasing agency 
25% (50 of 200) 27% (53 of 200) 
 
48% (97 of 200) 
Source: The Government Gazette 
 
personnel come from the Ministries of Development, Defence, Finance, Health and 
Welfare, Employment, and Interior485. 
 
Thus, after having taken into consideration the two main criteria for the assessment of 
the legality of the transfers, the irregular cases are divided into three categories: a) 
irregular cases, b) controversial cases, and c) extraordinarily irregular cases. 
a. The category of irregular cases simply pinpoints cases of conversion of the 
employee’s working relationship from private law contract of indefinite time to the 
status of regular civil servant. The ways of conversion are as follows:  
i) The tacit conversion, which comprises the majority of cases, according to which we 
assume the conversion based on the legal status of the agency, that is, public 
enterprises and organizations or other private law legal entities, and the absence of 
grade at the employee’s previous position, and  
ii) The explicit conversion, where the employee’s working relationship, that is, on 
private law contract of indefinite time, is explicitly written in the first part of the 
transfer decision, whereas the employee fills a vacant permanent position of the orga- 
nizational chart in the second part of the transfer decision. We have identified nine 
cases, that is, nine members of the transferred administrative personnel pertaining to 
the explicit conversion of the working relationship486. 
b. The category of controversial cases comprises those that might be irregular, 
depending on interpretation relating to the institutional design, lack of evidence, or 
other specific cases. The controversial cases are further analysed in Appendix 8, text 
2. 
c. The category of extraordinarily irregular transfer cases refers to cases where we 
have identified multiple violations of the legislation. The analysis of the cases located 
is presented in Appendix 8, text 2.  
 
Table 3 shows the legality of the transfers of the administrative personnel of the 
Secretariat of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel according to the 
previous analysis. Only 33% (66 of 200) of the transfers were legal, whereas 49% (97 
of 200) were illegal. The controversial cases represent 19% (37 of 200) of the cases 
under study. 
 
TABLE 3 The degree of legality of the transfers  
 
 Yes No Controversial Cases 
% of legality of 
the transfers  
33% 
(66 of 200) 
48% 
(97 of 200) 
19% 
(37 of 200) 
 
                                                 
485 See Appendix 8, table 2.  
486 TAP33, TAP36, TAP38, TAP183, TAP184, TAP187, TAP190, TAP194, and TAP199. The 
indication TAP stands for Transferred Administrative Personnel.  
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Despite the obvious defect in the institutional design of the clause on transfers, the 
empirical data show that half of the transferred personnel came from private law legal 
entities. As a result, there was an irregular conversion of the working relationship of 
the transferred personnel. However, the Annual Reports do not express any hesitations 
or reservations over the issue. On the contrary, in the Annual Reports of 1995 and 
2000, it is explicitly mentioned that it was a policy of the authority to transfer 
personnel from agencies of the broader public sector, as if there were no legal barriers 
in its implementation. Furthermore, with the exception of the Annual Report for the 
year 1994, the remainder of the Annual Reports does not provide any information on 
the public announcements for transfers that took place after 1994. The annual reports 
for the years 1997 and 1998 simply refer to the issue of the employees’ low interest 
for transfers to the authority. They were reluctant to submit their candidacies because 
of the lower remuneration provided for the personnel of the authority compared to the 
one they received from their respective agencies. The Annual Report for the year 
1999 notes that according to article 20 par. 3, subpara. b of the law 2738/1999 the 
personnel of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel would also receive 
the special allowance provided for the personnel of the Secretariat of the Greek 
Ombudsman. The Annual Report explains that this legislative measure was proposed 
by the authority in order to motivate employees of high quality to submit candidacies 
for transfer. 
 
The policy of transferring employees from public enterprises and organizations, and 
private law legal entities, in general, has also another dimension, apart from simply 
converting the employees’ working relationship to a more privileged status. These 
transfers, which took place from 1994 to 2004, coincide chronologically with the 
wave of privatizations in the broader public sector487, the conversion of the legal 
                                                 
487 Pagoulatos (2005) describes the three waves of nationalizations in the public enterprise sector before 
the wave of privatization as follows: “As in most other Western economies, the public enterprise sector 
in Greece was built gradually during the twentieth century through successive waves of state 
consolidation. Except for certain public specialized credit institutions (including the Agricultural Bank, 
the National Mortgage Bank and most notably the Bank of Greece, the country’s central bank) 
established in the late 1920s, the first notable wave of state initiative in the public enterprise sector 
occurred after the end the Second World War and through the 1960s. This developmental wave of 
public enterprise creation (rather than nationalization) included public utilities such as 
telecommunications and electricity, a national tourism organization, and several development 
institutions aimed to advance the country’s industrialization, offsetting private sector inability or 
market failures. The second major wave of nationalizations took place during the post-1974 transition 
to democracy, as was also the case in Spain and Portugal (Maravall 1993). Aiming to assert national 
economic control over key sectors, to emit a message of government resolve to major capital owners, 
and to appeal to wider radicalized social strata, the New Democracy (Νέα ∆ηµοκρατία, ND) 
government of Constantine Karamanlis in 1974-77 nationalised Olympic Airways, a number of major 
firms such as rafineries, and most notably the country’s second largest banking group, Commercial 
Bank, through which an additional group of industrial subsidiaries came under state control. This 
could be labeled the democratization wave of nationalization. The third major wave of nationalizations 
occurred under the first Pan Hellenic Socialistic Movement (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνηµα, 
PASOK) government of Andreas Papandreou. To a certain extent, this socialist wave of 
nationalizations (“socializations”) reflected a government strategy of assuming control over 
“strategic” sectors of the economy, as with the nationalizations of Larco (mineral exploitation), Pyrkal 
(munitions industry), the Lavrion lead mines and the Heracles General Cement Company 
(Georgakopoulos et al. 1987; Teitgen-Colly 1987). By 1983, 19 out of the top industrial concerns in 
Greece were controlled either directly or indirectly by the state – a single-year increase of eight very 
large firms (Bermeo 1990:4). This dirigiste rationale was subsumed under a broader job-saving effort 
to rescue a large number of faltering, over-indebted industrial firms. Thus the Industrial 
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status of public law legal entities to public anonymous companies, and the 
disbandment of a number of private law legal entities. Thus, could these transfers 
have served clientelistic purposes since they saved some employees serving in the 
broader public sector from unemployment or an unprivileged transfer? It seems that 
the transferred personnel already pertained to the clientele of the parties. Spanou 
(2008) argues that there was an “excessive proximity of public corporations to politics 
and their exploitation by the party in government for electoral purposes, especially in 
the form of employment reserves”. In other words, the recruitment of employees to 
enterprises of the broader public sector was the result of clientelistic practices. 
 
The empirical data derived from the government gazette relating to the releasing 
agencies permitted the construction of a comprehensive table488 containing 
information on the status of each releasing agency (legal status, under liquidation, 
trade sales) by the time of the transfer or shortly afterwards, the number of employees 
transferred by agency, and, in some cases, crucial dates of transfers in relation to any 
change in the status of an agency. The table is accompanied by a short analysis. 
 
ii. The qualifications and the mobility of the transferred personnel 
 
The transfer decisions contain information on the level of education (category), the 
specialization (branch), and the experience, through the grade system, of the 
transferred personnel. Table 4 shows the level of education of the transferred 
personnel489. It is obvious that the majority of the transferred personnel are graduates 
of higher education institutions (58%, 116 of 200). Nevertheless, in our opinion, the 
percentage of secondary education graduates is unacceptably high (37%, 74 of 200). 
The massive transfer of typists and computer operators seems incompatible with the 
principle of expertise which is predominant in the philosophy of independent 
authorities.  
 
Table 4 The level of education of the transferred administrative personnel  
 University 
Education 
Technological 
Education 
Secondary 
Education 
Compulsory Education 
% of the 
transferred 
administrative 
personnel by 
level of 
education 
49% (99 of 
200) 
9% (17 of 200) 37% (74 of 200) 9% (10 of 200) 
 
Table 5 shows the grades of the transferred personnel when the transfers took place. 
The grade system indirectly gives information on the employees’ experience, namely, 
                                                                                                                                            
Reconstruction Organisation (Οργανισµός Ανασυγκρότησης Επιχειρήσεων, ΟΑΕ) was established in 
1983 as a holding company for an initial 44 larger-sized ailing firms, to which many others were later 
added. Though OAE was supposed to overhaul the ailing firms and preferably return them to the 
market, any privatization intention was frozen until 1990, by which time their debts had multiplied”. As 
for the wave of privatizations, Spanou (2008) states: “Despite a short period under PASOK (1985-1987 
stabilisation programme) and the gradual liberalization of the capital market in the late 1980s, 
privatization became the order of the day under the New Democracy government (1990-1993) and was 
later systematically pursued by subsequent PASOK governments (1993-2004 ”. 
488 See Appendix 8, text 3 and table 3 on the status of the releasing agencies by the time of the 
transfers. 
489 See Appendix 8, table 4 on the specialization of the transferred personnel. 
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how many years they have served in the civil service. The indication “no grade” refers 
to ten cases490 according to which the transferred employees filled personal positions 
on private law contract of indefinite time. Therefore, they possessed no grade. The 
indication the “grade possessed” refers to cases of regular employees who are 
transferred. It is a typical expression often used in transfer decisions regarding 
permanent civil servants. However, it does not reveal the grade of the civil servant. 
The indication “unknown grade” refers to four cases491 according to which the 
transfer decisions remain silent on the grades given or possessed by the transferred 
employees. 
 
The empirical data, as shown in Table 5, reveal that 39% (80 of 200) of the 
transferred personnel possessed grade D. This means that they had recently been 
appointed to the releasing agencies, and had served there for three years at the most. 
On the contrary, employees possessing grade A represent only 5% of the transferred 
personnel. However, the exact percentage of the employees by grade remains 
unknown since we should take into consideration the fact that the category “the grade 
possessed” conceals the grades of 54 employees. Despite this gap in the data, these 
results combined with the age limits on transfers492 lead to the conclusion that the 
transferred personnel were not particularly experienced. This, in turn, might raise the 
question why the authority did not proceed to direct appointments, if they did not 
intend to transfer experienced personnel from the public sector493. Unless we consider 
that a two-year experience is satisfactory. Moreover, the activity of public enterprises 
and private law legal entities in general is not mainly based on the protection of 
legality compared to that exercised by the core services of the State. Therefore, the 
competences assigned to the authority demand not only efficiency and effectiveness in 
the daily exercise of duties, but also a deep sense of protecting legality as a core 
feature of the regulatory nature of the authority.  
 
Table 5 The experience of the transferred personnel through the grade system 
 
Grade  
% personnel by grade by the time of the 
transfer 
No grade 5% (10 of 200) 
The grade possessed 26% (54 of 200) 
Unknown grade  2% (4 of 200) 
Grade E 4% (7 of 200) 
Grade D 39% (80 of 200) 
Grade C 8% (15 of 200) 
Grade B 11% (21 of 200) 
Grade A 5% (9 of 200) 
Total  200 
 
In-service mobility of the transferred personnel, namely, reclassifications from one 
branch to another within the same category and reclassifications to a branch in a 
                                                 
490 TAP25, TAP26, TAP28, TAP29, TAP30, TAP31, TAP32, TAP69, TAP70, and TAP119.  
491 TAP1, TAP2, TAP3, and TAP34. 
492 Age limits were set by article 7 of the law 2190/1994, as amended by article 20, par. 2 of the law 
2738/1999. 
493 We should remind that according to Article 7 of the law 2190/1994 those who had experience 
especially in public services, local government agencies and legal entities of par. 1 of article 14 of the 
law 2190/1994 would be preferred to direct appointments. 
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superior category is not rare. According to the empirical data494, nine secondary 
education graduates changed branch within the same category, whereas eight 
secondary education graduates obtained a university degree while in service, and thus 
were reclassified to a superior category. Finally, one compulsory education graduate 
obtained a secondary education degree while in service, and was reclassified to a 
superior category. 
 
Cases of mobility of the personnel after the transfer, namely, new appointments, 
transfers, and secondments to other agencies of the public sector have also been 
identified495. As for new appointments, one employee was appointed as teacher in 
primary education shortly after his transfer to the authority. The Director General of 
the Secretariat was appointed Councillor of the authority in 1998 through the co-
optation system, while she simultaneously kept the position of Director General until 
2003. The renewal of the mandate to the position of Director General seems to have 
been irregular. She was reappointed as Councillor by the Conference of Presidents in 
2003, whereas her mandate was renewed in 2006. She was replaced in 2011. Seven 
employees were transferred to other agencies. Interestingly enough, three of the 
transferred employees moved to services situated to the province. The employee 
transferred to the Region of Central Macedonia served in the bureau of the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel in Thessaloniki. He was elected Prefectural 
Councillor in the Prefecture of Serres with the party of PASOK (2003-2010). The rest 
of the transfers, namely the transfer to the Hellenic Parliament, and two transfers to 
the Ministry of Finance could be characterized as privileged ones since the monthly 
remuneration is higher than that of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel. There is no open procedure for such transfers. One of the transferred 
employees to the Ministry of Finance had already served on secondment to the 
political bureau of the Minister of Finance before the transfer.  
 
Secondments to other agencies of the public sector are difficult to detect since they 
are not published in the government gazette with the exception of secondments to 
revocable governmental positions. We assume that the secondments might be more 
than the ones we finally managed to find. We have already mentioned one 
secondment to the political bureau of the Minister of Finance. Another interesting 
secondment implying political involvement is that to the Office of Organisation and 
Management of the Prime Minister (1998-2003). The same employee served on 
secondment to the General Secretariat of the Cabinet as Special Collaborator (2003-
2004). She is a secondary education graduate496 (S.E. Computer Operator). Finally, 
one employee has been seconded to the National Statistical Service of Greece, bureau 
of Patras, whereas another one serves on secondment to the Special Managing Service 
of the Operational Programme “Administrative Reform 2007-2013” at the Ministry of 
the Interior, as Head of Unit A2.  
 
Secondments to the authority from other agencies of the public sector are difficult to 
detect for the reasons previously analysed. However, the annual reports for the period 
                                                 
494 See Appendix 8, tables 5, and 6. 
495 See Appendix 8, table 7. 
496 According to article 79, par. 2 of the Presidential Decree 63/2005 “Codification of the legislation on 
government and governmental organs” the duties of Special Collaborator at the General Secretariat of 
the Government may be assigned to University graduates or Technological Educational Institutes 
graduates or secondary education graduates. 
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1994-2009 provide information on the seconded employees’ total number per year497.  
The annual reports for the periods 1994-1996 and 2001-2004 give more detailed 
information since they distribute the seconded employees by category. The annual 
report for the year 2010 remains silent on their number. The seconded employees’ 
number has significantly increased and stabilized since 2005. Interestingly enough, 
the empirical data on their level of education show that the authority followed the 
policy of massively seconding secondary education graduates which seems 
unjustifiable in relation to the special nature of the authority. Finally, the seconded 
employees enjoy a privileged remuneration status498.  
 
iii. Direct hirings 
 
The possibility of directly hiring the administrative personnel of the Secretariat 
through an open procedure was never implemented despite the relevant legislative 
regulation499. We should also remind that the clause was contradictory in itself since it 
gave priority to candidates who had previous experience in the public sector, that is, 
candidates through transfers. Therefore, the direct appointments would be activated 
only in the improbable case of positions left vacant through the transfers system. 
Furthermore, as we have previously analysed, the argument of saving public 
expenditure through the transfers system rather served as an alibi.  
 
The issue of direct hiring to the authority came back to the discussion in the Annual 
Report for the year 2000. According to the report, the filling of 85 vacant positions of 
the Secretariat was blocked because of the reluctance of the competent ministers 
supervising the releasing agencies to sign the transfer decisions. The authority 
following the decision 31/25.9.2000 of its Major Plenary proposed the legislative 
regulation of direct hiring according to the procedure provided for the selection of the 
specialized scientific personnel500, thus applying rules of the general recruitment 
system in the public sector. This legislative regulation never took place. It was the 
executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution on the constitutional independent 
authorities that finally settled the issue of direct hiring501. The autonomous selection 
mechanism was finally abolished by the law 3812/2009. 
Since 2003, the authority has launched four times open procedures for the selection of 
administrative personnel through direct hiring502. The public announcements were all 
published in the government gazette503. They defined the required diplomas of 
secondary or university education as well as additional required qualifications as they 
were each time specifically described, that is, postgraduate degrees (Masters), work 
experience, and the knowledge of word processing, excel, and internet. Additional 
                                                 
497 See Appendix 8, table 8. 
498 Those seconded to the authority receive their salary and any additional regular payments, as well as 
all the regular allowances, special compensations and earnings of their main position regularly paid, 
and which continue to be paid by the service from which they are seconded. Furthermore, they receive 
from the authority the special additional allowance provided for the personnel of the authorityPursuant 
to article 20, par. 2 of the law 2738/1999.  
499 Article 7 of the law 2190/1994. 
500 Article 19 of the law 2190/1994, as replaced by article 4 of the law 2527/1997. 
501 Article 4, par. 1 of the law 3051/2002. 
502 See Appendix 8, text 4 containing a short presentation of the four open procedures. 
503 The public announcements were published in the Government Gazette in 2003, 2006, 2008, and 
2009. 
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qualifications, namely, doctorates, work experience, and the knowledge of foreign 
languages were equally assessed. However, the policy relating to the formulation of 
the additional required qualifications was not uniform. More specifically, the 
postgraduate qualification (Master’s degree) seems to have played a crucial role in the 
sense that it was not always included in the additional required qualifications. Thus, 
the first and fourth public announcements launched in 2003 and 2009 respectively 
defined the possession of a Master’s degree as an optional additional qualification. 
The system of awarding points for each one of the selection criteria for all the 
categories of personnel was first implemented in the second open procedure, whereas 
it was introduced in the first open procedure only for the personnel of secondary 
education. An interview was provided for the preselected candidates of university and 
technological education in the first, second, and third open procedures. The fourth 
open procedure replaced the interview with the candidates’ performance at the 
panhellenic skills test. The unsuccessful candidates may submit an appeal. The 
percentage of secondary education positions to be filled, as provided for in the third 
and fourth public announcements, was unjustifiably high in our opinion.  
 
Table 6 shows the level of education of those appointed following the first three 
public announcements504. The percentage of the graduates of higher education 
institutions (86% in total, 36 of 42) is much higher than that of the transferred 
personnel. Nevertheless, it is impossible to estimate the number of appointees who 
possess postgraduate degrees or PhDs. Only the second and third public 
announcements defined postgraduate degrees as a prerequisite for selection for the 
category U.E. Administration-Finance, namely 11 of those appointed possess a 
postgraduate degree. There might be one or some with a PhD, but it cannot be 
verified. Furthermore, it is almost certain that many of the appointees of the same 
category who participated in the first public announcement possess postgraduate 
degrees. As for their specialisation, the vast majority of the directly appointed 
personnel pertain to the category and branch U.E. Administration-Finance505. Finally, 
we have identified two appointees who previously worked in the public sector. The 
employee 40, resigned from her position at the Athens Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry506 after her appointment to the authority. The employee 21 had served as a 
revocable employee at the political bureau of the Deputy Minister of National 
Education and Religious Affairs507. 
 
Table 6 The level of education of the directly hired administrative personnel 
 University 
Education 
Technological 
Education 
Secondary Education 
% of the newly 
hired personnel by 
level of education 
76% (32 of 42) 10% (4 of 42) 14% (6 of 42) 
 
As for the level of education of the total number of the administrative personnel, 1/3 
is secondary education graduates, an unjustifiably high rate508. The gender distribution 
                                                 
504 The appointment of the successful candidates of the fourth open procedure is still pending. 
505 See Appendix 8, table 9 on the specialization of the directly hired personnel.  
506 Government Gazette, vol. C, no 127, 23.2.2010. 
507 Government Gazette, vol. C, no 46, 6.3.2000. 
508 See Appendix 8, table 10. See also Appendix 8, table 11 on the specialisation of the total number of 
the administrative personnel.  
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is as follows: 67% are women, and 33% are men for the category of the transferred 
personnel, whereas 76% are women and 24% are men for the category of the directly 
hired personnel509. 
 
II. The specialized scientific personnel 
 
The first public announcement for the selection of specialized scientific personnel to 
the authority was published in the government gazette in 2007510. The selected 
candidates were appointed in 2008, and thus the authority hired scientific personnel 
for the first time after fourteen years of operation. The distribution of the 17 vacant 
positions of the organisational chart to be filled is shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 Distribution of the positions according to the public announcement 1A/2007 
for the selection of specialized scientific personnel 
Specialization Grade of the position Number of positions 
Administrative Law Special Rapporteur of First Order 1 
Administrative Law Special Rapporteur of Second Order 4 
Administrative Law  Special Rapporteur of Third Order 4 
Constitutional Law Special Rapporteur of Third Order 3 
Public Administration Special Rapporteur of Third Order 3 
Business Administration Special Rapporteur of Third Order 1 
Administration of Works or 
Informatics Systems 
Special Rapporteur of Third Order 1 
 
The formal qualifications were defined as follows: i) a university degree, as specified 
in the announcement, ii) a postgraduate degree within the field of specialty of the 
position to be filled, and iii) at least three-year specialised experience in the field of 
specialty of the position to be filled511. The excellent or very good knowledge of a 
foreign language, preferably English or French or German or Italian or Spanish, was 
equally taken into consideration for the assessment of the candidates.  
 
A five-member selection committee constituted by decision of the President of the 
authority would decide on the candidates to be finally appointed. According to the 
announcement, the selection committee would assess and classify the candidates 
based on the university degrees and their grades, the postgraduate degrees, the 
knowledge of foreign languages, the experience, the scientific works, and other 
relevant activities of the candidates as well as the results from the personal interview 
of each one of them with the committee. Interestingly enough, the announcement did 
not contain a grading system for each one of the selection criteria.  
 
According to the final selection results published in the government gazette512, fifteen 
candidates were finally selected with the grade of Special Rapporteur of Third Order. 
On the other hand, two positions, that is, the positions of Special Rapporteur of First 
Order and Second Order, remained vacant despite the fact that they were rolling 
                                                 
509 See Appendix 8, table 12. 
510 Public Announcement 1A/2007, Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel (ASEP), no 12, 7.2.2007. 
511 The positions of Special Rapporteur of First Order and Second Order required fifteen years and 
seven years of experience respectively. Nevertheless, if there were no candidates with a relevant 
experience, the positions could be finally filled by candidates who had at least three years experience. 
Thus, the ranks of the positions would be converted to that of Special Rapporteur of Third Order. 
512 Government Gazette, vol. C, no 459, 16.5.2008. 
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positions in the sense that the announcement gave the possibility to be equally filled 
by candidates fulfilling the selection criteria for the position of Special Rapporteur of 
Third Order. This might be an indication that no other appropriate candidates were 
found to fill the positions. Nevertheless, we found appointment decisions published in 
the government gazette513 only for the twelve of the fifteen selected candidates, 
whereas there are no appointment decisions for the other three. The lack of 
appointment decisions implies that they denied their appointment, whereas one 
appointment decision was revoked514. We located their career paths after the denial 
and revocation of the appointments. More specifically, SP9 was appointed as lawyer 
with a salary mandate at the legal service of the Greek Agricultural Insurance 
Organisation. SP13 and SP14 were appointed as lawyers with a salary mandate at the 
legal service of the Technical Chamber of Greece. SP15 succeeded in the entrance 
examination for Judicial Officials according to the table of final results published in 
the government gazette in March 2008. In 2010 she was appointed administrative 
judge at the Court of First Instance of Lamia. Finally, there was also one resignation. 
More specifically, SP7 resigned from the authority after his appointment as Lecturer 
at the Department of Law of the University of Thessaloniki in December 2010515. 
 
The denial of the appointment by the three lawyers, who were afterwards appointed as 
lawyers with a salary mandate to other public law legal entities, could have a logical 
explanation. They were probably discouraged from assuming duties at the authority 
since the lawyers who are appointed as members of the scientific staff of the 
constitutional independent authorities are suspended from the exercise of the 
profession of lawyer pursuant to article 4 par. 7 of the executive law of the 
Constitution 3051/2002. 
 
Appendix 2, Table 3 contains detailed information on the professional background of 
the majority of the scientific personnel516 before their appointment to the authority. 
There is also information on the parallel professional activity of some of them. Thus, 
six members of the scientific personnel were lawyers (SP1, SP3, SP9, SP13, SP14, 
and SP15). Five members of the scientific personnel were civil servants. More 
specifically, they had served in the following public services: (SP2) Secretariat of the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel; (SP5) Ministry of National 
Education and Religious Affairs; (SP6) Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (SP8) Ministry of 
the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, and graduate of the National 
School of Public Administration; and (SP11) Ministry of Culture. One member of the 
scientific personnel (SP7) had previously worked as a researcher, whereas after his 
resignation from the authority, he followed an academic career. Two members of the 
scientific staff (SP11 and SP12) were adjunct professors, whereas SP4 had served as 
Deputy Consumer Advocate (2005-2008). 
 
The member of the scientific personnel SP11, a specialist in informatics systems, 
presents an intense academic activity as adjunct professor in various higher education 
                                                 
513 Appointment decisions for the following members of the specialised scientific personnel: SP1, SP2, 
SP3, SP4, SP5, SP6, SP7, SP8, SP9, SP10, SP11, and SP12 published in the Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 885, 22.9.2008. 
514 Revocation of the appointment of SP9 published in the Government Gazette, vol. C, no 1043, 
11.11.2008. 
515 Government Gazette, vol. C, no 1293, 31.12.2010. 
516 Those who denied their appointment are included. 
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institutions even while serving in the authority, as well as institutional and political 
involvement in public life. Table 8 shows the intensity of his academic activity as 
adjunct professor by chronological order based on his Curriculum Vitae uploaded on 
the Official Website of the Higher Technological Educational Institute of Chalkida, 
and the Official Website of the Greek Open University. During the academic year 
2008-2009 he simultaneously served as adjunct professor in five higher education 
institutions while serving in the authority. As for his institutional involvement, he was 
appointed special collaborator, and member of project management groups at the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity. He was 
politically involved since he was appointed Special Advisor at the Ministry of Health 
and Social Solidarity in 2008. SP11 represents a case of functional accumulation. 
 
 
Table 8 Academic activity of the member SP11 of the specialized scientific personnel 
Academic Year  Department/Higher Education Institution 
2004-2009 Department of Business Administration,  
Higher Technological Educational Institute of Chalkida 
2005-2006 Department of Automation,  
Higher Technological Educational Institute of Chalkida 
2005-2007 Adjunct professor at the School of Pedagogical and Technological 
Education 
2006-2009 Department of Informatics, Undergraduate Programme,  
University of Piraeus 
2008-2009 Department of Informatics, Postgraduate Programme,  
University of Piraeus 
2007-2010 Department of Logistics,  
Higher Technological Educational Institute of Chalkida 
2007-2009 The Hellenic Naval Academy 
2009-2010 School of Social Sciences, Greek Open University 
 
 
SP4 had political and institutional involvement. Interestingly enough, he had been 
appointed to governmental positions by both adversary political parties of New 
Democracy and PASOK. He was appointed as special scientist at the political bureau 
of the undersecretary of Health and Welfare (2001-2003), that is under the PASOK 
government, and special advisor at the political bureau of the Minister of 
Development (2004-2005). He was then appointed Deputy Consumer Advocate with a 
five-year mandate by the Minister of Development. However, he only served for the 
period 2005-2008. He submitted his resignation from the position after his 
appointment as member of the specialized scientific personnel of the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel. According to his Curriculum Vitae contained 
in the Annual Report of the Consumer Advocate, he was institutionally involved as 
President and member of legislative drafting committees of various ministries. 
Finally, he had civil society involvement since he has been General Secretary of 
Caritas Hellas. 
 
SP12 has also served as adjunct professor at the University of Peloponnese (spring 
semester 2008), that is, before her appointment to the authority. She has also worked 
as adjunct professor at the Greek Open University during the academic year 2010-
2011, namely, while she was serving in the authority. Before being hired to the 
authority, she had institutional involvement as member of the working group on the 
elaboration of an instruction manual for filling in the reports on Regulation Impact 
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Assessment. Finally, she was appointed as member of the management board of the 
Industrial Property Organisation with a three-year mandate in 2004 under the New 
Democracy government. 
 
SP2 and SP4, and SP7 gave courses517 at the National Centre for Public 
Administration while serving in the authority, whereas SP4 has been member of the 
teaching staff under contract at the National School for Public Administration and 
Local Government.  
 
As for their level of education, they all have a postgraduate degree since it was a 
prerequisite for their selection. As for PhD degrees, SP2, SP7, SP11, and SP12 are 
PhD holders. SP4 was a PhD candidate, whereas we found no information for the 
other seven members of the specialized scientific personnel. Finally, the gender 
distribution of the scientific personnel is as follows: 67% are women, and 33% are 
men518. 
 
b. The Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
A. The legal framework on the recruitment policies 
 
I. The administrative personnel  
 
The legal framework regarding the recruitment of the administrative personnel of the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel served as a model for the recruitment 
of the administrative personnel of the Secretariat of the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority.  Thus, on first implementation of the founding law 2472/1997519, the 
positions of the heads of service units would be filled following a public 
announcement either through the transfer of civil servants possessing grade A, or its 
equivalent, coming from public services or public law legal entities, or through direct 
appointment. Direct hiring would take place only for the positions which would not be 
filled by transfer. The authority would select those transferred or directly appointed. 
The appointment of those selected by the authority would be effected by decision of 
the Minister of Justice, and the transfer by joint decision of the Minister of Justice, 
and the minister supervising the releasing agency without the opinion of the service 
council of the releasing agency. On first implementation of the law, the remaining 
positions of the administrative personnel of the Secretariat would be filled with the 
same procedure. Therefore, the recruitment of the administrative personnel fell under 
the absolute jurisdiction of the authority, and thus was excluded from the general 
recruitment system of the law 2190/1994.   
 
The MP of the Communist Party of Greece, Stratis Korakas, during discussions in 
Parliament on the draft law “Protection of the individual against the processing of 
personal data520”, expressed his reservations over the transfer procedure. He claimed 
that it was not transparent since there were no selection criteria. Nevertheless, article 2 
                                                 
517 The working relationship was under contract. 
518 See Appendix 8, table 12. 
519 Article 20, par. 6 of the law 2472/1997. 
520 Minutes of Parliament, 9th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, 
Session 100 discussion and debate in particulars, March 19, 1997, p. 4960, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/19_03_97.pdf, 
date of access: 10.07.2010 
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of the draft law provided that all the issues regarding the organization of the 
Secretariat, and its personnel would be regulated by a Presidential Decree issued on 
the proposal of the Ministers of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation, Finance, and Justice upon recommendation of the authority. Indeed, 
the formal qualifications of the candidates to be appointed or transferred, that is, the 
selection criteria, were explicitly set forth in the Presidential Decree 207/1998521. 
However, it did not provide for a grading system in relation to these criteria. The said 
Presidential Decree defined the positions of the organisational chart of the 
administrative personnel522 as well as the formal qualifications, and other additional 
selection criteria.  Thus, all the positions523, apart from the relevant diplomas as 
prescribed in the qualifications indexes, additionally required the excellent knowledge 
of one foreign language, and the use of computers524.  
 
After the Constitutional revision of 2001, the selection of the administrative and 
scientific personnel of the authority fell under the ambit of par. 1 of article 4 of the 
executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. The selection criteria remained under 
the jurisdiction of the authority, as prescribed in its organisational chart, whereas a 
member of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel and a judge of the 
Supreme Courts participated in the selection committee. Finally, pursuant to par. 1d, 
article 1 of the law 3812/2009, the authority was included in the group of public 
sector bodies that fell under the ambit of the general recruitment system applied in the 
public sector. 
 
II. The Auditors:  the scientific personnel of the authority 
 
Apart from the administrative personnel of the authority, the scientific personnel, that 
is, the Auditors, are regular civil servants. It seems that the common legislator 
preferred the service status of permanent tenure for the scientific personnel of the 
authority in relation to that of private law contract of indefinite time provided for in 
article 3, par. 3 of the Constitution. Thus, the common legislator bypassed the 
constraints of the said article of the Constitution regarding the working status of the 
                                                 
521 Government Gazette, vol. B, no 164, 15.07.1998. 
522 The administrative personnel were distributed by categories and branches as follows: U.E. 
Communication (5 positions), U.E. Administration-Finance (2 positions), U.E. Informatics (1 position), 
T.E. Informatics (1 position), S.E. Administration-Accounting (4 positions), C.E. Caretakers (2 
positions), and C.E. Cleansing Personnel (2 positions). The category and branch U.E. Communication 
was new, and it was created for the special needs of the authority. It was not provided for in the 
qualifications indexes of the Presidential Decrees 194/1988, 172/1992, and 368/1992 which defined the 
civil servants’ formal qualifications by category and branch. The positions of U.E. Communication 
may be filled by candidates who have a university degree in communication, journalism and mass 
media, translation, social and literature sciences. Excellent knowledge of a foreign language and the 
use of computer were additional compulsory qualifications. The knowledge of other foreign languages 
was also assessed, whereas the public announcement might provide for relevant experience as an 
additional qualification.The number of the positions was increased by the Ministerial Decisions of the 
Ministers of Finance no 3984 in 2004 (G.G. vol. B, no 1803, 6.12.2004), and no 2/63286/0021 in 2010 
(G.G. vol. B, no 1666, 20.10.2010). Six new positions were created in the organisational chart in 2004, 
and were distributed as follows: U.E. Communication (1), U.E Administration-Finance (1), T.E. 
Informatics (1), S.E. Administration-Accounting (1), S.E. Telephone Operators (1), and S.E. Driver (1).  
Six new positions were provided for in the ministerial decision of 2010, whereas they are 
chronologically distributed as follows: 5 positions from January 1, 2011: U.E. Administration-Finance 
(2), T.E. Administration-Finance (3), and 1 position from January, 2013: T.E. Administration-Finance. 
523 The positions C.E. Caretakers and C.E. Cleansing Personnel were exempted. 
524 The positions U.E. Informatics and T.E. Informatics were exempted. 
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scientific personnel by creating a new branch in the category of university education, 
namely U.E. Auditors. Interestingly enough, nowhere in the legislative texts on the 
authority do we find the term “specialised scientific personnel”. Only in the first 
annual report of the authority in 1999525 do we have evidence that the Auditors 
constitute the specialized scientific personnel in the protection of personal data.  
 
The Auditors are selected by the authority either through selection or examination 
following a public announcement526.  The MP of the Communist Party of Greece, 
Stratis Korakas, during discussions in Parliament on the draft law “Protection of the 
individual against the processing of personal data527”, expressed his reservations in 
relation to the competence of the authority to select the auditors. He based his 
argumentation on the fact that the Auditors audited the authority itself in relation to 
the processing of personal data, and thus the audited agency appointed its own 
auditors. Lawyers, who are appointed as Auditors, are suspended from the exercise of 
the profession of lawyer during their mandate528. The heads of the Directorate of the 
Secretariat and the Department of Auditors are selected from the branch of 
Auditors529. The service council of the authority may decide on the reclassification of 
employees from other branches to vacant positions of the organisational chart of the 
branch of Auditors, in case they possess the qualifications of the branch530. 
 
The Presidential Decree 207/1998531 defined the positions of the organisational chart 
of the scientific personnel, as well as the formal qualifications and other additional 
selection criteria. The positions of the organisational chart for the category and branch 
U.E. Auditors were 13532, whereas they entered the service with grade B. The 
positions of U.E. Auditors may be filled by candidates who have a university degree 
of science and technology direction or theoretical direction, and a postgraduate or a 
PhD degree in Informatics, Computers Science, Legal Informatics, or other legal 
branches relevant to the subject of the authority, or to a specialised branch of the 
above. Excellent knowledge of a foreign language and the use of computers are 
considered as compulsory selection criteria. The knowledge of other foreign 
languages as well as the professional or research experience in the relevant fields 
would be evaluated. Finally, the public announcement may comprise, as additional 
qualifications, proved training in data protection, security and audit of informational 
                                                 
525 The Annual Report for the year 1999, available at: 
http://www.dpa.gr/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/APDPX/ANNUALREPORTS/AR1999/DPA_ANNUAL_RE
PORT_1999.PDF, date of access: 4.9.2011. 
526 Article 20, par. 3 of the law 2472/1997. 
527 Minutes of Parliament, 9th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, 
Session 100 discussion and debate in particulars, March 19, 1997, p. 4960, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/19_03_97.pdf, 
date of access: 10.07.2010 
528 Article 16, par. 10 of the law 2703/1999. 
529 Par. 1, article 6 of the Presidential Decree 207/1998. 
530 Article 9 of the Presidential Decree 207/1998. 
531 Article 5 of the Presidential Decree 207/1988. 
532 The number of the positions of the Auditors was increased by the Ministerial Decisions of the 
Ministers of Finance no 3984 in 2004 (G.G. vol. B, no 1803, 6.12.2004), and no 2/63286/0021 in 2010 
(G.G. vol. B, no 1666, 20.10.2010). Fourteen new positions were created in 2004.  Nineteen new 
positions were provided for in the ministerial decision of 2010, whereas they are chronologically 
distributed as follows: 10 positions from January 1, 2011, 5 positions from January 1, 2012, and 4 
positions from January, 2013.  
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systems. After the Constitutional revision of 2001, the selection of the administrative 
personnel of the authority fell under the ambit of the executive law 3051/2002 of the 
Constitution533. 
 
B. Analysis of the empirical data 
 
I. The administrative personnel  
 
Contrary to the long-lasting practice of transfers of the administrative personnel 
adopted by the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, transfers represent 
only 14% (4 of 28) of the recruitment policy followed by the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority, whereas the overwhelming majority of the personnel, that is, 86% (24 of 
28) are appointed through direct hirings. As for the transfers, the Heads of two 
departments, namely the Department of Communication and the Department of 
Administrative and Financial Affairs, were transferred from the Prosecution Office of 
the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law (AP1), that is a judicial 
employee, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare respectively (AP2). They both 
possessed grade A. One employee (AP4) (Grade B, UE Administration-Finance) was 
transferred from the General Army Staff (Ministry of National Defence), whereas one 
position of the Category & Branch C.E. Curator was filled by a transfer from the 
Prefectural General Hospital of Melissia “A. Fleming” (AP3). No legality issues on 
the transfers are raised with the exception of one controversial case. The legality of 
transferring a judicial employee is dubious, and has been extensively discussed in the 
unit regarding the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. 
 
All the other positions were filled by direct hiring following a public announcement 
(24 employees). The authority published a public announcement for the recruitment of 
two C.E. Curators in the Government Gazette for the first time in 2007. As for the 
candidates’ qualifications, certain social criteria534 were combined with the possession 
of a compulsory education diploma and, at least the good knowledge of a foreign 
language, preferably English. The public announcement did not provide for i) a 
grading system for the assessment of these criteria, and b) a mechanism for the 
submission of an appeal against the results. A second open procedure to fill one 
position of the category and branch S.E. Administration-Accounting took place in 
2008 and was also published in the Government Gazette. A grading system for each 
one of the selection criteria and the right to appeal were provided for in the public 
announcement of 2008. All the previous public announcements had been published in 
daily newspapers. Table 9 shows the level of education of the administrative 
personnel. The graduates of secondary education represent almost a third of the 
administrative personnel535. In our opinion, the policy of filling a high percentage of 
the positions of specialized agencies by secondary education graduates seems 
unjustifiable. Three employees of the administrative personnel (AP8, AP18, AP22) 
are PhD holders, whereas we do not have any information on whether there are any 
employees with postgraduate degrees.  
 
 
                                                 
533 Article 4, par. 1 of article 4 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. 
534 As social criteria are considered members of large families (candidates may be parents having more 
than three children, as well as children coming from these large families) and orphans.  
535 See Appendix 9, table 1 on the specialization of the administrative personnel. 
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Table 9 The level of education of the administrative personnel* 
               
 University 
Education 
Technological 
Education 
Secondary 
Education 
Compulsory 
Education 
% of the 
administrarive 
personnel by level 
of education 
47% (13 of 28) 7% (2 of 28) 32% (9 of 28) 14% (4 of 28) 
* Those resigned are included.  
Source: The Government Gazette 
 
As for the in-service mobility of the administrative personnel, three members of the 
administrative personnel were reclassified: two employees of the category and branch 
C.E. Curators (AP3 and AP15) were reclassified to the category and branch of S.E. 
Telephone Operator and S.E. Driver respectively536. The vacant positions of C.E. 
Curators were filled by new appointees (AP25, AP26). The employee AP9 became 
member of the specialised scientific personnel. 
 
As for secondments to other agencies, 1 employee (AP4) was seconded to the Greek 
Ombudsman for the period 2002-2003 according to the annual reports of the Greek 
Ombudsman for the years 2002 and 2003. One employee (AP7), immediately after 
her appointment, was seconded to the political bureau of the Minister of Culture 
(2000-2001), which might be an indication of party affiliation. The secondment was 
revoked in 2001, since she submitted her resignation from the authority.  
 
Resignations and new appointments in the public sector are not rare. The employee 
AP22, a PhD holder, appointed in 2006, resigned from the authority after her election 
as Lecturer –a tenured position- at the Department of Foreign Languages, Translation 
and Interpretation of the Ionian University in 2010. Another employee of the category 
and branch S.E. Administration-Accounting (AP27) resigned shortly after being hired 
since she was appointed to the General Hospital “Papageorgiou” of Thessaloniki. One 
employee of the category and branch S.E. Administration-Accounting (AP21) also 
resigned two years after her selection and appointment to the authority. She was 
appointed to the General Hospital “Attikon”. 
 
Since 2009 two employees of secondary education (AP29, AP30) have been working 
on secondment from the Ministry of Justice, and the University of the Aegean. 
Finally, the gender distribution of the administrative personnel is as follows: 7% are 
men, and 76% are women. 
 
II. The Auditors: the scientific personnel of the authority 
 
The first public announcement for the selection of the specialized scientific personnel 
to the authority was published in the government gazette in 2007537, whereas the 
second one was published in 2008538. The selection criteria were defined pursuant to 
article 5 of the Presidential Decree 207/1998, and article 4 of the executive law of the 
                                                 
536 See Appendix 9, table 2. 
537 Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel (ASEP), no 110, 
8.5.2007. 
538 Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel (ASEP), no 511, 
6.10.2008. 
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Constitution 3051/2002. The public announcement in 2007 neither contained a 
grading system for the rating of each one of the selection criteria nor provided for the 
submission of an appeal. On the contrary, a grading system and the right to appeal 
were provided for in the public announcement of 2008. All the previous public 
announcements had been published in daily newspapers.  
 
We have identified 42 Auditors -26 legal auditors and 16 informatics auditors- 
starting from the beginning of the operation of the authority in 1999 until December 
31, 2010. However, the total number of the positions of the organisational chart to be 
filled was 27 positions. What happened with the remaining fifteen auditors? 
Throughout this period, five selected candidates denied their appointment, whereas 
ten Auditors resigned from the authority. This negative situation for the effective 
operation of the authority had already been stressed in the Annual Reports for the 
years 2005, 2006, and 2007. More specifically, the Annual Report for the year 2007539 
stated that the authority found difficulties in attracting and taking advantage of a high-
quality specialised personnel because of the unfavourable working conditions, that is, 
i) lower remuneration compared to that of other independent authorities and agencies 
of the public sector for positions of equivalent qualifications, ii) fewer vacant 
positions in the organisational chart from those required for the proper operation of 
the authority, and iii) no appropriate promotions system for the auditors.   
 
Resignations and denial of appointments of the selected candidates are not rare540. We 
have identified their career paths.  SP9, SP17, SP24, SP29 preferred to continue their 
careers in other agencies of the public sector. SP8, SP22 worked as free-lance 
lawyers, whereas SP31 became a notary. SP14, SP25 and SP16 followed an academic 
career. SP2 and SP18 continued their careers abroad: SP2 became Officer of the Data 
Protection Unit of EUROPOL, whereas SP18 is working in a German Law Firm 
developing comprehensive legal, tax, finance, and management solutions. SP33 
continued her studies abroad541, whereas SP21 was parliamentary candidate with the 
party of New Democracy in the national elections of 2007. He also worked as Adjunct 
Professor, and was appointed in various committees under the New Democracy 
Government. We did not manage to gather information on SP28. As for the auditors’ 
level of education, they all possess postgraduate degrees, whereas a significant 
number of auditors have PhD degrees: 44% (12 of 27) of the auditors serving in the 
authority by 31.12.2010, and 53% (8 of 15) of those who resigned or denied their 
appointment542. 
 
A number of auditors were also seconded to other Hellenic or European Agencies. 
The Annual Report for the year 2007 links the auditors’ temporary mobility towards 
other agencies to their low remuneration in the authority. These secondments were 
compulsory since the opinion of the service council of the authority was not required. 
We have identified the following secondments to other Hellenic or European 
Agencies: SP18 and SP36 served as seconded trainees to the European Data 
                                                 
539 Annual Report for the year 2007, available at: 
http://www.dpa.gr/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/APDPX/ANNUALREPORTS/AR2007/DPA_ANNUAL_RE
PORT_2007.PDF, date of access: 4.9.2011. 
540 See Appendix 9, tables 3 and 4 on the career paths they followed. 
541 She was a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Studies and Research in Public Economic Law at 
Sorbonne-Paris. 
542 See Appendix 9, tables 5 and 6.  
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Protection Supervisor for the periods: Oct. 2005-Feb. 2006 and Oct. 2006-Feb. 2007, 
respectively; SP4 was seconded as National Expert to the European Commission 
(2007-2010); SP7 was seconded as National Expert on data protection and informatics 
to the Council of Europe and to the Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation, and 
Electronic Governance. 
 
As for their involvement in public life, the auditors SP11, SP13, SP20, SP32, SP39 
have participated as members or alternate members of special legislative drafting 
committees on issues related to data privacy. SP1, the Director of the Secretariat, have 
been working as adjunct professor at the Department of Informatics of the Greek 
Open University since 2000. The auditors SP1 and SP5 gave courses at the National 
Centre of Public Administration in 2011. SP21 has also worked as adjunct professor 
at the University of Thrace while he was serving in the authority. He was also 
member of the teaching staff under contract at the Greek Police Academy. As for his 
institutional involvement he was appointed to the following committees: i) member of 
the management board - representing the Ministry of National Education and 
Religious Affairs- of the non-profit Public Entity under Private Law, Centre for the 
Re-integration of ex-prisoners with a three-year mandate (2009), ii) member of the 
Management Board of the Institute for Defense Analyses (2006), and iii) member of 
the Scientific Council of the Institute for Defence Analyses (2008). SP42 has worked 
as adjunct professor at the Department of Informatics at the Technological 
Educational Institute of Athens, while serving in the authority (academic year 2010-
2011). He has also worked as adjunct professor at the Department of Informatics and 
Computer Technology at the Technological Educational Institute of Lamia (2005-
2007, 2008-2009) and at the Department of Informatics at the Technological 
Educational Institute of Athens (2008-2009),  before his appointment to the authority. 
As for their involvement in civil society, SP4 has been Vice-President of the 
Executive Board of the European Association for the Defence of Human Rights 
(AEDH) for the period 2008-2010, and is a member of the Hellenic League for 
Human Rights.    
 
We have identified the following cases of party affiliation and trade unionism: The 
auditor SP21 was Parliamentary Candidate in the National Elections of 2004 and 2007 
with the party of New Democracy, that is, before his appointment and after his 
resignation from the authority. He withdrew his candidacy in the National Elections of 
2010; the auditor SP16, two years after her resignation, was a political appointee to 
the General Secretariat of the Government as Head of the Office for International and 
European Union Issues by decision of the Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou 
(PASOK); the auditor SP23, before her appointment to the authority, had participated 
in the elections of the Thessaloniki Bar Association with the party "Avant Garde 
Lawyers" in 2004. 
 
Finally, the gender distribution of the scientific personnel is as follows: 43% are men, 
and 57% are women. 
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c. The Greek Ombudsman 
 
A. The legal framework on the recruitment policies  
 
I. The administrative personnel  
 
The common legislator adopted two recruitment policies in relation to the 
administrative personnel of the Secretariat of the Greek Ombudsman. The recruitment 
policy from the beginning of the operation of the authority in 1998 until 2007 was 
exclusively based on transfers, and secondments which could be revoked any time. 
From 2007 onwards, a combination of recruitment policies coexists, namely, transfers 
and secondments, and direct hirings.  
 
The founding law of the authority, that is, the law 2477/1997, set the recruitment 
framework that excluded direct hiring543. On first implementation of the law, the 
positions of the Secretariat could be filled through transfers or secondments of 
employees from public services544 following a public announcement. The seconded 
employees should have the qualifications for the position to which they were 
seconded. The Presidential Decree 273/1999 on the Regulations of the Greek 
Ombudsman specified that the public announcement should be published in at least 
one daily newspaper stating the following: i) the positions to be filled through transfer 
or secondment, ii) the required formal and substantial qualifications, iii) the deadline 
within which the candidates should submit their applications, and iv) the supporting 
documents or any documents that have to be submitted with the application.  
 
The transfer or secondment is decided by joint decision of the Minister of Interior, 
Public Administration and Decentralisation and the competent Minister in each case, 
without the opinion of the service council or any other council of the releasing 
agency, in derogation of the general and special provisions in force. The secondment 
may be revoked at any time, and in any case the resulting vacancy shall be filled. This 
clause is really innovative since the duration of a secondment, which is time-limited, 
is always defined in such cases. On the other hand, a secondment may be revoked 
when the need for the secondment ceases to exist. However, the clause clearly states 
that the vacancy shall be filled. Therefore, could this revocation “at any time” be 
linked to the improper way a seconded employee exercises his duties? And if so, the 
criteria for the improper exercise of duties remain unknown. 
 
The Secretariat is supervised by a Director. He/she is a permanent civil servant, a 
university graduate qualified for promotion to the rank of Director pursuant to the 
relevant provisions of the Civil Servants’ Code. The Director was selected by the 
Ombudsman for a three-year term from the candidates who applied following a public 
announcement published in two daily newspapers. Those interested should submit an 
application for selection within a time limit specifically defined for this purpose in the 
public announcement. The time limit could not be shorter than ten (10) days. The 
public announcement defined the field or fields and possibly the specific expertise 
required from the candidates, the formal and substantial qualifications the candidates 
should possess, as well as certificates that should be attached to the application. The 
                                                 
543 Article 5, par. 4 of the law 2477/1997. 
544 Par. 5, article 6 of the law 2623/1998 provided that the seconded employees may come from the 
public sector in general. 
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Director was seconded for a term of three years by decision of the Minister of the 
Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation without the opinion of the service 
council of the releasing agency in derogation of the provisions in force. As for the 
positions of the heads of the units of the Secretariat, they could also be filled by 
seconded employees. The secondment ended ipso jure with its revocation. However, 
the practice of the secondment of the Director was abandoned since the law 
3094/2003 provided that the Director would be transferred following a public 
announcement545.  
 
The seconded employees enjoy a privileged remuneration status546. Furthermore, the 
period of their secondment to the authority is considered as a period of service in a 
position of a head of department547. Thus, the measure enables them to get easier 
promoted to their agency of provenance since having served in a position of head of 
department is one of the criteria for promotion in the public service. The transitional 
clause of the executive law 3051/2002 permitting the conversion of secondments to 
transfers for those employees who were seconded to the constitutional independent 
authorities by the time of the regulation was not only problematic in terms of the 
silent conversion of the transferred employees’ working status previously analysed in 
the unit for the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. It also contained a 
puzzling point relating to the contracting parties for the issue of the administrative act 
of the transfer decision. The administrative act of the transfer had a unilateral 
                                                 
545 Par. 7 of article 5 of the law 3094/2003 reads as follows: “The Secretariat of the authority shall be 
headed by a public servant of the category of University Education with the grade of Director of article 
79, par. 2 of the Civil Servants Code (Law 2683/1999). The position of Director, established by the 
present article, shall be filled by decision of a special council constituted by the Ombudsman as 
President and the Deputy Ombudsmen as members, following a candidacy application submitted within 
an exclusive deadline defined in the public announcement to the interested parties. The application is 
accompanied by a CV whose content is consistent with the information contained in the employee’s 
personal service record. Permanent civil servants of the category of University Education coming from 
public services, public law legal entities, local government agencies, and independent authorities who 
have the qualifications for promotion to the grade of director pursuant to par. 2 of article 82 of the 
Civil Servants Code (Law 2683/1999) have the right to submit candidacy applications. The Special 
Council invites the candidates for an interview in order to formulate an opinion about their abilities 
and personality in relation to the execution of their duties. The provisions of par. 1 of this article 
regarding the taking into account and the concept of experience shall apply accordingly for the 
selection of the director. The employee who shall be selected as set forth above for the position of 
director shall be transferred in derogation of any general or specific provision by decision of the 
competent Minister without the opinion of the service council and is promoted by means of the same 
decision to the grade of director. On first implementation of the present clause, the selection of the 
employee who shall fill the post of director shall take place within two (2) months from the coming into 
force of this law. The secondment of the director in accordance with par. 3 of article 5 of the law 
2477/1997 shall end as soon as the above transfer has been completed and the period of this 
secondment is considered, for all intents and purposes, as a period of service in a position of the grade 
of director of article 79 of the Civil Servants Code (Law 2683/1999)”. As for the concept of experience 
previously mentioned, par. 1 of the said article of the law defines it as follows: “Experience is a feature 
particularly appreciated in the evaluation of the candidates. Experience is considered the exercise of 
work related to the object of the vacant post to be filled or the employment in an independent authority 
with a mission similar to that of the Ombudsman”.  
546 Pursuant to article 8, par. 6 of the law 2623/1998, those seconded to the authority receive their 
salary and any additional regular payments, as well as all the regular allowances of their main position 
regularly paid, which continue to be paid by the service from which they are seconded. Furthermore, 
they receive from the authority a special allowance which is defined, in derogation of the provisions in 
force, by joint decision of the Ministers of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation and 
Finance. 
547 Article 8, par. 1 of the law 2880/2001. 
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character, that is, it is a decision signed by the competent ministers or the organs of 
administration of the releasing legal entities without the joint action of the Minister of 
the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation representing the authority. 
According to the adopted administrative practice, the transfer decisions constitute a 
bilateral administrative act signed by the Minister supervising the releasing agency, 
and the Minister supervising the receiving agency. Moreover, the arrangement 
permitting the transfer decisions to be signed by the heads of administration of public 
law legal entities instead of the Ministers supervising these agencies seems equally 
problematic. Finally, the clause is in contradiction with article 5, par. 4 of the law 
founding law 2477/1997 regarding the type of the administrative act. 
 
Article 14, par. 2 of the law 3345/2005 also permitted the conversion of secondments 
to transfers for the second time after the legislative regulation of the law 3051/2002. 
The seconded employees who were serving in the authority by 31.1.2005 could be 
transferred, upon application, to vacant positions of the organisational chart or 
personal positions of a branch equivalent to the branch or specialty where the 
transferred employee was serving.  
 
The Presidential Decree 273/1999 on the Regulations of the Greek Ombudsman 
established 30 positions for the permanent administrative personnel548. The ministerial 
decision no 2/37007 of 30.9.2008 increased their number, that is they became 47549. 
The qualifications required for the appointment in the positions are those defined by 
the Presidential Decree 194/1988, as amended by the Presidential Decree 50/2001, 
and in addition very good knowledge of computers. After the Constitutional revision 
of 2001, the selection of the administrative personnel of the authority fell under the 
ambit of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution550. 
 
Apart from the positions of the administrative personnel, the law 2623/1998551 
established seven positions for personnel on private law contract552. Three positions 
                                                 
548 The 30 positions of the organisational chart were distributed as follows: 6 positions U.E. 
Administration-Finance, 3 positions U.E. Communication, 3 positions U.E. Informatics, 3 positions 
T.E. Administration-Accounting, 2 positions T.E. Informatics, 9 positions S.E. Administration-Finance, 
2 positions S.E. Drivers, 2 positions C.E. Auxiliary Personnel. The qualifications required for 
appointment in the positions U.E. Communications is a university degree in the field of 
communication, journalism and mass media. Excellent knowledge of at least one foreign language 
(english-french-german), defined every time in the announcement for the submission of applications, as 
well as very good knowledge of computers. On first application of the law, the positions U.E. 
Communication may be filled by seconded employees with a university degree in the field of 
Administration-Finance, or other fields of university level, possessing the corresponding qualifications 
and excellent knowledge of English, French, or German. The foreign language is specified in the public 
announcement for applications. 
549 The 47 positions were distributed as follows: 11 positions U.E. Administration-Finance, 1 position 
U.E. Economist-Statistician, 3 positions U.E. Informatics, 1 position U.E. Interpreters, 1 position U.E. 
Librarians-Archivists, 1 position U.E. Engineers, 6 positions T.E. Administration-Accounting, 3 
positions T.E. Informatics, 8 positions S.E. Administrative Secretaries, 1 position S.E. Informatics, 2 
positions S.E. Computer Operators, 3 positions S.E. Telephone Operators, 1 position S.E. Drivers, 2 
positions C.E. Auxiliary Personnel. The qualifications required for appointment in the position U.E. 
Economist-Statistician is a university degree in the field of Statistics or Statistics and Actuarial Science 
or Statistics and Insurance Science, excellent knowledge of English, French, or German, and 
knowledge of computers. 
550 Article 4, par. 1 of article 4 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. 
551 Article 8, par. 1 of the law 2623/1998. 
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are distributed to the bureau of the Ombudsman, and one position to the Bureau of 
each Deputy Ombudsman. The Ombudsman and each Deputy Ombudsman proceed to 
the recruitment of the personnel on a case by case basis through a relevant act without 
any procedure. Their remuneration is defined by joint decision of the Ministers of the 
Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, and Finance in derogation of the 
provisions in force. The hired personnel resign ipso jure simultaneously with the 
retirement, for whatever reason, of the organ that hired them, with no other procedure. 
Serving in these positions does not create any right for compensation or other claim or 
privilege. In other words, the working status of the personnel is equivalent to that of 
the revocable employees of article 103, par. 5 of the Constitution. These positions 
may also be filled by secondment of employees from the public sector. The 
secondment takes place, upon request of the Ombudsman, by joint decision of the 
competent Minister and the Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation, in derogation of the provisions in force.  
 
The ministerial decision no 2/37007 of 2008, amending the regulations of the 
Ombudsman, established six additional positions of permanent personnel for the 
administrative support of the Secretariat of each Deputy Ombudsman. Finally, the law 
3812/2009 abolished the autonomous selection procedure of the administrative 
personnel that fell under the ambit of the general recruitment system. 
 
II. The scientific personnel 
 
The common legislator introduced three innovative measures in relation to the 
scientific personnel of the authority. These arrangements were never implemented to 
the other constitutional independent authorities under research. First, apart from direct 
hiring, the personnel from both categories could also be seconded from the public 
sector. Second, a subcategory of the scientific personnel was created, the auxiliary 
scientific personnel. Third, they were hired on private law contracts for a term of five 
years, which could be renewed. Interestingly enough, the second and third 
arrangements were finally abolished.  
 
The law 2477/1997553 established 30 positions for the special scientific personnel, as 
defined in the law 1943/1991554, on a private law contract for a term of five years, 
which could be renewed. The positions would be filled following a public 
announcement for the submission of applications. The pre-selection among the 
candidates is effected by the Ombudsman, whereas the selection is assigned to a five-
member committee, whose composition is determined by the Ombudsman. The 
committee is constituted by the Ombudsman, two Deputy Ombudsmen, a university 
professor, and one judge of the Supreme Courts. The committee assesses the formal 
and substantial qualifications of the candidates and their personality by means of a 
public interview. Lawyers may be hired for the above positions under the same 
procedure in derogation of the provisions in force. The appointment of a lawyer 
entails the suspension of his professional functions. The special scientific personnel 
                                                                                                                                            
552 A new position was established by article 7 par. 3 of the law 3094/2003 for the Secretariat of the 
Deputy Ombudsman for the Children’s Rights. Finally, one more position was established by article 
13, par. 7 of the law 3488/2006 for the Secretariat of the Deputy Ombudsman for Gender Equality. 
553 Article 5, par. 1. 
554 Article 25, par. 2 of the law 1943/1991 defined the qualifications for the appointment to positions of 
special scientific personnel. 
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are appointed by decision of the Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation.  
 
To the Ombudsman could be seconded up to forty civil servants, either permanent or 
on private law contract of indefinite time, coming from public services, public law 
legal entities, banks controlled by the State, or other public sector bodies, who 
fulfilled the requirements of par. 2 of article 25 of the law 1943/1991555 or civil 
servants who were university graduates with at least eight years in service. Their 
selection followed the procedure provided for the directly hired special scientific 
personnel. The secondment was effected by joint decision of the Minister of the 
Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation and the competent Minister in 
each case, without the opinion of the service council of the releasing agency in 
derogation of the provisions in force. The secondment lasted three years and could be 
renewed once. The secondments were renewed twice through legislative regulation556. 
 
Interestingly enough, par. 4 of article 8 of the law 2623/1998 established thirty 
positions of the new subcategory of the auxiliary scientific personnel on private law 
contracts of indefinite time for a term of five years, which could be renewed. A 
university degree and the very good knowledge of a foreign language were defined as 
the required qualifications for the hiring or the secondment to these positions. The 
required formal qualifications and the foreign language would be specified every time 
by the public announcement issued by the Ombudsman. 
 
All necessary details for the procedure of hiring or seconding the special and auxiliary 
scientific personnel were defined in the regulations of the Greek Ombudsman 
contained in the Presidential Degree 291/1998. The stages of the pre-selection and 
selection procedures were fully described. However, the regulations did not contain a 
grading system for each one of the selection criteria. As for the remuneration of the 
seconded scientific personnel of both categories, they enjoyed the same privileged 
payment status as the seconded administrative personnel of the authority. 
 
The law 3013/2002557 decreased the number of the positions of the seconded scientific 
personnel by 15, whereas the positions of the scientific personnel were increased by 
15, and thus became 45. The law also set age limits for the positions of both 
categories of the scientific personnel, that is, only candidates under fifty years of age 
could be seconded or appointed to the authority. As for the composition of the 
selection committee, one of its members, the judge of the Supreme Courts, was 
replaced by a university professor.  
 
The law 3094/2003558 introduced the working status of private law contracts of 
indefinite time for the special and the auxiliary scientific personnel of the authority. It 
established 75 positions of special scientific personnel and 50 positions of auxiliary 
                                                 
555 The article describes the requirements for the positions of the special scientific personnel in public 
administration.  
556 The first three-year renewal of the secondments (1.1.2002-31.12.2004) was provided for in article 
28 par. 3 of the law 3013/2002, whereas the second renewal was provided for in article 14 par. 1 of the 
law 3345/2005 (1.1.2005-31.12.2007). Par. 3 of article 5 of the law 3094/2003 provides that the 
secondments may be renewed more than once. 
557 Article 25, par. 2. 
558 Article 5 par. 1. 
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scientific personnel. The provisions on maximum age-limit were abolished. However, 
the status of pensioner constitutes an impediment for appointment to these positions. 
Lawyers may also be appointed to the positions of auxiliary scientific personnel with 
suspension of their professional functions. As for the required qualifications, 
experience is particularly appreciated in the assessment of the candidates. Experience 
is considered the exercise of work related to the object of the vacant post to be filled 
or the employment in an independent authority with a mission similar to that of the 
Ombudsman.  
 
A public announcement is issued for the positions of the special and the auxiliary 
scientific personnel, and is published in at least two newspapers of Athens with wide 
circulation, whereas the principles of publicity, transparency, objectivity, and 
meritocracy are respected in any case. The announcement may, each time, specify the 
required basic and postgraduate degrees, and define the foreign language and level of 
proficiency, the required experience, as well as the knowledge of computers. For all 
the selection issues regarding the personnel which are not included in the 
announcement or regulated by the article of the law, the provisions of the Presidential 
Decree 291/1998 “Regulations on the recruitment procedure of the Ombudsman’s 
personnel” apply. Finally, the final and transitional provisions559 provided that for the 
first recruitment to the posts of the special and the auxiliary scientific personnel, 
following the entry into force of the law 3094/2003, the selection committee would be 
composed of the Ombudsman, two university professors and two active or former 
members of independent administrative authorities.  
 
The law 3448/2006560 abolished the subcategory of the auxiliary scientific personnel 
through the promotion of those serving as members of the auxiliary scientific 
personnel to positions of the special scientific personnel. The vacant positions of those 
promoted were converted to positions of special scientific personnel. The law 
regulated the promotion procedure561. 
 
i. Three innovative measures in the recruitment of the scientific personnel: 
searching for some answers for their introduction 
 
Why did the common legislator proceed to the introduction of these three innovative 
measures in relation to the scientific personnel of the Greek Ombudsman? The 
analysis following hereafter attempts to approach and interpret the issue. The 
invention of the subcategory of the auxiliary scientific personnel seems arbitrary, and 
                                                 
559 Article 7, par. 4.  
560 Article 22. 
561 The promotion procedure was as follows: those serving in positions of the auxiliary scientific 
personnel would be judged, upon application, for their promotion to a position of a special scientist, 
without public announcement of the relevant position, in case they fulfilled the qualifications defined in 
the civil servants’ qualifications index in force, and had successfully served for at least three years as 
members of the auxiliary scientific personnel. They would be judged by the selection committee 
provided for in article 1 of the law 3094/2003 after a public interview of the applicant in front of the 
committee. Those promoted would fill positions of the special scientific personnel, and the 
Ombudsman would issue a relevant act. Those who failed to get promoted could submit a new 
application only once one year at least after, and in any case, before the completion of three years since 
the rejection of the first application. The positions of those whose applications were rejected for a 
second time, or those who had not submitted an application for promotion until the date they would 
have completed three years in service starting from the coming into force of the law, were converted to 
special personal positions of  the auxiliary scientific personnel 
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this might explain its abolition in 2006. Indeed, this category of personnel is not 
provided for in the Constitution or the common legislation. Interestingly enough, the 
regulation for its establishment was not contained in the founding law of the 
institution of the Greek Ombudsman in 1997. It was introduced in the law 2623/1998 
as a supplementary provision of the founding law together with the establishment of 
the seven positions for employees on private law contract for the bureaus of the 
Ombudman and Deputy Ombudsmen. And it was finally abolished though an 
innovative promotions procedure by the time when the members of the auxiliary 
scientific personnel had already obtained a three-year experience in the authority. 
 
A reason that might explain the introduction of the measure could be the rigidity of 
the civil servants’ qualifications index in force in relation to the required 
qualifications for the positions of the special scientific personnel. More specifically, 
article 26 of the Presidential Decree 194/1988 regarding the qualifications of the 
special scientific personnel reads as follows: “1. The positions of the Special Scientific 
Personnel on private law contract shall be filled by graduates with a national 
university diploma or an equivalent diploma of a foreign university and special 
scientific expertise in the subject area of the relevant specialty proved through i) a 
PhD degree of a national university or an equivalent degree of a foreign university, or 
ii) a postgraduate degree of a duration of at least one year of a national university or 
an equivalent degree of a foreign university and experience of at least two years after 
the acquisition of the postgraduate degree, or iii) experience of at least four years 
after the acquisition of the main university degree, and at least one publication in a 
scientific review on an issue relevant to the content of the specialty. The excellent 
knowledge of a foreign language is additionally required in case the main degree, or 
the postgraduate degree, or the PhD is not acquired in a foreign university”. 
 
It is obvious that the standards set by the civil servants’ qualifications index for the 
appointment to positions of the special scientific personnel were high, and therefore 
consistent with the concept of expertise. The introduction of the new category of the 
auxiliary scientific personnel was probably the result of the fear that few candidates 
could meet the qualifications of the Presidential Decree 194/1988 in force by the time 
of the first recruitments to the authority. It seems no incidental that the new 
Presidential Decree 50/2001, which replaced the Presidential Decree 194/1988, 
presents greater flexibility in relation to the combination of the required qualifications 
for the category of the special scientific personnel. Despite the fact that the required 
qualifications remain the same, an additional paragraph in the clause relaxes its 
rigidity as follows: “The public announcement for the positions to be filled defines the 
relevant acceptable main degrees or diplomas for each position. It may additionally 
define every time the required foreign language or more foreign languages, the level 
of their proficiency, additional experience in the case that the expertise is proved by a 
PhD, as well as for all or part of the positions the public announcement may 
selectively require only some of the qualifications i, ii, iii of paragraph 1b562”. 
Therefore, according to the last paragraph, the public announcement may not require 
the qualifications disjunctively, as was the case with the Presidential Decree 
194/1988. In other words, it may exclude from the procedure postgraduate or PhD 
holders. However, in the case of the constitutional independent authorities, the said 
provision of the Presidential Decree 50/2001 combined with Article 12 par. 2 of the 
                                                 
562 See points i, ii, iii of the Presidential Decree 194/1988. 
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executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution, a diploma of postgraduate studies is 
considered as a prerequisite for the selection to a position of the scientific personnel. 
Under such circumstances, PhD holders may be excluded from the procedure. Still, 
the category of auxiliary scientific personnel was neither provided for in the executive 
law 3051/2002 of the Constitution. 
 
The measure of hiring scientific personnel on private law contracts of definite time, 
which may be renewed, was innovative within the institution of the constitutional 
independent authorities. Therefore, why did the common legislator proceed to this 
arrangement for the Greek Ombudsman? Before answering the question, we should 
point out that it is not uncommon to hire scientific personnel on private law contract 
of definite time, which may be renewed, in the Greek public administration. The 
article 3, par. 1 of the executive Presidential Decree 410/1988 of article 103 of the 
Constitution563 provides for two categories of scientific personnel in relation to their 
working status: i) scientific personnel on private law contract of indefinite time, and 
ii) scientific personnel on private law contract of definite time which may be renewed. 
The appointees shall fill positions of the organisational chart specifically provided for 
in the relevant provisions of each agency.  
 
However, Bakoyannis (2000), contrary to other legal theorists564, supports the view 
that the option of private law contracts of definite time as working relationship for the 
scientific personnel in public administration is not permissible by the Constitution. He 
bases his opinion on three arguments. First, the legal concept of the positions of the 
organisational chart and the policy of filling these positions by personnel under the 
working status of private law contracts of definite time are considered as incompatible 
by the jurisprudence of the Council of State565 since “the concept of the position of the 
organisational chart is indissolubly linked to a corresponding administrative 
competence fulfilling a permanent need of the state”. Second, par. 2, article 103 of the 
Constitution explicitly defines the cases where personnel are hired for a certain period 
of time, that is, “special statutes may provide for exceptions in order to fill 
unforeseeable and urgent needs with personnel hired for a certain period of time on a 
private law contract”. Third, he links the special nature and mission of the special 
scientific personnel to the executive duties which may never disappear as an object 
within the function of public administration. 
 
Irrespective of the issue of constitutionality, the measure was fervently supported by 
the then Greek Ombudsman, Yiorgos Kaminis, in his speech during the works of the 
legal symposium entitled “The independent authorities in modern democracy” that 
took place in Athens in 2008566. In his view, the constitutional independent authorities 
should have the freedom to select their personnel on their own. He considered that the 
regulation of par. 2 article 4 of the law 3051/2002 on the constitutional independent 
authorities which provided that the scientific and the rest of the personnel of the 
independent constitutional authorities “are permanent or hired on private law contract 
of indefinite time” was unfortunate. On the contrary, he supported that the previous 
                                                 
563 “The terms of employment and the specific guarantees under which these personnel shall be 
employed, shall be specified by law”. 
564 Papayannis D., “Administrative Reform”, vol. 30. 
565 Decisions 1715/1983, 1761/1983 of the Council of State. 
566 The speeches of the participants at the Symposium are contained in “The independent authorities in 
modern democracy”, Ed. Nikos Frangakis, Editions Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Athens-Komotini, 2008. 
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working status of the scientific personnel that was hired on private law contract with a 
term of five years, which was renewable, was correct. He justified his view on the 
basis that the permanent tenure of civil servants was established by the Constitution of 
1911 as a guarantee of personal independence against majority party power. He 
argued that permanent tenure protects dissident civil servants from possible 
persecutions from the government. He explained that there was no possibility of 
persecuting the personnel of the independent authorities on the basis of party 
convictions since the supervising authority, that is, the president and the members of 
the authorities are independent from the political parties, therefore, politically 
neutral567. He concluded that the independence of the authorities and the permanent 
tenure of their personnel are sizes inversely proportional to each other. 
 
It seems that these views probably draw inspiration from consultative texts on the 
institution of the Ombudsman568. However, empirical evidence on the delegatory 
relationship has shown that the members of the authorities are broadly involved in 
public life. On the other hand, permanent tenure is linked to the civil servant’s 
ultimate duty to defend the principle of legality and protect the citizens’ constitutional 
rights, irrespective of the members’ involvement in public life. Even if the heads and 
members of an independent authority are politically neutral, they do not incarnate the 
law and the Constitution. Invoking relationships of trust between heads and 
subordinates in the public service might give the wrong message, and might lead to 
the opposite conclusions and undesirable interpretations. Permanent tenure is not 
synonymous to arbitrariness since the Civil Servants’ Code provides the framework 
for punishing those violating their oath569. It should also be noted that if the institution 
of the independent authorities is partly inspired by the judicial power, judges are 
appointed for life. Therefore, the scientific personnel should enjoy the same 
independence in the discharge of their duties guaranteed by permanent tenure.  
 
The policy of seconding scientific personnel from other agencies of the public sector 
is only implemented in the case of the Greek Ombudsman. This policy might facilitate 
capture since the relational distance between regulator and regulatee is low. Capture is 
more likely to occur when regulators and regulatees (bureaucrats) come from the 
                                                 
567 At this point, he clarified that he had expressed similar views at a relevant public event organized by 
the Employees’ Association of the Greek Ombudsman. He had further pointed out that renewing the 
employees’ five-year mandate provided for in law 2477/1997 gave them the opportunity to become 
permanent employees after having successfully passed two consecutive judgements for the renewal of 
their mandate. Thus, he considered that the discretion of the independent authority to select the best 
would have been safeguarded,  as well as the employees’ justifiable expectation to avoid the status of 
work insecurity for an indefinite period of time. 
568 Gottehrer (1998, 2002) an international Ombudsman consultant, states that “the Ombudsman has the 
power to delegate responsibilities to staff. Staff often perform work that is sensitive, delicate or 
confidential. The Ombudsman must have confidence in them. The Ombudsman has the sole power to 
appoint and remove staff to ensure that staff will have the Ombudsman’s full confidence and to ensure 
that the Ombudsman has sole responsibility for administering the office”. 
569 According to article 19 par. 1 of the Civil Servants’ Code, the civil servant’s oath is as follows: “I 
pledge my allegiance to my country, to obey the Constitution and the laws and to perform my duties 
honestly and conscientiously”. Foreign nationals are required to take the following oath: “I pledge my 
allegiance to Greece, to obey her Constitutions and laws and to perform my duties honestly and 
conscientiously”. Persons declaring that they have no religion or that their religion does not allow oath 
taking, are required to offer the following assurance instead of an oath: “I declare, on my honour and 
consciousness, that I will be loyal to Greece, obey her Constitution and laws and perform my duties 
honestly and conscientiously”. 
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same professional group (Boyne et al., 2002). Thus, public administration becomes a 
regulatee partly scrutinized by peers, that is, bureaucrats control bureaucrats. On the 
other hand, the newly hired scientific personnel coexist with those seconded from 
other public sector agencies. Therefore, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the 
mentality of this mixed corps towards the regulatees, how the seconded scientific 
personnel convey their previous socialization to the new environment, and how one 
group might affect the other in the discharge of their regulatory duties. 
 
ii. The Greek debt crisis and the exclusive recruitment policy of transfers 
through secondments 
 
The Greek debt crisis seems to have affected the number of the positions of the 
special scientific personnel of the Greek Ombudsman, as well as the recruitment 
policy to be followed in the future. More specifically, article 284, par. 6 of the law 
3852/2010 abolished fifteen positions of the special scientific personnel that were 
vacant by the time of the coming into force of the said law, as well as any other 
position of the special scientific personnel that shall remain vacant for whatever 
reason in the future. Paragraph 7 was added to the article 284 of the law 3852/2010 
and was incorporated into the law 3862/2010 as article 9 par. 1a.  It established 40 
positions in the organisational chart for permanent personnel of the category U.E. 
scientific personnel or on private law contract of indefinite time of the same specialty. 
The positions shall be exclusively filled by secondments and transfers of permanent or 
on private law contract of indefinite time employees from public services, first and 
second-level local government agencies, public law legal entities and private law legal 
entities. They have to fulfill the qualifications of the special scientist as defined in the 
civil servants’ qualifications index, that is, the Presidential Decree 50/2001 as in 
force. Civil servants who are university graduates with at least eight years in service, 
and excellent knowledge of a foreign language may also be selected for the positions. 
As for the selection procedure, the provisions of the Presidential Decree 291/1998 
“Regulations on the recruitment procedure of the Ombudsman’s personnel”, and 
article 5 par. 1 of the law 3094/2003 shall apply. 
 
The selection of the candidates for secondment is effected by decision of the Greek 
Ombudsman in derogation of any general or special provision. The secondment lasts 
three years, and may be extended only twice for the same period of time with an act 
issued by the Greek Ombudsman, whereas it is compulsory for the releasing agency. 
Two months before the completion of the duration of the second extension of the 
secondment, the employee may request, upon application, his transfer to a vacant 
chart position; otherwise his secondment shall end with the expiration of the period of 
this secondment. The transfer is effected upon decision of the Greek Ombudsman and 
the competent Minister or the organ of administration of the legal person, on the 
opinion of the service council of the releasing agency, in derogation of the provisions 
in force, and the parallel abolition of the position of the organisational chart 
previously possessed by the employee at the releasing agency. The employee shall be 
transferred after a special assessment. The procedure and the selection criteria are 
defined in the Regulations of the authority. In case the application for transfer is 
rejected, the secondment is ipso jure terminated.  
 
The institutional design of the clause could be characterized as improvising in many 
respects. It abolishes direct appointments, whereas secondments, or secondments 
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converted to transfers become the exclusive recruitment policy. This strategy 
undoubtedly saves public expenditure since it relieves the state budget from the 
burden of new appointments. However, the clause is flawed. It incorporates the 
positions of the scientific personnel into a category and branch, namely, U.E. 
scientific personnel, despite the fact that the positions of the scientific personnel are 
autonomous following the constitution and the civil servants’ qualifications index. 
Thus, part of the positions shall be permanent ones, whereas their number is not 
defined since it depends on the number of the permanent employees transferred to 
them. Another part of the positions shall be filled by employees on private law 
contracts of indefinite time. The number of the positions remains equally undefined 
for the same reason. We should remind that the positions of the special scientific 
personnel in the Greek public administration may be filled by personnel hired on 
private law contracts pursuant to article 103, par. 3 of the Constitution. Consequently, 
two categories of scientific personnel shall serve in the authority in relation to their 
working status: i) permanent, and ii) on private law contract of indefinite time 
employees. 
 
However, beyond any institutional distortions, the clause might impact on the 
credibility of the recruitment policy itself. First, the procedure of the transfer is in 
itself puzzling in two respects. Contrary to the practice of the authority in the past in 
relation to secondments and transfers and the relevant provision on transfers of the 
Civil Servants’ Code of 2007, that is, the transfers are compulsory for the releasing 
agency, the new clause provides that the concurrent opinion of the service council of 
the releasing agency is required for the realization of the transfer. Moreover, the 
clause moves a step further: apart from its approval, the releasing agency must abolish 
the chart position that shall remain vacant after the transfer.  Thus, the institutional 
design apart from derogating from the previous secondment and transfer policy of the 
authority, and the relevant rules on transfers in the civil service, might activate 
clientelistic practices. No agency would easily approve a transfer under such 
preconditions. This might lead to political interference and bargaining. On the 
contrary, the policy of transferring personnel through open and competitive 
procedures without the opinion of the service council of the releasing agency liberates 
the employee from dependencies of any kind. 
 
Finally, the policy of transferring the scientific personnel from the public sector 
annihilates the degree of the relational distance between regulator and regulatee, thus 
jeopardizing the credibility of the institution. On the other hand, the minimum formal 
qualifications are not strict enough in relation to the required high level of expertise 
for such positions. An employee with a university degree with at least eight years in 
service, and excellent knowledge of a foreign language may be seconded to the 
authority as a special scientist. Thus, the main issue raised is whether previous 
experience in the public sector may substitute expertise in terms of high level 
academic qualifications.  
 
B. Analysis of the empirical data 
I. The administrative personnel 
 
The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman for the period 1998-2010 were the 
main source of information in relation to the administrative personnel of the authority.  
They contain detailed lists with the names, studies, as well as the employees’ agencies 
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of provenance in case they were seconded from other agencies of the public sector. 
However, we should point out that the annual reports for the years 2008 and 2009 do 
not provide lists with the personnel, whereas the annual report for the year 2010 
simply comprises lists with the names of the administrative personnel as distributed 
within the service units. This loss is irrelevant since the number of the personnel of 
the authority had already been stabilized. Indeed, the information on the seconded 
personnel is extremely valuable since secondments to the public sector are not 
published in the Government Gazette. Therefore, contrary to the case of the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel, we have a comprehensive view of the 
administrative personnel of the authority. Finally, the Government Gazette 
additionally served as a source of information in relation to the transferred personnel, 
and thus filled the informational gaps for the years 2008 and 2009.   
 
Secondments are classified in three categories, and comprise 49 employees in total. 
The first category refers to cases of ten secondments that were active by 
31.12.2010570, that is, until the end of the period under research. The average length of 
secondments is high (7.4 years), and ranges from 4 years to 12 years. Such a high 
score contradicts with the concept of secondment since it violates the temporary 
character of the secondment. As for their level of education, four employees were 
university graduates; one employee was a technological education graduate, whereas 
five employees were secondary education graduates. The specialty of the graduates of 
secondary education is not specified in the annual reports. 
 
The second category refers to cases of sixteen secondments which were revoked571. 
The average length of the revoked secondments is normal (3.0 years), and ranges from 
1 year to 8 years. However, 7 of 16 secondments were revoked after one year. We 
should also remind that the period of secondment to the authority, irrespective of its 
duration, is considered as a period of service in a position of a head of department 
pursuant to par. 1, article 8 of the law 2880/2001. Thus, the measure enables them to 
get easier promoted to their agency of provenance since having served in a position of 
head of department is one of the criteria for promotion in the public service. As for 
their level of education, seven employees were university graduates; two employees 
were technological education graduates; five employees were secondary education 
graduates, and two were compulsory education graduates. Their specialty is not 
always specified in the annual reports. 
 
The seconded employees of the categories and branches C.E. Ushers and S.E. Drivers 
remained longer compared to the other categories of personnel, and they all came 
from the Ministry of the Interior. Indeed, the secondments of the 4 of 7 university 
graduates were revoked after one year. The case of the seconded employee SAP39, a 
teacher of French in secondary education appointed to the 2nd Highschool of 
Amphissa, is of interest. All the newly hired teachers of primary and secondary 
education are appointed in the province. They are obliged to serve there for a few 
years in order to gather the necessary points that will permit their transfer to schools 
of Athens or those of other big cities of the country. Therefore, many of them seek to 
obtain secondments to various public agencies, mainly in Athens, in order to obtain 
these points while serving as seconded employees to another service. The secondment 
of SAP39 to the authority lasted four years. 
                                                 
570 See Appendix 10, table 1. 
571 See Appendix 10, table 2. 
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The third category refers to cases of eighteen secondments converted to transfers 
pursuant to the relevant legislative regulations572. The overwhelming majority of the 
personnel of this category had served on secondment during the period 2000-2003. As 
for their level of education, six employees were university graduates; two employees 
were technological education graduates; nine employees were secondary education 
graduates, and one was compulsory education graduate. It is obvious in all the 
categories of secondments that the authority followed the unjustifiable and unsuitable 
policy of seconding mainly secondary education graduates. As for the conversion of 
the secondments, 15 of 18 employees were transferred in 2003 pursuant to article 5 
par. 8 of the law 3051/2002. TAP 18 and TAP37, were transferred in 2007 and 2008 
respectively.  
 
The Director of the Secretariat, TAP12, was also transferred in 2003. She had 
previously served as Director of the Secretariat for the period 2000-2003 on 
secondment from the Ministry of the Interior, Public Amdinistration and 
Decentralisation. She was member of the seconded scientific personnel of the 
authority (1998-1999). Thus, she had already obtained the necessary experience to 
apply for the position of Director of the Secretariat. As for her institutional 
involvement in public life, she has been member of the Working Group constituted at 
the Ministry of the Presidency of the Government on the elaboration of a Report on 
the Reform and Modernisation of Public Administration, which was published in 
1990. Finally, she gave courses at the National Centre of Public Administration in 
2011.  
 
The overwhelming majority of the transfer decisions, that is, 15 of 18, were unilateral 
administrative acts. We have already expressed our reservations over the issue in the 
section regarding the institutional design of the recruitments. According to the 
empirical data, 11 employees were transferred from public law legal entities, and their 
transfer decisions were signed and issued by the heads of the management boards, 
instead of the competent Ministers. The transfer decisions of the employees coming 
from the Ministries of Press (TAP20), and Defence (TAP23) and the Headquarters of 
the Greek Police (TAP18 and TAP32) were unilaterally signed and issued by the 
Ministers supervising the releasing agencies, instead of a joint Ministerial Decision 
co-signed by the Minister of the Interior, representing the Greek Ombudsman. In the 
case of three employees coming from the Ministry of the Interior (TAP12) and the 
Prefecture of Piraeus (TAP11, TAP14), the minister of the releasing agencies and the 
minister representing the authority coincided, that is, the Minister of the Interior. The 
transfer of the employee TAP1 constitutes a controversial case. More specifically, it 
occurred simultaneously with a reclassification procedure to another branch within the 
same category. The employee before the transfer pertained to the category and branch 
S.E. Typists, whereas the branch was silently converted to that of S.E. 
Administration-Accounting.  
 
New transfers took place in 2009 and 2010 following the new transfer procedure 
provided for in article 71 of the Civil Servants’ Code of 2007. As for their level of 
education, one employee was a university graduate; two employees were 
technological education graduates, whereas two employees were compulsory 
                                                 
572 See Appendix 10, table 3. 
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education graduates. All the transfer decisions were appropriately signed by the 
competent Ministers, that is, they constitute bilateral administrative acts. The transfer 
of the employee TAP47 coming from the Anonymous Company for the Exploitation 
and Management of Greek Highways (T.E.O.) constitutes a controversial case. The 
company was a public law legal entity converted to an anonymous public company in 
2001, whereas it was finally privatized in 2007. The employee after the conversion of 
the public law legal entity to an anonymous public company, that is, a private law 
legal entity kept the status of permanent civil servant. However, according to the 
argumentation analyzed in the unit for the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel573, the legality of the transfer could be considered as dubious. Furthermore, 
the employee filled a personal permanent position despite the fact that there were 
vacant positions in the organisational chart for this category and branch. Finally, the 
majority of the total number of the transferred personnel that is, 75% (17 of 23) are 
experienced since they possessed grades A and B by the time the transfer took place. 
As for their level of education, the number of secondary education graduates is 
unjustifiably high574. Finally, the majority of the releasing agencies pertain to the 
categories of hospitals, and social security-pension funds.  
 
Cases of in-service mobility of the transferred personnel have been identified575. 
TAP24 was reclassified to a new branch within the same category, whereas TAP21 
and TAP33 were reclassified to a branch in a superior category. As for secondments 
to other agencies of the public sector, TAP1 has been seconded to the Inspector 
General of Public Administration most probably since 2010. The secondment of 
TAP13 to the political bureau of the Minister of Finance since 2009 under the 
PASOK government also implies political involvement. The seconded employee 
SAP38, had served on secondment to the political bureau of the Deputy Minister of 
Health and Welfare for the period 2000-2002, that is, before being selected as 
seconded employee to the authority in 2003. 
 
In 2007 the Greek Ombudsman proceeded to direct appointments. The public 
announcement was published in daily newspapers. A postgraduate degree was a 
prerequisite for the appointment. Therefore, nine appointees of the Categories of 
University Graduates and Graduates of Technological Institutions were postgraduate 
degree holders576. Two of the newly hired members of the administrative personnel 
had been working in public law legal entities before their appointment to the 
authority: AP8 had served in the Commercial and Industrial Chamber of Athens, 
whereas AP5 had served in the Civil Servants' Sickness Insurance Fund.  
 
Finally, Table 10 shows the level of education of the administrative personnel of the 
authority, that is, the transfrerred and newly hired personnel. Postgraduate education 
graduates represent 31% of the administrative personnel, whereas university graduates 
and graduates of Technological Institutes represent 32% of the administrative 
personnel. 
                                                 
573 See Appendix 8, table 2. 
574 See Appendix 10, tables 4, 5 and 6 containing information regarding the total number of the 23 
transferred employees, that is, those transferred through secondments, and those directly transferred: i) 
the employees’ experience through the grades system, ii) the employees’ specialization and level of 
education, and iii) the employees’ releasing agencies by categories.   
575 See Appendix 10, tables 7 and 8. 
576 See Appendix 10, table 9 on the specialization of the directly hired administrative personnel.  
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Table 10 The level of education of the administrative personnel of the Greek 
Ombudsman 
 Compulsory 
Education 
Graduates  
Secondary 
Education 
Graduates 
Technological 
Institutes 
Graduates  
University 
Graduates 
Postgraduate 
Education 
Graduates 
% of the 
administrative 
personnel by level 
of education 
12% 
(4 of 33) 
24%  
(8 of 33) 
12%  
(4 of 33) 
21%  
(7 of 33) 
31%  
(10 of 33) 
Source: The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman 
 
We have identified 24 persons in total who have served as Secretaries of the 
Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen since the establishment of the authority. As 
for the system of their recruitment, 71% (17 of 24) were directly hired, whereas 21% 
(5 of 24) were seconded from other agencies of the public sector577. However, we do 
not have information on the way of the recruitment of two Secretaries because of the 
lack of information in the Annual Reports for the years 2008-2010. As for new 
appointments after their resignation, the Secretary of the Deputy Ombudsman of the 
Department of Human Rights (S1), a PhD holder, who was hired in 1998, resigned in 
2000. She became member of the teaching staff of the University of Cyprus. The 
Secretary of the Deputy Ombudsman of the Department of Quality of Life (S3), hired 
in 1998, was selected as member of the auxiliary scientific staff of the authority in 
2003.  
 
Interestingly enough, the working relationship of the Secretary of the Deputy 
Ombudsman of the Department of Human Rights (S9), hired in 2000, was converted 
to a private law contract of indefinite time pursuant to the Presidential Decree 
164/2004578. In our opinion, the conversion was irregular since the working status of 
the Secretaries is equivalent to that of the revocable employees of article 103, par. 5 of 
the Constitution. Therefore, those hired for such positions have no right for 
compensation or other claim or privilege pursuant to article 8, par. 1 of the law 
2623/1998.  
 
Table 11 shows the level of education of the Secretaries who have served in the 
bureaus of the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen since the establishment of 
the authority. The majority of the Secretaries are university graduates, whereas 4 of 24 
possess a postgraduate degree. 
 
Table 11 The level of education of the Secretaries of the Ombudsman and the Deputy 
Ombudsmen 
 Secondary 
Education 
Degree 
University 
Degree* 
Postgraduate 
Degree 
PhD Degree Unknown 
% of the 
Secretaries by level 
of education 
29% 
(7 of 24) 
37%  
(9 of 24) 
17%  
(4 of 24) 
4%  
(1 of 24) 
2%  
(3 of 24) 
* One Graduate of a Higher Technological Institute is included 
Source: The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman and google search engine 
                                                 
577 See Appendix 10, table 10. 
578 The Presidential Decree provided for the conversion of private law contracts of definite time of the 
employees serving in the public sector to private law contracts of indefinite time. 
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Finally, the gender distribution of the administrative personnel is as follows: 37% are 
men, and 63% are women. 
 
II. The scientific personnel  
 
The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman for the period 1998-2010 were/are the 
exclusive source of information regarding the scientific personnel of the authority. 
Contrary to the policy of publishing a summary of the appointment act of the 
permanent civil servants in the government gazette following the relevant provision of 
the Civil Servants’ Code, article 11 of the Presidential Decree 410/1988 on the Code 
of personnel on private law contract simply provides for a hiring act issued upon 
decision of the competent organ for the hiring without publication in the government 
gazette. Therefore, the Annual Reports give detailed information on the scientific 
personnel’s names, studies, and category by department. The informational gap for 
the period 2008-2010 is irrelevant since few new scientific personnel were seconded 
or hired during that period. We have identified the professional and/or educational 
background of the majority of those newly hired or seconded through the government 
gazette or the google search engine.  
 
The public announcements for the selection of scientific personnel have never been 
published in the government gazette contrary to the practice of the other constitutional 
independent authorities. They have always been published in daily newspapers 
pursuant to the Regulations of the Greek Ombudsman as defined in the Presidential 
Decree 291/1998. The public announcements do not provide for a grading system for 
the award of points for each one of the selection criteria or the possibility of raising a 
written objection in case of the rejection of a candidacy. 
 
The Annual Report for the year 1998579, that is, the First Annual report of the 
authority, is the only Annual Report that gives some information on the first selection 
procedure for the hiring of the special and auxiliary scientific personnel that took 
place in 1998. More specifically, it states that the total number of the applicants for 
the positions of the special and auxiliary scientific personnel was 1,486, whereas 280 
had passed the preliminary stage and attended the public interview. The members of 
the selection committee finally selected 44 candidates for the positions of the special 
scientific personnel (25 seconded and 19 newly hired), and 25 candidates for the 
positions of the auxiliary scientific personnel. The Annual Report also gives the 
names of the five-member selection committee. Apart from the Greek Ombudsman, 
who participated as President, one of the two Deputy Ombudsmen, a former Director 
General at the Directorate General of Administrative Organisation and Procedures of 
the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, was a trade 
unionist. The judge coming from the Supreme Courts was a Councillor of State, and 
became Vice-President of the Council of State upon unanimous approval of the 
Cabinet580 under the New Democracy Government in 2009. The fifth member of the 
selection committee, the university professor, became Member of Parliament (2007-
                                                 
579 The Annual Report of the Greek Ombudsman for the year 1998, available at: 
http://new.synigoros.gr/?i=stp.el.annreports.31533, date of access: 4.9.2011. 
580 Source: Article entitled “Changes in the leadership of Justice” in the electronic newspaper 
“Epikairotita” dated: July 1, 2009, available at: http://www.epikoinonia-
arg.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8811&catid=13:2010-06-28-15-26-
20&Itemid=57, date of access: 2.9.2011. 
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2009) with the party of PASOK, and was appointed as Special Secretary at the 
Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs in 2009581 under the PASOK 
government. She is also member of the National Council of PASOK582. 
 
The transition of the scientific and auxiliary scientific personnel on private law 
contracts of definite time to the new working status of private law contracts of 
indefinite time provided for in the executive law 3051/2002 of the Constitution and 
the updated law 3094/2003 on the Greek Ombudsman was realized through an open 
procedure. According to the Annual Report for the year 2003, 23 members of the 
scientific personnel and 27 members of the auxiliary scientific personnel already 
serving in the authority were re-hired. Furthermore, 10583 of 27 members of the 
auxiliary scientific personnel had submitted applications for positions of the special 
scientific personnel, and were re-hired to these positions. The remainder of the 
positions was filled by newly hired personnel. Therefore, 33 successful candidates 
filled positions of the special scientific personnel, and 32 successful candidates filled 
positions of the auxiliary scientific personnel.   
 
The selection procedure that took place in 2003 indirectly inaugurated the promotion 
of the already serving auxiliary scientific personnel to positions of the special 
scientific personnel through an open procedure584. Article 22 of the law 3448/2006 
abolished the subcategory of the auxiliary scientific personnel by promoting its 
members to positions of the special scientific personnel through an internal 
assessment. These promotions were published in the Government Gazette. More 
specifically, 14 members of the auxiliary scientific personnel were promoted in 
2006585, 26 were promoted in 2007586, and 2 were promoted in 2008587. However, 11 
members of the auxiliary scientific personnel588 had already resigned from the 
authority before having the chance to get promoted.  
 
We have identified 42 employees of the public sector seconded to the authority as 
members of the scientific personnel since the beginning of the operation of the 
authority in 1998. Secondments are classified in two categories. The first category 
comprises secondments589 that remained active until 31.12.2010, that is, until the end 
of the period under research. Twenty-three employees were serving on secondment to 
the authority by 31.12.2010. The average length of secondments is high (8.1 years), 
and ranges from 3 years to 12 years. The secondments of six members of the scientific 
personnel have been renewed four times, whereas the secondments of five members 
of the scientific personnel have been renewed three times. Such a high score 
                                                 
581 Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 492, 19.11.2009. She submitted her resignation in 2010 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 371, 16.11.2010). 
582 Source: The Official Website of PASOK, available at: 
http://www.pasok.gr/portal/resource/contentObject/id/f852db07-36c9-45f6-87f2-6cf1ed8bd315, date of 
access: 2.9.2011. 
583 The following members of the auxiliary scientific personnel succeeded in being re-hired as special 
scientists: 17, 18, 20, 21, 62, 63, 67, 110, 157, and 159. 
584 The same seems to have happened in 2001, 2004 and 2005 with the members of the auxiliary 
scientific personnel 66, 19, and 108. 
585 Government Gazette, vol. B, 1394, 14.9.2006 
586 Government Gazette, vol. B, 391, 16.3.2007 
587 Government Gazette, vol. B, 368, 5.3.2008 
588 These members of the auxiliary scientific personnel are: SP60, SP65, SP74, SP100, SP103, SP115, 
SP156, SP163, SP178, SP26, and SP153. 
589 See Appendix 10, table 11. 
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contradicts with the concept of secondment since it violates the temporary character 
of the secondment. As for the agencies of provenance, there is a wide 
representativeness of Ministries which in turn supervise a large number of public law 
legal entities. All these public bodies fall under the jurisdiction of the regulatory 
activity of the Greek Ombudsman. This policy of seconding employees coming from 
all the areas of activity of the authority, that is, health, social security, environment, 
urban planning, landscape, public works, human rights, taxes, customs, education, 
quality of services, transport, probably diminishes the relational distance of the 
regulator from the regulatees. 
 
The second category of secondments590 comprises secondments which were revoked 
or terminated for whatever reason. The average length of the revoked or terminated 
secondments is 4.4 years, and ranges from 1 year to 9 years. The majority of the 
seconded employees at least served for a full three-year period, whereas many 
secondments were renewed at least once. Furthermore, the empirical data enable us to 
proceed to the following observations: i) 3 secondments were annulled in 1998, the 
first year of operation of the authority, ii) 3 secondments were terminated, and the 
seconded members of the scientific personnel did not return to their agency of 
provenance. More specifically, SSP118, an employee from the Ministry of the 
Interior, was seconded to the Office of the Inspector General of Public Administration 
as Head of the Directorate of the Secretariat. He was still serving there on secondment 
by 31.12.2010. SPP122, an employee from the Ministry of the Interior, was 
transferred to the Secretariat of the Greek Ombudsman as Director. SPP127, an 
employee from the Ministry of the Environment, Planning and Public Works, was 
seconded to the Political Bureau of the Minister of Justice from 27.9.2007 until 
31.3.2008. The seconded SSP75 and SSP79, applied for a direct appointment to the 
authority. They were both hired in 2003, and submitted their resignations from their 
previous positions in the public sector, that is, Constructions EKTENEPOL, a 
subsidiary of the National Bank of Greece, and the Ministry of the Interior.  
 
Table 12 shows the level of education of the seconded scientific personnel in total. 
The majority has a postgraduate degree (48%, 20 of 42), 12% (5 of 42) are PhD 
holders, and 38% (16 of 42) are university graduates. Finally, 19 of 42 are graduates 
of the National School of Public Administration.  
 
Table 12 The level of education of the seconded scientific personnel* 
 University 
Degree* 
Postgraduate 
Degree 
PhD Degree Unknown 
% of the seconded 
scientific personnel 
by level of 
education 
38%  
(16 of 42) 
48%  
(20 of 42) 
12%  
(5 of 42) 
2%  
(1 of 42) 
* Only the employee 155 was seconded as member of the auxiliary scientific personnel  
Source: The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman and google search engine 
 
We have identified 148 newly hired members of the special and auxiliary scientific 
personnel since the beginning of the operation of the authority in 1998. However, the 
phenomenon of resignations is not rare since 37 of 148 directly hired members of the 
special and auxiliary scientific personnel resigned from the authority.   According to 
                                                 
590 See Appendix 10, table 12. 
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the empirical data, 15 of the directly hired followed an academic career. They were 
appointed to tenured positions at Greek and foreign higher education institutions591.  
 
The remainder of those resigned preferred other positions in the public sector592. 
These new appointments in the public sector could be classified as follows: 3 judges 
of the Supreme Courts; 6 lawyers appointed at the legal services of various public 
agencies and an independent authority; 1 researcher; 1 member of the scientific 
personnel of an independent authority; 6 employees appointed to various public 
services, four of them at the Ministry of Finance which is constantly preferred for the 
higher remuneration. The career paths of four resigned members of the special and 
auxiliary scientific personnel could not be identified. One member, SP21, was not 
appointed to a position of the public sector. She was hired as Director of the Sector for 
the Protection of Refugees at the United Nations Refugee Agency in Athens. The 
column with the indication “year of appointment”593 to the new position might explain 
why the directly hired personnel decided to resign. Indeed, twelve new appointments 
took place between the years 1999 and 2004. This exodus might be explained as a 
sign of work insecurity felt by this category of personnel since they were employed on 
private law contract of definite time. It should be reminded that the law that converted 
the working status of the personnel was promulgated in 2003. The other resignations 
that took place after the year 2004 might be linked to the personal professional 
aspirations and ambitions (researcher, judge, political career) as was the case with 
those who followed an academic career.   
 
The cases of seconded members of the scientific personnel to political positions are of 
great interest594. However, in our opinion, the policy of seconding members of the 
scientific personnel as political appointees constitutes a phenomenon that could be 
characterized as incompatible with the neutral and independent character of the 
institution irrespective of the high level of expertise of the seconded personnel. On the 
other hand, it reveals the political involvement of the seconded personnel. They are 
mainly appointed to the political bureaus of ministers, deputy ministers, secretary 
generals, the General Secretariat of the Government and the Prime Minister as 
advisors, special collaborators, and Director. The most characteristic cases are 
presented hereafter. SP10, a former Deputy Ombudsman, was appointed as Secretary 
General for Migration Policy at the Ministry of the Interior, Decentralization and 
Electronic Governance in 2010. Two Prime Ministers, Konstantinos Karamanlis (New 
Democracy), and Georgios Papandreou (PASOK) have consecutively seconded 
members of the scientific personnel of the authority to the General Secretariat of the 
Government (SP8: 2004-2009), and the political bureau of the Prime Minister (SP2: 
2009-). The case of the member of the scientific personnel SP66 is of great interest in 
relation to the duration of the secondment that lasted six years. These secondments 
actually followed the political career of a politician from the party of New 
Democracy, Nikitas Kaklamanis. SP66 was seconded to his political bureau while he 
was serving as Minister of Health and Social Solidarity (2004-2007). She was 
seconded to the Municipality of Athens, as legal advisor, after his election as Mayor 
of Athens (2007-2010). Apart from her position as legal advisor of the municipality of 
Athens, she had also institutional and financial involvement since she was appointed 
                                                 
591 See Appendix 10, table 13. 
592 See Appendix 10, table 14. 
593 See Appendix 10, table 14.  
594 See Appendix 10, table 15. 
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as member of the Management Board of the Society for the Protection of Minors of 
Athens, representing the Municipality of Athens and member of the management 
board of the Athens Municipal Radio Enterprise, Athens 9.84. 
 
Two other members of the scientific personnel had also financial and institutional 
involvement while they were seconded as political appointees. SP11, on secondment 
to the political bureau of the Minister of Finance as Director, was also appointed as 
member of the State Lottery Administration Committee, and as non executive member 
of the management board of the Organisation of Football Prognostics S.A. SP78, on 
secondment as Special Advisor to the Bureau of the Minister of Environment, Energy 
and Climatic Change, was also appointed as member of the Management Board of the 
Hellenic Mapping and Cadastral Organisation (OKXE). He had also institutional 
involvement as member of the Working Group for the submission of a 
recommendation upon the necessary amendments regarding the legal framework on 
quarries. SP86, on secondment to the political bureau of the Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs has political affiliation since she is member of the Sector for the 
Environment and Planning of the party of PASOK595.  
 
As for secondments of the scientific personnel to other public services596, SP124, 
SP159 and SP120 were seconded to the bureau of the Inspector General of Public 
Administration following the relevant annual reports of the Inspector General of 
Public Administration. 
 
Table 13 shows the level of education of the total number of the special and auxiliary 
scientific personnel seconded and directly hired since its establishment. According to 
the empirical data, over ¾ of them hold postgraduate and PhD degrees. It should also 
be noted that nine members of this category of personnel completed their PhDs while 
in service, whereas twelve completed their postgraduate studies while in service.  
 
Table 13 The level of education of the special and auxiliary scientific personnel  
 University 
Degree 
Postgraduate 
Degree 
PhD holders Unknown 
% of the scientific 
personnel by level 
of education 
18% (33 of 190) 52% (97 of 190) 28% (55 of 190) 2% (5 of 190) 
Source: The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman (1998-2010) 
 
As for the specialisation of the scientific personnel, a report of the Greek Ombudsman 
states597: “Unlike the Ombudsman Bureaus of the other nations staffed almost 
exclusively by lawyers, the professional personnel of the Greek Ombudsman covers a 
wide range of specialisation in order to be able to provide a comprehensive 
investigation on the complaints received through a multidisciplinary approach”. The 
                                                 
595 Date of publication of the composition of the Sector: 8.12.2008 Source: The Official Website of 
PASOK, available at: http://www.pasok.gr/portal/resource/contentObject/id/7d45db1b-7f0c-426d-
a97b-a72139975caf, date of access: 8.6.2010. 
596 See Appendix 10, table 16. 
597 Adam Ch. and Papastylianos Ch., The Greek Ombudsman and the other independent authorities, 
available at: http://video.minpress.gr/wwwminpress/aboutgreece/aboutgreece_ombudsman.pdf, date of 
access: 4.9.2011 
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breakdown of the personnel by specialisation serving by 31.12.2010598 is as follows: 
77 lawyers (55%),  8 political scientists (6%), 9 engineers (6%), 8 psychologists (6%), 
6 sociologists (4%), 6 economists (4%), 5 archaeologists (4%), 4 geologists (3%), 2 
communication specialists (1%), 2 social scientists (1%), 2 philologists (1%), 2 
oceanographers (1%), 1 chemist (1%), 1 medical doctor (1%), 1 statistician (1%), 1 
anthropologist, 5 unknown (4%).  
 
Finally, the gender distribution of the scientific personnel serving in the authority by 
31.12.2010 is as follows: 99 are women (71%), and 41 are men (29%). 
 
Some members of the scientific personnel have involvement in public life. The case 
of SP84 is characteristic. He is politically involved. He resigned from the authority in 
2002. He was member of the Council of Students of the Political Youth "Rigas 
Feraios" (1985-1987), the Party of the Greek Left. He served as Collaborator at the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications (June 1997-December 1998). He became 
Secretary of the association of the scientific personnel of the Greek Ombudsman. He 
was parliamentary candidate of PASOK in the constituency of Magnessia in the 
National Elections of 2000 (2nd Runner-up). However, a fine was imposed on him 
since he was among the parliamentary candidates who had not published their 
electoral income and expenses in a newspaper of their electoral constituency599. He 
was elected Prefect of Magnessia in the Prefectural and Municipal Elections of 2006, 
whereas                      he ran for Regional Commissioner of the region of Thessaly in 
the Municipal and Regional Elections of 2010. He was elected member of the regional 
council. In 2002 he became member of the sector on gender equality of the Central 
Committee of PASOK. As for his participation in civil society, he has been President 
of the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies - Andreas Papandreou 
(ISTAME) of Magnessia (2004). He is also founder of the NGO "Network of 
Voluntary Organisations of Magnessia" (2000), and member of the Events 
Committees of "Citizen Everyday", a non-profit corporation for the promotion of 
participatory democracy  founded in 2005 by the Volunteers’ Network of PASOK. As 
for his scientific involvement, he has been  
Associate Professor (Human Rights Unit) at the School of Officers of the Greek 
Police pursuant to the no 6501/5/83b/20.8.1998 decision of the Chief of the Greek 
Police (academic year: 1998-1999),  adjunct professor at the University of Thessaly 
for the Academic Year 2000-2001 
 
SP14, was hired in 2003 and resigned in 2009 after his appointment as Assistant 
Professor at the Department of Law at the University of Cyprus. Before his 
appointment in the authority, he had served as adviser of the Minister of Justice, 
Evangelos Yiannopoulos (1998-2000), and as special collaborator at the political 
bureau of the Minister of Justice, Michalis Stathopoulos (2000-2001) under the 
PASOK governments. As for his institutional and financial involvement he was 
                                                 
598 The breakdown of the total number of the scientific personnel by specialisation since the 
establishment of the authority (190 members of the scientific personnel) is as follows: 101 lawyers 
(54%), 20 political scientists (11%), 11 engineers (6%), 8 psychologists (4%), 8 sociologists (4%), 7 
economists (4%), 5 archaeologists (3%), 5 geologists (3%), 4 communication specialists (2%), 2 social 
scientists (1%), 2 philologists (1%), 2 oceanographers (1%), 2 chemists (1%), 1 medical doctor (1%), 1 
statistician (1%), 1 anthropologist (1%), 1 informatician (1%), 1 translator-interpreter (1%), 1 teacher 
of secondary education (1%), 5 unknown (3%).  
599 See no 1148 of the relevant list for the imposition of a fine in G.G. vol. B, no 411, 11.4.2001. 
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appointed as Vice-President of the Management Board of the National Centre for 
Vocational Guidance in 1996.  He has been member of legislative drafting committees 
and various working groups.  
 
SP129, was appointed as special collaborator at the Ministry of Culture (2000-2004) 
after his resignation in 2000. He was candidate councillor for the management board 
of the Athens Bar Association in the elections of 2010. He is member of Amnesty 
International and member of the political party “Union of Independent Citizens”. 
 
SP187, was appointed as special collaborator at the political bureau of the Minister of 
the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation in 2004. SP98, was appointed 
as alternate representative of the party of PASOK in the Committee constituted for the 
Control of Electoral Violations in the Prefectures of the Region of Thessaly 
(Prefecture of Larissa) in 2007. As for trade-unionism, SP11 was President of the 
Management Board of the Association of the employees of the Greek Ombudsman 
(2001-2003) and elected member at the Service Council of the Authority (2001-2005). 
SP79 has also served as Vice-President of the Association the employees of the Greek 
Ombudsman and member of its management board. SP26 was candidate councillor 
for the management board of the Athens Bar Association in 2002, before being hired 
to the authority.  
 
As for their institutional involvement, the members of the scientific personnel 
participated in various legislative drafting committees (SP8, SP11(2), SP14, SP43) 
and working groups, (SP8(3), SP11, SP14(4), SP17, SP19, SP28, SP56, SP84(2), 
SP78, SP128). 
 
Many of the members of the scientific personnel have been adjunct professors in 
higher education institutions while in service (SP38, SP42, SP80, SP84, SP95, SP96, 
SP103, see Appendix 4). The member of the scientific personnel SP54, a PhD holder 
in public law, presents an intense academic activity as adjunct professor in various 
higher education institutions even while serving in the authority. He was hired in 
2005. Table 14 shows the intensity of his academic activity as adjunct professor by 
chronological order based on his Curriculum Vitae uploaded on the Official Website 
of the Department of Political Science of the Demokritos University of Thrace, and 
other sources. During the academic year 2008-2009, he was simultaneously adjunct 
professor at five higher education institutions while he was serving in the authority. 
Table 14 Academic activity of the member SP54 of the specialized scientific 
personnel 
Academic Years Department/Higher Education Institutions and other public schools 
2003-2009 Police Officers’ School and the  Further Education and Training School of 
the Hellenic Police Academy Academic Years 2003-2009 
2006-2008 Adjunct Professor at the Department of Business Administration, 
University of Patras  
2007-2010 Department of Economic and Regional Development, University of 
Central Greece  
2009-2010 Department of Political Science, Demokriteion University of Thrace  
Academic Year: 2009-2010 
2008-2009 Department of Social Work and 
Department of Commerce and Marketing,  
Technological Educational Institute of Athens  
2009-2010 Member of the hourly paid teaching staff for the training of the special 
uniformed personnel of the Municipal Police 2009 
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Finally, they were members of the following NGOs: the Hellenic League for Human 
Rights (SP9, SP28, SP41, SP131, SP143); the Research Centre for Minority Groups 
(KEMO) (SP10, SP11, SP13, SP41, SP131, SP135, SP179); the Greek Centre for the 
Protection of the Environment-Ecosystem (SP105); the Special Synodical Committee 
for Migrants, Refugees, and Repatriated of the Church of Greece (SP138); Greek 
Young Women's Christian Association (SP138). 
 
d. The Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy 
A. The legal framework on the recruitment policies  
 
I. The administrative personnel 
 
Contrary to the legal framework of the other three constitutional independent 
authorities that always provided for the transfer of personnel from the public sector on 
first implementation of their founding laws as one way of recruiting personnel, the 
recruitment system of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and 
Privacy is exclusively based on direct hirings. Indeed, this legislative arrangement 
was inevitably imposed by the executive law 3051/2002600 of the Constitution 
regarding the recruitment system of the constitutional independent authorities. The 
founding law 3115/2003601 regulates all issues regarding the personnel of the 
authority.  
 
The administrative personnel are regular civil servants. The authority proceeds to the 
recruitment of the personnel either through selection or examination following a 
public announcement. In case an interview is provided for, it is public. The public 
announcement defines the required specialization and experience of the personnel, the 
selection criteria and the procedure for raising objections as well as any other detail. A 
selection committee is constituted for the selection of the administrative personnel. A 
member from the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, appointed by the 
President of the said authority, participates in the selection committee as President. 
The members of the committee are remunerated. The authority, based on a justified 
decision, selects the candidates who possess the broadest experience and knowledge 
required for the position to be filled. The lists of the selected candidates are sent for 
ratification to the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. The Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel has the obligation to ratify the selection lists 
within the exclusive deadline of twenty days from the day of their receipt. In case the 
above mentioned term expires with no action taken by the authority, the Hellenic 
Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy proceeds to the recruitment of 
                                                 
600 Article 4, par. 1. 
601 According to article 8, par. 1 the law 3115/2003, the 25 positions of the organisational chart for the 
administrative personnel were distributed by categories and branches as follows: U.E. Administration-
Finance (4 positions), U.E. Engineers (2 positions), U.E. Informatics (2 positions), T.E. 
Administration-Accounting (3 positions), T.E. Technological Applications (positions 5), Secondary 
Education (6 positions), C.E. Auxiliary Personnel (3 positions). Interestingly enough, the branches of 
the secondary education positions are not specified. Article 19 of the law 3472/2006 replaced par. 1 of 
article 8 of the law 3115/2003, and diminished the number of the positions of the organisational chart 
regarding the administrative personnel. Thus, the 19 positions left were distributed as follows: U.E. 
Administration-Finance (3 positions), T.E. Administration-Accounting (3 positions), T.E. 
Technological Applications (positions 5), Secondary Education (7 positions), C.E. Auxiliary Personnel 
(1 position). 
 215
those selected. Employees from other agencies of the public sector may be seconded 
to the authority for two years, with a possibility of renewal, in case they have 
experience relevant to the subject area of the authority. The force of the measure 
would expire four years after the publication of the law in the Government Gazette.  
 
II. The scientific personnel and the personnel of the legal service 
 
According to article 8 of the law 3115/2003 regulating the issues of the personnel of 
the authority, the scientific personnel are hired on private law contracts of indefinite 
time. Thus, the working relationship is consistent with the dicta of article 103, par. 3 
of the Constitution. The general principles of the selection procedure are the same as 
those previously analysed for the administrative personnel. However, it is 
differentiated in two respects: i) the interview is compulsory, and ii) one university 
professor, at least, participates in the selection committee. The number of the 
positions provided for the scientific personnel was low compared to that of the 
administrative personnel602. Thus, the law 3115/2003 increased the number of the 
positions of the scientific personnel603. Lawyers would be suspended from the 
exercise of their profession while in service.  
 
Contrary to the practice prescribed in the founding laws of the other constitutional 
independent authorities, that is, transferring or seconding the heads of units from other 
public services, which was innovative in itself and derogated from the rules of the 
Civil Servants’ Code, the Presidential Decree 40/2005 provides for direct hirings to 
the three Directorates of the authority604, as well as to the autonomous Department of 
International Collaborations and Public Relations605. This practice of direct 
appointments of the heads of units is also unique in the public service.  
 
Article 14 of the Presidential Decree 40/2005 containing the organisational chart of 
the authority sets forth the selection procedure and the required qualifications for the 
heads of units. Those selected as heads of the said units are hired as members of the 
scientific personnel of the authority on three-year private law contracts. Their 
mandate may be renewed for equal terms on the decision of the authority. However, 
                                                 
602 According to par. 1 of article 8 of the law 3115/2003, the 12 positions of the organisational chart 
regarding the scientific personnel were distributed as follows: 10 positions for Electrical and Computer 
Engineers, or Electrical Engineers, or telecommunications engineers, informatics engineers, or 
informaticians, or physicians, and 2 positions for law school graduates. 
603 Indeed, article 19 of the law 3472/2006, which replaced par. 1 of article 8 of the law 3115/2003, 
increased the number of the positions of the scientific personnel. Thus, these positions of the 
organisational chart were distributed as follows: 14 positions for Electrical and Computer Engineers, or 
Electrical Engineers, or telecommunications engineers, informatics engineers, or informaticians, or 
physicians; 2 positions for graduates of International or European studies or Political or Financial 
studies, or Organisation and Business Administration; 2 positions for law school graduates. 
604 The three Directorates of the authority are: i) the Directorate for the Infrastructures Assurance, 
Infrastructures, Services Secrecy, Internet Applications, ii) the Directorate for the Assurance of 
Infrastructure and Secrecy of Telecommunication Services, and iii) the Directorate for the Assurance of 
the Secrecy of Mailing Services. 
605 The heads of the other Departments of the authority are selected pursuant to the relevant provisions 
of the Civil Servants’ Code according to par. 6 of article 14 of the Presidential Decree 40/2005. 
However, if there are no employees with the required qualifications, the positions of these departments 
shall be filled by seconding employees from public services or public law legal entities of the same 
branch possessing grade A on the decision of the authority. The seconded employees shall exercise the 
duties of head of department until it shall be possible to select the heads of departments from among 
the regular employees of the authority.  
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the scientific personnel of the authority may also participate in the selection 
procedure. The required qualifications for the Heads of the Directorates are as 
follows: at least ten years experience in a relevant subject area, teaching in a 
university included. Three years from the above mentioned experience should have 
been spent in the exercise of administrative duties. The candidates for the position of 
the head of the autonomous department are required to have six years experience in a 
relevant area, whereas two years from the above mentioned experience should have 
been spent in the exercise of administrative duties. In case the candidates do not have 
the required experience, the positions may be filled by candidates with less 
experience, which may not be less than six years for the heads of the directorates and 
three years for the head of the autonomous department. Other qualifications that shall 
be considered are as follows: postgraduate degrees relevant to the subject area of the 
authority, the knowledge of foreign languages and the use of computers. 
 
The formal and substantial qualifications are assessed by a three-member committee 
constituted by decision of the authority. This committee, after the assessment of the 
formal and substantial qualifications of the candidates, and the interview with each 
one of them, submits to the authority in plenum a table with the three strongest 
candidates for each position, if there are, whereas the authority in plenum selects the 
one to be hired.  
 
The personnel of the legal service 
 
Article 8 of the law 3115/2003 provides for two positions of lawyers with a salary 
mandate, and one position of a Legal Advisor who must be a Supreme Court lawyer, 
and possess at least a postgraduate degree in a subject area relevant to the aims of the 
authority. Further selection criteria for these positions are not specified in the law. 
 
B. Analysis of the empirical data  
I. The administrative personnel 
 
Only one public announcement for the selection of administrative personnel was 
published in the government gazette606. The 4 vacant positions of the organisational 
chart to be filled were distributed as follows: 2 U.E. Administration-Finance, and T.E. 
Administration-Accounting. The criteria were explicitly defined. However, the public 
announcement did not contain a grading system for these criteria. As for the 
qualifications, apart from the main university degree607, special qualifications were 
defined for the positions of the category and branch U.E. Administration-Finance608. 
                                                 
606 Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel (ASEP), no 423, 
22.10.2004. 
607 The one position of the category and branch U.E. Administration-Finance required a university 
degree related to administration, whereas the other required a university degree with financial 
orientation.   
608 The special qualifications were defined as follows: i) very good knowledge of English, or French or 
German, ii) at least three years experience on issues related to the organisation, management and 
exploitation of human resources and business administration in the public sector or private enterprises 
(for the specialty of Administration), and three years experience in a computerised accounts office in 
the public sector or private enterprises (for the specialty of Finance) iii) the knowledge of word 
processing, excel, and data bases. 
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Additional qualifications were also taken into consideration609. The procedure also 
provided for an interview.  
 
Table 15 shows the level of education of the administrative personnel610. The 
graduates of Technological Educational Institutes represent 47% (8 of 17) of the 
administrative personnel, whereas only two employees are university graduates. The 
graduates of secondary education represent almost a third of the administrative 
personnel, which, in our opinion, is unjustifiably high. Furthermore, the branches of 
the secondary education appointees are not specified, with the exception of the 
category and branch S.E. Drivers. As we have already stated, the branches of the 
positions of secondary education are not defined in the founding law or the 
organisational chart. Apart from the S.E. Driver hired in 2005, another Driver had 
already been seconded from the Thermal Bus Company SA the same year according 
to the annual report for the year 2005611. The secondment was renewed in 2006, and 
ended in 2007. 
 
Table 15 The level of education of the administrative personnel  
 University 
Education 
Technological 
Education 
Secondary 
Education 
Compulsory 
Education 
% of the 
administrative 
personnel by level 
of education 
12% (2 of 17) 47% (8 of 17) 35% (6 of 17) 6% (1 of 17) 
Source: The Government Gazette 
 
According to the appointment decisions published in the government gazette, we have 
identified 23 employees starting from the beginning of the operation of the authority 
in 2004 until December 31, 2010. However, the total number of the positions of the 
organisational chart to be filled was 19 positions. Throughout this period, three 
selected candidates denied their appointment, whereas three employees resigned from 
the authority.  
 
Cases of resignations and denial of appointments are not rare612. Indeed, all the 
resigned employees as well as the successful candidates who refused to assume duties 
were all reappointed to positions in the public sector. Four of them pertained to the 
category of Secondary Education (AP10, AP21, AP13, AP22), whereas the other two 
pertained to the category of technological education (AP4), and compulsory education 
(AP14) respectively. The case of AP10 is of interest. He was appointed to the 
authority as a secondary education graduate. However, after his resignation he filled 
the position of a teacher of physical training in secondary education, that is, he was a 
university graduate. On many occasions, university graduates submit their candidacies 
to fill positions of secondary education in the public sector since the rate of the 
unemployment of university graduates is high. AP21 and AP22 preferred positions to 
                                                 
609 The additional qualifications were defined as follows: i) graduation from the School of Public 
Administration, ii) the mandate as head of personnel units in a public or private agency, iii) the grade of 
the main degree, iv) a postgraduate degree, v) the excellent knowledge of English, or French or 
German, vi) the knowledge of other languages. 
610 See also Appendix 11, table 1 on the specialization of the administrative personnel. These tables 
contain information only for the administrative personnel serving in the authority by 31.12.2010. 
611 Annual Report for the year 2005, available at: http://www.adae.gr/portal/index.php?id=44, date of 
access: 4.9.2011. 
612 See Appendix 11, tables 2, and 3. 
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the Ministry of Finance since the employees of this Ministry and its supervising 
agencies are better remunerated.  
 
Finally, the gender distribution of the administrative personnel is as follows: 38% are 
men, and 62% are women. 
 
II. The scientific personnel and the personnel of the legal service 
 
Only one public announcement for the selection of scientific personnel was published 
in the government gazette613. All the previous public announcements had been 
published in daily newspapers. The 3 vacant positions of the organisational chart to be 
filled were distributed to subject areas as follows: Security of Telecommunications 
Infrastructures, Systems, and Services (2 positions), and Security of Information 
Systems, and Implementations (1 position). The founding law and the organisational 
chart do not define the selection criteria for the scientific personnel of the authority. 
Therefore, the public announcement of 2008 becomes a source of information on the 
issue. The special qualifications were defined as follows:  
i) a university degree with specialization in the subject area as specified in the 
announcement,  
ii) scientific expertise in the subject area of the position or other relevant sectors 
specifically defined in the announcement,  which is proved by  
- a PhD degree in the subject area of the announced position, or  
- a postgraduate degree in the subject area of the announced position or other relevant 
scientific sectors specifically defined in the announcement, and at least a relevant two 
years experience,  
- or at least a relevant four years experience in the subject area of the announced 
position and at least one publication or a scientific announcement in a subject related 
to the content of the specialization of the position in a reputable international review 
or congress. 
iii) Excellent or very good knowledge of the English language. The knowledge of 
other languages will be taken into consideration in the procedure of the assessment of 
the candidates, 
iv) one year of additional experience for all the candidates in the subject area of the 
announced position, or other relevant fields of the subject area  
 
The selection procedure also provided for an interview. However, the public 
announcement did not contain a grading system for the rating of each one of the 
selection criteria.  
 
Resignations and denial of appointments of the scientific personnel of the authority 
are not rare614. We have identified 21 members of the scientific personnel starting 
from the beginning of the operation of the authority in 2004 until December 31, 2010. 
The total number of the positions of the organisational chart to be filled was 18 
positions. Throughout this period, four selected candidates denied their appointment, 
whereas four of the appointed members of the scientific personnel resigned from the 
authority.  The career paths of SP13, SP2, and SP20 are unknown. SP1, SP3 and SP10 
followed an academic career; SP11 became Head of Administration at the European 
                                                 
613 Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel (ASEP), no 694, 
31.12.2008. 
614 See Appendix 11, tables 4 and 5. 
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Network and Information Security Agency; SP5 was promoted to the position of 
Director. However, he submitted his resignation from the authority in 2008, and was 
hired at Ontelecoms, a Greek Telecommunications Company, as Director of Access 
Backbone Networks. As for the scientific personnel’s level of education615, a 
significant number have PhD degrees: 54%, 7 of 13 of those serving in the authority 
by 31.12.2010, and 71%, 5 of 8 of those who resigned or denied the appointment. 
 
 As for their involvement in public life, SP4 and SP12 participated as members of the 
special legislative drafting committee representing the Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and Privacy, on the study and elaboration for the 
transposition of the Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
of March 15, 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with 
the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. 
 
As for the heads of the three Directorates, two of them resigned during their mandate 
(SP5, HSP3). As we have already mentioned SP5, who was member of the scientific 
personnel promoted to the position to the position of Director, was hired at a 
Telecommunications Company of the private sector. HSP3 is a free-lance lawyer. He 
only served for five months. HSP5, who replaced SP5 after his resignation, hold a 
postgraduate degree. We could not find any information on the professional or 
educational background of two of the heads of the Directorates (HSP2, HSP6), and 
the head of the autonomous department of International Collaborations and Public 
Relations (HSP4).  
 
Finally, the gender distribution of the scientific personnel is as follows: 68% are men, 
and 32% are women. 
 
Two public announcements for the selection of lawyers with a salary mandate were 
published in the government gazette616. The previous public announcements for the 
legal advisor and one lawyer with a salary mandate617 had been published in daily 
newspapers. The founding law and the organisational chart do not define the selection 
criteria for the lawyers with a salary mandate. Therefore, the public announcements of 
2008 become a source of information on the issue. The special qualifications were 
defined as follows: i) a law degree, ii) to be at least appellate lawyers, iii) at least five 
years experience, preferably in public law, iv) excellent knowledge of at least one of 
the languages of the European Union, v) knowledge of the use of computers. Other 
additional criteria taken into consideration were defined as follows: i) employment in 
a subject area relevant to the competences of the authority or relevant publications, ii) 
a postgraduate degree (preferably in public law), iii) the degree of the main diploma, 
iii) the knowledge of other foreign languages, and iv) the personality of the candidate 
which would be assessed through the interview. However, the public announcements 
did not contain a grading system for the rating of each one of the selection criteria.  
 
As for the profile of the members of the legal service, the legal advisor, a PhD holder, 
was appointed to various governmental positions - special collaborator of the Minister 
                                                 
615 See Appendix 11, tables 6 and 7. 
616 Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel (ASEP), no 74, 
26.02.2008, and no 271/5.06.2008. 
617 The lawyer with a salary mandate was appointed in 2005 and submitted his resignation in 2007.  
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of National Education and Religious Affairs in 1999, adviser at the Ministry of State 
in 2004- under different governments. In 1997, he was appointed as member of the 
Committee of Legislative Initiative constituted by the then Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, G. Papandreou. He was appointed lawyer of the Organising 
Committee of the Athens Olympics 2004.  He was member of the special legislative 
drafting committee constituted at the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human 
Rights for the final elaboration of the draft law on the transposition of the Directive 
2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications networks and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC. 
 
The organisational chart provides for two positions of lawyers with a salary mandate. 
One of them resigned in 2007. The vacant position was filled in 2008, whereas the 
appointment of the second lawyer took place in 2009. Regarding their level of 
education, two of them are postgraduate degree holders. We do not have any 
information on the educational level of the third lawyer. However, the one who 
resigned participated six times in various legislative drafting committees in 2010 
mainly related to the transposition of directives regarding data privacy and security of 
communications, the amendment of legislation regarding the Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and Privacy, and the Code of Laws on drugs. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The diachronic presentation of the recruitment policies as well as the identification of 
the selected personnel permitted us to draw useful information on the internal 
hierarchical relationship, that is, the members of the authorities as bureaucratic 
superiors-principals, and their personnel as bureaucratic subordinates-agents. We may 
discern common recruitment policies among the four independent constitutional 
authorities.  Based on this criterion the authorities will be divided into two groups in 
order to systematize our conclusions. The first group consists of the Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel and the Greek Ombudsman. The second group 
comprises the Hellenic Data Protection Authority and the Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and Privacy. 
 
The first group adopted mixed recruitment policies, that is, transfers, secondments, 
and direct hiring. On the contrary, the second group adopted almost exclusively the 
policy of direct hiring. The mission of the authorities of the first group has great 
impact on Greek society, and this might partly explain the preference of the legislator 
to transfers and secondments which, in turn, diminish the relational distance between 
regulators and regulatees, that is, the political decision-makers. The mission of the 
authorities of the second group does not directly affect the citizens’ everyday life and 
is not widely promoted, whereas the number of the personnel is small and the required 
expertise is scarcely found in other agencies of the public sector.  
 
The institutional design of the recruitment strategy applied in the case of the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of personnel represents a characteristic case of legislative 
manipulation that violated the Constitution, administrative law, and jurisprudence. 
Regarding the administrative personnel, the common legislator adopted the policy of 
transfers and long lasting secondments from other agencies of the public sector. The 
necessity of recruiting experienced personnel from the public sector, and public 
expenditure savings served as an alibi for the arrangement. Legislative regulations and 
empirical evidence make both arguments crumble. First, thousands of temporary 
employees were appointed as long-term contract employees or permanent civil 
servants, thus putting an enormous burden on the state budget. Second, the empirical 
data show that the majority of the transferred administrative personnel were neither 
experienced nor qualified, and mainly came from private law legal entities of the 
broader public sector that did not have competences relevant to the mission of the 
authority.  
 
Furthermore, the selection criteria for the transfers were so vague that the discretion 
of the selection committees was enormous. The vagueness of the selection criteria 
combined with the flawed clause on transfers, which illegally converted the working 
status of the transferred personnel on private law contract of indefinite time, seem to 
have served clientelistic purposes. Therefore, the policy of transfers and long lasting 
secondments rather created a corps linked to the political decision-makers, thus 
diminishing the relational distance from the regulatees. The authority proceeded to the 
direct hiring of administrative personnel ten years after its establishment. The 
majority of the directly hired personnel of the category of university education have 
postgraduate degrees. However, the less qualified transferred employees may be 
promoted as heads of units without fearing the concurrence of the directly hired.  The 
better qualified but directly hired personnel have the right to apply for promotion 
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twelve years after their appointment.  However, once more, the number of the directly 
hired secondary education graduates remains unjustifiably high. According to the 
empirical data 33% (80 of 242) of the total number of the administrative personnel 
were secondary education graduates, 54% (131 of 242) were university graduates, and 
9% (11 of 242) were graduates of Technological Educational Institutes. The number 
of secondary education graduates was further increased by the massive secondments 
of employees of the same category. 
 
The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel is the only independent authority 
whose founding law does not provide for specialized scientific personnel. This seems 
as an unorthodox aspect of the institutional design since the nature and mission of the 
independent authorities require high expertise. The first members of the scientific 
personnel were appointed fourteen years after the beginning of the operation of the 
authority. A postgraduate degree was a prerequisite for the selection. However, the 
public announcement put emphasis on previous experience to the subject area of the 
announced positions acquired in the public or private sectors, whereas PhD holders 
without prior experience were excluded from the procedure. Therefore, expertise 
through high level academic qualifications was substituted for experience because of 
the relaxation of the civil servants’ qualifications index regarding the category of 
scientific personnel combined with the relevant clause of the executive law 3051/2002 
of the constitution. No grading system was provided for in the public announcement 
for the classification of the candidates. The majority of those finally selected 
previously worked in the public sector, whereas some of them had significant 
involvement in public life.  
 
The recruitment policy of the Greek Ombudsman regarding the administrative 
personnel was equally based on transfers and secondments from the public sector, 
thus keeping a low relational distance between regulator and regulatee. Contrary to 
the policy of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, an open procedure 
was provided for the secondments. Special legislative regulation permitted the 
seconded employees to apply for transfer to the authority. The transferred personnel 
were quite experienced, whereas the number of secondary education graduates was 
unjustifiably high. The authority proceeded to the direct hiring of administrative 
personnel ten years after its establishment, as was the case with the Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel. The directly hired personnel were all postgraduate 
degree holders, whereas positions for secondary education graduates were not 
announced.  
 
The Greek Ombudsman is the only constitutional independent authority that provided 
for seconded scientific personnel, apart from direct hiring. However, those who could 
be seconded from the other agencies of the public sector did not pertain to the special 
category of special scientists. Instead, university graduates with at least eight years 
experience in the public sector could be seconded to fill relevant vacant positions. On 
the other hand, the creation of the category of the auxiliary scientific personnel was 
rather arbitrary, and served the purpose of mitigating the rigidness of the civil 
servants’ qualifications index in relation to the high standards provided for the 
positions of the scientific personnel. According to the empirical data ¾ of the total 
number of the special and auxiliary scientific personnel seconded or directly hired 
since the establishment of the authority hold postgraduate (52%), and PhD (28%) 
degrees. However, the remainder is simply university graduates. 
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The large number of resignations of the members of the special scientific and 
auxiliary scientific personnel, and their reappointment to higher educational 
institutions in Greece and abroad, and other positions in the public sector could be 
interpreted as follows: work insecurity felt by personnel during the first years of 
operation because of the working status of private law contracts of definite time, and 
personal professional aspirations and ambitions. Moreover, it seems that the authority 
failed to inspire its personnel, and create a committed corps of bureaucrats as is the 
case with judges. Some members of the scientific personnel have involvement in 
public life, whereas a certain number have been politically involved. On the other 
hand, the phenomenon of seconding members of the scientific personnel to political 
positions, apart from revealing political affiliation, reduces the credibility of the 
institution since this policy seems incompatible with its neutral and independent 
character.  
 
The recruitment of the administrative personnel of the Hellenic Data Protection 
authority was almost exclusively based on direct hiring. On the contrary, the heads of 
two departments were transferred from other agencies of the public sector. The 
graduates of secondary education represent almost a third of the administrative 
personnel, a policy which is unjustifiable for agencies based on expertise. As for the 
scientific personnel, their level of education is high since they all possess postgraduate 
degrees, whereas 44% have PhD degrees. However, resignations are a usual 
phenomenon that seems to hinder the normal operation of the authority. According to 
the annual reports, those resigned seem to have been unsatisfied from their 
remuneration, and career prospects in the authority. 
 
The administrative personnel of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security 
and Privacy were directly hired. The graduates of Technological Education Institutes 
represent 47% of the administrative personnel, whereas only 12% are university 
graduates. The percentage of secondary education graduates is unacceptably high 
(35%). As for the scientific personnel, the phenomenon of resignations is common. 
The authority does not seem to satisfy their aspirations, and serves as an intermediate 
stage in order to continue their career elsewhere. Members of the administrative 
personnel have equally resigned. 
 
The public announcements for the selection of the personnel of the four constitutional 
independent authorities are not always published in the government gazette with the 
exception of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. Most importantly, 
on many occasions, they do not apply a grading system for each one of the selection 
criteria in order to classify the candidates.  Article 1 of the law 3812/2009 abolished 
the autonomy of the constitutional independent authorities in directly hiring their 
personnel, and included them in the group of public sector bodies that fall under the 
ambit of the general recruitment system in the public sector. Could this arrangement 
be interpreted as a signal of distrust of the society towards the credibility and 
transparency of the selection mechanisms adopted by the constitutional independent 
authorities that the executive came to satisfy? It should be pointed out that the new 
measure coincided with the outbreak of the Greek debt crisis that actually blocked 
new appointments in the public sector. A few months later, article 284 par. 6 of the 
law 3852/2010 provided that the forty newly established positions of the scientific 
personnel of the Greek Ombudsman would only be filled through transfers, an internal 
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selection mechanism that additionally diminishes the relational distance between 
regulator and regulatee.   
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Chapter 4 
 
The External at Arm’s-length Relationship: 
The Constitutional Independent Authorities and  
Public Administration 
 
Signs of Regulatory Capture and Inertia? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The qualitative assessment of the external at arm’s-length relationship between 
regulators (principals) and public administration (agents-regulatees), that is, the 
identification of cases of regulatory failure, constitutes the third principal-agent dyad. 
The term regulatory failure refers to the management of cases by the regulator in a 
way that safeguards the regulatee’s interests, thus failing to serve the public interest. 
This, in turn, could finally be the result of regulatory capture, thus implying a 
straightforward allegation of collusion between regulator and regulatee, the latter in 
the double role of public administration-polical decision-makers. Different tools and 
approaches were applied for the identification of cases of regulatory failure of the four 
constitutional independent authorities under research. Thus, positive theoretical 
approaches on the control of the constitutionality of laws by public administration, 
court decisions, publicity through the media, international research findings, annual 
and special reports served as a basis for the identification of cases of regulatory 
failure. The unit is divided into four parts, one for each independent constitutional 
authority, whereas each part comprises further analysis, mostly through case study 
presentations, and a final assessment.  
 
In the case of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, the incidents of 
regulatory failure are identified through the application of a simulative control of the 
constitutionality of laws relating to the regulatory field of the authority. The view 
expressed by a group of Greek legal theorists that public administration, under certain 
preconditions, is legitimized to proceed to the control of the constitutionality of laws 
gave inspiration for this hypothetical experiment. Thus, the implementation of the 
positive theoretical approach permitting the control of the constitutionality of laws by 
the independent authorities served as a means to test the neutrality of the regulator’s 
action. The main idea relies on the identification of specific provisions in the 
legislation on recruitments in the public sector that the authority could have 
challenged in the first place by ruling them unconstitutional for violating the 
constitutional principles of equality and meritocracy. Two facets of these 
infringements are tested regarding their constitutionality. The first facet is related to 
the broadness of the jurisdiction of the authority over recruitments in the public 
sector, that is, clauses providing for partial and pseudo-jurisdiction, as well as 
unjustified exceptions from the general recruitment system, whereas full jurisdiction 
is considered as the ideal case. The second facet corresponds to clauses concerning 
flawed terms of the recruitment procedure itself, irrespective of the type of 
jurisdiction over recruitments. 
 
In the case of the Greek Ombudsman, regulatory failure is tested indirectly through 
the assessment of the exhaustion of its statutory powers of a deterrent character. In 
 226
order to achieve this, it was deemed necessary to briefly present the nature of the 
Ombudsman’s regulatory agency, as well as the principles and values of the 
institution, as described in the introductory texts of the annual reports. On the other 
hand, the acknowledgment, on the part of the regulator, of the existence of intrinsic 
causes of maladministration diachronically rooted in the country combined with the 
tactics of conflict-avoiding regulation makes the detection of the effectiveness of the 
institution difficult. Therefore, the relationship developed between regulator and 
regulatee could only be approached through examining the exhaustion of the 
Ombudsman’s statutory powers of a deterrent character since the institution is also 
considered as a proactive anti-corruption mechanism.  
 
Regulatory literature rejects the idea of assessing agency independence through 
sanctions. However, high levels of corruption in public administration combined with 
the low use of the statutory powers of a deterrent character might, in effect, conceal 
the unwillingness of the regulator to proceed to the use of the sanctions toolkit. In the 
annual reports the Ombudsman acknowledges the existence of corruption in Greek 
public administration as well as his proactive role on the issue. Furthermore, the 
Ombudsman, unlike representatives of other institutions618, does not dispute the 
reliability of the measurement of corruption by International Transparency through 
the Corruption Perception Index issued each year619. Taking these into consideration, 
we attempted to identify the relationship between the levels of corruption in Greece 
for the period 1999-2010, and the degree of the exhaustion of the statutory powers of 
a deterrent character, namely referrals to the prosecutor, by the Ombudsman. The CPI 
scores served as the main source of information for the measurement of corruption in 
Greece on a year-to-year basis. The levels of corruption in the country indicated by 
the CPI scores constitute external evidence that may be tested against analogous 
levels of initiatives of a deterrent character undertaken by the Greek Ombudsman. 
Any mismatch in the analogy between the levels of corruption and the levels of 
initiatives of a deterrent character, that is, high levels of corruption combined with 
significantly low levels of anti-corruption initiatives, rather signal regulatory failure. 
Thus, as a first step, we proceeded to a comparative presentation of the CPI scores 
between Greece and Turkey for the period 1999-2010. Turkey was selected for two 
reasons. First, unlike Greece, it is not considered a consolidated democracy. Second, 
                                                 
618 According to the conclusions of the Research Project entlitled “Views on Corruption in Greece: 
Between “Low Morals” and a “Culture of Compromise” (Lambropoulou, Papamanolis, Ageli, Bakali, 
2008) financed by the European Commission, the Target Groups (Politics, Public Administration, 
Justice, Police, Media, NGOs, Economy) that participated in the research supported the view that “the 
European and international research findings with the CPIs reflect, according to them trends, which 
are not particularly reliable. However, the measurement is not denied or rejected, but it is emphasized 
that more research is needed with the use of other instruments”. On the other hand, according to the 
same research “no groups apart from some interviewees in economy and NGOs accepted that 
corruption in Greece is higher or even much higher than in other developed European countries”. 
619 In the introductive text of the Annual Report for the year 2001 the Ombudsman states: “It is 
indicative that the creation of conditions capable of ensuring transparency in public administration 
has, over the past few years, become a priority on the agendas of supranational organisations such as 
the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, of which 
Greece is a member. It further constitutes the exclusive preoccupation of the private international 
organisation, known as “International Transparency”. Indeed, this organisation annually issues a 
“corruption perception index which has become increasingly influential and particularly significant in 
more mature democracies”. Source: The official website of the Greek Ombudsman, Annual Report for 
the year 2001, available at: http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/564_a.pdf, date of access: 
26.10.2011. 
 227
the institution of the Ombudsman had not yet been established in Turkey during the 
period under research. This comparison could be indicative of whether the presence of 
the institution in Greece impacts on the levels of corruption. Second, the levels of 
corruption in Greece, as reflected in the CPI scores, were, in turn, compared with the 
number of reports the Ombudsman referred to the public prosecutor relating to 
potential acts of corruption in the period from 1998 to 2010.  
 
The Greek Ombudsman’s acceptance of the system of exemptions from the general 
recruitment system, as expressed in the relevant Special Report for the year 2006, is 
also presented as a case study. The Ombudsman’s proposals seem to tolerate at the 
institutional level the perpetuation of clientilistic practices in public administration, 
which, in turn, constitute a facet of corruption. Finally, the lack of a legislative 
initiative and intervention on a consultative basis regarding a regulatory reform on 
recasting, simplification and consolidation of legislation, as well as the lack of 
systematic publicity of the Ombudsman’s findings when the regulatees refuse to 
comply with his recommendations, as means to fight corruption, are briefly presented.   
 
The second part on the Greek Ombudsman attempts to present two characteristic case 
studies of regulatory failure indicative of the way the Ombudsman fulfills his 
institutional role. Both cases refer to his unwillingness to activate his statutory power 
regarding the violation of the duty of assistance. According to the annual reports, the 
Ombudsman has never activated this statutory power since its adoption in 2004. The 
duty of assistance refers to a public servant’s negation to cooperate with the 
Ombudsman with a view to impede or prevent the conduct of an investigation. 
Criminal proceedings may be brought about only after the independent authority 
refers a relevant report to the competent prosecutor. The Ombudsman’s failure to 
enforce the provision is described in a case study regarding the disclosure of the 
opinion no 3273 dated 19.4.2005 of the legal service of the Manpower Employment 
Organisation. The second case study describes and assesses the mediation of the 
Ombudsman as derived from the decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
Tsourlakis v. Greece  
 
In the case of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, the analysis and assessment of 
the decision 27/2007 was selected as a characteristic case study revealing signs of 
probable collusion between regulator and regulatee. It seeks to highlight how the 
unwillingness of a public sector regulatee, that is, universities, to upload on the 
internet the university professors’ selection minutes, was finally justified by the 
regulator on the basis of the disproportionate dissemination of personal data, thus 
completely disregarding the dimension of public interest in the crucial area of higher 
education. More specifically, the authority had to judge upon the permissibility of 
publishing the university professors’ selection minutes in the Internet, apart from their 
publication in a freely accessed special volume explicitly provided for in the law 
2083/1992. The section comprises the following: i) the criticisms and views expressed 
on the decision in a newspaper article and an internet forum, and ii) comments and the 
final assessment of the decision. 
 
In the case of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy, the 
research simply failed to detect incidents of regulatory failure as the regulatory action 
remains incomplete in two respects. First, the authority ex ante fails to audit its main 
public sector regulatee, that is, the National Intelligence Service. Second, a flawed 
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clause deprives the authority of having recourse to legal remedies in the exercise of 
the control of the legality of the rulings and ordinances relating to the terms and 
conditions of the procedure for the waiver of the confidentiality of communications. 
The annual reports, the minutes of parliament, and publicity in the media serve as a 
source of information to describe the inexistent relationship between regulator and 
regulatee. As for the flawed clause, the annual reports and the minutes of parliament 
permit us present the views of the authority supporting the introduction of the measure 
of the legal remedies as well as that of the political decision-makers on the issue.   
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2. The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
 
a. Simulating a contol of the constitutionality of laws relating to the regulatory field 
of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel   
 
The control of the constitutionality of laws is explicitly and exclusively assigned to 
the Courts as provided for in article 93 par. 4 combined with article 100 par. 1, 
subpara. e and par. 4 subparagraph 2 of the Constitution620. However, in recent years 
legal theorists have fervently been discussing over the issue of the legitimacy of the 
executive branch of government, that is, public administration, to proceed to the 
control of the constitutionality of laws621 (Chrysogonos, 1989 and 2010; 
Vogiatzoglou, 2005; Mathioudakis, 2006; Tsiliotis, 2010). Those supporting the 
positive approach on the issue argue that all the independent authorities, whose 
function is provided for in legislation irrespective of their consolidation in the 
Constitution, may proceed to the control of the constitutionality of laws.  
 
Based on Tachos’s (2005) proposal622, we will implement a simulative control of the 
constitutionality of laws relating to the regulatory field of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel. More specifically, this process will enable us to identify 
specific provisions that the members of the authority could have challenged and 
probably overturned through their intervention, that is, the control of constitutionality, 
on the basis of the violation of the constitutional principles of equality and 
meritocracy. Futhermore, the process will facilitate the identification of the 
relationship developed between the regulator, that is, the principal-authority, and the 
regulatee, that is, the agent-public administration.  
 
The violation of the constitutional principles of equality and meritocracy623 within the 
field of regulation of recruitments in the public sector, as prescribed in the relevant 
legislation, may have two facets. The first facet is related to the partial and pseudo-
jurisdiction of the authority over recruitments, as well as the unjustified broadening of 
the circle of exceptions from the general recruitment system. In these cases the 
legislator usurps the “full control” of recruitments from the regulator, thus violating 
the constitutional principles of equality and meritocracy. The term “full jurisdiction” 
means that all the stages of the recruitment procedure, either through competitive 
                                                 
620 Regarding the control of the constitutionality of laws in Greece, Stathopoulos (2009) states: “The 
monitoring of the constitutionality of laws (control of their compliance with the Constitution) is carried 
out by all the courts, but only as to the specific case which is before them. The courts do not deprive the 
law which they judge to be unconstitutional of its force; they simply do not apply it in the case which 
they are hearing. There is only one court which can annul a law (with general applicability and beyond 
the case being heard): the Special Supreme Court (Article 100 of the Constitution). However, the 
Special Supreme Court has this power only in a few instances, more specifically (Article 100, par. 1, 
subparagraph (e) and par. 4, subparagraph 2 of the Constitution), when contradictory decisions as to 
the constitutionality of a law have been issued by the supreme courts of the three jurisdictions which 
exist in Greece (the Council of State, that is, the supreme administrative court, the Court of Cassation 
of Areios Pagos, and the Court of Audit”. 
621 See Appendix 1 for an analysis on the relevant theoretical debate. 
622 See Appendix 1. 
623 The principle of meritocracy in relation to the access of citizens to posts of the public administration 
is safeguarded by article 103, par. 7 of the revised Constitution of 2001. However, the Council of State 
deduced this principle, before its introduction in the Constitution, from articles 5 par. 1 and 4 par. 1 of 
the Constitution by linking it to “the rule-of-law State and the under equal terms guarantee of the 
principle of the free development of the individual’s personality” (Papadopoulou, 2005) . 
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entry examination or by selection according to predefined and objective criteria, are 
exclusively handled by the regulator without the intervention of the regulatee. The 
regulator’s full jurisdiction over recruitments in the public sector, with the exception 
of special categories of personnel (e.g. judges, university professors, etc), formulates a 
zero relationship with the regulatee, which is the ideal case in the regulation of 
recruitments in the public sector. Thus, the regulator has contact with the regulatee 
only once, that is, in the initial stage when the regulatee submits a request to the 
regulator in order to fill vacant positions of the organisational chart of an agency. On 
the contrary, provisions permitting partial or pseudo-juridiction over recruitments 
might lead to a complex relationship with the regulatee that might probably cause 
regulatory failure.  
 
The second facet corresponds to provisions relating to specific terms of the 
recruitment procedure that violate the constitutional principles of equality and 
meritocracy, albeit under the regime of full jurisdiction. In these cases, even if there is 
no visible relationship between regulator and regulatee, the political decision-makers 
formulate the specific legal framework that will be applied by the regulator. Thus, 
such unconstitutional provisions, in case they are not ruled as such by the authority,  
bypass the regulator, and meet the interests of the political decision-makers coinciding 
with the regulatee-public administration.  
 
b. The first facet: Cases relating to the type of jurisdiction over recruitments 
 
i. The concept of full jurisdiction over recruitments in the public sector 
 
The full jurisdiction over recruitments in the public sector, either through competitive 
entry examination or by selection according to predefined and objective criteria, 
constitutes the ideal type of regulation since it is consistent with the constitutional 
principles of equality and meritocracy. The authority is the only actor during all the 
stages of the competitive selection procedures, that is, the regulatee has no 
intervention. In the case of contests in order of priority, namely selection according to 
predefined and objective criteria, the procedure, exclusively reserved for the authority, 
comprises the following stages: the formulation of the public announcement, its 
publication in the government gazette, the processing of the results, and the 
competence to answer to any objections filed by the candidates.  
 
ii. The concept of partial jurisdiction over recruitments in the public sector 
 
The type of partial jurisdiction applies in the case of contests in order of priority, and  
was initially provided for the temporary personnel624. Partial jurisdiction consists of 
the following stages: i) the public sector body, that is, the regulatee, formulates the 
text of the public announcement and sends it to the authority for control in order to 
obtain the final approval for publication in the government gazette, ii) the candidates 
submit all the required documents to the public sector body, iii) the public sector body  
drafts the selection lists, that is, it issues the provisional results, and sends them to the 
authority for the ex-post control of the formal and substantial legality of the lists, iv) 
unsuccessful candidates may file their objections to the authority, v) the public sector 
body proceeds to the publication of the appointments to the government gazette after 
                                                 
624 Article 21 of the law 2190/1994. 
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the approval of the final selection lists by the authority. In any case, the decisions of 
the authority may be appealed to the administrative courts. The stage of  the ex post 
control, which seems to be the most crucial, deprives the authority from the ex ante 
full overview of the processing of the results. All the required documents submitted 
by the candidates are gathered, and assessed by the regulatee. The regulator simply 
controls the selection lists, which might be misleading, and thus capture might be 
facilitated. Obvious mistakes contained in the selection lists or the filing of objections 
from unsuccessful candidates give the regulator the opportunity to proceed to 
substantial control, that is, ask for the submission of all the necessary documents in 
order to verify the correctness of the final results. The type of partial jurisdiction over 
the recruitment of temporary personnel seems to have been practically unavoidable625. 
On the contrary, applying partial jurisdiction over the recruitment of permanent 
employees for certain public sector bodies in parallel with full jurisdiction for others 
seems to violate the constitutional principles of equality and meritocracy. In other 
words, the regulator implements two different types of recruitment control for the 
same category of personnel.  
 
The law 2527/1997 introduced the implementation of partial jurisdiction626 over the 
recruitment of the permanent and on private law contract of indefinite time 
administrative personnel of first and second-level local government enterprises, as 
well as the administrative personnel of all types of public enterprises627 and the 
subsidiaries of public enterprises and banks. It should be noted that these public 
bodies had been initially exempted from the general recruitment system. However, the 
law 2527/1997 also initiated the gradual detachment of full jurisdiction over the 
recruitment of permanent employees, those on private law contracts of indefinite time 
included, from the authority. The case of first and second-level local government 
authorities is of interest. A series of legislative amendments of the founding law 
2190/1994 on recruitments gradually introduced the type of partial jurisdiction over 
the selection of the permanent personnel of this category of agencies628. Partial 
                                                 
625 Partial jurisdiction seems to have been practically unavoidable for the recruitment of temporary 
personnel for the following reasons: i) the time-limited duration of the employment, that is, mainly 
eight-month contracts, presupposes speed in the selection procedure since it would have been 
impossible for the regulator in a month’s time to proceed to the processing of the huge number of 
recruitment requests coming from various public sector bodies, the gathering of the candidates’ 
documents, and the issue of the results, and ii) even if partial jurisdiction might raise reservations in 
relation to its transparency, the category of temporary personnel is not crucial for the functioning of 
public administration.   
626 Article 1, par. 3 of the law 2527/1997. 
627 The gradual privatization of public enterprises and organizations in the 2000s inevitably excluded 
them from the general recruitment system in case the State participated with less than 50% in their 
funding. Article 13 par. 1 of the law 3429/2005, regulated the system of the recruitment of the 
personnel of those enterprises and organisations that still remained under the control of the State. Joint 
ministerial decisions further specified the recruitment system for each enterprise. The Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel kept partial jurisdiction over the recruiments, albeit in the form of the 
control of legality.  
628 The law 2539/1997 defined that partial jurisdiction would apply for the personnel of the 
contributory services (mainly cleansing personnel) of first-level local government authorities. The same 
system was extented to the rest of the personnel of the said agencies with the exception of the 
categories UE Administration, UE Financial, TE Administration-Accounting, and SE Administration 
Secretaries (law 3013/2002). These exceptions were finally abolished by the law 3274/2004, and thus 
all the permanent personnel of first-level local government authorities were selected under the system 
of partial jurisdiction. The law 3345/2005 introduced the same system for the filling of permanent 
positions in second-level local government authorities. 
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jurisdiction629 was also extended to certain categories of the permanent personnel630 of 
hospitals, health centres, and the National Centre for Emergency Care. However, a 
new regulation in 2004631 restricted partial jurisdiction to the category of nursery 
personnel.  
 
Since the establishment of the system of partial jurisdiction over the recruitment of the 
permanent personnel of the aforementioned public sector bodies, the authority has 
exposed in its annual reports a series of problems arising from its application.  The 
regulatees showed reluctance to comply with the rules set forth by the relevant 
legislation, and the recommendations of the regulator. As a result, there were long 
delays in the processing of the stages of the procedure632, due to the problematic 
relationship between regulator-regulatee, a relationship which could have been 
avoided in the first place. The regulatee became part of the procedure, and had to be 
persuaded.  On the other hand, it remains unknown as to whether the regulator finally 
achieves to avoid capture by the regulatee. The authority failed to rule the system of 
partial jurisdiction unconstitutional. In the annual reports for the years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008 the authority simply restricted itself to propose that it should take under its 
full jurisdiction the recruitment of the personnel of these public sector bodies.  
 
iii. The concept of pseudo-jurisdiction over recruitments in the public sector 
 
The type of pseudo-jurisdiction over recruitments in the public sector refers to a 
procedure that almost approaches the category of exceptions from the general 
recruitment system established by the law 2190/1994. Special legislative regulations 
provide for the selection procedure. In such cases, the regulator simply offers an 
external guarantee to the procedure, that is, a hint of legitimacy. This guarantee varies 
depending on the occasion, and the following alternatives may occur: i) the authority 
nominates one of its members as President or member to the selection committee, 
constituted in all other respects by decision of the regulatee, ii) the authority simply 
controls the formal legality of the procedure, that is, it cannot proceed to the full and 
substanstial control of the documents submitted by the candidates in order to audit the 
real possession of the qualifications and qualities that define their classification rank 
in the selection lists, iii) the regulatee submits the minutes of the assessment 
procedure to the authority on a purely informative basis.  A combination of these 
alternatives may also occur. However, the participation of a Councillor of the 
authority to these selection committees, and the competence of the authority to control 
ex post the procedure leads to a conflict of interest situation. Five characteristic cases 
are briefly presented hereafter.  
 
The case of the non administrative and workers technical personnel of certain public 
sector bodies: The technical, in its broad sense, and the worker technical personnel of 
                                                 
629 Article 24, par. 2 of the law 2716/1999, as amended by article 19 par. 8 of the law 3106/2003. 
630 Doctors were exempted. It included the following specialties: nursery personnel, medical laboratory 
technologists, manufacturers, radiology personnel, operators-printers, operators of medical devices, 
operators of medical equipment, ambulance crews, social workers, physiotherapists, early childhood 
nannies, and occupational therapists. 
631 Article 27 of the law 3293/2004. 
632 Article 10, par. 8 of the law 3051/2002 provides for the disciplinary and penal (article 259 of the 
Penal Code) liability of the elected organs of local government authorities violating their obligation to 
draft, hung on notice boards, and submit in due time to the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel the relevant selection lists.  
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the full-fledged and joint enterprises of the first and second-level local government 
authorities - where the agency possesses, directly or indirectly, at least 50% of their 
share capital – as well as the same category of personnel of all forms of public 
enterprises and banks with their subsidiaries were exempted from the general 
recruitment system633. The authority simply exercised the control of legality in 
relation to the selection procedure. Papadopoulou (2005) states that “these exceptions 
cover a large part of the labour market, and were considered as a means offering 
deviation from the general recruitment system of the law 2190/1994”. 
 
The case of work contracts with natural persons: The type of control the authority 
exercises over the legality of the conclusion of work contracts with natural persons634 
in public sector agencies is particular. More specifically, all the approving decisions 
of work contracts with natural persons should be notified to the Supreme Council for 
the Selection of Personnel. The authority has the jurisdiction to control the legality of 
the work contracts in the sense that they do not conceal dependent work. In case the 
authority notes that the work contracts cover fixed and permanent needs that should 
have been dealt with the hiring of temporary employees on private law contract of 
definite time, it refers its findings to the competent bodies for the imposition of 
sanctions635.   
 
It is obvious that the control on work contracts is not preventive, and thus the 
authority has to act on its own initiative through inspections, or upon complaint by 
citizens. The unit of the annual reports dedicated to inspections related to the control 
of the legality of work contracts show that they were not initiated ex officio. In the 
majority of cases the inspections were exercised upon citizens’ complaints. In a few 
cases the authority intervened as a result of the reports of inspections of the Public 
Administration Controllers. Therefore, the authority seemed reluctant to act ex officio, 
despite the fact that it was not difficult to detect infringement cases through the 
approving decisions notified by the public sector agencies themselves.  
 
In its annual reports the authority admitted that work contracts constitute a way to 
circumvent the general recruitment system, thus restoring the regime of clientelistic 
practices. The case of the recruitment of the personnel of the Citizen Service Centres 
was extraordinary (Law 3260/2004, art. 15, par. 1). It permitted the recruitment of 
natural persons on work contracts for a pilot period of twenty-four months, whereas 
that type of employment was incompatible with the administrative duties assumed by 
the personnel. On the other hand, the recruitment procedure was fully exempted from 
the control of the authority. The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
simply recommended that recruitments on work contracts should be under its 
                                                 
633 Article 1, par. 3 of the law 2527/1997. 
634 Article 6 of the law 2527/1997 regulates the conclusion of work contracts with natural persons in 
services and legal entities of the public sector. According to the Greek Civil Code, the term work 
contract refers to the execution of a project from one party (contractor) in favour of another (employer) 
against remuneration. Work means the achievement of any outcome (e.g. construction, repair or 
maintenance of goods, offering of services, compilation of a study). Renewal or extention of the work 
contract is forbidden, whereas the legal service or the legal councillor of the public sector agency, as 
employer, should certify that the work contract is genuine and does not conceal dependent work, thus 
covering fixed and permanent needs of the public sector agency. 
635 The heads of services or other competent bodies violating the provisions for the conclusion of work 
contracts are prosecuted for breach of duty under private prosecution or ex officio, and are 
compulsorily referred to the relevant disciplinary jurisdiction (article 21 par. 16 of the law 2190/1994).  
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jurisdiction as with the case of temporary employees. It never ruled the relevant 
provisions unconstitutional. 
 
The case of the Ministry of Environment, Planning, and Public Works: Two months 
before the national elections of March 7, 2004, the governing party, PASOK, passed 
the law 3212/2003. Article 20 provided for the creation of 900 positions on private 
law contracts of indefinite time for the needs of the services of the Central Service and 
the General Secretariat of Public Works of the Ministry. The personnel would handle 
issues relating to anti-quake planning and protection, rehabilitation of physical 
disaster stricken, and execution of special works and provision of special services on 
environmental issues. Interestingly enough, par. 3 of the article, provided that the said 
personnel were allowed, upon request followed by the concurrent opinion of the 
relevant service councils, to be transferred to first and second-level local government 
authorities or the Regions. The Minister of Environment, Planning, and Public Works 
issued on January 9, 2004 a ministerial decision defining the special qualifications 
required for the positions, as well as details on the selection procedure. Hiring would 
take place by selection according to predefined criteria. The assessment committees, 
five in total, would be constituted by employees of the Ministry, whereas its President 
was a member of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel nominated by 
the President of the authority. The unsuccessful candidates could file their objections. 
The committees would draft the assessment minutes, and submit them to the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel on a purely informative basis. The Minister 
issued two public announcements for the filling of the aforementioned positions on 
January 14, 2004636. The selection procedure was completed, and the successful 
candidates were appointed to the 900 vacant positions. 
 
The case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Articles 120 and 128 of the law 
3566/2007, passed by the New Democracy government, amended the Organisational 
Chart of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in relation to the selection procedure and the 
required special qualifications of the administrative personnel of the categories and 
branches UE and TE Administration, and SE Administration Secretaries. A central 
five-member selection committee would be constituted upon decision of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. Hiring would take place by competitive entry examination (written 
and oral examination). The Directorate for Personnel of the Ministry would formulate 
the text of the public announcement and send it to the authority in order to control the 
formal legality before its publication in the government gazette. The relevant selection 
lists with the successful candidates would be also sent to the authority for the control 
of legality. Before the amendment all the selection procedures relating to the 
administrative personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were realised by the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. A relevant selection procedure 
following the new provisions was never activated.  
 
The cases of the Court of Audit and other services pertaining to the Ministry of 
Justice: These cases refer to two legislative regulations circumventing the Supreme 
                                                 
636 The Public Announcement no 1041 for the filling of 56 positions (Government Gazette, vol. 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel), and the Public Announcement no ∆16β/015/9/Φ.4.1.7 
for the filling of 798 positions were published (Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel, no 1, 14.1.2004). The President of the Supreme Council for the Selection 
Personnel nominated the President of the selection committees according to the documents 
640/13.1.2004 and 643/13.1.2004 invoked in the text of the aforementioned public announcement. 
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Council for the Selection of Personnel through the pseudo-jurisdiction regime. Article 
24, par. 8 of the law 3202/2003, passed by the PASOK government, provided that a 
number of vacant positions of the Court of Audit pertaining to certain categories of 
personnel637 would be filled in derogation of the provisions in force concerning the 
general recruitment system in the public sector. A joint ministerial decision of the 
Ministers of Justice, Finance, and the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation further specified the required qualifications, and the selection 
procedure. Hiring would take place by selection according to predefined criteria and 
an interview. The Selection Committee would forward the results to the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel for the control of legality. The Minister of 
Justice issued a public announcement for the filling of 70 positions of the category 
and branch UE Economists on October 4, 2005638. The selection procedure was 
completed, and the successful candidates were appointed to the 70 vacant positions639. 
 
Article 72 of the law 3659/2008, passed by the New Democracy government, 
provided that a number of vacant positions pertaining to certain categories of 
personnel640 of various services under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice would 
be filled in derogation of the provisions in force concerning the general recruitment 
system in the public sector. Two joint ministerial decisions of the Ministers of Justice 
and Finance further specified the required qualifications, and the selection procedure. 
Hiring would take place by selection according to predefined social criteria for the 
positions of compulsory education, whereas the positions of the categories of 
University Education and Secondary Education would be filled by competitive entry 
examination (written examination and interview). A selection committee presided 
over by a high-ranking judicial official on active service or retired would be 
constituted upon decision of the Minister of Justice. A representative of the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel with his alternate would be nominated by the 
President of the Authority. The selection lists, accompanied by the minutes and the 
applications of the candidates, would be forwarded to the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel for contol. The Committee would proceed to any corrections 
indicated by the authority and draft the final selection lists. The Minister issued two 
public announcements for the filling of the aforementioned positions641. The relevant 
selection procedure was completed.  
 
                                                 
637 The new positions were distributed as follows: UE Economists (120 positions), SE Computer 
Operators (24 positions). The same selection procedure would be applied for all the other categories of 
personnel that still remained vacant. 
638 The Public Announcement no 1/2005 (Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel, no 405, 4.10.2005). 
639 Government Gazette, vol. C, no 355/24.10.2006. 
640 These categories comprised: UE Translators-Interpreters, UE and TE Informatics at the Central 
Service of the Ministry of Justice, 50 positions of the category and branch CE Bailiffs, and 156 
positions of court employees distributed as follows: UE Secretaries (80 positions), UE Administration-
Finance (4 positions), SE Secretaries (70 positions), SE Administration-Accounting (2 positions). 
641 The Public Announcement no 111648 was published for the filling of 44 positions of the category 
and branch CE Bailiffs. According to the Annual Report for the year 2008, one Councillor with his 
alternate was nominated as member of the Selection Committee. They were appointed in April 2009. 
(Government Gazette, vol. C, no 292, 27.4.2009). The Public Announcement no 5223 was published 
for the filling of 148 positions (Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel, no 23, 2.2.2009). According to the Annual Report for the year 2009, one Councillor with his 
alternate was nominated as member of the Selection Committee. 
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The case of the Ministry of National Defence: Article 33 of the law 3648/2008 
supplemented the Organisational Chart of the political personnel of the Ministry of 
National Defence in relation to the selection procedure of the scientific personnel. A 
joint ministerial decision issued by the Ministers of National Defence and Interior , 
Public Administration and Decentralisation further specified the required 
qualifications, and the selection procedure in derogation of article 19 of the general 
recruitment system (law 2190/1994) regarding the selection of scientific personnel. A 
three-member selection committee would be constituted upon decision of the Minister 
of National Defence. Hiring would take place by selection according to predefined 
criteria. The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel would proceed to the 
control of legality and ratify the results within ten days after their submission to the 
authority. In case the deadline expired without the ratification of the selection lists, the 
concurrent opinion of the authority would be presumed, and the Ministry would 
proceed to the appointment of those finally selected.  
 
The Minister of National Defence issued a public announcement for the filling of the 
aforementioned positions on January 27, 2009642. Many unsuccessful candidates 
submitted their complaints to the Greek Ombudsman. The authority judged that the 
procedure lacked transparency643, and forwarded its findings to the Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel that had jurisdiction over the issue. The authority, after 
the control of legality, refused to ratify the results, and the Minister of National 
Defence under the newly elected PASOK government annulled the examination in 
September 2010. Interestingly enough, the annulment coincided with the Greek debt 
crisis, and the general suspension of appointments in the public sector. 
 
In all the aforementioned characteristic cases, the authority failed to rule these 
legislative regulations unconstitutional.  By issuing a decision of its Major Plenary, it 
could have ex ante blocked their implementation. The Council of State should have to 
make final decisions over these issues in case the competent Minister used legal 
remedies against the decisions of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel.    
The authority simply restricted itself to point out in its annual report for the year 2007 
that, according to the revised Constitution of 2001644, it is impermissible to 
                                                 
642 The Ministerial Decision of the public announcement no 246263 was published for the filling of 55 
positions of special scientific personnel on private law contract of indefinite time (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 92, 27.1.2009).  
643 The authority in its letter addressed to the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel and 
notified to the Ministry of Defence judged that candidates who did not fulfil the required formal 
qualifications unjustifiably participated at the stage of the interview, whereas the minutes of the 
Committee did not fully justify its decision concerning the rejection of candidates at the stage of the 
interview. Letter of the Greek Ombudsman to the Ministry of Defence, Source: The Official Website of 
the Greek Ombudsman, available at: http://www.synigoros.gr/pdf_01/8464_1_EPISTOLH_STP.pdf, 
date of access: 26.10.2011. 
644 Article 103, par. 7 of the revised Constitution of 2001 reads as follows: “Engagement of servants in 
the Public Administration and in the wider Public Sector, as this is defined each time, with the 
exception of cases under paragraph 5, shall take place either by competitive entry examination or by 
selection on basis of predefined and objective criteria, and shall be subject to the control of an 
independent authority, as specified by law. The law may provide for special selection procedures that 
are subject to increased guarantees of transparency and meritocracy, or for special procedures for 
personnel selection to posts whose activities are subject to special constitutional guarantees or are 
similar to a mandate”. Moreover, article 118 par. 6 of the revised Constitution of 2001 provides that  
“Exceptions from the competence of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel provided for 
or maintained in the law 2190/1994, as in force, [before the entry into force of the new constitution], 
continue to apply”. 
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promulgate new legislative or other provisions of normative nature regarding 
recruitments in the public sector, thus bypassing it. However, the authority 
participated in these procedures in the case of the Ministry of the Environment, 
Planning, and Public Works, and in the cases of the Court of Audit and the various 
services supervised by the Ministry of Justice.  The refusal to ratify the results in the 
case of the Ministry of the Defence was rather a result of the unfavourable economic 
and political juncture for the country. In the case of the non administrative and 
workers technical personnel, the authority simply proposed the abolition of this 
exception in its annual report for the year 1999645. Indeed, the issue was finally 
regulated by article 10, par. 5 of the law 3051/2002, at a time when the wave of 
privatizations had already started.  
 
The legislative regulation regarding the administrative personnel of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is of special interest.  Before its entry into force, two different 
opinions had been formulated during the elaboration of the relevant Presidential 
Decree at the Council of State. The competent Department of the Council of State 
opined that the limitation of the competence of the authority to the simple control of 
legality of the public announcement and the selection lists with the successful 
candidates was contrary to the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Because of the 
seriousness of the case, the Department referred it to the competent plenary formation. 
Interestingly enough, the latter supported the regulation based on a rather unorthodox 
argumentation. More specifically, it opined that the simple control of legality was 
acceptable in cases of competitive entry examinations carried out by the interested 
public sector agencies. Therefore, any new clauses that entered into force after the 
constitutional revision of 2001 providing only for the control of legality646, and are 
contrary to clauses of laws as in force before the constitutional revision of 2001 
providing that certain positions should be filled according to the provisions of the law 
2190/1994, that is, after an examination carried out by the authority647, are in force 
and are not in contrast with the new constitutional provisions. The Court finally 
concluded that taking also into consideration article 118 par. 6 of the revised 
Constitution of 2001 it cannot be deduced at all that the constitutional legislator 
adopted a prohibition of the limitation of the competences of the authority as in force 
at the time of the revision of the Constitution since this is not explicitly provided for. 
In other words, the Court based this imaginative interpretation on the fact that the 
constitutional legislator should have otherwise explicitly regulated that, as is the case 
with article 118 par. 6 on the maintenance of exceptions, any competences of the 
authority as in force before the constitutional revision, continued to apply. Therefore, 
the Court accepted forms of pseudo-jurisdiction over recruitments, and disregarded 
the explicit constitutional demand for the control over recruitments by an independent 
authority, as prescribed in article 103, par. 7.  
 
The authority expressed its strong reservations over the opinion of the Council of 
State in the annual report for the year 2007 since it hindered the authority from 
                                                 
645 Annual Report for the year 1999 (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 286, 12.3.2003). 
646 Control of legality refers to the control of the public announcement and the selection lists forwarded 
to the authority by public sector bodies. 
647 It should be reminded that the recruitment of the administrative personnel of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was under the full jurisdiction of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. 
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proceeding to the substantial control of the procedure648. However, it could have ruled 
it unconstitutional since the opinion of the Council of State in the elaboration of 
Presidential Decrees has a consultative character. Therefore, the competent Minister 
should have to appeal to the Council of State for the final decision.  
   
iv. The exceptions from the jurisdiction of the authority 
 
A series of exceptions from the general recruitment system649 are reserved for certain 
categories of employees (judges, university professors, researchers, members of the 
armed forces, diplomats, doctors of the National Health System, revocable employees, 
special collaborators and advisors etc). These exceptions were considered necessary 
either because a special entry procedure with increased guarantees was provided for 
(e.g. judges, lawyers with a salary mandate) or because the nature of their duties was 
not compatible with the general recruitment system of the law 2190/1994 (e.g. artists, 
writers). In its annual reports the authority refers to the regime of exceptions pointing 
out that a part of them, especially those adopted by the initial law 2190/1994, are 
objectively justified, and are generally acceptable. However, even the initial law 
contained a provision that all categories of the personnel of the full-fledged or joint 
enterprises of local government authorities were, unjustifiably in our opinion, 
exempted.   
 
A series of additional exceptions were gradually introduced, and the authority 
aknowledged that they had neither objective support, nor substantial justificatory 
basis. Interestingly enough, article 1, par. 12 of the law 2527/1997 provided that by 
decision of the Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation 
and the competent Minister, adopted upon recommendation of the Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel, public sector agencies or categories of personnel that 
are exempted may fall, fully or partly, within the scope of the general recruiment 
system of the law 2190/1994. The authority neither put pressure for the 
implementation of this option nor  challenged the unjustifiable exceptions through a 
decision ruling them unconstitutional.  
 
c. The second facet: Cases relating to the terms of the recruitment procedure 
 
The second facet corresponds to provisions violating the consitutional principles of 
equality and meritocracy in relation to the terms of the recruitment procedure. Four 
characteristic cases are presented hereafter. 
 
i. The discrimination of specialties in competitive entry examinations  
 
Competitive entry examination represented, at least in the beginning, the cornerstone 
of the general recruitment system. However, the law 2190/1994650 provided that only 
administrative positions of the categories of University, Technological, and Secondary 
education would be filled by competitive entry examination. More specifically, 
bachelor graduates in law, political or economic sciences, sociology, business 
administration, archives and library science, accounting, and graduates of faculties of 
                                                 
648 Substantial control refers to the access of the authority to all the documents submitted by the 
candidates in order to prove their formal qualifications. 
649 Article 14 par. 2 of the law 2190/1994. 
650 Article 15, par. 1 of the law 2190/1994. 
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philosophy and education fell under the ambit of the provision. On the contrary, 
technical positions651, in the broad sense, of the categories of University, 
Technological, and Secondary education would be filled by selection according to 
predefined and objective criteria. Therefore, there is discrimination in relation to the 
specialties since the candidates for administrative positions have to bear the burden of 
psychological suffering through an additional examinination. Papadopoulou (2005) 
argues that the reason for this discrimination should be sought in extra-legal criteria, 
as is the power of certain chambers and bodies. The authority never called into 
question the arrangement. 
 
ii. The case of the panhellenic competitive entry examination of the year 1998  
 
The results of the panhellenic comptetitive entry examination of the year 1998 
provoked tremendous reactions on the part of unsuccessful candidates who appealed 
to the administrative courts. The issue attracted publicity and extensive coverage by 
the media. The judgements 2396-2398/2004 of the Council of State in Plenum ruled 
unconstitutional three provisions regulating the terms of the selection procedures 
regarding panhellenic competitive entry examinations652. All these provisions were 
judged incompatible with the constitutional principles of meritocracy and equality 
since they provided that i) the candidates could express a preference for only one 
prefecture, ii) they were additionally restricted to declare a preference for maximum 
ten public sector agencies within the one prefecture they opted for appointment, and 
iii) the candidates would be selected based on a quota of 50% for each type of lyceum, 
that is graduates of technical and general lyceums, thus disregarding the criterion of 
the best performing candidates. 
 
While the cases were still pending in courts, and before the publication of the 
aforementioned final judgements of the Council of State in 2004, the common 
legislator proceeded to the deletion of the limitation of one prefecture and ten public 
sector agencies653 (article 6, par. 2 of the law 3051/2002). Furthermore, article 1, par. 
6 of the law 3051/2002 showed the political will for the substantial abolition of the 
written examination as a selection procedure in the public sector. It restricted its 
application in cases of special branches of personnel upon request of the public sector 
agency. As for the solution given in the case of the competitive entry examination of 
the year 1998, article 5 of the law 3200/2005 provided the drawing up of a new 
panhellenic selection list after the submission of new applications of preferences by 
the unsuccessful candidates. In other words, those who had been initially appointed 
with lower scores were not affected by the measure, and remained in their positions.  
 
                                                 
651 According to article 18 of the law 2190/1994, the term refers to the specialties of archeologist, 
political engineer, chemist, electrical engineer, agronomist, geologist or agricultural technicians, 
doctor, psychologist, veterinarian, inspector of public health, food technologist, dental technician, and 
gaffer.  
652 See Appendix 1, text 2 for an analysis of the rationale of the judgements of the Council of State.  
653 Apart from the case of the examination of the year 1998, unsuccessful candidates appealed against 
relevant selection procedures. According to the Annual Report for the year 2004, more than 120 
applications of annulment were submitted to the administrative courts against the public announcement 
15/2Γ/2002 for the filling of 709 positions at the Ministry of Finance through a panhellenic competitive 
entry examination. The candidates once more appealed against the limitation of preference for one 
prefecture, as well as the limitation of preference for ten public sector agencies by prefecture.  
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Interestingly enough, in the annual reports for the years 1998654, and 2000655, the 
authority had already admitted that both the quota system in relation to the type of 
lyceum, as well as the system of the limitation of preferences for one prefecture, and 
ten public sector agencies violated the constitutional principles of equality and 
meritocracy. It simply suggested that the common legislator should abolish the 
relevant unconstitutional provisions. However, it failed to block ex ante the 
implementation of the relevant provisions by ruling them unconstitutional. 
  
iii. The home-grown candidates’ criterion for the hiring of temporary personnel 
 
Article 21 of the law 2190/1994 regulates the selection procedure for the hiring of 
temporary personnel in public sector agencies, that is, personnel on private law 
contracts of definite time. The candidates for these positions are classified in selection 
lists by specialty based on the home-grown candidates’ criterion, irrespective of their 
ranking if all the other criteria were assessed. Thus, those citizens who are enrolled in 
the registers of a certain municipality or community have priority in the selection lists 
when the public sector agency that hires is the said municipality, or community, or a 
municipal or community enterprise or a public law legal entity or foundation 
pertaining to the said municipality or community. If the public sector agency that 
hires is a public sector agency or a public law legal entity (municipalies or 
communities exempted), the candidates enrolled in the registers of a municipality or 
community of the prefecture where the public sector agency that hires is located have 
priority in the selection lists. The measure obviously violates the constitutional 
principle of equality, and probably serves clientelistic purposes especially in the case 
of hirings in municipalities or communities. However, it was never ruled 
unconstitutional by the authority. 
 
iv. Privileged ensuring of experience in public sector agencies 
 
A series of provisions656 introduced the privileged treatment of candidates with 
previous work experience in public sector agencies as temporary employees or 
apprentices. Therefore, experience as one of the selection criteria for the filling of 
permanent positions, if obtained in public sector agencies, was double counted 
compared to that obtained in the private sector. In its annual report for the year 
2007657 the authority stated that those clauses providing for a privileged marking 
increased by 50% for experience obtained in public sector agencies under work 
contracts or STAGE programmes should be abolished. The report further pointed out 
                                                 
654 The Annual Report for the year 1998, p. 3475-3476. 
655 The Annual Report for the year 2000, p. 3534. 
656 The idea for the privileged ensuring of experience obtained in public sector agencies was introduced   
by the law 3051/2002. The increase in the estimation of a candidate’s previous experience in the public 
sector agency that hired personnel to permanent positions initially amounted to 40%. Article 2 par. 1 of 
the law 3320/2005 extended the arrangement to any experience obtained in duties of the same or 
similar specialty with the permanent position to be filled, either on private law contracts or work 
contracts, in any public sector agency that fell under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel. The increase in the relevant estimation amounted to 50% under the 
precondition that the candidate had at least worked for 24 months (consecutive or not). Finally, 
participation in programmes for the acquisition of working experience (STAGE) of the Manpower 
Employement Organization was equally considered as time of experience. Article 11, par. 3 of the law 
3613/2007 extended the deadline of the application of the measure until December 31, 2010. 
657 The Annual Report for the year 2007, p. 37822-37823. 
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that experience should be avoided as a formal criterion of appointment since it leads 
to the violation of the principle of equity towards those candidates who do not have 
the possibility to get hired under work contractss or partipate in STAGE programmes 
where the selection of candidates is not under the control of the authority. As for the 
experience obtained in STAGE programmes, the authority stressed in its report that it 
is rather fictitious since the participants in these programmes are employed as 
apprentices, and thus they are less employed in real work. The authority once more 
acknowledged the unconstitutionality of these clauses in its annual report. However, it 
failed to rule them unconstitutional, thus preventing their implementation.   
 
d. The Greek debt crisis and the reform of the recruitment system in the public sector 
 
The law 3812/2009 on the “Reform of the recruitment system in the public sector” 
was promulgated on December 2009, that is, at the beginning of the Greek debt crisis. 
It seems that it was part of the broader public sector rationalization scheme. The 
Explanatory Report on the draft law submitted to Parliament658 stated that the basic 
axes of the proposed draft law was i) the inclusion of the whole spectrum of the public 
sector under the full jurisdiction of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel659, and ii) the restoration of injustices and internal imbalances within the 
current recruitment system, so as to redress transparency, objectivity, and meritocracy 
in hiring. But, ironically, the reform in the recruitment system would remain inactive, 
that is, an arrangement with a rather symbolic significance in the electorate’s 
conscience. The public sector rationalization scheme would be simoultaneously 
accompanied by the privatization, disbandment or merger of public sector agencies, 
the reorganization of public services, the outsourcing of certain competences, and the 
inevitable firing of thousands of the surplus personnel. It seems that the reform in the 
recruitment system came too late simply because the recruitment of permanent 
personnel will be rare in the future. Thus, the measure rather institutionalized the 
collapse of the remaining clientelistic practices at a time when the political clientele 
was vanishing. 
 
In the annual reports for the years 2009 and 2010 the authority stated that its role was 
restored, whereas it expressed its vindication since it had repeatedly proposed a series 
of regulations that were finally incorporated into the new law. However, in effect, the 
authority had limited itself to the simple observation of distortions in the recruitment 
system through the annual reports without making use of its functional independence. 
Therefore, it seems that the regulator failed to block the will of the political decision-
makers to partly manipulate the recruitments in the public sector through the control 
of the constitutionality of the provisions that fell under the ambit of its regulatory 
field. In other words, the regulatee-public administration that simoultaneously makes 
the rules of the game under the role of the political decision-makers managed to 
capture its regulator.   
 
                                                 
658 Explanatory Report on the draft law “Reform of the recruitment system in the public sector”, 
available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/2f026f42-950c-4efc-b950-340c4fb76a24/A-
ASEP-eis-A.pdf, date of access: 31.11.2011. 
659 According to the Explanatory Report of Parliament, the few exceptions that remained (judges, 
university professors, researchers, personnel of the armed forces, diplomats, doctors of the National 
Health System etc) concern personnel whose selection is governed by transparent, objective, and 
meritocratic procedures.  
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SUMMARY 
 
A simulative control of the constitutionality of laws relating to the regulatory field of the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel served as a method for the identification of 
regulatory failure. This hypothetical retroactive experiment was based on legal theorists’ 
positive approach to the legitimization of the independent authorities to implement the control 
of the constitutionality of field-specific provisions. In other words, the authorities should 
challenge legislative regulations designed and promulgated by the political decision-makers in 
their double role as principals-agents of the regulator. Thus, it was considered that the 
identification of unconstitutional clauses violating the constitutional principles of equality and 
meritocracy in relation to the recruitments in the public sector would facilitate testing the 
regulator’s neutrality vis-à-vis public administration. Two facets of these infringements in the 
relevant legislation were tested regarding their constitutionality. The first facet is related to 
the broadness of the jurisdiction of the authority over recruitments in the public sector, that is, 
clauses providing for partial and pseudo-jurisdiction, as well as unjustified exceptions from 
the general recruitment system, whereas full jurisdiction is considered as the ideal case. The 
second facet corresponds to clauses concerning flawed terms of the recruitment procedure 
itself, irrespective of the type of jurisdiction over recruitments. A series of cases-provisions of 
both facets briefly presented and commented prove that the authority failed to rule them 
unconstitutional, thus avoiding conflict with the political decision-makers-public 
administration. The authority simply restricted itself to raise issues of constitutionality in the 
annual reports. Interestingly enough, it was the common legislator under the pressure of the 
Greek debt crisis that restored these legislative distortions, albeit at a time when the state 
started to shrink. 
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3. The Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
a. The Decision 27/2007 
The recent reform in higher education, as reflected in the law 4009/2011, was a source 
of inspiration for assessing the decision 27/2007 of the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority660. Reforms always seek to correct what might have gone wrong in the past. 
However, the human factor itself plays a crucial role in the effective functioning of 
institutions irrespective of the orientation of the sector specific policies. Selecting 
university professors based on meritocracy through transparent procedures safeguards 
not only the survival of an institution for the future but also protects the public 
interest. The common legislator of the law 2083/1992 explicitly provided for 
transparency in the university professors’ selection procedures through the publication 
of the selection minutes in a special volume freely accessed to the interested persons. 
In other words, the common legislator imposed to universities the status of own-
initiative publicity. However, when the issue of the permissibility of publishing the 
selection minutes in the internet arose -a technological evolution that was beyond the 
knowledge and imagination of the common legislator in 1992- the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority gave an interpretation which was favourable for the regulatee, 
that is, the universities that posed the question in the first place. The section comprises 
the following: i) the criticisms and views expressed on the decision in a newpaper 
article, and an internet forum, and ii) the assessment of the decision. 
b. The debate on the Decision 27/2007 
The decision of the authority provoked intense debate on the internet among 
university professors working in higher education institutions both in Greece and 
abroad. The controversy was triggered by an article entitled “The “personal data” 
and the lack of transparency in Higher Education Institutions” which was written by 
Nikolaos Theotokas661, and was published in the newspaper Avgi662, on October 17, 
2007, namely, six months after the issue of the decision by the authority. Theotokas 
fiercely criticised it. He stressed the fact that the decision was pending since February 
2006, that is, shortly before the preliminary draft of the framework law on the 
“neoliberal” reform in higher education was made public by the Ministry of 
Education. He argued that article 18 of the preliminary draft law entitled 
“Transparency-Publicity” provided that “. . . the Faculties or the Departments are 
obliged to offer through their websites full information about the procedures related 
to the selection of the members of the TRS”663. In his opinion, due to this unexpected 
development, the authority put off the discussion of this thorny topic. Interestingly 
enough, the aforementioned provision was not included in the final draft law that the 
                                                 
660 See Appendix 3, text 1 containing the full-text of the decision. 
661 Professor at the Department of Political Science and History, Panteion University of Social and 
Political Sciences. He teaches historical and theoretical sociology. He is also a trade-unionist. He was 
former President of the aforementioned Department, and former Secretary General of the Panhellenic 
Confederation of Associations of the Teaching and Research Staff (TRS). 
662 The newspaper “I Avgi (=the Dawn) was founded in 1952. It is a morning daily newspaper 
expressing the views of the left. 
663 The part of the text preceding this sentence, finally omitted, reads as follows: “The Faculties or the 
Departments are obliged to upload on their websites curriculum vitae with the studies, scientific 
experience, research work as well as the main scientific publications of their TRS members subject to 
the provisions of the legislation in force on the protection of personal data”. 
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government submitted to Parliament.  Theotokas further noted that the Coalition of 
the Radical Left (SYRIZA)664 proposed an amendment, and asked the restoration of 
the previous provision665. 
Theotokas pointed out that the text of the law that was finally voted by Parliament, 
namely the law 3549/2007, did not contain any anticipation regarding the publication 
of the procedures related to the TRS members’ elections. In his opinion, it was one 
more victory for university conservatism and clientilistic networks in higher 
education institutions that “fear transparency and publicity like their sins”. He 
ironically added that behind closed doors they all are very sensitive to the issues of 
“evaluation” and “social accountability”. Theotokas remarked that twelve days after 
the publication of the new law in the government gazette666.the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority met with more than one year delay667 in order to examine the 
pending issue on the publication of the minutes. He also pointed out that four of the 
seven members were university professors, whereas the rapporteur, one of the 
members, was a university professor as well. Theotokas supported that, as the new 
law did not finally change, the provisions of the law 2083/1992 were still in force. 
Therefore, the minutes should be published each year in a special volume with the 
responsibility of the competent Department and should be accessible to any interested 
person.  
Theotokas argued that the authority completely disregarded the real meaning of the 
term “publication”, and proceeded to an extreme narrow [mis]interpretation of the 
law. He quoted Mayer’s668 phrase according to which “publication is the sole of 
                                                 
664 This political force, commonly known by its Greek abbreviation ΣΥΡΙΖΑ (SYRIZA), is a coalition 
of left political parties and organisations in Greece. In other words, it does not constitute a unified 
political force, but it is rather an alliance of parties and organisations of the Greek left. Coalition 
(Synaspismos), is the largest party to be a member of the coalition. The alliance participated for the 
first time in the national elections of 2004, whereas the process that ended up in its formation can be 
traced back to the Space for Dialogue for the Unity and Common Action of the Left in 2001. In the 
national elections of 2004 it gathered 241,539 votes (3.3% of the total), and elected six members to 
parliament. In the national elections of 2007 it gained an unexpected 5,04% (361,211 votes) and elected 
14 members to parliament. Finally, in the national elections of 2009 the votes for SYRIZA decreased 
(315,627 votes, 4,60% of the total), thus losing one seat in Parliament. Source: Wikipedia, available at: 
http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A3%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%B1%CF%83%CF%80%CE%B9%C
F%83%CE%BC%CF%8C%CF%82_%CE%A1%CE%B9%CE%B6%CE%BF%CF%83%CF%80%C, 
25.11.2011E%B1%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AE%CF%82_%CE%91%CF%81%C
E%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%81%CE%AC%CF%82, date of access: 25.11.2011. 
665 The proposed amendment read as follows: “The Faculties or the Departments are obliged to offer 
through their websites full information about the procedures related to the selection of the members of 
the TRS. The minutes concerning the public calls, the constitution of the electoral bodies and 
introductory committees, the introductory reports and the minutes of the selection of each member of 
the TRS are publicized and uploaded on the website of the Department”. 
666 The law 3549/2007 on the “Reform of the institutional framework on the structure and operation of 
higher education institutions” was published in vol. A, no 69 of the Government Gazette on March 20, 
2007.  
667 According to the text of the authority’s decision, the members of the authority, in effect, met on 
June 15, 2006 in order to discuss the issue, whereas the decision no 27/2007 was made public on April 
2, 2007, that is, twelve days after the publication of the new law in the government gazette.ρα 
668 John Jacob Mayer (Zurich 1798-Messologhi 1826) was a Swiss philhellene and Editor of the 
newspaper “Greek Chronicles”, the first published newspaper of the war of independence. 
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Democracy”. However, in the opinion of the authority, the protection of personal data 
and the informational self-determination prevail over publication. Theotokas stressed 
that the Constitution considers that university professors are public functionaries, 
whereas the law explicitly imposes publicity in relation to the procedures of their 
election for reasons of public interest. He reminded that article 5, par. d of the law 
2472/1997 on data privacy provides that the publication is permitted even without the 
consent of the interested party only if this is imposed by the law or when it concerns 
the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or a project carried out in 
the exercise of public function by a public authority.  
 
The newspaper article was commented on the Greek University Reform.org, a forum 
of dialogue where texts, links, reviews, complaints, and journal articles on higher 
education in Greece and the need for reform are posted669. The section of the forum 
dedicated to the article was entitled “Personal data and the lack of transparency in 
Higher Education Institutions”670 and a number of Greek university professors 
working in Greece and abroad participated in the debate671 that started on October 17, 
2007, and ended on November 1, 2007. One of the debate participants gave the 
information that the decision of the authority was the result of a request for an opinion 
on the permissibility of the publication of the selection minutes on the Internet 
submitted by the then President of the Department of Archives and Library Science of 
the Ionian University, Professor G. M. The Unified Association of the Teaching Staff 
of the Ionian University “Petros Vrailas-Armenis”, member of the Confederation of 
Associations of the Teaching and Research Staff, announced through a press issue 
dated 14.2.2006672 that it had decided to disclose on its website the minutes of the 
meeting of the electoral body that rejected the election of a non-tenured Assistant 
Professor to the tenured position of Assistant Professor673. The President of the 
Department, G.M., had presided over the meeeting and signed the relevant minutes. 
According to the text of the decision of the authority, the President of the Department 
submitted his request to the authority on February 15, 2006, that is, one day after the 
disclosure of the minutes on the Internet. 
 
The debate participants expressed opposing views on the issue. The university 
professors working abroad pointed out that no minutes are kept of these meetings in 
the U.S., even in the case of public universities, and generally noted that such 
practices are uncommon in most countries. The publicization of the minutes become 
                                                 
669 The electronic forum was created by Themis Lazaridis in 2005. He is Professor at the Department of 
Chemistry, City College of New York. The new website address is: http://www.gurforum.org. 
670 The debate on the issue is available at: 
http://greekuniversityreform.wordpress.com/2007/10/17/%CF%84%CE%B1-
%C2%AB%CF%80%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%83%CF%89%CF%80%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC%
CE%B4%CE%B5%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%BC%CE%AD%CE%BD%CE%B1%C2%BB-
%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CE%B7-
%CE%B1%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%B1%CF%86%CE%AC%CE%BD/, date of access: 09.10.2011 
 
671 Some of the university professors participate anonymously. 
672 Source: The Website of the Unified Association of the Teaching Staff of the Ionian University 
“Petros Vrailas-Armenis”, Press Issue dated 14.2.2006, available at: 
http://www.ionio.gr/~papabas/vrailas/, date of access: 26.11.2011. 
673 The minutes of the meetings of the electoral bodies are recorded.  They are afterwards transcribed 
and signed by the President and the Secretary of the Department. The full text of the minutes dated 
15.06.2005 is available at: http://www.ionio.gr/~papabas/vrailas/eisigiseis/praktika-apolisis-
moschopoulou.pdf, date of access: 26.11.2011. 
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part of a bureaucratic procedure proving that the Greek universities are not considered 
capable and competent to regulate their internal selection procedures despite the fact 
that they are self-governing institutions. As a result, the Council of State produces 
jurisprudence regarding the details of the selection procedure in the name of 
bureaucracy, obstruction, stagnation, and lawyers. One of the debate participants 
observed that excessive transparency might facilitate the development of conciliation 
practices on the one hand, and serve populist purposes on the other. In his view, the 
non-disclosure of the minutes protects the members of the electoral bodies from the 
abuse of a wider publicization of their assessments that would probably satisfy 
populist pursuits. He stressed that the candidates’ personal data seem to be the good 
the least exposed since those of the members of the electoral bodies in the sense of the 
views expressed and the procedure itself are in real danger.  
 
Another group of the debate participants supported the disclosure of the minutes on 
Internet, and based their argumentation on four axes. First, the selection minutes are 
part of a complex administrative action674 that is concluded with the publication of the 
act of the elected candidate’s appointment in the government gazette. All the stages of 
the selection procedure are considered as administrative acts that may be appealed to 
the administrative courts in terms of legality by those who have legitimate interest, 
that is, unsuccessful candidates, members of the electoral bodies, or students 
participating in the meetings of the electoral bodies. Therefore, their disclosure is 
relevant from a legal perspective since it saves useful material for the court on the one 
hand, and makes those judging feel vulnerable because they are obliged to perfectly 
document their rejection or approval on the other. In other words, publicization might 
serve as a deterrent. Second, the principles of transparency and accountability are 
indispensible parts of any procedure related to public interest. University professors 
are public functionaries and universities are public law legal entities financed by the 
state. Therefore, taxpayers have the right to know how public money is spent. Third, 
minutes are administrative documents accessible to citizens. Court decisions are also 
made public. Both categories do not attract general interest, even if uploaded on the 
Internet, since only a specific part of the public will seek for such information. Fourth, 
most university professors upload their curriculum vitae and publications on the 
Internet. Therefore, any such information incorporated in the selection minutes does 
not violate privacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
674 Tachos (2005) defines the term complex administrative action as follows: “A complex 
administrative action exists when the relevant provisions define that for the occurrence of the final 
legal effect a number of successive administrative acts are required. The publication of each one of 
them is a precondition for the publication of the next one, whereas the final act incorporates all the 
previous ones, which thus lose their autonomy. Within the complex administrative action each one of 
the acts that constitute it is issued under a specific procedure. The concept of the complex 
administrative action is particularly relevant for the judicial review of the administrative acts”. 
According to the jurisprudence of the Council of State (Decision 3619/1995) the complex 
administrative action presupposes the publication of at least two consecutive administrative acts for the 
intended effect to occur. The election of university professors is considered as a complex 
administrative action (Council of State, Decision 1966/1988). 
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c. A decision weakly supported?  
 
Apart from the Constitution and the relevant legislation, the information and the views 
expressed in the newspaper article and the internet debate served as an additional 
useful tool to assess the validity of the decision 27/2007 of the Hellenic Data Privacy 
Authority. The decision presents certain weaknesses that are analysed hereafter.  
 
i. A conflict of interest situation 
 
The rapporteur of the case as well as the majority of the members of the authority that 
participated in the meeting that was held on June 15, 2006, that is, four of seven, were 
university professors themselves.  It is far from clear that the issue under discussion 
affected their professional interests. Therefore, a conflict of interest situation was 
created, and a favourable decision for universities, that is, the regulatee, was rather 
inevitable.   
 
ii. The law 3549/2007 probably facilitated the justificatory basis of the decision  
 
The long delay in the issue of the decision proved by the mismatch between the date 
of the meeting (15.06.2006) and the date of the issue of the decision (02.04.2007) 
probably justifies Theotokas’s allegations. Theotokas, as a trade-unionist, gives 
detailed information on the different stages of the formulation of article 18 entitled 
“Transparency-Publicity” of the law 3549/2007. The provision for the publication of 
the selection minutes on Internet was finally eliminated. If we accept Theotokas’s 
version of events, the authority proceeded to the issue of its decision only after the 
publication of the new law in the government gazette on March 20, 2007, that is, 
when it made sure that the contested provision was not contained in the new law on 
higher education. 
 
iii. The ignorance of the Italian paradigm 
 
In the text of the decision it is mentioned that the respective British, Norwegian, 
Polish, and Spanish authorities on data privacy were also consulted on the issue675. 
However, there is no detailed reference on their views and arguments. But, most 
importantly, it remains unknown whether similar cases were compared.  In other 
words, this consultation should have been based on two pillars: similar legislation 
regarding the university professors’ selection procedures, that is, the existence of 
minutes, and the provision and conditions for their access and publication. On the 
other hand, the authority seemed to ignore the most similar case, that is, the Italian 
paradigm which could have eventually contributed to drawing safer conclusions. 
More specifically, article 2 par. h of the Italian law n. 210 of July 3, 1998 on “the 
Rules regarding the recruitment of researchers and university professors” provides 
that “1. The regulations reffered to in Article 1, par. 1, regarding procedures for 
appointments, in each case must include: . . . h. the terms for the completion of the 
assessment procedure and the related forms of publicity, which, in any case, include 
the justified judgements expressed for each candidate by each member participating 
in the committee. Such judgements shall be, in any case, published electronically and 
                                                 
675 Article 19, par. 1, subpara. n of the law 2472/1997 reads as follows: “It [the authority] shall co-
operate with the respective authorities of other member states of the European Union and the Council 
of Europe on matters relevant to the exercise of its powers”. 
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through the official bulletin of the Ministry of university and scientific and 
technological research676”.  
 
Indeed, in the Italian case, the so-called final report, relazione finale, constitutes the 
minutes of the comparative assessment procedure for the recruitment of the academic 
ranks of researchers, associate professors, and full professors, and is drafted and 
signed by the members of the Judging Committee. The minutes are uploaded on the 
Internet, namely the Official Website of each University and the Official Website of 
the Italian Ministry of Education, University, and Research. These multi-paged and 
detailed final reports-minutes contain all the personal data of the candidates regarding 
their studies, professional and scientific profile as well as the personal and collective 
assessments of the Judging Committees and are inevitably accessible to an 
innumerable number of recipients in Italy and abroad677. It seems that publicity 
regarding the university professors’ selection procedures through internet is fully 
acceptable by the national data protection authority, the Garante per la protezione dei 
dati personali.  
 
iv. Can publicity be quantified? 
 
Following freedom of information legislation in Greece678, the selection minutes are 
indisputably considered as administrative documents. However, the common 
legislator of the law 2083/1992 moved a step further from simply accessing an 
administrative document upon request, and reserved the status of an own initiative 
provision of information through the publication of the minutes in a special volume. 
In our opinion, it is far from clear that the common legislator expressed his crystal 
clear will for publicity in the sense that he sought to achieve transparency of the 
administrative action regarding the university professors’ selection procedure. And 
the common legislator’s will seems identical to that of the Italian legislator the only 
difference being that as early as 1992 information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), the Internet, among others, were almost unknown outside a close circle of 
scientists and researchers.  
 
In its decision the authority does not challenge the issue of transparency-publicity per 
se in terms of infringing the subject’s personal data. However, it proceeds to a 
quantification of the publicity of the minutes, that is, once published in multiple 
volumes or uploaded on the internet the protection of the subject’s personality and 
                                                 
676 The original text of the law reads as follows: “1. I regolamenti di cui all’ articolo 1, comma 1, 
relativamente alle procedure per la nomina in ruolo, devono in ogni caso prevedere: . . . h) i termini 
per l'espletamento della procedura di valutazione e le relative forme di pubblicità, che comprendono 
comunque i giudizi motivati espressi su ciascun candidato da ciascun componente la commissione. Tali 
giudizi, in ogni caso, dovranno essere resi pubblici per via telematica e tramite il bollettino ufficiale 
del Ministero dell'università e della ricerca scientifica e tecnologica. . .” Source: The Official Website 
of the Italian Ministry of University and Research, available at: 
http://www.miur.it/0006Menu_C/0012Docume/0098Normat/1612Norme__cf2.htm, date of access: 
28.09.2011. 
677 A characteristic example presents the webpage regarding the procedures of comparative assessment 
contained in the Official Website of the University of Milan (Universita degli Studi di Milano) where 
all the final reports are uploaded on the Internet. They are available at: 
http://www.unimi.it/ateneo/valcomp/1473.htm, as well as via the website of the Italian Ministry of 
Education, University and Research, date of access: 20.11.2011.  
678 See Appendix 3, text 2 containing a short presentation of freedom of legislation and relevant 
provisions of the revised Constitution of 2001. 
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personal data is violated. The authority justifiably argues that “the publication of the 
minutes constitutes a form of processing of personal data in accordance with article 
2d of the law 2472/1997, and specifically it falls within the concept of 
“dissemination” which, contrary to “transmission”, is addressed to a potentially 
unlimited number of recipients”. Nevertheless, it failed to take into consideration the 
fact that in this case dissemination also serves the public interest679. Under such 
circumstances, pursuant to article 5 par. 2 of the law 2472/1997, data may 
exceptionally be processed even without the subject’s consent, “only if, among others, 
processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest 
or a project carried out in the exercise of public function by a public authority or 
assigned by it to the Controller or a third party to whom such data are 
communicated”. Therefore, the interests of the state, that is, transparency in university 
professors’ selection, should have been balanced against the disproportionate 
dissemination of personal data through internet.  
 
d. The decision 27/2007: A case of regulatory capture?  
 
The questions concerning the permissibility of publishing the university professors’ 
selection minutes in the Internet submitted to the Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
by two Presidents of University Departments in 2006 as well as the final elimination 
of the relevant clause from the law 3549/2007 rather prove the reluctance of the Greek 
academic community to accept transparency in the recruitment procedures. At that 
moment the authority came to block an uncontestable case of own-inititative provision 
of information by the state with the rather irrational alibi of disproportionate 
dissemination of personal data. 
 
On the other hand, the debate participants who supported the view that any form of 
publicity regarding the selection of university professors in Greece is an uncommon 
practice in the academia that simply promotes conciliation practices, populism, and 
lust for law, seem to ignore the constitutional and legal constraints of the relevant 
recruitment system. Indeed, there exist an insurmountable chain of interdependencies. 
The Constitution provides that higher education institutions are public law legal 
entities, fully self-governed. They operate under the supervision of the State, whereas 
university professors are public functionaries. Within this framework, the legality of 
the university professors’ selection procedures is compulsorily subject to the control 
of the Ministry of Education, whereas those who have a legitimate interest may also 
appeal to the administrative courts. The selection minutes are not only administrative 
documents freely accessed according to the Constitution and the relevant legislation 
but also an own-initiative publicity status has been reserved for them by the common 
legislator. Even if we accepted the view that the selection procedures should be 
                                                 
679 In its preliminary ruling C-465/00 and C-138/01, Rechnungshof v. Osterreichischer Rundfunk 
20.5.2003 requested by the Austrian Constitutional and Supreme Courts, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (former Court of Justice of the European Communities) judged that articles 6 par. 1, 
subpara. c and 7 subpara. c and e of the Directive 95/46 on the protection of personal data do not hinder 
the implementation of a national regulation permitting the wide disclosure of the income-data of 
persons subject to the control of the Austrian Court of Audit provided that the disclosure not only of the 
income data but also of the names of the recipients of that income is necessary for and appropriate to 
the objective of proper management of public funds. Source: The Official Website of the European 
Commission, ECJ decisions relating to data protection, prepared by Laraine Laudati, OLAF DPO, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/olaf/data/doc/Summary-caselaw-EU-courts.pdf, date of access: 
29.11.2011. 
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confidential following international practice, it would have been impossible to 
overcome the contraints of the Constitution and administrative law. Otherwise, the 
common legislator should have to explicitly classify them as confidential together 
with those categories of public documents that are explicitly classified as such, that is, 
the documents related to national defence, foreign policy, state security, public order, 
discussions of the cabinet and other governmental organs, public faith, currency etc. 
Therefore, generalisations regarding unsimilar legal civilizations seem inappropriate. 
In October 2010 the Ministry of Education, during the elaboration of the reform 
scheme in higher education institutions undertaken by the PASOK government after 
its victory in the national elections of 2009, conducted an investigation regarding 
cases of nepotism in Universities, Technological Educational Institutes, and research 
bodies of the General Secretariat of Research and Technology680. There was evidence 
of nepotism in certain university schools, such as Medicine, Theology, Law, where it 
was found that members of the same family were serving together. The Deputy 
Minister of Education stressed that he would definitely put an end to contentious 
elections of university professors. On the other hand, the case of the Ionian 
University, where trade-unionists uploaded the selection minutes on the internet, 
seems to imply that certain interests and rivalries developed within the institution, 
probably irrelevant with a candidate’s scientific and teaching competences, ended up 
with the dismissal of a non-tenured TRS member.  
It should also be reminded that in his article, Theotokas, a trade-unionist himself, 
overtly denounced the existence of clientelistic networks in higher education 
institutions, thus indirectly linking selection procedures to party politics. It would be 
impossible to identify the card-carrying members of the political parties in the 
academic community in Greece. However, the following characteristic event probably 
unravels that partisanship is not uncommon in Greek universities; quite the contrary. 
During the race for the leadership of PASOK in 2007681, two texts containing a 
declaration of support682 for the candidacy of Evangelos Venizelos683 were issued and 
                                                 
680 Article in the newspaper “TA NEA” entitled “Investigation going back fifteen years in time for 
nepotism in higher education institutions”, published on November 11, 2010, available at: 
http://www.tanea.gr/ellada/article/?aid=4603598, date of access: 28.09.2011. 
681 “After the legislative elections of 2007, in which PASOK was soundly defeated, Venizelos 
announced his candidacy for the leadership of the party. In the leadership election, held on 11 
November 2007, Venizelos was defeated by incumbent party leader George Papandreou, receiving 
38.18% of the vote against 55.91% for Papandreou”. Source: Wikipedia, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evangelos_Venizelos, date of access: 06.11.2011 
682 The full texts of the declaration of support signed by 166 university professors are uploaded on the 
personal website of E. Venizelos, available at: http://www.evenizelos.gr/el/statementsgr/-2010/289-
2009-03-31-19-07-13, date of access: 19.05.2010. 
683 He is Professor of Constitutional Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki under suspension 
of duties. E. Venizelos was elected MP with PASOK in the Thessaloniki A constituency in the general 
elections of 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007 and 2009. He has served in the following government posts: 
Deputy Minister to the Presidency, and government spokesman, 13 October 1993 to 8 July 1994, 
Minister for the Press and the Media, and government spokesman, 8 July 1994 to 15 September 1995, 
Minister for Transport and Communications, 15 September 1995 to 22 January 1996, Minister for 
Justice, 22 January to 5 September 1996, Minister for Culture, 25 September 1996 to 19 February 
1999, Minister for Development, 19 January 1999 to 13 April 2000, Minister for Culture, 21 November 
2000 to 10 March 2004, Minister of National Defence, 7 October 2009 to 17 June 2011, Minister of 
Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, 17 June 2011-. Source: Wikipedia, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evangelos_Venizelos, date of access: 06.11.2011 
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signed by 166 university professors from 13 universities on November 9, 2007. 
Interestingly enough, 98 university professors taught at the Aristotle University of 
Thessaloniki and the University of Macedonia, namely at higher education institutions 
located to the constituency of Thessaloniki A where E. Venizelos was elected. It is far 
from clear that the clientelistic networks at local level overtly and eagerly exhibited 
their support in this intra-party campaign. 
Finally, the issue of legality, that is, the proper application of the rules of the game 
relating to the selection procedures, as prescribed in the relevant legislation and 
administrative law, was underestimated and considered as irrelevant by a group of the 
debate participants in the forum. In effect, this is a view which is unofficially 
widespread in the academic community in Greece, thus disregarding Luhmann’s 
“legitimacy through procedure”684. Within this context, we proceeded to an indicative 
research on candidates’ appeals to the Council of State regarding the legality of the 
selection procedures in the Greek Universities from 1990 to 2010685. The respective 
decisions show that in the overwhelming majority of cases the university departments 
failed to comply with the relevant legislation. Under such circumstances, 
transparency-publicity of the selection procedures through information and 
communication technologies definitely serves the public interest. Candidates applying 
for such state positions should be aware that their scientific profile and competences 
will be exposed and assessed. As for the members of the electoral bodies or judging 
committees, they should have to think twice before their final judgement. 
Transparency might facilitate fair assessment, and respect for legality. The Clarity 
Programme and the new law 4009/2011 on higher education seem to have weakened 
the validity of the decision 27/2007686. However, the publication of the pending joint 
ministerial decision regulating in detail the issue might probably solve the 
interpretative enigma of the publicization of the university professors’ selection 
procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
684 An abstract from O’ Mahony and O’Sullivan (2006) on Luhmann’s theoretical reflexion on 
procedures is quoted: “Procedural law is seen as providing greater levels of justice than political 
procedures, as law curbs the strength of stronger interaction partners (Bussman, 1998). . . Luhmann’s 
theory has some affinity with legal positivism in viewing legal procedures and rules as formal, logically 
consistent concepts, principles and systems of regulations with clear rules, ensuring a right way of 
deciding on a case beyond personal values and manipulation (Roach Anleu, 2000)”.  
685 The decisions are classified by university. The indication YES refers to decisions where the 
applicants -the candidates- win the case, whereas the indication NO refers to decisions where the 
candidates’ appeals were rejected. A detailed list of the decisions is set out in the Appendix. 
University of Athens: 84% YES, 16% NO, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki: 85% YES, 15% NO, 
University of Patras: 83% YES, 17% NO, University of Crete: 92% YES, 8% NO, National Technical 
University of Athens: 100% YES, Athens School of Fine Arts: 100% YES, University of Ioannina: 
81% YES, 19% NO, Democritean University of Thrace: 87% YES, 13% NO, Athens University of 
Economics: 83% YES, 17% NO, Ionian University: 67% YES, 33% NO, University of Thessaly: 85% 
YES, 15% NO, Agricultural University of Athens: 67% YES, 33% NO, University of the Aegean: 50% 
YES, 50% NO, University of Macedonia: 62% YES, 38% NO, Technical University of Crete: 60% 
YES, 40% NO, Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences: 87% YES, 13% NO. 
686 See Appendix 3, text 3  analysing the impact of the “Clarity” programme and the law 4009/2011 on 
the validity of the decision 27/2007 
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SUMMARY 
 
The decision 27/2007 of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority served as a characteristic 
paradigm of the regulator’s effort to hinder the disclosure of freely available public sector 
information based on the alibi of the protection of personal data. The authority had to judge 
upon the permissibility of publishing the university professors’ selection minutes in the 
Internet, apart from their publication in a freely accessed special volume explicitly provided 
for in the law 2083/1992. The case study sought to explore signs of probable collusion 
between regulator and regulatee. The full text of the decision containing its justificatory basis, 
additional information on the background of the decision, as well as criticisms, and views 
expressed on the issue in a newspaper article and an internet forum were used as valuable 
complementary evidence. These sources proved to be useful methodological tools in order to 
highlight how the unwillingness of a public sector regulatee, that is, universities, to upload on 
the internet the university professors’ selection minutes, was finally justified by the regulator 
on the basis of the disproportionate dissemination of personal data, thus completely 
disregarding the dimension of public interest in the crucial area of higher education.   
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4. The Greek Ombudsman 
a. The effectiveness of the Ombudsman as anti-corruption mechanism 
The assessment of the relationship between regulator and regulatee in the institution 
of the Ombudsman might be a tricky or even useless task for the researcher. Indeed, 
the nature of the regulatory agency of the Ombudsman, that is, the proposal of new 
legislation improving the administrative system, recommendations with no legally 
binding character, and the lack of prosecutorial powers, rather renders redundant any 
attempt to approach the issue of the de facto independence of the Ombudsman from 
public administration. Publicity, if effectively used, remains the only mechanism that 
might do damage to the regulatees’ reputation. Nevertheless, the introduction of the 
institution in Greece, a country with an administrative system characterized by 
specific pathologies, might make it easier to highlight some aspects of the relationship 
between regulator and regulatee. 
The introductory texts of the annual reports of the Greek Ombudsman expose the 
principles and values of the institution. In other words, they reflect the regulator’s 
self-perception in relation to the exercise of the regulatory action, and the relationship 
towards the citizens and public administration. The extrajudicial and mediatory role of 
the institution is viewed as a mechanism for the improvement of the quality of 
democracy in the country. In the annual report for the year 2000, the Ombudsman 
explained that the control strategy of the institution is based on consensus rather than 
conflict687. As for the relationship developed in dispute resolution among the three 
players, that is, the Ombudsman, public administration, and society, the annual report 
for the year 2007 states that society and public administration are the two main 
“interlocutors” of the Ombudsman emphasizing that there is no rivalry between the 
Ombudsman and public administration688.  
The measure of publicity, which does not create legal consequences for the regulatee, 
provides that the Ombudsman may make public the refusal to accept his 
recommendations, if he considers that this is not sufficiently justified689. In the annual 
report for the year 2004, the Ombudsman views publicity as a sanction of moral 
nature, a kind of moral motion addressed by the authority. However, the authority 
clarifies that, in any case, this competence should be exercised with a high sense of 
responsibility, sparingness, and caution since the practice of denunciation should be 
avoided. Thus, according to the report, sanction should maintain its extraordinary 
character that would finally render it increased significance. 
Apart from the analysis of the principles of operation, in the annual report for the year 
2002, the Greek Ombudsman identified the following diachronic causes of 
maladministration690: i) the low quality of the administrative personnel in public 
administration, ii) the civil servants’ predominant mentality of avoiding the 
implementation of legislation in case of infringement of the applicable provisions, iii) 
overregulation, and iv) long delays in resolving individual complaints which in turn 
facilitate the creation of sources of potential corruption due to the aforementioned 
                                                 
687 See Appendix 2, abstract 1. 
688 See Appendix 2, abstract 2.  
689 Article 4, par. 6 of the law 3094/2003. 
690 See Appendix 2, text 1. 
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causes. It is not clear how these causes of maladministration diachronically rooted in 
the Greek administrative system could be effectively combatted through a relationship 
between regulator and regulatee based on the principle of good faith. Indeed, if the 
institution of the Ombudsman is considered as a state-control mechanism against 
maladministration and ultimately corruption691, how could it be finally effective in a 
conflict-avoiding manner? Taking into consideration the absence of punitive 
competences, and legally binding decisions, the issue at stake is as to whether the 
institution exhausts its statutory powers as a deterrent to public administration. 
Nevertheless, the literature on regulatory agencies rejects the idea of assessing agency 
independence from the use of sanctions since “there are definitional and 
methodological difficulties” (Thatcher, 2005). The absence or the rarity of the use of 
statutory powers with a deterrent character on the part of the regulator inevitably leads 
to the conclusion that the regulatee complies with law, if no other collateral evidence 
is available. Thus, high levels of corruption could serve as an indirect proof for the 
regulator’s reluctance to make full use of his statutory powers. 
The annual reports for the years 2001 and 2009 acknowledge the existence of 
corruption in Greek public administration and make special reference on the issue692. 
As for the content of the concept, it is far from clear that they refer to corruption in 
public administration under the form of exchanges of economic nature, that is, 
monetary transactions between citizens and public services (bribery), and mutual 
services at all levels (clientelism). The annual report for the year 2001 puts emphasis 
on cases of bribery. The reference of the annual report for the year 2009 on 
clientelism is general and vague, albeit giving the impression of a thriving 
phenomenon. The clientelistic aspect of corruption seems to be the most pervasive in 
public administration, albeit the least promoted and assessed in relation to the 
bribocentric aspect. Indeed, its consequences might be devastating since it constantly 
undermines the public interest, whereas administrative action is unavoidably 
accompanied by the breach of duty. Not incidentally, the Inspector General of Public 
Administration has supported that corruption in public administration is mainly 
fuelled by “the administration’s reliance on governments and party politics”. In his 
opinion, regulatory and administrative reforms “will be ineffective if the involvement 
of politics in public administration continues” (Lambropoulou, Papamanolis, Ageli, 
Bakali, 2008).  
These observations on the phenomenon in the country are confirmed by the annual 
Corruption Perceptions Indexes issued by Transparency International. The Corruption 
Perceptions Index693 “measures the levels of public-sector corruption in a country, as 
seen by country analysts and business people. Questions cover both the administrative 
and political aspects of corruption, including topics such as the bribery of public 
officials, kickbacks in public procurement, the embezzlement of public funds, and the 
strength and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts”. Transparency International 
defines corruption as “the use of one’s public position for illegitimate private gains” 
                                                 
691 Annual Report for the year 2001, p. 13. 
692 Two characteristic abstracts from the annual reports for the years 2001, and 2009 are quoted in 
Appendix 2, abstracts 3 and 4. 
693 Reservations are expressed by the authors of the index over the scientific basis of the methodology 
applied for the measurement of corruption since it is based on polls regarding the perception some 
individuals have about corruption, and not on its real situation which is impossible to be documented 
(Milionis, 2003). 
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(Raikos, 2005). The term does not seem to refer only to economic benefits. In other 
words, it is not purely bribocentric. Corrupt practices may offer immaterial 
advantages related to the improvement of the legal position of a public official or 
employee, e.g. appointment to various posts in the public sector or promotion (Raikos, 
2003).   
Table 1 constitutes a comparative presentation of the CPI scores between Greece and 
Turkey for the period 1999-2010. Turkey, unlike Greece, is not considered a fully 
consolidated democracy (Yeşilada, 2007). The law establishing the Ombudsman has 
yet to be adopted694. A draft law has already been submitted to Parliament according 
to the Turkey 2011 Progress Report drafted by the European Commission. The Table 
shows that the CPI score for Greece has dramatically deteriorated throughout this 
period despite the fact that the Ombudsman has been operating in the country since 
1998.  According to the CPI scores, it could be argued that the position of the two 
countries were reversed in 1999 and 2010, that is, 3.4 for Turkey in 1999 and 3.8 for 
Greece in 2010, and 4.9 for Greece in 1999 and 4.4 for Turkey in 2010. The CPI score 
difference was equally reversed, that is, 1.5 for Greece in 1999 against 0.9 for Turkey 
in 2010. Indeed, the Annual Report of Transparency International for the year 2003695 
warned that “But is not only poor countries were corruption thrives: levels of 
corruption are worringly high in European countries such as Greece and Italy . . .”. 
The annual report for the year 2001 confirms two issues. First, the Ombudsman has 
the competence to refer to the public prosecutor any case where there is tangible 
evidence that a criminal act has been committed pursuant to article 4, par. 10 of the 
law 2477/1997 as in force. Therefore, he deals indirectly with cases related to 
corruption. Second, the Ombudsman admits that corruption is thriving. The question 
that emerges is whether the Ombudsman effectively used his statutory powers in 
relation to potential acts of corruption in the period from 1998 to 2010. During this 
period the authority received 130,712 citizens’ complaints696, whereas an average of 
29,4% of them were filed because they did not fall within the mandate of the office of 
                                                 
694 Today’s Zaman, an electronic gateway to Turkish daily news, states the following in relation to the 
draft law on the Ombudsman: “The ombudsman bill, originally drafted in 1998 during the Bülent 
Ecevit government, was submitted to Parliament in 1999, but was shelved after the 2002 elections. It 
was updated in 2004 and passed as part of the European Union reform process that started in 2005. 
However, former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed it on July 1, 2006, maintaining that the 
Constitution does not contain any reference to an ombudsman. The government put a reference into a 
Constitutional amendment package that was approved in a referendum held on Sept. 12, 2010. After 
the referendum, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) reintroduced the ombudsman bill 
to Parliament once again”. Article entitled: Turkey looks for its Ombudsman as relevant bill makes it 
to Parliament, dated February 27, 2011, available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-236778-
turkey-looks-for-its-ombudsman-as-relevant-bill-makes-it-to-parliament.html, date of access: 
5.11.2011. 
695 Annual Report Transparency International 2003, p. 20, available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/annual_report_2003, date of 
access: 7.11.2011. 
696 The annual number of the citizens’ complaints is analytically as follows: 1998: 1,430; 1999:7284, 
2000: 10,107; 2001: 11,282; 2002: 11,762; 2003: 10,850, 2004: 10,571, 2005: 10,087; 2006: 9,162, 
2007: 10,611; 2008: 10,954; 2009: 13,433; 2010: 13,179. Source: Annual Report for the year 2010. 
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the Ombudsman697. Each annual report dedicates a section to the use of the statutory 
powers by the authority. According to the official published data in the period from 
1998 to 2010 the Ombudsman referred 81 reports698 to the competent prosecutor, that 
is, cases where in the course of investigation of complaints, sufficient indications 
arose for the commission of criminal acts by functionaries, employees or members of 
the administration. However, the number of referrals to the competent prosecuting 
authorities seems inversely proportional to the number of complaints, the general 
observations of the authority on corruption as described in the introductory texts of 
the annual reports, and the perceived level of corruption in the country. Interestingly 
enough, since 2003 the number of referrals has astonishingly diminished in parallel 
with the rising trend of the perceived level of corruption. Therefore, within a period of 
eight years 24 reports were referred to the competent prosecutor. 
Table 1. Comparing Corruption CPI scores in Greece and Turkey (1999-2010) 
 
Year No of 
Countries 
Rank-
GREECE 
Rank-
TURKEY 
CPI Score 
GREECE 
CPI Score 
TURKEY 
CIP Score 
difference 
1999 85 36 54 4.9 3.4 1.5 
2000 99 36 54 4.9 3.6 1.3 
2001 91 42 54 4.2 3.6 0.6 
2002 102 44 64 4.2 3.2 1 
2003 133 50 77 4.3 3.1 1.2 
2004 146 49 77 4.3 3.2 1.1 
2005 158 47 65 4.3 3.5 0.8 
2006 163 54 60 4.4 3.8 0.6 
2007 179 56 64 4.6 4.1 0.5 
2008 180 57 58 4.7 4.6 0.1 
2009 178 71 61 3.8 4.4 0.6 
2010 180 78 56 3.5 4.4 0.9 
 
Compilation of data from the Annual Reports of Transparency International (Years 1999-2010)  
6.523 
* The index scores countries on a scale from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (very clean).  
9.0 – 10   Very  
8.0 – 8.9  Clean 
7.0 – 7.9 
6.0 – 6.9 
5.0 – 5.9 
4.0 – 4.9 
3.0 – 3.9 
2.0 – 2.9 Highly  
1.0 – 1.9 Corrupt 
The Greek Ombudsman’s Special Report on public sector personnel selection 
procedures exempted from the general recruitment system699 is of great interest. 
Someone might justifiably wonder how such a report might be linked to the 
                                                 
697 The annual percentage of the complaints that did not fall within the mandate of the office of the 
Ombudsman is as follows: 1998:4,7%; 1999: 23,9%; 2000: 29%; 2001: 32,9%; 2002: 39,4%; 2003: 
34,9%; 2004: 33,5%; 2005: 31,2%; 2006: 28,8%; 2007: 27,5%; 2008: 25,8%, 2009:31,3%; 2010: 
40,2%. 
698 The annual number of the reports referred to the prosecutorial authorities is analytically as follows: 
1998:-; 1999: 3; 2000:12; 2001:30; 2002:12; 2003:8; 2004:7; 2005:1; 2006:2; 2007:3; 2008:2; 2009:0, 
2010:1. 
699 The Special Report on public sector recruitments exempted from the procedures of the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel was drafted and issued in 2006. The Report was based on 648 
complaints that the authority had investigated during the period 1998-2005.   Source: The Official 
Website of the Ombudsman, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/reports/eidiki_ek8esh_proslhpseis_ektos_asep.pdf, date of access: 14.11.2011. 
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reproduction of corrupt practices in public administration. It is far from clear that the 
adoption of exceptions, as well as regimes of partial and pseudo-jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel perpetuates the clientelistic model of 
recruitment, which, in turn, constitutes a facet of corruption. Interestingly enough, the 
independent authority that combats corruption, that is, the Ombudsman, undermines 
the institutional role of another independent authority, that is, the Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel. More specifically, the summary of this special report 
700 supports the view that the overall management of the recruitment procedures 
should not be under the full jurisdiction of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel since such concentration of control could impede the smooth function of 
administration701. 
The argumentation used in the special report is vague and quite puzzling. The 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel has successfully organized and 
completed, technically speaking, very demanding selection procedures, among others, 
the entry examinations for teachers in primary and secondary education with 
thousands of candidates, or the special entry examinations for air traffic controllers of 
the civil aviation authority. On the other hand, it is not clear what is meant “by 
rigidities impeding the smooth function of administration”. As for the system of 
exceptions, it is considered as a sign of flexibility. Therefore, the Ombudsman fully 
approves the options of the executive in relation to exceptions, and the regimes of 
partial and pseudo-jurisdiction in public sector recruitments. These views are in 
contrast with those expressed by the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
which suggested the renegotiation and subsequent limitation of the exceptions and the 
abolishment of the regimes of partial and pseudo-jurisdiction. 
The proposals of the Ombudsman contained in the Special Report do not promote the 
strengthening of the institutional role of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel, and its recognition as undisputable regulator in the field of recruitments; 
quite the contrary. The Ombudsman stressed the need for the rationalization of the 
legal framework for those selection procedures that do not fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel as well as the adoption of good 
practices. For this purpose, a series of measures702 were proposed, whereas it was 
                                                 
700 Summary and press issue of the Special Report on public sector recruitments exempted from the 
procedures of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. Source: The Official Website of the 
Ombudsman, available at: http://www.synigoros.gr/reports/perilipsi_deltio_tupou_ee_proslhpseis.pdf, 
date of access: 14.11.2011. 
701 See Appendix 2, abstract 5. 
702 Within this framework the Ombudsman proposed the following measures as incorporated into the 
English version of the Annual Report for the Year 2006: 
“- The legal framework should be rationalised and minimum specifications should be set in order to 
ensure objectivity and meritocracy; these specifications should refer to all stages of the procedure for 
the hiring of personnel in the public sector; 
- The candidates’ assessment criteria should be explicitly and clearly mentioned in the advertisement     
- The selection proceeding which is formulated by the competent selection committee should refer to 
the aforementioned set criteria 
- The results should be publicised in a more efficient way 
- The examination of appeals should be compulsory 
- The way works’ contracts are formulated should change 
- Vacant post scheduling should be more flexible 
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suggested that the supervisory and coordinating role of the Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration and Decentralisation for these selection procedures should be 
reinforced. All these measures should be included in a “Personnel Selection Code703”. 
These views actually reflect the Ombudsman’s accordance with the legislative 
interventions of the executive that gradually diminished the regulatory field of the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. Thus, the constant weakening of the 
role of the recruitment regulator has increased the space for the development of 
clientelistic practices in public sector selection procedures since 1997. However, the 
law 3812/2009 restored the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel to its 
pedestal, at least symbolically, thus obtaining full jurisdiction over recruitments in the 
public sector704.  
 Within the framework of the legislative intervention of the authority on a 
consultative basis, it has systematically avoided proposing specific measures to tackle 
overregulation, which, in turn, facilitates corruption. As early as 2001, the 
Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation Final Report705 urged member states of the 
European Union to promote the coherence and clarity of regulations through 
consolidation706 which includes both codification and recasting. Unfortunately, the 
authority remained silent on the issue instead of putting pressure to the executive 
through its annual reports.  
As for publicity, the Ombudsman does not adopt the policy of denunciating the 
regulatees as already stated in the annual report for the year 2004. The authority 
avoids making public the majority of its findings communicated to the competent 
                                                                                                                                            
- The supervisory role of the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration, and Decentralisation 
should be reinforced” 
703 “All the above measures are included in a “Personnel Selection Code” which will serve as the 
specifications framework with which all the stages of the employment procedure should abide. This 
code should include and specify the principles that should be employed, such as the principle of 
publicity, of equal opportunity to participation, of objectivity, of transparency, of meritocracy”. Source: 
The Official Website of the Ombudsman, Abstract from the English version of the Annual Report for 
the Year 2006, p. 71, available at: http://www.synigoros.gr/pdf_01/SYN__AGGL__2006.pdf, date of 
access: 14.11.2011. 
704 New categories of personnel that were exempted from the general recruitment system with special 
provisions fell under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, that is, the 
permanent personnel of the Greek Parliament, the Presidency of Democracy, and the independent 
authorities. The exceptions were purely restricted to specific categories of personnel. See Appendix 2, 
text 2.  
705 The Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation Final Report was finished in November 2001, and was 
considered at the European Council in Laeken in December 2001. The main goal of the Report is the 
improvement of the regulatory quality at both national and EU levels, and thus seeks to promote best 
practice in seven key areas: policy implementation options, impact assessment, consultation, 
simplification, access to regulation, structures, and implementation of European regulation. 
706 The Mandelkern Report defines the concepts as follows: “At European level, the term “official 
codification” is used to describe the process of repealing a set of acts in one area and replacing them 
with a single act containing no substantive change to those acts. It thus produces a text with legal 
effect. In some Member States (for example France), the meaning of codification is closer to the 
European term recasting  – that is the process not only brings together multiple texts into one, but also 
makes changes to remove out-of-date or nonsensical provisions or correct gaps. It also has the sense of 
“incorporating into a code” in those countries that have such a legal structure. In this report 
codification is used in the European sense unless specified otherwise by the context”. Source: The 
Official Website of the European Commission, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/documents/mandelkern_report.pdf, date of access: 
12.11.2011. 
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Ministries after the refusal of public sector agencies to comply with its 
recommendations. On the contrary, the total number of these findings should be at 
least uploaded to the official website of the authority as a deterrent.  
b. Cases of regulatory failure: does the Greek Ombudsman effectively fulfill his 
institutional role?  
It seems that another statutory power of the Ombudsman related to the violation of the 
duty of assistance has never been activated since its adoption in 2004. More 
specifically, article 12, par. 4 of the law 3242/2004 provides that any public 
functionary or civil servant who denies cooperation with the Ombudsman with a view 
to impede or prevent the conduct of an investigation, shall be liable to up to two years 
imprisonment. Criminal proceedings may be brought about only after the independent 
authority refers a relevant report to the competent prosecutor.  
Interestingly enough, during the research we came across a summary of a finding707 
concerning the staffing of the Employement Promotion Centres of the Manpower 
Employment Organization708. The summary of the case accompanied by our 
comments are presented hereafter. The Ombudsman, within the framework of the 
investigation of citizens’ complaints concerning the procedure for the conclusion of 
work contracts at the Employement Promotion Centres of the Manpower 
Employement Organisation, requested the opinion no 3273 dated 19.4.2005 of the 
legal service of the organisation regarding the authenticity of the work contractss709. 
The Ombudsman concluded that following the relevant legislation on the 
Employement Promotion Centres of the Manpower Employment Organization the 
conclusion of work contractss was not justified to the extent that the work was part of 
the cycle of the usual duties of the Organisation. Therefore, the authority requested 
the granting of the legal opinion that justified the conclusion of these work contracts. 
                                                 
707 Article 4, par. 6 of the law 3094/2003 concerning the drafting of a finding reads as follows: “On 
completion of the investigation, if required by the nature of the case, the Ombudsman shall draw up a 
report on the findings to be communicated to the competent Minister and the competent services, and 
shall mediate in every expedient way to resolve the citizen’s problem”. 
708 Source: The Official Website of the Greek Ombudsman, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/reports/perilipsi_porismatos_oaed_10_06.pdf, date of access: 7.11.2011. 
709 Pursuant to article 6, par. 1 of the law 2527/1997 on the conclusion of work contracts with natural 
persons, the joint ministerial decision no 191143/30.8.2005 (Government Gazette vol. B, no 1203, 
30.08.2005), issued by the Ministers of the Interior, Public Administration, and Decentralisation, 
Finance, and Employement and Social Protection, provided for the hiring of 443 individuals on work 
contracts (233 individuals of University Education and 210 individuals of Secondary Education) at the 
Employment Promotion Centres of the Manpower Employment Organisation. This joint ministerial 
decision defined the number of individuals to be employed, the specific work to be executed, the period 
of time required for the total or partial delivery of the work, the total amount of the contractors’ 
remuneration, the location of the work. It additionally clarified that the work was not part of the cycle 
of the usual duties of the employees of the Manpower Employement Organisation. Finally, it justified 
the need for work contracts on the fact that the personnel of the organisation were not sufficient neither 
qualitatively nor quantitatively to carry out the activities laid down in the joint ministerial decision 
since the work demanded expertise. As for the use of the term “authenticity”, here it implies that the 
work was not part of the cycle of the usual duties of the employees of the Manpower Employment 
Organisation, and therefore the working relationship does not conceal fixed and permanent needs of the 
public sector agency. The relevant agency should provide a justification for the reasons why the work 
cannot be carried out by its own employees.  
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On December 22, 2005, the administration of the organisation informed the 
Ombudsman that it was not entitled to send the said opinion to the authority because 
“the opinion no 3273 dated 19.4.2005 of the legal service of the Manpower 
Employement Organisation “incorporated” into a Ministers’ act710 pertaining to their 
political function, does no longer constitute a simple administrative document, which 
may be subject to the control of the authority of the Ombudsman on the occasion of a 
citizen’s complaint”.  
The authority with subsequent documents addressed to the administration of the 
Manpower Employement Organisation, and finally with its finding addressed to the 
Minister of Employment and Social Protection pointed out that its request for the 
disclosure of the contested opinion was legal by all means. Thus, the refusal to 
disclose it was contrary to the provisions of article 5, par. 4 of the law 3094/2003 
“The Ombudsman and other provisions”711. The organisation never disclosed the 
relevant legal opinion. The authority considered appropriate that it should remind the 
Minister of Employment and Social Protection supervising the organisation of the 
competences of the Ombudsman. Therefore, in its Finding adressed to the Minister, 
the authority pointed out that it has the mission to mediate between citizens and public 
services, public law legal entities, local government authorities, and public utilities in 
order to combat maladministration and safeguard legality. It stressed that under such 
circumstances, all public services are obliged to facilitate the investigation in every 
possible way. The Ombudsman constitutes by nature an institution of extrajudicial 
dispute resolution between citizens and public administration. Therefore, the authority 
is not only an observatory of any form of maladministration but, above all, it is the 
protector of legality. It concluded that the Ombudsman is not in conflict with public 
administration. It is an institution of mediation moving within the framework of 
securing legality which constitutes the main principle of action in public 
administration. 
The provision on the referral to the competent prosecutor in case of violation of the 
duty of assistance was in force at the time the authority mediated. The organisation 
justified its negation on the fact that the legal opinion, as incorporated into the joint 
ministerial decision, was part of the ministers’ political function. This misleading 
argumentation was justified on the basis that article 3, par. 2 of the law 3094/2003 
provides that “the Ombudsman shall not have any jurisdiction over government 
ministers and deputy ministers for acts pertaining to their political function”.  Under 
this interpretation, all public documents invoked in a ministerial decision are 
considered as part of the political function, and therefore should be exempted from the 
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. However, there is a misunderstanding of basic 
concepts. Woodrow Wilson in his famous article “The Study of Administration”  
published in 1887, as well as classic management theories, make a distinction 
                                                 
710 It refers to the joint ministerial decision no 191143/30.8.2005. The said decision simply invokes the 
number and date of the opinion of the legal service, that is, it does not quote the text. 
711 Article 5, par. 4 of the law 3094/2003 reads as follows: “. . . The Ombudsman may request public 
services to provide him with any information, document or other evidence relating to the case, and may 
examine individuals, conduct on-site investigations and order an expert’s report. During the 
examination of documents and other evidence, which are at the disposal of public authorities, the fact 
that they have been classified as secret may not be invoked, unless they concern issues of national 
defense, state security and the country’s international relations. All public services have an obligation 
to facilitate the investigation in every possible way. Non-cooperation with an investigation by a public 
service shall make the object of a special report from the Ombudsman to the competent Minister”. 
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between policy formulation (a political function), and policy implementation (an 
administrative responsibility). Therefore, the joint ministerial decision simply 
implemented the clauses on work contractss which had been previously formulated by 
the executive at the stage of policy formulation. On the other hand, it is far from clear 
that the legal opinion did not fall within the ambit of exceptions, that is, it did not 
concern issues of national defense, state security, or the country’s international 
relations. The joint ministerial decision provided for the hiring of 443 individuals on 
work contracts at the Employment Promotion Centres. It seems that the Manpower 
Employment Organization refused to disclose information on the content of the legal 
opinion since it could not probably justify the authenticity of these contracts. The 
organisation impeded the investigation, whereas the authority failed to exhaust its 
institutional competences by enforcing the provision on the violation of the duty of 
assistance. Therefore, it is not clear how the Ombudsman served the principle of 
legality through the mediation process. 
The conviction of Greece by the European Court of Human Rights in the case 
Tsourlakis v. Greece712 is of interest since the Ombudsman seems to have failed to 
mediate effectively. A short assessment of the Ombudsman’s mediation based on 
parts of the text of the judgement713 follows. The applicant was fully deprived of the 
access to the welfare report of the Society since it had been submitted to the Court of 
Appeal the same day of the trial. Under such circumstances, there was no deadline in 
order to apply for a copy. Therefore, the report was accessible neither before nor 
during the discussion. Similarly, the report was not accessible after the trial because it 
had been removed from the file since it was discovered that the file did not contain the 
report. The European Court of Human Rights pointed out that the national legislation 
in relation to the use of a report drafted in the context of a welfare research is not 
clear. The applicable articles of the Civil Code make no reference to it. Indeed, the 
Ombudsman informed714 the applicant that the welfare report of the Society was not 
bound by the confidentiality applied in similar reports drafted within the framework 
of penal proceedings. Furthermore, the Ombudsman noted that the Society was 
obliged to communicate its welfare report only to the authority that had ordered its 
drafting, and could not give copies to the parties without the prosecutor’s prior 
consent. The Ombudsman concluded that the said Society could not communicate a 
copy of the report to the applicant since the latter had not formulated his request 
through the competent prosecutor. 
                                                 
712 See Appendix 2, abstract 5 containing the summary of the case as quoted in the press issue issued by 
the registrar, Chamber Judgement, Tsourlakis v. Greece (application no. 50796/07). Source: The 
Official Website of the European Court of Human Rights, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Tsourlakis
%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20Greece&sessionid=81536890&skin=hudoc-pr-en, date of access: 
9.11.2011. 
713 First Section, Judgement, Tsourlakis v. Greece, Strasbourg, October 15, 2009. Source: The Official 
Website of the European Court of Human Rights, available at: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Tsourlakis
%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20Greece%20%7C%2050796/07&sessionid=81537453&skin=hudoc-en, 
date of access: 9.11.2011 
714 Our information on the content of the Ombudsman’s reply to the applicant is exclusively based on 
the text of the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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In this case the Ombudsman handled the applicant’s request in the way a common 
public service could have reacted. In effect, the authority simply avoided to take sides 
in the issue, thus putting further pressure on the Society, and passed the buck to the 
competent prosecutor. However, the procedure as dictated by the Ombudsman was 
misleading. In other words, the prosecutor’s prior consent was not a prerequisite for 
obtaining a copy of the report. In case a public service refuses to disclose a public 
document upon a citizen’s request, the latter may call upon the prosecutor to approve 
or deny the request. In other words, either the applicant should have directly applied 
to the prosecutor circumventing the Ombudsman, or the Ombudman should have 
applied the provision on the violation of the duty of assistance, if the request was just 
and the Society insisted on refusing cooperation. The authority failed to support its 
institutional role on the one hand, and prove its expertise on human rights issues on 
the other. More specifically, it restricted itself to the interpretation of the vague 
provisions of the national legal framework, which finally proved to be favourable for 
the applicant. Nevertheless, it could have additionally tried to persuade the Society 
that its refusal violated the right to respect for private and family life pursuant to 
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
The personnel of the authority should have mediated more constructively, and should 
have proved its familiarisation with the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights. Indeed, the Court based its argumentation on two of its judgements. 
Thus, it concluded that the essentially unjustified refusal of the authorities to consent 
to the publication of the welfare report after the end of the procedure before the Court 
of Appeal is considered as a disregard of the positive obligation to safeguard the real 
respect for the applicant’s right to his private and family life715. This could have been 
fulfilled through an effective and accessible procedure enabling the applicant to have 
access to all relevant and appropriate information (Roche v. the United Kingdom716). 
Furthemore, the Court reminded that it is a duty of the authorities to prove the 
existence of compelling reasons justifying the non-disclosure of a welfare report 
containing personal information of direct concern to the applicant (K.H. and Others v. 
Slovakia717). However, in this context, neither the competent authorities nor the 
government invoked such reasons, whereas the contested report de facto contained 
such information.  
                                                 
715 The Court developed the following argumentation in relation to the relevance of the welfare report 
for the applicant: “The information contained in the welfare report had been relevant to Mr Tsourlakis’ 
relationship with his son. In that regard, the courts had acknowledged the affection shown by the father 
towards his child, which was reaffirmed by his persistent efforts to obtain custody. Being informed of 
any negative findings contained in the report would have enabled the applicant to take them into 
account in order to improve the relationship. Moreover, Mr Tsourlakis had had a legitimate claim to 
be informed of the use made of the details he had provided for the purposes of compiling the report” 
(Summary of the judgement as formulated in the press issue). 
716 Source: The Official Website of the European Court of Human Rights, available at: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Roche%20
%7C%20v.%20%7C%20United%20%7C%20Kingdom&sessionid=81679444&skin=hudoc-en, date of 
access: 10.11.2011 
717 Source: The Official Website of the European Court of Human Rights, available at: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=K.H.%20%
7C%20Others%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20Slovakia&sessionid=81679498&skin=hudoc-en, date of 
access: 10.11.2011 
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c. The Greek Ombudsman: servant of two masters? 
In Goldoni’s play “The servant of two masters” the principal hero, Arlecchino, 
unsuccessfully tries to fulfill the orders of his two masters, whereas Matthew the 
Apostle (6:24) states that 
No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the 
other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You 
cannot serve both God and Money. 
In the case of the Greek Ombudsman the conflict-avoiding consensual techniques and 
the conflict-seeking quest for legality seem to be incompatible. There is direct and 
indirect evidence that the authority shows unwillingness to exhaust its statutory 
powers, publicity included, thus failing to act preventively against corruption. It is no 
coincidence that the effectiveness of the anti-corruption efforts in a country 
constitutes one of the main parameters measuring the phenomenon. Therefore, the 
Chair of Transparency International, Huguette Labelle, argued718 that  
Stemming corruption requires strong oversight by parliaments, a well 
performing judiciary, independent and properly resourced audit and 
anti-corruption agencies, vigorous law enforcement, transparency in 
public budgets, revenue and aid flows, as well as space for independent 
media and a vibrant civil society . . . 
The case of the Special Report on public sector recruitments exempted from the 
procedures of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel is astonishingly 
revealing of the way the authority supported the survival, reproduction and 
perpetuation of clientelistic practices in public sector recruitments. The authority 
legalized the deconstruction of the regulatory space of the competent independent 
authority in the name of flexibility and best practices. It even proposed the 
substitution of the recruitment regulator for the reinforcement of the supervisory role 
of the executive, that is, the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation. However, these proposals, clearly undermining the Supreme Council 
for the Selection of Personnel, were not adopted. On the contrary, the law 3812/2009 
moved to the opposite direction, and restored the institutional role of the regulator as 
arising under the Constitution, albeit at a time when the state started to shrink. 
The conviction of Greece in the case Tsourlakis v. Greece is revealing in two respects. 
First, the mediation of the authority was misleading and contradictory. Despite the 
fact that it judged that the welfare report was not confidential, the applicant could only 
obtain it upon request to the competent prosecutor. Second, the European Court of 
Human Rights based its judgement on the provisions of a binding international 
agreement, that is, article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights that the 
authority should have invoked in the first place. This paradigm explicitly shows that 
the contradictory decisions between Justice and the Ombudsman might hurt the 
prestige and credibility of the latter.  And this probably explains why the common 
legislator introduced the criterion of subsidiarity, that is, article 3 par. 4 of the law 
                                                 
718 The Official Website of Transparency International, available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/what_s_new_in_cpi_2009, date 
of access: 10.11.2011. 
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3094/2003 according to which the Ombudsman “shall not investigate cases pending 
before a court or other judicial authority”.  However, the clause directly violates the 
right of access to justice719. Furhermore, taking into consideration the prerequisite for 
the absence of pending lawsuits combined with the short deadlines to submit a 
lawsuit, a de facto dilemma is posed to the citizen: recourse to Justice or to the 
Ombudsman? In the annual report for the year 1998, the authority stressed that one of 
its primary aims is “reducing the number of cases taken to court and thus lightening 
the burdens of the judicial system”. However, this legitimate aim might prove in effect 
tricky since lightening the caseload of the courts might have implications for the 
citizens’ interests. In other words, reducing recourse to the courts, that is a conflict-
seeking mechanism, probably reduces the number of unfavourable decisions for 
public administration. Under such circumstances, the citizen cedes the defense of his 
rights to a rather administration-friendly extrajudicial mechanism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
719 Article 20 of the Constitution reads as follows: “Every person shall be entitled to receive legal 
protection by the courts and may plead before them his views concerning his rights or interests, as 
specified by law”. 
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SUMMARY 
In the case of the Greek Ombudsman regulatory failure was detected through the assessment 
of the regulator’s performance as proactive anti-corruption mechanism, on the one hand, and 
the presentation of two case studies where mediation failed in parallel with the non-activation 
of the duty of assistance, on the other. The philosophy of the institution as reflected in the 
annual reports, that is, the strategy of conflict-avoiding consensual techniques combined with 
the conflict-seeking quest for legality rather undermine the effective regulatory action and 
seem to be at odds with the effort to combat the phenomenon of widespread 
maladministration diachronically rooted in the country. Thus, the proactive anti-corruption 
effectiveness as indicator of agency independence was assessed in three respects. First, the 
intensity of the use of the statutory powers of a deterrent character, that is, the number of 
reports the Ombudsman referred to the public prosecutor relating to potential acts of 
corruption, were compared with the levels of corruption as reflected in the CPI scores issued 
by Transparency International in the period from 1998-2010. The comparison showed that 
high levels of corruption were accompanied by the low use of deterrent measures. Second, the 
Ombudsman’s supportive stance towards the system of exemptions from the general 
recruitment system as expressed in the relevant Special Report for the year 2006 legitimised 
clientelistic and non-transparent practices facilitating corruption in recruitments, thus offering 
ideological backing to the legislative initiatives of the political decision-makers. Third, the 
authority failed to combat overregulation, a key factor enhancing corruption, on a consultative 
basis through the systematic promotion of a regulatory reform on recasting, simplification, 
and consolidation of legislation. Finally, the two case studies offer insights into failed 
mediation, thus showing the unwillingness of the regulator to intervene positively on behalf of 
the citizens and inevitably come into conflict with the regulatee-public administration.  
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5. The Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy 
 
a. Beyond regulatory failure: When the regulator fails to audit the regulatee in the 
first place 
  
The Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy (ADAE) was 
founded under article 1 of the law 3115/2003. The establishment of the authority 
arises from the Constitutional demand for the protection of the secrecy of mailing, 
free correspondence or communication720. The authority also ensures the security of 
networks and information. As for the concept of privacy of communication, it also 
refers to the control of the respect of the terms and the procedure of waiving privacy 
protection rights as foreseen by the law. The authority pertains to the group of 
regulators auditing public and private sector organisations alike, as is the case with the 
Hellenic Data Protection Authority. The main public sector regulatee is the Hellenic 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) pursuant to article 5 of the founding law 
3115/2003. Thus, the authority may put in effect scheduled and emergency auditing 
procedures, ex officio or upon complaint, of installations, equipment, archives, data 
bases and documents of NIS as well as of other public services, organisations, and 
enterprises of the wider public sector. It also summons hearings of the 
administrations, legal representatives and employees of the aforementioned public 
sector bodies. 
According to the annual reports, the authority has never proceeded to any audit 
regarding NIS or any other public authority under its jurisdiction throughout its period 
of operation. It remains silent on the issue, and only the annual reports for the years 
2005-2008 provide the following information in relation to NIS and other authorities 
that have the jurisdiction to request a waiver of confidentiality: “These authorities 
should define their fields of activity in relation to communications sector and 
facilitate the audit of the auditing body to which they are subjected”. Indeed, a series 
of newspaper articles published in July, 2011721 relating to the serious increase of 
interceptions of communications effectuated by the NIS and the antiterrorism agency 
of the Greek Police, also confirmed that the authority “does not carry out controls to 
the central bases of the interception systems of the NIS and the antiterrorism agency, 
whereas it audits the land and mobile telephones companies intruding with these 
systems and “opening lines” to the secret and prosecuting services”. 
                                                 
720 Article 19, par. 1 and 2 of the Constitution reads as follows: “1. Secrecy of letters and all other 
forms of free correspondence or communication shall be absolutely inviolable. The guaranties under 
which the judicial authority shall not be bound by this secrecy for reasons of national security or for 
the purpose of investigating especially serious crimes, shall be specified by law. 2. Matters relating to 
the constitution, the operation and the functions of the independent authority ensuring the secrecy of 
paragraph 1 shall be specified by law”. 
721 Newspaper “To Vima” on-line edition, article entitled “The ears of the NIS listen to everything: the 
wiretappings of NIS and the antiterrorism agency increased by 70%”, available at: 
http://www.tovima.gr/default.aspx?pid=6525&la=1&aid=413331, date of access: 12.12.2011. 
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The Greek wiretapping case of 2004-2005, also referred to as the Greek Watergate722, 
proves the lack of audit and cooperation between regulator and regulatee, that is, the 
NIS. The scandal was officially revealed in January 2006 despite the fact that 
members of the government had already been informed of the issue by Vodafone in 
spring 2005. In the summer of 2006 the special permanent parliamentary committee 
on institutions and transparency addressed the issue723. The President of the authority 
and the heads of the NIS were asked to appear before the parliamentary committee. 
Opposition MPs accused the secret service of being involved in a cover-up. They 
claimed that they had been demanding more information from NIS which had 
conducted its own secret investigation into the case, whereas the then Minister of 
Public Order had so far turned down these requests. The President of the authority 
informed the parliamentary committee that NIS had not assisted the authority in its 
probe. PASOK MPs also accused the competent prosecutor of helping to prevent 
details of the investigation of NIS being passed on to the authority. The authority 
drafted its finding in 2007, whereas a second report was submitted to the 
parliamentary Committee on Institutions and Transparency in 2010. In this report the 
experts of the authority claimed that there was a series of gaps and “mistakes” in the 
assessment of the evidence at the initial stage of the investigation of NIS724. It is 
characteristically stated that “the finding of NIS comprises general information of 
technical nature derived from executives of Vodafone”. 
The further publicization of the lack of audit of the NIS by its regulator was triggered 
by the parliamentary question 260/14/6.12.2011 relating to “cases of monitoring 
citizens and the protection of the secrecy of communications” submitted by the 
President of the Parliamentary Group of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras, and addressed to 
the Prime Minister, Loukas Papademos725. Tsipras stated that, during discussions of 
the special permanent standing committee on Institutions and Transparency on the 
Annual Report for the year 2010 of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy, the President of the Authority had argued that there had been 
                                                 
722 The case involved the illegal tapping of 104 mobile phones on the Vodafone Greece network 
belonging mostly to members of the Greek government, the Prime Minister included, and top ranking 
civil servants. The illegal software was according to reports installed on the Vodafone Greece network 
so that calls could be relayed to another number for recording. The taps began sometime near the 
beginning of August 2004 and were removed in March 2005 without discovering the identity of the 
perpetrators. One Greek official noted on background that the initial penetration occurred during the 
run-up to the 2004 Athens Olympics stating: “it is evident that the wiretaps were organized by foreign 
intelligence agencies, for security reasons related to the 2004 Olympic Games”. According to the 
newspaper “Kathimerini on Sunday” dated August 28, 2011 the prosecutor of appeals stated that the 
U.S. embassy in Athens was apparently behind the wiretapping.  
723 Source: The electronic English edition of the newspaper Kathimeni. Article entitled “Pressure 
mounts on NIS to give tapping answers” dated July 27, 2006, available at: 
http://archive.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_1_27/07/2006_72565, date of access: 
08.06.2009. 
724 Source: The electronic edition of the newspaper “To Vima on line”. Article entitled “The 
wiretapping scandal: Two key-witnesses that were never called upon” dated May 27, 2010, available 
at: http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=333910, date of access: 27.05.2010. 
725 Minutes of Parliament, 13th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), Third Assembly, 
Session 48, Parliamentary Question 260/14/6.12.2011 submitted by the President of the Parliamentary 
Group of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras and answered by the Minister of the Citizen’s Protection, Christos 
Papoutsis, due to the absence of the Prime Minister in Brusssels, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias, date of access: 10.12.2011. 
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identified incidents of wiretapping and violation of the security of communications 
through primary cross-connection points (PCPs), where small tape recorders had been 
found. Furthermore, he had also admitted that the authority cannot effectively audit 
the NIS. Tsipras stated that the NIS remains uncontrollable, and asked the Minister of 
the Citizen’s protection whether he could assure Parliament that i) the Minister’s own 
telephone, as well as those of his colleagues were not tapped, ii) during his mandate 
the NIS had not purchased illegal equipment, iii) politicians or trade-unionists were 
not monitored, and iv) the numbers to be monitored following the previous waiver of 
confidentiality might be falsified. Finally, he proposed that the audit of the NIS should 
fall under the jurisdiction of an interparty committee as is the Committee on 
Institutions and Transparency. 
The Minister of the Citizen’s Protection, Christos Papoutsis (PASOK), replied on the 
part of the Prime Minister. He stressed that he had the political responsibility and 
supervision of the NIS, and accused the President of the authority of making general 
and vague references and allegations regarding massive monitorings. He stated that at 
the same time the authority had failed to fulfill its mission, that is, to audit the NIS, 
whereas he was of the opinion that it was the responsibility of the state to check why 
the authority did not exercise these competences. In relation to wiretapping through 
primary cross-connection points, he blamed the President of the authority for 
irresponsible behaviour since he seemed to ignore that in recent years intrusions have 
been taking place electronically. The Minister also replied that no number 
falsifications could be effectuated since the procedure is controlled in three different 
stages: the authority, the prosecutor, and the provider. As for the equipment, he stated 
that last summer the NIS had purchased a system for locating mobile phones with no 
possibility of wiretapping. Finally, he informed Parliament that after the President’s 
allegations, the NIS issued an announcement inviting the authority to proceed to an 
audit and offering any technical assistance required by the auditors. He claimed that 
until that moment the authority had not reacted to the invitation. 
According to the video recorded minutes of the session of the special permanent 
standing committee on Institutions and Transparency 726, during the hearing of the 
President of the authority, two members of the committee, Prokopis Pavlopoulos 
(New Democracy), and Ioannis Korantis727 (Popular Orthodox Rally-LAOS) insisted 
on the issue of the relationship between the authority and the NIS, and the number of 
audits, regular or extraordinary, exercised by the authority. The President admitted 
that the authority does not have the possibility to audit NIS, and therefore cannot 
proceed to its substantial control. He argued that in the past he had supported the view 
that it would have been better not to have jurisdiction over the audit of NIS since the 
authority could not exercise it effectively. He pointed out that there was also the 
opposite view insisting that the authority should undertake this competence, albeit 
                                                 
726 Video recorded minutes of the session of the special permanent committee on Institutions and 
Transparency on the Annual Report for the year 2010 of the  Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy, and hearing of its President, held on November 22, 2011, Multimedia Archives 
of the Hellenic Parliament, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-
Ellinon/ToKtirio/Fotografiko-Archeio/#65eae45b-a755-4d70-89c6-793d0bb134f1, date of access: 
10.12.2011. 
727 Honorary Ambassador, he was appointed Commander of the NIS (2004-2009) by the New 
Democrary Government, and was elected MP in the national elections of 2009 with the party of the 
extreme right wing party of the “Popular Orthodox Rally”. Interestingly enough, an ex-regulatee 
participates in the parliamentary review of his ex-regulator.  
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with few means at its disposal, since this was better than nothing. As for the number 
of audits, he claimed that they had visited the headquarters of NIS two or three times 
throughout the period of the operation of the authority. He admitted that they had 
never exercised an audit since January 7, 2009, whereas whenever they had conducted 
such controls they had found nothing objectionable. He pointed out that he had 
observed that the equipment of NIS presented to the authority during a relevant 
control had been considered poor. Ioannis Korantis asked the President of the 
authority whether he was aware of a series of press reports and websites concerning 
the supply of wiretapping systems by the NIS728, pointing out that such systems do 
not simply facilitate the user’s location. The President informed the members of the 
committee that he had no information on the issue, and asked the MP to send him all 
the relevant documentation he had at his disposal.  
The NIS immediately reacted to press reports referring to the briefing of the President 
of the authority in the permanent special standing committee on Institutions and 
Transparency, and issued a communication dated November 22, 2011729. The 
communication stressed that the authority had failed to audit the NIS since January 7, 
2009, and asked the authority to fulfill its statutory obligations stressing that it would 
provide any possible assistance in order to facilitate the auditors’ task.  
 
b. A flawed clause regarding the legality of the control of the waiver of the 
confidentiality of communications 
 
The law 2225/1994 provides for the terms and the procedure for the waiver of 
confidentiality of communication. The waiving procedure requires a ruling issued by 
the Council of Appeals or the Council of First Instance, depending on the gravity of 
the offence under investigation, or a prosecutorial ordinance ratified by a respective 
ruling. On issues of national security, the ordinance of the Prosecutor of Appeals is 
simply required. It is also foreseen that the Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy is informed, in any case, irrespective of the authority submitting 
the relevant request for the waiver of confidentiality. Within this framework, the 
authority controls the terms and the procedure for the waiver of confidentiality, 
without proceeding to the examination of the content of the judgement of the 
                                                 
728 According to the blog “Greece blognews” and the newpaper “To Vima” more than 8 million euros 
were spent for the supply of two sophisticated interception systems in 2009 and 2010. One interception 
system is operating at the Antiterrorism agency of the Greek Police, equally subject to the control of 
the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy. According to the blog, the executives 
of the NIS had submitted the request for the supply of these systems when Prokopis Pavlopoulos was 
appointed Minister of the Interior (Sep. 2007-Oct. 2009, at the time the Ministry of Public Order was 
merged with the Ministry of the Interior). However, the request was rejected since it was considered 
that the use of such systems stretch the bounds of legality. They may be used without permitting any 
substantial control from the relevant judicial authorities or the Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy as to whether the monitorings pertain to the numbers or the persons for whom the 
waiver of confidentiality had been approved. This is achieved simply because these systems may tap 
communications without leaving any trace. On the contrary, the monitorings effectuated by the older 
system were recorded indelibly both to the central system installed in the headquarters of the NIS as 
well as to the mobile companies to which this system is connected with straight lines. Sources: Greece 
blognews, available at: http://kostasxan.blogspot.com/2011/11/blog-post_8936.html, date of access: 
11.12.2011, Newspaper “To Vima” on-line edition, article entitled “The ears of the NIS listen to 
everything: the wiretappings of the NIS and the antiterrorism agency increased by 70%”, available at: 
http://www.tovima.gr/default.aspx?pid=6525&la=1&aid=413331, date of access: 12.12.2011. 
729 Appendix 4, text 1 contains the full text of the communication of the NIS. 
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competent judicial authorities. In all its annual reports for the period 2004-2010, the 
authority considers that there should be a legislative regulation complementing its 
competence on the issue. It supports the view that the current clause, in the absence of 
legal consequences in case a violation of the terms and the procedure for the waiver of 
confidentiality are ascertained, remains flawed. Therefore, it proposes that in cases of 
such infringements, the authority should have the competence to ask from the 
materially responsible prosecutor (Appeals or Supreme Court) the exercise of legal 
remedies (appeal, reversal) against Rulings for the waiver of confidentiality. In the 
case of a prosecutorial ordinance issued for reasons of national security, the 
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court should be responsible, upon request of the authority. 
We fully acknowledge that this gap in the legislation is related to a special kind of 
sanctions under the form of legal remedies, which in turn, does not serve as an 
appropriate tool for the assessment of agency independence. However, it is indicative 
of the will of the political decision-makers to hinder regulatory action in the first 
place, thus leaving the regulatees in peace.  
Table 2 shows the number of Ordinances and Rulings regarding the waiver of 
confidentiality communicated to the authority during the period 2005-2010, whereas 
there is an impressive increase in their number in the years 2009 and 2010. According 
to the annual reports for the period 2004-2010, the authority was sending each year 
letters to the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court noting i) omissions of the judicial and 
prosecutorial authorities regarding the communication of rulings and ordinances to the 
authority, and ii) the need for compliance with the procedure for the waiver of 
confidentiality, as in force, in order to safeguard full and indispensable 
implementation of the provisions of the current legislation regarding the management 
of relevant cases. In other words, the authority asked for the assistance and 
intervention of the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court since a number of ordinances and 
rulings never reached the authority, whereas there were cases where the procedure for 
the waiver of the confidentiality of communications was violated. Under such 
circumstances, it seems that the authority justifiably suggests a legislative regulation 
regarding the measure of legal consequences concerning the violation of the waiving 
procedure. Thus, the statutory control of the legality of the procedure would become 
effective.   
Table 2 Communication of Ordinances and Rulings                                         
regarding the waiver of the confidentiality of communications, 2005-2010 
Year  Ordinances Rulings 
2005 55 144 
2006 161 309 
2007 214 411 
2008 302 607 
2009 1,061 970 
2010 2,231 1,169 
                      Source: The Annual Report for the year 2010 
Interestingly enough, during the hearing of the President of the authority at the 
permanent special standing committee on Institutions and Transparency, the MP 
Theodora Tzakri (PASOK) expressed her reservations on this legislative proposal. 
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She supported that the arrangement would create more problems than it was supposed 
to solve. She stressed that the rulings are issued with extremely rapid procedures, and 
aim to serve immediate needs of the investigating authorities. She finally pointed out 
that the judicial courts are exclusively competent to judge over the rulings, and 
therefore the involvement of the authority constitutes involvement in the work of 
justice. However, the MP’s argumentation seems to be based on a misinterpretation of 
the purpose of the proposed arrangement. In other words, there is confusion between 
the concepts of the control of the legality of the procedure, and the control of the 
content of the rulings and ordinances. It would have been unwise on the part of the 
authority to suggest a measure directly intervening in the work of justice. It simply 
proposes an arrangement deemed necessary for the completion of the control of the 
legality of the procedure, which, otherwise, remains useless. 
c. Mission unaccomplished 
In recent years, the fight against crime and terrorism has inevitably permitted 
governments to abuse privacy rights as a counterbalance to security. It has also been 
argued that safeguarding security serves as a convenient excuse for governments to 
exercise their power. Within this context, the national regulators responsible for the 
protection of the confidentiality of communications have to face powerful regulatees, 
that is, the police and intelligence services. Not incidentally, the hearing of the 
President of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy during 
the parliamentary review on the annual report for the year 2010 provoked tremendous 
reaction on the part of the regulatee, the NIS. Moreover, a parliamentary question was 
submitted, and the issue attracted further publicity. The NIS and the Minister of the 
Citizens’ protection criticized the authority for not fulfilling its statutory competences, 
whereas at the same time it had proceeded to allegations regarding abuses of 
communication interceptions.  
However, the President’s proposal that the audit of the NIS should have been 
exempted from the field of regulation escaped attention. The regulator actually 
admitted that oversight was impossible to achieve, whereas his reference to the view 
that insisted on the delegation of this competence to the authority, even weakly 
exercised, rather revealed the political decision-makers’ will for the symbolic use of 
politics. Indeed, privacy laws arise from the constitutional dicta, as well as binding 
international treaties on human rights, that is, article 12 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights730, and article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights731. 
Therefore, the respect for human rights and the principles of democratic governance 
inevitably imposed the inclusion of this competence in the regulatory field of the 
                                                 
730 Article 12 of the Universal Declaration for Human Rights reads as follows: “No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks 
upon his honou and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks”.  
731 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” 
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authority. The regulator’s correspondence with the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court 
also reveals omissions, and violations of the procedure for the waiver of the 
confidentiality of communications732. The absence of legal remedies against such 
infringements leads the control of the legality of the procedure to a deadlock. The 
MP’s rejection of the proposed arrangement on the issue, albeit ostensibly based on a 
misunderstanding, shows the reluctance of the political decision-makers to concede 
any further substantial power that could impede the circumvention of the legality of 
the waiving procedure.  
However, it seems that the Greek regulator’s weakness to audit the NIS is not an 
exception in relation to the respective European national regulators. Privacy 
International733, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the Center for 
Media and Communications Studies (CMCS), conducted the study "European Privacy 
and Human Rights (EPHR) 2010", funded by the European Commission's Special 
Programme "Fundamental Rights and Citizenship," 2007-2013734. According to 
Privacy International the study “investigates the European landscape of national 
privacy/data protection laws and regulations as well as any other laws or recent 
factual developments with and impact on privacy. The study consists of 33 targeted 
reports, an overview presenting a comparative legal and policy analysis of main 
privacy topics and a privacy ranking735 for all the countries surveyed”. All categories, 
that is, the seventeen main privacy topics736, were measured out of 10 points. The 
report contains the following general assessment for Greece:  
A rich and controversial history of privacy, with whole-scale abuse, 
and political upheaval. While many promising developments occurred 
in the mid 2000s, since then the Government has repeatedly failed to 
implement necessary safeguards, and so surveillance continues. 
                                                 
732 The newspaper article “The ears of the NIS listen to everything: the wiretappings of the NIS and the 
antiterrorism agency increased by 70%” notes that “Competent public officials state that “the great 
danger arises from the procedure of the correspondence regarding the requests submitted to the Office 
of the Prosecutor of Appeals. However, executives from the NIS and the Antiterrorism agency contend 
that “the relevant procedure is transparent, since it is controlled by the competent prosecutors 
supervising the two services”. 
733 Privacy International is a non-profit private limited company. 
734 Source: The Official Website of Privacy International, available at: 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/ephr, date of access: 14.12.2011. 
735 Privacy International explains the selection of the methodological option of ratings against rankings 
as follows: “We have also abandoned the idea of a 'ranking', where one country is awarded the 'worst' 
mark. We believe that there is some merit to this practice, but we felt that we would fnd the results 
more interesting to see the classifications rather than the number figures. That is, if country A had an 
average of 4.2 and country B had an average of 4.5, we are unsure if it would be fair to say that country 
A was 'worst' out of this list. Similarly, we would be cautious to say that country B was 'best'. Rather it 
is more valuable to see the gradations in each category, and the similarities and disparities between 
countries when they are categorised by both criteria and average results. As such, we felt that a 'ratings' 
scheme would be more appropriate”.  
736 The main privacy topics were: i) democratic safeguards, ii) constitutional protection, iii) statutory 
protection, iv) privacy enforcement, v) leadership, vi) ID cards and biometrics, vii) data-sharing, viii) 
visual surveillance, ix) communications interception, x) communications data retention, xi) government 
access to data, xii) workplace monitoring, xiii) medical, xiv) financial, xv) border, xvi) intelligence and 
surveillance oversight, and xvii) DNA. 
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The categories of communications interception737, and intelligence and surveillance 
oversight738 are of great interest. Table 3 shows their ratings in 33 countries. Those 
countries pertaining to the group of ratings ranging from 0.0 to 1.7 are classified as 
cases of “endemic surveillance”. Greece figures among cases of “endemic 
surveillance” in the category of communications interception. Moreover, most 
countries, Greece included, present low ratings in the category of intelligence and 
surveillance oversight, whereas no data are available for seven countries. Thus, the 
large number of “endemic surveillance” cases in most European countries rather 
proves the unwillingness of the governments to facilitate the oversight of police and 
state security agencies. 
 
Table 3 European Privacy Ratings in the categories of i) Communications Interception and ii) 
Intelligence and Surveillance Oversight 
Country Communications 
Interception 
Intelligence and 
Surveillance 
Oversight 
Country Communications 
Interception 
Intelligence and 
Surveillance 
Oversight 
Austria 2.5 0.0 Luxembourg 5.0 - 
Belgium 1.3 2.5 Malta 1.7 - 
Bulgaria 1.3 2.5 Netherlands 1.3 1.3 
Cyprus 5.0 - Poland 1.3 1.7 
Czech Republic 3.3 2.5 Portugal - - 
Denmark 2.5 2.5 Romania 5.0 3.3 
Estonia 3.3 2.5 Slovakia 3.3 3.3 
Finland 5.0 - Slovenia 3.3 1.7 
France 3.3 1.7 Spain 1.7 - 
Germany  1.3 1.7 Sweden 2.5 1.3 
Greece 1.3 1.7 UK 1.7 1.7 
Hungary 1.3 1.7 NON EU   
Ireland 1.7 - Croatia 2.5 1.7 
Italy 1.3 1.7 FYROM 1.7 1.7 
Latvia 1.7 3.3 Norway 3.8 5.0 
Lithuania 1.7 1.7 Switzerland 3.3 1.7 
   Turkey 2.5 0.0 
 Source: Privacy International, European Privacy and Human Rights Report 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
737 See Appendix 4, text 2 containing a summary of the content and accompanying questionnaire on the 
category communications interception according to Privacy International. 
738 See Appendix 4, text 3 containing a summary of the content and accompanying questionnaire on the 
category intelligence and surveillance oversight according to Privacy International. 
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SUMMARY 
The Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy is a characteristic case of 
regulatory inertia, that is, a case where the regulator fails to audit its main public sector 
regulatee, in this case, the National Intelligence Service. Furthermore, a flawed legislative 
regulation, that is, the institutional design itself, ex ante hinders regulatory action, thus 
leading once more to regulatory inertia. More specifically, the authority is blocked from 
having recourse to any legal remedies when exercising the control of the legality of the 
rulings and ordinances relating to the terms and conditions of the procedure for the waiver of 
the confidentiality of communications issued upon request of the respective public sector 
regulatees (NIS, the antiterrorism agency of the Greek Police etc). The annual reports, the 
minutes of parliament, and publicity in the media served as a source of information to 
describe the inexistent relationship between regulator and regulatee, as well as the reluctance 
of the political decision-makers to settle the issue of the lack of legal remedies. However, it 
seems that Greece is not an outlier regarding regulatory inertia, since governments in most 
European countries show unwillingness to facilitate the oversight of police and state security 
agencies. 
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6. Conclusion 
The qualitative assessment of the external at arm’s length relationship attempted to 
detect trends in the regulators’ behaviour towards their regulatees, namely the 
coinciding diptych public administration-political decision-makers. The term “trend” 
is used in order to identify conflict-avoiding, inertia included, or conflict-seeking 
strategies adopted by the regulators either while interacting with the regulatees or on 
own initiative. In other words, the issue at stake is whether the regulatory action 
satisfies the regulatee’s interests. In cases where the regulatory action clearly fails to 
serve the public interest, and therefore coincides with the regulatees’ interests, 
regulatory failure occurs. Different approaches and tools were applied for each 
constitutional independent authority in order to highlight indicative instances of the 
regulatory behaviour.  
In the case of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, the application of 
the simulative control of the constitutionality of laws came to test the regulator’s 
willingness to act on an own initiative basis. In other words, the weakness of the 
authority to intervene in its own regulatory field constitutes a case of regulatory 
failure. Indeed, a series of provisions, either relating to the broadness of the 
jurisdiction of the authority over public sector recruitments or the terms of the 
recruitment procedure itself, clearly violated the constitutional principles of equality 
and meritocracy. However, the authority restricted itself to the simple observation of 
these distortions through its annual reports. Thus, it failed to block the will of the 
political decision-makers that partly managed to dominate over their alter ego, that is, 
public administration, through legislative manipulation. Ironically, it was the law 
3812/2009 that came to regulate the injustices of the public sector recruitment system, 
and restore the regulator’s prestige at a time when the public sector was starting to 
shrink.  
In the case of the Greek Ombudsman, the inherent conceptual contradictions guiding 
regulatory action and their introduction into an administrative system characterized by 
specific pathologies might make the institution more vulnerable to regulatory failure. 
Thus, the high levels of corruption in the country, as reflected in the CPI scores issued 
by Transparency International, combined with the Ombudsman’s low use of statutory 
powers of a deterrent character probably reveal the regulator’s unwillingness to 
disturb the regulatees. Furthemore, signs of ideological convergence with the political 
decision-makers on certain aspects of the public sector recruitment system facilitating 
clientelistic practices, the lack of a systematic consultative intervention against 
overregulation, and the avoidance of a broad publicity regarding the Ombudsman’s 
findings are not persuasive of an effective proactive anti-corruption effort. The case of 
the Manpower Employment Organisation as well as the conviction of Greece in the 
case Tsourlakis v. Greece, serve as paradigms of ineffective mediation, and failure to 
activate the statutory power regarding the violation of the duty of assistance. 
In the case of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, the decision 27/2007 supported 
the position of the Greek academic community, and hindered the uploading of the 
university professors’ selection minutes on the internet. Despite the explicit will of the 
common legislator to make universities proceed to own-initiative publicity through 
the publication of the selection minutes in a special volume, the authority considered 
that uploading them on the internet constituted a disproportionate dissemination of 
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personal data.  The decision could be characterized as biased in many respects. It 
presents weaknesses, not only linked to its content per se but also to external factors. 
The creation of a conflict of interest of situation, the unjustified long delay in the 
publication of the decision, the ignorance of the Italian paradigm may cause doubts to 
arise in relation to the impartiality of the decision. At the same time, the university 
professors’ selection procedures seem to be traumatized to a large extent by cases of 
nepotism, signs of involvement of party politics, and the violation of the legality of 
the procedures themselves. It is far from clear that the regulator struggled to protect 
the regulatees’ interests, thus jeopardizing the public interest.  
The case of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy is an 
extreme case of regulatory inertia. The regulator publicly admitted his weakness to 
audit the main public sector regulatee, that is, the National Intelligence Service, and 
stated that he had proposed that the relevant competence should not have been 
delegated to the authority in the first place. The minutes of Parliament and the 
extended publicity present the peculiar hide-and-seek between the regulator, the 
regulatee, and the political decision-makers.  However, the nature of the regulatee, 
and the relevant European experience on the issue, prove that the inertia of the 
authority is not the exception to the rule.  
To sum up, the regulators’ behaviour, either on own initiative or upon request, seems 
to be conflict-avoiding in relation to the regulatees. Therefore, the regulatory action is 
cautious, and gives the impression of not exceeding the limits of what could be 
considered as acceptable by the regulatees, namely public administration-political 
decision-makers. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The External Accountability Relationship:  
The Citizens and the Constitutional Independent Authorities  
Immunity Arrangements Restricting the de facto Independence from Public 
Administration through the Violation of Human Rights 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, cases relating to the waiver of state leaders’ immunity or the 
overruling of immunity provisions in legislation as unconstitutional attracted 
international media coverage739, and provoked debate in literature regarding immunity 
regimes (Altman, 2002; Evans, 2006). Moreover, such protective legal frameworks 
for politicians or other high-ranking public officials or servants at national or 
supranational level have, interestingly enough, established a convergence against 
immunity arrangements among different actors, that is, citizens’ political 
movements740 and business people741 that traditionally represent opposing interest 
groups. Transparency International, an international rating organisation742 (Scott, 
2002), pinpoints that “immunity laws are being strengthened in many parts of the 
world, making it harder to prosecute political corruption”743.  
 
These paradigms, although pertaining to different immunity arrangements, serve as a 
starting point for the discussion that follows. The purpose of this unit is to introduce, 
analyse and comment on a new generation of immunity provisions in Greek 
legislation, their impact on the concept of administrative responsibility and their 
implications for the quality of democracy. More specifically, these provisions vest the 
members of the five constitutional independent authorities with almost absolute 
                                                 
739 We refer to the cases of Augusto Pinochet, Ariel Sharon, and Silvio Berlusconi. 
740 According to their website Newropeans is the first trans-European political movement which has 
run for European elections in 2009 in several EU Member States with the same name, the same 
programme and the same objective. The first of their 16 proposals for rendering the European Union 
more democratic and meeting the challenges of the XXIst Century refers to the maintenance of the 
principle of equality of all European citizens before the law by eliminating the legal immunity of 
European officials. Available at: http://www.newropeans.eu/spip.php?article=68&lang=en, 02.01.2010 
741 The President of the Federation of Industries of Thessaly and Central Greece, E. Eulogimenos, in his 
speeches at the Annual Regular Assemblies of the Management Board that took place in Volos on 
March 17th 2007 and May 15th 2009, emphasized the importance of equality in the relationship between 
the State and the Citizen (i.e., the principal of equality before the law), and proposed that the 
inviolability of parliamentarians should be abolished and measures regarding the personal 
responsibility of the members of the independent authorities and the agents effecting controls should be 
introduced. Source: The bi-monthly magazine of the Federation “Bulletin”, vol. March-April 2007, p. 
11, available at: http://www.sbtke.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73%3A-
qq&catid=16%3A-qq&Itemid=97&lang=el, date of access: 02.01.2010. 
742 Scott (2002) classifies Transparency International to “the group of private regulators that operate 
both nationally and internationally, lack a legal mandate and yet have the capacity to exercise 
considerable power in constraining governments and public agencies”. 
743 Transparency International Annual Report 2004, p. 6, available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/annual_report_2004, date of 
access: 02.01.2010. 
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immunity. They foresee that “they are not held responsible, prosecuted or subjected 
to inquiry for any opinion expressed or act committed in the discharge of their duties. 
Prosecution is permissible only following an accusation for slander, libel or breach of 
confidentiality”744. Such legal arrangements have rarely been discussed in regulatory 
literature. Furthermore, the issue of the quality of democracy revolves around whether 
immunity arrangements violate individuals’ fundamental rights, and simultaneously 
reduce the de facto independence of the Greek constitutional independent authorities 
regulating government from public administration. Within this context, we will 
attempt to question and challenge the prevailing view that immunity arrangements for 
high- ranking public functionaries at the top of bureaucratic hierarchies, as is the case 
with constitutional independent authorities regulating government in Greece, are a 
prerequisite for the independent function of these agencies. In other words, according 
to the functional necessity rationale, it would have been impossible for these public 
officials to fulfil their functions without such privileges that protect them from 
political control. However, the justificatory basis for the introduction of these 
provisions in the Greek legal order seems to have been based on a mixture of inexact 
and vague theoretical grounds.  
 
In our opinion, immunity provisions through the impunity they guarantee to those 
enjoying them decisively affect their day-to-day regulatory action towards citizens, 
their own personnel, and public administration. Thus, the core mission of these 
authorities is to shield citizens from the violation of their human rights by public 
administration, that is, to limit the authoritarian stance of the state.  We argue that if 
citizens are deprived of their right of access to court against those who are supposed 
to protect them, due to the lack of legal responsibility, the de facto independence of 
these authorities towards public administration is inevitably restricted.  
 
Our analysis proceeds as follows: First, we present the legal framework regarding the 
legal responsibility of civil servants in Greece and the relevant jurisprudence. Then, 
we comment on the introduction of immunity provisions for the high-ranking public 
functionaries of the five constitutional independent authorities, and on the relevant 
discussions in parliament. Next, a brief history is presented of the evolution of the 
ombudsman and the main immunity regimes in the institution since it appears that the 
French version served as a model for the Greek Ombudsman and became the 
justificatory basis for the extension of immunity provisions to the other constitutional 
independent authorities in Greece. A fourth step concerns a discussion on the sources 
of inspiration for the immunity regime in the institution of the ombudsman, that is, 
parliamentary immunity, immunity enjoyed by the officials of international 
organisations, theoretical approaches, and legal opinions. Then, we propose a 
typology of immunity in the institution of the ombudsman derived from the study of 
relevant provisions in the legislation of Council of Europe member states. Finally, we 
assess whether the regulatory agency of these authorities justifies the measure, on the 
one hand, and we discuss the relationship between expertise and legal responsibility, 
on the other. We conclude that the extension of immunity provisions beyond “the 
degree necessary for a democratic society”745 traumatizes the polity and citizens’ trust 
                                                 
744 The laws 2477 /1997, 3094/2003 and 3613/2007. 
745 The part of the sentence in quotation marks is a citation from Principle 6 of Resolution (97)24 of the 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against 
Corruption: ‘to limit immunity from investigation, prosecution or adjudication of corruption offences to 
the degree necessary in a democratic society”. Available at: 
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in government. In the Greek case, immunity provisions for the members of the five 
constitutional independent authorities restrict the de facto independence of these 
agencies from public administration through the violation of human rights.  
 
The legal responsibility of civil servants in Greece 
 
Before proceeding to the legal framework regulating the legal responsibility of civil 
servants in Greece, we should specify what the term responsibility implies in a 
bureaucratic context. It implies more than mere accountability of bureaucrats to 
“externally imposed institutional and statutory arrangements” (Gregory, 2007) which 
coincides with Mosher’s (1968) concept of objective responsibility.  Odegard (1954) 
identifies multiple loyalties and responsibilities for the bureaucrat746. According to 
this classification, legal responsibility to the courts (both administrative and judicial) 
refers to cases where “he [the bureaucrat] transgresses the rights of citizens by 
abusing or exceeding his powers”.  
 
In Greece the competences and responsibilities of civil servants are regulated by 
administrative law –the Civil Servants’ Code- and an important part of the criminal 
code. Three types of liabilities exist: disciplinary, criminal, and civil (patrimonial). 
Disciplinary liability is imposed on civil servants through internal proceedings747. The 
particular breaches which may give rise to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings 
pertain, among others, to the breach of duty pursuant to the Criminal Law, improper 
conduct or unjustified abstention from service. The range of disciplinary sanctions 
that may be imposed vary from a reprimand in writing, or a fine of up to three (3) 
months of salaries to temporary or final dismissal. Disciplinary liability does not seem 
to have a deterrent effect in practice since public services are reluctant to initiate 
disciplinary investigation or, when they commence such a procedure, it proves to be 
deficient748. The law 4057/2012 -promulgated after the outbreak of the Greek debt 
crisis- amended the provisions of the Civil Servants’ Code regarding the disciplinary 
liability, and attempted to combat the deficiencies arising from the content and 
implementation of the previous legal framework.  
 
The twelfth chapter of the Greek Penal Code entitled “crimes concerning the public 
service”749 describes the criminal offences that can be committed only by civil 
servants. Such crimes may pertain, among others, to bribery, abuse of power, 
falsification of documents, disclosure of official secrets or generally violation of 
duties.  
 
The civil liability of the Greek State and its agents 
The civil liability of the Greek State in tort caused by the legal actions of its agents is 
regulated by the provisions of the article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Greek 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.anticorruzione.it/Portals/altocommissario/Documents/Atti%20internazionali/risoluzione%2
0(97)%2024%20COE.pdf, date of access: 02.01.2010. 
746 These responsibilities are i) political (vicarious and indirect), ii) administrative, iii) legal, iv) 
professional, v) moral and vi) responsibility to his own soul (self-respect).  
747 Civil Servants’ Code (Law 3528/2007, art. 122-146). 
748 Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman and Reports of the Inspector General of Public 
Administration.  
749 Articles 235-263a of the Greek Penal Code. 
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Civil Code750. In its initial version, it recognized a joint liability of the civil servants 
and the State. The legislator made no distinction regarding the gravity of the offences 
(i.e., whether the public servant acted intentionally or under ordinary or gross 
negligence in a manner that was grossly negligent or intentional,) since it was 
considered purposeless. This law introduced a double liability mechanism for the civil 
servants: one towards the State for direct or indirect damages, and one towards the 
citizens who could sue personally the agent for the damages suffered because of the 
employee’s illegal conduct. The regulation set forth the social relevance of civil 
liability. Apart from the compensation of the victim, it could serve as a deterrence 
measure. Consequently, civil servants would become more diligent in the 
performance of their duties.   
The extent of the civil liability of state agents after the introduction of the 
relevant clauses in the Civil Servant’s Code 
The first Civil Servants’ Code was promulgated in 1951 (law 1811/1951), establishing 
not only common and uniform rules, but also ensuring some fundamental guarantees 
against the arbitrary interference by the administration in the employment position of 
the civil servants. The law was codified in 1977 (Presidential Decree 611/1977), 
whereas a new Civil Servants’ Code was introduced in 1999 (Law 2683/1999), and 
amended in 2007 (Law 3528/2007). In the law of 1951, article 57, which coincides 
with article 38 of the law of 2007, currently in force, redefined the extent of the civil 
liability of the organs of the state, thus amending the second verse of article 105 of the 
Introductory Law. An indulgent and protective regulation regarding the civil servants’ 
civil liability was enacted, thus restricting the scope of article 105 only to the direct 
liability of the state. Under the regime of vicarious liability751, which was introduced, 
the state had to compensate people for the damages caused by its agents752. Civil 
servants may not be sued personally for errors they commit in the performance of 
their duties. However, in case the state compensates the injured party, it has a right of 
recourse against the civil servant only when the agent acted in a manner that was 
grossly negligent or intentional. Thus, civil liability is limited to damages against the 
state’s assets and the positive damages suffered by the injured third parties.  
The civil servants’ personal civil liability against third parties is provided for in two 
cases. First, pursuant to article 11 of law 3242/2004, the civil servants owe to comply 
with final court decisions. In case they fail to comply, the provisions of articles 105 
and 106 of the Introductory Law to the Greek Civil Code are implemented, only after 
the activation of disciplinary measures against them753. The legislator, taking into 
consideration the relevant constitutional requirement, establishes the regime of direct 
                                                 
750 Compulsory Law 2783/1941.  
751 According to this system, the administration compensates the third party’s damages as a surrogate 
(vicarious liability of the administration). SIGMA, Support for Improvement in Governance and 
Management. A joint initiative of the OECD and the European Union, principally financed by the EU, 
Francisco Cardona, January 2003, http://www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/61/6/37890790.pdf, date of 
access: 02.01.2010 
752 In most legal orders as well as in that of the European Union (see article 340 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, and Regulation No 31/1962  (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the 
Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European 
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community) no direct civil liability is 
provided for civil servants.  
753 Art. 5, par. 1 and 2 of the law 3068/2002. 
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and personal civil liability provided that the non-compliance with court decisions has 
been previously disciplinary judged. Yet the precondition of a disciplinary decision 
weakens the effectiveness of the measure since, in practice, internal proceedings may 
delay or may never take place754. Within this context, it could be argued that the said 
regulation lacks legal realism in the sense that it is of doubtful effectiveness. Second, 
article 3 of the law 2957/2001 ratifying the Council of Europe’s Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption established the civil servants’ and public functionaries’ 
personal civil liability towards third parties in case they commit an act of corruption 
as defined in article 2 of the Convention755.  
The decision 3/2009 of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law 
(Areios Pagos) 
The decision 3/2009 of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law (Areios 
Pagos) concerning the civil liability of high-ranking public functionaries756 is of 
special interest since its rationale reverses previous decisions of the same court757. 
Furthermore, it links civil liability with the expertise of high-ranking public 
functionaries. More specifically, University Professors’ working status is governed by 
special provisions758, and they are considered public functionaries and not mere civil 
servants. By the time the specific action took place in 1995, these special provisions 
had neither provided for the civil liability of University Professors, nor made any 
reference that the provisions of the Civil Servants’ Code759 would have to be applied.  
Furthermore, the court argues that the principle of equality before the law (i.e., “All 
Greeks are equal before the law)760 also implies the equality of the law before them, in 
the sense that the legislator, when regulating substantially similar things, relations or 
situations relating to various categories of persons, is bound not to introduce 
unjustified exemptions or discriminations, thus regulating the said situations 
dissimilarly, unless this dissimilar regulation is imposed by rationales having to do 
with the broader social or public interest, which in turn are tested before the courts761. 
Consequently, the law may regulate in a different way for similar relations or 
situations for persons pertaining to different categories of functionaries or servants or 
employees, and this discrimination is justified without violating the principle of 
equality.  
In this case the university professor acted not in his capacity as a mere civil servant, 
that is a hospital doctor, but he bore the capacity of a high-ranking public functionary 
                                                 
754 Despite the fact that the provisions foresee that judges monitor the procedure, this might become a 
rather ineffective means due to judges’ workload. 
755 Article 2 of the Civil Law Convention on Corruption reads as follows: “For the purpose of this 
Convention, “corruption” means requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a 
bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any 
duty or behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, - the undue advantage or the prospect thereof”. 
Source: The Official Website of the Council of Europe, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/174.htm, date of access: 24.03.2012. 
756 In this case a university professor working also as a doctor at the National Health System.  
757 Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law (Areios Pagos), Decisions 1/1969, 1780/1989.  
758 Law 1268/1982. 
759 Article 85 par. 1 of the Codified Civil Servants’ Code in force from 15.7.1977 until 9.4.1999 
(Presidential Decree 611/1977). 
760 Art. 4, par. 1 of the Constitution. 
761 See also decisions of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law (Areios Pagos) in Plenary 
Session, 11/2008, 31/2007, 3/2006 and 38/2005. 
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(i.e., university professor) with high prestige and an increased responsibility compared 
to that of the mere civil servant, stemming exactly from this capacity. In the 
performance of his duties as a hospital doctor, his university capacity still existed and 
was not degraded to that of a mere doctor. In this sense he had to prove his 
outstanding knowledge -as a university professor- of his science and his art he is 
supposed to have by taking the personal responsibility for faultless performance. Yet 
there would have been a discrimination if, among doctors with different 
qualifications, a privileged regulation concerning their responsibility in service 
existed only for those having higher qualifications. Conversely, if the favourable 
regulation of the indirect civil liability of hospital doctors were applicable to 
university professors working also as doctors in hospitals, the extension of this 
privileged regulation to higher-ranking public functionaries, that is, to a different 
category of persons, would lead to the inequality of the law before the citizens, 
something that is unacceptable under the said provision of the Constitution. The 
rationale of the decision is relevant since it acknowledged direct civil liability for 
public functionaries due to their scientific and/or technical expertise. However, the 
legislator has already covered the gap in legislation through the amendment of article 
2 of the Civil Servants’ Code that is in force since 2007762. In other words, all 
categories of civil servants and public functionaries are henceforth subject to the said 
article, thus avoiding direct civil liability. 
Indeed, a series of counter arguments in Greek legal theory763 appears to have 
influenced the extension of non-liability in civil suit to all the other categories of civil 
servants or public functionaries for whom special provisions regulating their status 
and situation remained silent on the matter. First, the argumentation reiterated the 
relevant views expressed in the minutes of the Special Interparty Commission on the 
Greek Civil Code of the Fourth Revisionary Assembly in 1949764. Thus, it was argued 
that i) the liability of the state protected the citizen in a more effective way since he 
had the guarantee of obtaining proper compensation, ii) any direct civil action by an 
injured party against a civil servant would intimidate him since he would hesitate to 
act or decide, thus paralysing public administration, iii) the possibility of a direct civil 
suit might encourage citizens to act upon the revenge criterion. Second, the 
argumentation invoked the principle of equality before the law, as stamped in article 4 
par. 1 of the Constitution, combined with article 26 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations765 ratified under the law 2462/1997, 
supporting and imposing the retrieval of the legal inequality suffered by those under 
unfavourable discriminatory clauses relating to civil liability.  
                                                 
762 According to article 2 of the Civil Servants’ Code: “Civil servants or functionaries working for the 
State or legal persons of public law and governed by special provisions pertaining thereto pursuant to 
a constitutional or legislative regulation, as well as civil servants working for local government 
agencies, are subject to the provisions contained in the present Code for those matters that are not 
regulated by the special provisions that specifically apply to them”. 
763 Tachos, A. I, Comments on the Decision 12598/2003 of the Multi Member First Instance Court of 
Thessaloniki, Armenopoulos, January 2004.  
764 See Fourth Revisionary Assembly, Minutes of the Special Interparty Commission on the Greek 
Civil Code, 1949, pp. 114-123. 
765 Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations reads as 
follows: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. 
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Nevertheless, both categories of argumentation do not seem to take into consideration 
the aspect of expertise of high-ranking public functionaries, and insist on degrading 
them to the rank and status of mere civil servants. Moreover, the rationale of 
discrimination under article 4.1 of the Constitution combined with article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations could be 
reversed. More specifically, Clause 13 of the Human Rights Committee contained in 
“CCPR General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination766” states that: “Finally, the 
Committee observes that not every differentiation of treatment will constitute 
discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective 
and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant”. If we 
take a closer look, this point seems to be in accordance with the justificatory basis of 
the decision of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law (Areios Pagos) 
since it sets reasonable and objective criteria for the constitution of a discriminatory 
treatment. It differentiates the degree of civil liability between high-ranking public 
functionaries and civil servants based on the criterion of expertise. 
Immunity provisions for the members of the constitutional independent 
authorities in Greece 
 
Immunity is a multifaceted legal term, but still “with no universally recognised legal 
definition767”. National constitutions and legislation, European Union law, and 
customary international law and applicable treaties recognise multiple types of 
immunity for states, heads of states, prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs, 
deputies of national parliaments or the parliament of the European Union and its 
officials and servants, diplomats, representatives and officials of international 
organisations, judges. However, analysing these different types of immunity is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation and has already been done in literature.  
 
Our interest focuses on the gradual emergence of a new generation of immunity or 
quasi-immunity arrangements for high-ranking public functionaries in non-
majoritarian institutions. The members768 of the five constitutional independent 
authorities are high-ranking public functionaries, enjoy personal769 and functional 
independence770 and have no criminal, civil, and disciplinary liability. Their immunity 
does not extend to slander, libel or breach of confidentiality771. Provisions that hold 
                                                 
766 It was adopted at the Thirty-seventh Session of the Human Rights Committee, on 10 November 
1989. Available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/3888b0541f8501c9c12563ed004b8d0e?Opendocument, date of 
access: 02.01.2010. 
767 Fifth general activity report of the Council of Europe Group of Countries against Corruption 
(GRECO) (2004), p. 6, Adopted by GRECO at its 22nd Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 14-18 March 
2005) Available at:http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/2005/Greco(2005)1_EN.pdf, 
date of access: 02.01.2010. 
768 According to article 1 of the executive law 3051/2002 of the constitution regarding the 
constitutional independent authorities, the term “members of an independent authority” refers to the 
President or the supreme single-headed organ of its administration, to the Vice-President and the other 
members, as well as, their alternates. 
769 Personal independence refers to the duration of their term of office, the way of their appointment 
and dismissal. 
770 See Chapter 3, appendix 1, text for an explanation of the term functional independence. 
771 Article 1 of the law 3613/2007 provides that they are not “held responsible, prosecuted or subjected 
to inquiry for any opinion expressed or act committed in the discharge of their duties. Prosecution is 
permissible only following an accusation for slander, libel or breach of confidentiality”. 
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members of the constitutional independent authorities personally irresponsible first 
appeared in the law 2477/1997 establishing the Greek Ombudsman772 and were 
repeated in its amendment773. Their extension to the members of the other 
constitutional independent authorities raised tremendous criticism on the part of the 
Union of Greek Prosecutors. When the draft law was submitted to Parliament774, the 
Union expressed deep concern for its constitutionality stating that “the relevant clause 
contravenes the principle of equality before the law775”. Furthermore, they argued that 
“the immunity of the high-ranking public functionaries of the independent authorities 
comes to supplement a series of provisions that establish substantial impediments to 
the judicial-penal review of the actions or omissions of certain categories of public 
officials, such as ministers and deputies, in the performance of their duties776”.  
But what was the rationale for the introduction of these provisions in the first place? 
The Explanatory Report777 of February 7th, 1997778 that accompanied the draft law for 
the establishment of the Greek Ombudsman justifies it as follows: “The need to 
protect the Ombudsman from devious, misleading and unfair accusations that would 
impede his work and would make him concentrate more on his judicial defence rather 
than on the control of public services, appears particularly intense in administrative 
systems that, as is the case of Greece, are quite centralised and not accustomed to 
control procedures. A relevant regulation is included in the French Law (article 3 of 
the Law 73-6/3.1.1973779)”. On the other hand, the Scientific Report of March 12th , 
1997780, issued by the scientific service of the Parliament, makes no reference on the 
matter, and simply expresses its reservations concerning par. 4 article 2781, and 
                                                 
772 Article 1 par. 3 of the law 2477/1997 reads as follows: “The Ombudsman and the Assistant 
Ombudsmen are not responsible and they are not prosecuted and examined for an opinion that they 
have expressed or for an act that they have performed during the exercise of their duties. A prosecution 
is permitted only for an accusation for slander, libel or breach of confidentiality”. 
773 Article 1 par. 2 of Law 3094/2003. 
774 See above art. 1 of the law 3613/2007. 
775 Article 4, par. 1 of the Constitution. 
776 Newspaper, To Vima, article dated 06.11.2007 and entitled “Prosecutors against the immunity of the 
members of the independent authorities”, written by P. Tsimboukis, available at: 
http://www.tovima.gr/default.asp?pid=2&ct=32&artid=218474&dt=06/11/2007, date of access: 
02.01.2010. 
777 According to article 74 of the Constitution on the legislative procedure: “Every Bill or law proposal 
must be accompanied by an explanatory report; before it is introduced to the Plenum or to a Section of 
Parliament, it may be referred for legislative elaboration to the scientific service defined in article 65 
paragraph 5 as soon as this service is established, as specified by the Standing Orders”. 
778 The explanatory report is available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-
Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-Ergou?law_id=7ab346ee-b1b7-48c1-a646-96c465579212, date of 
access: 02.01.2010. 
779 “Art. 3 – Le médiateur ne peut être poursuivi, recherché, arrête, détenu ou jugé à l’occasion des 
opinions qu’il émet ou des actes qu’il accomplit dans l’exercice de ses fonctions », Loi no 73-6 du 3 
janvier 1973 instituant un médiateur » Journal Officiel de la République Française, 4 janvier 1973. 
780 The scientific report is available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-
Nomothetikou-Ergou?law_id=7ab346ee-b1b7-48c1-a646-96c465579212, date of access: 02.01.2010. 
781 The article reads as follows: “4. The Ombudsman may be relieved of his duties by a presidential 
decree, issued upon recommendation of the Ministerial Council and after previous opinion of the 
Institutions and Transparency Committee, on the grounds of inability in the performance of duties 
because of disease or disability, physical or mental one. The Assistant Ombudsmen may be terminated 
by decision of the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization, upon 
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recommends that the inefficiency in the performance of  the Ombudsman’s duties 
should also be provided among the reasons for the termination of his office as is the 
case with the Deputy Ombudsmen. This recommendation will not be included in the 
final text of the law, despite the fact that such a provision for the ombudsperson is 
commonplace in almost all other jurisdictions (Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 2008:13-14). 
Furthermore, we should note that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe in its Recommendation 1615 (2003) concerning the characteristics that are 
essential for the effective operation of the institution of the ombudsman, provides for 
the dismissal of the ombudsman782.  On the other hand, the Explanatory Report in its 
rationale for the inclusion of such a provision, apart from invoking special attributes 
and conditions that dominate the Greek administrative system, seems to be inspired by 
the paradigm of the French Mediator.  
As for the extension of immunity provisions to the other four constitutional 
independent authorities, the explanatory report783 that accompanied the draft Law 
justified the amendment of the executive law 3051/2002 of the constitution on the 
grounds that “the expression of opinion, the vote and in general the actions of the 
members of the independent authorities as prescribed in the Constitution, while 
performing their duties, might be considered as the most essential aspect in the 
performance of their competences. For this reason they should be protected, so that 
the members of the administrative authorities can perform their competences 
according to their conscience . . . in this way a common regulation is introduced for 
the members of all the constitutionally consolidated independent authorities”. 
Moreover, the scientific report784 expresses no reservations. Thus, we may distinguish 
two justificatory levels. The first justificatory level seems to perceive the members of 
these authorities as equals with the members of parliament. The words opinion, vote, 
conscience remind us of the relevant provisions relating to the immunity of 
parliamentarians.  The second justificatory level regards the extension of the scope of 
the immunity as a fair measure since it establishes uniformity among the 
constitutional independent authorities deriving its legitimating basis from the 
paradigm of the French mediator.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
recommendation by the Ombudsman, on the grounds of inability in the performance of their duties 
because of disease or disability, physical or mental one, as well as for inefficiency in the performance 
of their duties”. 
782 Recommendation 1615 (2003), par. 7. “The Assembly therefore concludes that certain 
characteristics are essential for any institution of ombudsman to operate effectively, namely: . . . iii. 
exclusive and transparent procedures for appointment and dismissal by parliament by a qualified 
majority. . . v personal immunity from any disciplinary, administrative or criminal proceedings or 
penalties relating to the discharge of official responsibilities, other than dismissal by parliament for 
incapacity or serious ethical misconduct”. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/EREC1615.htm, date of access: 03.01.2010. 
783 Available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/2f026f42-950c-4efc-b950-
340c4fb76a24/s-esoter01-eis.pdf, date of access: 03.01.2010. 
784 Available at: http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/nomosxedia/EkthesiEpistimonikis/R-ELENXOS-
EPIST.pdf, date of access: 03.01.2010. 
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The first round of discussions in Parliament on the immunity of the Greek 
Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen 
 The discussions and debates of the draft law “Ombudsman of the Citizen and the 
Corps of Inspectors – Controllers of Public Administration” in principal and in 
particulars in the Greek Parliament785 were of significant interest regarding the 
immunity clause provided for the Ombudsman and his deputies786. As already 
mentioned, neither the explanatory report nor the scientific report gave an 
interpretation of the provision, and it was not clear what immunity covered. This 
omission raised questions and hesitations. Some MPs doubted the constitutionality of 
the provision, whereas others proposed its amendment. The expression “any . . .  act 
committed in the discharge of their duties” seems to have provoked intense 
controversy. The special speaker of DIKKI787 (Democratic Social Movement), 
Georgios Tsafoulias, expressed his concern on the absence of any political or 
administrative responsibility related to the functioning of the institution. He stated that 
neither kings nor heads of state enjoy such immunities, and wondered whether the 
ombudsman and his deputies were considered to be saints, and why they could not 
commit a violation of duty. He claimed that, in the discharge of their duties, they may 
commit the crimes of bribery, falsification of documents, fraud, defalcation or even 
oppress their employees in the sense of giving illegal orders788. He proposed that these 
offences or the consideration of others that might take place in the performance of 
their duties should also be taken into account in the formulation of the clause.  
Anna Psarouda-Benaki, (New Democracy)789 agreed with the remark of the MP of 
DIKKI, and argued that the expression concerning the acts “is totally 
incomprehensible and almost inadmissible”. The wording was not clear as to whether 
this privilege was permanent. She assumed that the legislator simply had the intention 
to protect the ombudsman from vexatious actions by disgruntled litigants, that is, in 
cases where citizens considered that the ombudsperson was not responsive or 
expressed an opinion that was unsatisfactory to them. If the ombudsman and his 
deputies were vested with absolute immunity, it should only be limited to “any 
opinion expressed in the discharge of their duties”. Accordingly, they should be 
relieved of offences against honour or whatever stemmed from the expression of 
opinion. For all the other acts, breach of confidentiality included, the common law 
should apply. Finally, she stressed that the issues relating to the duration of this 
protection and to the statute of limitations should be regulated. On this point, 
Kyriakos Spyriounis, (PASOK)790, claimed that the meaning of the clause was not to 
cover illegal acts that might have intentionally been committed by the organs of the 
                                                 
785 Session 101, discussion and debate in principle, March 20th , 1998 and Session 102, discussion and 
debate in particulars, March 26th , 1998. Minutes of Parliament in Plenary session available at: 
http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/praktika/pdf/20_03_97.pdf and 
http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/praktika/pdf/26_03_97.pdf, date of access: 04.01.2010. 
786 See above note 34.  
787 The party was founded in 1995 by a group of former members of PASOK. Dimitrios Tsovolas, 
former Minister of Finance in the governments of PASOK in the 80s, was the President of the party.  
788 According to article 261 of the Greek Penal Code the exhortation of subordinates by their superiors 
to commit the offences of articles 235 to 260 of the said code, is a criminal offence. 
789 The major opposition right wing political party.  
790 PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement), the governing party. 
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said authority. Acts were conceived of in their strict sense, namely, the way these acts 
were carried out within the framework of the officials’ competences. Thus, these 
public functionaries would be accountable for omission, non-transparent practices, 
faulty performance of their duties, or inefficiency connected to these acts. 
Consequently, this part of the clause should be separated from opinion, and it should 
be further clarified, so that even the suspicious ones would be persuaded.  
When the draft law was discussed on particulars, Ioannis Varvitsiotis, (New 
Dimocracy), asked the Deputy Minister whether the expression “any act committed in 
the discharge of their duties” meant that no legal proceedings could be initiated 
against the ombudsman and his deputies and whether this had a permanent character. 
Fivos Ioannides, Parliamentary representative of PASOK, raised the issue of the 
constitutionality of the clause since, in his opinion, it was not possible to legislate on 
anyone’s inviolability through common legislative procedure791, and thus the 
provision would be legally invalid. On the other hand, he argued that protection 
against criminal proceedings should be avoided, despite the fact that he acknowledged 
that such a provision dealt with the substantive problem of constant prosecutions and 
lawsuits, which in turn would hinder the ombudsman’s task. Thus, he suggested that 
the expression “any act committed in the discharge of their duties” should be amended 
as follows: The phrase “. . . are not subjected to inquiry for any opinion expressed” 
should remain, complemented by “. . . or for the remarks and the conclusions they 
formulate in their findings” since it was more probable that these competences would 
become the object of lawsuits.   
Fotis Kouvelis, (SYNASPISMOS)792, stressed that the formulation of the non-liability 
of persons presupposes the revision of the constitution, and insisted that the second 
part of the expression should be eliminated. This time, Anna Psarouda-Benaki, 
supported a more moderate version regarding the controversial second part of the 
phrase. Thus, she suggested, for the sake of the protection of the right of the citizen to 
file suit, the suspension of the prosecution of the ombudsman and his deputies while 
in office. Under these circumstances, the officials would continue to perform their 
duties, whereas legal proceedings would start after the expiration of their mandate.  
                                                 
791 At this point he insinuated that the Constitution had to be revised. We should also mention that this 
was also pinpointed in GRECO’s (Group of States against Corruption) Report on Greece in 2002. In 
the First Evaluation Round GRECO addressed the issue of the limitation of immunities. In the 
Immunities section of the Greek Report (p. 15) it is stated that: “The Ombudsman also enjoys an 
immunity provided for in law but not by the Constitution” (Group of States against Corruption 
Directorate, First Evaluation Round, Report on Greece adopted by GRECO at its 9th Plenary Meeting, 
Strasbourg, 13-17 May 2002.  
Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/GrecoEval1(2001)15_Greece_EN.pdf) 
According to its website “GRECO, the Group of States against Corruption, was established in 1999 by 
the Council of Europe to monitor States’ compliance with the organisation’s anti-corruption standards”. 
As for its evaluation procedures they “involve the collection of information through questionnaire(s), 
on-site country visits enabling evaluation teams to solicit further information during high-level 
discussions with domestic key players, and drafting of evaluation reports. These reports, which are 
examined and adopted by GRECO, contain recommendations to the evaluated countries in order to 
improve their level of compliance with the provisions under consideration. Measures taken to 
implement recommendations are subsequently assessed by GRECO under a separate compliance 
procedure” Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/3.%20What%20is%20GRECO_en.asp and 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp, date of access: 05.01.2010. 
792 Minor opposition left wing party. 
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In his reply, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation, (PASOK), Anastasios Mantelis, underlined that international 
experience showed that it was quite common for those who wanted to hinder the 
function of the institution to start legal proceedings against the ombudsman. He 
pointed at the example of France where legislation provided for the non-liability for 
the acts of the Ombudsman. Yet, the Greek legislator exempted the offences of 
slander, libel or breach of confidentiality since they constitute the citizens’ 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of secrecy and personal dignity. Moreover, he 
stressed that non-liability refers only to opinions expressed or acts performed in the 
discharge of their duties. He added that courts would decide on whether an act was 
official or not. Non-official acts were excluded from the scope of the provision. As for 
the question raised by Ioannis Varvitsiotis, he explained that the privilege was 
permanent, and argued that suspending prosecution after the expiration of the 
ombudsman’s mandate would not permit him to fulfil properly his mission. He 
stressed that this was a matter of political decision and that parliament should protect 
the ombudsman in order to perform his duties diligently. Finally, Fotios Kouvelis, 
proposed that, at least, they should introduce a provision for the waiver of the 
immunity, otherwise legislation would reserve for the ombudsman a position superior 
to that of parliamentarians.  
The second round of discussions in Parliament on the extension of the scope of 
immunity to the members of the other constitutional independent authorities 
Ten years after the establishment of non-liability of the Greek Ombudsman and his 
deputies, the discussions and debates in principal and in particulars of the draft law 
“Regulations on issues of Independent Authorities, Inspector General of Public 
Administration, Corps of Inspectors-Controllers of Public Administration and other 
matters of the competence of the Ministry of Interior” in Greek Parliament793 raised 
additional scepticism about the extension of the scope of immunity to the members of 
the other constitutional independent authorities. Moreover, discussion revolved 
around the institution of independent administrative authorities and their relationship 
with the political system. The rapporteur of the Majority, Fevronia Patrianakou (New 
Democracy), in her introductory speech, pinpointed that the proposal of article 1 of 
the draft law entitled “Liability of the members of the Independent Authorities” to 
extend the immunity provisions of the ombudsman and his deputies to the members of 
the other constitutional independent authorities was consistent with the need to protect 
them in the discharge of their duties. That regulation would guarantee the non-liability 
and inviolability of these members, for the sake of “the unhindered, courageous and 
transparent performance of their duties”.  
The special speaker of SYRIZA794, Theodoros Dritsas, reminded that his party had 
already submitted a request for a presentation of the rationale of the measure for each 
one of the authorities. He stated that the clause was general, and the Explanatory 
report was far from being illuminative. He pinpointed that it was of crucial 
                                                 
793 Session 20, discussion and debate in principle, October 31, 2007 and Session 24, discussion and 
debate in particulars, November 6, 2007. Minutes of Parliament in Plenary session available at:  
http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/praktika/pdf/es31102007.pdf and 
http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/praktika/pdf/es06112007.pdf, date of access: 05.01.2010. 
794 Left wing party of the minor opposition. SYRIZA stands for “Bloc of the radical left”. 
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importance to examine and justify the functional necessity795 of non-liability on a case 
by case basis since the regulatory domains and competences of the authorities varied.  
The special speaker of LAOS796, Athanasios Plevris, apart from the fierce criticism 
against the institution of the independent authorities and their questionable role in the 
political system, made reference to the liability of judges797 in Greece, and wondered 
why the members of these authorities should be irresponsible. Ioannis Bougas, MP of 
the Majority (New Democracy), underlined that the clause was consistent with the 
principles of personal and functional independence of the members of the independent 
authorities as provided for in article 101A of the Constitution. Theofilos Leontarides, 
MP of the Majority (New Democracy), made no special comments in his speech, but 
it seems that there had been a misinterpretation as to what immunity covered. 
Leontarides and most MPs mention non-liability with respect to criminal offences. 
But this provision, as already mentioned, was inspired from that of the French 
Mediator which, in turn, drawn its formulation on the non-liability (irresponsabilité) 
of the French deputies798. On the French Mediator’s website799 it is mentioned that: 
“He also benefits from the exact same immunity as members of parliament: he may 
not be prosecuted or judged for the opinions he gives or the actions he takes in the 
exercise of this duties”. This privilege is absolute for the French parliamentarians, that 
is, no legal proceedings – criminal, civil and disciplinary – can be initiated against 
them (Mark Van der Hulst, 2000). Consequently, we may argue that the provision 
should be interpreted according to the French model.  
Apostolos Kaklamanis, MP of the major opposition (PASOK), supported that the 
members of the constitutional independent authorities should not be liable in relation 
to their opinions, but they should be prosecuted for those of their decisions that 
obviously violated the law they were supposed to defend against any interference. He 
emphasized that those decisions had a binding character – contrary to the 
ombudsman’s recommendations- and that his proposal could make members of the 
authorities be fully aware of their responsibilities in the sense that they would resist to 
pressures that might lead them to act on the verge of illegality. He suggested the 
suspension of the prosecution until the expiration of the members’ mandate, and 
proposed that the Conference of Presidents that nominated them should decide upon 
the waiver of their immunity. The decision should take into consideration the 
motivation of the prosecutions, namely, whether they were of a malicious or 
                                                 
795 This view to apply the criterion of functional necessity for the grant of immunities seems analogous 
to the case of the attempt to codify the privileges and immunities of international organisations and 
their officials in the late ‘60s. The International Law Commission and the committees from the Council 
of Europe took a contrasting approach to the issue. The former tended to expand them and advocated 
their harmonisation, whereas the latter tended to contract them and supported that immunity should be 
based on functional need (Frey and Frey, available at: 
http://www.diplomacy.edu/Books/mdiplomacy_book/frey_frey/frey_frey.htm, date of access: 
05.01.2010. 
796 Extreme right wing party of the minor opposition. LAOS stands for “Popular Orthodox Rally”. 
797 The judicial liability in Greece is criminal (Art. 239 and 259 of the Greek Penal Code), civil 
(mistrial-Article 99 of the Greek Constitution and article 6 of Law 693/1977), and disciplinary 
(Tsaoussi and Zervoianni, 2007) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1009455, date of access: 
05.01.2010. 
798 Art. 26 par. 1 of the French Constitution: “Aucun membre du Parlement ne peut être poursuivi, 
recherché, arrêté, détenu ou jugé à l’occasion des opinions ou votes émis par lui dans l’exercice de ses 
fonctions».  
799 Available at: http://www.mediateur-republique.fr/en-citoyen-01-01-04, date of access 05.01.2010. 
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blackmailing character. After the expiration of their mandate, justice would decide 
upon these issues.  
Anna Psarouda-Benaki, after having stated that she had discussions in the past with 
members of the independent authorities in her capacity as President of the Greek 
Parliament, communicated to Parliament that criminal proceedings had been initiated 
against most of the members of the Greek National Council for Radio and Television 
because of the sanctions and high fines they had imposed upon the Mass Media and 
journalists in the discharge of their sanctioning competences. In her opinion, these 
members should not be for ever unprotected800, simply because there were reactions 
against their regulatory action. Fotis Kouvelis, Parliamentary representative of 
SYRIZA, focused on the fact that the said provision was in tension with the principle 
of equality under article four of the Constitution, and that in his view such a protective 
clause would not stimulate the members of the authorities to perform their duties in a 
more prudent manner. 
The evolution of the institution of the Ombudsman and immunity regimes 
The Ombudsman is an institution already known in the ancient world and in the 
Islamic administrative tradition. In 1713 the absolute monarch Charles XII, during his 
thirteen year absence from Sweden, created the office of His Majesty's Supreme 
Ombudsman801 in order to ensure that judges and public officials acted in accordance 
with the legislation in force and performed their duties diligently. He had 
prosecutorial powers since he could raise charges against them for dereliction of their 
duties. In 1809 the Swedish Parliament802, as a result of the division of powers 
between the legislative and the King, appointed its own Ombudsman that was inspired 
by the institution of the Chancellor of Justice. The Parliamentary Ombudsman’s 
duties were to protect the rights of citizens through inspections and inquiries that 
could also be initiated by the submission of complaints on the part of those damaged 
by the action of the public authorities803. The new agency was independent from the 
executive and initially it had prosecutorial powers. As time went on, there was a shift 
towards the waiver of prosecution for minor transgressions and an admonition was 
issued instead. In 1975, the Swedish Parliament abolishes the special right to waive 
prosecution as part of the broader reform of the major curtailment of the legal 
responsibility of public officials for their actions. Thus, the institution lost its punitive 
                                                 
800 Before the extension of the immunity regime, the members of the Greek National Council for Radio 
and Television were criminally and civilly liable for their acts or omissions in the exercise of their 
duties pursuant to article 3 of the Presidential Decree 573/1989 and article 3, par. 6 of the law 
2863/2000. 
801 In 1719 the Supreme Ombudsman was given the title of Chancellor of Justice (Justitiekanslern). 
This office still exists, and today the Chancellor of Justice acts as the government's Ombudsman. 
Available at: 
http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?MenuId=20&MainmenuId=12&ObjectClass=DynamX_Documents&Lang
uage=en, date of access: 05.01.2010. 
802 With the autocratic rule of King Gustav III fresh in mind, the legislators introduced into the new 
constitution a system that would allow Parliament some control over the exercise of the executive 
power.  
803 During the first century of the existence of the Office, the total number of complaints amounted to 
around 8,000.  
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function804 substituted almost exclusively for the advisory and consultative ones. As 
for the immunity provisions, the Ombudsman may be prosecuted only with the 
approval of Parliament pursuant to article 8 of the Risksdag Act. The Committee on 
the Constitution may decide upon the institution of legal proceedings against a 
parliamentary Ombudsman for an offence committed in the discharge of his/her 
duties805. Consequently, for the first time, a parliamentary type of immunity shields 
high-ranking public functionaries that are not directly elected by the citizens.  
 
The institution of the Ombudsman moved to Finland (1920), Denmark806 (1955), 
Norway (1962), and was introduced to the English speaking world through New 
Zealand (1962). The social movements in the 60’s precipitated the procedure of 
setting up Ombudsman offices in the United States. This was a time when the public’s 
distrust of the executive and its dissatisfaction with courts and bureaucracy created 
conditions favorable to openness and to a more decentralized and responsive 
government (Kaufman, 2004). Hawaii was the first state to establish a public sector 
office in 1967807. Since then a number of states, counties and municipalities have 
followed suit by establishing offices of general jurisdiction. The first model 
ombudsmen law808 was adopted in 1969 by the American Bar Association and can be 
revised under authorisation of the board of directors of the United States Ombudsman 
Association. Immunity provisions are expressly set forth: “the ombudsman has the 
same immunities from civil and criminal liability as a judge of this State”809. The 
immunity model for the Ombudsman in the United States stems from the immunity of 
state judges. In the United States judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil claims 
with the exception of decisions that do not fall into their judicial competences (i.e. 
administrative decisions) or in cases of declaratory or injunctive relief. Moreover, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity810 prevents injured parties from actions against the 
state for any responsibility of judicial nature (Tsaoussi and Zervogianni, 2007). 
According to the penal codes of the states, judges may be prosecuted for bribery and 
abuse of power (Goré, 2006).  
 
                                                 
804 The Parliamentary Ombudsman still reserves the right to act as a special prosecutor against public 
officials for criminal acts committed under their public duties but the initiation of such legal 
proceedings today is rare. On the other hand, he has the right to initiate disciplinary procedures against 
an official for misdemeanours. 
805 Chapter 9, article 8 of the Riskdag Act: “A decision may be taken to institute proceedings against an 
official named below for an offence committed in the execution of his appointment or duties: 
(...) 
2. In the case of legal proceedings against a member of the Riksdag Board of Administration, the 
Election Review Committee, or the Riksdag Complaints Board, or against a parliamentary Ombudsman 
or the Clerk of the Chamber, only by the Committee on the Constitution”. Available at: 
http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/R_PageExtended____6426.aspx, date of access: 05.01.2010. 
806 The first Ombudsman in Denmark, unlike the Swedish and Finnish models, initiated the tradition of 
the restriction of jurisdiction of the institution, that is, it focused mainly on public administration. 
807 In operation in 1969 (Reif, 2004). 
808 This model was inspired by Gellhorn’s model Ombudsman law (Hoover, 2008).  
809 Model Ombudsman Act for State Governments drafted by Model Ombudsman Act Committee of 
the United States Ombudsman Association and approved on February 11, 1997 by the United States 
Ombudsman Association’s Board of Directors. Available at:  
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/usamodel1.html, date of access: 05.01.2010.  
810 The State may not be sued without its consent. 
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At this point we should underline that the paradigm of New Zealand811 represented a 
turning point for the formulation of a new philosophy.  The Ombudsman’s institution 
– unfettered by its punitive component812 - served as a model for the establishment of 
agencies where the role of citizens through the submission of complaints was 
predominant. The previous ‘investigation and report’ mode of operation gave its place 
to case handling where recommendations and conciliatory approaches served as 
devices for remedial action. This gradual reform in both theoretical and practical 
perspectives of the institution could be regarded as part of the access to justice 
movement813 where Alternative Dispute Resolution814 figured as one of its main 
components. The concept of what is called the classical Ombudsman started to expand 
in both the public and private sectors and took the form of a pure alternative 
resolution mechanism, representing the organizational model. Nevertheless, if we take 
a closer look, the classical ombudsman does not fit wholly to the tradition of 
adversarial dispute resolution since, after having made a recommendation as a result 
of a judgment about who is right and wrong, he is not authorized to enforce that 
judgment (Gadlin, 2000). At this point attributes of mediation815, a form of alternative 
dispute resolution, come into play on a symbolic or informal level. Reason as stamped 
                                                 
811 The Ombudsman Activities Project undertaken by the Institute of Governmental Studies in Berkeley 
University was inspired by the creation of the new Ombudsman Office in New Zealand. In 1964, 
Stanley Scott, Assistant Director of the Institute suggested that the Institute “ought to keep an eye on 
Ombudsman developments and follow them and study them”.  Establishing Ombudsman Offices: 
Recent experience in the United States, Transcript of the Ombudsman Workshop Honolulu, Hawaii 
May 5-7, 1971, Eds, Stanley V. Anderson and John E. Moore, Ombudsman Activities Project, 1972 
Available at: 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&E
RICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED077073&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED077073, 
date of access: 05.01.2010. 
The focus was primarily set on redressing grievances. A comparative study of Ombudsman Offices in 
Australia, Pakistan, www.policy.hu/bokhari/Ombudsman_An%20Introduction.doc, date of access: 
05.01.2010. 
812 Gellhorn (1967) in his historical comparative analysis on the institution of the Ombudsman and its 
benefits in modern societies underscored that it serves as a complementary mechanism to traditional 
administrative and legal remedies, and pointed out that any attempt to punish or embarrass 
administrators should be avoided.  
813 In the 1960s, reformers called for changes in national legal systems to enhance "access to justice" 
for disadvantaged groups and citizens at large. Cappelletti and Garth popularized the idea of access to 
justice in their international study "Access to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to Make Rights 
Effective—a General Report" and identified the movement with legal aid, representative actions, 
alternative dispute resolution, and other strategies of court reform. 
814 “Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms are common components of legal and judicial 
reform projects. From mediation and conciliation, in which a third party presents a non-binding 
solution to a dispute, to arbitration, in which disputants are contractually bound to abide by a third 
party's decision, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can shorten the time needed to resolve 
disputes, lower litigation costs, and alleviate slow or overburdened courts” Excerpt available at: . 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:2074
5989~menuPK:1990313~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:1974062,00.html, date of access: 
05.01.2010. 
815 Carie Menkel-Meadow (2000) defines “Mediation, as a structured form of conflict resolution, 
challenges the Anglo-American ideal of adversarial dispute resolution, which presumes that two sides 
must argue their case to a third-party neutral who will make rule-based, often binary, decisions about 
who is right and wrong. Instead mediation offers the possibility of party-crafted solutions to problems, 
disputes, conflicts, transaction and relationships, which are facilitated by a third party with no authority 
to decide anything or to impose rules”. 
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in the ombudsman’s decisions does not have an enforcing power and persuasion 
becomes the final tool to achieve voluntary compliance. In this sense, the institution 
represents a hybrid type of resolution mechanism combining the adversarial and the 
alternative dispute resolution traditions. As time goes by, this symbolic and informal 
alternative aspect observed at the initial stage of the classical ombudsman, will be 
substituted for the formal use of flexible methods of procedure parallel to the classical 
investigatory function. Thus, legislation may give the Ombudsman the authority to 
proceed to case handling without the need for an investigation. Consequently, formal 
and more structured Alternative Dispute Resolution methods were introduced 
(Stodulka, 1998). These new ADR applications vested the institution with the function 
of a dispute resolver.  
  
France, as other consolidated democracies in Western Europe, within the context of 
reforming its governance structure after the turbulent events of 1968 which echoed the 
general public distrust of the traditional and legislative functions, established the 
French Mediator in 1973 (Clark, 1984). The term “Mediator” that was used to name 
the institution is not a coincidence. It reflects the impact of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in the philosophy of the institution. Immunity provisions are expressly set 
forth: “Art. 3 – The Mediator may not be prosecuted, searched, arrested or judged for 
the opinions he gives or the actions he takes in the exercise of this duties”816 . The 
Mediator enjoys the same immunity as the members of parliament. Compared to the 
paradigms of Sweden and the U.S.A., France establishes a radical form of immunity, 
that is, absolute non-liability, since no authorisation for its waiver is provided for.  
 
The Hybrid Ombudsman or the Human Rights Ombudsman is a quite recent evolution 
of the institution regarding its competences. But the need to set up national 
institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights was first discussed in 
1946, two years before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human rights by 
the General Assembly (Gottehrer , 2002). Under the guidelines of the United 
Nations817 and the co-ordinating efforts of the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)818, the classical ombudsman could additionally handle 
complaints about violations of human rights under the obligations of international 
treaties and/or national legislation on human rights. Separate offices for the protection 
of Human Rights could also be set up.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
816 Law no 73-6 January 3, 1973 establishing a Mediator, Journal Officiel de la République Francaise, 4 
janvier 1973. 
817 In the First International Workshop on National Institutions for the promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights that took place in Paris in October 1991, the Paris Principles, as have been called its 
conclusions, affirm that national institutions have competence to promote and protect human rights 
(Reif, 2004). The Paris Principles were embodied in resolution 48/134 on National Institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the General Assembly of the United Nations, dated 20 
December 1993 (A/RES/48/134). 
818 Originally created in 1975 and renamed in 1995, it is “an informal forum for the discussion of 
matters ranging from peace and security to democratisation and human rights. It has 55 participating 
States from Europe, Central Asia and North America” (Reif, 2004). 
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Sources of inspiration and rationales for the establishment of immunity 
provisions in the institution of the Ombudsman 
 
In most jurisdictions immunity arrangements for the ombudsperson are clearly 
inspired by parliamentary immunity. In this part a short note on the origins, the major 
systems and rationale for the parliamentary immunity will be outlined819. This will 
enable us later to better understand and assess its transfer to the office of the 
Ombudsman. Historically, two different immunity systems protecting 
parliamentarians have emerged thus reflecting two different legal traditions in relation 
to the protection of human rights against those in power. On the one hand, in England, 
a series of Acts820 established a consensual system on basic political values in the 
country that excluded the concept of any kind of prerogatives. On the other hand, 
France experienced a fierce transition to democracy through a revolution. In the 
revolutionary period the position of the National Assembly was strengthened towards 
the other organs of the State, whereas this superiority in the meta-revolutionary era 
vested the representatives of the people with special privileges. The concept of 
inviolability is introduced821, that is, the MPs are not prosecuted for private acts 
carried out in the performance of their duties.  This measure aimed to protect the MPs 
against the arbitrariness of the executive.  
 
Thus, two models of parliamentary immunity were formulated. The first model, 
representing a narrow version of immunity, bars any legal action against the 
legislative agency of the deputies, that is, their parliamentary speech, debate and votes 
(parliamentary non-accountability). The principle of freedom of speech in Parliament 
was formally inscribed in the 1689 English Bill of Rights and has been adopted by 
almost all countries. The second model, which represents a broader version of 
immunity, includes non-accountability, but also demands the explicit authorisation of 
                                                 
819 This part drew information from the following sources: Maas G. W., Parliamentary Immunity, 
Studies of the  
Venice Commission, CDL(1995)004e-restr, Strasbourg, 24 January 1995, available at:  
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1995/CDL(1995)004-e.asp, Van der Hulst, M. (2000), The Parliamentary 
Mandate, A Global Comparative Study, IPU, Geneva, available at: 
http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/mandate_e.pdf, date of access: 05.01.2010. 
“Privileges and Immunities in Parliament. General Debate moderated by Mrs Helene Ponceau, 
Secretary General of the Questure of the Senate (France), Const. Parl. Inf. 55 (2005), 190, available at: 
http://www.asgp.info/Resources/Data/Documents/MSUMEOMVPXKTACUJDEWNDNORPOBTYP.
pdf, date of access: 05.01.2010, Parliamentary Immunity. Background Paper prepared by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, UNDP Initiative on Parliaments, Crisis Prevention and Recovery In association 
with the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, September, 2006, available at:  
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/72258892/PARLIAMENTARY-IMMUNITY, date of access: 
05.01.2010, Wingley, S., (2003), Parliamentary Immunity: Protecting Democracy or Protecting 
Corruption?, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 1, pp. 23-40, Koηan G., 
Wingley S., (2005), Democracy and the politics of parliamentary immunity in Turkey, New 
Perspectives on Turkey, no. 33 (2005): 121-143, Wingley, S., (2009), Parliamentary Immunity in 
Democratizing Countries: The Case of Turkey, Human Rights Quarterly, 31, pp. 567-591. 
820 The Magna Carta in 1251, the Petition of Rights in 1627, the Habeas Corpus in 1670, the Bill of 
Rights in 1689, and the Act of Settlement in 1701: all these acts refer to common law, i.e. to the 
traditional rights and freedoms of individuals against the abuse of royal power. “It is therefore 
understandable that the members of the British Parliament have not felt the need to establish specific 
protection for themselves, since common law is sufficient to prevent and suppress illegal and arbitrary 
proceedings, arrests and detention.” (Van der Hulst, 2000). 
821 On June 23, 1789 the French National Assembly declared “the person of each deputy shall be 
inviolable” (Van der Hulst, 2000). 
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the assembly for the initiation of any legal proceedings822 regarding the non-
legislative agency823 of the representatives (parliamentary inviolability). The narrow 
version influenced Commonwealth countries, whereas the two-component French 
model had the greatest impact in European countries and in the former colonies. 
Despite the fact that the degree of protection afforded by the first model varies among 
countries, in some of them, all judicial proceedings – criminal, civil and disciplinary – 
are excluded, and the deputy is protected not only as long as he holds the office, but 
also after losing her parliamentary mandate. In other words, parliamentary non-
accountability is absolute and permanent. On the contrary, parliamentary inviolability 
is relative and temporary. It is relative in three ways: i) in many jurisdictions 
protection exists depending on the nature or gravity of the offence, whereas others 
make no distinctions, ii) it may be lifted and iii) in general, cases of flagrante 
delicto824 are exempted from the requirement of prior authorisation by Parliament. It 
is temporary since it lasts until the end of the MP’s term of office.  
 
The rationale for the MPs’ immunity is related to the core of the democratic system 
since the MPs, as representatives of the people, formulate laws and policies. The 
privilege of freedom of speech and vote protects the function of representation and not 
the person itself. On the other hand, the lack of judicial review of the legislative 
agency is counterbalanced by the scrutiny of the public. Electoral accountability 
makes representatives vulnerable in the sense that they are subject to public criticism 
not only for the way they carry out their ordinary parliamentary duties, but also for the 
way they handle cases concerning requests for the waiver of the MPs’ inviolability. 
Indeed, inviolability seems to bear severe and increasing criticism. Nonetheless, the 
main reason supporting its maintenance refers to the need to prevent indirect 
intimidation of the legislative agency of parliamentarians. Powerful interests could 
easily attempt to affect parliamentary decision-making by initiating legal proceedings 
against the non-legislative agency of deputies or threatening to do so. Thus, politically 
motivated charges are discouraged.  
 
In recent years, scandals, strong criticism by the judicial world and the mass media 
and the individual’s right of recourse to law has led to a serious reduction of this type 
of protection. It seems that in many consolidated democracies in Western Europe 
influenced by the French parliamentary tradition, the intolerance of the public opinion 
towards privileged categories of citizens before the law and the persuasive weakness 
of the “fear of the executive” pretext used by the MPs in order to justify the privilege 
of inviolability, restricted this rather obsolete and anachronistic protective measure. 
However, it is reasonably argued that the introduction of parliamentary inviolability is 
crucial for the function of parliaments in transitional societies where democracy is 
fragile, and the MPs have to be protected against the encroachments of the executive 
in order to control it in an effective way. 
 
                                                 
822 The term, apart from prosecution for penal, civil or disciplinary liabilities, may also refer to 
protection from arrest, detention, personal searches, house or office searches, preliminary enquiries, 
police investigations and the use of special investigative means (telephone tapping etc) since the scope 
of inviolability immunity varies greatly among countries. 
823 Non-legislative agency refers to acts other than those undertaken in pursuance of their parliamentary 
duties.  
824 The term refers to any offence in the process of being committed or just committed.  
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Over the past two decades the institution of the Ombudsman has been introduced into 
countries in democratic transition as an indispensable part of strengthening the rule of 
law825. The diffusion of Ombudsmen offices in transitional countries created new 
versions of immunity arrangements based upon new rationales, and sources of 
inspiration. These new trends are supported and reflected in views of scholars, in 
guidelines of international organizations, in papers establishing legislative priorities 
for the institution, and legal opinions on Ombudsmen draft laws stemming from 
recommendations of the Venice Commission826 and resolutions of the United Nations. 
Stadlmayer (2008:15) in her European comparative legal study on the institution 
throughout Europe states: “Immunity provisions aim to protect the ombudsmen, 
similarly to members of parliament, against the arbitrariness of the executive branch 
and to ensure their freedom to publicly denounce maladministration in the 
administrative branch”. In this abstract, the fear of the executive argument, as in the 
case of parliamentary immunity, is reiterated.  
 
Dean Gottehrer,827 an international Ombudsman consultant, in his briefing on the 
ombudsmen institution in the countries of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe that took place in Washington in 1998, and in a number of his 
papers on essential characteristics and legislative provisions for the Ombudsman’s 
office, suggests the inclusion of immunity provisions in national legislations and gives 
the rationale for such arrangements: “The Ombudsman is an attractive target for the 
people criticized or served. The Ombudsman is immune from liability for acts 
performed under the law. Those dissatisfied with the Ombudsman may follow other 
official procedures to make government accountable. Immunity also allows the 
Ombudsman to focus resources on receiving and investigating complaints rather than 
defending suits. The Ombudsman may not be prosecuted criminally for acts 
performed under the law. This protects the office from another possible form of 
                                                 
825 Regarding transition countries, Sir, John Robertson (New Zealand’s Chief Ombudsman for the 
period 1986-1994) states: “The Ombudsman institution is seen in those countries as a valuable 
insurance against falling back into old habits, and an influential oversight organisation to ensure that 
the bureaucracy has a more human face”. The Ombudsman and the World by Sir John Robertson 
KCMG CBE, Twenty Years of Commonwealth Ombudsman 1977-1997, Commonwealth Ombudsman, 
Canberra, June 1997. p. 67 
826 “The European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as the Venice Commission, 
is the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters. Established in 1990, the 
commission has played a leading role in the adoption of constitutions that conform to the standards of 
Europe's constitutional heritage. The Venice Commission is composed of “independent experts who 
have achieved eminence through their experience in democratic institutions or by their contribution to 
the enhancement of law and political science” (article 2 of the revised Statute). The members are senior 
academics, particularly in the fields of constitutional or international law, supreme or constitutional 
court judges or members of national parliaments. Acting on the commission in their individual 
capacity, the members are appointed for four years by the participating countries. All Council of 
Europe member states are members of the Venice Commission. The European Commission and 
OSCE/ODIHR participate in the plenary sessions of the Commission”. Information available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/Presentation_E.asp, date of access: 06.01.2010. 
827 At the time of the briefing on the Ombudsmen in the OSCE that took place in December 2, 1998 in 
Washington DC, he was consultant on ombudsmen in human rights institutions for the United Nations 
Development Programme, the UNDP, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United States Information Agency. He 
had also served as President of the United States Ombudsmen’ Association from 1993 to 1995. He was 
also author of the “Ombudsmen and Human Rights Institutions in OSCE Participating States” 1998 
report for the OSCE and also served as writer and editor of the International Ombudsmen Legislative 
Reference document for the International Ombudsmen Institute.  
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political control” (Gottehrer and Hostina, 1998; Gottehrer, 2002). In this justificatory 
statement, the fear of the citizen, “the people served” in Gottehrer’s words, becomes a 
new element apart from the old cliché of the fear of the executive reflected in the 
expression “the people criticized”.  
 
The Recommendation 1615 (2003) 1 of  the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe on the institution of the ombudsman and relevant opinions on draft 
legislation of member states issued by the Venice Commission become new sources 
of inspiration in context and wording.  In Recommendation 1615 (2003) 1 the 
guarantee of “personal immunity from any disciplinary, administrative or criminal 
proceedings or penalties relating to the discharge of official responsibilities, other 
than dismissal by parliament for incapacity or serious ethical misconduct” is viewed 
as an essential characteristic for the effective operation of the institution of the 
ombudsman. This clause clarifies what immunity covers and corresponds to a clearly 
functional approach. The Venice Commission, in a series of opinions on draft laws on 
the institution of the ombudsman828, comments on provisions relating to immunity. 
Recent opinions829 are of special interest since they openly support the theory of 
functional necessity,830 and suggest that the implementation of immunity provisions 
should cover not only the ombudsperson, his or her deputies, but also the staff of the 
authority831. As for the wording of the clauses832, they are identical to article 18 of the 
General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe 
concerning the Officials of the Council of Europe833. Yet, contrary to other texts on 
                                                 
828 See documents on countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Serbia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedionia) for 
which there are opinions on the institution of the ombudsman available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/dynamics/N_Opinion_ef.asp?L=E, date of access:  
829 Joint opinion on the Draft Law on the Ombudsman of Serbia by the Venice Commission, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Directorate General of Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 61st Plenary Session, Venice, (3-4 December 2004) 
on the basis of comments by Mr R. Lavin (Member, Sweden) and Mr K. Tuori (Member, Finland), 
available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-AD(2004)041-e.asp, date of access: 
06.01.2010, Opinion on the Draft Law on the People’s Advocate of Kosovo. Adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 71st Plenary Meeting, Venice, (1-2 June 2007) on the basis of comments by Mr 
Pieter van DIJK  (Member, the Netherlands), available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-
AD(2007)024-e.asp, date of access: 06.01.2010, Opinion on Draft Amendments to the Law on the 
Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms of Montenegro. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 
80st Plenary Session, Venice, (9-10 October 2009) on the basis of comments by Mr Marek Antoni 
Nowicki (Expert, Directorate of Co-operation, Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal 
Affairs), and Mr K. Tuori (Member, Finland), available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL-
AD(2009)043-e.asp, date of access: 06.01.2010. 
830 In its general remarks the opinion on the Ombudsman of Serbia states: “The ombudsperson, his or 
her deputies and the staff of the secretariat should benefit from a functional immunity”. 
831 The opinion on Draft Amendments to the Law on the Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms of 
Montenegro stresses that: “The draft does not devote sufficient attention to immunity issues. Article 14 
provides that the immunity of the Protector and his/her Deputy are the same as granted to 
parliamentarians. This seems however inappropriate. Not only the Protector and his/her Deputies, but 
also his/her staff should have immunity “from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and 
acts performed by them in their official capacity.” Such immunity shall continue to be accorded even 
after the end of the Protector’s mandate or after the members of staff cease their employment with the 
Protector’s institution”. 
832 The relevant clauses are formulated as follows: “The ombudsperson, his or her deputies and the staff 
of the secretariat should be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all 
acts performed by them in their official capacity and within the limit of their authority”. 
833 “Officials of the Council of Europe shall: be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken 
or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity and within the limit of their 
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privileges and immunities regarding international, regional or supranational 
organizations, no provisions for the waiver of immunity are recommended834. The 
opinions on draft amendments to the Law on the Protector of Human Rights and 
Freedoms of Montenegro and on the draft law on the People’s Advocate of Kosovo 
move a step further, coming closer to the diplomatic paradigm, and provide that the 
immunity includes baggage835, correspondence and means of communication 
belonging to the Protector.  
 
These paradigms may prove that neither parliamentary immunity nor the type of 
immunity enjoyed by judges were the only sources of inspiration for the introduction 
and the adaption of analogous provisions to the institution of the ombudsman. The 
core difference between these three institutions, that is, the legislature, the courts, and 
the ombudsman, is that only the ombudsman pertains to the bureaucratic model836. 
The MPs’ non-accountability is related to their opinions expressed or votes cast, 
whereas judges are not liable for the content of their decisions in most jurisdictions837. 
                                                                                                                                            
authority”. Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/002.htm, date of access: 
06.01.2010. 
834 All the relevant texts provide for the waiver of immunity. For example, article 19 of the General 
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe concerning the Officials of the 
Council of Europe, states: “Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the 
Council of Europe and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Secretary 
General shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in his 
opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the 
interests of the Council of Europe. In the case of the Secretary General and of the Deputy Secretary 
General, the Committee of Ministers shall have the right to waive immunity”. See also article 17 of the 
Protocol (No 36) on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities: “Privileges, 
immunities and facilities shall be accorded to officials and other servants of the Union solely in the 
interests of the Union. Each institution of the Union shall be required to waive the immunity accorded 
to an official or other servant wherever that institution considers that the waiver of such immunity is 
not contrary to the interests of the Union” or article V, Section 19 of the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the United Nations: “The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to 
waive the immunity of any official in any case, where in his opinion, the immunity would impede the 
course of Justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations”. 
835 No reference is made on reservations concerning personal baggage as provided for in Article 36 of 
the Convention on Diplomatic Relations: “1.The receiving State shall, in accordance with such laws 
and regulations as it may adopt, permit entry of and grant exemption from all customs duties, taxes, and 
related charges other than charges for storage, cartage and similar services, on: 
(a) Articles for the official use of the mission; 
(b) Articles for the personal use of a diplomatic agent or members of his family forming part of his 
household, including articles intended for his establishment. 
2.The personal baggage of a diplomatic agent shall be exempt from inspection, unless there are serious 
grounds for presuming that it contains articles not covered by the exemptions mentioned in paragraph 1 
of this article, or articles the import or export of which is prohibited by the law or controlled by the 
quarantine regulations of the receiving State. Such inspection shall be conducted only in the presence 
of the diplomatic agent or of his authorized representative”. 
836 Kaufman (2004) describes the ombudsman offices as highly bureaucratic. Moreover, Becky Hoover 
in her dissertation entitled “Building Community through the mediation of citizen complaints: The 
Mediator of the French Republic” states that: “A review of the organizational structure and founding 
documents of the office of The Mediator of the French Republic reveals that all six of Max Weber’s 
characteristics of modern bureaucracy, as discussed in his seminal work Economy and Society, are 
present in the structure of the Mediator’s office. These characteristics include clear areas of 
jurisdiction, hierarchy, full-time staff, rules, maintenance of written files, and specialized training for 
staff members (Weber, 1968; Hummel, 1994)”. Available at: http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-
pdf.cgi/Hoover%20Becky%20J.pdf?acc_num=akron1207839242, date of access: 06.01.2010. 
837 In Denmark, Spain and Estonia judges may be held criminally liable for the content of their 
decisions (Cavinet July-Hurard, 2006).  
 299
It is rather obvious that, as the institution evolved, immunity provisions were both 
indirectly justified and based on treaties, conventions or protocols dealing with 
privileges and immunities of international or regional organizations838. The 
bureaucratic model they both share becomes the common denominator for the 
formulation of identical immunity provisions, as we have already shown. But it 
should also be noted that, historically, international immunities have their origin in 
diplomatic privileges and immunities839.  
 
After World War II the proliferation of international, regional, supranational, or 
intergovernmental organizations led to the adoption of immunity provisions according 
to which officials enjoy immunity from legal process840 for all acts performed by 
themselves in their official function. This is also known as immunity rationae 
materiae or rationae functionae and is differentiated from immunity rationae 
personae that covers all acts regardless of their nature, that is, whether performed in 
one’s official or private capacity841 (Wetzer, 2008). Protection rationae materiae is 
permanent, that is, beneficiaries of the privilege continue to enjoy immunity after they 
have ceased to hold office, whereas protection rationae personae lasts only as long as 
beneficiaries of the privilege hold office. Theorists put emphasis on the theory of 
functional necessity among various rationales842 for the justification of immunities 
and privileges of officials in international organisations843 (Frey and Frey). The 
independent exercise of the functions of the officials is a prerequisite for the 
fulfillment of the purposes of such organizations. In other words, the nature of the 
functions presupposes a privileged work status. Thus, it should be taken into account 
that the same functional approach legitimizes the MPs non-liability, judges and 
ombudsmen, since this type of immunity is a guarantee of their independence.  
 
Nevertheless, questions about the content of the acts performed in an official capacity, 
the preconditions, criteria, and transparency mechanisms to waive the officials’ 
immunity in international and regional bureaucratized contexts seem to have become 
part of serious debates concerning the necessity of such immunities844. Moreover, we 
                                                 
838 See for example the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946), the 
General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe (1949), the Agreement on 
Privileges and Immunities of the Organisation of American States (1949), the Protocol (No 36) on the 
privileges and immunities of the European Communities (1965).  
839 Diplomatic law was based on well-established customary law which was codified in 1961 (Petrovic, 
2009). The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides also for the waiver of the diplomatic 
immunity in article 32 par. 1. (“The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons 
enjoying immunity under article 37 may be waived by the sending State”). 
840 The term “legal process” covers civil, criminal and administrative proceedings.  
841 Personal immunity is limited to diplomats, heads of State, heads of Government, ministers of 
foreign affairs, some other high-ranking officials, but it also applies to heads of international 
organisations (for example, the UN Secretary-General, Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant 
Secretaries-General) (Wetzer, 2008; Kolodkin, 2008). 
842 The other rationales refer to precedent, the independence or prestige of the organisation, and the 
equality of member states. Frey and Frey, available at: 
http://www.diplomacy.edu/Books/mdiplomacy_book/frey_frey/frey_frey.htm, date of access: 
06.01.2010. 
843 The same theory prevails in the justification of diplomatic immunities. In recent years, the 
representational theory has fallen out of use and the theory of exterritoriality has received increasing 
criticism. 
844 See the campaign for the suppression of European civil servants' immunities initiated by 
Newropeans, a transeuropean political movement. All documentation available at: 
http://www.newropeans.org/en/on-going/e-mmunities/articles_media.htm, date of access: 06.01.2010. 
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should bear in mind that the introduction of the doctrine of functional immunity to 
international organizations and their officials in the ‘50s was consistent with the 
concept of sovereign immunity of the states, namely, in an age when states were less 
subject to law suit. As time went on, state immunities eroded, and new legal concepts, 
such as individual or human rights, emerged (Hanrahan, 2005). Moreover, the fight 
against corruption came into play, and recommendations are made for the limitation 
of immunities (GRECO, 2005). In this context, the preservation of immunities seems 
rather anachronistic or, at least, calls for the reexamination of such legal 
arrangements.  
 
A typology of immunity regimes in the institution of the Ombudsman  
 
The attempt to formulate a typology of immunity regimes in the institution of the 
Ombudsman in Council of Europe member states drew inspiration from the report on 
the regime of Parliamentary Immunity845 in states represented in the Venice 
Commission846 (Venice Commission, 1996).  The aim was to classify relevant 
legislation of the Council of Europe member states providing for immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman847, identify immunity models, and comment on them. 
Interestingly enough, many legal orders do not provide for immunity provisions in the 
institution of the ombudsman848.  
 
Greco in its Fifth General Activity Report (2004) stated that “Immunity” is a term 
with no universally recognized legal definition”. Indeed, legal texts provide for a 
series of measures which vary among jurisdictions, organizations, and the persons 
covered by such arrangements. The extension of immunity regimes to the institution 
of the ombudsman gives the researcher the chance to approach and further clarify the 
concept through the construction of a multidimensional qualitative classification, that 
is, a typology (Bailey, 1994; Elman, 2005). Immunity clauses as prescribed in the 
relevant legislation of Council of Europe member states serve as the appropriate tool 
in order to extract the dimensions which constitute the concept of immunity itself. In 
other words, disentangling the concept of immunity in its constituents-dimensions 
through the immunity clauses constitutes the preliminary stage for the construction of 
                                                 
845 The final report was based on the draft report prepared by Mr G. W. Maas Geesteranus with the 
assistance of the Secretariat of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission). It was adopted by the Sub-Commission on Democratic Institutions and approved by the 
Venice Commission during its 27th meeting which took place on 17 and 18 May 1996. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1996/CDL-INF(1996)007-e.pdf, date of access: 06.01.2010. 
846 The following European states represented in the Venice Commission replied to the request for the 
submission of information on their respective immunity regimes: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine.  Moreover, Canada, Japan, and Kyrgystan, non-European states 
represented in the Venice Commission, responded to the request.  
847 See at Appendix 1, the tables summarizing legislation by Council of Europe member states in 
respect of the immunity regimes in the institution of the ombudsman.  
848 Council of Europe member states with no immunity regime in the institution of the ombudsman: 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Germany-Rhineland Palatinate (regional ombudsman), Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy-Valle d’ Aosta (regional ombudsman), Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Switzerland-Canton of Zurich (regional ombudsman), United 
Kingdom. 
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a group of broader typologies (immunity models) on the one hand, and the 
identification of empirical cases for these immunity models, on the other. 
 
The first stage of the classification process comprises the identification of the 
dimensions of the concept of immunity as prescribed in the legislation of 24 Council 
of Europe member states849. Thus, we have created a 4X8 matrix based on four 
dimensions, that is, the scope of immunity, its duration, the persons covered, and the 
provision for a waiving procedure. The scope of immunity, the first dimension, is 
divided in four categories related to whether immunity applies with regard to actions 
linked to official functions. Functional non-liability takes an absolute character when 
it extends beyond the expiration of one’s mandate. The first category, the functional 
non-liability, shields the ombudsperson from judicial proceedings (civil, criminal or 
administrative) with regard to his official duties. The second category, the divided 
functional non-liability, could be conceived of as a sub-category of the functional 
non-liability. However, they do not coincide since the relevant immunity clauses 
simultaneously make a distinction between the opinions, views, decisions, or 
recommendations of the ombudsperson, and all the other acts in the discharge of 
his/her duties850.  
 
The third category, extra-functional inviolability applies to the ombudsperson’s acts 
which are not related to his public office. Nevertheless, this is a distinction that we 
made for methodological reasons since inviolability “may apply to any action linked 
to official functions or not” (Greco, 2005). Thus, each time the immunity clauses 
provide for inviolability, and remain silent on the functional non-liability aspect851, 
inviolability is split into two separate categories: the extra-functional inviolability, and 
the functional non-liability. The scope of inviolability varies among countries, and the 
phrasing of the relevant clauses appears to have been modeled upon those regarding 
parliamentarians. In some cases inviolability applies to all proceedings (civil, 
criminal, and administrative), and protects from arrest and detention. The fourth 
category, the extended extra-functional inviolability, comprises those cases where 
extra-functional inviolability extends to search of residential and work premises, 
baggage, personal and work means of transport, correspondence, means of 
communication, documents. 
 
The second dimension, the duration of the immunity, has two facets. As a rule, 
functional non-liability is perpetual in the sense that the protection for those enjoying 
immunity with regard to their opinions, recommendations or decisions is not limited 
to the duration of their mandate. Moreover, a certain group of immunity clauses also 
include the acts of the ombudspersons or the staff of the authority in functional non-
liability with perpetual character. However, many jurisdictions, either through the 
wording of inviolability or an explicit formulation of the clause provide for the 
                                                 
849 The Council of Europe member states which provide for immunity clauses in the institution of the 
ombudsman are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Russian Federation, Spain, Portugal, Serbia, 
Slovenia, Ukraine. 
850 Thus, the cells C17, C18, C19, and C20 of the 4X8 matrix (see Table 1) correspond to the acts of the 
ombudsperson, whereas the cells C21, C22, C23, and C24 correspond to the opinions, views, decisions, 
and recommendations expressed in the discharge of the ombudsperson’s duties.  
851 See the formulation of the immunity clauses in the cases of Albania, Azerbaijan, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Moldova, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
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functional non-liability immunity during the mandate. The third dimension, the 
persons falling under the ambit of the immunity clauses, refers to the ombudspersons 
and deputy ombudspersons, if the latter are provided for in legislation, or the staff of 
the authority, which is a rare case. The fourth dimension provides for whether a 
waiving procedure is established either in functional non-liability cases or in extra-
functional inviolability cases. The relevant immunity clauses specify the competent 
authority or person that decides upon the waiver of immunity, except in cases of 
flagrante delicto, that is, if being caught at the scene of a crime. The procedure and 
preconditions for the waiving of immunity are explicitly set forth in the immunity 
clauses. 
 
The second stage of the classification process comprises the design and construction 
of the 4X8 matrix of Table 1 based on the four dimensions of the first step of the 
classification process. Furthermore, the cells are numbered, and empirical cases, that 
is, Council of Europe member states are located in them. Thus, a combination of 
numbered cells or a cell on its own constitutes the immunity clause of each 
jurisdiction. The third step of the classification process consists of the construction of 
immunity models. The groups of countries pertaining to the same cells of the 4X8 
matrix fall within the ambit of a common immunity model since they share common 
dimensions.  
 
The third stage of the classification process comprises the compression of a number of 
cells of the 4X8 matrix of Table 1. Compression procedures are part of the 
classificatory process (Bailey, 1994; Elman, 2005). We will apply empirical 
compression, thus “deleting empty cells”, and logical compression, thus “deleting 
cells that are the product of impossible or highly improbable combinations of 
variables” (Elman, 2005). The cells A2, A5, A6, A8, B10, B11, B13, B14, B15, B16, 
C18, C20, C21, C24, D26, D27, D28, D29, D30, D31, and D32 in the 4X8 matrix can 
be deleted since there are no empirical cases in the group of countries under study. 
However, the case of Kosovo, which is excluded from the group of Council of Europe 
member states852, pertains to the hybrid immunity model, and could be located in cells 
A6853 and A7. Kosovo represents an outlier in relation to the staff’s immunity since it 
is perpetual, and applies to all “the words spoken or written and acts performed by 
them in their official capacity” according to Section 12 par. 1 of the Regulation No 
2006/06 of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. On the 
other hand, we may reduce the property space using logical compression. Thus, the 
cells A5, A8, B10, B11, B13, B14, B15, B16, C21, C24, D26, D27, D29, D30, D31, 
and D32 in the 4X8 may be deleted since the combination of variables does not 
produce logical results. More specifically, the concept of inviolability is incompatible 
with the perpetual aspect of immunity854. The perpetual aspect of immunity is 
incompatible with a waiving procedure855. Finally, the concept of inviolability is 
incompatible with the inexistence of a waiving procedure during one’s mandate856.  
 
                                                 
852 Kosovo pertains to the group of states which are Non-UN member states recognised by at least one 
UN member. It is currently recognised by 71 UN members and 1 UN non-member state, the Republic 
of China (Taiwan), although Kosovo does not recognise the ROC.  
853 The cell A6 was earlier deleted through empirical compression.  
854 See the cells B13, B14, B15, B16, B29, B30, B31, and B32. 
855 See cells A5, A8, C21, and C24. 
856 See cells B10, B11, D26, and D27.  
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The fourth stage of the classification process provides for the construction of 
immunity models (typology) with their variations, and the identification of empirical 
cases pertaining to these models, that is, Council of Europe member states, combined 
with types of democracy for each empirical case. Table 2 presents the fourth stage of 
the classification process857. Three immunity models have been identified, and are 
briefly analyzed hereafter. Each immunity model has internal variations. The first one, 
the Broad Model, based on the French system of parliamentary immunity, provides 
ombudspersons with a broad scope of immunity that combines the two aspects of 
immunity, that is, non-liability in the discharge of the ombudspersons’ duties 
(functional immunity), and inviolability for actions in their private capacity (extra-
functional immunity). The Broad Model consists of six variations where all the 
dimensions create different combinations. The second model, the narrow model, is 
restricted to the protection of views, opinions, decisions, recommendations, and acts 
in the discharge of the ombudspersons’ duties, that is, it does not extend to actions 
outside their official capacity. The Narrow Model comprises four variations.  
 
The third model, the hybrid immunity model, introduces the extension of immunity to 
the staff of the authorities, thus imitating analogous immunity regimes for the staff of 
international organizations. Moreover, this innovative feature might encompass the 
staff’s inviolability in respect of private actions, as is the case with Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This privilege is limited in time for members of the staff, whereas the 
ombudsperson is to be informed by the competent body or authority in case any 
offence is committed by his personnel, and consequently decide upon the waiver of 
their immunity. Nevertheless, the provisions for the procedure to lift the immunity of 
the staff are not explicit in legislative texts858. It should be noted that a waiver 
mechanism is not provided for the non-liability aspect of the personnel’s immunity, as 
is the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina, contrary to the procedure foreseen for 
international civil servants.  
 
 
Finally, we have identified a fourth model, the qualified immunity model, which is 
not depicted in the 4X8 matrix of table 1. The immunity clauses of Cyprus and 
Romania859 appear to pertain to this model which partly erodes the absolute character 
of the notion of functional non-liability. If an ombudsperson is sued, the court is to 
determine on a case by case basis whether the alleged defendant acted based upon the 
respect of the constitutional rights criterion. The concept, as formulated in the ‘70s in 
the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, led to the demise of the doctrine of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
857 See Appendix 2 containing a table with the analytical version of the typology.  
858 The Venice Commission in its opinion no. 274/2004 on draft amendments to article 23(5) of the 
Law on the Human Rights Defender of Armenia, pinpoints that the said article currently in force “lacks 
sufficiently precise provisions on the procedure for waiving immunity”. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL-AD(2008)028-e.asp, date of access: 06.01.2010. 
859 The immunity clauses of Romania also provide for the ombudsperson’s inviolability. 
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TABLE 1.  Dimensions of the concept of immunity as prescribed in relevant legislation 
                                          
                                                          Persons Covered: Ombudsman – Staff  
                                                                   (Abbreviations: Omb-Staff) 
 
                                         Possibility of waiving immunity: Waiver – Non Waiver of Immunity 
                                                                        (Abbreviations: W-NW) 
 
Scope of                                                             Duration of Immunity    
Immunity                 DURING MANDATE                                            PERPETUAL 
                                                                
 
 
Functional Non-
liability 
A 
 
Staff/NW 
     BA  
1 2  3 
Omb/W                                               Omb/NW 
AL, AZ, CZ, EE, FI, RS* 
MD, PL, SE,  
RU, UA 4 
                          Staff/W 
AM 
Staff/NW 
 
5 6 7 
                                                        Omb/NW        
Omb/W    AM**, BG, 
                                                           FR, GR**, 
FYROM                                              ES, PT 
 8  
                         Staff/W 
 
Extra-Functional 
Inviolability 
B 
 
Staff/NW 
10 
9 11 
Omb/W Omb/NW 
AL, AM,                                 
BA, BG, CZ, 
EE, HU, ME, PL,  12 
ES, PT, UA  
 Staff/W 
BA 
 
Staff/NW 
14 
 
 
13 15 
Omb/W                                               Omb/NW 
 
16 
                                Staff/W 
Divided 
Functional 
Non liability  
(Cells C17, C18, 
C19, C20: Acts of 
the ombudsperson, 
Cells C21, C22, 
C23, C24: 
opinions, views, 
decisions, 
recommendations 
of the 
ombudsperson) 
C 
Staff/NW 
18 
 
17 19 
Omb/W                                                         Omb/NW 
BA, GE, HU, HU**, SI 
ME, SI  
                                          
                                         20 
 
Staff/W 
Staff/NW 
22 
 
21 23 
Omb/W                                              Omb/NW 
BA, GE, 
  
                                     
                                    24 
                                   ME       
Staff/W 
    
 
 
Extra- Functional 
Extended 
Inviolability 
D 
 
Staff/NW 
25 26 
Omb/W 27 
AZ,  GE,                                                        Omb/NW 
MD, RU 
Staff/W 
 
28 
Staff/NW 
30 
29 31 
Omb/W                                               Omb/NW 
  
 
32 
Staff/W 
 
The abbreviations of the countries are given according to the 2-letter codes standardized by the ISO (International 
Organization for Standardization). Source, International Organisation for Standardization, available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/english_country_names_and_code_elements, date of access: 16.11.2010. These codes are 
based on the 3-letter codes of the country abbreviations published by the United Nations (see the United Nations 
official website, available at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm). The 2-letter codes of the 
table correspond to the following countries: AL (Albania), AM (Armenia), AZ (Azerbaijan), Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(BA), BG (Bulgaria), CZ (Czech Republic), EE (Estonia), FI (Finland), FYROM (The Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia), GE (Georgia), GR (Greece), HU (Hungary), MD (Moldova), ME (Montenegro), PL (Poland), RO 
(Romania), SE (Sweden), RU (Russian Federation), ES (Spain), PT (Portugal), RS (Serbia), SI (Slovenia), UA 
(Ukraine). We used the symbol * in the case of Serbia in order to clarify that the functional immunity covers “any 
opinion, criticism, or recommendation” and not all the other acts in the discharge of the Protector of Citizens’ 
duties. We used the symbol ** in the cases of Armenia, Greece, and Hungary in order to clarify that slander and 
offence are exempted from the scope of immunity (Armenia and Greece). Moreover, a breach of confidentiality is 
equally exempted from the scope of immunity in the case of Greece.  In Hungary slander and libel are exempted 
from the scope of immunity, whereas the Ombudsman of Civil Rights is responsible under civil law.  
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Table 2 Immunity Models, Empirical Cases, and Types of Democracy 
Immunity 
Model 
Variations of the Model Council of 
Europe Member 
States 
Type of 
Democracy 
Broad Model   
(non liability 
+inviolability 
variations) 
Functional non-liability+ 
extra-functional inviolability 
Albania, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 
Poland, Ukraine 
New 
Democracies 
 Functional non-liability + 
extended extra-functional 
inviolability 
Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, Russian 
Federation 
New 
Democracies 
 Functional non-liability 
(perpetual) + extra-functional 
inviolability 
Bulgaria, Spain, 
Portugal 
New 
Democracies 
 Divided functional non-
liability (perpetual) + extra-
functional inviolability 
Montenegro New Democracy 
 Divided functional non-
liability  + extra-functional 
inviolability 
Hungary  New Democracy 
 Divided functional non-
liability  + extended extra-
functional inviolability 
Georgia New Democracy 
Narrow Model 
(non-liability 
variations) 
Absolute functional non-
liability (perpetual) 
France,          
Greece, FYROM 
Consolidated 
New 
Democracies 
 Functional non-liability 
(during mandate-waiving 
procedure) 
Finland, Sweden Consolidated 
 Divided functional non-
liability 
Slovenia New Democracy 
 Functional non-liability 
(during mandate-non waiver) 
Serbia New Democracy 
Hybrid Model 
(broad model + 
staff immunity) 
Ombudspersons: absolute 
functional non-liability 
(perpetual)+extra-functional 
inviolability                               
Staff: Functional non-liability 
Armenia New Democracy 
 Ombudspersons: divided 
functional non-liability 
+extra-functional inviolability   
Staff: Functional non-liability 
+ extra functional 
inviolability 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
New Democracy 
Qualified 
Immunity Model 
Courts decide upon the matter 
based on the principle of 
good faith 
Cyprus, Romania      
*qualified immunity 
for official acts 
combined with extra-
functional 
inviolability 
New 
Democracies 
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official executive immunity from civil suits for damages as stamped in the 1896 case 
of Spalding v. Vilas860. Thus, in the case Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) the decision of the 
Supreme Court attempted to strike a balance between the effective function of public 
administration, on the one hand, and the protection of the individuals’ constitutional 
rights against incidents of their violation by agents of the state, on the other. The 
defendant had to prove that he acted in a reasonable way, and that he did not have the 
intention to harm an individual by disregarding his constitutional rights861 
(Rosenbloom, 1987). 
 
As we have already stated most consolidated democracies and a limited number of 
new democracies do not provide for immunity arrangements in the institution of the 
ombudsman. However, France represents an outlier since it has established, as early 
as 1973, a unique immunity regime of an absolute character with regard to the 
protection of the functions of the ombudsperson. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Sweden and Finland provide for a soft immunity regime enshrined in their 
Constitutions. Greece pertains to the group of new democracies with a strong 
immunity regime since it is perpetual and covers all the acts in the discharge of the 
ombudsman’s duties save in cases of slander, libel or violation of confidentiality. 
However, the majority of new democracies pertain to the Broad model combining 
non-liability and inviolability, whereas only Bosnia-Herzegovina and Armenia pertain 
to the hybrid model. Interestingly enough, the Venice Commission in its opinions on 
draft laws on the institution of the ombudsman clearly promotes the hybrid immunity 
model. Serbia, despite an analogous recommendation on the formulation of the 
immunity clause, finally opted for a soft version of immunity that protects the 
ombudsman’s opinion, criticism, and recommendation during his mandate.   
The regime of immunity in the institution of the Ombudsman: high protection 
for low risk regulatory agency? 
The institution of the Ombudsman is an accountability mechanism, and constitutes a 
regulatory regime. More specifically, it pertains to the phenomenon of regulation 
inside government that refers to processes where government regulates itself beyond 
the two classical primary regulators, i.e., the courts and the legislature. This so-called 
secondary regulation is effected by public bodies operating at arm’s length from the 
direct line of command and takes the form of a steering or control system – in a 
cybernetic perspective - that combines standard setting (the “director” element), 
information-gathering (the “detector” element), and behaviour modification (the 
“effector” element) (Hood et al.,1999). Despite the fact that Ombudsmen, as other 
regulators of government, rather disagree with such a categorisation (Hood, et al., 
                                                 
860 The Court reasoned that: “In examining the functions of his office, the head of an Executive 
Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit 
for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as 
entrusted to the executive branch of government, if he were subjected to any such restraint”.   
861 The Court held that: “. . . a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of 
government, the variation of being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the 
office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability 
is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in 
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief that affords a basis for qualified immunity 
of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official misconduct”.  
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1999: p. 53-54), it seems that their powers correspond to a great extent to the 
regulatory model.   
 
First, it could be argued that standard setting, the director element of the control 
process, is indirect. The Ombudsman does not intervene directly in the legislative 
procedure862. They supervise the rule of law in public administration and guarantee 
that the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, as prescribed in national and 
ratified international legislation, are not encroached upon in the public or in the 
private sector. But this supervisory role enables the Ombudsmen to identify problems 
and recommend amendments in law or propose new legislation that would improve 
the administrative system. In this sense, they may influence indirectly the legislative 
procedure. Nevertheless, in recent years, the initiative of the European Ombudsman to 
issue the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, which was approved by the 
European Parliament, served as a model for the elaboration and drafting of similar 
codes by national institutions. They have a standard-setting nature and lay down 
general principles of good administrative behaviour and rules governing the action of 
public functionaries and civil servants.  
 
Second, information gathering, the detection element, is two-fold. It may take either 
the form of inspection, as part of his investigatory competences863, or the form of 
mediation where the Ombudsman gathers information “through a process of conflict 
by the assessment of complaints and disputes” (Hood et al., 1999:47). Most of the 
time, in cases of violation of the duty of assistance by public agencies during the stage 
of investigation, moderate measures are undertaken864. Third, changing behaviour, the 
effector element, may be achieved through the enforcement of moderate measures 
since Ombudsmen lack prosecutorial powers or other punitive instruments. Thus, 
complaints submitted by individuals, may be resolved either by informal means (e.g 
                                                 
862 The Venice Commission in its No. 425/2007 opinion on the possible reform of the Ombudsman 
Institution in Kazakhstan, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 71st Plenary Session (Venice, 1-2 June 
2007) on the basis of comments by Mr Peter PACZOLAY (Member, Hungary) and Mr Hjörtur 
TORFASON (Member, Iceland) states that: “It may generally be seen as consistent with the mandate of 
an Ombudsman or Human Rights Defender according to the model most widely accepted that the 
institution should have the power to make recommendations to the parliament or legislature for the 
introduction of amendments or additions to existing laws or other legislative innovation in respect of 
matters related to his mandate, in the annual report on its activities which the institution is expected to 
deliver or otherwise. This is the more so as in most countries, the Ombudsman/Defender is appointed 
by the parliament and expected to report to the legislative body . . . it is to be doubted that the 
institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman of Kazakhstan would gain by being endowed with a right 
of legislative initiative. In view of the neutrality and independence which the institution needs to 
possess in the pursuit of its functions, it is believed that the nation would be better served by having the 
mandate of the Ombudsman limited to the power of issuing recommendations for legislative reform to 
the Parliament and/or to the Government or the President of the Republic (to whom the Ombudsman 
reports according to the present Statute), without a direct initiative. Such recommendations in the 
annual or ad hoc reports obviously do not have binding effect, and do not oblige the state organs to 
act, but can influence them and might draw the attention of the public opinion to the issue in question.” 
Available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-AD(2007)020-e.asp, date of access: 
06.01.2010. Furthermore, it should be noted that in most European countries, contrary to the U.S.A., 
rule-making powers are not delegated to agencies regulating business with the exception of secondary 
legislation in some cases. Thus, even in business regulation the three components of control systems, 
that is, standard-setting, information gathering and enforcement- may not be combined within a single 
agency.  
863 He may perform autopsies ex officio or within the context of grievance handling. 
864 These measures may take the form of (administrative) criminal sanctions, involvement of other 
bodies of control, reports to superior agencies, or recording such failures to annual reports.  
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legal advice, explanation of a specific administrative conduct, advice about 
alternatives of action) or by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (mediation). 
On the other hand, decisions in the form of recommendations, the most typical aspect 
of the institution’s authority, are “soft-law” acts with no legally binding character. 
Thus, judicial review is excluded. Nevertheless, the case of the Parliamentary and 
Health Service Ombudsman in the U.K. seems to constitute an exception865. 
 
The recommendations are submitted to the audited public service and notified to the 
complainant and the agency’s supervising authority. Most legal frameworks do not 
provide for strict and explicit obligations of those audited to react to 
recommendations. In cases of indifference or reluctance of the audited agencies to 
respond to recommendations, sanctions may take the form of notifications to the 
competent supervising agency, initiation of criminal or disciplinary proceedings 
against officials (own initiative or recommendation to the competent authority), 
reports to Parliament, special reports, annual reports, publicity of recommendations 
through the office’s website, brochures, bulletins and exposure of the deviant public 
services to the media (Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 2008). Publicity appears to be the only 
mechanism that might do damage to the regulatees’ reputation. But is it really enough 
or effective? A crucial question thus arises: does the nature of the regulatory agency 
of the institution and its rather weak sanctioning toolkit justify such a high protection, 
that is, the provision of immunity arrangements in its various types, as already 
analysed, for the ombudsperson and his/her staff? In other words, is the measure 
consistent with the seriousness and gravity of the competences and powers of the 
institution?  
 
It is obvious that the modern institution of the ombudsman represents a rather 
simplified version of its Swedish and Finnish prototypes. Maher Abdel Hadi in his 
paper “The extension of the Ombudsman: the triumph of an idea or the deformation of 
an institution?” discerns four stages in the process of deformation: i) the limitation of 
jurisdiction, that is, the administration of justice and public servants are exempted866, 
ii) nomination does not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of parliament867, iii) the 
indirect lodging of complaints868, and iv) the lack of prosecutorial powers869. And he 
                                                 
865 The Report on the Pre-appointment hearing for the post of Parliamentary and Health Service, dated 
July 6, 2011, states: “The Ombudsman has sole accountability for the decisions made and in this 
respect the role is quasi-judicial. Decisions of the Ombudsman are subject to judicial review”. Source: 
The Official Website of the U.K. Parliament, Pre-appointment hearing for the post of Parliamentary 
and Health Service Ombudsman, Ninth Report of Session 2010-2012, Volume I: Report and 
appendices, together with formal minutes, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/1220/1220.pdf, date of 
access: 16.02.2012. 
866 “The Parliamentary Ombudsman [in Finland] has jurisdiction over public authorities, including 
ministers, judges, police officers, military officers, civil servants, public prosecutors, members of 
municipal councils, social welfare workers, tax commissioners and other civil servants.” Excerpt from 
the First Evaluation Round, First Evaluation Report on Finland, p. 9, Adopted by the GRECO at its 5th 
Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 11-15 June 2001). Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/GrecoEval1(2000)4_Finland_EN.pdf, 
date of access: 06.01.2010.  
867 He invokes the case of New Zealand where the first Parliamentary Commissioner for Investigation 
was nominated by the General Governor upon the proposition of Parliament.  
868 In the United Kingdom and in France the complainant has to submit his complaint to a member of 
Parliament who, after having examined the grounds of the petition, forwards it to the Ombudsman. 
869 “The Parliamentary Ombudsman (Finland) can press charges before the courts if he/she finds 
evidence that a public authority or an official committed an offence in the exercise of his/her duties…he 
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concludes that the “the discovery of this institution by the non-scandinavian world 
simply permitted various countries to reformulate and “adapt” their old procedures 
of complaints and petitions that citizens addressed to their governors. And they have 
probably borrowed the Swedish term in order to fool public opinion and calm 
tensions resulting from the heaviness of bureaucracy”.  
 
Yet recent evolutions on the issue of the limitation of immunities, theoretical 
approaches, and relevant paradigms may offer an opportunity to better develop our 
argumentation. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in its Resolution 
(97) 24 on the twenty guiding principles for the fight against corruption expressly 
stated its willingness to “limit immunity from investigation, prosecution or 
adjudication of corruption offences to the degree necessary in a democratic society” 
(Principle 6)870. During its first evaluation round (2000-2002), the Group of Countries 
against Corruption (GRECO) monitored the categories of officials enjoying immunity 
and the procedures followed for its waiver in member states of the Council of Europe. 
An interpretation of these two aspects of the Guiding Principle 6 was thus instituted. 
GRECO recommended that there should be a limitation of the categories of officials 
benefiting from immunity to a minimum, on the one hand, and that the procedure of 
the waiver of immunity should be “clear, objective, swift and transparent”, on the 
other. (GRECO, 2004).   
 
The underlying theme for the limitation of immunities was that such legal 
arrangements provided for certain categories of holders of public office and/or elected 
representatives might seriously prevent the fight against corruption and hamper the 
initiation of court proceedings against those involved in corrupt practices. The 
institution of the Ombudsman is related to the prevention of corruption since it 
supervises public administration and deals with phenomena of maladministration. 
Moreover, good governance and human rights, as promoted and protected by the 
institution, are strictly related. In its conclusions, the joint OHCHR-UNDP Seminar on 
good governance practices for the promotion and protection of human rights 
highlighted that “human rights and good governance are affected by corruption on the 
one hand and can contribute to the fight against corruption on the other hand871”. 
                                                                                                                                            
is generally competent to examine complaints relating to prosecutor’s activities although in practice 
the complaints are examined by the Prosecutor General. If a prosecutor decides not to prosecute in a 
specific case the Parliamentary Ombudsman is empowered to order the reopening of the case or to 
prosecute himself”. Excerpt from the First Evaluation Round, First Evaluation Report on Finland, p. 10, 
Adopted by the GRECO at its 5th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 11-15 June 2001). Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/GrecoEval1(2000)4_Finland_EN.pdf, 
date of access: 06.01.2010. 
“The Parliamentary Ombudsmen [in Sweden] check that the authorities under the supervision apply 
the laws in a correct way. All Government officials are accountable under criminal law for the way 
they carry out their powers. There is a law on negligent or abuse of public power; and the 
Parliamentary Ombudsmen are empowered to prosecute any official or judge if there is reason to 
believe s/he acted wrongly when on duty”. Excerpt from the First Evaluation Round, First Evaluation 
Report on Sweden, p. 13, Adopted by the GRECO at its 5th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 11-15 June 
2001). Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/GrecoEval1(2001)3_Sweden_EN.pdf, 
date of access: 06.01.2010. 
870 Resolution (97) 24 on the twenty guiding principles for the fight against corruption, available at 
http://www.anticorruzione.it/Portals/altocommissario/Documents/Atti%20internazionali/risoluzione%2
0(97)%2024%20COE.pdf, date of access: 06.01.2010. 
871 The Seminar was organised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and the United Nations Development Programme and took place in Seoul in 15-16 September, 
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Within this context we could argue that the ombudsperson and his/her staff should not 
enjoy immunity. Nevertheless, GRECO in its compliance reports, and the Venice 
Commission in its opinions, excludes the office from the scope of the Guiding 
Principle 6.  
 
Indeed, the Venice Commission in its Joint Opinion No. 490 / 2008 adopted at its 
76th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 October 2008), following the submission of a 
letter dated 1 July 2008, by the Human Rights Defender of Armenia, Mr 
Harutyunyan, who requested from the Venice Commission an opinion on amendment 
to article 23(5)872 of the Law on the Human Rights Defender, found that the  proposed 
amendment873 to deprive the staff of the immunity regime it enjoyed was inconsistent 
with the guarantees of independence that the institution requires. More specifically, 
the Guiding Principle 6, that is, the fight against corruption, served as the justificatory 
basis for the said amendment. In the Joint Opinion it was stated that GRECO’s 
compliance report on Armenia did not recommend the removal of immunity clauses 
regarding the Protector or his/her staff since “the institution of the Human Rights 
Defender falls within “the justifiable range of holders of public office who should 
enjoy an immunity according to the distinctive characteristics of the office and the 
functions performed”. It is obvious that in the Commission’s view the preservation of 
immunity provisions overweighs the principle of the fight against corruption since 
“owing to its tasks conducting a special kind of examination often resulting in strong 
criticism of the authorities, the institution becomes a likely target of attacks motivated 
by political and other interests”.   
 
The fear of the executive argument is reiterated. But is it strong enough to support an 
institution with advisory competences and no substantial punitive powers apart from 
criticism of the authorities? Moreover, the theory on the separation of powers, as the 
unique justificatory basis for the legitimisation of immunity in civil and criminal 
actions in a democratic society, seems to be incompatible with the profile of the 
institution. The non-liability aspect of immunity is closely linked to the necessary 
legitimate discretion that elected or appointed officials use in the discharge of their 
duties. Differently put, judicial sanction should not interfere into the discretionary 
area of the decision-making process of the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary 
that otherwise hampers their functional independence (Opinion No. 492, Venice 
                                                                                                                                            
2004. Information taken from the “Chairperson’s Statement United Nations Conference on Anti-
Corruption Measures, Good Governance & Human Rights Warsaw, Republic of Poland, 8-9 November 
2006”. Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/governance/docs/Chairperson-
Statement.pdf, date of access: 07.01.2010. 
872 Article 23(5) reads as follows: “Those persons that hold any position in the Defender's staff cannot 
be convicted, persecuted, detained, arrested or brought to court for any action performed, opinion 
expressed or decision made while performing their responsibilities under the Defender's instructions. 
In all these circumstances when any person holding a post in the staff is detained, arrested or brought 
to court, the enforcing agency shall inform the Defender of this occurrence in the defined procedure 
and due time”. Available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL(2008)087-e.pdf, date of access: 
07.01.2010. 
873 The proposed amendment reads as follows” “In case of subjecting any person holding a post in the 
 HRDO staff  to detention,  arrestment, administrative or criminal liability by court order, the enforcing 
agency  shall inform the Defender of this occurrence in the defined procedure and due time.” Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL(2008)087-e.pdf, date of access: 07.01.2010. 
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Commission, 2008; GRECO, 2004). The institution of the Ombudsman does not fit 
into this context.  The criticisms expressed by the Ombudsman in the annual reports, 
in reports to Parliament or publicised to the media, on the one hand, and the non-
binding recommendations aiming to reform legislation and persuade the regulatees, on 
the other, could be paralleled neither with parliamentary deliberation nor with binding 
court decisions.  
 
Nevertheless, the Venice Commission’s and GRECO’s view that the preservation of 
the immunity provisions for the ombudsman and his/her staff is not inconsistent with 
the fight against corruption principle seems to be challenged by the context of a 
recommendatory document issued by EURALIUS and OPDAT in 2008874. It is 
addressed to two authorised members of the Council for Legislation of the Assembly 
of Albania within the initiative to reform the immunity of members of Parliament and 
others through Constitutional revision. The People’s Advocate in Albania enjoys the 
same immunity as a High Court Judge. The proposed constitutional amendment on the 
restriction of High Court Judges’ immunity affects directly that of the People’s 
Advocate, and makes no distinction. More specifically, the document states: 
“Interventions would, it seems to us, be required only in articles 73 (deputies), 126 
(Constitutional Court judges) and 137 (all other judges). While there are other 
provisions in the Constitution referring to the immunity of particular officials (for 
example, article 61/3 on the People’s Advocate or article 165/2 on the Chairman of 
High State Control), those provisions cross-refer to the immunity of High Court 
judges”.  
 
 
 
                                                 
874 The document is available at: 
http://www.euralius.org.al/reccomendations/eng/Microsoft%20Word%20-
%20Immunity_Memo_eng.pdf, date of access: 07.01.2010. According to the information available on 
their respective websites: “EURALIUS II (European Assistance Mission to the Justice System in 
Albania) is a project funded by the European Commission under the Albania CARDS 2006 
programme. It is a direct follow-on project from the previous EURALIUS I Mission which was 
completed in the middle of November 2007. Like EURALIUS I, the contractor of the new Grant 
Contract of EURALIUS II is the Federal Ministry of Justice of Austria, which is implementing the 
project in a consortium together with the Federal Ministry of Justice of Germany”. 
http://www.euralius.org.al/php/index.php?lang=1&page=1, “The objective [of the programme] is to 
facilitate, through the building of the required capacities within the Ministry of Justice and the 
Judiciary the development of a more independent, impartial efficient, professional, transparent and 
modern justice system in Albania, therefore contributing to the restoring of people’s confidence in their 
institutions and the consolidation of democracy and rule of law in the countries”, 
(http://www.euralius.org.al/php/index.php?lang=1). “Established in 1991, the Office of Overseas 
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), draws on Department of Justice 
resources and expertise to develop and administer technical assistance designed to enhance the 
capabilities of foreign justice sector institutions and their law enforcement personnel, so they can 
effectively partner with the Department of Justice in combating terrorism, trafficking in persons, 
organized crime, corruption, and financial crimes”, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/about/mission.html. 
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It is recommended that the newly adopted Constitution of Kosovo875 could serve as a 
model for the amendment of article 137 on the immunity of ordinary judges 
(including those of the High Court). Thus, judicial scrutiny interferes directly into the 
regulatory agency of the People’s Advocate since courts are competent to decide upon 
whether there has been an intentional violation of the law in the discharge of his/her 
duties. Finally, despite the fact that Albania pertains to transitional democracies, the 
recommendation transcends this cliché, so regularly invoked for the preservation of 
complete immunity arrangements in such countries, and pinpoints: “We are, as we 
said above, aware of the tensions and lack of trust existing in Albania at this time 
among the institutions, and there is no doubt that lawmakers, judges and other 
government officials should be protected from abuse of the criminal justice system for 
political purposes. In the early stages of democratic development in Albania, it may 
be that this need for protection justified the grant of complete immunity. But Albania 
has moved forward and should now balance this protection against the urgent 
necessity to hold high officials who are corrupt or engage in other criminal conduct 
accountable for their actions”. 
 
But, apart from the emergence of divergent approaches to the issue of whether the 
ombudsman’s immunity affects the fight against corruption principle, the role of the 
citizen and his relationship with the institution should also be highlighted. The weak 
regulatory agency of the institution and its evolution as an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution mechanism makes politically motivated attacks rather improbable. 
Moreover, in many legal orders, the institution shields public administration from 
judicial review and sanction. Τhe criterion of subsidiarity, most of the times regulated 
in the ombudsman act876, puts constraints on the lodging of a complaint. One of the 
following conditions shall be met for the fulfillment of this criterion: the absence or 
the exhaustion of the available legal remedies877 and the non-initiation of legal 
proceedings by the complainant878. Yet the rationale of the avoidance of the collision 
of procedures that refers to the second condition may have serious implications and 
directly violates the right of access to justice as guaranteed under Article 6 of the 
                                                 
875 Article 107 of the Constitution of Kosovo reads as follows: “Article 107. 1. Judges, including lay-
judges, shall be immune from prosecution, civil lawsuit and dismissal for actions taken, decisions made 
or opinions expressed that are within the scope of their responsibilities as judges. 2. Judges, including 
lay-judges, shall not enjoy immunity and may be removed from office if they have committed an 
intentional violation of the law. 3. When a judge is indicted or arrested, notice must be given to the 
Kosovo Judicial Council without delay.” 
876 Ombudsman acts in Bulgaria, Finland, Sweden, as well as those of the regional institutions of Italy 
and Switzerland, do not provide for the criterion of subsidiarity (Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 2008:20). 
877 “Partly the exhaustion of all legal remedies (e.g. A, A-Vor, DK, GE, H, IS KS, N, NL, P, RUS, 
SRB) or at least of all judicial remedies is required (GB, IRL)”, (Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 2008:20).  
878 “In some legal orders the ombudsman is only prohibited from intervening if there is another 
proceeding pending (administrative proceeding:GR; judicial proceeding: AL, AZ, B, D-Rhe, E, EST, 
EU, IL, KS, LT, M, MK, SK, UA; administrative or judicial proceedings (CY, HR)”. (Kucsko-
Stadlmayer, 2008:20). In the revised introductory and explanatory note on the preliminary draft law on 
the Ombudsman of the Republika Srpska, prepared by the Secretariat of the Venice Commission, 
commenting on relations of the Ombudsman with the Judiciary, it is noted that: “The Ombudsman 
should not interfere with pending court proceedings and should not challenge the legality of court 
judgements”. Available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1999/CDL(1999)054-e.asp, date of access: 
07.01.2010. 
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European Convention on Human Rights. The tension between the principle of 
subsidiarity and the right of access to justice may be highlighted by the Greek case879.  
 
In the Greek legal order the initiation of administrative proceedings provide for 
exclusive, short term deadlines880. On the other hand, according to article 3, par. 4 of 
the ombudsman act881, the ombudsman does not intervene if there is another 
administrative proceeding pending. If the complainant recourses to the ombudsman 
and the conciliation system fails to render justice, or in the ombudsman’s wording, 
fails to persuade administration since nonbinding recommendations are issued, not 
only does (s)he lose the right of access to justice, but also misses the possibility of 
reparation for any damage caused by an administrative act882.  The Joint Opinion (No 
318/2004) on the Draft Law on the Ombudsman of Serbia adopted by the Venice 
Commission883 states that “the requirement of exhaustion of judicial remedies before 
the ombudsperson would go counter the very idea of the ombudsperson institution” 
and that “the latter (the ombudsperson) should have the obligation to advise the 
complainant about legal remedies and about the fact that the complaint to the 
ombudsman does not prevent the expiry of deadlines for such remedies”884.   
Moreover, principle IV of the Recommendation No. R (84) 15 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States relating to Public Liability, as 
interpreted in the annexed memorandum, may serve as a supporting argument. 
According to this principle “If there is an administrative conciliation system prior to 
judicial proceedings, recourse to such system should not jeopardize access to judicial 
proceedings”885. The interpretation of this principle in the memorandum stresses that 
the provision of conciliation procedures in law, should in no case deprive persons of 
obtaining compensation through legal action. In other words, if persons are to select 
                                                 
879 While the draft law of the Greek Ombudsman was discussed in Parliament, Dimitrios Tsovolas, 
President of the greek party DIKKI (Democratic Social Movement), underlined the dilemmas posed to 
complainants and the subsequent deadlock created by such arrangements, since they would finally 
impede the effective review of the administrative action. (Minutes of Parliament in Plenary Session – 
Session 101st, March, 20 1997, available at: 
http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/praktika/pdf/20_03_97.pdf, date of access: 07.01.2010). 
880 The litigant has to file a petition/a lawsuit in administrative courts within two months according to 
article 46, par. 1 of the Presidential Decree 18/1989.  
881 “The Ombudsman shall not investigate cases pending before a court or other judicial authority” Law 
3094/2003, article 3 par. 4. 
882 According to Greek jurisprudence persons may claim reparation only after the issue of a judicial 
decision that annuls an administrative act. 
883 Opinion no. 318/2004, CDL-AD(2004)041 adopted by the Venice Commission at its 61st Plenary 
Session, Venice (3-4 December 2004) available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-
AD(2004)041-e.pdf, date of access: 07.01.2010. 
884 This comment takes into account principle (b) of the additional principles concerning the status of 
commissions with quasi-jurisdictional competence of the so-called Paris Principles embodied in 
resolution 48/134 on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, according to which they (the commissions) should “inform 
the party who filed the petition of his rights, in particular the remedies available to him, and promote 
his access to them”.  Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm, date of 
access: 07.01.2010. 
885 Recommendation No. R (84) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States relating to Public 
Liability (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 September 1984 at the 375th meeting of the 
Minister’s Deputies Available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/administrative_law_and_justice/Texts_&_Docu
ments/Conv_Rec_Res/Recommendation(84)15.asp, date of access: 07.01.2010. 
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among procedures, especially in serious cases, they run the risk of failing to exercise 
their legitimate rights.   
 
Posing such dilemmas to the complainants violates the principle of access to justice 
and indirectly Recommendation No R(84) 15. The institution of the ombudsman 
should be considered as a complement to courts, an alternative administrative 
complaint process where harmonization of procedures regarding the possibility of 
filing a lawsuit in court would guarantee the recourse to the judicial system.886 But it 
is not only the subsidiarity criterion that violates human rights. Another issue that 
aggravates the disadvantageous position of the citizen towards the institution is that of 
the unconstitutionality887 of the provision of immunity.  Not only does it contravene 
the principle of equality before the law (article 4.1 of the Constitution), but it also 
prevents citizens from their constitutional right of judicial protection against the 
ombudsperson and his/her staff. Thus, the principle of proportionality is violated 
(articles 20 and 25 of the Constitution) when no mechanism for the waiver of non-
liability is provided. Furthermore, the absolute non-liability version directly violates 
the right of access to court under article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  
The extension of the immunity provisions: the violation of human rights and the 
subsequent limitation of the degree of the de facto independence of the  
constitutional independent authorities from public administration 
In this unit we will attempt once again to discuss, as with the case of the Ombudsman 
earlier on, whether the regulatory agency of the rest of the five constitutional 
independent authorities in Greece888 justifies the measure of the non-liability 
provisions for the members of their management boards. In recent years, there has 
been serious debate about whether non-majoritarian institutions constitute a fourth 
branch of government or they are simply part of the executive (Thatcher and Stone, 
2002; Zoller, 2004). Moreover, the delegation of legislative, executive and 
adjudicatory powers, as enshrined in their constitutive acts, has provoked tremendous 
criticism regarding the constitutionality of their institutional design. This controversy 
revolves around the violation of the principle of the separation of powers889, and more 
specifically the delegation of legislative competences since, in this way, the 
representational function of parliament is restricted. Nevertheless, these institutions 
rarely dispose of rule-making powers in Europe, contrary to the U.S. paradigm 
(Yseult, 2007).  
                                                 
886 See for example the procedures followed by the U.S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
available at: http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/lawsuit.cfm, date of access: 07.01.2010.  
887 Lorena Gonzales Volio (2003) states that the Supreme Court of Panama in its decision of February 
12th, 1998, declared unconstitutional the immunity of the Ombudsman and his deputies. Nevertheless, 
the writer of the paper does not mention the justificatory basis of the decision.  
888 Apart from the Ombudsman, the rest of the constitutional independent authorities in Greece are: the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel (ASEP), the Greek National Council for Radio and 
Television (NCRTV), the Hellenic Data Protection Authority (HDPA), and the Hellenic Authority for 
Communication Security and Privacy (ADAE). 
889 As Rosenbloom (1987) states “In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) and Schecter Poultry v. U.S. 
(1935), the Supreme Court reached to the heart of the matter by ruling that the constitutional 
requirements of the separation of powers prohibited delegation of legislative power to administrative 
agencies in the absence of strict standards for its use”. This opposing stance of the courts in the U.S.A. 
toward the development of autonomous administrative power, as reflected in jurisprudence, led 
President Roosevelt to control appointments in the Supreme Court and the Federal Courts. 
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Greece makes no exception in this European practice. More specifically, the 
independent authorities interfere indirectly with the legislative process, mainly 
through recommendations to the competent ministries for the introduction of new 
legislation and amendments to existing laws or with the issue of secondary legislation 
published in the official journal890. Regarding this second aspect of legislative 
activity, article 43.2 of the Constitution on legislative delegation891 and article 26 on 
the separation of powers892 currently in force, restrict the legislative initiative of these 
authorities to technical matters. There is no clear definition of the term, but it implies 
that the authorities have a regulatory power of technical nature that permits them to 
define the rules under which they are authorised to enforce them.  On the other hand, 
in cases when special legislative authorisations are provided for the issue of 
presidential decrees to regulate on matters of a non-technical character, ministerial 
participation and elaboration of the decrees by the Council of State893 are added with 
all relevant implications. Thus, the degree of delegation of rulemaking powers to the 
independent authorities is not only a determinant of their independence from the 
political decision-makers894, but it may also affect the legitimisation of immunity 
provisions for the members of their management boards. In this sense, limited 
legislative competences delegated to the independent authorities equate them, more or 
less, with a common agency of the executive.  
 
The rationale of the legitimacy for setting-up these authorities appears to support this 
view. Public acceptance would be guaranteed with the involvement of experts and the 
exclusion of political decision-makers from certain decisions in this new bureaucratic 
scenery (Gill, 2002). It could be argued that the establishment of these authorities 
came to address the lack of core administrative values in the traditional executive 
branch. The need for the implementation of the principles of impartiality in decision-
making, of non-discrimination, and of good administration in general, gave birth to 
the substitution of the old executive paradigm for an analogous bureaucratic 
                                                 
890 The Greek National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV) is the only authority that enjoys 
clear rule-making powers (Yseult Marique, 2007; Kozyris, 2003). According to article 15.2 of the 
Greek Constitution: “Radio and television shall be under the direct control of the State. The control 
and imposition of administrative sanctions belong to the exclusive competence of the National Radio 
and Television Council, which is an independent authority, as specified by law”. Neverthless, the 
executive curtails this constitutional provision, and takes the legislative initiative. The NCRTV decided 
upon a majority vote that it has the competence to judge whether relevant legislation is constitutional 
(Kozyris, 2003). 
891 According to article 43.2 of the Constitution: “The issuance of general regulatory decrees, by virtue 
of special delegation granted by statute and within the limits of such delegation, shall be permitted on 
the proposal of the competent Minister. Delegation for the purpose of issuing regulatory acts by other 
administrative organs shall be permitted in cases concerning the regulation of more specific matters or 
matters of local interest or of a technical and detailed nature”. 
892 According to Article 26.1 of the Constitution: “The legislative powers shall be exercised by the 
Parliament and the President of the Republic. 
893 According to article 95.1.d of the Constitution: “The jurisdiction of the Council of State pertains 
mainly to: . . .d. The elaboration of all decrees of a general regulatory nature”. 
894 Gilardi’s Agency Independence Index contains, among others, the dimension of the rulemaking 
competences of the agencies in order to measure their formal independence from the political decision- 
makers. Moreover, Majone and Surdej (2006) argue that this dimension is of high relevance and 
comment that: “It should be noticed that Gilardi’s Agency Independence Index has one methodological 
flaw: it treats all dimensions as equally significant for independence. This is obviously not true. If an 
agency has no rulemaking powers, if it is directly supervised by the political principal, then its 
independence is seriously weakened, even if it has high scores on other dimensions”.  
 316
mechanism headed by experts and not by ministers. Consequently, the respect for 
certain general principles of administrative law and the concern to protect the 
constitutional rights of the individuals are reflected in the exercise of their decision-
making powers in their multiple facets: inspections, controls, sanctions, interpretation 
of legislation, issue of codes and guidelines.  
 
Odegard (1954) demystifies the debate over the mixture of powers in independent 
agencies, and sets the problem of their accountability: “The mixture of executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers in these bodies has caused no end of confusion among 
experts accustomed to a neat tripartite division of political powers . . . But there is 
scarcely an agency or official of the government that does not in one way or another 
exercise two or more of these “distinct” powers. Wherever an official has discretion 
to decide controversies among persons or between private persons and the 
government, he may be said to exercise judicial power; wherever he has power to 
issue rules or regulations to which penalties for violation are attached, he exercises 
legislative power; and wherever he has power to direct, or control, conduct in terms 
of these decisions or rules, he may be said to have executive power. Mean is the 
official, and humble indeed in his station, who does not in some measure combine 
these powers in the performance of his duties. To call them quasi-judicial and quasi-
legislative may help the judicial conscience to rationalize departure from fundamental 
doctrine, but to justify the “independence” and hence the practical “irresponsibility” 
of an agency of government because it exercises quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative 
power may be to establish a principle which, if extended to all officials or agencies 
whose powers may be similarly described, can undermine the democratic principle 
that public officials –including bureaucrats called commissioners - must be politically 
responsible to the people through their elected representatives”. Thus, Odegard 
equates independent agencies with other governmental bodies in respect of the powers 
they exercise, on the one hand, and criticises the lack of political responsibility in the 
name of independence, on the other. Yet legal responsibility to the courts precedes 
accountability to parliament, and could even make the latter redundant due to its 
deterrent character.  
 
Within this context, the introduction of non-liability provisions for the members of the 
independent administrative authorities regulating government in Greece creates a 
human rights paradox, as is the case with the Greek Ombudsman. These authorities 
regulate the citizens-State relationship, “a relationship where the state risks not being 
neutral or impartial towards citizens” (Yseult Marique, 2007). What the human rights 
paradox rests on is that while these authorities protect citizens’ fundamental rights 
against encroachment by public administration, the establishment of non-liability 
provisions for their members violates the right of access to court under article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, impunity might lead either to inertia or 
reduce the independence of these authorities from their regulatees. Depriving citizens 
of the right of access to court inevitably insinuates a relationship of complicity 
between regulator and regulatee. Interestingly enough, such provisions are not 
provided for in business regulation.  
 
Non-liability does not promote the necessary neutrality on the part of the authorities 
towards public administration. Consequently, this creates a tension between the 
authorities and the citizens. It could be described as an external tension. Yet, an 
internal tension could also be identified, and rests upon the unequal relationship 
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developed between the members enjoying immunity, and the personnel that are 
responsible in their capacity as civil servants. This internal tension has two aspects. 
The first one deals, once more, with the violation of the personnel’s human rights. The 
administrative functions of the members of the authorities, as assigned to them by 
law, are not excluded from the scope of immunity. Consequently, the personnel are 
deprived of their right of access to court whenever the members’ decisions fail to 
comply with law. The second aspect revolves around possible pressures that members 
of the authorities might put on the personnel regarding the way they perform their 
duties. Therefore, the members of the authorities might violate article 261 of the 
Greek Penal Code that refers to the offence of exhortation of subordinates by their 
superiors to commit the offences of articles 235 to 260 of the said code without 
running the risk of being punished.  
 
Both aspects relating to the internal operation of the authorities might, in turn, trigger 
the external tension, the relationship of the authorities with citizens. Consequently, the 
immunity regime might enable the development of a favourable stance of the 
authorities towards public administration, thus reducing their independence from the 
regulatees. A paradigm might help us think of these possible tensions created by such 
arrangements. The Human Rights Defender of Armenia requested from the Venice 
Commission an opinion on the amendment of Article 23(5) of the Law on Human 
Rights Defender. The proposed amendment aimed to deprive the personnel of the 
agency of the immunity they enjoyed. The justificatory basis for the limitation of the 
personnel’s immunity was the fight against corruption, and more specifically principle 
6 of the Committee of Ministers’ Resolution 97(24) on the Twenty Guiding Principles 
for the Fight against Corruption. Despite the fact that GRECO in its compliance report 
for Armenia did not recommend the abolition of the immunity of the Defender’s 
personnel, Principle 6 might have been invoked as a pretext. A possible tension in the 
relationship between the Defender and his personnel might have given rise to the 
proposal of the amendment of Article 23(5). Yet, the Defender did not propose the 
abolition of the immunity he himself enjoyed. Thus, we could think of two possible 
scenarios. According to the first one, the Defender put pressure on the personnel 
regarding the way they performed their duties, and they, in turn, refused to comply 
with illegal orders. According to the second one, the personnel got involved into 
corrupt behaviour while exercising their duties due to the regime of impunity. 
 
Expertise and legal liability: Reinforcing the independence of the constitutional 
independent authorities from public administration 
The absolute character of non-liability enjoyed by the high-ranking public 
functionaries of the Greek constitutional independent authorities directly violates the 
citizens’ rights, on the one hand, and shields public administration from the 
regulators’ conflict-seeking stance. In other words, if there were no immunity 
provisions, the citizens’ right of access to court would operate as a deterrent, and 
would inevitably detach the authorities from the interests of public administration, 
that is, from the whole political system. Non-liability is a parameter that reduces 
independence from public administration, but not vice versa. The argumentation that 
the individuals would have recourse to court simply to revenge officials, on the one 
hand, and that there would be a diversion of energies from the proper performance of 
duties to the deflection of claims, on the other, rather downgrade the situation. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the basic criterion for the appointment of these 
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high-ranking public functionaries is their expertise in the field of regulation of the 
authorities. The notion of expertise, as a predominant feature of these authorities, 
enables us to further develop our argumentation regarding its relationship with the 
legal liability of their high-ranking public functionaries.  
In order to better support our view, we will adapt our case to the rationale of the 
decision 3/2009 of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law. Thus, the 
principle of discrimination in civil liability between high-ranking public functionaries 
and mere civil servants introduces the concept of liability based upon expertise. 
Likewise, the members of the authorities should not be exempted from civil, penal 
and disciplinary liability due to the expertise criterion. The principle of discrimination 
and the liability non-exemption based upon the expertise criterion could be paralleled 
with the first of the four maxims that Adam Smith recommended in respect of what a 
good tax should conform to: "The subject of every State ought to contribute towards 
the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective 
abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the 
protection of the State." (Smith, 1776)895. Thus, tax contribution should be equal to 
one’s economic abilities. Likewise, legal liability should be analogous to one’s 
professional qualifications. No matter how simplistic this paradigm appears, immunity 
provisions in the institution of the constitutional independent authorities constitute 
discrimination and violate the right of equality before the law since they are not based 
on reasonable and objective criteria. Indeed, discussions in the Greek Parliament 
proved that the argumentation of the supporters of the measure was misleading and 
vague disregarding its further implications. Moreover, theoretical approaches and 
legal opinions on the immunity regime in the institution of the ombudsman seem to 
move towards a mixture of inexact equations of the ombudsperson with deputies and 
international organisation officials.   
The legal responsibility of the high-ranking public functionaries of the five Greek 
constitutional independent authorities would become the demarcation line between the 
agencies and public administration. Liabilities should be identified in relation to the 
nature of the powers exercised by the authorities. Furthermore, the offences 
committed by civil servants and judges in the discharge of their duties, as provided for 
in the Greek penal code, should be taken into consideration. As for civil liability, 
article 23.4 of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)7 of the Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers to member states on good administration opens the road to 
direct civil action against public officials896. Interestingly enough, in the last revision 
of the Constitution, the government proposed the revision of article 104897 of the 
                                                 
895 Adam Smith (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book Five 
Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth. CHAPTER II Of the Sources of the General or 
Public Revenue of the Society  PART 2, Of Taxes, available at: http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-
b5-c2-pt-2.htm, date of access: 07.01.2010. 
896 Article 23.4 reads as follows: “It shall be possible, where appropriate, for public authorities or 
private persons adversely affected to issue legal proceedings against public officials in their personal 
capacity”. Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/administrative_law_and_justice/Texts_&_Docu
ments/Conv_Rec_Res/Rec(2007)7_en.pdf, date of access: 07.03.2010. 
897 Explanatory Report on the proposal of New Democracy (party of the Majority) for the revision of 
provisions of the Constitution, May 11th, 2006 
available at: http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/nomosxedia/EisigisiEpitropon/g-anasy-eis.pdf, date of 
access: 07.01.2010. 
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constitution. The proposal provided for the obligation of civil servants to serve 
citizens efficiently and effectively, whereas they would be personally responsible for 
any damages resulting from their wrongful acts that may cause damages to the public 
property. It is obvious that strained public budgets in most countries nowadays, apart 
from deterrence, may play a crucial role in the formulation of relevant policies. The 
revision of the article was not approved, and the MPs wrongfully argued that it was 
redundant since the direct civil responsibility of civil servants was provided for in 
article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Greek Civil Code898. Yet, as we have 
already mentioned earlier on, the system of vicarious liability of the administration899 
was introduced in the Civil Servants’ Code in 1951, and thus the second verse of 
article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Greek Civil Code was amended.   
 
Greece: a consolidated democracy or a polity traumatised by immunity 
arrangements beyond “the degree necessary in a democratic society?900” 
 
Since the end of the Civil War and until the restoration of democracy in Greece in 
1974, the country suffered under authoritarian regimes that had restricted political, 
civil and social rights. In the economic sphere, the country did not follow the West-
European paradigm of the accumulation of capital through competition in the market 
place. Instead, political patrons granted loans to industrials on a clientelistic basis. The 
post-authoritarian period is characterised by reforms and significant progress in the 
citizens’ rights as a result of democratisation and European integration. Nevertheless, 
state bureaucracy is “highly inefficient and corrupt”. (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 
2004). A form of bureaucratic clientelism was developed901 (Lyrintzis, 1984). The 
economy is not export-oriented, and business activity aims at gaining public contracts. 
This struggle for the control of public works interferes with parliamentary operation, 
thus weakening its autonomy (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2004).  Unfortunately, 
Europanization has not yet eliminated tiers mondiste aspects of the political, 
administrative and, economic spheres. It is not a coincidence that Greeks agree that 
corruption is a national problem902. The country seems to have been trapped in a 
                                                 
898 Minutes of the Committee on the Revision of the Constitution, April 2, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/praktika/pdf/essyn02042008.pdf,  date of access: 08.01.2010. 
899 The concern that injured parties could not practically get compensation directly from public servants 
for any illegal acts or omissions committed in the discharge of their duties led to the regime of 
vicarious liability. As Odegard  (1954) states: “The theory that a public officer was individually 
responsible for damages resulting from his wrongful acts may have helped to inspire caution and 
respect for the rights of others, but it was cold comfort to those actually damaged to know that their 
only redress was a damage suit against impecunious bureaucrats”.  
900 The part of the sentence in quotation marks is a citation from Principle 6 of Resolution (97)24 of the 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight Against 
Corruption: ‘to limit immunity from investigation, prosecution or adjudication of corruption offences to 
the degree necessary in a democratic society”. Available at: 
http://www.anticorruzione.it/Portals/altocommissario/Documents/Atti%20internazionali/risoluzione%2
0(97)%2024%20COE.pdf, date of access: 08.01.2010. 
901 Mouzelis and Pagoulatos state that: “It is not surprising, therefore, that informal, quasi-clandestine 
networks of clients, state bureaucrats and politicians came to permeate the social pyramide from top to 
bottom, undermining the universalism upon which the rule of law is premised. All this took place at the 
expense of citizens unable or unwilling to become involved in such dealings” (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 
2004).  
902  Full Report Special Eurobarometer, “Attitudes of Europeans towards Corruption”, Fieldwork: 
September-November 2009, Publication: November 2009.  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_325_en.pdf, date of access: 
08.01.2010. In Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, it is stated that: “Greece 
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constant transitional phase, and its authoritarian past indirectly survives through the 
extension of immunity arrangements in the last decade.  
 
The legal liability of Ministers connected with the performance of their duties as 
provided for in article 86 of the revised Constitution in 2001 and its executive law 
3126/2003903, still provokes severe criticism904. The legislative framework appears to 
be extremely protective for multiple reasons: the procedure for the prosecution is 
complex and cumbersome; the treatment of the accomplices is discriminatory; the 
establishment of a short statute of limitations period (five years from the commitment 
of the offence) that violates article 29 of the United Nations Convention against 
                                                                                                                                            
which registered a substantial drop in score from 4.7 in 2008 to 3.8 this year, is a particularly 
concerning case. The 2009 score reflects insufficient levels of anti-corruption enforcement, lengthy 
delays in the judicial process and a string of corporate corruption scandals which point to systemic 
weaknesses. Greece’s poor score shows that joining the EU does not automatically translate into a 
reduction in corruption. Immediate and sustained efforts are required to ensure the country lives up to 
acceptable levels of transparency and accountability. 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/regional_highlights, date of 
access: 08.01.2010. 
903 “The legal liability of Ministers is established in Article 86 of the Constitution, as well as, in Law 
3126 of 19.3.2003 which specifies the content of this constitutional provision. The law makes a 
distinction between offences – misdemeanours and felonies - committed by the Ministers or Deputy 
Ministers during the exercise of their duties and offences committed outside the exercise of their duties. 
The former are tried, following the proceedings established in Article 86 of the Constitution, by a 
special court (even if such Minister has no longer this capacity), while the latter by competent courts, 
pursuant to the provisions of the law 3126/2003. By virtue of that law, preliminary investigation, 
pressing of criminal charges, preliminary examination or examination against a Minister for punishable 
acts, shall not be carried out without the previous resolution by the Plenary Session of the Parliament. 
If, during, another administrative investigation , preliminary investigation, preliminary examination, or 
examination, evidence arises, which relates to punishable acts as mentioned above, the same shall be 
promptly forwarded to the Parliament by the person who conducts the investigation, preliminary 
examination or examination. In no case the person conducting the investigation or examination may 
evaluate the evidence related to possible Ministers’ criminal liability. The criminal proceedings shall be 
instituted as long as it is requested in writing by at least thirty (30) members of the Parliament. The 
Parliament, shall, by a resolution passed by the absolute majority of all its members, form a special 
parliamentary committee, to conduct a preliminary investigation, with all powers of a Public Prosecutor 
of the First Instance Court. It establishes a motion for the pressing of criminal charges or not. The 
resolution of the Parliament in Plenary Session on whether to press criminal charges or not shall be 
passed by the absolute majority of all members of Parliament. If the Plenary Session of the Parliament 
rejects the motion for the pressing of criminal charges as obviously unfounded, any further motion 
concerning the same persons and the same acts shall in all cases be inadmissible, even if it has a 
different legal characterization” (excerpt from: GRECO, First Evaluation Round, Compliance Report 
on Greece, adopted by GRECO at its 21st Plenary Meeting, Strasbourg, 29 November – 2 December 
2004) Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/GrecoRC1(2004)2_Greece_EN.pdf, 
date of access: 08.01.2010. 
904 Transparency International Greece addressed six proposals to the Greek parties before the general 
elections of October 4th 2009. The second proposal referred to Ministers’ responsibility and the 
necessity to extend the period of the statute of limitations. It recommended that it should be equated to 
that provided for in common penal law. The new law 3961/2011 on Ministers’ responsibility, 
promulgated after the outbreak of the Greek debt crisis, settled the issue by abolishing the period of 
limitation. However, the amended clause is irrelevant since the period of limitation provided for in 
article 86, par. 2 for the initiation of criminal prosecution remains valid. More specifically, article 86, 
par. 2 and 3 of the Constitution provides that “The Parliament may exercise its competence pursuant to 
paragraph 1 until the end of the second regular session of the parliamentary term commencing after 
the offence was committed. The Parliament may at any time revoke its resolution or suspend the 
prosecution, preliminary proceedings or main proceedings, according to the procedure and majority 
provided in the first section of this paragraph”.  
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Corruption (Resolution 58/4/31.10.2003) ratified by law 3666/2008905; the Parliament 
may at any time revoke its resolution. GRECO in its Compliance Report on Greece in 
2003 pinpointed the cumbersome procedure even in cases of preliminary 
investigation, and recommended amendments recognising though that the initiation of 
such procedures could not be made before 2006 due to constitutional obstacles. 
Interestingly enough, no relevant proposals had been made during the constitutional 
revision of 2006. Moreover, the proposed amendments regarding issues on the MPs’ 
immunity had been rejected by the Parliament during the constitutional revisions of 
2001 and 2006. Yet, such legal arrangements might raise doubts over the transparency 
and accountability of the political system906.  
 
But despite criticism, immunity arrangements have spread to public services or public 
collective bodies beyond suspicion. More specifically, according to paragraph 6 of 
article 1 of law 3207/2003 “Regulation of issues regarding the Ministry of Culture and 
other provisions”, the clauses of the second and third verse of the second paragraph of 
article 1 of law 3094/2003, that is, those relating to the immunity of the Greek 
Ombudsman and his deputies, apply to the President and the members of the advisory 
boards of articles 49, 50 and 51 of law 3028/2002. These collective bodies are the 
Local Councils of Monuments, the Central Council of Recent Monuments, and the 
Council of Museums. Neither the Explanatory report of the draft law, nor the 
scientific report of Parliament gives reasons for the necessity of the measure. A 
second case refers to article 18 of law 3728/2008 “Service of Market Supervision and 
other provisions”. According to this article, the Special Secretary and the staff of the 
service are not prosecuted and sued for any opinion expressed in the discharge of their 
duties, unless they acted intentionally or violated the secrecy of the information that 
came to their knowledge in the performance of their duties. The Economic and Social 
                                                 
905 According to Article 29 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption: “Each State shall, 
where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of limitations period in which to 
commence proceedings for any offence established in accordance with this Convention and establish a 
longer statute of limitations period or provide for the suspension of the statute of limitations where the 
alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice”.  
906 During the period 1974-2005 Parliament received 808 requests for the waiver of parliamentary 
immunity. However, only five deputies have had their immunity waived (Source: “To Vima” 
Newspaper, 19.06.2005) available at: 
http://www.tovima.gr/default.asp?pid=2&ct=32&artid=166769&dt=19/06/2005). This extremely low 
ratio of immunity waivers suggests that peer solidarity is rather strong, and the MPs show reluctance to 
expose their colleagues to the law. The European Court of Human Rights, consistent with its 
jurisprudence in the cases of Cordova v. Italy 30.01.2003 and DeJorio v. Italie 3.6.2004, convicted 
twice Greece in the cases Tsalkitzis v. Greece (16.11.2006) and Syngelidis v. Greece (11.02.2010). The 
Court held that the negation of waiving the immunity of deputies for offences that are not related to the 
performance of parliamentary duties in the strict sense, deprives plaintiffs-citizens of the right of access 
to justice, thus violating Article 6 par. 1 (right to a court) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Available at: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Tsalkitzis
%20%7C%20Greece%20%7C%2011801/04&sessionid=44469450&skin=hudoc-en, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Syngelidis
%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20Greece&sessionid=89497970&skin=hudoc-en, date of access: 14.4.2010. 
The last conviction seems to have provoked the amendment of articles 83 par. 3 and 4 of the Standing 
Orders of Parliament in 2010 (Government Gazette, vol. A, no 139, 10.08.2010). According to the new 
regulation, the Parliament’s Ethics Committee should investigate whether the act against which 
immunity is requested to be lifted is clearly connected with the MP’s political or parliamentary activity 
or whether the prosecution, lawsuit, or accusation conceal political objectives, otherwise it should 
recommend the waiver of the immunity. The report of the Committee should be justified.  
 322
Committee907 in its opinion on the draft law considered the measure to be excessive, 
and suggested the withdrawal of the clause.  
 
Two legislative attempts to establish immunity regimes failed. First, the draft law on 
“Inspector General of Public Administration, upgrade of the Corps of Public 
Administration Inspectors-Controllers and of the Coordinating organ of Inspection 
and Control” included a clause to extend the Greek Ombudsman’s immunity to the 
Public Administration Inspector General. The scientific report of Parliament 
expressed reservations908. It stressed that the content and the legal form of the 
competences of the Inspector General differed from those of the Greek Ombudsman –
the latter issues non-binding decisions- , and suggested that more offences should be 
included in the clause or that the proposed regulation should be further justified. 
Second, the Minister of Development in an irrelevant draft law on the “Promotion of 
the coproduction of two or more useful forms of energy; Regulation of issues 
regarding the Hydroelectric Works of Mesochora and other provisions” that was 
submitted to Parliament on November 21st 2008, attempted to pass an amendment 
regarding the immunity of the President, the members, and the staff of the Hellenic 
Competition Commission. The amendment provided that the said persons were not 
criminally or civilly responsible for their acts or omissions in the discharge of their 
duties, unless they acted intentionally909. The amendment was finally withdrawn.  
 
Phenomena of extending immunity provisions or failed legislative initiatives to do so, 
beyond “the degree necessary in a democratic society” traumatise the polity, and 
remind people of the authoritarian practices of the past. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
907 “The only formal consultative mechanism is the tripartite Economic and Social Committee (ESC). It 
was formed in 1994 to represent interest groups in Greece: employers and businessmen as one group; 
employees and civil servants as another; and citizens, local authorities, independent professions as the 
third. The separate views of each of these three groups are given equal treatment and are all distinct 
from State power. The role of the ESC is to promote “social dialogue” through the formation of 
common positions on issues concerning society as a whole. The ESC expresses a reasoned opinion on 
important issues related to labour relations, social security, taxation measures, and matters of socio-
economic policy in general. The procedure involves the competent ministry requesting the opinion of 
the Committee. The committee issues its view within 30 days. The ESC reviews all “important” 
regulations, but the criteria for an important law are unclear, and the Council has no enforcement 
powers. As a result ministers choose when they want to consult the ESC and if they wish to accept its 
opinion”. Excerpt from: OECD (2001), Government capacity to assure high quality regulation in 
Greece, p. 24-25, Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/36/2475366.pdf, date of access: 
08.01.2010. 
908 Scientific Report on the draft law “Public Administration Inspector General, upgrade of the Corps of 
Public Administration Inspectors-Controllers and of the Coordinating organ of Inspection and Control”, 
October 29th, 2002. Available at: 
http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/nomosxedia/EkthesiEpistimonikis/G-EPIELE-EPIS.pdf, date of 
access: 08.01.2010. 
909 Source: Newspaper, To paron tis Kyriakis, article entitled “Stop” to the immunity of the 
Competition Commission” dated 18-01-2009 , available at: 
http://www.paron.gr/v3/new.php?id=36885&colid=&catid=27&dt=2009-01-18%200:0:0; Other 
Information available at Websites: http://www.stopcartel.gr , 
http://www.capital.gr/news.asp?id=632520, date of access: 08.01.2010. 
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Conclusion 
 
The rationale for the establishment of independent administrative authorities 
regulating government is based upon the necessity to create a barrier against the 
erosion of individual constitutional rights by the modern administrative state. The 
protection of these fundamental human rights, as prescribed in national legislation or 
ratified international conventions, is entrusted to experts that “are required to be 
cognizant of constitutional and judicial values”910 in the discharge of their regulatory 
functions. Their main concern should be neutrality towards public administration, and 
their legal responsibility guarantees that citizens will have the right to control it. 
These high-ranking public functionaries enjoy personal and functional independence 
as prescribed in the agencies’ constitutive acts in order to ensure their separateness 
from the political system, thus representing a depoliticised mechanism. However, the 
concept of independence is not a synonym for irresponsibility. Immunity 
arrangements, contrary to what is often argued, do not promote independence from 
the political decision-makers, namely, the alter ego of public administration.  
It is no coincidence that the introduction of such provisions for the members of the 
five constitutional independent authorities provoked tremendous reaction on the part 
of the Union of Greek Prosecutors and scepticism on the part of a number of MPs 
when the draft laws were discussed in Parliament. One major criticism concerned the 
constitutionality of the provisions. Not only do they contravene the principle of 
equality before the law (article 4 of the Constitution), but they also prevent citizens 
from their constitutional right of judicial protection against these high-ranking public 
functionaries. Thus, the principle of proportionality is violated (articles 20 and 25 of 
the Constitution) since no mechanism is foreseen for the waiver of their immunity. 
Furthermore, they restrict the right of access to court under article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Criticism also dealt with the issue of integrity. 
Providing immunity assumes that a certain category of people is just and unwilling to 
harm others. Plato in his Republic states: “And this we may truly affirm to be a great 
proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to 
him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be 
unjust, there he is unjust”911. 
 
The survival and function of governments throughout space and time have been 
entrusted to bureaucracies. Yet government has to be both effective and democratic. 
Enforcing responsibility upon the bureaucracy is a means to counterbalance the abuse 
of power which sooner or later might appear when external punitive controls are 
lacking. In a polity in which the people are sovereign, popular control over 
administrative action guarantees the implementation of public policies as prescribed 
in law. Since a significant part of the decision-making process has been transferred to 
non-majoritarian institutions, those at the top of their hierarchies should be held 
responsible for their actions, in the same way as Isocrates argues in his Areopagiticus 
for those at the top of public affairs: “26…In short, they had made up their minds that 
                                                 
910 David Rosenbloom, (1987), Public Administrators’ Liability: Bench v. Bureau in the Contemporary 
Administrative State”, Public Affairs Quarterly, Winter, p. 382.  
911 Plato, The Republic, Book II, translated by B. Jowett, available at: www.sharebooks.ca, date of 
access: 08.01.2010. 
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the people, like an absolute master, ought to control the public offices, punish 
offenders and settle disputed points, and that those who were able to enjoy ease and 
possessed sufficient means should attend to public affairs like servants and, 27. if they 
acted justly, should be praised and rest contented with this recognition of their 
services, while, if they managed affairs badly, they should meet with no mercy, but 
should be visited with the severest penalties. And how would it be possible to find a 
democracy more just or more secure than one which set the most influential citizens 
at the head of public affairs and at the same time invested the people with sovereign 
control over these same officials?912” 
Immunity arrangements represent an anachronistic practice in democratic societies 
that strive for transparency and accountability. The legal responsibility of those 
handling delicate human rights issues against their violation by public administration 
is an indispensable part of the battle to strengthen democracy and enhance public trust 
in the institutions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
912 Isocrates, Areopagiticus, The J. A. Freese Translation, available at: 
http://fxylib.znufe.edu.cn/wgfljd/%B9%C5%B5%E4%D0%DE%B4%C7%D1%A7/pw/isocrates/pwiso
c7.htm, date of access: 08.01.2010. 
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CΟNCLUSION 
 
Summarizing the main findings derived from the autonomous study of the dyads  
 
The structure of the dissertation corresponds to a tetralogy. In each chapter there has 
been an attempt to grasp and reconstruct diachronically institutional aspects and 
empirical evidence of the reality of the Greek constitutional independent authorities as 
determined by the four principal-agent dyadic presentations. Each dyad had its own 
autonomous story to tell with respect to the degree of the de facto independence of the 
constitutional independent authorities from their regulatees-public administration. 
This relationship was assessed qualitatively through the construction of a chain of 
principal-agent relationships in regulation inside government, whereas aspects of their 
formal independence were simultaneously challenged and renegotiated. The research 
extends chronologically from the establishment of each one of the constitutional 
independent authorities to December 31, 2010. The end of the research incidentally 
coincided with the beginning of the Greek crisis that will inevitably affect and 
transform these authorities in new ways in the future. Therefore, a new updating and 
time-comparative study would be of interest in a few years. 
 
The Constitution of 2001 vested the independent authorities under study with the 
constitutional guarantee of independence in order to protect citizens against the 
encroachment of their constitutional-human rights by the state. As state interests 
become the field of regulation, the human rights regulators have the mission to limit 
and prevent any action facilitating the development of forms of authoritative state 
behaviour with respect to the constitutional-human rights under protection. Each one 
of the principal-agent dyads facilitated the assessment of the regulators’ levels of 
commitment to their mission, that is, their degree of resistance towards their 
regulatees. The low levels of certain aspects of the formal independence coinciding 
with the first, second, and fourth dyadic presentations, seem to undermine and 
annihilate the concept of formal independence itself, and thus negatively impact on 
the facto independence from the political decision-makers-regulatees. 
 
The theoretical part of the first dyad, that is, the members’ selection mechanisms, 
viewed and analysed from a formalistic perspective, led to the conclusion that the 
appointments clauses diachronically proved to be unconstitutional and non 
transparent. The final adoption of the legislative prerogative in the selection 
mechanism, as dictated by the functionalist argumentation infiltrated in the relevant 
commitments to International Governmental Organisations, the relevant 
jurisprudence, and the predominant legal scholars’ views, seems to unjustifiably 
facilitate the aggrandizement of the legislative branch of government. On the other 
hand, consensual practices leading to unanimous decisions create collusion and an 
unorthodox collective responsibility imposed on the entire political system, a process 
which is inherently incompatible with the democratic values and principles. The 
empirical part of the dyad revealed signs of party representativeness in the 
composition of the authorities. But even if we accept the widespread view expressed 
by the political decision-makers and theorists that a member’s party affiliation is not 
synonymous with party representation in the authorities, the members’ high levels of 
involvement in public life prove the existence of a system-friendly elite. These 
findings, that is, strong involvement in public life, are similar to those of Thatcher’s 
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(2005), albeit differently interpreted. In other words, scholars may differ in their 
evaluation over the role of experts as independent players in the regulatory state. 
 
The internal hierarchical relationship, that is, the members’ autonomy in the selection 
of the administrative and scientific personnel of the authorities, seems to have equally 
failed in many respects. First, the institutional design of the selection mechanisms 
gave priority to secondments and transfers, that is, a clientelistic mechanism, instead 
of direct hirings in the case of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel and 
the Greek Ombudsman, thus ending up to a low relational distance between regulator 
and regulatee. Second, flawed selection clauses seem to have also served clientelistic 
purposes, thus testing the legality of the members’ administrative action in the case of 
the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. Third, the selection processes 
either in cases of transfers and secondments or in cases of direct hirings are not 
systematized and transparent compared to the guarantees offered by the general 
recruitment system in the public sector. Fourth, secondary education graduates are 
unjustifiably high within the category of the administrative personnel, whereas the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel operated for fourteen years with no 
scientific personnel. The cases of university graduates filling positions of the 
scientific personnel of the Greek Ombudsman probably reduce the effectiveness of 
organizations based on expertise. Fifth, the significant number of negation of 
appointments and resignations on the part of the scientific personnel probably lead to 
the conclusion that the independent authorities are not highly esteemed with respect to 
the mode of their operation as well as the career perspectives they offer. And sixth, 
the members of the scientific personnel present significant involvement in public life, 
whereas the cases of secondments of the scientific personnel of the Greek 
Ombudsman to political posts reduce the credibility of the institution. 
 
The external at arm’s-length relationship sought to identify cases of regulatory failure 
through the implementation of different approaches and tools for each authority. It is 
far from clear that in the cases under study the regulator failed to serve the public 
interest, thus safeguarding the regulatees’ interests. Under such circumstances, the 
regulator operates in a discrete, probably misleading manner in the struggle not to 
exceed the limits of what would be tolerable and acceptable by the regulatees in their 
double role. Beyond recourse to courts, the citizens’ lack of intervention in order to 
control and preventively block regulatory capture through the members’ legal 
responsibility is represented and analysed in the external accountability relationship. 
The adoption of immunity provisions for the members of the constitutional 
independent authorities might predispose future regulatory action in a rather 
regulatee-friendly manner contrary to the views supporting the guarantees of integrity 
offered by such arrangements. Therefore, the human rights paradox created 
traumatizes the democratic order and, consequently the citizens’ trust in government.  
 
The interaction of the dyads 
 
Beyond the main findings derived from the autonomous study of the dyads, this 
concluding section rather seeks to approach the issue of the interaction of the dyads 
with respect to the regulators’ de facto independence from their regulatees-public 
administration. In other words, there will be an attempt to achieve an overview aiming 
to assess whether one dyad affects the other, thus detaching it from its previous 
autonomous situation. However, the role of the first dyad is considered as crucial both 
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theoretically-institutionally and empirically since it could be imaged as the first tile of 
a domino game that may inevitably carry with it the rest of the tiles. The delegatory 
relationship between the principals-political decision-makers in a double role and 
their agents-regulators is theoretically challenged in formalistic terms. In other words, 
the legislature’s exclusive appointive power is considered as unconstitutional, thus 
violating the orthodoxy of the separation of powers as arranged and perceived in the 
Greek constitutional tradition. As a result, a directorial system co-exists with the 
official majoritarian system. Thus, the legislative aggrandizes and encroaches on the 
power of the executive without leaving space for the necessary democratic control 
incarnated through the mechanisms of the opposition and parliamentary review. On 
the other hand, the delegation of the members’ selection mechanism to the 
parliamentary organ of the Conference of Presidents equally raises concerns over its 
constitutionality, parliamentary representativeness, and transparency. Under such 
circumstances, these authorities remain unchecked, and simultaneously are under 
hostage to the whole political system.  
 
In our opinion, if formalistic terms are applied, legislative appointment does not 
guarantee a high degree of de facto independence of the independent authorities from 
the political decision-makers-public administration; quite the contrary. Indeed, the 
empirical part of the delegatory relationship proved our point. However, the Greek 
scholars and jurisprudence, MPs in discussions in Parliament, as well as relevant texts 
relating to commitments to International Governmental Organisations apply a purely 
functionalist approach based on the concepts of consensus and popular sovereignty 
considered as virtues encompassed in the nature of the legislature. According to these 
views, the (formal) independence of the independent authorities from the executive, 
that is, the political decision-makers, is guaranteed through the exclusive legislative 
appointive power by a qualified majority of votes. However, the pillar concepts -
consensus and popular sovereignty- seem tricky. As Busino (1987) states in relation to 
popular sovereignty: 
 
In order to acquire support on solid bases, it is necessary for power to 
dispose of a very sound judicial and moral infrastructure, an 
ideological and administrative apparatus, in other words, a political 
pattern able to firmly maintain the various components of society. 
Today society is engendered in the abstract and tricky principle of 
popular sovereignty913. 
 
On the other hand, the concept of consensus as pattern of democracy was coined by 
Sir Arthur Lewis, an economist rather than a political scientist. Lijphart (1999), a 
supporter of consensus democracy, describes the differences between the majoritarian 
and consensus models of democracy as follows:  
 
A closely related difference is that the majoritarian model of 
democracy is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the 
consensual model is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining and 
compromise.  
 
                                                 
913 The abstract was translated from French by the author. 
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However, Follesdal and Hix (2006) insist on the guarantees offered by the 
majoritarian model, that is, the traditional indispensable democratic aspects of the 
opposition and governmental responsibility914.  
 
The commitments to International Governmental Organisations brought about radical 
changes in the appointments clauses of the constitutions of their member states that 
inevitably distorted the political system, that is, the majoritarian model previously 
reserving the absolute appointive power to the executive. On the contrary, the U.S. 
still remains faithful to its own constitutional checks and balances orthodoxy. 
However, were such consensual practices as dictated by the appointments clauses 
unknown to Greek politics? In 1988 Greece was considered “after New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom, the closest approximation of the majoritarian model” the most 
eccentric case among the four Southern European democracies (Lijphart et al., 1988). 
Nevertheless, a closer look at the Greek case shows that the majoritarian model of 
democracy had already started being transformed into a consensual type of 
governance through institutional interventions that remain unobservable, if we restrict 
ourselves to the study of Lijphart’s characteristics contained in his two-dimensional 
classification of democracies. This rise of consensual democracy, prevailing in most 
of the western democracies, could be also associated with a new model of party 
organization, the cartel-party model coined by Katz and Mair in 1995. According to 
the cartel party thesis “colluding parties become agents of the state, and employ the 
resources of the state (the party state) to ensure their own collective survival915 (Katz 
and Mair, 1995). 
 
In the Greek case we do not apply the concept of consensual governance in terms of 
the formation of coalition governments as is the case with other western democracies. 
We rather describe a grid of scattered provisions in legislation revealing a world full 
of bargaining practices embracing all the political parties represented in parliament 
that proceed to decision-making on crucial issues. Another version of negotiation 
corresponds to the participation of employees, that is, trade-unionists representing the 
established political parties, to the management boards of public enterprises, public 
insurance funds, universities (students instead of employees) etc. Likewise, 
arrangements where parliamentary interparty committees interfere with the selection 
                                                 
914 Follesdal and Hix (2006) state: “For example, an essential feature of the practice of democracy is an 
institutional design that allows for an “opposition” to the current leadership elites and policy status 
quos (Dahl, 1971). Providing incentives and arenas for oppositions to organize and articulate their 
positions is important to ensure that citizens understand differences between the present government 
and the (democratic) political order (Spapiro, 1996). If citizens cannot identify alternative leaders or 
policy agendas, it is difficult for them to determine whether leaders could have done better or to 
identify who is responsible for policies. Active opposition parties in parliament with many affected 
parties represented, and media scrutiny, are crucial for such fact-finding, attention and assessments. 
These benefits require freedom of association and information, and real opportunity spaces for 
formulation and contestation of the agenda and policy choices”. 
915 Hopkins (2003) also states: “At the same time as such limits to growth are reached, and parties agree 
to agree on the most important questions of economic governance, the organizational evolution of 
parties has made them increasingly vulnerable to voter backlash. Their memberships, disillusioned by 
the deideologization of party politics implicit in the cartelization strategy, cease to sustain party 
organizations with their activism and financial contributions . . .Cartel parties depend on state 
subventions to meet their organizational and campaigning costs, at the same time as their electorates 
are being sold the message of austerity. Worse, in some cases state subsidies are insufficient, and 
parties use their control over political decisions to raise money corruptly, further alienating their 
supporters”. 
 329
of the heads of public enterprises, banks, etc or judges are equally considered to be 
consensual. Within this framework, the executive and public servants, as its 
implementing branch, are put aside, and representatives of the political parties or 
parliamentary interparty committees participate in a negotiating game where political 
responsibility remains unclear. Moreover, the constitutionality of such arrangements 
is dubious. Thus, a form of para-governmental loci was created.  
 
Greece’s experiment with coalition governments in 1989-1990916 may be considered 
as the visible starting point for the institutional spread of consensual practices in 
Greek politics. Interpretations and evaluations on its significance for strengthening 
democracy differ. Political scientists (Pridham and Verney, 1991) at the time felt 
optimistic stating: 
 
The perspective of democratic consolidation requires a longer view of 
developments and that everyday politics be placed in a broad context. 
The inclusion of Synaspismos, and particularly the KKE917, in the 
1989-90 coalitions was certainly symbolic as an historical departure. 
Also, despite long-standing fears about its role, this experience hardly 
proved a threat to the system, and that in itself was an important lesson. 
It is likely to have reinforced the Left’s greater system-supportiveness, 
already evident before these coalitions. And, not to be forgotten, these 
coalitions created an undeniable precedent for better relations between 
the parties in the future and certainly for less stereotyped behaviour 
between Left and Right in Greek politics. . . Thus, while any 
conclusions must be tentative, it seems that the long-term effects of the 
1988-89 crisis and the coalition governments it produced will have 
been positive for the Greek democratic system. 
 
On the other hand, journalistic sources offer a look into the dark side of the coalition 
experiment. The following abstract from the newspaper article entitled “The 
nightmare of the ecumenical government of ’90918” gives a cynical interpretation on 
the issue. 
 
Some still argue that the ecumenical government was formed so that no 
party takes responsibility for the digital benefits of the Greek 
Telecommunications Organisation (OTE) procured by the state from 
the consortium Intracom919-Siemens920. . .The ecumenical government 
was dissolved on February 13, 1990, when Mr. Mitsotakis921 estimated 
that from that moment he could confidently assert power, since in the 
                                                 
916 See for details in Chapter 1, part 1.  
917 The Communist Party of Creece. 
918 This article written by Vassilis Chiotis, dated 14.11.2010 is available at the website of the 
newspaper “To Vima”, http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=366990, date of access: 15.11.2010. 
919 According to the Official Website of the Intracom Holdings it is “one of the largest multinational 
technology groups in Greece. The Group's main activities are: Telecommunications solutions and 
products; Defense Electronics Systems; e-Government projects and IT systems for Public 
Administration, Financial Institutions, Banks and Large Enterprises; Telephony and Broadband 
Telecommunications Service provision; and Construction”. Available at: 
http://www.intracom.gr/intracom_holdings/en/company/profile/intracom_holdings_glance.htm, date of 
access: 27.02.2012. 
920 Siemens is a German multinational. It is the largest Europe-based electronics and electrical 
engineering company. 
921 Leader of the right wing party of New Democracy. 
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meantime the Electoral Act was amended by the famous clause "plus 
one". The pretext for the dissolution of Parliament came from the 
disagreement that arose between the political leaders in relation to the 
selection of the new leadership of the Armed Forces. In effect, all the 
political parties admitted that coalition governments can not operate in 
Greece. Recently, the then Deputy Minister of Transport and 
Communications, Mr. I. Kefaloyiannis922, revealed that the Zolotas’s 
government923 was overthrown when the supply of 470,000 digital 
benefits of OTE from Siemens and Intracom was ensured. Despite the 
fact that the procurement had been blocked by prosecutorial order in 
the spring of 1989, the Cabinet decided not to carry out a new 
competition but instead to proceed to a direct award by privately 
negotiated procedure, thus cancelling another decision which had been 
taken by the Cabinet a few days ago! "I announced to Gennimatas924 
that I will resign, but Mitsotakis asked me not to announce my 
resignation because he wanted to settle a serious issue” claims Mr. 
Kefaloyiannis. "If the people knew that the resignation of the 
government took place because of the fact that the three political 
leaders intervened in the issue of the supply of the digital material of 
OTE, it would have been a slap in the face for the political system. 
Unfortunately, then began the big interweaving of the political system, 
which is maintained until today" declares the then Deputy Minister of 
Transport”. 
 
Unfortunately, the Greek crisis that started in 2009 did not confirm the political 
scientists’ optimistic prediction of further democratic consolidation. Some indicative 
cases of strengthening consensual practices in key state affairs are presented hereafter. 
Article 16, par. 2, of the law 1388/1983, establishing the National School of Public 
Administration in 1983, provides that, among other appointees, all the political parties 
represented in parliament directly appoint their representatives with their alternates to 
the Central Examination Committee competent for the entry examination. In 1995 the 
government of PASOK passed the law 2286/1995 providing for the participation of 
representatives of the political parties925 recognized in parliament in the Committee 
for the procurements of goods of important financial or technological value. The MPs 
of the major opposition, the party of New Democracy, and the party of the minor 
opposition, Political Spring, expressed their deep satisfaction for the measure. An 
abstract from the speech of the MP of New Democracy, Anastassios Krikelis, during 
discussions in parliament on the draft law “Public sector procurements and regulations 
on relevant issues926” is presented hereafter.  
 
Only one positive point do I find in the present draft law; it is 
commendable and I should praise it. I mean the fact that the Minister 
accepted that there will be a provision according to which 
representatives of the parties will also participate in the committee for 
important procurements as it is called. He should be praised for this. 
This provision is indeed innovative. Not because in the specific case it 
                                                 
922 MP of the right wing party of New Democracy. 
923 Xenophon Zolotas was the Prime Minister of the Ecumenical Government. 
924 Minister of National Economy from the Party of PASOK.  
925 The representatives with their alternates are directly appointed by the respective political parties. 
926 Minutes of Parliament on the draft law “Public sector procurements and regulations on relevant 
issues”, 8th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), Second Assembly, Plenary Session 52, 
January 9, 1995.  
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will be of significance, however it establishes another rule, that is, to 
understand from now on that in all the important organizations and 
committees should also participate representatives of the political 
parties. Thus, no opposition will appear after three or four years saying 
that you destroyed Olympic Airways and created a debt of 700 billion. 
Therefore, we should all participate, us and you, Mr Korakas, so that 
we should all share responsibility and monitor the progress. . .  
Stratis Korakis (MP of the Communist Party of Greece) replied: “Just 
think and I had the impression that this was all about safeguarding 
transparency!” 
Anastassios Krikelis replied: “Please, Mr Korakas. The government 
will have, of course, the majority and will implement its programme, 
but the parties will also share responsibility in order to prevent and 
avoid coming back afterwards and judge and criticize and then claim 
that “we found “burnt land”. Therefore, it is positive as an action, and I 
expect to see this in other essential draft laws. Since – I repeat- we 
should all participate in the management boards in order to make 
something better for this Place. No more hypocrisy. Thank you. 
 
The speech is indicative of the purpose and inevitable results of consensus: collusion, 
lack of opposition and control, that is, sharing responsibility through complicity. And 
this lack of mechanisms of control and opposition -concepts inherent in democracy- 
substituted for a consensual style of governance contaminating the institutions (justice 
and public administration) might have probably facilitated and partly explains the 
Greek crisis in political terms. 
 
In 1997, the ministerial decision no 15629 of the Deputy Minister of Culture927 
regarding the members constituting the Central Organizational Committee for the 
conduct of the World Championships in Athletics-Athens 1997 contained also the 
names of the representatives of the political parties represented in Parliament. 
Following article 4 of the law 2435/1996, the Committee was a private law legal 
entity, whereas the audit of its expenses would be carried out by independent auditors 
and inspectors of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The budget and its management 
raised questions. According to an article posted on the electronic edition “Sports of 
the North928”, in the summer of 1996 the total budget was 5.18 billion drachmas. In 
June 1997 the budget soared to 9.23 billion drachmas. Eventually the organization 
cost 19 billion drachmas, around 60 million euros to date. In 2002, the First Instance 
Court prosecutor requested an audit in order to ascertain where so much money was 
spent. The result of the inspection was made known in 2007. “Excesses in spending, 
at a rate twice as high as to what had been initially agreed, and a number of supplies 
that did not meet the legal route of settlements" the findings stated, among others. The 
article mentioned that so far, nobody has been held accountable.  
 
The law 3841/2010 introduced consensual practices in relation to the selection of the 
heads of the supreme courts despite the explicit provision of the Constitution that the 
selection mechanism constitutes an executive prerogative. The revised Constitution of 
2001 failed to satisfy the constant demand of the judges for autonomous selection 
                                                 
927 Government Gazette, vol. B, no 459/5.6.1997. 
928 Article entitled “Scandals written on snow” written by Elias Tatalas, dated 07.02.2011, available at: 
http://www.makthes.gr/news/sports/69255/, date of access: 8.2.2012. 
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procedures compatible with the principle of the separation of powers, that is, the 
independence of justice from the other branches of government. The new mechanism 
provides for a pre-selection procedure from the organ of the Conference of  
Presidents. It also comprises hearings of the candidates proposed by the cabinet. The 
parliamentary organ formulates an opinion unanimously or with the qualified majority 
of four-fifths for a part of the proposed candidates. The opinion is not binding for the 
cabinet that takes the final decision. Adonis Georgiadis, MP of the extreme right wing 
party of the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) during discussions in Parliament on the 
relevant draft law929 expressed the view that this new arrangement makes all the 
political parties share responsibility for the selection of the heads of justice, thus 
leading to the full allegiance of the judicial power to the political parties. 
 
These indicative paradigms rather shatter the myth of the majoritarian model of 
democracy in Greece. This long-term familiarity of the political parties with 
consensual practices and jointly decision-making on crucial issues is also reflected in 
the legislative evolution and final convergence of the appointments clauses. As a 
result, once more, the political parties through a small parliamentary organ, imaging 
the core of the political system, share control of the state. Not incidentally, since 2003 
all the decisions of the Conference of Presidents for the selection of the heads and 
members of the independent constitutional authorities have been unanimous930. 
Moreover, empirical evidence confirms unofficial party representativeness in the 
composition of the authorities despite the political decision-makers’ assurances of 
appointing independent personalities931. And even if we accept the view that, despite 
signs of party affiliation, each member expresses its own will and acts led by its 
conscience in the discharge of his/her duties, the evidence of broad and intense 
involvement in public life inevitably proves the existence of a system-dependent elite. 
Busino (1987) aptly decodes the intellectuals’ system-supportive role nowadays932:  
 
The study of the socio-professional categories and mainly the study of 
the mechanisms of reproduction give evidence of the radical 
modifications that have taken place in the diffusion of work and the 
importance of the intellectual functions in this type of context. The role 
                                                 
929 Minutes of Parliament on the draft law “Selection of judicial functionaries to the supreme positions 
of Justice and restoration of the self-governance of courts”, 13th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary 
Democracy), First Assembly, Plenary Session 87, March 18, 2010 (morning), available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a 
09f4c564609d/es20100318(proi).pdf, date of access: 08.02.2012. 
930 As previously stated in the first chapter, the extreme right wing party, the Popular Orthodox Rally 
(LAOS), had disagreed with the procedure followed for the constitution of the independent authorities, 
that is, the National Council for Radio and Television, and the Greek Ombudsman during the session of 
the Conference of Presidents, on February 14, 2008. This could have been simultaneously perceived as 
a sign of discontent and pressure for the imminent nominations for the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority and the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. Indeed, the party of LAOS managed 
to achieve the appointment of the member FP56 to the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. 
He was a member of the party, and parliamentary candidate at the second constituency of Athens in the 
national elections of 2007. 
931 The report of the rapporteur of the party of the majority (PASOK) on the Revision of the 
Constitution of 2001, Evangelos Venizelos, states on the issue: “. . . And third, a special selection 
process of the members constituting the single-headed or collective authority is introduced. This is the 
crosspoint. Because we want to have independent authorities constituted by personalities and not by 
representatives of the political parties, or social groups”. Source: Minutes of Sessions and Report of the 
Committee on the Revision of the Constitution, Seventh Revisional Parliament, Athens 2000, p.650. 
932 The abstract was translated from French by the author. 
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of intellectuals is very important for the reproduction, for the diffusion, 
for the power: the symbolic productions, the predominant ideologies, 
the political ideologies, the diffusion, the popularization, the 
socialization, the integration, the adaption etc are part of the 
intellectual work. This is furthermore confirmed by the qualitative 
development of the intellectual roles in all societies. Could we consider 
intellectuals as the new elites and these elites as a bureaucracy and 
administration? Do we see the advent of “organic” intellectuals, of new 
mandarins, and the decline of the intellectual considered as deviant?”  
 
The internal hierarchical relationship corresponding to the ex ante control mechanism 
of the screening and selection of the administrative and scientific personnel, is 
exclusively delegated to the members of the independent authorities. However, on 
many occasions the political decision-makers-public administration drafted a distorted 
institutional design relating to the recruitment strategies, thus putting the burden of its 
implementation on the members of the authorities. Despite instances of legislative 
manipulation, a term used to describe incompatibilities of the recruitment clauses with 
the constitution, administrative law, and jurisprudence, the principals-members never 
expressed concerns and proceeded to its implementation. As for the recruitment 
strategies, the extensive use of transfers and secondments seem to have served 
clientelistic purposes and inevitably diminish the relational distance between 
regulators and regulatees-public administration. On the other hand, the unjustifiably 
large numbers of secondary education graduates as well as cases of university 
graduates fulfilling positions of the scientific personnel probably reduce the 
effectiveness of organizations based on expertise.  
 
The selection processes, either in cases of transfers and secondments, or direct hiring, 
are not systematized and transparent compared to the guarantees offered by the 
general recruitment system in the public sector. The flaws of the selection processes 
may be resumed as follows:  lack of publication of the public announcements in the 
government gazette; vagueness of the selection criteria permitting great discretion for 
the selection committees; lack of an assessment method attributing credits to the 
typical and substantial qualifications when the selection criteria are clearly defined; 
lack of information to the public on citizens’ constitutional rights, that is, the right of 
petition in public administration (article 10) and information (article 5A), thus 
impeding citizens from exercising their right to appeal, or submit an application for 
remedy; the lack of credits for each one of the selection criteria hinders the 
submission of appeals and impedes their effective assessment even in case they are 
provided for in the public announcement. Under such circumstances, that is, flawed 
institutional design and selection processes, the credibility of the autonomous hiring is 
severely damaged, and the members of the authorities may be considered as carriers 
of the will of the political decision-makers-public administration. Moreover, cases of 
significant involvement in public life on the part of the members of the scientific 
personnel as well as secondments to political positions reveal a communicating 
vessels mechanism.  
 
Not incidentally, the principals-regulators, bound by the limitations of the first and 
second dyads, inevitably exhibit conflict-avoiding tactics, inertia included, towards 
their agents-regulatees in their double role as political decision-makers-public 
administration. Regulatory action, either on own initiative or upon request, gives the 
impression of not exceeding the limits of what would be considered as politically 
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correct and tolerated, thus satisfying the regulatees’ interests as shown by instances of 
regulatory failure. 
 
In the fourth dyad, the intervention of the citizens, as an accountability mechanism, is 
excluded from the chain of regulation inside government through the adoption of 
immunity provisions, an arrangement that could be considered as a sign of 
internationalization of the national bureaucracies. The main functionalist argument for 
the necessity of the measure lies in the assumption that it protects high-ranking public 
functionaries against the political decision-makers, that is, the executive as object of 
regulation. Hence, it follows that the members of the authorities act in an independent 
way without the fear of pressures and interventions since they have no legal 
responsibility in the discharge of their duties. However, beyond the argumentation and 
reservations over the measure expressed in the relevant chapter relating to issues of 
democratic order and the creation of the human rights paradox, the three first dyads 
seem to impact on the fourth dyadic presentation in a way that probably puts into 
question the functionalist approach. Indeed, the empirical evidence, that is, the 
consensual selection procedure safeguarding a joint control of the state by all the 
political parties, the ubiquitous system-supportive elite appointed in these independent 
authorities, the lack of transparency in the personnel’s selection processes, and 
instances of regulatory failure might offer a different insight on the issue. In other 
words, it could be argued that the immunity provisions might serve as a protective net 
against citizens whose human rights might probably be violated by those who are 
supposed to defend them. 
 
A glimpse of the future: The emergence of a new profile for the members of the 
independent authorities? 
The United Kingdom and France were the last bastions of executive prerogative for 
the selection of the heads of their respective Ombudsmen institutions. In the case of 
the French Mediator, renamed as Défenseur des Droits in 2008933, the appointments 
clause follows the U.S. checks and balances paradigm. In June 22, 2011, Dominique 
Baudis934 was appointed Défenseur des Droits by President Sarkozy. The consensual 
                                                 
933 The institution of the Ombudsman, le Défenseur des Droits, was constitutionally consolidated in 
article 71-1 of the revised French Contitution of July 23, 2008. The organic law no 2011-333 and the 
ordinary law no 2011-334 of March 29, 2011 define the activities and powers of the French 
Ombudsman. The selection process provides that the President of the Republic proposes and appoints a 
candidate upon approval by three-fifths of the competent parliamentary committees of both legislative 
chambers.  
934 Dominique Baudis, a graduate of the Paris Institute of Political Studies, started his career as a 
journalist at the Lebanese radio and television. He became a foreign correspondent for TF1 in the 
Middle East (1976-1977) and worked as a news anchor on TF1 (1977-1980), and FR3 (1980-1982).  
Member of the centre right party UDF (Union for a Popular Movement), he was elected Mayor of 
Toulouse in 1983. In 1984, he was elected to the European Parliament, in 1986 he became President of 
the Regional Council of the Midi-Pyrénées, whereas he was elected MP in 1986 representing Haute-
Garonne's 1st constituency. He was re-elected in 1988, 1993 and 1997. Jacques Chirac nominated him 
President of the Conseil Supérieur de l' Audiovisuel (2001-2007), whereas in 2007 he was nominated 
President of the Arab World Institute. In 2009, he was elected to the European Parliament. Source: The 
Official Website of the Défenseur des droits, and Wikipedia, available at : 
http://defenseurdesdroits.fr/sinformer-sur-le-defenseur-des-droits/linstitution/presentation-de-
 335
selection process nominated a political figure for the position. On the contrary, the 
case of the appointment of the new Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman in 
the U.K. in 2011 offers new insights in terms of both the selection process and the 
profile of the appointee.  
The recruitment strategy provided for an open procedure led by the House of 
Commons Service, in collaboration with the Cabinet Office and the Department of 
Health935. The recruitment panel was constituted by the Chair of the Public 
Administration Select Committee, the Permanent Secretary of the Department of 
Health, a university professor, a former Scottish Public Service Ombudsman, and an 
external assessor. The shortlisted candidates participated in psychometric tests, 
interviews, and submitted references. The Prime Minister was notified of the 
recommended candidate by the panel and tabled a motion to allow the House of 
Commons to approve it. Before the final approval by the House of Commons, the 
Public Administration Select Committee held a pre-appointment hearing with the 
preferred candidate. The process partly drew inspiration from relevant practices for 
the selection of state-level legislative Ombudsmen936 in the U.S.  
Dame Julie Mellor DBE937 was finally selected and appointed to fill the position of 
the resigned Ann Abraham. Contrary to her predecessors938, who were either senior 
career civil servants or lawyers, Mellor has a strong managerial-advisory profile as 
                                                                                                                                            
dominique-baudis, and http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%C3%A9fenseur_des_droits, date of access : 
16.02.2012. 
935 The Public Administration Select Committee in its report on the pre-appointment hearing for the 
post of Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman states on the selection process: “To reflect the 
parliamentary nature of the post and its independence from government the recruitment process is 
being led by the House of Commons, in collaboration with the Cabinet Office and the Department of 
Health”. Source: The Official Website of the U.K. Parliament, Pre-appointment hearing for the post of 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, Ninth Report of Session 2010-2012, Volume I: Report 
and appendices, together with formal minutes, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/1220/1220.pdf, date of 
access: 16.02.2012. 
936 During the pre-appointment hearing for the post of Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 
before the Public Administration Committee on July 6, 2011, the Chair Kelvin Hopkins (Labour, Luton 
North) stated: “This is a new process, which is, I think taken from an American practice, but which we 
think is a very positive advance in the way appointments are made”. The member Paul Flynn (Labour 
Newport West) also noticed: “This event this morning is a bit of trailblazing by the Committee, 
because this is the first time there has been a pre-appointment hearing for this office. When this 
Committee went to America to have a look at the process there, we found great weaknesses in the 
process and we were very critical of many of the results of pre-appointment hearings, but we thought it 
was worthwhile for a few senior positions”. Source: The Official Website of the U.K. Parliament, Pre-
appointment hearing for the post of Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, Volume II: Oral 
Evidence, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/1220/1220ii.pdf, date of 
access: 16.02.2012. 
937 DBE stands for “Dame Commander of the Order of the British Empire” 
938 Careers of past Ombudsmen: Sir Edmund Compton (1967-1971): Senior career civil servant; Sir 
Alan Marre (1971-1976): Senior career civil servant; Sir Idwal Pugh (1976-1978): Senior career civil 
servant; Sir Cecil Clothier (1979-1984): lawyer; Sir Anthony Barrowclough (1985-1989): lawyer; Sir 
William Reid (1990-1996) Senior career civil servant; Sir Michael Buckley (1997-2002) Senior career 
civil servant; Ann Abraham (2002-2011) Senior career civil servant. 
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shown by her career paths both in the private and public sectors939. This transition to a 
new profile for the post seems compatible with the neoliberal reforms in the public 
sector, that is, the model of market-centered public governance aiming at “efficiency, 
outcome, competition, value-for-money, catalytic role, autonomy, partnership, and 
customer orientation” (Haque, 2000). The case of Mellor is of interest for one more 
reason. Before being appointed she was a partner within PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 
Government and Public Sector practice and more specifically the health sector team. 
According to her CV submitted to the Public Administration Select Committee and 
the official website of PricewaterhouseCoopers she founded and led the firm’s 
“innovative Forward Thinking programme which works with politicians across the 
political spectrum, think tanks and public sector opinion formers to contribute pwc 
expertise and ideas to solve big public sector challenges”. Therefore, a private sector 
consultant advising public organizations on board effectiveness and governance 
penetrates into the public sector in order to implement the corporate governance 
principles and practices that she had previously developed. In other words, the service 
provider becomes the client, thus moving from the advisory level to that of 
implementation. This is an interesting evolution with respect to the increasing 
influence of powerful global firms940 in dictating public policies. Will such profiles 
                                                 
939 Curriculum vitae as quoted in Appendix 3 of the Public Administration Select Committee report on 
the pre-appointment hearing for the post of Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. Honours 
and Education: She studied Experimental Psychology at Brasenose College, Oxford. She was awarded 
an honorary doctorate by Anglia Polytechnic University. She was also made an honorary fellow of 
Brasenose College, Oxford and of the City & Guilds of London Institute. In 2006, she was made a 
Dame Commander of the Order of the British Empire (DBE) for services to equal opportunities. 
Employment: Between 1979 and 1981, Mellor was Eleanor Emerson Fellow in Industrial Relations 
Education at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA. Between 1981 and 1983 she was an employee 
relations adviser at Royal Dutch Shell and an economic development officer at Islington Borough 
Council between 1983 and 1984. She served as Senior Employment Policy Adviser at Greater London 
Council until 1986 and then at Inner London Education Authority until 1989. From 1989 until 1991, 
Mellor was appointed Human Resource Manager at TSB Group and then served as Corporate Human 
Resources Director of British Gas between 1992 and 1996. She created Julie Mellor Consultants where 
she was also the principal and worked as a consultant on employment and consumer issues until 1999. 
Her clients included TSB, Motorola, Northern Foods, Xerox, the National Health Service, the 
Department for Education and Employment, the Home Office and the Employer’s Forum on Disability. 
Mellor was a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers between 2005 and 2011, where she was part of the 
health sector team while she ran the “Forward Thinking Programme”. Mellor was a commissioner at 
the Commission for Racial Equality between 1996 and 2003 and was the chairman of both the Equal 
Opportunities Commission between 1999 and 2005 and of the Fatherhood Institute between 2004 and 
2008. She has also served as a non-executive board member of a number of bodies, including the 
National Consumer Council (2001-2007), Employer’s Forum on Disability (1994-2009), the Green 
Alliance (2007-), the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2008-2011) and the Public 
Services Lab Committee of the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (2011-). In 
2012 Mellor was appointed to the post of Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/1220/1220.pdf, date of 
access: 16.02.2012. 
940 PricewaterCoopers is not a Corporation. It has the legal structure of a limited liability partnership 
(LLP) and as such it is a collection of member firms that are run autonomously in their respective 
jurisdictions. According to Wikipedia: “It is a global professional services firm headquartered in 
London, United Kingdom. It is the world's largest professional services firm measured by revenues and 
one of the "Big Four" accountancy firms. PwC has offices in 771 cities across 158 countries and 
employs over 169,000 people. It had total revenues of $29.2 billion in FY 2011, of which $14.14 billion 
was generated by its Assurance practice, $7.63 billion by its Tax practice and $7.46 billion by its 
Advisory practice. . . As of 2010 PwC was the seventh-largest privately-owned organization in the 
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for the members of the authorities become a trend? The future will tell. A new 
national or cross-national study will be welcome in a few years under the precondition 
that the independent authorities, as part of a constantly transforming public 
administration, will still be in place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
United States”. Information available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PricewaterhouseCoopers, date of 
access: 10.02.2012. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Explanatory text containing some basic concepts: separation of powers, 
separation of functions, checks and balances, and function in the United States 
 
This explanatory text briefly introduces the reader to the United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on separation of powers cases relating to independent agencies (e.g. the 
appointments clauses of their members (commissioners), the removal power of the 
President). Certain concepts are clarified, some of them characteristic of the 
constitutional tradition of the U.S. We considered that the paradigm of the U.S., 
where the institution of the independent agencies was first introduced, seemed more 
appropriate for the understanding of its logic through the decisions of the Supreme 
Court, scholars’ views, and relevant policies of the President and Congress.  
 
The concept of the separation of powers941 refers to the constitutionally named heads 
of government, that is, the President, the Congress and the Supreme Court, and 
provides for a radical compartmentalization of power divided in particular functions: 
enforcing, legislating, and deciding upon the application of law. The rationale for that 
strict division stems from the need to protect the citizenry from tyrannous government 
since it would be impossible to keep one of the aforementioned heads of government 
within the constraints of law, if it exercised all three of the powers, or even two.  
 
The concept of the separation of functions is linked to the idea of fairness to litigants. 
In other words, there is a necessity for impartial decision-making in agencies, either 
executive or independent ones, which are often statutorily assigned the power to 
exercise all three governmental functions, albeit under the guarantee of judicial and 
parliamentary review and executive oversight942. The idea is grounded in 
considerations related to the respect and implementation of due process in particular 
proceedings of individual interest943, that is, the same persons within an agency 
should not exercise multiple functions944 (Strauss, 1984; Swire, 1985). 
 
The concept of checks and balances reintroduces the issue of the protection of citizens 
against tyranny, albeit from a different perspective945. This time, the constitutional 
                                                 
941 We should note that contrary to the rest of the Constitutions, “the consecutive Swiss Constitutions, 
the current Constitution of 1999 included, do not expressly guarantee the separation of powers, which 
is considered as an “unwritten principal” of the constitutional order. The relevance of the separation 
of powers is relativated by the predominant position of the Federal Assembly as the “Supreme 
Authority of the Confederation” (article 148 par. 1 of the new constitution) on the one hand, and by the 
multiple institutions of direct democracy, on the other” (Dimoulis, 2002).   
942 Independent administrative agencies do not fall under the ambit of executive oversight.  
943 Strauss states: “. . .the separation-of-functions inquiry asks to what extent constitutional due process 
for the particular individual(s) who may be involved with an agency in a given proceeding requires 
special measures to assure the objectivity or impartiality of that proceeding. The powers are not kept 
separate, at least in general, but certain procedural protections, for example, the requirement of an on-
the-record hearing before an “impartial” trier -  may be afforded”.  
944 Swire notes that: “The reduced requirement of impartiality is seen most clearly in the case of 
commissioners of independent agencies, who now often exercise both rulemaking and adjudicating 
authority”. 
945 In Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1975) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court in its 
judgement (Page 424 U.S. 120) stated that: “James Madison, writing in the Federalist No. 47, defended 
the work of the Framers against the charge that these three governmental powers were not entirely 
separate from one another in the proposed Constitution. He asserted that, while there was some 
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scheme of the sharp separation of powers is relaxed, and becomes counterbalanced by 
the idea of “establishing multiple heads of authority in government, which are then 
pitted one against another in a continuous struggle; the intent of that struggle is to 
deny to any one (or two) of them the capacity ever to consolidate all governmental 
authority in itself, while permitting the whole effectively to carry forward the work of 
government . . . Rather, the focus is on relationships and interconnections, on 
maintaining the conditions in which the intended struggle at the apex may continue” 
(Strauss, 1984).    
 
Regarding the concept of “function” in relation to independent agencies, we cite 
Swire’s interpretation based on the diptych formalism-functionalism (Swire, 1985): 
“Distinguishing among three meanings of “function” clarifies the relationship 
between formalism and functionalism. The first meaning is the overall goal, as in the 
“primary “function” of separation of powers is to prevent tyranny”. See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1975) (per curiam); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. 
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Functionalism and formalism share this goal. 
Functionalism seeks directly to achieve this and subsidiary goals, such as the 
assurance of impartiality and expertise, through balancing of practical 
considerations. Formalism, in contrast, attempts to prevent tyranny by preventing any 
branch from overstepping the restraints provided in the constitutional text. A second 
meaning of function refers to the three “functions” of government, as exercised by the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. The three functions do not correspond 
precisely with the three branches; the President’s veto, for instance, although 
exercised by the executive branch, is part of the legislative function. Formalism posits 
that each branch should act only in pursuit of its named function, except when the 
Constitution specifically indicates an exception. Functionalism allows exceptions in 
addition to those explicitly listed in the Constitution when pragmatic considerations 
so dictate. The third meaning of “function” refers to the various modes of function by 
which government operates, such as rulemaking and adjudication. Functionalism has 
used the mode of function of adjudication as a criterion for justifying independence. 
Independence is one way to foster agency impartiality and expertise and to avoid 
possibly excessive concentration of power in the President’s hands”.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
admixture, the Constitution was nonetheless true to Montesquieu's well known maxim that the 
legislative, executive, and judicial departments ought to be separate and distinct: "The reasons on 
which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. 'When the 
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body,' says he,"there can be no 
liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws 
to execute them in a tyrannical manner." "Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the 
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would 
then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the 
violence of an oppressor." Available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/424/1/case.html#11, date of 
access: 26.09.2010 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Abstracts from discussions in Parliament relating to the appointments clauses in 
the constitutional independent authorities regulating government 
 
1. Discussions in Parliament on the draft law “Establishment of the National Council 
for Radio and Television, and grant of licenses for the foundation and function of 
broadcasters” (Law 1866/1989) 
The Rapporteur of the Majority of the draft law “Establishment of the National 
Council for Radio and Television, and grant of licenses for the foundation and 
function of broadcasters, Theodoros Kassimis (New Democracy), explained that the 
aim of the draft law was to avoid the interference of the government in the selection 
mechanism of the members of the National Council. He further analysed the 
philosophy of the role of the political parties in that procedure. He emphasized that 
the members who would be nominated by the political parties were not bound by 
orders, instructions, and practices of the parties they represented. He argued that the 
government conceded the privilege of selection to the political parties and the relevant 
societal groups who would nominate individuals of high prestige, not necessarily their 
members, in order to control the implementation of the new law. He categorically 
denied the predominance of party discipline in the discharge of their duties.  
Alexandros Papadopoulos (PASOK)946 expressed his reservations regarding the 
absence of representatives from universities, the discretion of political parties to 
nominate individuals from Literature and the Arts, and the issue of incompatibility 
regarding the nomination of representatives of trade unions and professional 
organisations as members of an independent authority. In his opinion, the guarantee of 
personal independence of the members of the Council as prescribed in article 1, par. 2 
should be eliminated since it was inconsistent with their capacity as representatives of 
political parties, trade unions, and professional organisations. He also proposed, as 
other members of Parliament, that the president of the Council should be elected 
among its own members.  
Manolis Drettakis (Coalition) stressed that the composition of the Council, that is, the 
formulation of a small interparty committee which possessed the majority in the 
organ, was not only a demand of the left, but also the other political parties had 
supported that view. Dimitris Androulakis947 (Coalition) used a sophisticated 
argumentation in his speech. He stressed that they had to do with a completely new 
institution based upon social and political representation, absolute transparency, 
public scrutiny, consensus and consultation since it would be impossible to take 
decisions by majority rule. He argued that decision-making would be based on the art 
                                                 
946 Party of the opposition. 
947 He was elected Member of Parliament for the first time in the elections of 1989 with Coalition. He 
was an alternate member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Greece. He participated as a 
member of the Communist Youth of Greece in the resistance against the dictatorship. He joined 
Coalition after the schism of the Greek Left in 1991. He left Coalition and active politics in 1993. He 
took initiatives in order to promote cooperation between PASOK (the socialist party) and the Left. He 
joined PASOK (the socialist party) and was elected Member of Parliament in the national elections of 
2004, 2007 and 2009. 
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of the consensus through consultation rather than vote and correlations among the 
political parties. In his opinion, no party would have absolute majority in the Council 
since the representatives of the parties would be individuals of high prestige forced to 
operate under consensual procedures.  
Theodoros Pangalos (PASOK) expressed his absolute disagreement regarding the 
corporatist composition of the Council since it was contrary to the philosophy of the 
greek political system, and thus violated democracy. Nikolaos Sifounakis (PASOK) 
stated his concern regarding the  numerus clausus principle in the sense that only three 
political parties had the right to nominate their representatives, thus hindering the 
participation of the representatives of new parties in the composition of the Council in 
case they managed to enter Parliament in the future. He admitted that they all agreed 
upon interparty representativeness. Nevertheless, he proposed that, since there was 
much discussion about the enhancement of the role of Parliament, the representatives 
of the parties should be nominated and elected by the Standing Committee of 
Parliament. In his view, the procedure through Parliament would enable the 
competent Committee to discuss upon the proposals of the parties, examine the 
quality of the nominees, and finally select among the best of the candidacies.   
Konstantinos Stefanopoulos948 (Democratic Renewal-DIANA), supported the view 
that the members of the Council should be appointed by the President of the 
Democracy or the Speaker of Parliament according to the model adopted by other 
European countries949, a selection mechanism that would provide greater guarantees 
regarding the quality of the members of the Council. Moreover, he stressed, as other 
members of Parliament, that the representatives of the parties should be equally 
represented in the Council, and not according to the number of their seats since the 
first party had the majority in the organ.  
Georgios Lianis (PASOK), doubted the claim of the Rapporteur of the majority that 
the political parties would nominate individuals of high prestige who would be 
independent from the wishes of those who appointed them. His view was that the 
political parties, once more, would select those representatives that they could easily 
control.  
The Minister of the Presidency of the Government, Athanassios Kanellopoulos, (New 
Democracy), in his reply to the reservations expressed by the MPs, tried to support the 
                                                 
948 He was elected Member of Parliament for the first time in the national elections of 1964 with the 
right wing party, National Radical Union (ERE). Member of Parliament in the elections of 1974, 1977, 
1981 and 1985 with the party of New Democracy (right wing party, successor of ERE founded by 
Konstantinos Karamanlis). He served as parliamentary secretary and parliamentary representative from 
1981 until 1985. In 1974 he participated in the Government of National Unity of Konstantinos 
Karamanlis as Deputy Minister of Trade. He served as Minister in various ministries from 1974 until 
1981. He ran unsuccessfully for president of the party of New Democracy in 1985.  He left the party of 
New Democracy and created the party of Democratic Renewal in the same year. He was elected 
Member of Parliament in the elections of 1989 and remained President of the party until 1994. Failure 
of the party in the elections for the European Parliament led to the suspension of its activity. He was 
elected President of the Republic and served for two consecutive terms from 1995 until 2005. 
949 He refers to the model of the Supreme Council for the Audiovisual in France. It is made up of a 
nine-member Board. Three of its members, including the Chairman, are appointed by the President of 
the French Republic, whereas the Speakers of the Senate and Parliament appoint three members each 
(law n° 86-1067 of September 30 1986 as amended), available at: 
http://www.epra.org/content/english/index2.html, date of access: 05.07.2010 
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views of the majority. He acknowledged the fact that more societal groups should be 
represented in the composition of the Council, but stressed that such an arrangement 
would damage its effectiveness. Regarding the risks linked to the procedure of 
nominations by the political parties, he stressed that all parties had members of high 
prestige in the arts and science who could be promoted to the posts of the Council. 
Moreover, he claimed that the political parties and organisations could freely appoint 
the best individuals either from their own environment or elsewhere. He 
acknowledged that the appointment of the president of the Council by the first party 
gave the impression that the majority intended to increase its influence. He adduced 
two arguments to support his view. First, he argued that, since the government 
constituted a minority in the Council, it was imperative for it to take the broader 
responsibility through the nomination of the President. Second, they intended to 
appoint a full-time president, and thus the party which would make the nomination 
took in advance the responsibility to make an agreement with the nominee regarding 
the issue of his full-time occupation. He stressed that it would not be compulsory for 
the rest of the members to be occupied full-time. Finally, he argued that the 
appointment of the members of the Council by the President of the Republic was not 
feasible since legislation did not provide for such competences for the President.  
 
2. Discussions in Parliament on the draft law “Reconstitution of the National Council 
for Radio and Television, establishment of the National Committee for Electronic 
Mass Media”(Law 2173/1993) 
The Rapporteur of the Majority, Dimitrios Palaiothodoros (PASOK), acknowledged 
that the Council, as an independent authority, was not consolidated in the constitution. 
In his opinion, that constitutional gap which would otherwise solve issues of 
accountability of the authority, could be substituted for the proposed selection 
mechanism since four members of the Council were nominated by the party of the 
majority, four members by the parties of the major and minor opposition, whereas the 
president was nominated by the Speaker of the Parliament. He stressed that for the 
first time the government accorded such competence to the President of the Body, and 
that proved the political will to avoid the dependence of the public broadcasters from 
the government.  
The Rapporteur of the major opposition, Vassilios Magginas (New Democracy), 
claimed that the government should either exempt or reduce the participation of 
political parties in the composition of the Council. He admitted that the participation 
of the political parties in the composition of the Council according to the law 
1866/1989 was a mistake since even members coming from the socially relevant 
groups followed, more or less, the given party balance. He stressed that instead of 
fixing the problem, they made it worse by exempting the socially relevant groups 
from the composition of the Council. In his opinion, the philosophy of the regulation 
was the absolute control of the organ since five out of the nine members of the 
Council pertained to the party of the majority. Moreover, he argued that, despite the 
fact that he had respect for the institution of the Speaker of the Parliament, it was 
rather improbable that he would appoint someone who would act against the will of 
the government or at least someone neutral.  
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The special speaker of the Political Spring (POLAN), Fotini Stephanopoulou, 
emphasized that the provision aimed at the control of the mass media by the 
governmental majority, and the exclusion of social scrutiny. She proposed that the 
president of the Council should be appointed by parliament by a qualified majority of 
three fifths since such procedure would be a proof that the government wished to 
enhance consensus by proposing an individual of wider acceptance.  
The parliamentary representative of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), Ioannis 
Katsaros, stressed that his party would vote against the draft law since the 
parliamentary majority sought to control the organ, as in the case of the ministerial 
decision issued by the previous government in 1990950. In his opinion, the initial law 
guaranteed the independence of the Council from government.  
The Deputy Minister of the Presidency of the Government, Evangelos Venizelos951 
(PASOK), supported the view that parliamentary representation and the special 
institutional role of the Speaker of the Parliament should contribute to the selection 
mechanism of an independent authority. In his opinion, parties nominated individuals 
without assigning their representation to these persons. He explained that the political 
parties would be judged upon their ability or disability to select individuals competent 
to operate under a high degree of independence. With regard to the Speaker of 
Parliament, he argued that, despite the fact that he was elected by the party of the 
majority, institutional constraints set by the Constitution and the Standing Orders of 
Parliament reserved for him a role beyond parties and parliamentary majorities. The 
criticism of the Scientific Report of Parliament952 that the crucial governmental 
majority in the authority was safeguarded by the nomination of its President by the 
Speaker of Parliament who was elected by the party of the majority provoked a debate 
between the Deputy Minister of the Presidency of the Government and the Member of 
Parliament, Dimitrios Sioufas (New Democracy).  
The Deputy Minister of the Presidency of the Government, Evangelos Venizelos, 
argued that the report downgraded the Speaker of the Parliament since it implied that 
he was dependent upon the majority, and doubted the prestige of the scientific 
                                                 
950 The Ministerial Decision of the Minister of the Presidency of the Government no 
22255/2/03.11.1990 (Official Gazette, 695/05.11.1990, vol. B) provided the redefinition of the 
constitution of the NCRTV. The composition of the organ was further broadened with the participation 
of eight new members and their alternates nominated by socially relevant groups, that is, 
representatives from the Church of Greece, the Academy of Athens, the Court of Audit, the Legal 
Council of State, the Athens Chamber of Trade and Industry, the General Confederation of Greek 
Workers, the Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, and the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. Yet, the Ministerial Decision was annulled by the Council of State (Decision 
872/1992 in Plenary Session). The Court judged that the NCRTV was an independent authority and not 
a collective organ, and thus the executive could not proceed to its reconstitution since it had no 
legislative authorisation.  
951 Professor of Constitutional Law. He served as member of the Committee of Local Radio, an 
independent body competent to supervise radio stations (Law 1730/1987) before the establishment of 
the NCRTV. Member of Parliament since 1993. He served as Minister in various ministries, and was 
the Rapporteur of the comprehensive revision of the Greek Constitution in 2001.   
952 Scientific Report of the Parliament on the draft law: “Reconstitution of the National Council for 
Radio and Television, establishment of the National Committee for Electronic Mass Media”, available 
at:  http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-
Ergou?law_id=0a73af1a-5ea7-4626-83e3-5ab4fe997f6d, date of access: 09.07.2010 
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opinion. Georgios-Alexandros Mangakis953 (PASOK), emphatically supported that the 
previous regulation, which incorporated the principle of internal plurality, practically 
failed in the case of Greece contrary to theoretical expectations. In his opinion, the 
reason for that failure was the false belief that the nomination of impartial individuals 
would be appropriate for the function of the authority. Nevertheless, he supported that 
they should be afraid of those individuals who were characterized as impartial since in 
practice they were less impartial. He stressed that the draft law was an experiment of 
cynic sincerity since it established the principle of interparty composition that would, 
at last, allow them to know with whom they had to deal with, who had the 
responsibility.  
The MPs, Stavros Benos and Georgios Drys (PASOK), strongly doubted the view that 
the persons nominated by the parties would not represent them. The latter insisted that 
nobody could either control parties or refer back to them their proposals. In his view, 
it was obvious that the nominees would be representatives of the parties and not 
individuals gathering the necessary qualitative characteristics. Regarding the issue of 
the nomination of the president of the Council by the Speaker of the Parliament, they 
both argued, as other MPs of the opposition, that any weaknesses of the Council 
would be assigned to the Speaker whose high prestige should be protected against 
party antagonisms and confrontations. Kyriakos Spyriounis (PASOK), claimed that 
they should accept the proposal of the party of Political Spring, that is, the 
appointment of the President of the Council by Parliament by a qualified majority of 
the three fifths. MPs from the major opposition fiercely criticised government for the 
enhancement of the spirit of partisanship in the Council, and the simultaneous 
exclusion of all the socially relevant groups from its composition.  
The Rapporteur of the majority Dimitrios Palaiothodoros (PASOK) expressed his 
surprise towards that reaction since, while the draft law was discussed in the 
competent Standing Committee, they had managed to reach consensus on the issues 
posed by the major opposition to the Minister who had finally accepted them. He 
accused the major opposition of trying to create impressions on the Greek people who 
watched discussions in Parliament by presenting a fictitious image. The Minister of 
the Presidency of the Government, Evangelos Venizelos, declared that he was stunned 
by the spirit against parliamentarism and partisanship. He announced that when the 
draft law would be discussed in particulars he intended to propose an intermediary 
stage, that is, the opinion of the Conference of Presidents, regarding the nomination of 
the President of the Council.  
When the draft law was discussed in particulars the Minister of the Presidency of the 
Government proposed the final formulation of the appointments clause as follows: 
“The Speaker of the Parliament, upon the proposal of the Conference of Presidents, 
shall nominate the President and his alternate”. He explained that the opinion of the 
Conference of Presidents intervened in the selection mechanism since all the parties 
of the opposition participated in that organ. In his opinion, discussions in the 
Conference of Presidents would enhance the prestige of the Speaker’s selection.  
                                                 
953 Georgios-Alexandros Mangakis is Professor Emeritus at Athens University, School of Law. He was 
elected Member of Parliament, and served as Minister of Justice (1982-84 , 1984-85, 1985-86), Health, 
Welfare and Social Security (1987), and, finally, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (1995) in the 
PASOK governments.  
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Vassilios Magginas (New Democracy), considered that the proposal was positive, and 
suggested that the Conference of Presidents should formulate its opinion after 
consultation among representatives of the parties. In his view, parties could propose to 
the Conference two, three persons, probably of common acceptance; then the 
Conference would formulate its opinion, and finally the Speaker would decide.  
Fotini Stefanopoulou (POL.AN) admitted that it was an important improvement, but 
insisted on her proposal that the President should be appointed by parliament by a 
qualified majority of three-fifths. If a qualified majority could not be achieved, she 
proposed as ultimum refugium the solution of the Conference of Presidents. Ioannis 
Katsaros, parliamentary representative of the Communist Party of Greece, admitted 
that the correction of the Minister moved towards a more positive direction, but still 
the Council was an organ under governmental influence. Georgios-Alexandros 
Mangakis (PASOK), argued that the proposal relieved the Speaker of the burden of 
having to decide exclusively upon such a serious issue, and thus a basis for interparty 
nomination was created. 
3. Discussions in Parliament on the the draft law “Establishment of an independent 
authority for the selection of personnel and regulation of public administration 
issues” The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel (Law 2190/1994) 
MPs of the opposition, as well as MPs of the majority expressed reservations 
regarding the selection process. The special speakers of the Political Spring954 
(POLAN) and the Communist Party of Greece955 (KKE) Nikolaos Oiconomopoulos 
and Dimos Koubouris respectively stressed that the new independent authority would 
be part of the government, an organ of the party of the majority since it was the 
Minister who selected and appointed its members.  
Stavros Benos (PASOK)956, suggested the creation of a mixed body constituted of 
political groups on the one hand, and members of the academia on the other. The 
members of this body would propose thirty to fifty nominees coming from the ranks 
of high-ranking public functionaries or judges. Moreover, they would be individuals 
enjoying broad social acceptance. They would be chosen by lots, and the procedure 
would take place in Parliament. That would give prestige to the new institution. 
Georgios Drys (PASOK) took this suggestion one step further and asked the Minister 
of the Presidency of the Government, Anastasios Peponis, who submitted the draft 
law, to show sensitivity to the issue of the composition of the Council. He 
recommended that each party in Parliament should propose a representative with 
expertise in public administration to participate in the management board, and thus 
prove that the government did not intend to control the organ by appointing partisans 
of the party of the majority.  
                                                 
954 Party of the minor opposition. The Political Spring is a former Greek political party with liberal 
orientation established in June 1993 by Antonis Samaras, ex-minister of foreign affairs. His radical 
stance towards the issue of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provoked his 
removal from the office in April 1992. Unsuccessful electoral rates (below the national threshold of 
3%) at the national elections in 1996, and the elections for the European Parliament in 1999 led to the 
gradual dissolution of the party.  
955 Party of the minor opposition. 
956 Party of the majority.  
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Christos Markogiannakis (New Democracy)957 stressed that it was the Cabinet upon 
proposal of the Minister of the Presidency of the Government that designated the 
composition of the Council. Moreover, he criticized the fact that the members of the 
board were self-renewed. The MP wondered whether anyone could have ever 
believed in the Minister’s good intentions. The President of New Democracy, 
Miltiadis Evert, accordingly stressed the hereditary right that was created through a 
selection mechanism that enabled members that were about to retire to participate in 
the procedure of appointing those who would replace them.  
Anastasios Peponis, Minister of the Presidency of the Government, supported that this 
was a procedure based upon a historic precedent. He claimed that it was not his 
intention to compare sizes and individuals. He referred to the case of the foundation of 
the Council of State, the supreme administrative court, in 1929. According to the 
relevant legislation of the time, it was the Cabinet that first appointed the President, 
Vice-President and members of the Council. In his opinion, it was the composition of 
the body that guaranteed the prestige of the institution, and not the selection procedure 
of the first President, Vice-Presidents and Councillors. He supported that those people 
created the tradition, and that explained the intention of the government to create an 
analogous tradition for the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel. He 
stressed that the organ would be self-reproduced, and the government should be 
praised for that arrangement. Moreover, he emphasized the fact that the members of 
the management board selected the president and vice-president, a practice not 
followed for the appointment of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the supreme 
courts958. He argued that promotions in supreme courts excluded any external 
intervention, and that served as a model for the new authority, namely, the creation of 
a system of reproduction and self-renewal. Finally, he stressed that all accusations 
stemmed from a fear that, through that procedure, the members of the management 
board would appoint their children and grandchildren to the vacant posts. He accepted 
that the phenomenon was not uncommon in other areas, especially in universities in 
the past. He argued that it never happened in the case of the supreme courts, and there 
was no such danger in the case of the new authority.  
The MPs Dimitrios Sioufas (New Democracy) and Antonios Skyllakos (KKE), 
interestingly enough, reiterated the idea earlier proposed by Georgios Drys (PASOK) 
that representatives of the parties in Parliament or trade unions should participate in 
the composition of the management board. Moreover, the MP of the Communist Party 
insisted that the proposed system favored the governing party since it could control 
the majority of the Council. He then reminded the House that when no party had the 
majority in Parliament, all parties had unanimously agreed on the composition of the 
                                                 
957 Party of the major opposition.  
958 Article 90, par. 5 of the Constitution of 1975/1986 read as follows: “5. Promotion to the posts of 
President and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Administrative Court, of the Supreme Civil and Criminal 
Court and of the Court of Audit shall be effected by presidential decree issued upon proposal of the 
Cabinet, by selection from among the members of the respective supreme court, as specified by law. 
Promotion to the post of Supreme Civil and Criminal Court Prosecutor shall be effected by similar 
decree, by selection from among the members of the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court and Deputy 
Public Prosecutors of this Court”.  
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Council for Radio and Television959. He posed the question why they could not create 
an analogous organ where nobody would have taken control of it.  
Andreas Lendakis (POLAN) challenged the transparency of the selection mechanism, 
and proposed that the members of the Council should be appointed by parliament by a 
qualified majority of two thirds. He claimed that two hundred out of three hundred 
deputies should agree upon the members of ASEP. In his opinion, there was a need 
for consensus since no party disposed of two hundred deputies. He argued that such a 
procedure would guarantee transparency, and further enhance the members’ 
independence. Moral support from Parliament would strengthen their resistance and 
defense against those who would attempt to impose their opinion upon them.  
The Parliamentary Representative of PASOK, Christos Rokofyllos, challenged the 
view of the president of New Democracy, Miltiadis Evert, that internal procedures for 
the selection of new members in cases of death or age limit distorted the system. He 
explained that the proposed mechanism was called cooptation, and was internationally 
applied in cases when a body selected new members through internal processes in 
order to keep its independence.  
When the draft law was discussed on particulars, Spyridon Giatras (PASOK) 
Rapporteur of the draft law claimed that, despite criticisms expressed by MPs, those 
trustful eleven individuals could be found, as long as Parliament demonstrated its 
political will. Byron Polydoras (New Democracy), stressed that the selection 
mechanism, namely, the Cabinet, and distrust towards government as the main reason 
for the creation of independent authorities were not compatible with one another. In 
his opinion the draft law was schizophrenic since it confirmed the position that people 
should trust the government that would appoint the independent administrative 
authority. He proposed four alternative systems for the selection of the members of 
the Council. First, drawing lots.  Second, ex officio, namely, according to office. 
Third, interparty cooperation. In his opinion, it was a rather vulgar but realistic option. 
Fourth, ex officio from the supreme courts combined with representativeness. He 
acknowledged that representativeness was not a synonym for independence and 
objectivity, but it was a big step towards those principles. With regard to the concept 
of cooptation, as previously analyzed by the MP of Pasok Christos Rokofyllos, he 
stressed that it was not a modern institution since it had its origins in Roman Law. He 
insisted that the procedure did not fit modern societies since it was a relic of 
succession through hereditary right.  
Christos Rokofyllos (PASOK) intervened and reminded the MP Polydoras that 
cooptation was broadly implemented in cases when modern societies sought to 
guarantee the independence of a collective organ (e.g. Academies, the Greek and the 
French, institutions of higher education etc). He stressed that whenever the legislator 
sought to guarantee the independence of a collective body, he established the principle 
                                                 
959 In the national elections of June 18, 1989 no party could form government. This eventually led to 
the formation of a coalition government between the party of the left (a coalition of the two major 
parties of the left: the Communist Party of Greece and the Greek Left), and the party of the right.  
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of self-renewal, that is, the collective body itself decided upon the succession of its 
members.  
Nikolaos Economopoulos (POLAN), brought back the proposal of his party that 
Parliament by a qualified majority of two thirds should select the members of the 
Council since two hundred deputies are more credible than a Minister’s proposal. The 
Minister of the Presidency of the Government, Anastasios Peponis, agreed with the 
explanations given by the MP Christos Rokofyllos and repeated that cooptation, as 
applied in academies all over the world, in institutions of higher education, in the case 
of the supreme courts in Greece, with the exception of their Presidents and Vice-
Presidents, served as a paradigm for the appropriate selection mechanism that had to 
be implemented in the new authority. With regard to the issue of the first composition 
of the Council, he expressed his deep belief that the government could designate with 
a sense of responsibility its first composition in an unimpeachable manner by 
selecting individuals of broad recognition by the society and the state. Nevertheless, 
he acknowledged the fact that a number of MPs of the majority had already expressed 
their objections and had made their suggestions. Taking their remarks into 
consideration, he proposed to the House another regulation that would confirm the 
sincere intentions of the government. Thus, he suggested the reformulation of par. 7 
as follows: “For the first application of this law, as president, vice-president and 
members of the Council shall be appointed individuals who fulfil the preconditions of 
par. 2 according to the following procedure: First, within ten (10) days after 
publication of this law the Minister of the Presidency of the Government shall submit 
to the Conference of Presidents a uniform proposal for the posts of the president and 
vice-president of the Council. A qualified majority of four fifths of the members of the 
Conference shall be required for the approval of the uniform proposal”. At this point, 
Minister Anastasios Peponis emphasized that in the Conference of Presidents of 
Parliament960 all parties would have the opportunity to express their views, and justify 
either their agreement or their disagreement, if they had any, putting emphasis on the 
expression “if they had any”.  And he kept reading the rest of the reformulated 
provision: “If such majority is not obtained, the Minister of the Presidency of the 
Government submits within eight (8) days after the announcement of the relevant 
decision of the Conference a new uniform proposal that may be approved with simple 
majority. After the approval of the proposal, the appointment of the nominees is made 
official by presidential decree, issued upon proposal of the Minister of the Presidency 
of the Government. Second, within ten (10) days after their appointment, the President 
and Vice-President of the Council submit to the Minister of the Presidency of the 
Government a joint proposal comprising fifteen (15) individuals, at least, as 
candidates. The Minister selects nine (9) members whose appointment is made official 
by a presidential decree, issued upon the Minister’s proposal”. Finally, he stated that 
                                                 
960 One of the major innovations of the Standing Orders of 1987 was the introduction of the collective 
interparty organ of the Conference of Presidents of Parliament. The main duties assigned to it under the 
Standing Orders were to take decisions on the organization of Parliament’s work and issues of 
legislative planning. The Conference was at the time composed of the Speaker of Parliament, as 
President, the Deputy Speakers of Parliament, the Presidents of the Standing Committees and special 
committees, the Presidents of  the Parliamentary Committees, and one independent MP (Standing 
Orders of the Greek Parliament, Chapter 4, article 13 entitled “Composition-convocation”, Official 
Gazette, vol. A’, no 106/24.06.1987). 
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as members of the government they had promised the House that he they would 
communicate their thoughts regarding the individuals that would participate in the 
first composition of that body. He explained that if the majority of Parliament 
approved and voted for that reformulation, it was obvious that the government had no 
involvement in the designation of the fifteen individuals since the President and the 
Vice President of the Council were the ones who would propose them to the Minister 
in order to select nine of them. And then he expressed his intention to announce to 
Parliament, as he had promised, the personalities to whom they would address 
themselves with the request to accept. If they accepted, they would constitute their 
common proposal to the Conference of Presidents. The names he announced were: for 
the post of the President, the honorary Prosecutor of the Supreme Civil and Criminal 
Court, Mr. Giorgos Plagiannakos, and for the post of the Vice-President, the honorary 
Vice-President of the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court, Mr. Michalis Papadakis.  
Dimitrios Sioufas (New Democracy) observed that the Minister’s proposal for a new 
version of the selection mechanism, namely, the Conference of Presidents, was simply 
a way to attach a sense of objectivity in the procedure. He explained that the 
government obviously had the majority in the Conference. Moreover, he claimed that 
the Minister, in order to further impress the House, simply announced the names of 
two judges of the supreme courts whom he intended to ask to accept the posts of 
president and vice-president of the Council. He argued that the majority that 
supported government was manipulated in such a way that someone could actually 
speak of what handbooks of political science called dictatorship of the majority. In his 
opinion, the intention of the Minister was to persuade the majority which supported 
the government to accept his proposal, and give the impression that the selection 
mechanism was objective and unimpeachable.  
Christos Rokofyllos (PASOK), stressed that it was the opposition that challenged the 
first version of the relevant clause, that is, the arbitrary appointment of the 
management board by the Cabinet.  He explained that the Minister moved towards the 
creation of a more objective system in order to avoid distrust, and expressed his full 
surprise at the opposition’s view that the new mechanism reflected the dictatorship of 
the majority. He wondered whether the opposition really followed what the 
government suggested. Once more, however, he explained the philosophy of the 
system: the Minister would propose the President and Vice-President of the eleven-
member board of the independent organ to the Conference of Presidents that was 
mixed and interparty. In case they were approved by the majority of the four-fifths of 
the body, the procedure would be completed. Otherwise, there would be a new 
proposal, and the nominees would be selected by simple majority vote. Moreover, he 
stressed that the government moved a step further, and announced the names of the 
individuals it intended to propose to the Conference of Presidents, after having put out 
feelers to the nominees about their intentions to accept the posts. He stressed that the 
government proposed a judge of a supreme court as president of that independent 
body, Mr. Giorgos Plagianakos, whom the government of New Democracy had 
appointed upon decision of its Cabinet as Prosecutor of the Supreme Civil and 
Criminal Court. He expressed his surprise at the opposition’s lack of tolerance and 
understanding, and wondered whether they trusted the ex-Prosecutor of the Supreme 
Civil and Criminal Court that the government proposed since he had been selected for 
that post by the party of the opposition in the past. He claimed that the appointment 
was a proof that they had considered him either as their sympathiser or, at least, 
someone who was not opposed to their views and values. He wondered whether they  
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still distrusted a competent person, capable of exercising the deed of the guardian of 
law in an ethical and objective manner. He argued that Mr. Papadakis, honorary Vice-
President of the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court, as nominee for the post of the 
vice-president was broadly praised and well-known for his decency.  
Christos Rokofyllos, addressing himself to the Parliamentary representative of New 
Democracy, Dimitrios Sioufas, asked him whether he held those publicly nominated 
individuals in high esteem, and if he did so, he had to answer where he located the 
signs of “the dictatorship of the majority”. Dimitrios Sioufas replied that their 
reservations had nothing to do with the individuals since the problem stemmed from 
the procedure and the qualified majority of the four fifths of the Conference where the 
government had the majority. He added, moreover, that the nominees had not yet 
accepted the government’s proposal. Christos Rokofyllos wondered why they 
objected to a procedure that would allow those two individuals to submit a common 
proposal for the rest of the members of the Council since they were highly esteemed.  
Andreas Lendakis (POLAN), insisted on the selection mechanism that his party 
proposed, that is, consensus by a two-thirds qualified majority since no party disposed 
of two hundred deputies. He claimed that the proposed procedure guaranteed that all 
would agree upon individuals and their qualifications. He argued that such an 
agreement would inevitably help the new institution gain high prestige, thus providing 
mechanisms of resistance towards any government that could have never achieved to 
attain such a wide majority in order to impose its will.   
The Minister of the Presidency of the Government, Anastasios Peponis, explained that 
the submission of the government’s proposal to the Conference of Presidents meant 
that all parties would have the chance to express their view and justify it. He claimed 
that under such circumstances they would let the Greek people know why they 
rejected or approved certain individuals whose candidacies the government would 
submit to the Conference of Presidents in order to exercise its judgement for the first 
and last time. Furthermore, he argued that if those two individuals succeeded in 
achieving the trust of the parties, they would commit government regarding the nine 
new members that would supplement the body. He emphasized that either they trusted 
the individuals that the government intended to plead in order to accept their 
candidacy or they did not trust them. He claimed that it was their right to show to the 
Parliament and the people why they did not trust those individuals, and then the 
Parliament and the people would judge them. He made once more clear that he did not 
speak on behalf of the candidates. He clearly stated that the government would 
address its proposal to those individuals, and that proposal would be binding for the 
government. He explained that if those individuals accepted their candidacy, and if 
the majority of Parliament confirmed their selection, they would be the ones who 
would propose the fifteen candidates for the nine posts. Consequently, the government 
would have no alternative but to appoint from among those proposed by the honorary 
Prosecutor and the honorary Vice-President of the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court.  
Andreas Lendakis (POLAN) expressed his reservation regarding the proposal of 
certain individuals for the posts of the Council since Parliament should decide upon 
the procedure and not upon individuals. In his opinion, the recommended procedure 
was not transparent since the Minister proposed the President and Vice-President, and 
then the body was self-renewed. He explained that even if the procedure foresaw that 
the Minister had the right to propose the President and Vice-President only once, that 
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is, during the first application of the law, a new government could change the law and 
the relevant procedure. Finally, he wondered why the government did not accept the 
proposal of his party that provided for the appointment of the Council by Parliament 
by a qualified majority of the two-thirds. In his opinion, it was a transparent procedure 
that would guarantee that the eleven-member management board would not be 
controlled.  
Angelos Bratakos (New Democracy) claimed that the reformulation of article 4 was 
nothing else but a new Jesuitism since the announcement of the names was mere 
tactics developed to impress and disorientate. He wondered who would be the next 
nominees in case the ones they announced did not accept. He expressed his concern 
that the proposed individuals, due to their personal history, would not accept the 
posts. In his opinion, the government would appoint its partisans through hereditary 
right since they would secure their successors and, consequently, the government and 
the party would keep continuation.  
4. Discussions in Parliament on the draft law “Protection of the individual against 
the processing of personal data” (Law 2472/1997) 
The Rapporteur of the major opposition, Anna Psarouda-Benaki961 (New Democracy), 
supported the view that the new authority should be under parliamentary scrutiny 
regarding its functional competences, whereas the administrative ones should be 
under the supervision of the Minister of Justice. Thus, in her opinion, parliamentary 
scrutiny should be linked to the competence of Parliament to select the heads and 
members of the authority. Regarding the composition of the board, she argued that 
judges should be the majority in the organ, namely, two members, apart from the 
president, should be judges. Moreover, she wondered how the selection mechanism 
provided for the president, that is, his nomination by the Minister of Justice, would 
guarantee the independence of the authority from public administration. As for the 
two of the members, she stated that the terms “of high standing and experience” were 
vague, and thus could not properly define their qualifications. She further noticed that 
those members were also proposed by the Minister of Justice. She wondered whether 
university professors could be proposed by the relevant departments of their 
institutions. She argued that the intervention of the Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency for the formulation of an opinion was correct since the Committee’s 
work was relevant, and would be linked to an issue which dealt with transparency in 
the function of the state and society. Nevertheless, she expressed her concern 
regarding the interference of the Conference of Presidents in the procedure since it 
was the first time, to her knowledge, that the organ was assigned a decisive 
competence on an issue that concerned the Polity and was not connected to the 
function of Parliament. She stressed that it was an internal organ provided for in the 
Standing Orders of Parliament, and was not based on a legislative provision. She 
stressed that the Conference of Presidents was abruptly upgraded and proclaimed as 
organ of the Polity that selected the organs of an authority that was going to exercise a 
serious function in society. She believed that not only the Conference of Presidents 
was not the appropriate organ, but also Parliament had no legitimisation for the 
assignment of such a competence to the Conference. She proposed that Parliament 
                                                 
961 Professor at Athens University, School of Law. Member of the Academy of Athens (2010). She was 
elected Member of Parliament, and served as Minister in various ministries. She was the first Greek 
woman to be elected Speaker of Parliament (2004-2007).  
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should directly nominate and select the board of the authority by a majority vote. She 
did not have in mind whether the Standing Orders could provide for an internal 
nomination procedure since according to the Constitution it was only Parliament that 
could take decisions which could be implemented in the system of the polity. Finally, 
she argued that she could not think of a more appropriate interparty nomination 
system.  
The Speaker, Apostolos Kaklamanis (PASOK), intervened regarding some provisions 
of the draft law that dealt with the Standing Orders of Parliament. He admitted that 
the issue was also related to other draft laws which Parliament had already passed and 
cited at the Standing Orders. He announced that the Standing Orders would be 
revised, and all those procedures provided for in the various draft laws which had 
been voted by parliament until then, would be included in them. He stressed that there 
were draft laws that assigned to Parliament various competences, draft laws that 
Parliament itself had previously voted. He informed the Body that he had asked the 
competent service to identify those laws in order to adapt them to a future revision of 
the Standing Orders. He clarified that those laws, in turn, would probably be revised 
in accordance with the relevant discussions and decisions of Parliament regarding the 
Standing Orders. Finally, he explained, that the Standing Orders, according to the 
constitution, defined under the guarantee of the autonomy of the legislative body all 
issues regarding its functions and competences.  
Leonidas Avdis (KKE), expressed the disagreement of his party regarding the 
proposed selection mechanism since it did not provide for broader guarantees for the 
appointment of the president and its members. In his opinion, they should be selected 
by Parliament by a qualified majority that would hinder appointment by the governing 
party. As for the nomination procedure, he proposed that the competent body for the 
selection, either Parliament, or the Committee on Institutions and Transparency 
should not select among a certain number of candidates submitted by the Minister of 
Justice, but should rather have the possibility to ask for the submission of 
supplementary candidacies.   
Fotis Kouvelis (Coalition), supported that representatives of social groups, such as the 
General Confederation of Greek Workers, the Coordinating Committee of the Greek 
Bar Associations, the Central Union of Municipalities and Communities, should 
participate in the composition of the Authority. He stressed that his party was opposed 
to the participation of pensioners, either retired judges or university professors since it 
was common knowledge that it would be easier to control and manipulate someone 
retired. Moreover, he insisted that someone after his retirement identified himself 
more easily with a certain political perception. Regarding the two individuals of high 
prestige and experience, he argued that the formulation of the provision was vague 
since special qualifications for the posts should be expressly set forth. He stressed that 
such vagueness could become dangerous. In his view, Parliament should participate in 
the selection mechanism, despite the fact that he acknowledged that the Standing 
Orders should be revised in order to keep legality. He explained that the interference 
of the Cabinet upon proposal of the Minister of Justice in the appointment of the 
president could serve as a mechanism that - irrespective of those in power- carried 
preferences or even suspicious omissions regarding the control of the processing of 
personal data that the authority should have to carry out. Moreover, he disagreed over 
the different procedures to be followed for the selection of the president and the 
 368
members of the board. He insisted that Parliament should make the proposal for both 
the President and the members, and that proposal should be binding. He concluded by 
saying that the presence of Parliament in the whole procedure could serve as a 
guarantee for the objective and neutral function of the authority.  
Stratis Korakas (KKE) agreed with Anna-Psarouda Benaki that it was impossible to 
assign competences to the Conference of Presidents which were not provided for in 
the Standing Orders. He commented that the Speaker’s proposal regarding the 
revision of the Standing Orders could be a solution to the problem, but rather difficult 
to achieve. Kyriakos Spyriounis and Panagiotis Kouroumblis, (PASOK), supported 
the view that Parliament should appoint the heads and members of the authority. 
Moreover, Panagiotis Kouroumblis, agreed with the view of Fotis Kouvelis that 
judges on active service, and not retired ones, should participate in the composition of 
the authority since they could resist more against temptations of power. Evangelos 
Yannopoulos, Minister of Justice, replied that the issue of the constitution of the 
authority had been discussed many times. There were proposals that Parliament 
should select the board of the authority by a qualified majority of two-thirds or three-
fifths, but no agreement could be reached since views differed. 
 
5. Preliminary Discussions on the draft law “The Greek Ombudsman and the Corps of 
Inspectors – Controllers of Public Administration” in the Standing Committee on 
Public Administration, Public Order and Justice 
 
According to the minutes of the Standing Committee on Public Administration, Public 
Order and Justice962, the Rapporteur of the major opposition Georgios Tzitzikostas 
(New Democracy) stressed that there was no reference on the procedure to be 
followed regarding the selection of the Ombudsman by Parliament. In his opinion, 
that point raised a constitutional issue since, after the law was passed by Parliament, 
the Standing Orders should have to be revised. He further noticed that the qualified 
majority voting was not specified. He supported the view that the Ombudsman should 
be elected, at least, by a qualified majority of three fifths, and claimed that his party 
had already proposed that during the procedure for the revision of the constitution, 
and submitted a draft law on the introduction of the institution of the ombudsman.  
 
The Special Speaker of the Coalition of the Right and Progress (SYN), Fotis 
Kouvelis, did not express any reservations on the constitutionality of the provision, 
and argued that the Ombudsman should be elected by a qualified majority since 
otherwise he feared that one more institution would be subordinated to the control of 
                                                 
962 Minutes of the Standing Committee on Public Administration, Public Order and Justice, available 
at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-Nomothetikou-
Ergou?law_id=7ab346ee-b1b7-48c1-a646-96c465579212, date of access: 30.07.2010. Discussions on 
the draft law were held in three sessions on February 12, 13 and 18, 1997. During the second session on 
February 13, 1997, following article 38 par. 2 of the Standing Orders, the Committee held hearings on 
the draft law. Georgios Kasimatis, President of the Union of Greek Constitutionalists, Nikiforos 
Diamandouros, President of the National Centre for Social Research, and Ioannis Koutsoukos, 
President of the Supreme Administration of the Unions of Public Servants were called and expressed 
their views on the draft law. Interestingly enough, Nikiforos Diamandouros became the first Greek 
Ombudsman. 
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party majorities, and thus would lose its character. The Special Speaker of the 
Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI), Georgios Tsafoulias963, challenged the 
constitutionality of the provision. The Minister of the Interior, Public Administration 
and Decentralisation, Alexandros Papadopoulos, admitted that the issue of the 
election of the Ombudsman had preoccupied the Ministry, and discussions had also 
been held with the services of Parliament. He explained that their main concern was 
whether they had first to vote on the draft law and then proceed to the revision of the 
Standing Orders or vice versa. He noticed that the prevailing scientific view and many 
of his colleagues proposed that the Standing Orders had to be revised first. 
Nevertheless, he stressed that the Standing Orders could not regulate an issue 
referring to an institution that was not previously provided for in legislation. He 
explained that the government finally supported the option to introduce the institution 
first. Moreover, he stressed that the procedure for the selection of the ombudsman 
would be regulated by the revision of the Standing Orders, and expressed the 
government’s intention of supporting the procedure of appointment by parliament by 
a qualified majority of three fifths.  
6. Discussions in Parliament on the “The Greek Ombudsman and the Corps of 
Inspectors – Controllers of Public Administration” (Law 2477/1997) 
 The Special Speaker of the Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI), Georgios 
Tsafoulias, faithful to his stance as expressed in the minutes of the competent Standing 
Committee, supported that the election of the Ombudsman by Parliament was contrary 
to the Constitution since no constitutional clause or provision of the Standing Orders 
gave Parliament the power to elect the Ombudsman. He stressed that the draft law 
made reference to a future provision in the Standing Orders, and MPs were actually 
asked to vote for a draft law that provided for the election of the Ombudsman by 
Parliament by an undefined qualified majority, an institution that was not even 
contained in the Standing Orders. He argued that the claim of the Minister of the 
Interior that the Standing Orders would be revised actually proved that Parliament 
would ratify in the future a legislative act that should have passed by Parliament before 
the introduction of the law on the institution of the ombudsman, something that lacked 
legal basis. With regard to Professor Kasimatis’s964 view, expressed during the 
                                                 
963 George Tsafoulias (Patras, 1935 -Patras, 2004) was a lawyer and Greek politician. He was a 
founding member of PASOK. In 1995 he left PASOK and adhered to Democratic Social Movement 
(DI.K.KI.) founded by Dimitris Tsovolas. He was elected member of Parliament with DIKKI in 1996. 
964 George Kassimatis is Professor Emeritus at the School of Law, Athens University. From 1981 to 
1988 he was Director of the Legal Office of the Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, and Legal 
Councillor of the Prime Minister. From 1997 until 1998 he served as President of the National Council 
for Radio and Television. During the period 1978 to 1980, he was appointed as alternate member of the 
Council of Citizenship of the Ministry of the Interior. From 1982 to 1985 he was a member of the 
Executive Committee of the Greek National Commission for UNESCO, and served for two terms as a 
member of the Special Court for Mistrial. In 2003, upon decision of the Speaker and with the 
unanimous approval of the Conference of Presidents he was appointed member of the board and Vice- 
President of the "Foundation of the Hellenic Parliament for Parliamentarianism and Democracy”. He 
participated in the preparatory phase of the elaboration and revision of the Constitution of 1975. During 
the revision of the Constitution of 1986, he elaborated the draft of the revision, and actively 
participated in its formulation throughout the revision process. During the period 1974-1975, he was a 
member of the Scientific Working Group for the study and revision of the Organic Law governing 
Universities (Group Evrigenis). Since 1974 he has been appointed as chairman or member of numerous 
legislative drafting committees. Since January 2005 he is Vice Chairman of the Committee of Experts 
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sessions of the Standing Committee, that linked the function of parliamentary review 
to the duty of Parliament to elect the Ombudsman, Georgios Tsafoulias stated that 
never before had he heard that the content of the function of parliamentary review led 
to the possibility that Parliament had the obligation to elect the Ombudsman. In his 
view, the Professor’s argumentation was totally paradoxical and irrelevant to any 
logical explanation since the provisions of the Constitution and the content of 
parliamentary review did not allow for such an interpretation. He supported that 
Professor Kassimatis should have presented one by one all provisions regarding 
parliamentary review, and should have indicated the part of the Constitution referring 
to the parliamentary review that suggested that Parliament had the right and the 
obligation to elect the Ombudsman. On the contrary, he stated that Professor Kasimatis 
came to the Committee and constructed a myth that they, the non-experts on the 
constitution, had to accept his view. He stressed that they would not support Professor 
Kassimatis’s position since they considered it as infantile. He wondered why members 
of parliament had to support and agree upon a view that accepted that provisions 
regarding the parliamentary review gave parliamentarians the right and the obligation 
to elect the Ombudsman. Georgios Tsafoulias stated that Professor Kassimatis had 
claimed all these in order to support the draft law, and thus justify its 
unconstitutionality and the omission of all those acts that should have taken place 
before the submission of the draft law to Parliament. He argued that they had first to 
revise the Constitution, and after its revision the draft law could be submitted to 
Parliament.  
Kyriakos Spyriounis, (PASOK), emphasized the fact that the interference of 
Parliament in the selection mechanism of the Ombudsman was a sign of democratic 
consistency. Regarding the objections on the constitutionality of the provision and the 
gap in the Standing Orders, he argued that the Constitution could not foresee 
everything. In his view, the Constitution defined the guidelines of the polity, that is, 
the fundamental rights, social, political, freedoms, and the constitution of justice and 
public administration, the three functions in Montesquieu’s well-known overlapping. 
He argued that the Constitution could not define all special details.  
Anastasios Peponis, (PASOK), intervened and stressed that the Standing Orders could 
not be contrary to the Constitution. Kyriakos Spyriounis replied that they should 
correct it. Anastasios Peponis asked whether he referred to the Constitution, and 
Kyriakos Spyriounis answered that he meant the Standing Orders. He believed that 
the governing party was characterized by democratic sensitivity and responsibility, 
and any unconstitutional points in the draft law would be corrected. In his opinion, the 
interference of Parliament in the procedure of the election of the Ombudsman by a 
qualified majority should be praised since it guaranteed the liberation of the institution 
from party commitments, that is, the independence of the Ombudsman from the 
governing party.  
                                                                                                                                            
on Public Administration. Since 1982 he is member of the Legal Council of the Bank of Greece, and 
during the period 1999 to 2002 he served as legal Councillor at the state owned company “Cadastre 
SA”. Source, Kremalis Law Office, available at: http://www.kremalis.gr/object.php?obj=9f203e8, date 
of access: 02/08/2010. 
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Prokopis Pavlopoulos965, (New Democracy), expressed his concern regarding the 
constitutionality of the provision on the selection mechanism of the Ombudsman 
based upon his own assessment and the report of the scientific service of Parliament. 
In his opinion, two major issues should be re-examined: first, the procedure for the 
election of the Ombudsman, and, second, the qualified majority for the election. He 
made clear to the other members of Parliament that he had no intention to introduce 
legal barriers to the discussion, but he warned that a bad start might create problems 
in the future since a constitutional violation was always a violation that bore no 
qualitative ratings; it was one and uniform. In his opinion, the Constitution could not 
be violated in order to satisfy any political or other tendentiousness since the 
Constitution had its own logic, and its observance was a matter of principle. He 
supported that the Ombudsman was an organ of the executive, something that nobody 
doubted -the government included-, and, therefore, it was impossible to be appointed 
by Parliament without prior special revision of the Constitution that would permit 
deviation from the principle of the separation of powers. Moreover, he clarified that 
even the Standing Orders could not settle the issue without prior constitutional 
provision since, according to the principle of the separation of powers, the Legislative 
power had competences relevant to the Legislative power, and thus could not appoint 
organs of the Executive power. Regarding the second major issue of the qualified 
majority, he doubted the view that the law or even the Standing Orders could provide 
for a qualified majority. In his opinion, it was the Constitution that strictly defined 
qualified majorities in certain cases. He explained that it was impossible for 
Parliament itself to define arbitrarily qualified majorities every time a draft law was 
submitted for voting. He asked the members of Parliament to consider the 
consequences of such a practice in the future since it would enable governments to 
submit draft laws that would allow organs of the executive power to be appointed by 
Parliament by qualified majorities each time defined by law. Furthermore, he 
explained that such a practice could form a mosaic of qualified majorities in the Greek 
legal order. That, in turn, he concluded, could lead to a legal insecurity since a law 
does not have an increased typical force in relation to another law, and thus if a law 
provided for a qualified majority in a certain occasion, it could be easily changed by 
another law in the future. Consequently, he stressed that Parliament could not define 
the rules upon which it functioned within the context of the exercise of its legislative 
power since that was the essence of the Constitution: a set of strict rules for the 
function of the parliamentary system. He insisted that new institutions, as the 
Ombudsman, should be legitimized in the conscience of the public through the respect 
of constitutional procedures. In his opinion, the members of Parliament should protect 
the institution and wait for the necessary revision of the Constitution, if they respected 
                                                 
965 Professor of Public Law at Athens University. In the national elections of 1996 he was elected State 
deputy with the New Democracy Party while in 2000, 2004, 2007 and 2009 he was elected Member of 
Parliament representing the 1st Athens constituency. He has been Deputy Minister of the Presidency 
and Spokesman for the Zolotas Coalition Government (1989-1990), Legal Advisor to the President of 
the Hellenic Republic, Constantinos Karamanlis (1990-1995), Spokesman for the New Democracy 
Party (1995-1997), Parliamentary Spokesman for the New Democracy Party (2000-2004), Minister of 
Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (2004-2007) and Minister of Interior (2007-2009). 
Source, Prokopis Pavlopoulos’ web page, available at: 
http://www.prokopispavlopoulos.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=119&Itemid=6
7, date of access, 03.08.2010.  
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the rule of law. Until then, he proposed that they should introduce the institution by 
taking into consideration the constitutional constraints.  
Anastassios Peponis966, (PASOK), agreed with the reservations expressed by other 
members of Parliament regarding the constitutionality of the provision, and mentioned 
that if they were willing to upgrade Parliament and enhance its prestige, they were the 
ones who should respect the Constitution and stand in reverence before provisions 
that were fundamental for the function of the polity. He regretted that he had to 
remind the scientific staff of the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation that the Standing Orders they cited through the provision of the draft 
law were not autonomous from the Constitution. He clarified that the Constitution 
defines the scope of the Standing Orders, in other words, the Standing Orders regulate 
the functioning of Parliament, and do not define the competences of Parliament 
according to article 65 of the Constitution. He stressed that the proposed procedure for 
the election of the Ombudsman by Parliament had nothing to do with the functioning 
of Parliament since the provision clearly assigned competences to the Body. 
Nevertheless, in his opinion, it was obvious that the Standing Orders could define the 
competences of the internal organs of Parliament, organs which were related to the 
internal functioning of Parliament, but could not define competences of Parliament 
regarding the total functioning of the Polity. Regarding the issue of the qualified 
majority, he feared that if a qualified majority could not be attained, the Ombudsman 
should have to be elected by a simple majority in order to avoid deadlock since 
Parliament could not commit itself to attain a qualified majority. Nevertheless, in his 
opinion, simple majority could not serve the purpose of neutrality of the Ombudsman 
since the elected individual would be the organ of the governing party. Moreover, he 
stressed that such a procedure would expose candidates in relation to their political 
affiliations. He insisted once more that they would violate article 110 of the 
Constitution967, if they decided to overcome the boundaries of the competences of 
Parliament by proceeding to a revision of the constitutional provisions by simple 
legislative procedure. He added that constitutional legislators were aware of the 
problems created by qualified majorities, and thus introduced them to specific 
occasions. He emphasized that if there were political forces which wished,-or thought, 
believed, and proposed- that they should gradually be led to support the perception of 
a directorial system, that was an issue of major national and political relevance which 
was related to the form of the political system.  He acknowledged that those forces 
could propose it, and fight for it, but the political system in force did not adopt the 
perception that Parliament had governmental competences since the principle of the 
separation of the basic functions of the Polity characterised the Greek political system. 
He proposed that they should formulate the provision according to the paradigm of 
other relevant clauses which provided for hearings of the candidates by the Standing 
Committee on Institutions and Transparency. Moreover, he stressed that the opinion 
of the Committee should influence the final selection. Finally, he warned that he 
would vote against the provision, and vote for its unconstitutionality, if government 
insisted on keeping it.  
 
                                                 
966 Anastassios Peponis, lawyer and politician. He was elected Member of Parliament in the national 
elections of 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1996, and served as Minister in various Ministries 
under the PASOK governments.  
 
967 Article 110 of the Constitution refers to the procedure of its revision. 
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Fotis Kouvelis968, (SYN), following the statement of Anastasios Peponis admitted that 
he was personally an adherent of the perception that Parliament should acquire the 
attributes of a directorial system. Nevertheless, he clarified that taking into 
consideration the Constitution in force, and the principle of the separation of powers, 
the regulation regarding the election of the Ombudsman was deeply unconstitutional. 
He stated that if Members of Parliament were called upon to decide on the issue of the 
constitutionality of the draft law, his party would vote for its unconstitutionality for 
the reasons previously set forth.  
 
The Deputy Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, 
Anastasios Mantelis969, (PASOK), in his speech, defended the government’s position 
                                                 
968 Fotis Kouvelis studied law and political science at Athens University. In 1987 he was elected 
president of the Athens Bar Association. He was elected Member of Parliament with the party of the 
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Democratic Left, and was elected president on July 10, 2010. He is member of the Greek Association 
of Penologists and the Greek Association of Constitutionalists. Source, Fotis Kouvelis’ official web 
page, available at: http://www.kouvelis.gr, date of access: 04.008.2010. 
969 He studied law at Athens University. He was elected Member of Parliament in 1981 with PASOK. 
During the period 1985-1989 he was appointed chairman of the board of the Hellenic Organisation of 
Telecommunications  (OTE), and the Hellenic Post (ELTA). In 1993 he was appointed Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Technology, whilst in January 1996 he became 
Secretary General of the Cabinet. In 1994, he was exonerated by the Athens Council of Appeals for the 
case of direct award tenures to the companies Siemens Hellas and Intracom. In the elections of 1996 he 
was elected Member of Parliament, and was appointed Deputy Minister of the Interior, Public 
Administration and Decentralisation (1996-1997). From 1997 to 2000 he served as Minister of 
Transport and Telecommunications. He was elected Member of Parliament in the national elections of 
2000, but failed to be reelected in the elections of 2004. In 2004 he was hired by European Profiles SA, 
an international consultancy company based in Athens, specialized “in providing services to numerous 
institutional clients in transition and developing economies through the implementation of complex 
Technical Assistance projects financed by the EU, the World Bank and other international donors” 
according to the company’s web site, available at: 
http://www.europeanprofiles.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=122&Itemid=53&la
ng=el, date of access: 04.08.2010). Mantelis first installed himself in Uzbekistan, then Russia, and 
finally Azerbaijan. During the investigation of the Siemens cash-for-contracts scandal – the case dealt 
with allegations that the Greek unit of Siemens bribed officials from Greece's two main political 
groups to win state contracts - by a parliamentary Committee, in May 2010, “Anastasios Mantelis, who 
was transport minister under the PASOK government, reportedly told the parliamentary committee that 
200,000 German marks which had been paid into the Swiss bank account of his best man, Giorgos 
Tsougranis, in November 1998 had been deposited there by Siemens on his behalf. Mantelis reportedly 
told the committee that the money had been given as a “pre-election donation” as he had been 
planning to run as a candidate for Greater Athens in the next parliamentary polls. Mantelis was also 
alleged to have claimed that the 200,000 marks given to him accounted for just a fraction of some 10 
million marks paid to state officials by the firm in a bid to secure lucrative contracts. According to the 
probe, the 200,000 marks ostensibly given to Mantelis to fund an election campaign were not spent on 
electioneering. A portion of the money is alleged to have been spent on schooling fees for the former 
minister’s son. The remainder was transferred to a Greek bank account in Mantelis’s name after the 
Siemens bribery scandal broke in 2007 and the Greek judiciary informed Swiss authorities that it 
needed access to the account containing the suspicious funds”. (Source, Newspaper Kathimerini 
English Edition, May 27, 2010, available at: 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_27/05/2010_117307, date of access: 
04/08/2010). After his testimony before the parliamentary committee “an Athens prosecutor charged 
the ex-minister with “seeking to legalize revenues from criminal activity” after it emerged that some of 
the cash Mantelis received from Siemens Hellas between 1998 and 2000 had been spent on his son’s 
education. Authorities could not charge Mantelis with accepting the payments – which he had 
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regarding the constitutional issues raised by the MPs. He mentioned that even the 
scientific committee of Parliament avoided saying explicitly whether there was a 
constitutional problem since it simply stated the issues raised by an institution which 
bore certain characteristics. He stressed that the government’s intention was to 
achieve the archetypes of the Ombudsman, that is, independence through broad 
interparty acceptance, and democratic legitimacy. With regard to the Constitution, he 
stated that they should always move towards a broad interpretation of its provisions 
since a narrow interpretation would probably create problems. He reminded 
Parliament that in the history of the Nation the issue of unconstitutionality was the last 
taboo invoked in order to hinder progressive efforts that would move things forward. 
He went on saying that interpretation should always be broad, whereas the 
fundamental constitutional principles of the rule of law, egalitarianism, the protection 
of the citizens’ rights, transparency and impartiality should prevail in the institutions 
they voted for. He stressed that they should assess whether the rule of law that 
comprised all the said constitutional values could be achieved through the new 
institution. Regarding the issue of the separation of powers, he reminded Parliament 
that the idea of the strict separation according to which each power was strictly 
entrenched was abandoned shortly after its enactment by the French Revolution since 
there was no real separation among them in practice. He supported his argument by 
making reference to the paradigm of the election of the heads of boards or CEOs of 
the Public Enterprises, Banks and Utilities (DEKO). According to that procedure 
provided for in the Standing Orders, the appointment of head of board or CEO of a 
DECO should be approved by the Committee on Institutions and Transparency970, that 
is, a parliamentary committee. He wondered whether that procedure was equally 
unconstitutional since the CEO of a Public Utility was an organ of the executive that 
had to be approved by Parliament. Moreover, he explained that the legislative body 
should, in a way, follow and monitor the functions of the Executive Power. He also 
mentioned paradigms which proved that powers were complementary such as the 
rulemaking competences of certain independent administrative authorities or the 
elaboration of all presidential decrees of a general regulatory nature by the Council of 
State according to article 95, par. 1d of the Constitution. Within this context, he 
argued that the basic aim of the Greek Constitution and all progressive Constitutions 
was the functional intersection of all the powers in order to achieve balance among 
them. In his view, the concept of the separation of powers guaranteed the avoidance 
of the concentration of all powers in one organ. Consequently, whenever Parliament 
voted for provisions which satisfied that principle, the Constitution was respected. He 
stressed that such a practice gave new perspective to the Constitution since the need to 
proceed to minor changes every four years was made redundant. He supported his 
                                                                                                                                            
described in testimony as “pre-election donations” – because the alleged misdeed has expired under 
the statute of limitations”. (Source, Newspaper Kathimerini English Edition, May 28, 2010, available 
at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_28/05/2010_117335, date of access: 
04.08.2010). Sources for Anastasios Mantelis’s CV, Wikipedia, available at: 
http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A4%CE%AC%CF%83%CE%BF%CF%82_%CE%9C%CE%B1%
CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%B7%CF%82, date of access, 04.08.2010 
970 The information is inexact. The parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises, Banks, and 
Utilities, established in 1989 by the Standing Orders, was competent for the formulation of an opinion 
in relation to the candidates nominated by the competent Minister for the posts of heads of boards or 
CEOs of Public Enterprises, Banks and Utilities. At the time of the discussions, the special permanent 
Committee on Institutions and Transparency did not have such competence according to article 43A of 
the Standing Orders (Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 151/08.07.1996).     
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argumentation on the issue by claiming that England had an unwritten constitution 
established through the functioning of the parliamentary system. He insisted that MPs 
should not consider the draft law unconstitutional - a view that would postpone the 
introduction of the institution for four years, if they had to wait for a constitutional 
revision – since they should take into consideration that the Constitution was 
animated by the principle of the rule of law. Furthermore, he continued his 
argumentation by claiming that the Ombudsman did not pertain to the classic 
administrative bodies, and was not contained in the Constitution. It was widely 
accepted that the Ombudsman was an independent authority, and as such, it should 
evade the regulation implemented in the classic administrative organs.  
 
With regard to the issue of democratic legitimacy, he admitted that government lacked 
the power to scrutinize independent authorities. In his view, that weakness could be 
substituted through the election and dismissal of the Ombudsman by Parliament. The 
proposed provision complemented by the discussion and control of the annual report 
by Parliament constituted fundamental functions of democratic legitimacy. Under 
such circumstances he wondered whether anyone could claim that the 
institutionalisation of that democratic legitimacy was unconstitutional simply because 
there was no reference of the word “democratic legitimacy” in the Constitution.  
Another issue that made him wonder was how they could possibly prohibit, without 
an explicit provision, since the precondition for prohibition was the existence of an 
explicit provision, the institutionalisation of such an authority especially when it 
institutionally guaranteed interparty consensus. He stated that interparty consensus 
was the fullest form of democratic legitimacy, especially when the organ to be 
institutionalised, the Ombudsman, had principally an adjudicatory character. 
Moreover, he wondered why they had the impression that in a parliamentary system 
there was no place for the necessary cooperation between the parliamentary groups 
and the government. In his opinion, it was obvious that government took 
responsibility for its actions, but still it sought to pass these actions through the 
judgement of Parliament. Moreover, he wondered why they had to deprive a 
democratic institution of the possibility to be elected by the whole of the Greek 
Parliament, that is, the whole of the Greek public opinion in order to guarantee its 
independence. Regarding the issue of the qualified majority, he explained that the 
provision in the draft law was not binding and only expressed the intention of the 
government since it was simply a recommendation that would be regulated by the 
Standing Orders in the future. He proposed that they could eliminate the wording 
“qualified majority”, if parliament finally disagreed upon its inclusion in the 
provision. He argued that the final decision upon a qualified or a simple majority 
would be taken by parliament during the revision of the Standing Orders. He stated 
that the government’s proposal was to elect the Ombudsman by a qualified majority 
of three fifths.  
 
Dimitris Sioufas, the Parliamentary Representative of the major opposition (New 
Democracy), regretted that the Deputy Minister had not succeeded in convincing 
Parliament that the government was right in insisting on the issue of the election of 
the Ombudsman, on the one hand, and the issue of the qualified majority, on the other. 
He said that both issues were presented with scientific and legal clarity by Professor 
Pavlopoulos on the part of New Democracy, and Mr. Peponis on the part of the 
majority, and waited for the official position of the government, that is, the speech of 
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the Minister971 who had the political responsibility for the issue. He proposed to 
discuss the clauses in the next session; otherwise, he would put the issue of the 
constitutionality of the provisions before Parliament in order to decide according to 
article 100 of the Standing Orders972. He declared that his party supported the view 
that government should appoint the Ombudsman upon recommendation of the 
Parliament, whereas the issue of the qualified majority should be abandoned.  
 
Stratis Korakas, (Communist Party of Greece/KKE), reminded the MPs of the fact 
that they had recently voted for the provision regarding the election of the heads and 
members of the board of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority by the Conference of 
Presidents973. He stressed that it was one more competence assigned to a Body of 
Parliament, the Conference of Presidents, not even Parliament itself, which was 
created by the Standing Orders with concrete competences: the definition of the 
duration of sessions. He reminded Parliament that they had voted for the provision, 
and the Speaker had simply declared that those issues should be examined in the next 
revision of the Standing Orders. Nevertheless, he stressed that, according to the views 
developed during the session, doubts were expressed upon the power of Parliament to 
define and assign itself new competences, and broaden them, a procedure that 
normally pertained to the jurisdiction of the Constitution. He said that they considered 
that those issues were open, but supported that they should be very attentive, and 
should not act hastily in the promotion of the legislative work.  
 
Leonidas Avdis974, (Communist Party of Greece/KKE) stressed that they could not 
conceal the unconstitutionality of article 2 regarding the issue of the appointment of 
the Ombudsman. He explained that he had the hope that government would have dealt 
with it, and would have proceeded to certain modifications following the relevant 
discussions in the Standing Committee. He emphasized that government did not settle 
the matter despite the fact that the Scientific Committee of Parliament explicitly posed 
the issues of unconstitutionality. He believed that during discussions in particulars all 
necessary modifications would be effected; otherwise, it would be impossible to pass 
the draft law. Moreover, he expressed his great concern regarding the speech of the 
Deputy Minister. In his opinion, the method of interpreting the Constitution upon the 
basis of certain general principles or the legitimisation of draft laws straight upon 
certain general constitutional principles was not only legally dubious and doubtful, 
but also democratically poor. Moreover, he claimed that such legitimisations based 
upon the democratic principle, the general interest, the salvation of the Homeland and 
so on, were close to practices applied by authoritarian regimes.   
                                                 
971 The Deputy Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Anastasios 
Mantelis, had already informed Parliament that the Minister apologized for being absent because he 
had to participate in an extraordinary session of the governmental committee.   
972 Article 100 par. 1 of the Standing Orders entitled “Issues of unconstitutionality” reads as follows: 
“The Speaker of Parliament and each member of Parliament or member of the government may ask 
Parliament, during discussions in principle, to decide upon certain reservations he expresses regarding 
the constitutionality of a draft law or a proposal for a law”. 
973 The draft law “Protection of the individual against the processing of personal data” was discussed 
in principle on March 12, 1997, and in particulars, on March 13, 18, and 19, 1997.  
974 Leonidas Avdis (1937-2000) was a lawyer and politician. During the dictatorship he was exiled to 
the island of Sikinos. In 1994 he was elected Municipal Councillor to the Municipality of Athens 
(Dimos Athinaion). He was elected Member of Parliament in 1996 with the Communist Party of 
Greece, and resigned in May 1997 in order to get involved in the Municipality of Athens. Information 
available at: http://www.avdis.gr/1-2-2-BIOGRAFIKA1.htm, date of access: 06.08.2010. 
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Styliani Alfieri (SYN), agreed with the position of the Special Speaker of her party, 
Fotis Kouvelis, regarding the unconstitutionality of the draft law, and stressed that 
irrespective of the benefits that citizens would gain from the new institution, it would 
not have to be passed by violating the Constitution. She insisted that government 
should examine and resolve the issue.  
 
Georgios Tsafoulias (DIKKI), referring to the speech of the Deputy Minister, 
wondered how it would be possible to judge the constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality of the provisions on the basis of the general principles of 
egalitarianism, protection of the rights, and the rule of law. He argued that the 
invocation of general philosophical principles would lead to interpret everything on 
the basis of those principles. He asked which clause in the Constitution provided that, 
each time a draft law was submitted, they would have to evaluate its content, and, 
consequently, decide upon its constitutionality based upon those principles. He 
claimed that dictatorial regimes, as that of Papadopoulos975, also exercised their 
autocratic rule in the name of justice, egalitarianism, rule of law. In his view, the 
Deputy Minister should not use such concepts in order to combat the value of the 
concept of constitutionality of a provision. He stressed that the Constitution was 
established with blood, effort, and fights and they could not decide upon whether 
something was constitutional simply because it was dictated by the general principle 
of egalitarianism, the protection of rights and the rule of law. He believed that the 
invocation of those vague postulates could not abolish explicit constitutional clauses. 
Moreover, he claimed that they could neither extend the competences of Parliament, 
nor support that the election of the Ombudsman pertained to the provisions regarding 
the function of Parliament on the basis of the general principles since there was no 
such content in article 65 of the Constitution. He wondered how they could possibly 
overcome the clauses regarding the interpretation of the Constitution and the laws in 
order to arrive at the government’s point of view simply because they wanted to do 
so. He claimed that they, the legislators, would be accused of violating any rule of 
interpretation or any rule of constitutional provision in the name of those principles. 
He explained that those principles were established during the French Revolution, and 
Constitutions were established in their name. Furthermore, he reminded that 
constitutional provisions were formulated based upon the content of those principles. 
He stressed that the Minister disregarded the stage of the effectuation of the 
constitutional provisions since he supported that it should be omitted in the name of 
those principles. He reminded that they were in Parliament; there were laws, the 
Constitution, and constitutional provisions. Addressing himself to the Deputy 
Minister, he said that the Deputy Minister should not transfer the spirit of a preacher 
into Parliament. He declared that the MPs had no right to proceed to something like 
that, and his party would resist by the creation of a defensive review against all those 
proclamations. He announced that his party supported the following solution: the 
Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency would propose the 
Ombudsman and the government would be bound to proceed to the appointment. 
Regarding the issue of the qualified majority, he stressed that it was a constitutional 
overthrow. Finally, he supported the proposal of the Parliamentary Representative of 
                                                 
975 G. Papadopoulos, leader of the military-dictatorial regime set up in Greece following the coup in 
April 1967. 
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New Democracy, Dimitrios Sioufas, regarding the need for further discussions upon 
the constitutionality of the provisions in the next session.  
 
The Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Alexandros 
Papadopoulos976 (PASOK), admitted the fact that certain legal and constitutional 
issues were raised. He declared that following the proposals, comments and 
discussions which had previously taken place, there would be an adjustment to the 
provision, and the Ombudsman would be approved by the Committee on Institutions 
and Transparency according to the Standing Orders. He announced that the final 
formulation of the provision would be presented during discussions in particulars.  
 
The Parliamentary Representative of New Democracy, Dimitrios Sioufas, expressed 
the satisfaction of his party, announced that they would vote for it and declared that 
they withdrew their proposal to raise an issue of unconstitutionality of the draft law 
according to article 100 of the Standing Orders. Anastasios Peponis, PASOK, also 
expressed his satisfaction since the Minister confirmed his proposal. He explained that 
the special permanent Committee on Institutions and Transparency had no 
competence to elect and appoint, whereas the Committee on Public Enterprises, 
Banks, and Utilities977 simply expressed an opinion which had an increased prestige. 
He underlined that if the majority of the Committee decided negatively, it would be 
difficult for a democratically sensitive government to ignore the opinion of the 
Committee. He proposed that they should continue that tradition which had first been 
formulated in 1989, and amended through time. Thus, he suggested that in the case of 
the Ombudsman, the competent parliamentary Committee, either the Committee on 
Institutions and Transparency or any other, should express an opinion. He stressed 
that if they decided that the opinion should be expressed by a qualified majority, they 
should be able to foresee what they would do in case the qualified majority was not 
attained. He expressed his personal disagreement with the practice of qualified 
majority in the expression of opinion since it would create political problems, and 
doubts over the prestige of the proposed individual. In other words, in his opinion, it 
meant that an individual rejected by a qualified majority, would be finally supported 
by a simple majority.  
 
The Minister, Alexandros Papadopoulos, stressed that the proposed regulation 
regarding the selection mechanism of the Ombudsman through parliamentary 
consensus was transitional. He announced that the intention of the government was to 
consolidate those procedures through the imminent Constitutional revision since the 
institution needed the prestige of Parliament. Finally, the Deputy Minister, Anastasios 
Mantelis, said that he owed an explanation to Parliament since his views were 
interpreted in various ways. He explained that it was obvious that the government 
sought for a broad interparty acceptance not only during the phase the 
institutionalisation, but also during the implementation of the institution. He noticed 
                                                 
976 Alexandros Papadopoulos is a lawyer and politician. He was elected Member of Parliament in the 
elections of 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2007 and served as Minister in the Ministry of Finance 
(1994-1996), the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (September 1996-
February 1999),  and the Ministry of Health (April 2000-June 2002) under the PASOK governments. 
Source Alekos Papadopoulos’s website, available at: 
http://www.apapadopoulos.gr/main/ministergr/ministergr.htm, date of access:06.08.2010. 
977 The Committee on Public Enterprises, Banks and Utilities has the competence to formulate an 
opinion upon the nominees proposed by the competent Minister as chairmen of the management boards 
of Public Enterprises, Banks and Utilities according to article 49A of the Standing Orders.  
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that some of his colleagues had the impression that the views he expressed in his 
effort to defend the position of the government were extreme and undemocratic. He 
argued that the proposal of the government was that the institution of the Ombudsman 
should have democratic legitimacy by the large majority of the Greek Parliament. And 
he continued by saying that the government’s proposal could not be interpreted as 
undemocratic no matter how hard they tried to harm their political opponent. Finally, 
he stated that their initial proposal that the Ombudsman should be elected by 
Parliament constituted the maximum of democratic legitimisation, whereas their final 
decision that the organ should be approved by the Standing Committee on the 
Institutions and Transparency still guaranteed a minor precondition of democratic 
legitimacy which should always prevail.  
 
7. Discussions of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution regarding the new 
article 101A 
i. The first session of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution: Two 
alternative proposals set by the Rapporteur of the Majority 
 
During the first session that was held on October 17, 2000, Antonios Skyllakos, the 
MP of the leftist party of the minor opposition, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) 
was absent. The General Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos Venizelos, (PASOK), 
in his introductory speech, made clear that through the selection mechanism which 
would be established  in the Constitution they expressed their will that they did not 
intend to create interparty authorities which operated on a compensatory basis among 
parties or social and productive groups. In his opinion, those authorities should be 
composed of outstanding personalities, thus achieving broad acceptance and 
legitimacy. He mentioned that the initial proposal of his party was that the members 
of the independent authorities should be elected by a parliamentary organ, the 
Conference of Presidents, with a qualified majority of three fifths upon proposal of 
the competent Minister. He informed the MPs that the proposal was rejected by the 
opposition since the governing party secured that majority on its own due to the 
composition of the organ978. He proceeded to present two alternative proposals: the 
first version provided that the individuals that would compose the authorities were 
proposed by the Speaker of Parliament and the proposal was submitted to the 
Conference of Presidents. In his view, the Conference was the most appropriate organ 
for consultation in order to achieve consensus. He admitted that the Speaker was a 
member of the governing party, but went on to explain that his institutional role and 
prestige made him suitable for the formulation of a proposal which had many chances 
to be accepted after all necessary consultations with the interested parties. He stressed 
                                                 
978 The composition of the organ is fluctuating according to the number of i) the Standing Committees, 
ii) the independent parliamentarians, and iii) the former Speakers of Parliament that have been elected 
in office. The arithmetic predominance of the parliamentary majority in the Conference of Presidents 
exceeds the one provided for the parliamentary committees that are established in proportion to the 
strength of parties, groups and independents as specified by the Standing Orders according to article 
68, par. 3 of the Constitution. According to the last amendment of the provision regarding the 
composition of the Conference of Presidents by the Standing Orders (Official Gazette, vol. A, 151, 
8.06.1996), the organ is composed of the Speaker of Parliament, the former Speakers of Parliament, in 
case they have been elected in office, the Vice Speakers of Parliament, the Presidents of the Standing 
Committees, the President of the Committee on Institutions and Transparency, the Presidents of the 
Parliamentary Groups, and one independent MP, as representative of the independents, in case there are 
at least five of them (article 13 of the Standing Orders, as in force. Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 
151/-8.07.1996).  
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that the members of the body would seek to reach unanimous decisions. Nevertheless, 
in case they failed, they would have to decide with a qualified majority of three fifths. 
He reminded them of the successful implementation of the analogous provision 
regarding the selection of the President and Vice President of the National Council for 
Radio and Television since the nominees had always been proposed unanimously by 
the Conference of Presidents.  
 
The second version proposed by the Rapporteur provided that the proposal of the 
nominees was submitted by the competent Minister after consultation with the 
political parties and social groups to the competent Standing Committee. He 
explained that the competent Standing Committee would seek to attain a qualified 
majority of three fifths. In case the Committee failed to achieve that after repeated 
voting -twice or three times-, the decision would be taken by a simple majority (the 
absolute majority) of votes, whereas the Minister and the government bore 
responsibility for their failure to attain a qualified majority. Moreover, he clarified 
that those proposals were collective, that is, all nominees should gather a qualified 
majority of votes. Finally, he informed the MPs that during discussions in the 
Standing Committee on Public Administration and Justice the Coalition (SYN) 
through its President Mr Konstantopoulos979 had supported the first proposal, and 
announced that he shared his view.  
 
The General Rapporteur of the Major Opposition, Ioannis Varvitsiotis980, (New 
Democracy), declared that he rejected both versions as appalling since they finally 
facilitated the predominance of the governing party. Moreover, he emphasized that the 
provisions of the Constitution should not be burdened by partisan tendentiousness. He 
clarified that they would accept the first version of the proposal, if two preconditions 
were satisfied: first, a qualified majority of four-fifths, and, second, the stable 
composition of the Conference of Presidents that would permit the attainment of the 
said majority. The General Rapporteur of the Majority asked what would happen, if 
the four fifths were not attained. Ioannis Varvitsiotis replied that the authority should 
cease to operate as an independent authority, and political parties should take their 
responsibilities for that failure.  
 
The General Rapporteur of the Coalition, Fotis Kouvelis, (SYN), supported the view 
that the Conference of Presidents was the appropriate organ to select the members of 
the authorities by a qualified majority of four fifths since the effective function of an 
independent authority demanded the continuous consensus of the political forces, the 
parties, in order to fulfil its work. He also referred to the draft law on the amendment 
of the legislation regarding the National Council for Radio and Television that was 
about to be submitted to the plenary assembly of the Parliament. More specifically, he 
                                                 
979 He is a lawyer, politician, and ex-president of the left-wing party of Coalition (1993-2004). He 
served as Minister of the Interior in the Tzannetakis government, the coalition government between the 
right-wing and left-wing parties, in 1989. In 2010 he was elected President of Panathinaikos F.C. He 
served at the post 57 days since he took over as President on July 13, 2010 and resigned on September 
8, 2010. 
980 He studied law and has a PhD in Corporate Law. He was first elected MP in 1961.  Since then he 
was reelected in all elections (1963, 1964 with the party of ERE and 1974 , 1977 , 1981 , 1985, June 
1989, October 1989, 1990, 1993 , 1996, 2000, with the party of New Democracy). He served as 
Minister in various Ministries under the New Democracy governments. In 2004 he was elected member 
of the European Parliament. Source, National Book Centre, available at: 
http://www.ekebi.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=462&t=1440, date of access 
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emphasized that they considered that all the parties through the procedure of the 
Conference of Presidents were legitimised and recognised as carriers of suggestions 
and proposals.  
 
Charalambos Kastanides981 (PASOK), supported the view that the members of the 
independent authorities, either collective or single-headed, should be elected by the 
competent Standing Committee by a qualified majority of three-fifths regardless of 
whether the proposal was submitted by the competent Minister. In his opinion, the 
main precondition that had to be fulfilled in the procedure was not the person who 
submitted the proposal, either the Minister or the Speaker of Parliament, but the 
increased number of the members who participated in the selection organs. He 
explained that the selection organs should not be single-headed or composed of few 
members since they provided few guarantees. Moreover, he claimed that he did not 
fear that the selection would finally fail since government wanted the operation of 
independent authorities, whereas the opposition would be irrational if it blocked the 
constitution of an authority which eventually facilitated its recognized role of the 
control of power.  
 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos, (New Democracy), rejected the proposal of the General 
Rapporteur  of the Majority since the members of the independent authorities were 
selected by the governmental majority. In his view, the parliamentary organ for the 
selection should be either the Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency, 
which was competent for the parliamentary review of the authorities as provided for 
in the Standing Orders, or the competent Standing Committee. Furthermore, he 
proposed that the executive laws of the appointments clause should define certain 
criteria for the selection. He also suggested two different selection mechanisms 
depending on whether the authorities were collective bodies or single-headed. In the 
case of collective bodies –the heads of the authorities excluded- the political parties 
would propose the triple number of the nominees they were entitled to, whereas the 
Committee on Institutions and Transparency would decide by a qualified majority of 
three fifths. If that failed, parties would propose the candidates in proportion to their 
strength in Parliament based upon the criteria provided for in the law. In the case of 
single-headed authorities and the heads of the management boards of the authorities, 
the Conference of Presidents would decide by a qualified majority of four-fifths. The 
General Rapporteur of the Majority pointed out that his proposal was based upon an 
interparty logic, and thus promoted party dealings. He stressed that according to 
previous experience, as in the case of the selection of the members of the National 
Council for Radio Television, he was not convinced that parties eventually nominated 
independent personalities since it had been proved that those appointed were party 
members. Prokopis Pavlopoulos emphasized that there was no party bargaining when 
specific selection criteria were defined by the law. 
 
Anna Psarouda-Benaki, (New Democracy), supported the view that the institution of 
the independent authorities should be strengthened through the enhancement of the 
role of the Parliament, the role of the parties, and the rights of the parliamentary 
minority. In her opinion, if they moved towards a qualified majority of four fifths, it 
would be a satisfactory solution since a small party of the minority or the major 
                                                 
981 He is a lawyer and politician. He is constantly elected in Parliament since 1981. He served as 
Minister in various Ministries under the PASOK governments. Source, Kastanides’s website, available 
at: http://www.kastanidisharis.gr/index.php?action=constant&id=15, date of access: 12.08.2010. 
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opposition could participate in the formulation of the final result without the 
participation of the governing party. Moreover, she expressed her disagreement with 
the Pavlopoulos’s proposal since party representatives in the composition of the 
authorities could not guarantee their proper and independent functioning as they 
became carriers of the party orders. In case of failure of the attainment of the said 
qualified majority, the independent authority would automatically be degraded to the 
status of a collective administrative organ. In her view, such an undesirable result 
harmed the prestige of the Parliament and the executive power, and thus could serve 
as a deterrent. Ioannis Kefalogiannis982 (New Democracy), argued that Parliament 
should not transfer its powers, which people had entrusted to them, to any other levels 
or organs or extra institutional centres. He suggested that Parliament should appoint 
the members of the authorities by a qualified majority upon proposal of the Speaker. 
He argued that the MPs could not disclaim that responsibility. Moreover, he argued 
that it was politically inconceivable that the MPs of the Hellenic Parliament, as 
representatives of the popular sovereignty and the political power, were not in the 
position to agree upon the constitution of the independent authorities, which would be 
responsible not only for the protection of the public interest, but also the protection of 
the honour and dignity of the political world of the country.  
 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis983, (New Democracy) supported Mrs Benakis’s proposal, and 
fiercely disagreed with the participation of party representatives in the composition of 
                                                 
982 A Greek politician (1932-2012). He studied medicine and was a PhD holder. He came from an old 
family of politicians of the island of Crete. He was elected Member of Parliament in 1958, 1961, 1963 
with the right wing party of ERE, and since 1974 he was continuously reelected until 2004 with the 
right wing party of New Democracy. He served as Minister in various Ministries under the New 
Democracy governments. In 2007 he retired from politics as his daughter, Olga, was elected MP in his 
seat in Crete, and became informal advisor of the Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis. He was accused 
and convicted in 2008 to five months imprisonment with a three year suspension for having pressured 
police officers to scrap evidence in an attempt to protect a cannabis grower in Crete. In January 2010, 
the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law rejected the petition for suspension submitted by 
the convicted former deputy, and ratified the decision of the Court of Appeals. Sources, CNN, available 
at: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/09/23/greece.minister.ap/index.html, date of access, 
12.08.2010, Newspaper Avgi, available at: 
http://www.avgi.gr/ArticleActionshow.action?articleID=519056, date of access, 12.08.2010, 
Wikipedia, available at: 
http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%93%CE%B9%CE%AC%CE%BD%CE%BD%CE%B7%CF%82_
%CE%9A%CE%B5%CF%86%CE%B1%CE%BB%CE%BF%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%AC%CE%B
D%CE%BD%CE%B7%CF%82, date of access, 12.08.2010. 
 
983 He is a politician and former Prime Minister (1990-1993). In 1994 he was indicted for tapping. The 
prosecution was suspended by parliamentary decision on January 16, 1995. In 1994 the Prime Minister, 
K. Mitsotakis, the Minister of Finance, J. Paleokrassas, and the Minister of Industry, Trade and 
Technology A. Andrianopoulos were indicted for the case of the sale of AGET, a state-owned 
enterprise in difficulty. Mitsotakis was accused of inciting a breach of trust, passive corruption and 
misconduct. The Ministers were both accused of dishonesty and misconduct. The prosecution was 
suspended by parliamentary decision on January 16, 1995. Source, Wikipedia, available at : 
http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%95%CE%B9%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BA%CF%8C_%CE%94%
CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%83%CF%84%CE%AE%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%BF_(%CE%A5
%CF%80%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%81%CE%B3%CE%BF%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B5
%CE%AF%CE%BF), date of access: 16.08.2010. 
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the authorities. He was confident that the competent selection committee would find 
and propose the persons who would undertake that task since he believed there were 
still honest people in the country for whom the MPs had no information on their party 
affiliations. As for the draft law on the amendment of legislation regarding the 
National Council for Radio and Television which was about to be submitted in the 
Plenary assembly of the Parliament, he considered it as inadmissible in the sense that 
the selection mechanism of the members of the National Council for Radio and 
Television would be discussed and voted before the final formulation of the relevant 
clause by the Constitution. In his opinion, it was a way to prejudice the decision of 
Parliament, and suggested that the government should withdraw the clause from the 
draft law. The General Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos Venizelos, agreed upon 
that suggestion, and went on formulating a new proposal based upon what was 
previously said by the MPs: the Speaker of Parliament proposed, the constitutionally 
consolidated [sic] Conference of Presidents decided unanimously or, at least, by a 
qualified majority of four fifths. In case they failed to attain the said majority, -which 
he doubted- despite the fact that it was a procedure in which the Speaker of 
Parliament, the political parties with their official representatives, the Conference of 
Presidents were engaged, they should provide for a mechanism for the constitution of 
a simple collective organ. Nevertheless, he was confident that the selection procedure 
would succeed. Prokopis Pavlopoulos replied that degrading the independent 
authorities to the status of common public services practically led to their 
abolishment. Moreover, he explained that under such circumstances the government 
should propose the individuals it preferred for those posts since it had the majority, 
whereas the opposition was indirectly forced to follow the majority’s proposal, 
otherwise, they would all bear the burden of degrading the independent authorities to 
common public services.  
 
Charalambos Kastanides, (PASOK) insisted that he preferred collective organs with 
many members since they provided more guarantees of independence and credibility, 
and rejected once more the version of the Conference of Presidents despite the fact 
that he expressed his deep respect for all those who composed that organ.   
 
ii. The second session of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution: the role of 
the political parties in the nomination procedure and the proposal of the competent 
Standing Committee as the appropriate organ for the selection 
 
During the second session that was held on the morning of October 18, 2000, Fotis 
Kouvelis, the MP of the leftist party of the minor opposition, the Coalition (SYN), 
was absent. The General Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos Venizelos, (PASOK), 
submitted a note on the proposal of the provision for the selection mechanism984. 
Antonios Skyllakos985, (KKE), expressed the disagreement of his party over two 
                                                 
984 The proposed provision read as follows: “The members of the authorities are selected upon decision 
of the Conference of Presidents with the intent to attain unanimity, or at least, by a qualified majority 
of four-fifths of those present. If the said unanimity is not attained, it is considered that are selected and 
appointed those who gathered a qualified majority of three-fifths of the members present, whereas the 
selection procedure for those members who did not gather a qualified majority of four-fifths is repeated 
after six months. All relevant issues regarding the selection procedure are specified by the Standing 
Orders of Parliament”.  
985 He is a lawyer and politician. Since 1989 he is elected Member of Parliament. Source, Website of 
the Hellenic Parliament, available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouleftes/Viografika-
Stoicheia/?MPId=1788a2eb-3531-474e-af3a-ec9a08e54cdd, date of access: 13.06.2010.  
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issues: first, the final and decisive role of the governmental majority in the selection 
mechanism, and second the exclusion of the political parties from the selection 
procedure, and subsequent exclusion of party representatives from the composition of 
the boards of the authorities.   
 
Vasilios Kontogiannopoulos986, (New Democracy) supported that the members of the 
authorities had to be selected by the competent Standing Committee by a qualified 
majority of three fifths. Moreover, he agreed with Mrs Benakis’s and President 
Mitsotakis’s proposal that in case they failed to attain unanimity, all the political 
forces should accept the cost, and thus those authorities would operate as public 
services.  
 
Anastasios Nerantzis987, (New Democracy) argued that the main issue regarding the 
selection mechanism was not the organ which had to decide, but the qualified 
majority that would be applied. He stressed that he preferred an independent authority 
of interparty composition, and reminded that they did not have much leeway in the 
achievement of an agreement upon the individuals who had to be selected.  
 
The General Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos Venizelos, summarised the 
previously exposed prevailing proposals that formulated the following procedure: The 
competent Standing Committee would decide upon the selection. The Standing Orders 
would define the competent Standing Committee. The competent Minister would 
submit a proposal. Proposals could also be submitted by the parties. He wished that 
those proposals would not assume a partisan character, but would be the result of 
consultation. The members of the authorities would be selected by a qualified 
majority of the three-fifths of the members present of the competent Standing 
Committee. In case the attainment of the said majority for all the members failed, 
despite all efforts, the authority would temporarily be complemented by those 
individuals who would have taken the majority of votes. Those members who did not 
gather the qualified majority of the three-fifths would participate to a new selection 
procedure after six months988. He claimed that such a procedure guaranteed broad 
consensus, and demanded a continuous effort in order to achieve it. Moreover, he 
stressed that the competent Standing Committee kept contact with the independent 
authority, and thus contributed to its proper function despite the weakness to gather a 
                                                 
986 He studied law, and was continuously elected MP from 1974 until 2000. He served as Minister and 
Deputy Minister under the New Democracy governments, the Tzannetakis cooperation government, the 
Zolotas ecumenical government. In 1998 he was expelled from the party of New Democracy, and 
joined the party of PASOK. In 2000 he was elected MP with the party of PASOK. He participated as 
Deputy Minister of Health in the Simitis’s last government. Source, Kontogiannopoulos’s official 
website, available at: http://www.kontogiannopoulos.gr/index.php?lang=gr&sec=1&ctg=12, date of 
access: 13.08.2010.  
987 He studied law and was elected MP in the elections of November 1989, October 1993, September 
1996, April 2000, March 2004, September 2007 with the party of New Democracy. He served as 
Deputy Minister of Transport and Communication (2004-2006), and Deputy Minister of Development 
(2006-2007) under the New Democracy governments.   
988 Evangelos Venizelos explained that within the repeat process they could enlarge the list of nominees 
with new candidates apart from those who had not initially gathered a majority of three-fifths during 
the previous procedure. Charalambos Kastanides improved the wording of the provision as follows: “. . 
.the procedure for those members who did not gather the qualified majority is repeated among them 
or/and other persons, after six months”. 
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qualified majority for its constitution. The President of the Committee, Phoibos 
Ioannides, asked whether the three-fifths corresponded to the whole number of the 
members of the competent Standing Committee or to the members present. Evangelos 
Venizelos replied that it corresponded to the members present, and explained that if a 
party wanted to abstain from the procedure, it could do so by taking the responsibility. 
 
Antonios Skyllakos (KKE) expressed his intense disagreement with the formulation 
of the provision.  He was deeply concerned with the reversal of the previous regime 
regarding the selection mechanism of the National Council for Radio and Television 
which was politically relevant and crucial. He stressed that until then each party 
appointed directly its representatives, whereas the new system provided that parties 
simply proposed their nominees. He explained that the majority of the three-fifths 
could reject the proposals of the smaller leftist parties, and thus a vested right was 
violated; it was taken back by the parties of PASOK and New Democracy.  The 
President of the Committee, Phoibos Ioannides989, clarified that the new clause did not 
provide for an interparty authority. Antonios Skyllakos claimed that they should be 
sincere and admit that the parties would propose, but the majority would decide 
whether a candidate of the Communist party would be finally appointed.  
 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis (New Democracy) argued that he completely disagreed with 
Antonios Skyllakos. Moreover, he stressed that it would be a big mistake, if the 
wording of the clause in the Constitution explicitly provided that the Minister and the 
parties proposed the nominees. He suggested that the wording of the provision should 
be simple and make only reference to the issue of the majority. From then on they 
would have the chance to select the best. He explained that if the parties proposed, the 
nominees bore the stamp of partisanship. In his opinion, there would be reactions 
from the other parties, as the ones previously described by Antonios Skyllakos. He 
insisted that the Standing Committee should select the best candidates with a qualified 
majority without making any reference on the procedure, and without identifying the 
nominees with party affiliations. He reminded that the participation of party 
representatives in the composition of the National Council for Radio and Television 
that had led to the failure of the authority. Evangelos Venizelos agreed with that view. 
 
Ioannis Varvitsiotis (New Democracy) stressed that the parties should have the right 
to propose candidates. He wondered why a political party could not propose a 
competent, uncorrupted person. He believed that such a person would not be voted on 
the basis of her party affiliation. Konstantinos Mitsotakis replied that nobody claimed 
that parties should not have such a right. He explained that it should not be explicitly 
formulated in the provision of the Constitution since there would be a 
misunderstanding. Ioannis Varvitsiotis (New Democracy) still expressed his 
disagreement, and explained that as Rapporteur of the major opposition he had agreed 
upon the formulation of the provision after consultation with Mr Venizelos. 
 
Charalambos Kastanides (PASOK) agreed that the appointments clause should make 
no reference to the persons or institutions that had the right to propose the candidates 
of the authorities. He explained that there was no reason to define that since the 
political parties were an institution recognised in the Constitution. In his opinion, it 
                                                 
989 He studied law and was elected MP for the first time in 1989. He served as Deputy Minister of 
Health, Welfare and Social Security (1993-1995) and Deputy Minister of Development (1996) under 
the PASOK governments. 
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was obvious that there would be a consultation process among the political parties 
before the submission of the final proposal to the competent parliamentary committee. 
 
Evangelos Venizelos proposed that they should vote upon the issue during the 
evening session since there were disagreements. He argued that two more issues were 
raised. First, he claimed that it would be difficult to find credible and serious persons 
who would accept to exercise their functions for six months in case their candidacy 
failed to attain the necessary qualified majority. Second, he reminded that the Speaker 
of Parliament had the power to select the president of the National Council for Radio 
and Television according to the law 2173/1993, and wondered whether it was elegant 
to deprive him of that competence. He proposed that they should decide upon those 
issues during the evening session. Finally, he declared that he would continue 
consultations with the left-wing parties, Coalition and the Communist Party since he 
wanted to prove that the government followed democratic practices and the 
perceptions of the smaller parties were fully respected.  
 
iii. The third session of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution: an 
illegitimate voting and the reintroduction of the Conference of Presidents to the 
discussion 
 
During the third session that was held on the evening of October 18, 2000 a number of 
articles were voted. The President of the Committee, Phoibos Ioannides, suggested 
that they should vote article 101A the day after since they did not have the final 
formulation of the provision. The General Rapporteur of the major opposition, Ioannis 
Varvitsiotis (New Democracy), replied that they had completed the formulation of the 
provision during the morning session. The General Rapporteur of the majority asked 
whether they were about to vote for article 101A. The President of the Committee 
confirmed that they would vote for it; that was certain. He went on by asking the 
Body whether the article was accepted. All MPs replied that it was accepted. The 
President of the Committee, Phoibos Ioannides, announced that article 101A was 
unanimously accepted.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the voting, the General Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos 
Venizelos, brought back the issue of the selection mechanism for further discussion. 
He claimed that due to the serious remarks exposed by President Konstantinos 
Mitsotakis, (New Democracy), the reservations and objections expressed by the MP 
of the Communist party (KKE), Antonios Skyllakos, and the absence of the MP of the 
Coalition (SYN), Fotis Kouvelis, from the session the previous day, they should try to 
set a framework that would guarantee the core of their agreement. The President of 
the Committee, Phoibos Ioannides, announced that they would continue to discuss the 
issue the day after. Before the interruption of the session, the General Rapporteur of 
the Coalition, Fotis Kouvelis, (SYN) and the General Rapporteur of the major 
opposition, Ioannis Varvitsiotis (New Democracy) spoke. Fotis Kouvelis argued that 
the members of the National Council for Radio and Television should be selected by 
the Conference of Presidents by a qualified majority of four-fifths. He claimed that it 
was the appropriate organ for the exchange of views, the evaluation and assessment of 
the proposals of all the political parties. He announced that his party would not renege 
on its position regarding the selection organ. He stressed that if they were willing to 
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deal with the issue of intermeshed interests990, they should select a qualified majority 
in the context of the function of the Conference of Presidents that would guarantee 
greater democratic support and social representativeness. The Rapporteur of the major 
opposition, Ioannis Varvitsiotis, (New Democracy), claimed that the Conference of 
Presidents was an organ mostly formulated by the Majority and did not have the 
democratic legitimacy of the Standing Committees. Fotis Kouvelis argued that the 
qualified majority of four fifths did not only correspond to the governmental majority. 
Ioannis Varvitsiotis announced that his party would not accept any change in the 
provision as formulated in the morning session, and declared that it was obvious that 
the Majority reneged on its initial position. Evangelos Venizelos replied that they 
should respect the agonies of the small parties.  
 
iv. The fourth session of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution: the 
Conference of Presidents as the competent organ for the selection of the members of 
the authorities by a qualified majority of four-fifths. 
 
The fourth session was held on the morning of October 19, 2000. After the 
introductory speech of the President of the Committee regarding the procedure to be 
followed during the session, the Rapporteur of the major opposition, Ioannis 
Varvitsiotis, (New Democracy) claimed that they had already entered the stage of 
voting, that they had already agreed upon the formulation of article 101A the previous 
day, and that the voting was interrupted thus violating the provisions of the Standing 
Orders. The President replied that Mr Venizelos had to contact the other parties in 
order to agree upon the formulation of the final proposal upon which the MPs would 
have to vote. Ioannis Varvitsiotis insisted upon his claim, whereas the President of the 
Committee expressed his disagreement, and argued that even if there had been some 
kind of irregularity, he would have accepted it since they dealt with major issues as 
the Constitution. The General Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos Venizelos, 
admitted that they had agreed with the party of New Democracy that the competent 
organ for the selection would be a Standing Committee. Nevertheless, he stressed that 
they had to avoid raising concerns on the part of the Communist party and the 
Coalition regarding a possible cooperation of the two big parties in the competent 
                                                 
990 Nicos Mouzelis and George Pagoulatos (2004) describe the phenomenon of diaplekomena 
symferonta (intermeshed interests) as follows: “The phenomenon can be regarded as one of the 
perverse effects of the otherwise positive development of the liberalization of radio and television from 
the end of the 1980s. Liberalization ended the monopoly of state-controlled television, which had often 
become a mechanism of shameless and unrestrained government propaganda. However, the gains in 
pluralism and freedom of information were somehow offset by a Gresham-like quality race to the 
bottom, as private channels competed to attract the mass audiences that would allow sufficient profit. 
Moreover, the rise of television programmes into the centre of public attention transferred the 
epicenter of political importance from the Parliament to the talk-show studios, thus further eroding the 
legislature’s institutional role. More importantly, the high political visibility offered by privately owned 
radio and television has constituted the object of desire of competing politicians, increasing their 
dependence on media owners and raising stakes (and consequent economic costs) of publicity. As in 
many other Western democracies, the soaring financial costs of political campaining, largely a result 
of the growing  professionalization of electioneering, have raised party dependence on so-called 
“political money”. The unprecedented power enjoyed by media moguls had had a lot to do with this 
nexus of interdependence at the level not only of party or government but individual politicians as well. 
The inevitable control of state resources (including public contracts, favourable selective legislative 
arrangements and administrative measures) by governments in power and the penetration of media 
owners into a wide range of high-stake business activities perpetuates the umbilical cord between 
politics and business as a mutually accommodative relation of dubious transparency or legitimacy”.   
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parliamentary organ, thus leading to an exclusion of the wishes, proposals, 
personalities that would be introduced for discussion by the other political parties. 
Finally, he reminded the body that all the presidents of the National Council for Radio 
and Television had been unanimously elected by the Conference of Presidents in the 
past. He proposed the final formulation of the provision that read as follows: “. . . The 
members of the authorities are selected by the Conference of Presidents with the 
intent to attain unanimity or by a qualified majority of the four-fifths. In case the 
attainment of the said majority failed, those individuals who gathered the majority of 
the three-fifths are appointed. However, the procedure for the selection of those 
members who did not gather the qualified majority of the four-fifths is repeated after 
six months. All relevant issues regarding the selection procedure are specified by the 
Standing Orders”. Evangelos Venizelos stressed that the Speaker would submit the 
nominations to the organ, but it was obvious that the Speaker conferred and consulted 
with the members of the Conference of Presidents. Answering to Mrs Benaki 
regarding the issue of the composition of the said organ, he stressed that it could not 
be introduced in the Constitution. He assured the MPs that they had no intention to 
change the composition of the Conference of Presidents in the future.  
 
The General Rapporteur of the major opposition, Ioannis Varvitsiotis, declared that 
his party did not agree with the change of the organ for the selection of the members 
of the authorities, and declared that they would not vote for it. First, he explained that 
the Conference of Presidents lacked the broad democratic legitimacy that enjoyed the 
Standing Committees since it was an organ provided by the Standing Orders. Second, 
he insisted that nobody could guarantee that the Speaker would not change the 
composition of the Conference of Presidents in the future through the Standing 
Orders. In his view, the new formulation of the clause was also linked to the effort of 
the party of the majority to eliminate reactions on the part of their own MPs who 
supported the competent Standing Committee as the appropriate selection organ. 
Finally, he stressed that the backbencher was bypassed. Regarding the issue of the 
majority of the four-fifths, the President of the Committee, Phoibos Ioannides, replied 
that even if the Speaker changed the composition, the proportion of the four-fifths 
would be invariable.  
 
The General Rapporteur of the party of the minor opposition (KKE), Antonios 
Skyllakos, once more insisted that the proposed provision favoured the governing 
party regardless of the competent organ for the selection. He repeated his concern 
over the exclusion of party representatives from the composition of the National 
Council for Radio and Television since the role of the media was crucial for the 
electoral results. He stressed that the truth was that the two big political parties, 
PASOK and New Democracy, intended to cover their practices through the saga of 
personalities. He asked the MPs of the two big parties to tell him which personality 
did not possess a political identity. He addressed himself to the MPs of PASOK, and 
wondered whether their party had ever appointed as president or head of an 
independent authority a personality that they did not believe that he would support the 
predominant policy or, in any case, that he would be close to PASOK in most issues. 
He said that they should stop fooling each other since they clearly appointed either 
people from the political parties, or personalities with high standing whose views and 
resistance against pressures were well known to the politicians. He argued that they 
took into consideration all those issues, and then they proceeded to the final selection. 
He stressed that the pursuit of his party was simply to guarantee through the 
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constitutional provision the representation of the smaller parties. The General 
Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos Venizelos, replied that they did not appoint 
party representatives since their intention was to achieve unanimity. Antonios 
Skyllakos, replied that both the political parties and the social groups should be 
represented in the composition of the National Council for Radio and Television, and 
declared that his party would not vote for the provision.  
 
The General Rapporteur of the Coalition (SYN), Fotis Kouvelis, expressed his 
satisfaction regarding the support of their proposal by the General Rapporteur of the 
Majority. He explained that the Conference of Presidents was the most appropriate 
organ for the pursuit of consensual solutions regarding the selection of the heads and 
members of the authorities. Nevertheless, he considered that the repeat of the 
selection procedure for those members who had not attained the qualified majority of 
four-fifths was unfortunate. He proposed that the Conference of Presidents should 
continue consultation until the attainment of the consensual solution of the four-fifths. 
He declared that if the General Rapporteur of the Majority insisted upon the issue of 
the majority of the three-fifths, they would not vote for that proposal.  
 
Anna Psarouda-Benaki (New Democracy), argued that the independent authorities 
were a means to limit and control the power of the executive branch of government 
and wondered whether that power could be limited by extra-institutional factors. She 
explained that at the moment the Conference of Presidents had no constitutional status 
since it was a creation of the Standing Orders. Moreover, the organ was under the 
control of the majority, and thus lacked legatimacy for such an important role, that is, 
give power to the Member of Parliament in order to limit the strength of the executive 
branch. She also linked the content of the proposal to the attempt of the majority to 
muzzle its own MPs who supported the solution of the Standing Committees. In her 
opinion, that proposal could be interpreted as an effort of the majority to deny their 
own MPs the right to express their best judgement according to their conscience, a 
judgement which probably went contrary to the choices of the governmental majority. 
She insisted that the proposed organ had no legitimisation, and was not provided for 
in the Constitution. Finally, she stressed that the majority of the four-fifths poorly 
represented the composition of the whole Parliament.  
 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos, (New Democracy), stressed that the proposed solution 
degraded the role of Parliament itself, and reminded the MPs that they had all agreed 
in the past that Parliament –not the Plenary for obvious reasons- should have a role in 
the selection mechanism of the boards of the authorities. He explained that the 
Plenary should be substituted for the Standing Committees for two reasons. First, the 
MPs would propose the nominees who would compose the final selection list. Second, 
the MPs could express their opinion upon the proposed individuals and discuss. He 
stressed that the Conference of Presidents was an artificial creation of the Standing 
Orders with the competence to settle all issues pertaining to the internal function of 
the Parliament, and thus such a proposal completely bypassed the Standing 
Committee. He admitted that the Speaker selected the president of the National 
Council for Radio and Television because the legislator considered that he enjoyed 
the increased prestige which allowed him to propose the President. He wondered 
whether they considered that all the members of the Conference of Presidents were 
personalities sharing the same prestige with the Speaker of Parliament. He insisted 
that the regulation was a mistake for two reasons. First, they attempted to exclude the 
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participation of parties, at least institutionally, with regard to the proposal of the 
names. In his view, it was obvious that the Speaker would propose them, and there 
would be an effort to make an agreement upon them. Second, the majority of the four-
fifths of the Conference of Presidents were clearly occasional. He explained that the 
major opposition could be totally excluded since the regulation permitted the 
governmental majority to decide with the support of one or two votes on the part of 
the smaller parties of the minor opposition. He claimed that he was not afraid to say 
that such a practice was undemocratic since it represented a smaller part of the Greek 
people. Finally, he asked his colleagues from PASOK that they should not legislate in 
order to keep balances or support the personal views of certain MPs.  
 
Charalambos Kastanides (PASOK) repeated his view that multimember bodies could 
guarantee credibility and transparency in the procedures. Moreover, he claimed that 
the role of the backbencher was appropriate for the selection of the members of the 
independent authorities. He clarified that he supported the version of the Standing 
Committee. Nevertheless, he recommended that in case the Conference of Presidents 
failed to select unanimously the members of the authorities, the issue should be 
relegated to the competent Standing Committee with the majority of three-fifths.  
 
Nicolaos Katsaros (New Democracy), explained with numbers what Mr Venizelos’s 
proposal meant. The majority of four-fifths corresponded to thirteen members, 
whereas the party of the Majority disposed of eleven members, that is, the six 
Presidents of the Standing Committees, the Speaker of Parliament, three Vice-
Speakers and the Parliamentary Representative991. If those eleven members were 
complemented by two more members coming from the third or the fourth party in 
Parliament, the majority of the four-fifths were attained. Moreover, the three-fifths of 
the members of the Conference of Presidents pertained to the governing party, and 
thus some members of the authorities could be selected simply by the governmental 
majority of the three-fifths. He claimed that the repeat of the procedure after six 
months might lead to the same result, if the governing party wished to avoid the 
attainment of the majority of the four-fifths. In his view, the organ did not reflect the 
electoral power of the parties in Parliament contrary to the Standing Committees, and 
thus the independent authorities would be dependent on the party of the majority. 
 
Anastasios Nerantzis (New Democracy), stated that their common concern was to 
assign the competence of the selection to the organ that guaranteed representativeness 
on the one hand, and institutional recognition, on the other. Nevertheless, the 
Conference of Presidents was a temporary and technical organ with restricted 
competences, whereas the procedure of its functioning was not even described in the 
Standing Orders. He claimed that on the contrary the Standing Committees were 
representative organs whose competences and functioning are contained in detail in 
the Standing Orders, and the Constitution. Furthermore, he stressed that the MPs 
could express more freely their opinion in the Standing Committees. Finally, he 
criticised the view of the General Rapporteur of the Majority who claimed that they 
simply wanted to satisfy smaller parties. In his view, there was an attempt to erode the 
representative character of the organ on the one hand, and limit even more the role of 
                                                 
991 According to article 13, par. 1 of the Standing Orders, as in force, regarding the composition of the 
Conference of Presidents, the party of the majority disposed of one more member by right, namely, the 
President of the permanent Committee on Institutions and Transparency.  
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the backbencher, who had become the compressed factor of the political system, on 
the other.   
 
Ioannis Kefalogiannis, (New Democracy), repeated his view that the Parliament by a 
qualified majority upon proposal of the Speaker should take the responsibility of the 
selection. Apostolos Andreoulakos, (New Democracy), stressed that the composition 
of the Conference of Presidents represents the political parties par excellence since it 
is made up of the Speaker, the former Speakers of Parliament if they are active MPs, 
the Vice-Speakers of Parliament, the Presidents of the all the Standing Committees, 
the President of the Committee on Institutions and Transparency, and the Presidents 
of the Parliamentary groups or their representatives. He explained that it is a 
composition of the omnipotence of the political parties, and mainly the governing 
party which possessed the crushing majority. In his opinion, Parliament should decide 
upon the selection of the heads and members of the authorities but since it was 
overburdened, the competence should be assigned to the competent Standing 
Committee and not to the Conference of Presidents. He emphasized that the Standing 
Committees gave the MPS the chance to express themselves and through them the 
people. Moreover, he argued that the organ offered more guarantees of credibility and 
transparency. 
 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis (New Democracy), expressed his discontent with the way 
they had voted. He noticed that if government had disagreements in its bosom, it 
should have resolved them in time without harassing the Committee on the 
Constitution. If the government had a problem with the Speaker of Parliament, they 
should have previously resolved it. He reminded that they had all accepted a proposal, 
and afterwards a new proposal was introduced. He stressed that it was not 
formally/typically inadmissible, but it was not nice and the government should have 
avoided it. He expressed his concern, as other MPs from his party, regarding the 
issues of the lack of the constitutional consolidation of the Conference of Presidents, 
the strict competence of the organ on issues pertaining to the internal functioning of 
Parliament, the degradation of the role of the MPs, and the temporary character of the 
organ. Finally, he asked the government not to insist on its proposal since it was 
politically, legally, and constitutionally unjustified.  
 
The General Rapporteur of the Majority, Evangelos Venizelos, (PASOK) replied to 
the concerns expressed by the MPs. He admitted that the competent Standing 
Committee reflected the proportion of the electoral strength of the political parties, 
and wondered whether in the case of the independent authorities they should rather 
prefer selection organs of high prestige and broader acceptance in the sense of the 
recognisability of their members. He stressed that the main asset of the Conference of 
Presidents - an asset that counterbalanced the issue of proportionality- was that the 
Speaker of Parliament, the Vice-Speakers and the other members would not 
jeopardise their personal prestige. Konstantinos Mitsotakis (New Democracy) 
intervened and noticed that there were no better and no worse MPs; that was a big 
mistake. Evangelos Venizelos (PASOK) replied that it was another thing to be 
Speaker of Parliament, and another not to be. In his view, there were categories of 
MPs in that sense, and special privileges were provided for that reason. He finally 
stated that the Conference of Presidents allowed for substantial discussion, allowed 
for the quest of the individuals who would accept to become members of an 
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independent authority, but who would not accept to undergo the aggressiveness of the 
simple parliamentary procedure.  
 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis (New Democracy) claimed that hearings before the 
competent Standing Committee could be avoided, whereas Evangelos Venizelos 
(PASOK) wondered whether such a thing was possible. On the other hand 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis (New Democracy) wondered why the Conference of 
Presidents could not ask for a hearing. Evangelos Venizelos (PASOK) repeated that 
the Conference of Presidents functioned in a different way compared to the Standing 
Committees, and allowed for substantial discussion. He claimed that distrust should 
end since the Standing Committees were consolidated in the Constitution, and their 
number was stable. Consequently, the composition of the Conference of Presidents 
could not be easily altered. He argued that the constitutional consolidation of the 
Conference of Presidents was guaranteed under article 101A of the Constitution since 
it would be invoked as the competent organ for the selection of the members of the 
independent authorities. He also reminded the MPs that the parliamentary Committee 
on Public Enterprises, Banks and Utilities which was competent for the assessment of 
the chairmen of the boards or CEOs of those public legal persons had failed many 
times to achieve consensus, whereas the Conference of Presidents had always reached 
unanimous decisions for the selection of the president of the National Council for 
Radio and Television. Anastasios Nerantzis (New Democracy) claimed that they 
could not put the blame on the parliamentary Committee; it was the persons’ fault.  
 
Evangelos Venizelos (PASOK) explained that the dynamics of party antagonism in 
the Standing Committees led to disputes and tensions, whereas the members of the 
Conference of Presidents could think and vote on a personal basis. Finally, he insisted 
that if they really intended to appoint powerful personalities to the independent 
authorities, they should protect the selection procedure and the prestige of those 
individuals since no individual with sensitivities and personality would accept to be 
rejected by a part of the Parliament. Konstantinos Mitsotakis (New Democracy) stated 
that there would be no hearings, and the political parties would not propose the 
nominees. Ioannis Varvitsiotis (New Democracy) insisted that the composition of the 
Conference of Presidents could be easily altered either through an increase in the 
number of the Vice-Speakers or through the participation of the President of another 
parliamentary committee. Moreover, he posed another practical issue: the majority of 
the four-fifths corresponded to 13.6 members according to the current composition of 
the organ. He asked whether it would be interpreted as thirteen or fourteen members, 
and expressed the certainty that the interpretation of the governing party would be 
thirteen members beyond any logic. He clearly stated that his party would not vote for 
the assignment of such a high role to the Conference of Presidents. Finally, he 
claimed again that the Speaker of Parliament had cruelly intervened in the work of the 
Committee, and informed the President of the Committee that newspapers made 
reference to the issue. The President of the Committee, Phoibos Ioannides, denied the 
allegations.  
 
The General Rapporteur of the Coalition of the Left and Progress, Fotis Kouvelis, 
(SYN), argued that his party supported the Conference of the Presidents for the 
regulation of the issue, and assured the body that no one had exerted pressure on his 
party, as the ones applied on the General Rapporteur of the Majority according to Mr 
Varvitsiotis’ allegations against the Speaker. He repeated that the Conference of 
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Presidents was the appropriate organ for the quest of consensual solutions. All 
political parties were expressed and represented in that organ. Finally, he stressed that 
the opposition was not divided into minor and major opposition; there was simply the 
opposition. Konstantinos Mitsotakis (New Democracy) interrupted him and argued 
that a small party possessed two votes, and thus contributed to the attainment of the 
majority of the four-fifths if the votes of the governing party were added. Fotis 
Kouvelis (SYN), wondered why fear was raised from the fact that the governmental 
majority would search for votes from the two small parties, whereas it was considered 
that there was no danger and fear from the cooperation of the two big parties that 
actually supported the bipolar, bipartisan system. Nicolaos Katsaros (New 
Democracy) replied that the fear came from the fact that they almost always agreed992. 
The President of the Committee interrupted the discussion and announced the 
beginning of the voting process. According to the voting results, eleven MPs voted for 
the proposal of the General Rapporteur of the Majority, eight MPs voted against the 
proposal, and one MP “present”. Fotis Kouvelis, explained that he voted “present” 
because he did not approve of the alternative solution of the qualified majority of the 
three-fifths in case the qualified majority of the four-fifths was not attained. 
 
8. Discussions on the draft law “National Council for Radio and Television and other 
authorities and organs of the sector for the provision of broadcasting services” (Law 
2863/2000) 
 
The Rapporteur of the Majority, Stephanos Manikas, (PASOK), stated that the draft 
law broadened the competences of the Council, and inevitably led to the need to 
change the selection mechanism of the members of its board. He acknowledged the 
worldwide originality of the current selection system, and the reservations which had 
been expressed in theory and jurisprudence over its constitutionality. Nevertheless, in 
his opinion, the highest risk came from the degradation of the authority to an 
interparty organ. He claimed that the new selection mechanism should be valid and 
credible, and search for the consensus of all wings in Parliament. He made reference 
to relevant authorities and selection mechanisms in the U.S.A., Canada, Sweden, and 
Finland, and concluded that the government’s proposal for the constitution of the 
NCRT marked an institutional step forward. He stressed that the organ of the 
Conference of Presidents was an organ of prestige, understanding, and consensus, and 
argued that the unanimous decisions upon the selection of the presidents of the NCRT 
in the past proved his point.  
 
Anastasios Nerantzis (New Democracy), mentioned that the initial formulation of the 
clause presented by the Minister provided that the Standing Committee of Parliament 
would select the heads and members of the NCRT by a qualified majority of the three-
fifths. Nevertheless, the Minister changed his mind and proposed an alternative 
version that assigned the selection to the Conference of Presidents by a qualified 
majority of the three-fifths which unfortunately coincided with the proportion of the 
strength of the governing party in the organ. Then he was informed with relief that the 
Minister finally proposed the qualified majority of the four-fifths. Nevertheless, in his 
view, two major issues looked for an answer: first, there was no explanation why the 
government did not wait for the completion of the revision of the Constitution, and 
second, why such an important draft law was introduced in a Section while Parliament 
                                                 
992 The MP implies the party of PASOK and the Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN).  
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was in recess. Finally, as member of the Committee on the revision of the 
Constitution, he informed the other MPs of the Plenum that the General Rapporteur of 
the Majority for the revision of the Constitution, had equally changed his initial 
proposal for the competent organ for the selection of the heads and members of the 
independent authorities, and finally proposed the Conference of Presidents instead of 
the competent Standing Committee. He clarified that the Conference of Presidents 
was an extra institutional organ whose composition could be simply altered by the 
Standing Orders of the Parliament.  
 
Liana Kanelli993, (KKE), intensely expressed her discontent with the exclusion of 
party representatives from the composition of the Council. Moreover, she totally 
disagreed with the clause which considered that the assumption of office or the 
position in a political party was incompatible with one’s capacity as member of the 
Council. She urged the MPs not to accept that since a declaration of no political 
involvement and purity as a guarantee of democracy was an insult against democracy 
itself.   
 
Panagiotis Lafazanis994, (SYN), stressed that the clause on the constitution of the 
Council was a positive step that should be properly exploited in order to achieve the 
consensus of all the wings of Parliament, thus enabling the authority to play its crucial 
role against the gigantic domestic interests in the sector of the mass media, and 
probably against foreign ones in the near future.   
 
The Minister of the Press and Mass Media, Dimitrios Reppas995 (PASOK), stressed 
that the new competences assigned to the Council demanded a new profile from its 
members. He refused the claims that the provision of the draft law preceded the final 
regulation by the Constitution since the two procedures, that is, the draft law on the 
appointment of the members of the NCRT, and discussions on the revision of the 
Constitution, ran parallel. He emphasized that in the other countries of the European 
Union the members of the relevant authorities were appointed by the executive power. 
He explained that the involvement of Parliament in the procedure put symbolically 
emphasis on the independent character of the organ. In his view, it was obvious that 
the selection of the Council through organs of Parliament prevented the revival of the 
party system for the appointment of its members, a procedure that could easily 
transform them into party representatives, thus distorting the profile the authority. He 
stressed that the majority of the Committee on the revision of the Constitution and the 
Standing Committee that elaborated the draft law under discussion voted for the 
Conference of Presidents as the competent organ for the selection of the members of 
the NCRT, an organ that had successfully selected the President and Vice-President of 
the NCRT upon proposal of the Speaker of Parliament. He emphasized that all the 
parties equally played a decisive role in the Conference of Presidents, whereas the 
Standing Committees favoured the cooperation of the governing party and the party of 
the major opposition, thus leading the smaller parties to marginalisation. Finally, he 
explained that they eliminated from the provision the possibility to appoint for six 
                                                 
993 She studied law and worked as a journalist. She publishes a monthly magazine. She was elected MP 
in 2000, 2004, 2007 and 2009 with the Communist Party of Greece. 
994 He studied Mathematics and was elected MP in the elections of 2000 (Coalition of the Left and the 
Progress), 2007 and 2009 (Coalition of the Radical Left). 
995 He studied dentistry. He was elected MP in the elections of 1981, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2007 and 2009. He served as Minister in various ministries under the PASOK governments.  
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months those members who would gather the qualified majority of three-fifths since 
they did not intend to exploit the arithmetic majority they possessed in the organ.  
 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos (New Democracy) claimed that even if they passed the clause, 
it could not be applied before the revision of the Constitution on the selection 
mechanism of the heads and members of the boards of the independent authorities, 
and the amendment of the Standing Orders of Parliament. He informed the assembly 
of the discussions that took place in the Committee on the revision of the Constitution 
regarding the selection mechanism of the independent authorities. He stressed that 
despite the fact that they had agreed that the organ for the selection would be the 
competent Standing Committee by a qualified majority of the three-fifths the General 
Rapporteur of the Majority changed his mind, and proposed instead the Conference of 
Presidents invoking the support of the representative of the Coalition in the 
Committee. He emphasized that many MPs from PASOK voted against that proposal, 
whereas the MP Ioannis Magriotis (PASOK) interrupted him and denied that there 
were any leaks on the part of PASOK. Prokopis Pavlopoulos insisted that he was 
right, and mentioned that he would not refer the MPs’ names since it was an internal 
affair of PASOK, and thus he did not want to expose colleagues. He claimed that the 
organ of the Conference of Presidents was inappropriate for three reasons. First, it had 
a fluctuating composition, and thus the majority party could even attain the qualified 
majority of the four-fifths on its own. Second, it lacked broad democratic legitimacy 
since it was composed of a small number of party representatives. He admitted that it 
would be difficult for the Plenum of Parliament to decide upon such an issue. In his 
opinion, the competent Standing Committees were made up of more MPs who could 
express their views upon the nominees in a mature way, unfettered by party 
expediency. Third, they assigned new competences to an organ which was strictly 
responsible for the internal functioning of Parliament before the amendment of the 
Standing Orders of Parliament. He noted that the government intended to create a 
precedent, and thus affect the Revisionary Parliament during discussions on the clause 
regarding the selection mechanism of the independent authorities. He considered that 
such a practice was politically inadmissible and institutionally unconceivable.  
 
Spiridon Striftaris, parliamentary representative of the Communist Party of Greece 
(KKE), claimed that the National Council for Radio and Television could not be an 
independent organ since the Speaker of Parliament was the only one who had the right 
to propose the nominees, and the composition of the Conference of Presidents was 
fluctuating. Moreover, he wondered how they could possibly ascertain whether a 
nominee proposed by the Speaker was not a party member. He suggested that they 
should suspend the discussion of the clause since the issue would be regulated on the 
whole by the revised Constitution. He denied the claims that the participation of party 
representatives in the composition of the NCRT led to its failure since five out of nine 
members were appointed by the majority party. He insisted that the government’s 
main target was to muzzle anyone who had an opposite view. Thus its intention was 
made apparent with the new clause which forbade the members of the NCRT to 
communicate any confidential information that came to their knowledge to persons or 
authorities –with the exception of courts and special parliamentary committees- in the 
discharge of their duties. In his opinion, the presidents of the NCRT had resigned 
because they felt that they did not have the necessary independence in order to 
exercise properly their functions. Finally, he argued that there were no independent 
authorities in practice since they would either serve the system, or they would not 
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exist at all. In his view, it would be inconceivable for a system to give power to 
authorities which would not be under its control. The proposed selection mechanism 
was one way to achieve that since there was no election procedure in practice; they 
rather appointed the ones they wanted.  
 
During the second session of the discussions on the draft law “National Council for 
Radio and Television and other authorities and organs of the sector for the provision 
of broadcasting services” which was held on November 3, 2000, the Parliamentary 
Representative of PASOK, Alexandros Akrivakis, admitted that the NCRT had 
become an interparty organ governed by disputes and controversy, and its members 
were more interested in the promotion of the views of their parties rather than the 
promotion of the serious issues of the Council. He stressed that the Conference of 
Presidents always took unanimous decisions regarding the selection of the president 
of the NCRT upon proposal of the Speaker of Parliament. He claimed that the solution 
of the relevant Standing Committee supported by the party of New Democracy 
presented drawbacks. First, the organ of the Standing Committee was multimember. 
Second, there was publicity which in turn would influence the MPs’ behaviour that 
could lead to disputes and acrimonies, thus making the composition of views even 
more difficult to achieve. Regarding the issue of the suspension of the discussion of 
the clause since it would be definitely regulated by the revised Constitution, he 
claimed that the majority which would vote for the provision on the selection 
mechanism of the NCRT coincided with the majority which would vote during the 
discussions on the Revision of the Constitution. Moreover, the Committee on the 
revision of the Constitution and the Standing Committee that elaborated the draft law 
on NCRT both supported the organ of the Conference of Presidents, and thus nothing 
would change that result in the future. Finally, he mentioned that Mr Pavlopoulos was 
inconsistent with his own views since he had supported the Conference of Presidents 
as the competent organ for the selection of the members of the NCRT in a report of 
the Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency written by the Rapporteurs 
of PASOK (Alexandros Papadopoulos), New Democracy (Prokopis Pavlopoulos), and 
the Coalition (Fotis Kouvelis)996.  
 
Vasilis Kedikoglou997 (PASOK), wondered how the Speaker of Parliament would 
proceed to the nomination of candidates for the Council without prior public 
announcement. He stated that he could not accept that the Speaker of Parliament was 
the wisest of all Greeks leaving in Greece and abroad who had the ability to propose a 
nine-member Council.  
 
                                                 
996 According to that report “The members of the National Council for Radio and Television should be 
selected by the Conference of Presidents, after a hearing by the Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency that will submit a comprehensive report”. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) 
submitted a separate report.   
997 He studied Civil Engineering. He was a founding member of PASOK. He served as Minister of 
Commerce (8.2.1984-21.9.1984) and Minister of Public Works (18.11.1988-17.3.1989) under the 
PASOK governments. In 22.2.1992 the President of PASOK, Andreas Papandreou, expelled him from 
the party. He challenged the validity of his expulsion from the Parliamentary Group of the party, and 
the president of PASOK annulled it later on. He was reelected MP in 1993, 1996 and 2000. In 
21.9.2000 PASOK announced his expulsion from the party, whereas in a letter dated 24.9.2000 he 
stated that he was leaving the Parliamentary Group of PASOK. Source: Evia Portal, available at: 
http://www.eviaportal.gr/content.asp?ID=5980, date of access: 25.08.2010. 
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Prokopis Pavlopoulos (New Democracy), explained to the Parliamentary 
Representative of PASOK, Alexandros Akrivakis, that he was not inconsistent with 
his views since at the time they discussed the issue of a new mechanism for the 
selection of the members of the NCRT, the Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency judged that the Conference of Presidents, after a hearing by the 
Committee on Institutions and Transparency, was more appropriate than the system in 
force. He claimed that discussions on the revision of the Constitution gave him the 
chance to consider the issue on a broader basis since the new constitutional clause 
provided for the formulation of an overall selection mechanism for the independent 
authorities which would be constitutionally consolidated. Moreover, he referred once 
again to the inconsistency of Mr Venizelos’ stance during discussions of the 
Committee on the revision of the Constitution regarding the selection mechanism of 
the heads and members of the independent authorities. He informed the Assembly that 
Mr Venizelos interrupted the voting procedure - an act which was irregular and the 
President of the Committee, Mr Ioannides, should have prevented-, and asked to 
speak. He claimed that many MPs, among them many MPs from PASOK, expressed 
their disagreement. Mr Venizelos, proposed the Conference of Presidents as the 
appropriate organ for the selection of the heads and members of the independent 
authorities instead of the competent Standing Committee. He mentioned that the 
Conference of Presidents prevailed over the competent Standing Committee with a 
marginal vote, whereas many MPs from PASOK disagreed. Finally, he announced 
that his party would vote against the draft law.  
 
Fotis Kouvelis (SYN), argued that the government could claim world-wide originality 
in the practice it followed since it showed contempt for the constitutional legislator 
who would regulate the issue in a few months time. He stressed that there was no such 
precedent in the political history of the world. He claimed that the view that the haste 
of the government to pass the law was suspicious and simultaneously guilty was 
absolutely justified since no concrete and convincing answers were provided. He 
announced that his party would vote against the draft law, and asked the government 
to show braveness and withdraw it.  
 
The Minister of the Press and Mass Media, Dimitrios Reppas, (PASOK) stressed that 
the current selection mechanism of the heads and members of the NCRT constituted a 
world-wide originality since everywhere the members of the relevant authorities were 
appointed by the executive power, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, or the Minister. 
He claimed that the government assigned to an organ of the Parliament the power to 
decide upon the issue in order to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the NCRT and 
safeguard its role. Nevertheless, he noticed that the government was blamed for that. 
Finally, he considered that the reservations or suspicions expressed by the party of 
New Democracy regarding the constitutional consolidation of the Conference of 
Presidents were unjustified since the Standing Orders of the Parliament had never 
been amended without prior broad consensus. 
 
During the third session of the discussions on the draft law “National Council for 
Radio and Television and other authorities and organs of the sector for/of the 
provision of broadcasting services” which was held on November 7, 2000, the 
President of New Democracy, Konstantinos Karamanlis, and the President of the 
Coalition of the Left and Progress, Nicolaos Konstantopoulos, took also part in the 
debate and made their arguments. Konstantinos Karamanlis expressed his intense 
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disagreement with the proposal that the Conference of Presidents should be competent 
for the selection of the heads and members of the boards of the National Council for 
Radio and Television. Moreover, he accused the government of practices that did not 
befit Parliament since the unanimous decision taken by the Committee on the revision 
of the Constitution that supported the version of the competent Standing Committee 
was annulled. He stated that he rejected the organ of the Conference of Presidents for 
the following reasons: first, the competent Minister had supported the version of the 
competent Standing Committee in his initial proposal; second, the Committee on the 
revision of the Constitution had already unanimously voted for the competent 
Standing Committee before the introduction of the new proposal; third, the idea of the 
organ of the Conference of Presidents was imposed by external interventions against 
the initial will of the MPs; fourth, the Conference of Presidents was an organ whose 
composition fluctuated, and thus it could be controlled by the government; fifth, the 
Conference of Presidents possessed less democratic legitimacy in relation to the 
competent Standing Committee; and sixth, the mission of the Conference of 
Presidents was strictly limited to the issues pertaining to the internal functioning of 
Parliament. He emphasized that the amendment of the Standing Orders of the 
Parliament was a prerequisite for the application of the law. In his view, such a 
regulation raised two issues. First, a Minister demanded and gave the order to proceed 
to the amendment of the Standing Orders, thus intervening in the work of the 
legislative body. He wondered how someone could possibly justify the fact that the 
executive branch could request and anticipate changes in issues pertaining to the 
internal functioning of Parliament. Second, the amendment of the Standing Orders – 
and consequently the implementation of the law –would take place after the revision 
of the Constitution. In his view, it made no sense to vote hastily for a law which 
would remain inactive and which would probably prove to be unconstitutional in three 
months time.  
 
The Minister of the Press and Mass Media, Dimitrios Reppas, (PASOK), argued that 
the proposal of New Democracy to assign the selection mechanism to the competent 
Standing Committee by a qualified majority of the three-fifths equally presupposed 
the amendment of the Standing Orders of Parliament. He explained that the decisions 
of the Standing Committee in principle are taken by the absolute majority vote of the 
members present and thus recommended that the opposition should not formulate 
arguments which simply created impressions. He acknowledged the fact that a 
consensus was needed for the constitution of the independent authorities. Therefore, 
he clarified that one’s capacity as member of the NCRT could not coincide with the 
same person’s capacity as a party member. Moreover, in his view, those nominated by 
the political parties should not be at arm’s length from them, but they should rather be 
prestigious personalities that could function unswayed by those who proposed them 
for the position in the board of the NCRT.  
 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos (New Democracy), made clear that they had already requested 
the suspension of the discussion of the clause. He explained that they supported the 
option of the Standing Committee by the qualified majority of the three-fifths, an 
issue that should be legally consolidated after the constitutional revision and the 
amendment of the Standing Orders of Parliament. 
 
The President of the Coalition of the Left and Progress, Nicolaos Konstantopoulos, 
explained that his party supported the Conference of the Presidents for two reasons. 
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First, the composition of the organ was indeed representative, and thus the bipartisan 
system could not level everything. Second, in the Conference of Presidents every 
small party would take responsibility for the way it would use its power. He addressed 
himself to Prokopis Pavlopoulos, and stated that the Coalition wanted to have the 
power of veto and disagreement in case they had to tackle the submission of 
unorthodox proposals, whereas the party of New Democracy sought to attain the 
agreement of the three-fifths in order to put aside the small parties. He reminded the 
assembly that his party had already warned that it was a mistake on the part of the 
government to introduce the draft law so hastily. 
 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis, (New Democracy), replied to the President of the Coalition, 
Nicolaos Konstantopoulos, that his conclusion was not democratic since he claimed 
that his party, which represented 4% of the votes, should have the power of veto, 
whereas the party of the Major Opposition, which represented 43% of the votes, 
should not. Furthermore, he argued that the revision of the Constitution constituted a 
procedure of paramount importance for democracy, and thus the draft law should not 
deal with issues that were currently discussed by the Committee on the revision of the 
Constitution. Finally, he mentioned that Mr Konstantopoulos should support the 
competent Standing Committee which represented in a reduced form the Plenum of 
Parliament – since it was technically impossible for the Plenum of Parliament to 
decide upon the issue-, whereas the organ of the Conference of Presidents did not 
express Parliament.  
 
The MPs of the Communist Party of Greece, (KKE), Liana Kanelli and Spyridon 
Striftaris, disagreed with the fact that only the Speaker of Parliament would have the 
right to propose the nominees, thus violating the independence of the institution. They 
recommended that a list of candidates should be submitted by the political parties and 
the social groups. Prokopis Pavlopoulos (New Democracy) claimed that the 
involvement of the chair of Parliament in the procedure was chargeable to it. He 
stressed that the resignation of two presidents of the NCRT had surely put burden on 
the institution of the Speaker of Parliament since he was directly involved in the 
selection of the said individuals.  
 
9. Discussions of the VII Revisionary Parliament on article 101A of the Constitution 
 
Antonios Skyllakos (KKE), stated that if they had to choose between the Conference 
of Presidents and the competent Standing Committee, they would support the latter 
since an amendment of the composition of the Conference of Presidents by the 
Standing Orders of the Parliament could lead to the attainment of the qualified 
majority of the four-fifths by the government majority itself. Nevertheless, he 
explained that the major issue for his party was the avoidance of the reproduction of 
the bipartisan system through the selection mechanism. In his view, all the political 
parties should be equally represented in the governing boards. Moreover, social 
groups should take part in the composition of the authorities.   
 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos (New Democracy) reminded the assembly that the ex-Speaker 
of the Parliament, Nicolaos Alevras998, had supported the view that the organ of the 
                                                 
998 Ioannis Alevras (1912-1995) was a Greek trade unionist and politician. He was a founding member 
of PASOK. He was elected MP in 1963, 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, and Speaker of the 
Hellenic Parliament in 1981, 1985, 1989. On March 10, 1985 he was appointed provisional President 
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Conference of Presidents could have no other competence than the facilitation of the 
work of the functioning of the Parliament. Therefore, the assignment of such 
procedures was out of question.  
 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis (New Democracy), referred once more to the issue of the 
lack of legitimisation of the Conference of Presidents, both popular and constitutional, 
which actually hindered the organ from taking such decisions. He proposed that if the 
government considered that the competent Standing Committee had too many 
members, they could create another Committee with fewer members which would 
nevertheless guarantee the representativeness of the parties in Parliament according to 
their electoral strength. 
 
Stephanos Manos999, (New Democracy), proposed that they should introduce a rolling 
system of appointments to the boards of the authorities as the one he had 
recommended to the former Minister of Finance Mr Papantoniou, and was 
successfully implemented in the case of the Council of the Bank of Greece. He 
claimed that those arguments that allegedly supported consensus either led to the 
selection of people who were not necessarily the best option or aged people who did 
not have the strength to exercise their duties in an independent manner. In his view, 
the government should appoint them in a rolling system which would prevent the 
simultaneous change of all the members of the authority. Moreover, democratic 
legitimacy meant that the government appointed, and took the responsibility for the 
selection.   
 
Fotis Kouvelis (SYN), stressed that their main concern as MPs should be the 
formulation of regulations which would enable the authorities to achieve real 
independence. In his view, the parliamentary review of the authorities guaranteed 
their substantial independence, thus excluding their subordination to the executive 
power. He explained that the role of Parliament should be decisive in the selection of 
the heads and members of the independent authorities. Therefore, his party supported 
the flexible organ of the Conference of Presidents which would seek the attainment of 
the qualified majority of four-fifths. He argued that the qualified majority would 
elevate the reflexes of the democratic behaviour of the political parties in order to 
achieve consensus which in turn would lead to real merit selections that would endure 
beyond the time of the appointment. Finally, he concluded that the continuous 
consensus of the political forces was a precondition for the function of an independent 
authority. 
                                                                                                                                            
of the Republic following the resignation of Konstantinos Karamanlis. He also exercised his duties as 
Speaker of the Parliament. On February 22, 1990 he was proposed by PASOK as President of the 
Republic but gathered 125 votes against 153 by Konstantinos Karamanlis. Source, Wikipedia, available 
at: 
http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%99%CF%89%CE%AC%CE%BD%CE%BD%CE%B7%CF%82_%
CE%91%CE%BB%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%81%CE%AC%CF%82, date of access: 30.08.2010 
999 He is a Greek politician and industrialist. He studied mechanical engineering (ETH Zurich), and 
received his MBA from Harvard University. He was elected MP in 1977, 1981, 1993, 1996, 2000, and 
2004. He served as Deputy Minister and Minister under the governments of New Democracy. In April 
1999 he founded the Liberal Party and cooperated with the party of New Democracy in the elections of 
2000. In the national elections of 2004 he was included as an independent candidate in the third 
position of the voting paper of the State with PASOK. On March 17, 2009 he was co-founder of a new 
political party, the “Action”. Source Wikipedia, available at: 
http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A3%CF%84%CE%AD%CF%86%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%BF%
CF%82_%CE%9C%CE%AC%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%82, date of access: 30.08.2010. 
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Evangelos Venizelos, Minister of Culture, (PASOK) in his closing speech attempted 
to highlight the superiority of the organ of the Conference of Presidents towards that 
of the competent Standing Committee. He acknowledged that the latter reflected the 
proportion of the strength of parties in Parliament. He claimed that the proposal for 
the Conference of Presidents provoked a distrust which was unjustified in a modern 
democracy. In his opinion, if there was no basis of trust and understanding, 
constitutional regulations seemed useless. He insisted that there should be a basic 
political and institutional trust. He explained that the Conference of Presidents was 
based on a parliamentary practice, a pan European practice. It was based on the 
practice of the European Parliament, and it had become a perennial practice of the 
Hellenic Parliament since the time of Ioannis Alevras. He stressed that the organ had 
proved to be successful in its competence to propose the president and vice-president 
of the NCRT. He stated that he was pleased since he was the competent Minister who 
had proposed that competence in 1993, whereas it was the first relevant competence 
assigned to the Speaker of Parliament and the Conference of Presidents. He 
emphasized that the major advantage of the organ was that it was not based upon the 
proportion of the strength of the political parties. Therefore, in his view, the selection 
did not result from the agreement among the political parties, but rather resulted from 
wider acceptance and consensus. Regarding the proposal of the competent Standing 
Committee and the qualified majority of three-fifths, he acknowledged that the 
agreement between the government and the major opposition would give the solution. 
On the other hand, he claimed that the Conference of Presidents allowed for more 
flexibility. He explained that the agreement of the opposition was necessary, but there 
should be a certain margin for personal assessments and behaviours. In other words, 
he believed that the members of the Conference of Presidents should not consider 
themselves as party representatives. They should be conscious of their own personal 
institutional responsibility as members of the Conference of Presidents, as Presidents 
of a Standing Committee, as members of the chair of Parliament. He argued that they 
should enjoy a greater margin of flexibility, a flexibility which all the MPs claimed 
during the procedure of the revision of the Constitution. He wondered why the 
members of the organ should not also acquire such flexibility in the selection of the 
members of the authorities since they wanted the authorities to come into conflict with 
interests and non political forms of power. In his opinion, it was that flexibility and 
that institutional approach of the procedure which actually made the Conference of 
Presidents the prevailing option. Finally, he proposed that the decision should be 
taken, in any case, by the qualified majority of the four-fifths, and thus recommended 
that the second part of the clause regarding the alternative solution of the repeat of the 
procedure after six months should be eliminated.  
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APPENDIX 3 
 
The Institutional Design of the Appointments Clauses 
in the Five Greek Constitutional Independent Authorities 
AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION (NCRTV) 
Law 1866/1989, article 2, par. 1 and 2 -Phase I 
   
“It shall be made up of an eleven-member Board composed of individuals of 
high prestige in the field of literature, arts, science, technology, and politics 
(par. 1). The members of the National Council and their alternates shall be 
officially appointed by the Minister of the Presidency as follows: a. the party 
or coalition of parties that comes first in seats  shall nominate three members, 
among them the President, b. the party or coalition of parties that comes 
second in seats shall nominate two members, and the party or coalition of 
parties that comes third in seats, one member, c. Five members shall be 
nominated by: the Union of Journalists of the daily newspapers of Athens, 
one member; the Union of Journalists of the daily newspapers of Macedonia-
Thrace, one member; the Central Union of the Greek Municipalities and 
Communities, one member; the Technical Chamber of Greece, one member; 
and the Hellenic Entertainment Federation, one member (par. 2)”. 
Direct nomination of the heads and 
members by the political parties and 
relevant societal groups. 
 
Official Appointment by the Minister 
of the Presidency of the Government 
 
Nomination by private 
organisations*. Before the official 
appointment, the Minister (the 
executive) has the discretion to 
scrutinise the proposal according 
to the criteria set forth in article 2, 
par. 4 of the law  
* We use the term as applied by the 
Greek jurisprudence (Council of 
State) which considers the political 
parties and trade unions, as part of 
the private sphere. 
At the time of the regulation such a 
selection mechanism was not 
provided for in the Constitution, 
irrespective of the conflicting 
theoretical views as to whether the 
authorities are part of the executive 
or they constitute a fourth branch of 
government.  
The appointments clause violated the 
principle of the separation of powers, 
as prescribed in article 26 par. 2 of 
the Constitution providing that “The 
executive powers shall be exercised 
by the President of the Republic and 
the Government”. 
Moreover, the Appointments Clause 
of the Constitution (article 46) 
combined with article 52 par. 1 of the 
Code of Civil servants were violated. 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION (NCRTV)   
Law 2173/1993, article 1-Phase II   
The National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV) shall be made up 
of a nine-member Board. The President and his alternate, the regular and 
alternate members of the NCRTV shall be officially appointed by an act of 
the Minister of the Presidency of the Government as follows: a. The Speaker 
of Parliament, upon proposal of the Conference of Presidents, shall nominate 
the President and his alternate, b. the party or coalition of parties that comes 
first in seats shall nominate four regular members with their alternates, b. the 
party or coalition of parties that comes second in seats shall nominate two 
regular members with their alternates, c. the party or coalition of parties that 
comes third in seats shall nominate one regular member with his alternate, d.  
the party or coalition of parties that comes fourth in seats shall nominate one 
regular member with his alternate (par. 1). If there is no party or coalition of 
parties that comes fourth in seats, the party or coalition of parties that comes 
second in seats shall nominate three regular members with their alternates. If 
there is no party or coalition of parties that comes third in seats, the party or 
coalition of parties that comes second in seats shall nominate four regular 
members with their alternates (par. 2). . .The individuals nominated by the 
Speaker of Parliament and the parties shall be: a. Journalists – members of a 
recognised journalistic union, such as the Union of Journalists of the daily 
newspapers of Athens and the Union of Journalists of the daily newspapers of 
Macedonia-Thrace, b. Scientists with high profile in the field of mass media, 
c. Personalities with particular presence and contribution to literature, the arts 
Phase 1- 
Procedure for the selection of the 
President and his alternate 
Nomination of the President and his 
alternate by the Speaker of 
Parliament upon proposal of the 
Conference of Presidents.  
 
Official Appointment by the Minister 
of the Presidency of the Government 
 
Nomination by parliamentary 
organs. The Minister (the 
executive) has the discretion to 
scrutinise the proposal according 
to the criteria set forth in article 2, 
par. 4 of the law  
 
Phase 2- 
Procedure for the selection of the 
members of the Council  
 
Council of State, Section E, 
Decision No 944, Year 1999. The 
Court judged that the provision was 
unconstitutional since the authority 
was part of the executive branch 
irrespective of the existence of 
administrative hierarchy. The 
selection and appointment of the 
members of the administrative organs 
were exercised by the state according 
to the principle of the separation of 
functions, and thus political 
organisations, as the political parties, 
or any other private organisation, 
could not take part in such 
nomination procedures.    
Due to its relevance, the case was 
relegated to the Plenary of the 
Council of State.  
Council of State in Plenary Session, 
Decision No 656, Year 2000. The 
court exercising an incidental review 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION (NCRTV)   
Law 2173/1993, article 1-Phase II   
or information, and, especially, entertainment, d. Personalities of high 
prestige with particular participation in public life, and especially in 
educational institutions, the local government or the trade union movement 
(par. 4). Parties or coalition of parties that shall nominate more than one 
regular members or their alternates, shall select these individuals from among 
more than one of the categories mentioned in the previous paragraph (par. 5) 
The members are directly nominated 
by the political parties. 
 
Official Appointment by the Minister 
of the Presidency of the Government 
 
Nomination by private 
organisations*. Before the official 
appointment, the Minister (the 
executive) has the discretion to 
scrutinise the proposal according 
to the criteria set forth in article 2, 
par. 4 of the law  
 
 
* We use the term as applied by the 
Greek jurisprudence (Council of 
State) which considers  the political 
parties as part of the private sphere. 
 
 
judged that the provision was 
constitutional since the legislator 
had the discretion to assign the 
selection of the members of the 
NCRTV to political parties on the 
basis of appropriate formal and 
substantial qualifications necessary 
for the exercise of state control over 
the mass media. 
 
At the time of the regulation such a 
selection mechanism was not 
provided for in the Constitution, and 
thus article 26 par. 2 of the 
Constitution was violated. Moreover, 
the Appointments Clause of the 
Constitution (article 46) combined 
with article 52 par. 1 of the Code of 
Civil servants were violated. 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE SELECTION OF PERSONNEL 
Law 2190/1994, art. 4, par. 7- 
Selection mechanism applied during the first application of the law 
  
For the first application of this law, as president, vice-president and members 
of the Council shall be appointed individuals who fulfil the preconditions of 
par. 2 according to the following procedure: First, within ten (10) days after 
publication of this law the Minister of the Presidency of the Government shall 
submit to the Conference of Presidents of Parliament a uniform proposal for 
the posts of the president and vice-president of the Council. A qualified 
majority of four fifths of the members of the Conference is required for the 
approval of the uniform proposal. If such majority is not attained, the 
Minister of the Presidency of the Government shall submit within eight (8) 
days after the announcement of the relevant decision of the Conference a new 
uniform proposal that may be approved by simple majority. After the 
approval of the proposal, the appointment of the nominees shall be made 
official by presidential decree, issued upon proposal of the Minister of the 
Presidency of the Government.  
 
Phase 1- 
Procedure for the selection of the 
President and Vice-President 
 
Selection by the Conference of 
Presidents by a qualified majority of 
four fifths upon a uniform proposal 
of the competent Minister (the 
Minister of the Presidency of the 
Government). In case the qualified 
majority of the four-fifths is not 
attained, a new uniform proposal is 
submitted which may be approved by 
the Conference of Presidents by 
simple majority. 
 
Official Appointment by presidential 
decree issued upon the competent 
Minister’s proposal 
 
At the time of the regulation such a 
selection mechanism was not 
provided for in the Constitution, 
irrespective of the conflicting 
theoretical views as to whether the 
authorities are part of the executive 
or they constitute a fourth branch of 
government.  
The appointments clause violates the 
principle of the separation of powers, 
as prescribed in article 26 par. 2 of 
the Constitution providing that “The 
executive powers shall be exercised 
by the President of the Republic and 
the Government”. 
Moreover, the Appointments Clause 
of the Constitution (article 46) 
combined with article 52 par. 1 of the 
Code of Civil servants were violated. 
The Conference of Presidents was 
not constitutionally consolidated on 
the one hand, and the Standing 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE SELECTION OF PERSONNEL 
Law 2190/1994, art. 4, par. 7- 
Selection mechanism applied during the first application of the law 
  
Second, within ten (10) days after their appointment, the President and Vice-
President of the Council shall submit to the Minister of the Presidency of the 
Government a joint proposal comprising fifteen (15) individuals, at least, as 
candidates. The Minister shall select nine (9) members whose appointment 
shall be made official by a presidential decree, issued upon the Minister’s 
proposal (par. 7). 
 
Nomination and appointment by the 
executive with legislative veto  
 
Checks and balances system 
 
Phase 2- 
Procedure for the selection of the 
members of the Council  
Joint proposal of nominees (at least 
fifteen individuals) submitted by the 
President and Vice-President of the 
Council and final selection of the 
nine members by the competent 
Minister (the Minister of the 
Presidency of the Government). 
 
Official Appointment by presidential 
decree issued upon the competent 
Minister’s proposal 
 
Nomination by the heads of the 
authority and final selection by the 
executive 
Orders of the Parliament did not 
assign any confirmation competences 
regarding the selection of high 
ranking public functionaries to the 
organ. 
 
The selection mechanism provided 
for the members of the Council was 
unconstitutional for the reasons 
mentioned above. 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE SELECTION OF PERSONNEL 
Law 2190/1994, art. 4, par. 7- 
The selection mechanism after the first application of the law 
   
Councillors* shall be selected by the Plenary of the Council after a public 
announcement for the submission of candidacies. The announcement shall be 
promptly issued before the retirement of a counsellor or counsellors due to 
age limit or expiration of the mandate. The counsellor or counsellors that are 
about to retire participate in the plenary session for the selection of a new 
counsellor or counsellors. If a post becomes vacant due to resignation or 
death, the selection shall take place among the rest of the members in quorum 
(as provided for in the decision of article 6 par. 2.). The selected person’s 
appointment shall be made official by a presidential decree issued upon the 
proposal of the Minister of the Presidency of the Government. (par. 3) 
 
Selection of the members of the 
Council  
Open procedure through public 
announcement for the submission of 
candidacies. The Councellors are 
selected by the Plenary of the 
Council. A ministerial decision 
published in the Government Gazette 
provides for the procedure of the 
submission of candidacies and 
selection. 
 
Official Appointment by presidential 
decree issued upon the competent 
Minister’s proposal 
 
Cooptation system. The Minister 
(the executive) has the discretion to 
scrutinise the selected persons 
according to the procedure set forth 
in the ministerial decision of article 
4 par. 5 of the law 
 
Cooptation is a selection model 
according to which members of an 
organ or committee decide on the 
appointment of new 
members/colleagues.  The procedure 
is implemented in the election and/or 
promotion of judges, university 
professors, members of the 
academies. The system of cooptation 
for the selection of the members of 
ASEP violated article 26 par. 2 of the 
Constitution.  
 
Moreover, the Appointments Clause 
of the Constitution (article 46) 
combined with article 52 par. 1 of the 
Code of Civil servants were violated. 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE SELECTION OF PERSONNEL 
Law 2190/1994, art. 4, par. 7- 
The selection mechanism after the first application of the law 
   
The President and the Vice-President shall be elected among the members of 
the Council in plenary session, as long as all vacant posts of the counsellors 
have been filled. The election of the (a new) president or vice-president takes 
place before the retirement of the (previous) president or vice-president due 
to age limit or expiration of the mandate. The president or vice-president that 
is about to retire participates in the plenary session for the election of a new 
president or vice-president. The appointment to the post of president or vice-
president shall be made official by a presidential decree issued upon the 
proposal of the Minister of the Presidency of the Government. 
 
* Councillors are called the members of the Council. 
Selection of the President and Vice-
President 
Selections take place among the 
members of the Council in Plenary 
session, as long as all vacant posts of 
the counsellors have been filled. 
 
Official Appointment by presidential 
decree issued upon the competent 
Minister’s proposal 
Cooptation system. The Minister 
(the executive) has the discretion to 
scrutinise the selected persons 
according to the procedure set forth 
in the ministerial decision of article 
4 par. 5 of the law 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
THE HELLENIC DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY   
Law 2472/1997, article 16, par. 2   
The Authority shall be composed of a judge of a rank corresponding at 
least to that of a Conseiller d’État as President and six members as 
follows: a) A University, full or associate, professor specialized in law; 
b) A University, full or associate, professor specialized in information 
technology; c) A University, full or associate, professor; d) Three 
persons of high standing and experience in the field of the protection of 
personal data. The judge-President and the professors-members may be 
on active service or not1000. 2. The President of the Authority shall be 
employed on a full and exclusive time basis and shall be appointed by 
a Presidential Decree issued upon proposal of the Cabinet following a 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice. If a judge on active service 
is selected for the position of the President, then a decision of the 
competent Supreme Judicial Council is also required. The same 
procedure is to be followed for the selection and appointment of the 
President’s alternate.  
Selection of the President and his 
alternate 
 
They are selected by the Cabinet 
upon proposal of the Minister of 
Justice. 
 
Official Appointment by presidential 
decree 
 
The Executive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The selection mechanism provided 
for the President and his alternate 
was constitutional. 
 
                                                 
1000 “It is allowed for the members of the Data Protection Authority to exercise duties as members of a University faculty on a full or part-time basis”. This section was added pursuant to article 
14 of Law 3068/2002 (Official Gazette 274 A/ 2002). 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
THE HELLENIC DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY   
Law 2472/1997, article 16, par. 2   
The members of the Authority shall be appointed by means of the 
following procedure: the Minister of Justice shall submit to the 
Speaker of Parliament a proposal for the appointment of the six 
ordinary members of the Authority and an equal number of alternates. 
The proposal shall include a double number of candidates. The 
Speaker will then forward the proposal to the Committee on 
Institutions and Transparency, which renders an opinion. The members 
of the Authority and their alternates shall be selected by the 
Conference of Presidents. The persons selected shall be officially 
appointed by presidential decree issued upon proposal of the Minister 
of Justice, and published in the Official Gazette.  
Selection of the members of the 
Council and their alternates 
Submission of a proposal for the 
appointment of the six ordinary 
members of the Authority and an 
equal number of alternates by the 
Minister of Justice to the Speaker of 
Parliament. The proposal includes a 
double number of candidates. The 
Speaker communicates the proposal 
to the Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency, which renders an 
opinion*. The members of the 
Authority and their alternates are 
selected by the Conference of 
Presidents.   
Official Appointment by presidential 
decree upon proposal of the Minister 
of Justice 
 
Nomination and appointment by the 
executive without legislative veto  
Pseudo-Checks and balances 
system 
At the time of the regulation such a 
selection mechanism was not 
provided for in the Constitution, and 
thus article 26 par. 2 of the 
Constitution was violated. Moreover, 
the Appointments Clause of the 
Constitution (article 46) combined 
with article 52 par. 1 of the Code of 
Civil servants were violated. 
 
 
Council of State in Plenary Session, 
Decision No 2279, Year 2001. 
The court exercising an incidental 
review judged that the provision 
regarding the selection of the 
members of the authority was not 
contrary to any constitutional 
provision or principle. The majority 
of the Court linked the special 
parliamentary review for the 
selection of the members of the 
authority (the President exempted) 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
THE HELLENIC DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY   
Law 2472/1997, article 16, par. 2   
 * The Committee formulates an 
opinion according to the procedure 
provided for in article 49A of the 
Standing Orders. 
According to article 49A, par. 3 4 
and 5 of the Standing Orders of the 
Parliament, as amended after the 
voting of the law 2477/1997, the 
competent Minister shall submit a 
CV of the nominee for the post 
containing his/her formal and 
substantial qualifications. The 
Committee holds a public hearing, 
and submits to the competent 
Minister a written report formulating 
its opinion on the candidate. The 
report may contain the opinion of the 
minority, should there is one. 
with the principle of popular 
sovereignty. The minority of the 
Court supported that the organs for 
the nomination and selection of the 
president and the members of the 
authority did not ensure impartiality 
since the selection procedure was 
under the direct or indirect influence 
of the governmental majority thus 
violating articles 2* and 9** of the 
Constitution and the provisions of 
Directive 95/46/EC (especially art. 
28)*** of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free 
movement of such data. In their 
opinion, the power for the 
constitution of the authority should 
be assigned to Parliament which 
possesses the broadest possible 
acceptance in a democratic society. 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
THE HELLENIC DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY   
Law 2472/1997, article 16, par. 2   
  [* Article 2, par. 1: “Respect and protection 
of the value of the human being constitute the 
primary obligations 
of the State”. 
**Article 9, par. 1. “Every person’s home is a 
sanctuary. The private and family life of the 
individual is inviolable. No home search shall 
be made, except when and as specified by law 
and always 
in the presence of representatives of the 
judicial power. 
***Article 28, par. 1 of the Directive 
95/46/EC: “. . .These authorities shall act 
with complete independence in exercising 
the functions entrusted to them”. 
 
The amendment of the provisions of the 
Standing Orders of Parliament* assigning 
decisional competences or/and the 
formulation of opinion to the  Conference of 
Presidents and the Committee on Institutions 
and Transparency regarding nominees for 
certain public posts, as prescribed in 
legislation or the Standing Orders,  took place 
after the enactment of the law 2472/1997.  In 
other words, the competent organs of 
Parliament (the Conference of Presidents and 
the permanent Committee on Institutions and  
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
THE HELLENIC DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY   
Law 2472/1997, article 16, par. 2   
  Transparency) involved in the selection 
mechanism of the members of the 
authority, did not have such competences 
prescribed in the Standing Orders by the 
time of the enactment of the law 
2472/1997** . The amendment of the 
Standing Orders was irregular. 
*Article 1, par. 1, e and par. 4 of the 
amended provisions of the Standing Orders 
of the Parliament (Official Gazette, vol. A, 
258/17.12.1997) 
** The Law was published in the 
Government Gazette on April 18, 1997 
 
 414
 
AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
THE GREEK OMBUDSMAN   
Law 2477/1997, article 2, par. 2   
Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen are selected individuals of recognized 
standing, with superior academic qualifications and enjoying broad social 
acceptance. 2. The Ombudsman is selected by the Cabinet upon previous 
opinion of the Committee on Institutions and Transparency according to the 
procedure provided for in the Standing Orders, and is officially appointed by 
presidential decree.  
 
The Ombudsman 
The Ombudsman is selected by the 
Cabinet upon previous opinion of the 
Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency according to the 
procedure provided for in the 
Standing Orders *.  
 
Official Appointment by presidential 
decree 
 
Nomination and appointment by the 
executive* with legislative 
confirmation  
Pseudo-checks and balances 
system 
 
* According to article 49A, par. 3 4 
and 5 of the Standing Orders of the 
Parliament, as amended after the 
voting of the law 2477/1997, the 
competent Minister shall submit a 
CV of the nominee for the post 
At the time of the regulation such a 
selection mechanism was not 
provided for by the Constitution, and 
thus article 26 par. 2 of the 
Constitution was violated. Moreover, 
the Appointments Clause of the 
Constitution (article 46) combined 
with article 52 par. 1 of the Code of 
Civil servants were violated. 
The amendment of the provisions of 
the Standing Orders of the 
Parliament* assigning the 
formulation of opinion to the 
Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency regarding nominees for 
certain posts public, as prescribed in 
legislation or the Standing Orders,  
took place after the enactment of the 
law 2477/1997. In other words, the 
competent Committee of Parliament 
(the permanent Committee on 
Institutions and 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
THE GREEK OMBUDSMAN   
Law 2477/1997, article 2, par. 2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Deputy Ombudsmen, among whom the Ombudsman’s alternate, are 
(officially) appointed by decision of the Minister of Interior, Public 
Administration and Decentralization upon recommendation of the 
Ombudsman 
 
containing his/her formal and 
substantial qualifications. The 
Committee holds a public hearing, 
and submits to the competent 
Minister a written report formulating 
its opinion on the candidate. The 
report may contain the opinion of the 
minority, should there is one.  
The Deputy Ombudsmen 
The Deputy Ombudsmen, among 
whom the Ombudsman’s alternate, 
are (officially) appointed by decision 
of the Minister of Interior, Public 
Administration and Decentralization 
upon recommendation of the 
Ombudsman  
 
Official Appointment by Ministerial 
Decision 
 
Nomination-selection by the head of 
the authority-Ombudsman, official 
appointment  by the competent 
Minister 
Transparency) involved in the 
selection mechanism of the 
Ombudsman, did not have such 
competences prescribed in the 
Standing Orders by the time of the 
enactment of the law 2477/1997** 
*Article 1, par. 1, e of the amended 
provisions of the Standing Orders 
of the Parliament (Government 
Gazette, vol. A, 258/17.12.1997) 
** The Law was published in the 
Government Gazette on April 10, 
1997. The amendment of the 
Standing Orders was irregular. 
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The Appointments Clause of the members of the constitutional independent authorities 
 proposed by the Committee on the Revision of the Constitution  
(Article 101A, par. 2 of the Constitution under revision) 
Their selection shall made by decision of the Conference of Presidents 
seeking unanimity or, in any case, by the increased majority of four fifths of 
its members. If the said unanimity is not attained, it is considered that are 
selected and appointed those who gathered a qualified majority of three-fifths 
of the members present. However, the selection procedure for those members 
who did not gather a qualified majority is repeated after six months. Matters 
relating to the selection procedure are specified by the Standing Orders of the 
Parliament. 
 
Selection by the Conference of 
Presidents seeking unanimity or, in 
any case, by the increased majority 
of four fifths of its members. Matters 
relating to the selection procedure are 
specified by the Standing Orders of 
the Parliament. 
 
The legislative (the Conference of 
Presidents). The Minister is legally 
bound to proceed to the 
appointment. 
 
Directorial system 
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AUTHORITY 
The Appointments Clause (original text) 
Codification of the provision 
Branch of government/ 
Competent organ/s participating in 
the selection mechanism 
(nomination, selection, and official 
appointment) 
Constitutionality of the provision 
 
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION   
Law 2863/2000, article 2, par. 2-Phase III   
1. The National Council for Radio and Television shall be made up of an 
eleven-member Board. One member is appointed as President, and one 
member as Vice-President. 2. The President, the Vice-President and the other 
members of the National Council for Radio and Television shall be selected 
by the Conference of Presidents of the Hellenic Parliament, upon proposal of 
its Speaker.  The decision shall be taken by a qualified majority of, at least, 
the four-fifths. The Speaker of Parliament shall communicate the selection 
decision to the Minister of the Press and Mass Media who shall issue the 
decision of the appointment of the members, which shall be published in the 
Official Gazette. The selection procedure is initiated by the Minister of the 
Press and Mass Media after a relevant query addressed by the Speaker of the 
Hellenic Parliament. 
The President, the Vice-President 
and the other members of the 
National Council for Radio and 
Television are selected by the 
Conference of Presidents upon 
proposal of the Speaker of 
Parliament.  The decision is taken by 
a qualified majority of, at least, the 
four-fifths. 
 
Official Appointment by the 
competent Minister  
 
The legislative (the Conference of 
Presidents). The Minister is legally 
bound to proceed to the 
appointment.  
 
Directorial system 
At the time of the regulation such a 
selection mechanism was not 
provided for by the Constitution, and 
thus article 26 par. 2 of the 
Constitution was violated. Moreover, 
the Appointments Clause of the 
Constitution (article 46) combined 
with article 52 par. 1 and of the Code 
of Civil servants were violated. 
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Convergence of the Appointments Clause of the Members of Constitutional Independent Authorities: 
Article 101A, par. 2 of the revised Constitution of 2001 
Their selection shall be made by decision of the Conference of the Presidents 
seeking unanimity or, in any case, by the increased majority of four fifths of 
its members. Matters relating to the selection procedure are specified by the 
Standing Orders of the Parliament. 
 
 
Selection by the Conference of 
Presidents seeking unanimity or, in 
any case, by the increased majority 
of four fifths of its members. Matters 
relating to the selection procedure are 
specified by the Standing Orders of 
the Parliament. 
The legislative (the Conference of 
Presidents). The Minister is legally 
bound to proceed to the 
appointment. 
 
Directorial system 
Article 26 of the Constitution was 
revised through the phenomenon of 
the intersection of functions. The 
constitutionality of the revision of 
article 26 is based on functionalist 
argumentation. 
The Conference of Presidents and its 
composition, irrespective of the 
qualified majority provided for by 
article 101A, par. 2, verse c, are not 
consolidated in the Constitution 
(Chrysogonos, 2000). 
Despite the amendment of article 14 
of the Standing Orders of the 
Parliament (Resolution of Parliament 
in Plenum on December 6, 2001, 
published in the Government 
Gazette, vol. A, 284/18.12.2001)   
regarding the competences of the 
Conference of Presidents as provided 
for by the revised Constitution, the 
selection procedure was not further 
specified. Consequently, the 
provision not only lacks 
transparency, but also is contrary to 
the constitutional demand. The 
provision simply provides that “the 
Conference of Presidents shall select 
upon proposal of the Speaker of the 
Parliament”. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
Appointments Clauses of the heads and members of the boards of the national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states –Branch of government/Organ/s participating in the selection mechanism 
Sources: European Platform of Regulatory Authorities, Website: www.epra.org, A site created in 2000 with the support of the DG Education and Culture of 
the European Commission, Websites of the national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field, date of access: 06.09.2010 
 
COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, 
appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the national regulatory authorities 
in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
ALBANIA 
National 
Council of 
Radio and 
Television 
NCRT 
 
Legal Framework: Law nr. 8410, dt.30.09.1998, "On private and public radio and television in 
the Republic of Albania", amended and law 9472. dated 28 may 2007 “On Digital Broadcasting in 
the Republic of Albania”. 
Composition 
Number of members: 7 (seven) Term of of f ice: 5 (FIVE) years Reelect ion possible: _ 
Proposal of members: The parliamentary Committee on Education and Media proposes to the 
Assembly 2 alternative candidates for each position after a selection among at least 4 nominees 
proposed as follows: 
a) 1 member elected from candidates proposed by electronic media associations and groups; 
b)1 member elected from candidates proposed by print media associations; 
c) 1 member elected from candidates proposed by academics and associations of electric 
engineering; 
ç) 1 member elected from candidates proposed by professors of Law, lawyers' associations and the 
Chamber of Lawyers; 
d)1 member elected from candidates proposed by parliamentary parties 
Selection of members: The members of the National Council of Radio-Television are elected by 
the Assembly for a 5 year term, with the right to be re-elected only once. 
 
 
 
 
Selection by the legislature 
(Parliament) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) 
of the heads and members of the boards of the national regulatory authorities in the 
broadcasting field in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
AZERBAIJAN 
National TV 
and Radio 
Council of the 
Republic of 
Azerbaijan 
Legal Framework: Law of TV and Radio Broadcasting”, “Regulation about National TV and 
Radio Council”, ”Law of advertisement“, “Law of mass (information) media“, 2003 
Number of members: 9 Term of office: 6 years  
Proposal of members: - 
Appointment of members: By the President 
 
The Executive (the President) 
Belgium 
(French 
Community) 
Conseil 
supérieur de 
l'audiovisuel - 
CSA 
Legal Framework : Decree on broadcasting services 
Proposal of members: 7 members proposed by the Parliament  - 3 members proposed by the 
government 
Appointment of the members: 7 members are appointed by the Parliament and 3 members are 
appointed by the government 
  
 
The legislature (Parliament) and 
the executive (the government) 
BULGARIA 
Council for 
Electronic 
Media (CEM) 
 
Legal Framework: Radio and Television Act 
Number of members: 9 Term of office: 6 years Re-election possible: _ Once 
Proposal of members: - 
Appointment of members: The Council for Electronic Media consists of nine members, of whom 
five shall be elected by the National Assembly and four are appointed by the President of the 
Republic. 
 
 
The legislature (Parliament) and 
the executive (the President of the 
Republic) 
CYPRUS 
Cyprus  
Radio-
Television 
Authority 
Legal Framework: Radio and Television Stations Law 7(I)/98 and Radio and Television Stations 
Regulations of 2000 
Number of members: 7, Term of office: 6 years  
Proposal and appointment of members: The Cabinet proposes and appoints the Members of the 
Board of the Authority.  
 
 
 
The Executive (the Cabinet) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, 
appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the national regulatory authorities 
in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
SWITZERLAND
Independent 
Complaints 
Authority - 
UBI/AIEP 
Legal Framework: Art. 93 of the Federal Constitution (SR 101) ; articles 58 ss of the Federal 
Law on radio and television of June 21, 1991 (LRTV ; SR 784.40) 
Proposal of members: The Federal Department of the environment, transport, energy and 
communication proposes the members to the Federal Council. 
Appointment of members: The Federal Council appoints the members and the President (art. 58 
al. 1 LRTV). 
 
Appointment by the Executive 
(Federal Council) upon proposal 
of the competent Minister 
SWITZERLAND
Communications 
Commission 
 
The authority has two missions: i) the regulation of the broadcasting sector, and ii) the creation of 
the necessary conditions for the liberalisation of the telecommunications market    
Legal Framework: Telecommunications Act of 30 April 1997, SR 784.10 
Appointment of the members: The Federal Council elects a Federal Communications 
Commission consisting of five to seven members and appoints the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. 
The members must be independent specialists. 
 
 
The Executive (Federal Council) 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
Council for 
Radio and 
Television 
Broadcasting 
Legal Framework: Act No. 483/2001 of 7 May 1991 Broadcasting Act 2001, Advertising Act 
1995 
Number of members: 15 (fifteen) Proposal of members: Chamber of Deputies (propositions of 
political groups of deputies) 
Proposal and selection of the members: The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the 
Czech Republic elects the members of the Council. Nomination proposals for membership in the 
Council submitted to the Chamber of Deputies by organisations and associations representing 
cultural, regional, trade union, employer, religious, educational, scientific, environmental, and 
nationality interests. The proposed nominations are submitted in the manner defined by the 
resolution of the Chamber of Deputies within 15 days after the public announcement of the 
invitation by the Chairperson of the Chamber of Deputies to submit the proposals. Council 
members shall be elected from among the candidates nominated in accordance with Article 4(2) 
above. The Council member’s term of office is 6 years, one-third of the members being elected 
every two years. Appointment of members: Prime Minister (there is legal obligation to appoint 
the proposed persons) 
 
 
 
 
The Legislature (the Chamber of 
Deputies) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
DENMARK 
The Radio And Television Board 
 
Legal Framework: Consolidated Radio and Television Broadcasting Act No. 338 
of April 11, 
2007 
Number of members: 8  
Proposal of members: The Minister of Culture proposes 7 of the members. 1 
member is proposed by the listeners’ and viewers’ organisation. 
Appointment of members: The Minister of Culture 
The minister appoints the 8 members, who together represent expertise in legal, 
financial/administrative, business and media/cultural affairs 
 
 
 
 
The Executive (the Minister), 
whereas 1 member is proposed 
by the listeners’ and viewers’ 
organisation 
 
 
 
ESTONIA 
Estonian Public Broadcasting 
Council 
 
Legal Framework: Broadcasting Law, as amended in June 2008 
Number of members: 10  
Proposal and selection of members:  Upon proposal of the Riigikogu (the 
Parliament of Estonia) Cultural Affairs Committee, the Riigikogu appoints five 
members of the Public Broadcasting Council from among the members of the 
Riigikogu on the basis of the principle of political balance and four members of 
the Public Broadcasting Council from among recognised specialists in the related 
fields of public broadcasting, for a term of five years 
 
 
 
Proposal by the competent 
parliamentary committee 
and selection by the legislature 
(Riigikogu) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
GERMANY 
i) Landesmedienanstalten 
(LMA)-14 State Media 
Authorities monitoring 
commercial 
broadcasting  
 
 
 
ii) Broadcasting Councils 
monitoring public 
radio and television 
i)There is no regulatory authority for private broadcasting at federal level. There 
are 14 State Media Authorities monitoring commercial radio and television at 
state level. State laws provide for the composition of the boards and the selection 
mechanism.  
 
 
 
 
 
ii) Public broadcasters are monitored by internal pluralistic bodies composed of 
representatives from the federal legislature, political parties, trade unions, 
religious communities and business and cultural organisations  
Pluralistically composed 
councils appointed by societal 
groups* and state parliaments 
* representatives from 
political parties are included 
since political parties are 
considered as “socially 
relevant groups” 
 
Pluralistically composed 
councils appointed by societal 
groups and the federal 
legislature 
SPAIN  
Telecommunications Market 
Commission - CMT 
 
Legal Framework:  Law 32/2003, November 3rd, General of 
Telecommunications 
Number of members: 9 Term of office: 6 years  
Proposal of members: The members of the Council are proposed jointly by the 
Ministers of Economy and Industry, Trade and Commerce. 
Appointment of members: The members of the Council are appointed by a 
Decree of the Spanish Government. The nomination of the proposed members 
should be 
submitted to the competent parliamentary Commission for information only. 
 
 
 
The Executive (competent 
Ministers) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
SPAIN 
AUTHORITIES AT REGIONAL 
LEVEL 
Audiovisual Council of Catalonia – 
CAC 
 
 
Audiovisual Council of Navarra 
 
 
 
 
Audiovisual Council of Andalusia 
 
 
Legal Framework: Law 2/2000 of May 4 
Proposal and appointment: Nine of the members are elected by the parliament at 
the proposal of at least three parliamentary groups and by a majority of two thirds. 
The tenth is the President of the Council, proposed and appointed by the 
Government after consideration of the majority opinion of the nine members 
elected by the parliament. 
Legal framework: Law 18/2001 
Number of members: 7 Term of office: 6 years  
Proposal, selection and appointment of members: The members chosen by the 
Parliament are proposed by the political parties with representation (5 members). 
The ones selected by the Government are directly named (2 members) 
Legal framework: Law 1/2004 
Number of members: 11 Term of office: 5 years  
Proposal, selection and appointment of members: The members are selected 
among individuals with a recognised professional prestige in the field of 
audiovisual communication, science, education, culture or society. The members 
are elected by the Parliament of Andalusia by a qualified majority of three-fifths 
of its members and appointed by the Council of the Government. The President is 
elected among the members of the Audiovisual Council of Andalusia and 
appointed by the Council of the Government.  
 
 
The Legislature (regional 
Parliament) 
 
 
 
 
The Legislature (regional 
Parliament) and the Executive 
(regional government) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Legislature (regional 
Parliament) 
 
  
FINLAND 
Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority (FICORA) 
 
Legal framework: A joint authority i.e. several acts applied; among others Act on 
Television and Radio Operations (744/1998), Communications Market Act 
(393/2003). The authority does not have a board and operates as a common 
service of the public sector. The Government grants the licenses (both analogue 
and digital) in a terrestrial mass communications network. FICORA grants short 
term licenses and technical licences (frequencies). 
Selection procedure as a 
common service of the public 
sector 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
UNITED KINGDOM 
(OFCOM) 
 
Legal framework: 2003 Communications Act 
Number of members: 9 
Selection and appointment: 6 members are selected and appointed jointly by the 
secretaries of state for Trade and Industry and for Culture Media and Sport. The 
appointed six members then select the other 3 members from the staff of Ofcom 
including the Chief Executive. 
 
The Executive and cooptation 
system 
CROATIA 
Agency for Electronic Media of the 
Republic of Croatia 
Legal framework: Article 68 of the electronic media act,  2009 
Number of members: Seven members one of which is the president of the 
Council.  
Proposal, selection and appointment: The president and other members of the 
Council shall be appointed by the Croatian Parliament upon the proposal of the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia. In the procedure of nomination of the 
Council members, the Government of the Republic of Croatia announces a public 
invitation for nominating candidates for Council members. The Deputy President 
of the Council, upon proposal of the president of the Council, is selected by the 
Council by majority vote. 
 
 
 
 
Nomination by the 
government through public 
announcement with legislature 
(the Parliament) confirmation 
 
HUNGARY 
The National Media and 
Communications Authority 
Legal Framework: Act LXXXII, 2010                                                                        
Law LXXXII established the National Media and Communications Authority, an 
autonomous administrative body under the supervision of the Parliament. The new 
authority was a merger of the telecom and broadcasting regulatory bodies: the 
National Communications Authority (NHH) and the National Radio and 
Television Commission (ORTT).      The Media Council assumed the role and 
powers of the Board of the former National Radio and Television Commission.        
Number of members: 5                                                                                                
Selection and appointment: The president and its 4 members are elected by 
Parliament by a qualified majority of two-thirds for a renewable term of nine 
years. The President of the authority heads the meetings of the autonomous Media 
Council. The Prime Minister appoints the President.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The legislature (the 
Parliament) by a qualified 
majority of two-thirds (the 
Parliament) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
ISRAEL  
The Council for Cable TV and 
Satellite Broadcasting 
 
Legal framework: The Communication Act 1982 
Number of members: 13 Term of office: 4 years  
Proposal of members: 6 government representatives, employed by the state of 
Israel, of which: 1 member recommended by the minister of justice. 
1 member recommended by the minister of finance. 
1 member recommended by the minister of education and culture. 
3 members recommended by the minister of communication. 
7 public representatives, of which: 
2 members recommended by the union of local authorities. 
2 members - representing the consumers. 
2 members - representing educational and cultural unions. 
1 member - representing the artists and creators in Israel. 
Selection of members: The minister of communication recommends the members 
to the government and the government may approve the recommendations. 
 
Pluralistically composed 
Council  
 
Proposal by the Executive and 
societal groups  
 
 
Selection: the government 
upon proposal of the minister 
of communication 
ITALY 
Autorità per le Garanzie nelle 
Comunicazioni 
Italian Communications Authority 
 
Legal framework: Law n° 249 of 31 July 1997 
Number of members: The Authority has the following structure: the Council and 
two autonomous commissions: i) the Infrastructures and networks Commission, 
and ii) the Services and products Commission. 
Each Commission is a collegiate body, composed of the President, and four 
Commissioners. The President is common for all collegiate bodies. 
Selection and appointment of members: The Senate of the Republic and the 
Chamber of Deputies elect four Commissioners for each commission. The 
members are appointed by a decree of the President of the Republic. 
Selection and appointment of the President: The president of the Authority is 
appointed by a decree of the President of the Republic upon proposal of the 
President of the Council of Ministers in agreement with the Ministry of 
Communications. The nomination of the president of the Authority shall be 
submitted to the competent parliamentary committees for approval.  
 
 
 
The members: 
The legislature (the Senate and 
the Chamber of Deputies)  
 
The President:  
Nomination by the Executive 
with legislature (competent 
parliamentary committees) 
confirmation  
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
LUXEMBOURG 
Conseil National des Programmes 
Legal framework: Law on the electronic media, 1991  
Number of members: 25 Term of office: 5 years  
Proposition and selection of members : They are proposed and selected by the 
following representative organisations of social and cultural life of the country 
(the officially recognised religions, political parties represented in parliament, the 
most representative trade unions, employers’ associations, active organisations in 
culture, family issues, ecology, charity, youth, foreigners) 
Representatives of the officially 
recognised religions; 
Parliamentary group of the CSV; 
Parliamentary group of the 
LSAP; Parliamentary group of 
the DP; Parliamentary group of 
the Déi Greng; OGB-L (Union); 
LCGB (Union); CGFP (Union); 
Chamber of Commerce; National 
Women’s Council; Chamber of 
Trade; Chamber of Agriculture; 
Actioun Lëtzebuergesch Eis 
Sprooch (Luxembourg Author’s 
Committee); ULC (Luxembourg 
Consumer Association); 
C.O.S.L. (National Olympic 
Committee); AFP (Action 
Familiale et Populaire) 
(Organisation for family rights); 
Foyer de la Femme (Organisation for 
Women’s rights) ; Conférence 
Générale de la Jeunesse (General 
Youth Conference) ; Amiperas 
(Committee for the elderly);  Comité 
de Liaison et d’Action des Etrangers 
(CLAE) (Liaison Committee for 
Foreigners) ; Coalition nationale 
pour les droits de l’enfant (National 
Coalition for children’s rights ) ;  
Croix-Rouge / Caritas (Red Cross) ; 
Mouvement Ecologique / Natura 
(Ecomovement) The Ecological 
Movement / Natura; UGDA 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
MONTENEGRO 
Broadcasting Agency  
of Montenegro 
 
 
Legal framework: Media Law 01-2808/4, 2002 
Number of members: 5 Selection: The Parliament of the Republic of 
Montenegro shall ratify the appointment of the Agency Council members. 
The authorized nominators for members of the Agency Council are: 
Government of the Republic of Montenegro; University of Montenegro; 
Broadcasters associations in Montenegro, excluding associations of public 
broadcasting services; Non-governmental organizations and citizens' associations 
involved in the protection of human rights and freedoms; Non-governmental 
organizations in the media sphere. 
A nominee for the Agency Council Member shall not necessarily be from the 
ranks of the authorized nominator. 
The law is under amendment. According to the Draft Electronic Media Law 
the organs of the Broadcasting Agency of Montenegro are:  
i) the Broadcasting Council; ii) the Board of Administration; 
iii) the Director General. 
The Broadcasting Council represents the interests of the general public with 
regard to programming. The Broadcasting Council is composed of twelve 
members, coming as far as possible from different groups comprising the civil 
society. The Council members are elected by (the Lower Chamber of) Parliament, 
by a three-quarters majority, following a public hearing with potential nominees. 
Each member is appointed for a fixed period of six years.  However, as regards 
the initial composition of the Council, four members shall be nominated for a 
period of two years, four members for a period of four years and four members for 
a period of six years. The Board of Administration supervises the business 
affairs of the agency, both internal and external, with the exception of matters 
relating to programming. It is composed of seven members.  They shall be experts 
in matters of administration and finance and may not in the exercise of their 
function represent their own interests or those of third parties. 
 
 
Pluralistically composed 
Council  
 
 
The Executive and societal 
group (the Legislature simply 
ratifies the selection) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposed appointments 
clause:  
 
The legislature (Lower 
Chamber of Parliament) by a 
qualified majority of ¾ after a 
public hearing of the nominees 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
MOLDOVA 
Council for Coordination on the 
audiovisual activity  
 
Legal framework: Broadcasting Law no. 603-XIII of 03.10.1995 
Number of members: 9 
Selection: The Council members are selected by the President (3), the Parliament 
(3) and the Government (3). 
The Executive (the President 
and the Government), and the 
Legislature (the Parliament)  
NETHERLANDS 
Commissariaat voor de Media 
(The Dutch Media Authority) 
Legal Framework: Dutch Media Act , 1988, chapter 2 
Number of members: 3; Term of office: 3 
Proposal, selection, appointment: By Royal Decree upon recommendation of the 
State Secretary of Media Affairs 
 
The Executive (the competent 
Minister) 
NORWAY 
Norwegian Media Authority 
 
 
 
The Broadcasting Council 
 
 
 
 
 
The Regional Broadcast Councils 
Legal Framework: Act no. 127 of 4 December 1992 relating to Broadcasting 
section 2-1, paragraph 4 
Number of members: 3 
The Norwegian Media Authority is the administrative agency for broadcasting 
and local broadcasting and reports to the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs.  
The Broadcasting Council discusses and expresses its opinion on the general 
programme policy of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation. 
Proposal, selection, appointment The Broadcasting Council comprises 14 
members with their alternates. The Storting (Parliament) appoints eight members, 
one of whom shall be the Director of the Sámi Programme Council. Six members, 
including the Chair and the Deputy-Chair, are appointed by the King. 
The Regional Broadcast Councils express their opinion on the general 
programme policy of the Regional Offices and on programme matters which the 
Director General or the Director of the Regional Office concerned submits to the 
Council, or which the Council itself sees reason to take up. 
Proposal, selection, appointment: The Regional Programme Councils comprise 
five members with their alternates who are appointed for a term of four years by 
the County Authority. The King may issue rules concerning the appointment and 
composition of Regional Programme Councils in cases where a Regional Office 
serves more than one county. 
 
 
 
The Executive  
 
 
The Legislature (the Storting) 
and the Executive (the King) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Executive 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
PORTUGAL  
Regulatory Entity for 
the Media 
Legal framework: Law no. 53/2006, of 8 November, established ERC and 
approved its Statutes 
Number of members: 5; Term of office: Five years  
Proposal of members: At least 10 members of the Assembly of the Republic, and 
40 at the most, propose the lists of candidates. 
Selection of members: The Assembly of the Republic appoints the members of 
the Regulatory Board. The Regulatory Board then elects the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman from among its members. 
 
 
 
The Legislature (the Assembly 
of the Republic) 
 
 
ROMANIA 
National Audiovisual Council 
Legal framework: Audiovisual Law no.504/2002, as amended  
Number of members: 11 
Proposal and selection of the members: Article 11 of Law no.504/2002. Law 
no.504/2002 (1) The Council is made up of 11 members and it is assigned by the 
Parliament, following the recommendations made as follows: a) The Senate: 3 
members; b) The Chamber of Deputies: 3 members; c) The President of Romania: 
2 members; d) The Government: 3 members . (2) The proposals assign the 
candidate for the position of a titleholder, as well as the candidate for the position 
of a deputy and they shall be forwarded to the standing offices of the two 
Chambers within 15 days since the date of commencing the assignment procedure. 
(3) The standing offices of the two Chambers forward the proposals to the 
specialized standing commissions with a view to the candidates’ hearing in joint 
session. (4)After the hearing, the specialized standing commissions draw up a 
joint notification which they present to the joint session of the Chamber of 
Deputies and of the Senate.(5) Candidateship shall be approved by the vote of the 
majority of deputies and senators, provided that the two Chambers are in quorum. 
According to Art.14 the Council is headed by a president and is elected from 
among the members of the Council, upon proposal of the Council’s members. The 
vice-president is elected by the secret vote of the Council, in the presence of at 
least 9 of its members.  
 
 
Nomination by the Senate, the 
Chamber of Deputies, the 
President of the Republic, the 
Government with legislature  
 
 
 
 
 
Nomination by the Senate, the 
Chamber of Deputies, the 
President of the Republic, the 
Government with joint 
legislature (the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate) 
confirmation 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
SWEDEN 
The Swedish Broadcasting 
Authority 
Legal framework: The Radio and Television Act, which came into force on 
August 1, 2010, transposes the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(AVMS). 
The Swedish Broadcasting Authority is the result of a merger between the Radio 
and TV Authority and the Swedish Broadcasting Commission.  
Number of members: 7 and 4 alternates Term of office: 3 years  
Proposal of members: Informal procedure within the Government 
Appointment of members: Members are appointed by the Government 
 
The Executive (the 
Government) 
SLOVAKIA 
Council for Broadcasting  
and Retransmission 
Legal framework: The Act on Broadcasting and Retransmission, 2000 
Number of members: 9 
Proposal and selection of members:  
The members are elected and recalled by the National Council. The National 
Council Committee may be presented with proposals for candidates of Council 
membership by members of the Parliament, professional institutions and civil 
associations operating in the areas of audio-visual, mass information means, 
culture, science, education, sport, registered religious and church societies, and 
civil associations of citizens with health handicaps through the Coordinating 
Committee for Issues of Health Handicapped Citizens of the Slovak Republic. The 
Council elects a Chairman and Vice-chairman of the Council from its members. 
(4) If a Chairman is not elected, the Vice-chairman performs his activities to the 
full extent. 
Pluralistically composed 
Council  
 
 
Nomination by authorised 
nominees and selection by  
the Legislature (National 
Council) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
TURKEY 
Radio and Television Supreme 
Council  
Legal framework: Law No 3984 on the Establishment of Radio and Television 
Broadcasting Enterprises of 20 April 1994. Article 6, (As amended by the Law 
No. 5373/1 on July 5, 2005.                                                                                          
Number of members: 9 
Proposal and selection of members:   
Supreme Council is composed of nine members elected by the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly from among persons who have at least four years of higher 
education, ten years of professional working experience in public and private 
organizations, sufficient professional knowledge and experience and qualification 
for being a state employee and shall be over the age of 30. 
 For their election, political parties shall nominate candidates two-fold more in 
number in accordance with the rate of their number of seats in the Grand National 
Assembly and the Supreme Council members shall be elected from among these 
candidates on the basis of the number of members of each political party in the 
General Session of the Grand National Assembly. But, no decision shall be taken 
or no negotiation shall be implemented about whom will be voted to in the group 
meetings of the political parties. Election of the Supreme Council members shall 
be executed in ten days following the publicly announcement of the candidates. 
For the every candidates nominated by the political parties, composite ballot notes 
shall be prepared in lists. Voting shall be realized by putting a mark on the special 
places across the names of candidates on the notes. In accordance with the already 
designated quota of the political parties as defined in the Paragraph 2, the votes 
which will be cast more than the members to be elected to the Supreme Council 
by the political parties shall be assumed invalid. The candidates from among the 
others who collected the most votes for the vacant member seats shall be elected, 
provided that the number of decision for quorum is ensured.  Result of the election 
shall be published in the Official Gazette. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nomination by the political 
parties and selection by the 
Legislature (the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, 
selection, appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of the 
national regulatory authorities in the broadcasting field in Council of Europe 
member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
SLOVENIA 
The Telecommunications, 
Broadcasting and Post Agency of 
the Republic of Slovenia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal framework: Mass Media Act, 2001                                                                  
Number of members: 7                                                                                                
Proposal and selection of members: Article 100 of the Mass Media Act: (2) The 
Broadcasting Council consists of seven members, who are selected by the 
National Assembly on the basis of a public invitation. Candidates shall be 
proposed by: Slovenian universities (candidates from the areas of law, 
telecommunications and informatics); the Chamber of Culture of Slovenia 
(candidates from the area of audio-visual culture); the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Slovenia (candidates from the area of commerce); the Journalists' 
Society of Slovenia (candidates from the area of journalism and communication)      
(3) Irrespective of the provisions of the previous paragraph the National Assembly 
may also choose from among candidates who submit their own candidacy if they 
are experts in the areas specified in the previous paragraph.                                        
(4) The Broadcasting Council shall have a president, who shall be appointed by 
the members from among themselves. 
Pluralistically composed 
Council  
 
 
 
 
Nomination by authorised 
nominees and submission of 
independent candidacies - 
selection by  
the legislature (the 
Parliament) 
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Appendix 5 
 
Appointment Clauses of Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states –Branch of the government/Organ/s participating in the 
selection mechanism 
Sources: Ombudsman Information Network, available at: http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/index_eng.htm, date of access: 07.09.2010, According to 
the website, “the Ombudsman Information Network was developed under the project Promoting European Standards in Human Rights: Establishment of 
Ombudsman Institution in Bulgaria implemented by the Centre for the Study of Democracy with the support of the European Commission”. 
 
COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
ALBANIA 
The People’s 
Advocate 
 
Legal framework: Statute No. 8454, dated 4.2.1999 on People's Advocate, Articles 60 through 63, 81 and 83, 
item 1 of the Constitution                                                                                                 
Proposal and selection: Article 4: The People’s Advocate is elected by three-fifths of all the members of the 
Assembly.  Available at : 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4853&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access, 07.09.2010 
 
The Legislature (the 
members of the 
Assembly) by a 
qualified majority of 
three-fifths 
AUSTRIA 
Austrian 
Ombudsman 
Board 
 
Legal framework: Federal Constitution of Austria (excerpt) Chapter seven. Volksanwaltschaft (Austrian 
Ombudsman Board), Art. 148g                                                                                                    
Proposal and selection: (2) Volksanwaltschaft members are elected by the Nationalrat on the basis of a joint 
recommendation drawn up by the Main Committee in the presence of at least half its members. Each of the 
three parties with the largest number of votes in the Nationalrat is entitled to nominate one member for this 
recommendation. The members of the Volksanwaltschaft render an affirmation to the Federal President before 
their assumption of office.                                                                                                                                         
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=3029&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
 
 
The Legislature 
(Nationalrat) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointment Clause regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
AZERBAIJAN 
The Human 
Rights 
Commissioner 
(Ombudsman) 
Legal framework: Constitutional Law on the Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsman) of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, Article 2. Election of the Commissioner 
Proposal and selection:  2.1. The Commissioner shall be elected by 83 votes majority of the Milli Mejlis of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan from among three candidates nominated by the President of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. 
2.2. If the Milli Mejlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan fails to come at decision with regard to these three 
candidates, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan shall, within 15 days, submit a new list of three 
candidates to the Milli Mejlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4044&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
Date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
 
Nomination by the 
President of the 
Republic with 
legislature (Milli 
Mejlis) confirmation 
 
BELGIUM 
The Federal 
Ombudsmen 
Legal Framework: The Federal Ombudsmen Act, Kingdom of Belgium, March 22, 1995 
Proposal and selection: Article 2. The ombudsmen are appointed by the House of Representatives (lower 
house of parliament) for a term of six years, after an open invitation to candidates to apply. At the end of each 
term of office, there is an open invitation to submit applications to renew the board of federal ombudsmen. An 
ombudsman’s term of office can be renewed only once for the same candidate. If his term of office is not 
renewed, the ombudsman continues to perform his duties until a successor is appointed. 
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=2832&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Nomination: open 
procedure 
 
The Legislature 
(lower house of 
parliament) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA 
The Human 
Rights 
Ombudsman 
Legal Framework: The Law on the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force 
on 3 January 2001 (BaH Official Gazette no 32/00 and 19/02), Article 9              
Proposal and Selection: 1. The Ombudsmen shall be appointed by the House of Representatives of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and by the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina by a two-thirds majority of each 
House, following a joint proposal by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.                                                    
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4461&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Nomination by the 
Presidency of 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with 
joint legislature  
(the House of 
Representatives and 
the House of 
Peoples) 
confirmation by a 
qualified majority of 
two-thirds 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA 
Republika Srpska 
Ombudsmen 
Legal Framework: Law on Republika Srpska Ombudsmen., October, 1999, Article 8                         
Proposal and Selection: 1. Three persons shall compose the institution of the Ombudsman: (of Serb, Bosniak 
and Croat nationality). 
2. They will be elected by National Assembly by a [two-thirds] three-fifth majority, following proposal by the 
High Judicial Council.                      Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4875&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Nomination by the 
Judiciary with  
legislature (the 
National Assembly) 
confirmation by a 
qualified majority of 
three-fifths 
CROATIA 
The Ombudsman 
Legal framework: Act on the Ombudsman of 25 September 1992, Article 3                                                          
Proposal and Selection: The Ombudsman shall be elected and relieved of the office by the Chamber of 
Representatives of the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia (Parliament). The Ombudsman will have three 
deputies. The Ombudsman deputies shall be elected and relieved of the office by the Chamber of 
Representatives of the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia (Parliament), at the proposal made by the Ombudsman 
in person.                                                                      Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4891&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
The Legislature (the 
Chamber of 
Representatives) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
Public Defender of 
Rights 
Legal Framework: Law of 8th December 1999 on the Public Defender of Rights, article, 2                                 
Proposal and selection: The Defender is elected by the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech 
Republic for a term of six years, and is chosen from a group of candidates, of whom two are proposed by the 
President and two by the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic; identical proposals are permitted. 
The Defender may be elected for a maximum of two consecutive periods                                                               
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=5711&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Nominations 
submitted by the 
President of the 
Republic and the 
Senate with  
legislature (the 
Chamber of 
Deputies) 
confirmation 
DENMARK 
The Ombudsman 
Legal framework: The Ombudsman Act, Act No. 473 of 12 June 1996,                                                                 
Proposal and Selection: (1) After every general election and when a vacancy occurs, the Folketing shall elect 
an Ombudsman.                                                                                                                                                
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4937&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
 
The Legislature (the 
Folketing) 
ESTONIA 
The Legal 
Chancellor 
Legal framework: Legal Chancellor Act Passed on 25 February 1999 (RT* I 1999, 29, 406), entered into 
force 1 June 1999                                                                                                                                                        
Proposal and Selection: The Legal Chancellor shall be appointed to office by the Riigikogu upon proposal of 
the President of the Republic for a term of seven years.                                                                                            
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4427&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Nomination by the 
President of the 
Republic with  
legislature (the 
Riigikogu) 
confirmation 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
FINLAND 
The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman 
Legal framework: Constitution Act of Finland (excerpt), Issued on 17 July 1919, (as amended by 
Constitutional Act 1221/90 issued on 21 December 1990 and by Constitutional Act 969/95 issued on 17 July 
1995), Article 49                                                                                                                                                         
Proposal and Selection: A Parliamentary Ombudsman shall be elected for a term of four years at a time in a 
regular session of Parliament. A person shall be elected who is known to be well versed in law. The election 
shall be carried out following the same procedure as is used for the election of the Chairman of Parliament. A 
Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman, who assists the Parliamentary Ombudsman and discharges his or her 
duties as necessary, and a Deputy Ombudsman's substitute, who discharges the duties of the Deputy 
Parliamentary Ombudsman when the latter is disqualified, shall be elected for an equal term of office using the 
same procedure. In case the Parliamentary Ombudsman dies or resigns before the expiration of the term of 
office, Parliament may elect a new Parliamentary Ombudsman for the remaining term of office.                          
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4895&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
 
 
Autonomous 
function: the 
Legislature (the 
Parliament) 
 
FRANCE 
The Mediator of 
the French 
Republic 
 
Since 2011: 
Défenseur des 
droits 
 
Legal framework: Law no. 73-6 of 3rd January 1973 establishing a Mediator of the French Republic, as 
amended                                                                                                                                                                    
Proposal and Selection: The Mediator of the French Republic shall be appointed for a period of six years by 
decree of the Council of Ministers.                                                                                                                           
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=5751&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
The new office was created by Article 71-1 of the Constitutional Law no 2008-724 of July 23, 2008. The 
organic law no 2011-333 and the ordinary law no 2011-334 of March 29, 2011 define the competencies and 
powers of the office. The Defenseur des Droits is nominated by the President of the Republic and confirmed 
by the competent permanent committees of the Senate and the National Assembly by a qualified majority of 
three-fifths. 
 
The Executive (the 
Council of 
Ministers) 
 
 
 
 
Nomination by the 
President of the 
Republic with 
legislative 
confirmation 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
GEORGIA 
Public Defender of 
Georgia 
Legal framework: Law on Public Defender of Georgia, May 16, 1996                                                                  
Proposal and selection: Article 6, 1. Any citizen of Georgia may be elected the Public Defender of Georgia. 
2. The Public Defender of Georgia is elected for a term of 5 years by the majority of total members of the 
Parliament of Georgia. The right to nominate the Public Defender is granted to the President of Georgia, 
parliamentary fraction, or at least 10-men group of the MPs who are not members of any fraction. 
3. Before voting the Chairman of Parliament shall familiarise the Parliament of Georgia with the list of 
nominees and their written consents on voting to the post of the Public Defender. Each nominee is voted 
separately by secret ballot. 
4. The nominee is considered elected by voting who will get more votes but not less than the majority of votes 
of the total members of the Parliament of Georgia. If more than one nominee gets votes sufficient to be elected 
but is not elected for equity of votes, those nominees are to be voted together and the one who will get more 
votes but not less than the majority of votes of total members of the Parliament of Georgia, is considered to be 
elected. In case of equity of votes the procedure of voting is prolonged till any nominee is elected. 
5. If no nominee gets votes sufficient to be elected, the new election shall be held not earlier than 7 and not 
later than 14 days following the first voting. Nominations and elections during the voting are held according to 
the order established by Points 2, 3 and 4 of this Article. 
6. One and the same person may be nominated twice only within one cycle of election.                                         
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4433&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
Nomination by the 
President of the 
Republic and MPs 
with legislative 
(Parliament) 
confirmation 
 
 
 
GERMANY 
The Ombudsman 
in Rhineland-
Palatinate 
Legal framework: A State Act to Establish the Office of an Ombudsman in Rhineland-Palatinate, May 3, 
1974, as amended, § 9 
Proposal and selection: The State Parliament shall elect the Ombudsman by secret ballot with the majority of 
its members.                                                                                                                                                               
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=6292&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Autonomous 
function:  
The State 
Parliament 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
HUNGARY 
Ombudsman for 
the Protectlon of 
Civil Rights. 
Ombudsman for 
the Protection of 
National and 
Ethnic Minority 
Rights 
 
 
Legal framework: Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, 1990 (excerpt), Chapter V. Ombudsman for the 
Protectlon of Civil Rights. Ombudsman for the Protection of National and Ethnic Minority Rights                        
Proposal and Selection: The Ombudsmen for civil rights and for nationality and ethnic minority rights are 
elected, on the nomination of the President of the Republic, by Parliament with two-thirds of the affirmative 
votes of all MPs necessary. For the protection of certain constitutional rights, Parliament may elect separate 
Ombudsmen.                                                                                                                                         Available 
at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=6061&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Nomination by the 
President of the 
Republic with  
legislature (the 
Parliament) 
confirmation by a 
qualified majority of 
two-thirds 
ICELAND 
The Althing 
Ombudsman 
(Parliamentary 
Ombudsman) 
 
Legal Framework: Act No. 85/1997 on the Althing Ombudsman, Article 1                                                           
Proposal and Selection: The Althing Ombudsman is elected by Althing for a period of four years.                      
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4949&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
The Legislature (the 
Althing) 
 
IRELAND 
The Ombudsman 
 
Legal framework: Ombudsman’s Act, 1980 Dáil Éireann (House of Deputies) and Seanad Éireann (Senate).        
Proposal and Selection: The appointment of a person to be the Ombudsman shall be made by the President 
upon resolution passed by Dáil Éireann (House of Deputies) and by Seanad Éireann (Senate) recommending 
the appointment of the person.                                                                                                                Available 
at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=5091&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Nomination by the 
President of the 
Republic with  
joint legislature (the 
House of Deputies 
and the Senate) 
confirmation 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORIT
Y 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the Ombudsmen and 
deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/
s participating in 
the selection 
mechanism 
ITALY 
Regional 
Ombudsman 
Valle d’ Aosta 
Legal framework: Regional Law No.5 of 2nd March 1992 A Law to Set Up the Office of Regional Ombudsman, (Official 
Bulletin No. 11 of 10th March 1992), as amended 
Proposal and Selection: Article 6, 1. The election process for the Regional Ombudsman shall be commenced by means of the 
publication (through the offices of the Regional Council Chairman) of a Public Notice in the Regional Official Bulletin setting out 
the following: a) The Region's intention to proceed to the election or re-appointment of the Regional Ombudsman; b) The 
qualifications required of candidates for the post; c) The financial remuneration; d) The time limit of thirty days from the date of 
publication of the Notice on the Regional Official Bulletin for the presentation of applications at the Offices of the Regional 
Council Chairman. 2. Associations of individual citizens may forward proposals for candidates to the Chairman of the Council. 3. 
Proposals for candidacy must contain the following details in relation to the proposed candidate: 
a) Personal details and residence; b) Academic qualifications; c) Professional experience; d) Details highlighting the candidate's 
suitability for the post on the basis of particular skills, experience, professionalism or aptitude. 4. Each proposal for candidacy must 
be accompanied by a declaration stating the candidate's readiness to accept the post signed by the candidate him or herself. 5. 
Candidates for the post of Regional Ombudsman must demonstrate a complete knowledge of the French language. To such end, the 
candidate will have to pass an exam in French prior to the election process. The exam concerned and the procedures to be followed 
shall be the same as the test given to external applicants for management posts in the Regional Administration. 6. As soon as the 
deadline for the presentation of applications has passed, the Chairman of the Council shall call the Commission for the election of 
the Regional Ombudsman in order to carry out the preliminary French test and the subsequent election of the Regional 
Ombudsman. 7. The Commission for the election of the Regional Ombudsman shall be composed of: a) The Regional Council 
Chairman who shall act as the Chairman of the Commission; b) The President of the Court of Aosta; c) The President of the 
Administrative Court of the Valle d'Aosta; d) The Chairman of the Aosta Lawyers' Guild; e) The Chairman of the Regional 
Supervisory Commission for Local Government Affairs.  8. A permanent teacher of French from secondary schools in the Region 
shall supplement the Commission for the Election of the Regional Ombudsman, in order to carry out the preliminary test in French. 
9. The Commission for the Election of the Regional Ombudsman shall elect the Regional Ombudsman from those candidates 
passing the preliminary test in French by taking a vote. The candidate to be elected shall be the person who receives votes cast in 
his or her favour by a majority of the Commission's members.        Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=6056&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=defaul
t, date of access: 07.09.2010 
Specified Proposal 
Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special Selection 
Commission 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
KYRGYZ 
REPUBLIC 
The Ombudsman 
Legal framework: Law on Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) of the Kyrgyz Republic, passed by the Legislative 
Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic on June 25, 2002.                                                           
Proposal and Selection: Article 4, par. 4.The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall be elected for the position by 
the Legislative Assembly of the Kyrgyz Republic by secret vote through submission of bulletins. 
5. Deputies shall vote separately for each candidate for a position of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy). 
6. The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall be considered as elected if the candidate has received the simple 
majority vote of the deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
7. If more than one candidate has received enough votes to be elected but the winner may not be established 
due to the same number of votes cast for each candidate, the deputies shall vote for several such candidates at 
the same time whereas the candidate who gets more votes shall be considered as elected. In case of equal 
distribution of votes the procedure of election shall be repeated until the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) is elected. 
8. If none of the candidates has received enough votes to be elected, then second election is made not earlier 
than 7 days and not later than 14 days after the time of the original election. 
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=5757&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
The Legislature 
(Jogorku Kenesh) 
LATVIA 
The Latvian 
National Human 
Rights Office 
Legal framework: Law on the Latvian National Human Rights Office, December 5, 1996, Article 3. Director 
of the Office 
Proposal and Selection: 1. The Office is guided by the Director who is appointed to the position by the 
Saeima for four years according to the suggestion of the Cabinet of Ministers 
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4129&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
07.09.2010  
 
 
Nomination by the 
Cabinet with 
legislature (the 
Saeima) 
confirmation 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
LITHUANIA 
The Seimas 
(Parliementary) 
Ombudsmen 
Legal framework: Law on the Siemas Ombudsmen, 3 December 1998 No. VIII-950, article 6 
Proposal and Selection: 1. The Seimas Ombudsmen shall be appointed for the term of 4 years from the 
candidates nominated by the Chairman of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. 
2. When nominating candidates to the post of Ombudsmen, the Chairman of the Seimas shall specify the 
officers to whom, subsequent to their appointment, their respective investigative jurisdiction will extend. 
3. Specifying the sphere of activities of each Ombudsman, the Seimas shall appoint 5 Seimas Ombudsmen: 2 
Ombudsmen for the investigation of activities of state institutions, 1 for the investigation of military 
institutions and those ranking as military institutions and 2 for the investigation of activities of local 
government officers.                                                                                                                                                   
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4900&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Autonomous 
function: 
The legislature (the 
Seimas) upon 
proposal of the 
Speaker of 
Parliament 
FYROM 
(Former 
Yugoslavian 
Republic of 
Macedonia) 
Legal framework: Law on the Public Attorney (Ombudsman) of 13 February 1997, article 4                               
Proposal and Selection: The Public Attorney shall be elected and dismissed by the Assembly of the Republic 
of Macedonia. The Public Attorney shall be elected for a term of eight years, liable to appointment for another 
term only. 
The Public Attorney can have one or more deputies of his. The number of deputies shall be determined by the 
Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia at the proposal by the Public Attorney. The deputies of the Public 
Attorney shall be elected and dismissed by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, at the proposal by the 
Public Attorney.                                                                                                                                  Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4877&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
The Legislature (the 
Parliament) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
MOLDOVA  
Parliamentary 
Advocates 
Legal framework: Law on Parliamentary Advocates, Law #1349-XIII of October 17, 1997                                 
Proposal and Selection: Article 4: The Parliament appoints three Parliamentary Advocates, which have equal 
rights and tasks.Article 5(1) The parliamentary advocates are nominated with majority of votes of the elected 
parliamentarians. 
(2) The proposals regarding candidates for Parliamentary Advocates positions are moved in the Parliament by 
the President of the Republic of Moldova, by a group of no less than 20 parliamentarians, and by the 
Government within one month before the authority of the previous Parliamentary Advocates ends. 
(3) For each of the candidates a reference of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and National 
Minorities should be provided to the Parliament.                                                                                                       
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4419&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
Nomination by the 
President of the 
Republic, MPs and 
the Government 
with legislature 
confirmation 
 
 
 
NORWAY 
The Storting’s 
(Parliamentary) 
Ombudsman  
Legal framework: Act concerning the Storting's Ombudsman for Public Administration of 22 June 1962 
Proposal and Selection: After each General Election the Storting shall elect an Ombudsman for Public 
Administration, the Civil Ombudsman. The Election is for a period of four years reckoned from 1 January of 
the year following the General Election.                                                                                                                    
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=5010&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
The Legislature (the 
Storting) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
POLAND 
Commissioner for 
Civil Rights 
Protection 
Legal framework: Act of 15 July 1987 on Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection, Article 3Proposal and 
Selection: 1. The Commissioner shall be appointed by the Sejm upon approval of the Senate on a motion 
tabled by the Speaker of the Sejm or by a group of 35 deputies. 
2. Detailed nomination procedures for the Commissioner shall be determined by resolution to be carried by the 
Sejm. 
3. The resolution of the Sejm whereby the Commissioner is appointed shall be conveyed forthwith by the 
Speaker of the Sejm to the Speaker of the Senate. 
4. The Senate shall carry a resolution regarding approval of the appointment of the Commissioner within one 
month of receipt of the Sejm's resolution mentioned in par. 3 hereof. The Senate's failure to carry such 
resolution within one month shall be tantamount to approval. 
5. Should the Senate disapprove of the Commissioner nominee, the Sejm shall appoint another person 
Commissioner. The provisions of par. 1-4 shall apply respectively. 
6. The outgoing Commissioner shall perform the Commissioner's duties until the office is taken over by the 
new Commissioner.                                                                                                                                                   
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=5018&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
 
Autonomous 
function:  
The legislature  (the 
Sejm) with Senate 
confirmation 
PORTUGAL 
The Ombudsman 
Legal framework: Statute of the Ombudsman, Law nr. 9/91, of 9 April 1991, as amended 
Proposal and Selection: Article 5, 1 - The Ombudsman shall be appointed by the Parliament, by a two thirds' 
majority of the Members present where that majority is larger than the absolute majority of the Members 
entitled to vote.                                                                                                                                               
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=4083&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default, 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
The legislature  (the 
Parliament) by a 
qualified majority of 
two-thirds of the 
members present 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
Ombudsmen and deputy Ombudsmen in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
SWEDEN                  
The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman 
Legal framework: Instrument of Government, Article 6, The Riksdag Act, Article 11                                  
Selection: Article 11: The Riksdag is to elect Ombudsmen to monitor the application of laws and other 
regulations by public agencies.                                                                                                                                  
Available at: 
http://www.anticorruption.bg/ombudsman/eng/readnews.php?id=5132&lang=en&t_style=tex&l_style=default 
date of access: 07.09.2010 
 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Parliamentary and 
Health Service 
Ombudsman 
Legal framework: Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967, the Health Service Commissioners Act 1993  
Selection: The Prime Minister  
For the first time in 2011 the recruitment was managed by the House of Commons Service, in close co-
operation with the Government (Cabinet Office and Department of Health). A selection panel was constituted, 
and the post was openly advertised. The selection panel reported its findings to the Prime Minister and asked 
him to table a motion to allow the House of Commons to approve the appointment. Before the legislative 
confirmation, a pre-appointment hearing of the candidate before the Public Administration Select Committee 
took place. 
Prime Minister  
 
 
Since 2011             
Confirmation by the 
House of Commons 
through an open 
selection procedure 
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Appointments Clauses of the heads and members of the boards of the national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data in Council of 
Europe member states – Branch of the government/Organ/s participating in the selection mechanism 
Sources: Council of Europe, Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Website: 
www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1NATIONAlLAWS_en.asp, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
 
COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, 
appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for 
the protection of personal data in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
ALBANIA 
Data protection 
Commissione 
Legal Framework: Law No. 9887 dated 10.03.2008, article 33 
Proposal and selection of members: 1. The Commissioner shall be elected by the Assembly 
upon a proposal of the Council of Ministers for a 5 year term eligible for re-election. 
Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1ALBANIA_DPLaw2008.pdf, date of 
access: 08.09.2010 
Nomination by the Cabinet with  
legislature (Parliament) 
confirmation 
 
AUSTRIA 
The Data 
Protection 
Commission 
Legal Framework: Federal Act Concerning the Protection of Personal Data (Datenschutzgesetz 
2000 - DSG 2000); Number of members: 6; Proposal and selection of members: Sect. 36 (1) 
The Data Protection Commission [Datenschutzkommission] shall consist of six members 
appointed by the Federal President [Bundespräsident] on a proposal of the Federal Government 
[Bundesregierung] for a term of five years. Reappointments shall be permitted. 
All members shall have legal expertise. One member shall be a judge. (2) The proposal of the 
Federal Government for the nomination of the members of the Data Protection Commission shall 
be prepared by the Federal Chancellor. The Federal Chancellor shall choose from 1. a proposal of 
three candidates by the President of the Supreme Court [footnote 27] [Oberster Gerichtshof] for 
the judge, 2. a proposal of the states [Bundesländer] for two members, 3. a proposal of three 
candidates by the Federal Chamber of Labour [footnote 28] [Bundeskammer für Arbeiter und 
Angestellte] for one member, 4. a proposal of three candidates by the Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber [footnote 29] [Wirtschaftskammer Österreich] for one member. Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws, date of access: 08.09.2010 
Pluralistically composed council  
 
 
Appointment by the Executive 
(the Federal President) upon 
proposal of the Federal 
Government. Nomination by the 
Supreme Court, the States, the 
Federal Chamber of Labour and 
the Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, 
appointment) of the heads and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for 
the protection of personal data in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the selection 
mechanism 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA
Legal framework: Law on the protection of personal data, 2001, Official Gazette of BiH, 32/01 
Number of members: 5 
Proposal and Selection: Article 19 The Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(hereinafter: the Council of Ministers) shall, on the proposal of the Ministry for Civil Affairs and 
Communications, appoint a commission for data protection and to monitor the access to and 
transfer of personal data to be called the Data Protection Commission (hereinafter: the 
Commission). . . . The Commission shall have five members who will be appointed by the 
Council of Ministers. Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1BiH_DP_LAW.pdf, date of access: 
08.09.2010 
 
 
The Executive (the Council of 
Ministers) upon proposal of the 
competent Minister 
BULGARIA 
Commission for 
Personal Data 
Protection  
Legal framework: Personal Data protection act, 2002, as amended                                                    
Number of members: 5; Proposal and Selection: Art. 7 (1) The Commission shall be a 
collegiate body consisting of a Chairman and four members. (2) The members of the Commission 
and the Chairman shall be designated by the Council of Ministers and elected by the National 
Assembly for a five-year term of office and shall be eligible for one re-election.                                
Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1BULGARIA-
personal_Dataprotection_Act.pdf, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
 
Nomination by the Cabinet with 
legislature (the Parliament) 
confirmation 
 
CYPRUS 
Commissioner 
for the Protection 
of Personal Data 
Legal framework: Law 138 (I) 2001; Proposal and Selection: 18.(1) There shall be appointed a 
Commissioner for the Protection of Personal Data (hereinafter referred to as "the Commissioner") 
who shall be responsible for monitoring the application of this Law and other provisions relating 
to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and who shall 
exercise the functions assigned to him from time to time by this or any other law. (2) The 
appointment of the Commissioner, shall be made by the Council of Ministers on the 
recommendation of the Minister and after consultation with the Parliamentary Committee of 
European Matters. Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1CYPRUS_DP_LAW_138(I)-
2001_en.pdf, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
The Executive (the Council of 
Ministers) upon proposal of the 
competent Minister and after 
consultation with the 
Parliamentary Committee on 
European Matters 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
heads and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data in 
Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
Office for the 
Protection of 
Personal Data 
 
Legal framework: the Personal Data Protection Act, 2000 
Proposal and Selection: Article 32 
 (1) The Office is directed by the President who shall be appointed and recalled by the 
President of the Czech Republic on the basis of a proposal of the Senate of the 
Parliament of the Czech Republic. 
Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1CZECHREP_DPLAW_2000.pdf, date of access: 
08.09.2010 
Appointment and 
removal by the 
Executive (the 
President of the 
Republic) upon 
proposal of the 
Senate of the 
Parliament 
DENMARK 
The Date 
Protection 
Agency 
Legal framework: The Act on Processing of Personal Data Act No. 429 of 31 May 2000, as amended 
Proposal and Selection: Chapter 16 (3) The Council, which shall be set up by the Minister of Justice, is 
composed of a chairman, who shall be a legally qualified judge, and of six other members. Substitutes may be 
appointed for the members of the Council.  
Available at: http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6481, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
The Executive (the 
Minister of Justice) 
ESTONIA 
Estonian Data 
Protection 
Inspectorate 
Legal framework: Personal Data Protection Act, 1996 as amended 
Proposal and Selection: § 36.  (1)The Government of the Republic shall appoint the head of Data Protection 
Inspectorate to office for a term of five years at the proposal of the Minister of Justice after having heard the 
opinion of the Constitutional Committee of the Riigikogu (the Parliament of Estonia). 
Available at: http://www.aki.ee/eng/?part=html&id=105, date of access: 08.09.2010 
Nomination by the 
Minister of Justice 
with legislature (the 
Constitutional 
Committee of the 
Parliament of 
Estonia) 
confirmation. 
Appointment by the 
Cabinet.  
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
heads and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data in 
Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
FINLAND 
The Office of the 
Data Protection 
Ombudsman 
Legal framework: The Personal Data File Act, (1988), Personal Data Act (1999), as amended. 
 The Authority: The Data Protection Ombudsman and the Data Protection Board.                                                  
Number of members (the Data Protection Board): 7                                                                                                 
Proposal and Selection: The office is run by the Data Protection Ombudsman, appointed by the Council of 
State for a term of five years. The Data Protection Board consists of a chair, deputy chair and five members, 
who are required to be familiar with register operations. The Board is appointed by the Council of State for a 
term of three years.                           Available at: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/32/topic/3, date 
of access: 08.09.2010 
 
 
 
 
The Judiciary (the 
Council of the State) 
FORMER 
YUGOSLAV 
REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA 
(FYROM) 
Directorate for 
protection of 
personal data 
Legal framework: Law on Personal Data Protection, 2005                                                                                       
Proposal and Selection: The Directorate is headed by the Director who is nominated and suspended by the 
Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia upon a proposal given by the Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia. 
Available at: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/31/topic/3, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
 
Nomination by the 
Government with 
legislature (the 
Assembly) 
confirmation 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
heads and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data in 
Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
FRANCE 
Commission 
nationale de 
l’informatique et 
des libertés 
(CNIL), 
(The French 
Data Protection 
Authority) 
Legal framework: Act n°78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties, as 
amended                                                                                                                                                                        
Number of members: 17                                                                                                                                             
Composition, Proposal and Selection: and Article 13 I. - The “Commission nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertés” shall be composed of seventeen members:(1) two Members of the “Assemblée nationale” (National 
Assembly) and two Members of the “Sénat” (Senate), appointed by the National Assembly and the Senate 
respectively; (2) two members of the “Conseil économique et social” (Economic and Social Council), elected by 
that body; (3) two members or former members of the “Conseil d’Etat” (the French Supreme Administrative 
Court), at least with the rank of “conseiller” (counsellor), elected by the general assembly of the “Conseil 
d’Etat”; (4) two members or former members of the “Cour de Cassation” (the French Judicial Supreme Court), 
at least with the rank of “conseiller” (counsellor), elected by the general assembly of the “Cour de Cassation”; 
(5) two members or former members of the “Cour des Comptes” (Accounting Court), at least with the rank of 
“conseiller maître” (senior counselor), elected by the general assembly of the “Cour des Comptes”; 14 (6) three 
eminent persons chosen for their knowledge of information technology or questions related to individual 
liberties, appointed by decree; (7) two eminent persons chosen for their knowledge of information technology, 
appointed by the President of the National Assembly and by the President of the Senate respectively. The 
Commission shall elect among its members a chairman and two vice-chairmen, one of them as delegate vice 
chairman, who together form the “bureau” (executive committee).Available at: 
http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/30/topic/3, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
Multiple Selection 
Organs: the 
Judiciary, the 
Legislative (the 
National Assembly 
and the Senate, the 
Speakers of the 
National Assembly 
and the Senate) the 
Economic and 
Social Council, the 
Executive (the 
President of the 
Republic) 
GERMANY 
The Federal 
Commissioner 
for Data 
Protection and 
Freedom of 
Information 
Legal framework: Federal Data Protection Act, 2006 as amended                                                                             
Proposal and Selection: Section 22 (1) At the proposal of the Federal Government, the German Bundestag 
shall elect the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information with more than half of the 
statutory number of its members. . .The person elected shall be appointed by the Federal President.                         
Available at: 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/1086936/publicationFile/87545/BDSG_idFv01092009.pdf, 
date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
Nomination by the 
Government with 
legislature (the 
Bundestag) 
confirmation  
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
heads and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data in 
Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
ICELAND 
The Data 
Protection 
Authority 
Legal framework: Act on the Protection and Processing of Personal Data, No. 77/2000, as amended                   
Number of members: 5 with their alternates                                                                                                             
Proposal and Selection: Article 36, The Minister shall appoint five persons to the Data Protection Authority's 
board of directors and an equal number of alternative members, for a period of four years at a time. The 
chairman and vice-chairman of the board are appointed without nomination and they shall be lawyers and fulfill 
the job requirements of district court judges. The Supreme Court of Iceland nominates one board member and 
the Icelandic Society for Information Processing shall nominate another and he shall be an expert in the field of 
computers and technology. Alternative board members shall fulfill the same requirements as the principal 
members.                                                                                                                                                   The 
Minister [of Justice], having received the recommendations of the board of directors, appoints the Data 
Protection Commissioner for a period of five years at a time. The Commissioner is in charge of daily 
management and hires other employees of the Authority. The Commissioner is responsible for the financial 
matters and personal management of the Data Protection Authority.                                                                           
Available at: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/24/topic/3, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
 
Nomination by the 
Executive, the 
Judiciary and the 
Icelandic Society for 
Information 
Processing 
 
IRELAND 
Office of Data 
Protection 
Commissioner 
Legal framework: Data Protection Act 1988, as amended                                                                                         
Proposal and Selection: Section 9 2. (1) The Commissioner shall be appointed by the Government and, subject 
to the provisions of this Schedule, shall hold office upon such terms and conditions as the Government may 
determine.                                                                                            Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1IRELAND_DPA88&03Compendium.pdf,                       
date of access: 08.09.2010 
No Specified 
proposal procedure 
The Executive (the 
Government) 
 453
 
COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
heads and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data 
in Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
LATVIA 
Data State 
Inspectorate 
Legal framework: Personal Data Protection Law, 2000 as amended                                                                
Proposal and Selection: Section 29 [The Authority is single-headed.] The State Data Inspectorate shall be 
managed by a director who shall be appointed and released from his or her position by the Cabinet pursuant 
to the recommendation of the Minister for Justice. [24.10.2002] 
Available at: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/19/topic/3, date of access: 08.09.2010 
The Executive (the 
Cabinet) upon 
proposal of the 
Minister of Justice   
LIECHTENSTEIN
i) The Data 
Protection 
Commissioner 
ii) The Data 
Protection 
Commission 
Legal framework: Data Protection Act, 2002 
i. The Data Protection Commissioner 
Proposal and Selection: Article 28, The Data Protection Commissioner shall be appointed by the 
government. 
B. The Data Protection Commission 
Proposal and Selection Article 33, 1) The Data Protection Commission shall consist of three members which 
shall be elected by the Diet for a term of four years together with two alter nate members. The Diet shall 
designate the President and Vice President of the Commission. 
Available at: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/18/topic/3, date of access: 08.09.2010 
i) The Executive 
(the Government) 
 
 
ii)  
The Legislature (the 
Diet) 
LITHUANIA 
State Data 
Protection 
Inspectorate 
Legal framework: Law on legal protection of personal data, 21 January 2003, No. IX-1296           
Proposal and Selection:. [The Authority is single-headed] Article 38. 1. The State Data Protection 
Inspectorate shall be headed by the Director of the State Data Protection Inspectorate.  2. The Director of the 
State Data Protection Inspectorate shall be a civil servant, the head of the institution, taken into service 
through competition for the period of office of five years and shall be dismissed by the Prime Minister in 
accordance with the procedure established in the Law on Civil Service.  
Article 39. 1. The Director of the State Data Protection Inspectorate shall have deputies. 2. Deputy Directors 
shall be taken into service by the Director of the State Data Protection Inspectorate in accordance with the 
procedure established in the Law on Civil Service. The State Data Protection Inspectorate shall be a 
Government institution financed from the State budget. It shall be accountable to the Government.                       
Available at: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/17/topic/3, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
 
Open Procedure  
The Executive 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the heads 
and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data in Council 
of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/
s participating in 
the selection 
mechanism 
MALTA 
i) The Data 
Protection 
Commissioner 
ii) Data 
Protection 
Appeals 
Tribunal 
Legal framework:  Data Protection Act, 2001, as amended  
Proposal and Selection: 36. (1) There shall be a Data Protection Commissioner who 
shall be appointed by the Prime Minister after he has consulted the Leader of the Opposition. 
 
Number of members: 3 
Proposal and Selection 48. (1) There shall be a Tribunal to be known as the Data Protection Appeals Tribunal, 
in this Act referred to as ''the Tribunal'', having the functions and powers assigned to it by this Act or by any other 
law. (2) The Tribunal shall consist of a chairman and two other members appointed by the Minister. (3) The 
chairman shall be an advocate with a minimum of twelve years legal experience. (4) The two other members 
mentioned in subarticle (2) shall be persons who in the opinion of the Minister represent the interests of data 
subjects and of data controllers.Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1MALTA_New_DP_LAW.pdf, date of access: 08.09.2010 
i) The Executive 
(the Prime Minister 
after consultation 
with the Leader of 
the Opposition) 
ii) The Executive 
(the Minister) 
NETHERLAND
S 
Data 
Protection 
Authority 
 
Legal framework: Personal Data Protection Act, 1999 
Number of members: 3; Proposal and Selection: Article 53 1. The Data Protection Commission comprises a 
chairperson and two other members. In addition, special members may be appointed to the Commission. In the 
appointment of special members, all efforts shall be made to reflect the various sectors of society. 2. The 
chairperson must fulfil the requirements governing the appointment of district court judges, as laid down in Article 
48(l) of the Judicature Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie). 3. The chairperson shall be appointed by royal 
decree, on the proposal of Our Minister, for a six year term. The other two members and the special members shall 
be appointed by royal decree, on the proposal of Our Minister, for a four-year term. The members may be 
reappointed immediately thereafter. At their own request, they are discharged by the Minister of Justice. 4. An 
advisory board has been established with the task to advise the Commission on general aspects of the protection 
of personal data. The members shall be drawn from the various sectors of society and shall be appointed by Our 
Minister, on the proposal of the Commission. Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1NL_DP_LA
W.pdf, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
 
The Executive (the 
Minister of Justice) 
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the heads 
and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data in Council 
of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/
s participating in 
the selection 
mechanism 
NORWAY 
Data 
Inspectorate 
i. The Director 
 
ii. The Privacy 
Appeals Board 
 Legal framework: Personal Data Act, 2000 
 
 
Proposal and Selection: The Data Inspectorate is headed by a director who is appointed by the King. 
 
Number of members: 7  
Proposal and Selection: The Privacy Appeals Board consists of seven members who are appointed for a term of 
four years with the possibility of reappointment for a further four years. The chairman and deputy chairman are 
appointed by the Storting. The other five members are appointed by the King. 
Available at: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/11/topic/3, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
 
 
i) The Executive 
(the King) 
 
The Legislature 
(the Storting-
Parliament) and 
the Executive (the 
King) 
POLAND 
Inspector 
General for the 
Protection of 
Personal Data 
 
Legal framework: Act on the protection of personal data, 1997, as amended                                                                
Proposal and Selection: Article 8.2. The Inspector General is appointed and dismissed by the Diet of the Republic 
of Poland with the consent of the Senate. 
Available at: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/10/topic/3, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
The Legislature 
(the Diet) with 
Senate 
confirmation  
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COUNTRY/ 
AUTHORITY 
Appointments Clauses regarding the selection mechanism (nomination, selection, appointment) of the 
heads and members of the boards of national regulatory authorities for the protection of personal data in 
Council of Europe member states 
Branch of the 
government/Organ/s 
participating in the 
selection mechanism 
PORTUGAL 
National 
Commission for 
Data Protection 
Legal framework: Act 67/98 of 26 October 1998, Act on the Protection of Personal Data, as amended 
Number of members: 7 
Proposal and Selection: SECTION II Article 25, 1 – The CNPD shall be composed of seven members of 
recognised integrity and merit, the chairman and two members being elected by the Assembleia de República by 
means of the d’Hondt highest average rule. 
2 – The remaining members shall be: 
(a) two magistrates with over 10 years’ experience, one being a legal magistrate appointed by the 
Magistrate Council , and the other a Public Prosecution Service magistrate 
appointed by the Public Prosecution Council; 
(b) two individuals of recognised competence appointed by the Government. 
3 – The members of the CNPD shall have a five-year mandate which shall cease when the newly 
appointed members take office. 
4 - The members of the CNPD shall be set down on the list published in the 1 st series of the Diário da 
República . 
5 – The members of the CNPD shall take office before the President of the Assembleia de República 
in the 10 days following publication of the list referred to in the previous number. 
Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1PORTUGAL_DP_LAW.pdf, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
 
Nomination by the 
Legislature 
(Parliament), the 
Judiciary and the 
Government 
SLOVAKIA 
Office for 
Personal Data 
Protection 
Legal framework: Act on Protection of Personal Data, Act 428, 2002, as amended 
Proposal and Selection: Section 35 (1) The Office shall be headed by a President. 
(2) The National Council of the Slovak Republic shall elect and recall the President of the Office upon a proposal 
submitted by the Government of the Slovak Republic.  
Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1Slovak%20Republic_DPLAW.pdf, date of access: 
08.09.2010 
 
Nomination by the 
Government with 
legislature (the 
Parliament) 
confirmation 
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SLOVENIA 
The Information 
Commissioner 
 
Legal framework: Personal Data Protection Act (ZVOP-1), 2004, as amended by the Information 
Commissioner Act, 2005  
Proposal and Selection: Article 6  (1) Information Commissioner is appointed by the National Assembly of the 
Republic of Slovenia on proposal of the president of the Republic of Slovenia.  
Available at: http://www.ip-rs.si/index.php?id=325, date of access: 08.09.2010 
Nomination by the 
President of the 
Republic with 
legislature (the 
National Assembly) 
confirmation 
SPAIN 
Spanish Data 
Protection 
Authority 
(AEPD) 
i. The Director 
 
ii. The 
Consultative 
Council  
Legal framework: Organic Law 15/1999 on the Protection of Personal Data, as amended 
 
 
 
Proposal and Selection: Article 36. 1. The Director of the Data Protection Agency manages and represents 
the Agency. He shall be appointed from amongst the members of the Consultative Council, by Royal Decree, 
for a period of four years; Number of members: 9; Proposal and Selection: Article 38. Consultative Council 
The Director of the Data Protection Agency shall be assisted by a Consultative Council made 
up of the following members:; One member of the Congress of Deputies, proposed by the Congress. 
One member of the Senate, proposed by the Senate; One member of the central administration, proposed by the 
Government; One member of the local administration, proposed by the Spanish Federation of Municipalities 
and Provinces; One member of the Royal Academy of History, proposed by the Academy; One expert in the 
field, proposed by the Supreme Council of Universities; A representative of users and consumers, to be selected 
according to a method to be laid down by regulation; One representative of each Autonomous Community 
which has set up a data protection agency on its territory, to be proposed in accordance with the procedure laid 
down by the Autonomous Community concerned. 
One representative of the private file sector, to be proposed according to the procedure laid down by regulation. 
The Consultative Council shall operate in accordance with the regulations laid down for that purpose. 
Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/national%20laws/1SPAIN_Organiclaw_15_99.pdf, date of access: 
08.09.2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Specified Proposal 
Procedure 
Multiple Selection 
Organs  
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SWITZERLAND
Federal Data 
Protection and 
Information 
Commissioner 
Legal Framework: Federal Act on Data Protection, 1992, as amended 
Proposal and Selection: Art. 26The Commissioner is appointed by the Federal Council.  
Available at: http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/2/235.1.en.pdf, date of access: 08.09.2010 
 
The Executive (the 
Federal Council) 
 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Information 
Commissioner 
Legal framework: Data Protection Act 1998                                                                                                              
Proposal and Selection: Chapter 29 The Commissioner and the Tribunal  (1) The office originally 
established by section 3(1)(a) of the [1984 c. 35.] Data Protection Act 1984 as the office of Data Protection 
Registrar shall continue to exist for the purposes of this Act but shall be known as the office of Data Protection 
Commissioner; and in this Act the Data Protection Commissioner is referred to as “the Commissioner”. (2) The 
Commissioner shall be appointed by Her Majesty by Letters Patent. Since 2008, a parliamentary select 
committee hold pre-appointment hearings (3) For the purposes of this Act there shall continue to be a Data 
Protection Tribunal (in this Act referred to as “the Tribunal”). (4) The Tribunal shall consist of—  (a) a 
chairman appointed by the Lord Chancellor after consultation with the Lord Advocate, (b) such number of 
deputy chairmen so appointed as the Lord Chancellor may determine, and (c) such number of other members 
appointed by the Secretary of State as he may determine. (5) The members of the Tribunal appointed under 
subsection (4)(a) and (b) shall be— (a) persons who have a 7 year general qualification, within the meaning of 
section 71 of the [1990 c. 41.] Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, (b) advocates or solicitors in Scotland of at 
least 7 years' standing, or (c) members of the bar of Northern Ireland or solicitors of the Supreme Court of 
Northern Ireland of at least 7 years' standing. (6) The members of the Tribunal appointed under subsection (4)(c) 
shall be— (a) persons to represent the interests of data subjects, and  (b) persons to represent the interests of data 
controllers. (7) Schedule 5 has effect in relation to the Commissioner and the Tribunal Available at: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980029_en_2#pt1-l1g4, date of access:08.09.2010. 
 
 
The Executive  upon 
confirmation 
without veto by a 
parliamentary select 
committee  
 
The Executive (the 
Lord Chancellor 
after consultation 
with the Lord 
Advocate) 
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Chapter 2 
APPENDIX 1
Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in 
the Public Sector before 
the Appointment to the 
Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
1 M. P. (J1) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
56, 5.4.1994
President
His mandate was renewed from 
April 6, 2000 until December 31, 
2001
(article 7 of the law 2527/1997) 
Government Gazette vol. C, no 
38, 24.2.2000
End of mandate on April 
24, 2003
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003)
Honorary Vice- President 
of the Hellenic Supreme 
Court of Civil and Penal 
Law (Areios Pagos) 
2 T. P. (J2) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
56, 5.4.1994
Vice-President
Retired due to age limit 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 272, 
21.12.1995) J3 was 
elected as Vice-
President (53 and 72 
decisions of ASEP in 
Plenum (Annual Report 
for the year 1995, 
Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no. 286, 
12.03.2003)
Honorary Councillor of 
State
President of the Supervisory 
Council of the Body of 
Certified Appraisers (mandate 
14.4.1994-21.10.1994), 
Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 269, 14.4.1994) 
Declaration of abdication 
(submission of resignation) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 671, 7.9.1994)
3 C. P. (J3) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
69, 26.4.1994
Councillor
He was elected Vice-President 
to fill  the vacant post of J2 (53 
and 72 decisions of ASEP in 
Plenum, Annual Report for the 
year 1995, Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no. 286, 12.03.2003)
Vice-President
Retired due to age limit 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 353, 
27.12.2000).
J15 was elected Vice-
President to fill the 
vacant post 
Honorary Vice-President of 
the Hellenic Supreme 
Court of Civil and Penal 
Law (Areios Pagos)
President of the Committee 
of article 4 of the legislative 
decree 76/1974 on the 
restoration of civil servants  
sacked or forced to resign 
during the dictatorship of the 
colonels (1967-1974). He 
was substituted in 1992. 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 444, 9.7.1992)
Career Paths of the Members of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in 
the Public Sector before 
the Appointment to the 
Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
4 A. A. (J4) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
69, 26.4.1994
Councillor
On May 30, 1995, J4 
passed away. 
J12 was elected to fill 
the vacant post (Annual 
Report for the year 1995, 
p. 3423, Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no. 286, 
12.03.2003)
Honorary Vice-President of 
the Court of Audit
5 V. L. (J5) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
69, 26.4.1994
Councillor
Retired due to age limit 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 236, 
15.12.1998)
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis)
Member of the Multi-member 
Council of the Rizareios 
Church School (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 655, 
30.8.1993)
Vice-President of the 
Supreme Disciplinary 
Council of the Lawyers 
(1992) (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 720, 
2.12.1992)
President of the National Council 
for Radio and Television (mandate: 
17.12.1999-31.5.2002), 
Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
2177, 17.12.1999, and vol. B’, no 
856, 11.7.2000)
Ex Officio Member of the National 
Committee for Human Rights 
representing the National Council 
for Radio and Television 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
24, 18.1.2000)
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
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the Public Sector before 
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
6 G. V. (U6) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
69, 26.4.1994
Councillor
He was selected second Vice-
President of the authority on 
December 1999 pursuant to 
article 20 of law 2738/1999 
providing for the establishment 
of a second post of Vice-
President
(Annual report, 1999)
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
President (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2008 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 238, 30.5.2008
End of mandate: 2012 Professor at  the National 
Technical University of 
Athens 
                                           
Professor Emeritus at  the 
National Technical 
University of Athens
Professor at the 
School of Rural 
and Surveying 
Engineering of 
the National 
Technical 
University of 
Athens
Special Scientist (Expert) at 
the Geodetic and 
Geophysical Committee of the 
State (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 40, 27.1.1992)
President of the Geodetic and 
Geophysical Committee of the 
State Two year mandate: 
1996-1998 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 874, 
17.9.1996)
President of the Scientific 
Council of the National 
Observatory of Athens (three 
year mandate), Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 316, 
21.4.1997)
Member of the Management 
Board of the Centre for 
Educational Research
(three year mandate) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 422, 31.5.1996)
Submission of resignation on 
6.2.1997 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 193, 
17.3.1997) 
President of the Hellenic 
Mapping and Cadastral 
Organisation (OKXE), 
President of the National 
Consultative Council for 
Research, 
Source: Official Website of 
the Federation of the 
Employees of the 
Independent Authorities, 
available at: 
http://www.google.gr/search
?hl=el&source=hp&q=OEAA
+%CE%93%CE%B5%CF%
8E%CF%81%CE%B3%CE
%B9%CE%BF%CF%82+%
CE%92%CE%AD%CE%B7
%CF%82+%CE%A3%CF%8
D%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%
BF%CE%BC%CE%BF+%C
E%92%CE%B9%CE%BF%
CE%B3%CF%81%CE%B1
%CF%86%CE%B9%CE%B
A%CF%8C+%CE%A3%CE
%B7%CE%BC%CE%B5%C
E%AF%CF%89%CE%BC%
CE%B1&meta=&rlz=1R2PC
TA_elGR329&aq=f&aqi=&aq
l=&oq=, date of access: 
27.2.2011
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
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7 I. K. (U7) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
69, 26.4.1994
Councillor
Submission of 
resignation 2.6.1997 
(Source, Annual Report 
of the year 2004 and 
review of the decade 
1994-2004, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1653, 
29.11.2005, p. 22670)
SOS NO FEK
Member of the European 
Parliament in the 
European elections of 
1999 with the party of 
Pasok
Professor at the 
School of Law of 
the Aristotle 
University of 
Thessaloniki 
(Labour Law)
President of the Economic 
and Social Committee 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 930, 14.12.1994)
President of the Management 
Board of the Organisation for 
Mediation and Arbitration 
(1991-1999) Source: The 
Official Website of the 
University of Thessaloniki, 
available at: 
http://www.law.auth.gr/astiko/
html/eioeeuaco.html, date of 
access: 28.11.2010
and the Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 910, 8.12.1994
President of the legislative 
drafting committee for the 
establishment of the 
Economic and Social 
Committee (Law 2232/1994)
Minister of Labour at the 
Grivas caretaker 
Government 
(12.10.1989-23.11.1989)
(G.G. Vol. A, no 
233/12.10.1989)
Vice-President of the 
Governing Board of the 
University of Thessaly 
President of the legislative 
drafting committee for the 
new legal framework of free 
collective bargaining (Law 
1876/1990) Source: The 
Official Website of the 
University of Thessaloniki, 
available at: 
http://www.law.auth.gr/astiko
/html/eioeeuaco.html, date 
of access: 28.11.2010
President of the Management Board 
of the Organisation for Mediation 
and Arbitration (2 year mandate, 
Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
256, 23.3.1999)
Submission of resignation 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
1600, 16.8.1999)
Member of the European 
Parliament in the European 
elections of 1999 with the party of 
Pasok
Professor Emeritus at the Aristotle 
University of Thessaloniki 
President of the Legislative Drafting 
Committee at the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security, 
Source: Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security, available at: 
http://www.ypakp.gr/uploads/docs/3
623.pdf, date of access: 25.2.2011
Vice-President of the Teloglio  
Foundation of Art 
Source: The Official Website 
of the University of 
Thessaloniki, available at: 
http://www.law.auth.gr/astiko/
html/eioeeuaco.html, date of 
access: 28.11.2010
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
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End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
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Parallel Main 
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the Public Sector before 
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
8 V. S. (U8) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
69, 26.4.1994
Councillor
Submission of 
resignation on 
30.10.1996
(Government Gazette 
vol. C, no 226, 
18.11.1996
Professor at the 
School of Law of 
the Aristotle 
University of 
Thessaloniki 
(Public Law-
Constitutional and 
Administrative 
Law)
Secretary of the 
Management Board of the 
Centre for International and 
European Economic Law
(1993-1997) (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 446, 
22.6.1993, no 634, 18.7.1995)
Regular member of the 
Central Legislative Drafting 
Committee, (2 year mandate, 
Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 849, 11.11.1993)
Submission of resignation on 
20.5.1994 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B., no 528, 
7.7.1994)
Member of the permanent 
legislative drafting committee 
at the Ministry of Justice 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 498, 25.6.1996)
Minister of the Interior at the 
Grivas caretaker 
Government 
(12.10.1989-23.11.1989)
(G.G. Vol. A, no 
233/12.10.1989)
- Member of the Governing 
Board of the University of 
Crete (1983-1987)
Member of the Scientific 
Council of the Hellenic 
Centre for European Studies 
(EKEM) (1989-1991) 
Source: EKEM, available at: 
http://www.ekem.gr/--a--, 
date of access: 7.3.2011  
Minister of Internal Affairs, 
Public Administration and 
Decentralization at the 
Simitis’ Caretaker 
Government (before the 
national elections of 1996) 
(G.G. Vol. A, no 
215/30.08.1996)
Director of the Centre for 
International and European 
Economic Law (three year 
mandate)
(G.G. vol. B, no 812, 9.9.1997)
President of the 
Management Board of the Centre 
for International and European 
Economic Law (1997-2001) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
922, 17.10.1997, Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 1867, 
11.10.1999)
Member of the Working Group 
constituted at the Ministry of 
National Education and Religious 
Affairs regarding the reformation of 
the current legal framework on the 
Post-graduate studies and the 
Research Institutes of Higher 
Education (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 965, 29.10.1997)
Member of the Scientific Committee 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(1997-1999)
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End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
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Unionism
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Occupation
Other parallel 
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the public sector
Appointments/Positions in 
the Public Sector before 
the Appointment to the 
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
8 V. S. (U8) Member of the permanent 
legislative drafting committee at the 
Ministry of Justice (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 79, 7.2.1997)
- Extraordinary member of the 
permanent legislative drafting 
committee at the Ministry of Justice 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
133, 18.2.1998)
-  President of the Economic and 
Social Committee Three year 
mandate (Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 331, 7.4.1998)
Submission of resignation on 
11.5.1999 (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 978/27.5.1999)
- Nominated as member of the 
European Court of Justice by the 
Greek Government. Judge at the 
Court of Justice since June 8, 1999. 
President of the Court since 
October 7, 2003. His mandate was 
renewed in 2006 and 2009.
- President of the Management 
Board of the Centre for International 
and European Economic Law (two 
year mandate, Government 
Gazette, vol. Y.O.D.D., no 158, 
17.03.2007)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
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Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
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Appointments/Positions in 
the Public Sector before 
the Appointment to the 
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
9 V. A. (CS9) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
69, 26.4.1994
Councillor
His mandate was renewed 
(article 7 of the law 2527/1997, 
Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
99, 25.4.2000)
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Vice-President (2 year mandate)
                                         
Submission of 
resignation from the post 
in 2004
(Government Gazette 
vol. B, no 849, 9.6.2004)
General Director 
at the Ministry of 
the Presidency of 
the Government. 
He 
simultaneously 
kept his main 
position until April 
25, 1999 
according to law 
2503/1997 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 109, 2.6.1997)
Member of the Committee for 
the elaboration of the New 
Code of the Civil Servants 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 358, 13.5.1994)
Member of the Committee 
constituted by the Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications in order to 
study the legislation in force 
regarding the organization 
and operation of the Civil 
Aviation Authority and submit 
a specific proposal for its 
reform (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 550, 7.7.1997) 
Member of the Working 
Group constituted at the 
Centre of Planning and 
Economic Research (KEPE) 
within the framework of the 
elaboration of the Five Year 
Programme of Economic 
and Social Development 
1988-1992 on the study of 
issues related to Public 
Administration (no 
3617/27.4.1987 Joint 
Ministerial Decision of the 
Ministers of National 
Economy and the 
Presidency of the 
Government and Interior)
Member of the Committee of 
the First Programme of 
Administrative Modernisation 
(1992-1995): Greek 
Administration 2000 
(Ministerial Decision 
∆1ΛΚ/Φ,2/19280/8,7,1992)
Source: Makrydimitris A., 
Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) 
Reports of Experts on Public 
Administration, Papazisis 
Editions, Athens 2000)
Member of the Project 
Management Group 
constituted at the Ministry of 
the Interior regarding the 
elaboration of the draft laws 
under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of the Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 293, 
8.3.2002)
Member of the Working 
Group constituted at the 
Ministry of the Presidency of 
the Government on the 
elaboration of a Report on 
the Reform and 
Modernisation of Public 
Administration published in 
1990
Member of the Committee 
for the elaboration of the 
draft Code of the Civil 
Servants (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 334, 
22.5.1992)
Member of the Central 
Examination Committee of 
the National School of 
Public Administration for the 
7th , 8th, 10th and the 9th 
(extraordinary) entrance 
competitions representing 
the Minister of the 
Presidency of the 
Government (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 278, 
20.4.1992, no 417, 
9.6.1993)
Revocable General Secretary of the 
General Secretariat of Public 
Administration and Electronic 
Governance of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation (Government 
Gazette, vol. C, no 74, 17.03.2004)
Submission of resignation from the 
position (Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 509, 4.12.2009)
President of the Central Committee 
for the Simplification of Procedures 
constituted at the Ministry of the 
Interior (Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 1431, 17.9.2004)
President of the Council for the e-
Government Forum (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 196, 15.2.2007)
Member of the Committee for the 
Legislative Policy and Regulatory 
Impact Assessment (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 373, 16.3.2007) 
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Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
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Resignation
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Unionism
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10 E. V. (CS10) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
69, 26.4.1994
Councillor
His mandate was renewed 
(article 7 of the law 2527/1997, 
Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
99, 25.4.2000)
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003) Councillor (4 
year mandate)
New appointment after 
the constitutional 
revision of 2001
End of mandate 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 394, no 
14.09.2007)
Ex-Director at the Ministry 
of the Interior
Member of the Scientific 
Committee at the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs regarding the 
elaboration of chart models 
for the Prefectural Self-
Administrations and internal 
regulations for the Prefectural 
Councils (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 867, 
23.11.1994)
Member of the Working 
Group on issues related to 
the local authorities 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 592, 1.8.1994)
Special Advisor at the 
Political Office of the 
Minister of the Interior. 
Submission of resignation 
from the position 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 93, 9.6.1994) 
Member of the Working 
Group constituted at the 
Ministry of the Interior in order 
to prepare and assist the 
operation of the new 
institutions provided for under 
the provisions of the law 
2218/1994 (prefectural self-
administration), study the 
problems encountered, and 
recommend to the 
interministerial committee of 
par. 5 of article 58 of the said 
law all the necessary 
measures in order to address 
these problems: 1996-1998 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1015, 8.11.1996, no 541, 
1.6.1998)
Member of the Project 
Management Group 
constituted at the Ministry of 
the Interior regarding the 
elaboration of the draft laws 
under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of the Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 293, 
8.3.2002)
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Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
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the Appointment to the 
Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
11 E. S. (CS11) Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
85, 25.5.1994)
Councillor
His mandate was renewed 
(article 7 of the law 2527/1997, 
Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
99, 25.4.2000)
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor  (2 year mandate)
Expiration of the 
mandate, not renewed 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 209, 7.8.2006)
General Director at the 
Ministry of Environment, 
Physical Planning, and 
Public Works 
General Director 
at the Ministry of 
Environment, 
Physical 
Planning, and 
Public Works
Member of the Central 
Council of Spatial Planning, 
Settlement, and Environment 
constituted by the Ministry of 
the Environment, Spatial 
Planning, and Public Works
1992-1995 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 31, 
24.1.1992, no 3, 7.1.1994)  
Member of the Special 
Legislative Drafting 
Committee constituted by the 
Ministry of Environment, 
Spatial Planning, and Public 
Works (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 109, 18.2.1994)
12 A. M. (J12) Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
224, 10.10.1995
He was elected to fill the vacant 
post of  the defunct J4
 
Councillor
Retired on 
31.12.1997, (Source, 
Annual Report for the 
year 2004 and review of 
the decade 1994-2004
Honorary Vice-President
of the Hellenic Supreme 
Court of Civil and Penal 
Law (Areios Pagos)
President of the Revisionary 
Council for the Property of 
Forests (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 563, 
15.9.1992)
- Regular 
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council of 
article 91 of the Constitution  
for the year 1992 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 703, 27.11.1992)
- Alternate member of the 
Supreme Disciplinary 
Council for the year 1993 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 144, 11.3.1993)
- Alternate President of the 
Committee of article 4 of the 
legislative decree 76/1974 
on the restoration of civil 
servants sacked or forced to 
resign during the 
dictatorship of the colonels 
(1967-1974). He was 
replaced in 1993 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 134, 5.3.1993)
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13 I. N.(J13) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
64, 22.03.1996
He was unanimously elected to 
fill the vacant post of Councillor 
after the election of J3 to the 
post of Vice-President (1/1996 
decision of ASEP in Plenum, 
Annual Reports of ASEP for the 
years 1994-2000)
Councillor
Retired due to age limit 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 236, 
15.12.1998)
Honorary General 
Commissioner of the 
Administrative Courts
14 D. K. (J14) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
64, 22.03.1996
Councillor
Retired due to age limit 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 236, 
15.12.1998)
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis)
15 N. K. (J15) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
20, 9.02.1998
Councillor
He was elected Vice-President 
to fill a vacant post of Councillor 
after the retirement of J3 
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
353, 27.12.2000)
Vice-President
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003) Vice-President 
(4 year mandate)
Expiration of mandate, 
not renewed 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 279, 
30.6.2008)
Honorary Vice-President of 
the Hellenic Supreme 
Court of Civil and Penal 
Law
Member of the permanent 
Legislative Drafting 
Committee at the Ministry of 
Justice (1998-1999) 
(Government Gazette vol. B, 
no 133, 18.2.1998, 
Government Gazette vol. B, 
no 2101, 1.12.1999)
Alternate Member of the 
Supreme Disciplinary 
Council of article 91 of the 
Constitution (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 132, 
25.23.1994)
Extraordinary Member of the 
permanent Legislative 
Drafting Committee at the 
Ministry of Justice 
(Government Gazette vol. B, 
no 686, 8.8.1997)
Member of the Special 
Legislative Drafting 
Committee for the study of 
the issue of usury 
(Government Gazette vol. B, 
no 15.9.1997) 
16 P.G.(LC16) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
20, 9.02.1998
Councillor
Submission of 
resignation on 2.12.1998 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 10, 25.1.1999)
Vice-President of 
the Legal Council 
of the State
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Public Sector after the end of the 
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Authority
17 V. S. (CS17) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
20, 9.02.1998
Councillor
End of mandate 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003)
Director General of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
Public Administration, and 
Decentralisation
Alternate Member of the 
Management Board of the 
Organisation for the 
Administration of Public 
Material  (ODDY) 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 927, 23.12.1993)
Member of the Committee 
for the elaboration of the 
New Code of Civil Servants 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 358, 13.5.1994)
Award of praise for her 
devotion and contribution 
during the elaboration of the 
draft law on the 
establishment of the 
Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel by 
the Ministry of the 
Presidency of the 
Government in 1994 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 480, 24.6.1994).
Member of the Working Group for 
the elaboration of a Plan for the 
Organisation of the General 
Secretariat of Tourism and the 
Greek National Tourism 
Organisation (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 1673, 13.11.2003)
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
18 A. D. (CS18) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
20, 9.02.1998
Councillor
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (2 year mandate)
Her mandate was renewed (four 
year mandate, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 953, 
19.7.2006)
End of mandate, not 
renewed (Government 
Gazettte, vol. YODD, no 
55, 8.3.2011)
General Director 
of the Secretariat 
of ASEPShe 
retired from the 
service on 
11.6.2003 and 
was honourably 
awarded the title 
of the grade and 
the post of the 
General Director 
of ASEP
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 135, 
17.6.2003) 
She 
simultaneously 
kept her main 
position, as 
General Director 
of ASEP, until 
February 13, 
2003 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 353, 
27.12.2000)
471
Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
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Public Sector after the end of the 
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Authority
19 N. P. (J19) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
236, 15.12.1998
Councillor
Retired on 31.12.2000 
(Source, Annual Report 
for the year 2004 and 
review for the decade 
1994-2004, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1653, 
29.11.2005, p. 22670)
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis)
Member of the Supreme 
Special Court of article 100 
of the Constitution for the 
period 1994-1995 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 35, 21.1.1994)
Member of the Court for 
Mistrial for the year 1997 
pursuant to article 99 of the 
Constitution and law 
693/1977 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 123, 
26.2.1997)
Member of the Hellenic 
Competition Commission 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 40, 27.1.1998)
Submission of resignation 
on 7.12.1998 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 978, 
27.5.1999)
20 N. T. (J20) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
236, 15.12.1998
Councillor
End of mandate 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003)
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis)
Alternate member of the 
Supreme Disciplinary 
Council of article 91 of the 
Constitution for the year 
1997 (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 128, 27.2.1997)
21 A. G. (U21) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
236, 15.12.1998
Councillor
Retired on 31.12.2000 
(Source, Annual Report 
for the year 2004 and 
review for the decade 
1994-2004, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1653, 
29.11.2005, p. 22670)
Professor Emeritus at the 
School of Law of the 
Aristotle University of 
Thessaloniki (Commercial 
Law)
Member of the Committee for 
the Study on the improvement 
of the legislation on National 
Endowments (16.3.1999-
31.12.1999)
Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 228, 16.3.1999
22 D. P. (J22) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
64, 19.03.1999
Councillor
End of mandate 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003)
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis
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Authority
23 A. B. (J23) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
247, 10.12.1999
Councillor
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor ((2 year mandate)
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
849, 9.6.2004
He was appointed Vice-
President after the resignation of 
CS29 (Government Gazette vol. 
B, no 849, 9.6.2004)
His mandate was renewed (four 
year mandate, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 953, 
19.7.2006)
Submission of 
resignation (due to the 
Expiration of the 
mandate), 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 231, 
1.7.2010, Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 
255, 27.7.2010)
Regular Member of the 
Special Supreme Court of 
article 100 of the 
Constitution for the years 
1993 and 1995 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 84, 
12.2.1992, no 982, 
29.11.1995)
Second alternate member of 
the Supreme Disciplinary 
Council for the year 1993 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 886, 6.12.1993)
Member of the permanent 
Legislative Drafting 
Committee at the Ministry of 
Justice (Government 
Gazette vol. B, no 116, 
5.3.1993)
President of the Hellenic 
Copyright Organisation 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 1456, 14.7.1999) 
Submission of resignation 
from the post (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 2172, 
17.12.1999)
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Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
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Unionism
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the Public Sector before 
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Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
24 G. B. (J24) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
247, 10.12.1999
Councillor
End of mandate 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003)
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis)
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council 
pursuant to article 91 of the 
Constitution for the year 
1997 (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 128, 27.2.1997)  
Alternate member of the 
Supreme Special Court for 
the two-year period 1998-
1999 (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 170, 25.2.1998). 
He was substituted due to 
his retirement (pension) in 
1999 (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 1855, 6.10.1999)
25 A. K. (J25) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
247, 10.12.1999
Councillor
End of mandate 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003)
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis)
Alternate Member of the 
Administrative Committee on 
Military Requisitions of the 
Capital of the State 
(Government Gazette vol. B, 
no 303, 16.4.1997)
Member of the 
Administrative Committee on 
Aviation Requisitions of the 
Capital of the State 
(Government Gazette vol. B, 
no 549, 4.7.1997)
26 A. P. (J26) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
247, 10.12.1999
Councillor
End of mandate 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003)
Honorary President of the 
Court of Appeal
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Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
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the Public Sector before 
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
27 D. G. (EUF27) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
247, 10.12.1999
Councillor
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (2 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2011 
Councillor (4 year mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 55, 8.3.2011)
Expiration of the 
mandate, not renewed 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 209, 7.8.2006)
Ex-Judge of the Court of 
Appeals
                                 Since 
January 16, 1983, 
Permanent Employee at 
the Commission of the 
European Union – Legal 
Adviser* , Grade A3 post 
(Source: 61998A0086 
Judgement of the Court of 
First Instance (Second 
Chamber) of January 26, 
2000, Dimitrios Gouloussis 
v Commission of the 
European Communities, 
Officials, Promotions-
Grade A 2 post-Action for 
Annulment, Case T-86/98 
Source: EUR-Lex, 
available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/L
exUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:6
1998A0086:EL:HTML, date 
of access: 29.11.2010
Vice-President of the Health 
Procurement Committee 
Two-year mandate (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 103, 
22.3.2010)
Submission of resignation on 
17.9.2010 (Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 330, 11.10.2010)
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Resignation
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Public Sector after the end of the 
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28 A. C. (CS28) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
247, 10.12.1999
Councillor
End of mandate 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003)
Honorary General Director 
of the Ministry of Labour
Alternate President of the 
National Council for 
Vocational Training and 
Employment (two-year 
mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 906, 7.12.1994)
Member of the Management 
Board of the Organisation 
for Mediation and Arbitration 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 910, 8.12.1994)
Member of the Supreme 
Labour Council  (department 
of gender equality) 1995 
and 1997 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 723 , 
23.8.1995, vol. B’, no 562, 
10.7.1997) 
Member of the Committee 
for directing the work of the 
New Structural Employment 
Policy (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 329, 
13.5.1996)
29 V. M. (CS29) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
247, 10.12.1999
Councillor
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 137, 2.4.2007)
He was appointed to the vacant 
post of J47  for the rest of his 
mandate 
The mandate was renewed
Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Ex Director General of the 
Secretariat of the Court of 
First Instance of Athens
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Public Sector after the end of the 
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30 K. S. (CS30) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
247, 10.12.1999
Councillor (full mandate of six 
years)
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
(Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003)
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2008 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Special Scientist 
(Expert) at the 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, 
Public 
Administration 
and, 
Decentralisation    
Suspension of 
duties from the 
Ministry pursuant 
to article 20 of 
law 2738/1999
Member of the Management 
Board of the Public Benefit 
Foundation “Kalogeropouleio 
Foundation-Museum 
Sakellariou” (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1247, 
11.12.1998)
Collaborator of the 
Committee of the First 
Programme of 
Administrative 
Modernisation (1992-1995): 
Greek Administration 2000 
(Ministerial Decision 
∆1ΛΚ/Φ,2/19280/8,7,1992)
Source: Makrydimitris A., 
Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) 
Reports of Experts on Public 
Administration, Papazisis 
Editions, Athens 2000)
Special Rapporteur of the 
Committee for the 
elaboration of the New Code 
of Civil Servants 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 358, 13.5.1994)
31 I. T. (J31) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
11, 18.1.2001
Councillor
End of mandate 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 100, 2.5.2003)
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis)
Alternate member of the 
Supreme Disciplinary 
Council of the Lawyers for 
the year 1994 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 170, 
17.3.1994)
32 F. B. (J32) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
11, 18.1.2001
Councillor
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
(Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003)
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2008 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Appointed Vice-President for the 
rest of his mandate (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 
8.3.2011)
Honorary Councillor of the 
Court of Audit. 
He retired from the service 
in the year 2000 (pension) 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 208, 19.7.2000)
Member of the Special Court 
of Mistrial for the year 1999 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 189, 5.3.1999)
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33 R. A. (LC33) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
11, 18.1.2001
Councillor
New appointment after the 
constitutional revision of 2001
Government Gazette vol. C, no 
220, 17.9.2003
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Expiration of mandate 
(not renewed) 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 279, 
30.6.2008)
Ex Vice-President of the 
Legal Council of State
Retired from service  on 
November 29, 2000 
(Government Gazette vol. 
C, no 340, 12.12.2000)
Ex-Vice-President of the 
Legal Council of the State
34 K. B. (J34) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (2 year mandate)
Expiration of the 
mandate, not renewed 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 209, 7.8.2006)
Ex-Vice President of the 
Court of Audit
Ex-Councillor of the 
Council of State 
35 A. P. (J35) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Expiration of the 
mandate, not renewed 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 279, 
30.6.2008)
Ex-Councillor of the 
Council of State 
36 G. F. (J36) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (2 year mandate)
His mandate was renewed (four 
year mandate, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 953, 
19.7.2006)
Submission of 
resignation (due to the 
expiration of the 
mandate)
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 255, 
27.7.2010)
Ex-Judge of the Hellenic 
Supreme Court of Civil and 
Penal Law (Areopagitis)
Retired from the service in 
the year 2002 (pension)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 160, 15.7.2002)
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37 G. P. (LC37) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2008 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Ex-Legal Councillor of 
State 
He retired from the service 
in the year 2000 (pension)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 340, 12.12.2000)
Member of the Working 
Group constituted at the 
Ministry of the Presidency of 
the Government on the 
elaboration of a Report on 
the Reform and 
Modernisation of Public 
Administration published in 
1990
Source: Makrydimitris A., 
Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) 
Reports of Experts on Public 
Administration, Papazisis 
Editions, Athens 2000)
Regular member of the 
Central Legislative Drafting 
Committee. Submission of 
resignation on 11.3.1992 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 214, 27.3.1992)
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
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the Public Sector before 
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
38 M. M. (CS38) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (2 year mandate)
His mandate was renewed (four 
year mandate, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, 19.7.2006)
End of mandate, not 
renewed (Government 
Gazettte, vol. YODD, no 
55, 8.3.2011)
Ex-Director General at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
Public Administration, and 
Decentralization
Member of the Working 
Group constituted at the 
Centre of Planning and 
Economic Research (KEPE) 
within the framework of the 
elaboration of the Five Year 
Programme of Economic 
and Social Development 
1988-1992 on the study of 
issues related to Public 
Administration (no 
3617/27.4.1987 Joint 
Ministerial Decision of the 
Ministers of National 
Economy and the 
Presidency of the 
Government and Interior)
Member of the Working 
Group constituted at the 
Ministry of the Presidency of 
the Government on the 
elaboration of a Report on 
the Reform and 
Modernisation of Public 
Administration published in 
1990
Member of the Committee of 
the First Programme of 
Administrative 
Modernisation (1992-1995): 
Greek Administration 2000 
(Ministerial Decision 
∆1ΛΚ/Φ,2/19280/8,7,1992)
Source: Makrydimitris A., 
Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) 
Reports of Experts on Public 
Administration, Papazisis 
Editions, Athens 2000)
Member of the Committee 
for the elaboration of the 
draft Code for the Civil 
Servants (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 334, 
22.5.1992)
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39 Ioannis 
Vassilopoulos 
(CS39)
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2008 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Ex Director General at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
Public Administration, and 
Decentralisation
Member of the Working 
Group for the elaboration of a 
Plan for the Organisation of 
the General Secretariat of 
Tourism and the Greek 
National Tourism 
Organisation (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1673, 
13.11.2003)
Member of the Management 
Board of the Organisation 
for the Administration of 
Public Material (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 927, 
23.12.1993)
Member of the Committee of 
article 39 par. 20 of the law 
2218/1994 constituted by 
the Ministry of the Interior on 
the study and submission of 
proposals for the pension 
regime and health care of 
the civil servants of the 
prefectures
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 13, 16.1.1995)
 
Member of the Central 
Examination Committee of 
the National School of 
Public Administration (1994 
and 1996) (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 774, 
12.10.1994, Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 369, 
22.5.1996)
40 Emmanouil 
Voiklis (J40)
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (2 year mandate)
Expiration of the 
mandate, not renewed 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 209, 7.8.2006)
President of the  
Administrative Courts of 
Appeals 
He retired from the service 
in 2003 (pension)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 163, 11.7.2003)
Member of the permanent 
Legislative Drafting 
Committee at the Ministry of 
Justice: 1993-1999 
(Government Gazette vol. B, 
no 875, 2.12.1993, G.G. vol. 
B, 380, 23.5.1994, G. G. vol. 
B, no 430, 17.5.1995, G. G. 
vol. B, no 498, 25.6.1996, G. 
G. vol. B, no 79, 7.2.1997, 
G.G.  vol. B, no 133, 
18.2.1998, Government 
Gazette vol. B, no 2101, : 
1.12.1999)
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
41 P. L. (CS41) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2008 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Ex-Assistant Director 
General attached to the 
Director General of the 
Public Power Corporation 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 880, 6.12.1993)
Revocation from the post 
following the decision 63 
as of 15.3.1995 of the 
Management Board of the 
Public Power Corporation 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 200, 21.3.1995) 
President of the 
Management Board of the 
Athens-Piraeus Electric 
Railways S.A. and General 
Director of its services 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 980, 28.11.1995)
Submission of resignation 
from the post of General 
Director (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 651, 
1.8.1997)
Member of the Management 
Board of the Athens Urban 
Transport Organisation
Five-year mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 642, 30.7.1997)
President of the 
Management Board of the 
Electric Railways S.A. 
representing the State 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 1023, 20.11.1997)
Submission of resignation 
on 30.7.2001 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no1029, 
3.8.2001)
42 V. K. (CS42) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2008 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Director at the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralization
Alternate member of the 
Central Examination 
Committee of the National 
School of Public 
Administration for the 9th 
(extraordinary), 10th and 
11th entrance competitions  
representing the Minister of 
the Presidency of the 
Government (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 417, 
9.6.1993, no 369, 
22.5.1996)
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
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Resignation
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Unionism
Parallel Main 
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the Public Sector before 
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
43 V. G.(FP43) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (2 year mandate)
His mandate was renewed (four 
year mandate, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 953, 
19.7.2006)
End of mandate, not 
renewed (Government 
Gazettte, vol. YODD, no 
55, 8.3.2011)
Lawyer Trade-Unionist He ran for 
Councillor with the left-
wing faction “Democratic 
Fighting Rally-Fighting 
Lawyers” (supported by 
the Greek Communist 
Party) in the elections of 
the Athens Bar 
Association in 2002. 
Source: Newspaper 
Rizospastis, issue of 
February 24, 2002, 
available at:  
http://www2.rizospastis.gr
/story.do?id=1160857&pu
blDate=24/2/2002, date 
of access: 1.3.2011
Member of the Disciplinary 
Councils of the Athens Bar 
Association (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 288, 
31.12.2002)
44 N. K. (FP44) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
486, 21.4.2003
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2008 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Lawyer
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
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appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in 
the Public Sector before 
the Appointment to the 
Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
45 K. T. (J45) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
220, 17.9.2003
Councillor (2 year mandate)
Expiration of the 
mandate, not renewed 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 209, 7.8.2006)
Ex-Vice-President of the 
Court of Audit
Member of the Working 
Group constituted at the 
Ministry of the Presidency of 
the Government on the 
elaboration of a Report on 
the Reform and 
Modernisation of Public 
Administration published in 
1990
Source: Makrydimitris A., 
Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) 
Reports of Experts on Public 
Administration, Papazisis 
Editions, Athens 2000)
Member of the Central 
Examination Committee of 
the National School of 
Public Administration for the 
7th entrance competition 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 278, 20.4.1992)
Member of the Committee 
for the elaboration of the 
draft Code of the Civil 
Servants (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 334, 
22.5.1992)
Alternate President of the 
Committee before which will 
be carried out written and 
oral exams of the candidates 
Chartered Accountants 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 17, 22.1.1993)
Alternate member of the 
Supreme Disciplinary 
Council under the article 91 
of the Constitution for the 
year 1996 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 90, 
13.2.1996)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
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the Public Sector before 
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
46 D. B. (J46) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
220, 17.9.2003
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2008 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Submission of 
resignation (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 
231, 1.7.2010)
Ex-President of the 
Administrative Courts of 
Appeals
47 V. K.(J47) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
849, 9.6.2004
Submission of 
resignation (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 
137, 2.4.2007)
Ex-President of the 
Administrative Court of 
Appeals of Athens
(Submission of resignation 
for pension, Government 
Gazette vol. C, no 161, 
11.06.2004) 
Alternate member of the 
Central Examination 
Committee of the National 
School of Public 
Administration for the 11th 
entrance competition 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 369, 22.5.1996)
48 G.
K. (U48)
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
953, 19.7.2006
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2011 
Councillor (4 year mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 55, 8.3.2011)
Professor Emeritus at the 
National Technical 
University of Athens 
(School of Mechanical 
Engineering)
He retired from the service 
in 2005 (pension) 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 90, 22.4.2005)
49 N. Y. (J49) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
953, 19.7.2006
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2011
Councillor (4 year mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 55, 8.3.2011)
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law
Member of the Supreme 
Council for the Sports 
Dispute Resolution (1992-
1993) (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 500, 4.8.1992, 
Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 621, 13.8.1993).
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in 
the Public Sector before 
the Appointment to the 
Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
50 Emmanouil 
Vassilakis (J50)
Government Gazette vol. B, no 
953, 19.7.2006
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2011 
Councillor (4 year mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 55, 8.3.2011)
Honorary President of the 
Administrative Court of 
Appeals
Regular member of the 
Administrative Committee on 
Military Requisitions of the 
Prefecture of the island of 
Chios: 1992-1995 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 227, 3.4.1992, no 508, 
9.7.1993, no 485, 
28.6.1994, no 223, 
28.3.1995)
51 C. B.(CS51) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
953, 19.7.2006
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Reappointed in 2011 
Councillor (4 year mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 55, 8.3.2011)
Ex-General Director at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
Public Administration, and 
Decentralizaation
Member of the Coordinating 
Committee for the 
negotiations regarding the 
Community Support 
Framework (1994-1997) 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 628, 22.10.1992)
Member of the Management 
Board of the Fund of 
Deposits and Loans 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 927, 23.12.1993)
Member of the Monitoring 
and Management 
Committee of the five-year 
Development Cooperation 
Plan 1997-2001 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 972, 11.9.1998)
Member of the 
Administrative Board of the 
public S.A. “Themis 
Construction”. Founded by 
law 2408/1996, operating in 
the public interest regarding 
the repair, design, 
expansion, construction, 
equipment and organization 
of the Judiciary Buildings
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 528, 26.03.2004)
Submission of resignation 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 33, 6.10.2006)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
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the public sector
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the Public Sector before 
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Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
52 E. B. (CS52) Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
953, 19.7.2006
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Resigned after her 
appointment as 
Revocable General 
Secretary of the General 
Secretariat of Public 
Administration and 
Electronic Governance 
of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Decentralisation 
and Electronic 
Governance 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. Y.O.D.D, no 509, 
4.12.2009). She 
resigned from ASEP 
according to the Annual 
Report for the year 2009 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 1096, 
21.07.2010,p. 15223). 
However,  the 
resignation was not 
published in the 
Government Gazette.
Ex-General 
Director at the 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, 
Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralization
Resigned from 
the post 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 119, 
16.05.2005)
Suspension of 
duties from the 
Ministry pursuant 
to article 3, par. 5 
of law 3051/2002
Award of praise for her 
devotion and contribution 
during the elaboration of the 
draft law on the 
establishment of the 
Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel by 
the Ministry of the 
Presidency of the 
Government in 1994 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 480, 24.6.1994)
Special Rapporteur of the 
Committee for the 
elaboration of the New Code 
of  the Civil Servants 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 358, 13.5.1994)
Member of the Supreme 
Labour Council  (department 
for the wages and working 
conditions in the public 
sector (1994-1995, and 
1997) (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 132, 25.2.1994, 
Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 723 , 23.8.1995, 
Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 562, 10.7.1997).
Revocable General Secretary of the 
General Secretariat of Public 
Administration and Electronic 
Governance of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Decentralisation 
and Electronic Governance 
(Government Gazette, vol. Y.O.D.D, 
no 509, 4.12.2009). She resigned 
from ASEP according to the Annual 
Report for the year 2009 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
1096, 21.07.2010,p. 15223). 
However,  no official resignation 
was published in the Government 
Gazette.
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Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
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appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in 
the Public Sector before 
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Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
52 E. B. (CS52) Member of the Project 
Management Group to work 
on proposals for the 
modernization of the civil 
servants’ payroll 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 760, 15.6.2001)
Member of the National 
Council for the Policy on 
Food Control (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1281, 
4.10.2001) 
Member of the Group of 
Experts constituted by  the 
Ministry of the Interior in 
order to study and put 
forward a concrete proposal 
for a new system of 
remunerations for the 
regular civil servants which, 
due to its structure, will 
provide incentives for the 
increase of the civil 
servants’ efficiency and 
facilitate attracting capable 
executives in the public 
sector (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1345, 
17.10.2001)
                                        
Member of the Monitoring 
Committee of the 
Programme “Polity” 
(Politeia) constituted at the 
Ministry of the Interior 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 192, 20.2.2002)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
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appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in 
the Public Sector before 
the Appointment to the 
Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
52 E. B. (CS52) Member of the Project 
Management Group 
constituted by  the Ministry 
of the Interior regarding the 
elaboration of the draft laws 
under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, and 
Decentralisation 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 293, 8.3.2002)
Member of the Working 
Group for the elaboration of 
a Plan for the Organisation 
of the General Secretariat of 
Tourism and the Greek 
National Tourism 
Organisation (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1673, 
13.11.2003)
Member of the Committee of 
article 14 par. 1 of the law 
3242/2004 for the review of 
the provisions of the Code of 
Civil Servants (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1292, 
23.8.2004)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/Trade 
Unionism
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Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
53 D. S. (J53) Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 238, 30.5.2008
Vice-President (4 year mandate)
Ex Vice-President of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law.
Retirement from the 
service in 2006 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
no C, no 192, 20.7.2006)
Member of the Working 
Group for the study and 
recommendation on the 
amendments regarding the 
constitution and operation of 
the supreme councils for the 
judges and judicial 
employees provided for 
under the articles 90 and 92 
of the Constitution and the 
harmonization of the 
legislation with the revised 
constitution of 2001 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 920, 18.7.2001)  
Alternate member of the 
Supreme Disciplinary 
Council of Lawyers for the 
year 2003 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 144, 
11.2.2003)
 
Ex Officio Member of the 
National Committee for 
Human Rights representing 
the Hellenic Supreme Court 
of Civil and Penal Law upon 
proposal of the President of 
the Court (Government 
Gazette vol. B’, no 1833, 
1.10.1999)
54 L. L. 
(J54)
Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Former /Ex Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis)
Alternate Vice-President of 
the Permanent Expert 
Committee operating at the 
General Directorate for 
Public Procurement of the 
General Secretariat of 
Commerce (Ministry of 
Development) (October-
December 2004)
Source: Ministry of 
Development, available at: 
http://www.ypan.gr/c_annou
nce/45_1381_cms.htm, date 
of access: 13.3.2010
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55 P. A. (CS55) Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Ex Director at the General 
Accounting Office 
Member of the Administrative 
Board of the Operator of the 
National Gas System S.A. 
(DESFA)
Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 245, 6.6.2008
Member of the 
Administrative Board of the 
Hellenic Aerospace Industry 
S.A. (Government Gazette, 
vol. A.E., no 
5529/10.06.2004)
Member of the 
Administrative Board of the 
Public Power Corporation 
S.A. (Government Gazette, 
vol. A.E., no 83/5.1.2005)
56 K. L. (FP56) Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 238, 30.5.2008
Councillor (4 year mandate)
Economist, specialised in 
management 
Party affiliation Member 
of the Committee for the 
procurement of goods of 
relevant financial or 
technological value of the 
Organisation of Greek 
Railways (O.S.E) 
proposed by the political 
party of the Popular 
Orthodox Rally as its 
representative 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 11, 
15.1.2008)
In the National Elections 
of 2007 he ran as 
parliamentary candidate 
of the said party at the 
second constituency of 
Athens (Source, 
Newspaper 
Eleftherotypia, 29.8.2007, 
available at: 
http://archive.enet.gr/onli
ne/online_text/c=112,dt=
29.08.2007,id=45730280, 
date of access: 13.3.2010
Member of the Committee for 
the procurement of goods of 
relevant financial or 
technological value of the 
Organisation of Greek 
Railways (O.S.E) proposed by 
the political party of the 
Popular Orthodox Rally as its 
representative (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 11, 
15.1.2008)
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Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
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1 K. D. (J1) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
163, 8.8.1997
President (full-time occupation)
4 year mandate
Submission of 
resignation on 
16.12.2002 due to his 
appointment to the post 
of Inspector General of 
Public Administration 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 288, 
27.12.2002)
Vice-President of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areios Pagos)
Under 
suspension from 
judicial duties 
Member of the Supreme Special 
Court of the article 100 of the 
Constitution and the Law 
345/1976 for the period 1992-
1993 (Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 84, 12.2.1992)
Member of the Committee of 
article 4 of the legislative decree 
76/1974 on the restoration of civil 
servants sacked or forced to 
resign during the dictatorship of 
the colonels (1967-1974). He was 
substituted in 1992. (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 558, 
10.9.1992)
Inspector General of Public 
Administration (Government Gazette 
vol. C, no 289, 27.12.2002) 
Appointment of the new Inspector 
General of Public Administration 
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 239, 
14.9.2004)
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council for the years 
1993-1994 (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 144, 11.3.1993,vol. B, 
no 132, 25.2.1994)
Member of the Legislative drafting 
committee for the elaboration of 
draft provisions on the criminal 
treatment of drug addicts who 
have undergone treatment for 
addiction
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
598, 17.7.1995
Member of the permanent 
Legislative drafting committee of 
the Ministry of Justice
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
572, 29.6.1995)
Career Paths of the Members of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority
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Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
2 G. D. (J2) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
163, 8.8.1997
Alternate President (part-time 
occupation)
4 year mandate
New appointment after the 
Constitutional Revision of 2001
Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
Alternate President 
4 year mandate
End of mandate
New appointment after 
the Constitutional 
Revision of 2001
Submission of 
resignation 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C’, no 185, 
6.8.2003)
Vice-President of 
the Council of 
State. 
Retirement from 
the service 
(pension) in 2001 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 183, 
11.7.2001)
Honorary Vice-
President of the 
Council of State
Member of the permanent 
legislative drafting committee 
of the Ministry of Justice 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 2303, 31.12.1999)
President of the Working 
Group for the study and the 
submission of a 
recommendation on the 
legislative amendments 
regarding the procedure of 
resolving the disputes of 
judges in relation to issues of 
earnings and pensions 
according to the revised 
paragraph 2 of the article 88 
of the Constitution 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 920/18.7.2001)
Member of the Central Legislative 
drafting committee (1993, 1995)
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
849, 11.11.1993, Government 
Gazette vol. C, no 932, 
10.11.1995)
Member of the Supreme Special 
Court for the period 1994-1995 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
35, 21.1.1994)
Member of the Board for the 
Management and Reformation of the 
river Kifisos of Attica and its torrents
(Government Gazette vol. B, no 566, 
9.5.2003)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
3 M. S. (U3) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Regular Member
Submission of 
resignation after his 
appointment to the post 
of the Minister of Justice 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. A, no 122, 
13.4.2000)
He was replaced by U4.
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 245, 
25.8.2000)
NGOs
Member of the 
Management 
Board of the 
Centre for 
European 
Constitutional 
Law-Themistokles 
and Dimitris 
Tsatsos 
Foundation 
(CECL) Three-
year mandate 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 104, 
14.4.2006)
                Elected 
Rector of Athens 
University  (1983-
1991). 
Professor of Civil 
Law at the 
Department of 
Law, Athens 
University
President of the Board of the 
Hellenic Copyright 
Organisation (3 year 
mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1253, 31.12.1997)
Since 1996 member of 
Management Board of the 
public benefit foundation “The 
Giannis Koutsocheras and 
Lena Strefi-Koutsochera 
International Foundation” 
Mandate: 18.7.2005-
17.7.2008 (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 37, 
1.2.2007)
Renewal of the mandate until 
17.7.2012 (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 270, 
4.8.2010)
Member of the Management 
Board of the the public benefit 
foundation “The Nikos and 
Eleni Kazantzakis Studies 
Foundation” Five year 
mandate (Government 
Gazette, vol.B, no 620, 
23.7.1997
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council (1994) 
(Government Gazette vol. B, no 
132, 30.12.1994)
Member of the Board of the 
Hellenic Copyright Organisation 
(3 year mandate)
(Government Gazette vol. B, no 
983, 30.12.1994)
Expert for the Development of the 
Spata Airport (Joint Ministerial 
Decision Y 409/1994, 
Government Gazette, 
861/17.10.1995)
Minister of Justice at the second 
Simitis Government  (2000-2001)
(Government Gazette, vol. A, no 
122, 13.4.2000) Substitution: 
Government Gazette vol. A, no 254, 
24.10.2001
Professor Emeritus (Athens 
University)
Member of the Management Board 
of the public benefit foundation “The 
Angelos and Leto Katakouzenos 
Foundation” 2001-2009 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1295, 8.10.2001) Replacement 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 541, 30.12.2009)
Member of the Management Board 
of the National Museum of 
Contemporary Art 
End of mandate: 30.11.2010
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 119, 6.4.2010)
Member of the Management Board 
of the National Transplant 
Organisation End of mandate: 
30.12.2011
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 136, 20.4.2010)
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Affiliation/NGOs/
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Authority
3 M. S.(U3) Alternate member of the 
Council for the Selection of 
School Councillors 
(secondary education). End of 
mandate: 31.12.1998
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 40, 27.01.1998)
Member of the Committee for 
the study of  the problems of 
religious freedom 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1316, 24.6.1999)
Ex officio Member of the 
National Committee for 
Human Rights representing 
the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1833, 1.10.1999)
Member of the Committee 
constituted by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for the study 
of the problems of religious 
freedom within  the context of 
article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 2214, 23.12.1999)
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
4 S. L. (U4) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
245, 25.8.2000
Alternate Member for the rest of 
the mandate
of M. Stathopoulos
He became Regular Member 
after the resignation of U3.
U16 was appointed to the vacant 
post of the Alternate Member
New appointment after the 
Constitutional Revision of 2001
Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
Regular Member 
2 year mandate
End of mandate: G.G. 
vol. C, no 279, 
24.10.2005-Nomination 
of new members
Professor of 
Public Law at the 
Department of 
Law, Athens 
University,
Lawyer, Law 
Office
                            
He was elected 
alternate 
President of the 
Department of 
Law, Athens 
University. 
Mandate: 
29.8.2002-
31.8.2003, 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 193, 
29.8.2002)
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council for the 
year 1999 (Government 
Gazette vol. B, no 49, 
29.1.1999)
Ex Officio Member of the 
National Committee for 
Human Rights representing 
the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 1224, 
6.10.2000)
Member of the Working 
Group for the study and 
proposal of amendments to 
the legislation on the penal 
liability of members of the 
Government (Cabinet) and 
Secretaries of State (Deputy 
Ministers) with a view to 
improve the relevant 
regulations and their 
harmonization with article 86 
of the revised Constitution 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 290, 18.7.2001) 
Ex officio alternate member of 
the National Committee for 
Human Rights  representing  
the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 276, 
7.3.2003)
Secretary of  the Cabinet at the 
second and third Andreas 
Papandreou- Pasok Government- 
(1988-1989 and 1993-1996) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
947, 30.12.1993)
Member of the Committee on 
Institutions (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 940, 19.12.1994)
Member of the Committee for the 
redaction of the new code of civil 
servants (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 358, 13.5.1994)
Member of the Committee on 
Institutions and Decentralisation 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
873, 20.10.1995)
Member of the Special Court for 
Mistrial for the year 1996) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
252, 11.4.1996)
Member of the Joint Supervisory 
Body of Europol representing 
Greece (1998-2005)
Source: The Official Website of 
the General Secretariat of the 
Government, available at: 
http://www.ggk.gov.gr/?page_id=5
&print=1, date of access: 
29.5.2011
Member of the Special Court for 
Mistrial for the year 2006 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
249, 27.2.2006)
Member of the Court for the 
determination of Disputes for the 
year 2006 (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 249, 27.2.2006)
General Secretary of the 
Government at the Georgios 
Papandreou Government (Pasok) 
(2009-2011) and Loukas Papadimos 
Government (2011-2012) 
(Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 
448, 7.10.2009)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
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Trade Unionism
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Appointments/Positions in the 
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Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
4 S. L. (U4) Member of the Special Court for 
Mistrial for the year 2005 
(Government Gazette vol. B, no 
177, 11.2.2005)
Member of the Court for the 
determination of Disputes for the 
year 2005 (Government Gazette 
vol. B, no 177, 11.2.2005)
Alternate Judge of the 
Administrative Tribunal of the 
Council of Europe, April 9, 2003-
March 31, 2006. Source: The 
Official Website of the 
Administrative Tribunal of Council 
of Europe, available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/administrativet
ribunal/WCD/former_mbs_en.asp
#, date of access: 29.5.2011.
5 E. K. (U5) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Regular Member
End of mandate: (G.G. 
vol. C, no 30, 13.2.2003)-
Nomination of new 
members
Professor of 
Informatics at the 
Department of 
Informatics, 
Athens University 
of Economics and 
Business
Retirement from 
the service in 
2005 (pension) 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 72, 
1.4.2005)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
6 P. S. (U6) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Alternate Member
of U5
End of mandate, (G.G. 
vol. C, no 30, 13.2.2003) 
-Nomination of new 
members
Professor of 
Informatics at the 
Department of 
Computer 
Engineering and 
Informatics,  
University of 
Patras
Member of the Committee for 
the conduct of an open tender 
for the supply of computer 
equipment (Hardware-
Software PCs Local Network) 
and the development of 
applications for the 
implementation of the 
Integrated Information System 
of the Customs
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1119, 18.12.1997)
Member of the Scientific 
Committee of the Institute for 
Language and Speech 
Processing (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 18, 
21.1.1998)
Member of the Committee for the 
Monitoring and Receipt of the project 
for the Computerization of the 
Criminal Records of the Ministry of 
Justice (Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 1427, 2.10.2003)
President of the Council of the 
Research Academic Computer 
Technology Institute (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 484, 14.12.2006)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
6 P. S. (U6) Member of the Committee for 
the Research and 
Organisation of the Archives 
of the Prime Minister, the 
members of the Government 
and Deputy Ministers 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 101 11.2.1998)
Member of the Committee for 
the study of the security 
mechanisms of the Instant 
State Lottery (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 330, 
16.3.2000)
President of the Council of 
the Research Academic 
Computer Technology 
Institute 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1348, 17.10.2001)
Expert Member of the 
Committee for the Monitoring 
and Receipt of the study for 
the Operational Plan and 
Action Plan of the Ministry of 
Justice for the integration into 
the Operational Programme 
“Information Society” 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 89, 30.1.2002)
Member of the Project 
Management Group of 
Strategic Planning for the 
Project Computerization of the 
Criminal Records of the 
Ministry of Justice 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 279, 7.3.2002)
7 N. A. (U7) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Regular Member
End of mandate, G.G. 
vol. C, no 30, 13.2.2003-
Nomination of new 
members
Professor of 
Constitutional 
Law, Athens 
University,
Lawyer, Law 
Office
Member of the Scientific 
Council of the National Centre 
for Social Research (EKKE) 
(3 year mandate) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 829, 11.9.1996)
Member of the National Council 
for Radio and Television 
Caretaker Minister of Internal Affairs, 
Public Administration, and 
Decentralisation before the national 
elections of 2004 
(Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 49, 
13.2.2004)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
7 N. A. (U7) Party Affiliation:
Member of the 
Group on 
Immigration 
Policy of the party 
of Pasok upon
decision of the 
President of 
Pasok, Georgios 
Papandreou, on 
the constitution of 
a group on 
Immigration 
Policy, date of 
publication: 
29.6.2009, 
Source: the 
Official Website 
of Pasok, 
Member of the permanent 
legislative drafting committee 
at the Ministry of Justice 
(1997-1998) (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 79, 
7.2.1997, vol. B’, 133, 
18.2.1998)
Member of the Management 
Board of the public benefit 
foundation “Thesaurus of the 
Greek Language” (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 150, 
10.3.1992)
Member of the Working Group 
constituted at the Ministry of the 
Presidency of the Government on 
the elaboration of a Report on the 
Reform and Modernisation of 
Public Administration published in 
1990
Source: Makrydimitris A., 
Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) Reports of 
Experts on Public Administration, 
Papazisis Editions, Athens 2000)
available at: 
http://www.pasok.
gr/portal/resource
/contentObject/id/
5d943eb5-9c3d-
4dfb-80e6-
afd5ff2daa10, 
date of access: 
4.5.2010Civil 
Society-NGOs:
- Member of the 
Management 
Board of the 
NGO: Hellenic 
League for 
Human Rights 
(HLHR), Source: 
Official Website 
of HLHR, 
available at: 
http://www.hlhr.gr/
id-el.htm, date of 
access: 4.5..2010
Member of the Management 
Board of the Greek National 
Committee of UNESCO 
1997-1998
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 862, 29.9.1997 and vol. B’, 
no 402, 29.4.1998)
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council of article 
91 of the Constitution 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 283, 20.3.1998)
Member of the Committee for 
the study of  the problems of 
religious freedom 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1316, 24.6.1999)
Member of the permanent 
Legislative drafting committee at 
the Ministry of Justice 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
430, 17.5.1995)
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee on the 
elaboration of the draft law 
“Protection of personal data” 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
623, 14.7.1995)
 
Member of the Board of the 
Centre for Educational Research 
(KEE) (3 year mandate) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
422, 31.5.1996). 
Submission of resignation 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
193, 17.3.1997)
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
7 N. A. (U7) Member of the 
NGO: Research 
Centre for 
Minority Groups 
(KEMO), Source: 
Official Website 
of KEMO, 
available at: 
http://www.kemo.
gr/index.php?sec
=members, date 
of access: 
25.12.2010
Member of the Committee for 
the transfer of the European 
Convention of Human Rights 
to the demotic Greek 
language (1999-2000) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no. 1653, 25.8.1999 and no 
237, 1.3.2000) 
Member of the Committee at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
for the study of the problems 
of religious freedom within  
the context of article 9 of the 
European Convention on 
Human Rights (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 2214, 
23.12.1999)
Member of the Working 
Group for the study and 
proposal of amendments to 
the administrative legislation 
in order to regulate the 
competence of dispute 
resolution by the Council of 
State and the regular 
administrative courts 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 920, 18.7.2001)
Member of the National Committee 
for Human Rights appointed by the 
Prime Minister (Konstantinos Simitis) 
as prestigious person with expertise 
in the protection of human rights
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
610, 16.5.2003)
Submission of resignation after the 
election of the Karamanlis 
government in 2004 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 312, 24.11.2004)
Member of the Working Group for 
the processing and elaboration of 
the general principles and the 
setting of the framework of the draft 
law on the change of the electoral 
system of the country (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 491, 19.11.2009)
Member of the Working Group 
constituted by the Ministry of the 
Interior, Decentralisation, and 
Electronic Governance on the 
change of the legal framework 
regarding the financial issues of the 
political parties and the provenance 
of the politicians’ assets 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 17, 28.1.2011)
  
President of the Management Board 
of the National Museum of 
Contemporary Art, three-year 
mandate (Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 49, 28.2.2011)
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Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
8 N. D. (U8) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Alternate Member
of U7
Submission of  
resignation after his 
appointment to the post 
of the Greek 
Ombudsman on April 30, 
1998
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 96, 7.5.1999)
Professor of 
Political Science 
at the 
Department of 
Political Science 
and Public 
Administration,  
Athens 
University.
He retired from 
the service on 
August 31, 2009 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C’, 
no 366, 
18.5.2009)
Director of the Hellenic 
Foundation for European and 
Foreign Policy (think tank) 
1988-1991 Source: The Annual 
Report of the Greek Ombudsman 
for the year 2001,Curricula Vitae 
of the Greek Ombudsman and the 
Deputy Ombudsmen, p. 193, 
available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual01
_en/en_2001.pdf, date of access: 
4.3.2011
The Greek Ombudsman
(5 year mandate)
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 57, 
24.3.1998)
Member of the Management Board 
of the Cultural Foundation of the 
National Bank of Greece (1999-
2005) Publication of the end of his 
mandate in the Government Gazette 
(Government Gazette, vol. NPDD, 
no 90, 4.4.2006)
Member of the Scientific Council 
of the National Centre for Social 
Research (EKKE) (3-year 
mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
457, 24.6.1993)
Member of the National Advisory 
Board of Research 
1994-1998
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
129, 24.2.1994, vol. B’, no 785, 
12.9.1995)
Director of the National Centre for 
Social Research (EKKE)
1995-1998
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
850, 11.10.1995)
Member of the National Council on 
Public Administration Reform (2000)
Source: The Annual Report of the 
Greek Ombudsman for the year 
2001,Curricula Vitae of the Greek 
Ombudsman and the Deputy 
Ombudsmen, p. 193, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual01_en
/en_2001.pdf, date of access: 
4.3.2011 
Ex officio Member of the National 
Committee for Human Rights 
representing the Greek Ombudsman 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
1833, 1.10.1999)
European Ombudsman (2003) 
2003/158/EC,Euratom: Decision of 
the European Parliament of 15 
January 2003 
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
8 N. D. (U8) European Ombudsman (2003) 
2003/158/EC, Euratom: Decision of 
the European Parliament of January 
15, 2003 appointing the European 
Ombudsman
OJ L 65, 8.3.2003, p. 26–26, 
available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSer
v.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:065:0026:0026:
EN:PDF, date of access: 26.12.2010
European Ombudsman (2005)
Decision of the European Parliament 
of 11 January 2005 appointing the 
European Ombudsman (2005/46/EC, 
Euratom), in  Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJEU). 
25.01.2005, No L 21,  p. 8, available 
at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Result.do?aaaa=2005
&mm=01&jj=25&type=&nnn=&pppp=
8&RechType=RECH_reference_pub
&Submit=%CE%91%CE%BD%CE%
B1%CE%B6%CE%AE%CF%84%CE
%B7%CF%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 26.12.2010
European Ombudsman (2010),
European Parliament Decision of 20 
January 2010 electing the European 
Ombudsman,
OJ C 305E , 11.11.2010, p. 19–20, 
available at: 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSer
v.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:305E:0019:002
0:EN:PDF, date of access: 
26.12.2010
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appointments/positions in 
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
9 A. P. (U9) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Regular Member
New appointment after the 
Constitutional Revision of 2001
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003)
Regular Member 
2 year mandate
End of mandate: G.G. 
vol. C, no 279, 
24.10.2005-Nomination 
of new members
Professor of Civil 
Law at the 
Department of 
Law, Athens 
University
Lawyer, Law 
Office
Member of the Central 
Legislative drafting committee 
1998-2004
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 61, 4.2.1998, vol. B’, no 
103, 4.2.2000, vol. B’, no 
1572, 22.12.2000, vol. B’, no 
782, 21.6.2001). Submission 
of resignation (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 1042, 
9.7.2004)
Member of the ad hoc law 
preparing committee for the 
law on transplantation 
Source: The Official Website 
of the National Bioethics 
Committee, available at: 
http://www.bioethics.gr/docum
ent.php?category_id=65&doc
ument_id=740, date of 
access: 26.3.2011
Member of the Greek-
National Section of the 
International Commission on 
Civil Status (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 357, 
2.4.2001)
Member of the Central Legislative 
drafting committee (1993-1997) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
849, 11.11.1993 and vol. B’, no 
932, 10.11.1995, vol. B’, no 1035, 
24.11.1997) 
Member of the National Authority for 
Medically Assisted Reproduction 
Four year mandate (G.G.vol. C, no 
300, 15.11.2005)
Member of the legislative drafting 
committee on the elaboration of the 
draft presidential decree regulating 
the organization and function of the 
institution of foster families 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
1616, 22.11.2005)
Member of the Supreme Disciplinary 
Council (Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 242, 14.2.2008)
Member of the ad hoc law preparing 
committee for the civil pact for 
unmarried couples Source: The 
Official Website of the National 
Bioethics Committee, available at: 
http://www.bioethics.gr/document.ph
p?category_id=65&document_id=74
0, date of access: 26.3.2011
Member of the National Bioethics 
Committee (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 81, 26.2.2009) 
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Appointment to the Authority
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
10 K. K. (U10) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Alternate Member
of U9
End of mandate, G.G. 
vol. C, no 30, 13.2.2003-
Nomination of new 
members
Associate 
Professor of 
Modern 
Economic and 
Social History 
(Greek and 
European) at the 
Department of 
Political Science 
and Public 
Administration, 
Athens University
Member of  the Ephorate of the 
General State Archives (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD’, no 373, 
17.11.2010)
11 P. P, (FP11) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Regular Member
He died on May 25, 2002. FP12 
was appointed to the vacant 
post.
NGOs
Ex- President of 
the Greek Section 
of Amnesty 
International
Source: 
Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1833, 
1.10.1999)
Civil Engineer,
Special Expert of 
the Networks of 
the European 
Union against 
racism
Alternate Member of the 
Management Board of the 
European Monitoring Centre 
on  Racism and Xenophobia 
(Official Journal of the 
European Communities, C 
51/13, 18.2.1998)                     
Member of the National 
Committee for Human Rights 
in his capacity as ex 
President of the Greek 
Section of Amnesty 
International.  
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1833, 1.10.1999). He was 
elected Vice-President of the 
Committee Source: To 
Syntagma, Review of 
Constitutional Theory and 
Practice, available at: 
http://tosyntagma.ant-
sakkoulas.gr/praxeis/item.php
?id=349, date of access: 
19.5.2010
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Position in the Authority
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Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
12 N. F. (FP12) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Alternate Member
of FP11
He was appointed Regular 
Member to the post of the 
defunct FP11.
Agapios Papaneophytou was 
appointed to the vacant post of 
FP11.
New appointment after the 
Constitutional Revision of 2001
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003)
Regular Member 
4 year mandate
Submission of 
resignation due to the 
Cameras Case 
(17.11.2007) Source: 
The official website of 
the Authority, Press 
Releases, 
http://www.dpa.gr/portal/
page?_pageid=33%2C1
5131&_dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL&_piref33
_24849_33_15131_151
31.etos=2007&_piref33_
24849_33_15131_1513
1.minas=11&_piref33_2
4849_33_15131_15131.
ananeosi=%CE%91%C
E%BD%CE%B1%CE%B
D%CE%AD%CF%89%C
F%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 4.5.2011
NGOs
Member of the 
Hellenic League 
for Human Rights 
(former President) 
Source: Law Firm 
Souriadakis-
Frangakis-
Skaltsas-
Pantelakis, 
available at: 
http://sfsplaw.ath.
cx/modules.php?n
ame=News&file=a
rticle&sid=105, 
date of access: 
9.12.2010
Lawyer President of the European 
Commission against racism 
and intolerance (ECRI, 
Strasbourg), Source, Council 
of Europe,1997 (two year 
mandate) 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monit
oring/ecri/archives/ecris_work
/annual_reports/Annual 
report_1997_EN.asp#, date of 
access, 20.5.2010
Member of the Committee on 
the drafting and elaboration of 
the regulatory Presidential 
Decrees and Ministerial 
Decisions provided for under 
the draft of the Chart of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 9, 19.1.1998)
Head of the Legal Service of the 
National Delegation of Greece in 
the European Communities in 
Brussels (1986-1989) Source: 
Law Firm Souriadakis-Frangakis-
Skaltsas-Pantelakis, available at: 
http://sfsplaw.ath.cx/modules.php
?name=News&file=article&sid=10
5, date of access: 9.12.2010
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Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
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Appointments/Positions in the 
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Appointment to the Authority
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
12 N. F. (FP12) Legal Adviser of PYRKAL 
(Hellenic Powder and 
Cartridge Company S.A.) 
(2000)
(Source: Government 
Gazette, vol. A’, no 293, 
29.12.2000)
Member of the National 
Committee for Human Rights 
representing the Hellenic 
League for Human Rights 
1999-2005 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1833, 
1.10.1999, renewal of 
mandate: vol. B, no 276, 
7.3.2003), end of mandate: 
vol. B, no 1665, 29.11.2005)
He was elected Vice-
President of the Committee 
during his first mandate. 
Source: To Syntagma, 
Review of Constitutional 
Theory and Practice, 
available at: 
http://tosyntagma.ant-
sakkoulas.gr/praxeis/item.php
?id=349, date of access: 
19.5.2010
Member of the special 
legislative committee 
regarding the final elaboration 
of the draft law of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of 
personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications 
sector (Directive on privacy 
and electronic 
communications) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 634, 30.4.2004)
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Public Sector after the end of the 
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Authority
12 N. F. (FP12) Alternate Member of the 
Board of the European 
Monitoring Centre on  Racism 
and Xenophobia (Official 
Journal of the European 
Communities, C 19/37, 
26.1.2006)
Member of the National 
Committee for Human Rights 
representing the Hellenic 
Data Protection Authority 
(Government Gazette vol. B’, 
no 322, 16.3.2006) Replaced 
in 2008 (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 236, 
30.5.2008)
13 V. P. (J13) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Regular Member
End of mandate, G.G. 
vol. C, no 30, 13.2.2003-
Nomination of new 
members
Ex Associate Judge of the 
Court of Audit 
14 D. G. (U14) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997
Alternate Member
of U9
End of mandate, G.G. 
vol. C, no 30, 13.2.2003-
Nomination of new 
members
Lecturer of 
Informatics at the 
Department of 
Informatics, 
Athens University 
of Economics and 
Business
Member of the Committee for 
the conduct of an open tender 
and evaluation of bids for the 
supply of computer equipment 
(Hardware-Software PCs 
Local Network) and the 
development of applications 
for the implementation of the 
Integrated Information System 
of the Treasury
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 34, 23.1.1998)
Member of the Technical 
Council of the National 
Technical Athens University 
(3 year mandate) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 626, 11.5.2000)
Appointed as an Expert at the 
Committee on the Integrated 
Information System at the Ministry 
of Economics and Finance – 
General Directorate of Investment 
and Development (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 1084, 
5.8.2003) 
Member of the Scientific 
Committee for the submission of a 
recommendation to the Plenary of 
the Council of  Higher 
Technological Education 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 46, 8.2.2007)
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Trade Unionism
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Occupation
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Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
14 D. G. (U14) Member of the Committee on 
the Integrated Information 
System constituted by the 
Ministry of Economics and 
Finance - General Secretariat 
of Investment and 
Development (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 1525, 
14.11.2001)
Member of the Committee for 
the study of the security 
mechanisms of the Instant 
State Lottery (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 330, 
16.3.2000)
President of the Management 
Board of the Digital Aid S.A. 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 144, 23.4.2010)
15 E. M. (FP15) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
96, 7.5.1999
Alternate Member
of U7 (replacing U1 after his 
resignation)
End of mandate, G.G. 
vol. C, no 30, 13.2.2003-
Nomination of new 
members
Lawyer, PhD in 
Law
Special Adviser on issues of 
Organisation and 
Administration (Management) 
at the Political Bureau of the 
Prime Minister (First and 
Second Konstantinos Simitis 
Government). Duration of the 
mandate: 1.2.1996-10.3.2004
Appointment (Government 
Gazette, vol. C’, no 62, 
20.3.1996)
Revocation of the mandate by 
decision of the Prime Minister 
Konstantinos Karamanlis 
(Government Gazette, vol. C’, 
no 74, 17.3.2004)
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee on the 
elaboration of the draft law 
“Protection of personal data” 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
623, 14.7.1995) 
Member of the Working Group on 
the Schengen Convention and the 
harmonization of the Greek 
legislation and particularly in 
relation to the legal problems 
arising from its implementation on 
issues related to the competences 
of the Ministry of Justice 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
395, 16.5.1997)
Assistant Professor at the University 
of Aegean (Government Gazette, 
vol. NPDD’, no 14, 20.1.2004)
Member of the special legislative 
committee regarding the final 
elaboration of the draft law of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of personal data and 
the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
634, 30.4.2004)
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee (Ministry of 
Justice, Transparency and Human 
Rights) for the final elaboration of 
the draft law on the transposition of 
the Directive 2006/24/EC
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
15 E. M. (FP15) Member of the Working 
Group on International Issues 
constituted by the Ministry of 
Justice 
Mandate: 1.4.2000-1.4.2001 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 296, 10.3.2000) 
Member of the Management 
Board of the Information 
Society S.A. (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 324, 
27.3.2001)
on the retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available 
electronic communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD’, 
no 72, 1.3.2010)
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee (Ministry of 
Justice, Transparency and Human 
Rights) for the final elaboration of 
the draft law on the transposition of 
the Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 
on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters (Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 141, 21.4.2010)
President of the special legislative 
drafting committee (Ministry of 
Justice, Transparency and Human 
Rights) for the final elaboration of 
the draft law on the transposition of 
the PNR (Passenger Name Record) 
Agreements of the European Union 
and the Governments of U.S.A., 
Canada and Australia on the 
processing and transfer of 
passengers’ data
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD’, 
no 165, 7.5.2010)
Alternate Member of the Ephorate of 
the General State Archives 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD’, 
no 373, 17.11.2010)
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Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
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Appointment to the Authority
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
16 K. M. (U16) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
245, 25.8.2000
Alternate Member
of U4
Submission of 
resignation on 
11.6.2002. He was 
replaced by Popi 
Fountedaki
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C, no 245, 
30.10.2002)
Professor of 
Constitutional 
Law at the 
Department of 
Law, Athens 
University
President of the Scientific 
Council of the Hellenic 
Parliament (2000- )
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1416, 21.12.2000)
Member of the Management 
Board of the Hellenic 
Telecommunications and Post 
Commission (5 year mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
29, 19.1.1995)
Submission of resignation: 
22.5.2000
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
669, 30.5.2000)
Member of the Working Group on 
the Schengen Convention and the 
harmonization of the Greek 
legislation and particularly in 
relation to the legal problems 
arising from its implementation on 
issues related to the competences 
of the Ministry of Justice 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
395, 16.5.1997)
Alternate Member of the 
Management Board of the State 
Scholarships Foundation 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
451, 30.5.1997)
Submission of resignation in 1999 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
878, 25.5.1999)
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council for the year 
1999 (Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 49, 29.1.1999)
Member of the Supreme Council for 
the year 2006 (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 667, 29.5.2006)
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the public sector
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Appointment to the Authority
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Public Sector after the end of the 
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Authority
17 A. P. (U17) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
245, 30.10.2002
Alternate Member
of U4
New appointment after the 
Constitutional Revision of 2001
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003)
Alternate Member of U26
2 year mandate
Mandate renewed. New 
appointment as  Regular 
Member
(Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
279, 24.10.2005)
Submission of 
resignation due to the 
Cameras case 
(20.11.2007) 
Source: The official 
website of the Authority, 
Press Releases, 
http://www.dpa.gr/portal/
page?_pageid=33%2C1
5131&_dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL&_piref33
_24849_33_15131_151
31.etos=2007&_piref33_
24849_33_15131_1513
1.minas=11&_piref33_2
4849_33_15131_15131.
ananeosi=%CE%91%C
E%BD%CE%B1%CE%B
D%CE%AD%CF%89%C
F%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 4.5.2011
Revocation of the 
resignation
Mandate should end on 
13.10.2009
NGOs
Member of the 
Secretariat of the 
Greek Committee 
for International 
Detention and 
Peace (NGO) 
(Decision of the 
14th Conference, 
November 16, 
2003) available 
at: 
http://www.eedye.
gr/, date of 
access: 
9.12.2010
Party Affiliation
Candidate in the 
Municipal and 
Prefectural 
Elections of 1998 
with the 
Communist Party 
of Greece 
(Candidate as 
Municipal 
Counselor at the 
City of Athens). 
Source, 
Newspaper 
Rizospastis, 
http://www1.rizos
pastis.gr/story.do
?id=3740985&text
CriteriaClause=, 
date of access: 
9.12.2010
Associate 
Professor of 
Penal Law at the 
Department of 
General Law, 
Panteion 
University of 
Social and 
Political Sciences
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Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
17 A. P. (U17) Candidate for the 
European 
Elections of 1999 
with the 
Communist Party 
of Greece 
Available at: 
http://org.election
s.gr/euroelections
99/countries/Gree
ce/Parts/kke/ipop
sifioikke.htm, date 
of access: 
20.5.2010
18 P. F. (U18) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
245, 30.10.2002
New appointment after the 
Constitutional Revision of 2001
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003)
Alternate Member of U9
2 year mandate
Mandate renewed. New 
appointment as Alternate 
Member of U31
(Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
279, 24.10.2005) 
Mandate renewed
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008)
Alternate Member of FP37
(until October 13, 2009)
Mandate should have 
ended on 13.10.2009
Associate 
Professor of 
Constitutional 
Law at the 
Department of 
General Law, 
Panteion 
University of 
Social and 
Political Sciences 
She was elected 
Alternate 
President of the 
Department of 
General Law of 
the Panteion 
University of 
Social and 
Political Sciences
Mandate: 
1.9.2010-
31.8.2012 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 294, 
2.9.2010)
Alternate Member of the 
Management Board of the 
State Scholarships 
Foundation. 
Mandate: 1.8.2001-29.5.2005 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1008, 1.8.2001)
Submission of resignation: 
5.4.2004
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1005, 6.7.2004)
Alternate Member of the 
National Committee for 
Human Rights representing 
the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority, 2006-
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 322, 16.3.2006, no 
108, 13.3.2009)
Member of the Secondary 
Supervisory Committee of Public 
Spectacles for the years 1995, 
1996, 1997 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
94, 10.2.1995, no 64, 31.1.1996, 
no 121, 26.2.1997)
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Public Sector after the end of the 
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Authority
19 D. G. (J19) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
President 
4 year mandate
Submission of 
resignation due to the 
Cameras case 
(19.11.2007) 
Source: The official 
website of the Authority, 
Press Releases, 
http://www.dpa.gr/portal/
page?_pageid=33%2C1
5131&_dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL&_piref33
_24849_33_15131_151
31.etos=2007&_piref33_
24849_33_15131_1513
1.minas=11&_piref33_2
4849_33_15131_15131.
ananeosi=%CE%91%C
E%BD%CE%B1%CE%B
D%CE%AD%CF%89%C
F%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 4.5.2011
Honorary Vice-President of 
the Hellenic Supreme 
Court of Civil and Penal 
Law (Areios Pagos)
Member of the National 
Committee for Human Rights 
representing the Hellenic 
Data Protection Authority
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 276, 7.3.2003)
Alternate President of the 
Committee of article 4 of the 
legislative decree 76/1974 on the 
restoration of civil servants 
sacked or forced to resign during 
the dictatorship of the colonels 
(1967-1974). He was substituted 
in 1992. (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, no 134, 5.3.1993)
Member of the permanent 
Legislative drafting committee of 
the Ministry of Justice, 1994-1996 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
380, 23.5.1994, no 430, 
17.5.1995, no 498, 25.6.1996)
President of the Administrative 
Committee on Military 
Requisitions of the Capital of the 
State (Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 638, 30.7.1996)
Caretaker Minister of Justice 
before the national elections of 
2000
(Government Gazette, vol. A’, no 
101, 20.3.2000)
President of the Central 
Legislative drafting committee 
(1998-2003)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
61, 4.2.1998, no 103, 4.2.2000, 
no 1572, 22.12.2000)
Submission of resignation on 
10.2.2003 (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 191, 19.2.2003)
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20 I. T. (U20) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
Regular Member 
4 year mandate
Submission of 
resignation 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. C’, no 872, 
14.6.2004)
U28 was appointed to 
the vacant post
Party affiliation:
Secretary for 
Informatics and 
New 
Technologies, 
Nea Dimokratia 
Party, 1998-2004
Source, European 
Parliament, 
available at: 
http://www.europa
rl.europa.eu/mem
bers/public/geoSe
arch/view.do?lang
uage=EN&id=968
98, date of 
access: 
9.12.2010
Member of the 
party of New 
Democracy
Extra-
parliamentary 
member of the 
Sector for 
Education and 
Religious Affairs 
of the 
Parliamentary 
Work of New 
Democracy (2 
year mandate) 
Professor of 
Informatics at the 
Department of 
Informatics,  
University of 
Thessaloniki
Member of the Management 
Board of the Information 
Society S.A. (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 324, 
27.3.2001)
Member of the Management 
Board of the National 
Research and Technology 
Network S.A. 
(Government Gazette, vol. AE-
EPE, no 11377, 23.10.2003)
Member of the Scientific Council 
of the National Centre for 
Scientific Research Demokritos 
(1997-2000)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
26, 21.1.1997)
Revocable Secretary General for 
Research and Technology at the 
General Secretariat of the Ministry of 
Development  (2004-2008) 
(Government Gazette, vol. C’, no 75, 
18.3.2004)
Representative of Greece in the 
European Space Agency (2004-
2007)
Source, European Parliament, 
available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/memb
ers/public/geoSearch/view.do?langu
age=EN&id=96898, date of access: 
9.12.2010
Member of the Council for the e-
Government Forum (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 196, 15.2.2007)
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Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
20 I. T. (U20) by decision of the 
Secretary 
General of the 
Parliamentary 
Group Dimitrios 
Sioufas, upon 
recommendation 
of the 
Coordinators and  
Heads of the 
Sector of 
Education and 
Religious Affairs 
and approval of 
the President of 
the Party 
(Konstantinos 
Karamanlis). The 
decision bears no 
date. However, it 
probably 
corresponds to 
the period 
between 2000-
2004
Available at: 
http://www.nd.gr/i
ndex.php?option=
com_content&tas
k=view&id=11469
&Itemid=151, 
date of access: 
21.5.2010
He was elected 
President of the   
Department of 
Informatics at the 
University of 
Thessaloniki
Mandate: 
1.9.2003-
31.8.2005 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 441, 
15.10.2007)
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
20 I. T. (U20) Member of the 
European 
Parliament 
elected in the 
European 
elections of 2009 
with the party of 
New Democracy
Source: European 
Parliament 
available at: 
http://www.europa
rl.europa.eu/mem
bers/public/geoSe
arch/view.do?lang
uage=EN&id=968
98, date of 
access: 
9.12.2010
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Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
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Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
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Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
21 G. P. (U21) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
Alternate Member of U20
4 year mandate
Renewal of the mandate
Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008
Alternate Member of U28              
Four year mandate
Submission of 
resignation due to the 
Cameras case 
(19.11.2007) 
Source: The official 
website of the Authority, 
Press Releases, 
http://www.dpa.gr/portal/
page?_pageid=33%2C1
5131&_dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL&_piref33
_24849_33_15131_151
31.etos=2007&_piref33_
24849_33_15131_1513
1.minas=11&_piref33_2
4849_33_15131_15131.
ananeosi=%CE%91%C
E%BD%CE%B1%CE%B
D%CE%AD%CF%89%C
F%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 4.5.2011
Professor at the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institution of 
Athens 
22 S. S. (J22) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
Regular Member 
4 year mandate
End of mandate, G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 125 , 
20.3.2008-Nomination of 
new members
Honorary Councillor of 
State He retired from the 
service (pension) on July 
1, 2000 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 201, 12.7.2000)
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council for the years 
1993 and 1998 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 144, 
11.3.1993, no 283, 20.3.1998)
Member of the Supreme Special 
Court of article 100 of the 
Constitution for the period 1993-
1997 (Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 35, 21.1.1994, no 42, 
19.1.1996)
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
23 C. P. (J23) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
Alternate Member of J22
4 year mandate
He was appointed Alternate 
President to the vacant post after 
the resignation of J2
(Government Gazette, vol. C’, no 
185, 6.8.2003)
Renewal of the mandate 
Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008
Alternate President Four year 
mandate
Submission of 
resignation due to the 
Cameras case 
(19.11.2007) 
Source: The official 
website of the Authority, 
Press Releases, 
http://www.dpa.gr/portal/
page?_pageid=33%2C1
5131&_dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL&_piref33
_24849_33_15131_151
31.etos=2007&_piref33_
24849_33_15131_1513
1.minas=11&_piref33_2
4849_33_15131_15131.
ananeosi=%CE%91%C
E%BD%CE%B1%CE%B
D%CE%AD%CF%89%C
F%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 4.5.2011
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis)
24 C. P. (FP24) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
Alternate Member of FP12
4 year mandate
Submission of 
resignation due to the 
Cameras case 
(19.11.2007) 
Source: The official 
website of the Authority, 
Press Releases, 
http://www.dpa.gr/portal/
page?_pageid=33%2C1
5131&_dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL&_piref33
_24849_33_15131_151
31.etos=2007&_piref33_
24849_33_15131_1513
1.minas=11&_piref33_2
4849_33_15131_15131.
ananeosi=%CE%91%C
E%BD%CE%B1%CE%B
D%CE%AD%CF%89%C
F%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 4.5.2011
Lawyer Member of the National 
Committee on Human Rights 
appointed by the Prime 
Minister (Konstantinos 
Karamanlis) as prestigious 
person with expertise in the 
protection of human rights 
(Government Gazette, vol. C, 
no 312, 24.11.2004) 
Member of the permanent 
Legislative drafting committee of 
the Ministry of Justice 
(Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
116, 5.3.1993)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
25 A. K. (U25) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
Alternate Member of U4
2 year mandate
End of mandate, G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 125 , 
20.3.2008-Nomination of 
new members
Party affiliation
Member of the 
party of New 
Democracy
Extra-
parliamentary 
member of the 
Sector for 
Education and 
Religious Affairs 
of the 
Parliamentary 
Work of New 
Democracy (2 
year mandate) by 
decision of the 
Secretary 
General of the 
Parliamentary 
Group Dimitrios 
Sioufas, upon 
recommendation 
of the 
Professor of Civil 
Procedural Law 
at the 
Department of 
Law, University of 
Thessaloniki,
Lawyer, Law 
Office
Member of the Scientific 
Council of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (3 year 
mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 855, 10.6.2004)
President of the Management 
Board of the Industrial 
Property Organisation (4 year 
mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1866, 15.12.2004)
Director and President of the Board 
of the Centre of International and 
European Economic Law (2005-
2007). Sources: Official Website of 
the Centre, available at: 
http://www.cieel.gr/en/about2.jsp, 
date of access: 10.12.2010, 
Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 538, 
28.4.2006, No 18246/404/18.5.2005 
Decision of the Minister of Finance 
and Economics.                                  
Member of the Governing Board of 
the International University of 
Greece (Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 157, 6.6.2006                     
President of the Extraordinary 
Committee for the technical 
assessment of the bids of the open 
tender for “the Development of the 
National System of Electronic Public 
Procurement” 
Coordinators and  
Heads of the 
Sector of 
Education and 
Religious Affairs 
and approval of 
the President of 
the Party 
(Konstantinos 
Karamanlis). The 
decision bears no 
date. However, it 
probably 
corresponds to 
the period 
between 2000-
2004
Available at: 
http://www.nd.gr/i
ndex.php?option=
com_content&tas
k=view&id=11469
&Itemid=151, 
date of access: 
21.5.2010
of  the General Secretariat of 
Commerce of the Ministry of 
Development (Government Gazette, 
vol. B’, no 700, 7.6.2006)
Reconstitution of the Committee for 
the reassessment of complaints 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 561, 31.12.2007
Member of the Committee on 
Bioethics (Government Gazette, vol. 
B’, no 851, 7.7.2006)
President of the special committee 
on the codification of the legislation 
regarding the structure and 
operation of the Institutions of Higher 
Education (Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 162, 23.4.2007)
Member of the National Council for 
Research and Technology 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 83, 25.2.2008)
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Position in the Authority
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appointments/positions in 
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Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
26 N. P. (U26) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
30, 13.2.2003
Regular Member 
2 year mandate
End of mandate: G.G. 
vol. C, no 279, 
24.10.2005-Nomination 
of new members
Party affiliation
Parliamentary 
candidate in the 
national elections 
of 2004 with the 
Communist Parry 
of Greece 
(second 
constituency of 
Athens)
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Lambrakis Press 
S.A.,
Professor of 
Mathematics at 
the School of 
Applied 
Mathematics and 
Physical 
Sciences,  
National 
Technical 
University of 
Athens 
., available at: 
http://ekloges.dol
net.gr/2004/news/
article.asp?IngIns
tID=50&IngEntityI
D=893&IngDtrID=
8,
date of access: 
21.05.2010
27 A. P. (J27) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
185, 6.8.2003
Alternate Member of J22
2 year mandate
Renewal of the mandate
Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008
Regular Member four year 
mandate
Former Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis). He retired 
from the service on July 1, 
2003
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 160, 10.7.2003)
President (in his capacity as 
Judge of Appeals) of the 
Secondary Council for the 
Selection of Medical and Dental 
Personnel in Hospitals 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
562, 28.6.1995) 
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Number
Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
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Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
28 A. P. (U28) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
185, 6.8.2003
Regular Member 
For the rest of the four year 
mandate of U20
Renewal of the mandate
Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008
Regular Member 4 year mandate
Party affiliation
Member of the 
party of New 
Democracy
Extra-
parliamentary 
member of the 
Sector for 
Education and 
Religious Affairs 
of the 
Parliamentary 
Work of New 
Democracy (2 
year mandate) by 
decision of the 
Secretary 
General of the 
Parliamentary 
Group Dimitrios 
Sioufas, upon 
recommendation 
of the 
Coordinators and  
Heads of the 
Sector of 
Education and 
Religious Affairs 
and 
Professor of 
Informatics at the 
Department of 
Informatics,  
University of 
Thessaloniki 
Alternate Member of the 
National Council for Research 
and Technology 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1675, 13.11.2003)
Alternate Member, 
representing the party of New 
Democracy according to the 
as of 3.5.2004 document of 
the General Secretary of the 
Parliamentary Group of New 
Democracy, of the Committee 
for the supply of goods of 
relevant economic or 
technological value (the 
supply of informatics articles 
for the implementation of the 
project “Computer Equipment  
for the participation of the 
Greek Police to the 
modernization of Public 
Administration with the use of 
Informatics (POLICE ON 
LINE), assigned to the 
“Information Society S.A.”) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 932, 21.6.2004)
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee with the aim to 
proceed to legal regulations for 
the adjustment of the internal 
legislation to the provisions of the 
Statute of the International Penal 
Court ratified by law 3003/2002 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1803, 6.12.2004)
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council of article 91 
of the Constitution for the year 
2004
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
76, 21.1.2004)
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Number
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Position in the Authority
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Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
28 A. P. (U28) approval of the 
President of the 
Party 
(Konstantinos 
Karamanlis). The 
decision bears no 
date. However, it 
probably 
corresponds to 
the period 
between 2000-
2004
Available at: 
http://www.nd.gr/i
ndex.php?option=
com_content&tas
k=view&id=11469
&Itemid=151, 
date of access: 
21.5.2010
He was elected 
President of the   
Department of 
Informatics at the 
University of 
Thessaloniki
Mandate: 
1.9.2007-
31.8.2009 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 441, 
15.10.2007)
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Name Surname Appointment-Reappointment- 
Position in the Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
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the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the end of the 
mandate/Appointment to the 
Authority
29 L. K. (U29) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
279, 24.10.2005
Regular Member 
4 year 
mandate 
Mandate should have 
ended on 13.10.2009
Professor of 
Penal Law at the 
Department of 
law, Athens 
University,
Lawyer, Law 
Office Source: 
The Official 
Website of 
Athens 
University, 
available at: 
http://poiniko.law.
uoa.gr/html/kotsal
is.html, date of 
access: 
26.3.2011
Member of the Central 
Legislative drafting committee
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1490, 1.10.2004)
Member of the Scientific-
Advisory Board of the Ministry 
of Transport and 
Communications pursuant to 
article 13, par. 7 of the law 
2578/1998 (2004,2005, 2007) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1608, 27.10.2004, no 
1813, 22.12.2005, no 14, 
23.1.2007)
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council of article 91 
of the Constitution for the year 
2004
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
76, 21.1.2004)                                
                                                       
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee with the aim to 
proceed to legal regulations for 
the adjustment of the internal 
legislation to the provisions of the 
Statute of the International Penal 
Court ratified by law 3003/2002 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1803, 6.12.2004)
Member of the special 
legislative drafting committee 
for the final processing and 
formulation of the draft law on 
the establishment of the 
Judicial Police 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 701, 25.5.2005)
President of the  special 
legislative drafting committee 
on the final processing of 
draft laws pertaining to the 
competence of the Ministry of 
Justice 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 382, 28.3.2006)
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Affiliation/NGOs/
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Occupation
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appointments/positions in 
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29 L. K. (U29) Member of the Special 
legislative drafting committee 
for the elaboration of a draft 
law on the enhancement of 
the legislative framework 
regarding the security of 
communications 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 493, 18.4.2006)
Member of the Central 
Committee of Codification 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 40, 1.2.2008) 
Submission of resignation and 
appointment of the new Board 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 535, 23.12.2009)
Member of the examination 
committee for the entrance 
examination to the National 
School of Judicial Officers 
(Civil and Penal Justice) for 
the year 2009
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 254, 15.6.2009)
Member of the Special 
legislative drafting committee 
for the reformation of the 
provisions of the Code of 
Laws on Drugs ratified by the 
law 3459/2006
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 96, 17.3.2010)
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Position in the Authority
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Appointment to the Authority
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Public Sector after the end of the 
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Authority
30 I. G. (U30) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
279, 24.10.2005
Alternate Member of U29
4 year mandate
Submission of 
resignation (Government 
Gazette, vol. C, no 341, 
4.8.2008)
Appointment of U38 to 
the vacant post
He was elected 
President of the   
Department of 
Law at the 
University of 
Athens
Mandate: 
1.9.2007-
31.8.2009 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 362, 
17.8.2007)
Associate 
Professor of 
Procedural Penal 
Law at the 
Department of 
Law, Athens 
University,
Lawyer, Law 
Office Source: 
The Official 
Website of the 
National Bank of 
Greece, available 
at: 
http://www.nbg.gr
/wps/wcm/connec
t/c80367004cef7
0a78a96dbd500a
6cdd0/007_017_
Giannidis_GR.pdf
?MOD=AJPERES
&CACHEID=c803
67004cef70a78a
96dbd500a6cdd0
&CACHEID=a539
96004cd0c7a599
85fdcd25ebc6fe, 
date of access: 
26.3.2011
Independent Non Executive 
Member of the Public Power 
Company S.A. (Government 
Gazette, vol. AE-EPE, no 538, 
23.1.2004)
Submission of resignation on 
July, 3, 2008
(Government Gazette, vol. AE-
EPE, no 10260, 5.9.2008)
Member of the Special 
Committee on the elaboration 
of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 1663, 
29.11.2005)
Since 1993 legal adviser of 
the National Bank of Greece
Source: The Official Website 
of the National Bank of 
Greece, available at: 
http://www.nbg.gr/wps/wcm/co
nnect/c80367004cef70a78a9
6dbd500a6cdd0/007_017_Gi
annidis_GR.pdf?MOD=AJPE
RES&CACHEID=c80367004c
ef70a78a96dbd500a6cdd0&C
ACHEID=a53996004cd0c7a5
9985fdcd25ebc6fe, date of 
access: 26.3.2011,
Since 1993 legal adviser of the 
National Bank of Greece
Source: The Official Website of 
the National Bank of Greece, 
available at: 
http://www.nbg.gr/wps/wcm/conne
ct/c80367004cef70a78a96dbd500
a6cdd0/007_017_Giannidis_GR.p
df?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=c
80367004cef70a78a96dbd500a6c
dd0&CACHEID=a53996004cd0c7
a59985fdcd25ebc6fe, date of 
access: 26.3.2011, 
Alternate Member of the 
European Cultural Centre of 
Delphi
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 483, 
1.7.1993)
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee on the 
reassessment of the substantial 
penal legislation (penal Code and 
special penal laws)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
317, 8.5.1996)
Member of the permanent 
legislative drafting committee of 
the Ministry of Justice, 1993, 1996-
1998
Customer Advocate at the National 
Bank of Greece: 2010-(Source: 
Newspaper Imerisia, available at: 
http://www.imerisia.gr/article.asp?cat
id=12334&subid=2&pubid=4789315
8, date of access: 11.10.2010
Member of the examination 
committee for the entrance 
examination to the National School 
of Judicial Officers (Civil and Penal 
Justice) for the years 2008, 2009 
and 2010
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 
483, 19.11.2008
254, 15.6.2009, no 122, 9.4.2010)
Member of the Special Committee on 
the elaboration of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure  2008-2009
 no 293, 8.7.2008, no 389, 
4.9.2009). Replaced (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 389, 4.9.2009)
Counselor of the Management 
Board of the National Bank of 
Greece SA, 2004-
(Government Gazette, vol. 
TAE-EPE, no 4413, 
20.5.2004)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
116, 5.3.1993
no 498, 25.6.1996
no 79, 7.2.1997)
no 133, 18.2.1998)
Member of the Special 
Committee on the elaboration 
of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (2005, 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 1663, 29.11.2005)
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30 I. G. (U30) Member of the Working Group for 
the study and proposal of 
amendments to the legislation on 
the penal liability of members of 
the Government (Cabinet) and 
Secretaries of State (Deputy 
Ministers) with a view to improve 
the relevant regulations and their 
harmonization with article 86 of 
the revised Constitution 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
290, 18.7.2001) 
Member of the Central Committee 
of Technical and Scientific 
Collaboration of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
1041, 28.7.2003)
31 F. D. (U31) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
279, 24.10.2005
Regular Member 
4 year
mandate
Submission of 
resignation due to the 
Cameras case 
(19.11.2007) Source: 
The official website of 
the Authority, Press 
Releases, 
http://www.dpa.gr/portal/
page?_pageid=33%2C1
5131&_dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL&_piref33
_24849_33_15131_151
31.etos=2007&_piref33_
24849_33_15131_1513
1.minas=11&_piref33_2
4849_33_15131_15131.
ananeosi=%CE%91%C
E%BD%CE%B1%CE%B
D%CE%AD%CF%89%C
F%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 4.5.2011
Professor of Civil 
Law at the 
Department of 
Law,  Athens 
University. 
He retired from 
the service on 
August 31, 2009 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C’, 
no 366, 
18.5.2009)
Professor 
Emeritus, Athens 
University,
Alternate Member of the 
Management Board of the 
State Scholarships 
Foundation (3 year mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 367, 28.3.2003)
First alternate member of the 
Supreme Disciplinary Council 
of article 91 of the 
Constitution
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1785, 7.12.2006)
Fourth Alternate Member of 
the Special Court for Mistrial 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 2009, 11.10.2007)
Member of the legislative drafting 
committee on the elaboration of a 
draft law on the National Land 
Registry 
(Ministerial Decision no 
13426/30.11.1994, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 27, 19.1.1996)
Member of the Management 
Board of the Greek Mapping and 
Cadastre Organisation 1994-2003 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
943, 30.12.1993, no 484, 
11.6.1997
no 1024, 21.8.2000)
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31 F. D. (U31) Professor of Civil 
Law at the 
Department of 
Law,  Athens 
University. 
He retired from 
the service on 
August 31, 2009 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C’, 
no 366, 
18.5.2009)
Professor 
Emeritus, Athens 
University,
Member of the legislative drafting 
committee for the elaboration of a 
Pan-Hellenic plan regarding the 
spatial distribution of the Courts of 
any degree and jurisdiction
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
286, 19.4.1994)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
1081, 20.8.2002)
Lawyer, Law 
Office The 
Official Website 
of the European 
Lawyer, available 
at: 
http://www.europ
eanlawyer.co.uk/
greece.html, date 
of access: 
26.3.2012
32 I. T. (U32) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
279, 24.10.2005
Alternate Member of U17
4 year
mandate
Submission of 
resignation on 2.9.2009 
after his appointment as 
member of the Hellenic 
Telecommunications 
and Post Commission 
Assistant 
Professor of 
International and 
European 
Economic Law at 
Department of 
Department of 
Balkan, Slavic, 
and Oriental 
Studies, 
University of 
Macedonia
Lawyer (Law 
Office) The 
Official Website 
of the 
Thessaloniki Bar 
Association, 
Vice-President of the 
Professional Education and 
Training Organisation
Mandate: 30.10.2007-
30.10.2010
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 500, 22.11.2007)
Submission of resignation: 
6.2.2009
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1088, 5.6.2009) 
President of the Regional 
Council of National Legacies 
of the Region of Central 
Macedonia 
Three-year mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 601, 5.5.2005)
Renewal of the mandate: 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 218, 15.5.2008)
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32 I. T. (U32) http://www.dsth.gr
/web/guest/memb
ers-
phonebook?p_p_
id=PA_CONTAC
TS&p_p_action=
1&p_p_state=nor
mal&p_p_mode=
view&p_p_col_id
=column-
2&p_p_col_pos=
2&p_p_col_count
=3&_PA_CONTA
CTS_struts_actio
n=%2Fext%2Fpa
rties%2Fcontacts
%2Fsearch&p_p_
action=1&_PA_C
ONTACTS_searc
h=true&_PA_CO
NTACTS_name=
%CE%A4*&_PA_
CONTACTS_d-
49489-
s=5&_PA_CONT
ACTS_alphabet=t
rue&_PA_CONT
ACTS_d-49489-
p=1&_PA_CONT
ACTS_d-49489-
o=1, date of 
access: 
26.3.2011
Vice-President of the Central 
Examination Committee on 
the Accreditation of 
Professional Training
Three-year mandate
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 15, 15.1.2008)
Member of the National 
Committee for the definition of 
Professional Rights,     2 year 
mandate
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 19, 17.1.2008)
Alternate Vice-President of 
the Steering Committee for 
the Association of Vocational 
Education and Training with 
Employment 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 386, 12.9.2008)
Submission of resignation 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 154, 10.4.2009)
Alternate Member of the 
Scientific-Advisory Council of 
the Ministry of the Transport 
and Communications
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 86, 3.4.2009)
Member of the Hellenic 
Telecommunications and Post 
Commission (4 year mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD’, 
no 380, 2.9.2009)
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33 C. G. (J33) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008
President
4 year mandate
Submission of 
resignation on February 
8, 2011.
Honorary President of the 
Council of State
He retired from the service 
on July 1, 2005
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 167, 8.7.2005)
Former member of the Court of 
First Instance of the European 
Communities (1989-1992) 
Member of the teaching staff 
under contract of the National 
School of Public Administration, 
and the National School of 
Judicial Officers
Source: Official Website of the  
Federation of the employees of 
the Independent Authorities, 
available at: 
http://www.oeaa.gr/index.php?opti
on=com_content&view=article&id
=90%3A2011-01-20-09-02-
39&catid=39%3A2011-01-15-08-
50-26&Itemid=68&lang=el, date of 
access: 7.3.2011
Member of the Scientific Council 
of the Hellenic Centre for 
European Studies (EKEM) (1994-
2001)  
Source: EKEM, available at: 
http://www.ekem.gr/--a--, date of 
access: 7.3.2011
 
President of the special legislative 
drafting committee of the Ministry 
of Environment, Planning, and 
Public Works
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
109, 18.2.1994)
President of the special legislative 
drafting committee on the 
strengthening of the legal 
framework regarding the security 
of communications
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 36, 10.10.2006)
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34 I. D. (J34) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008
Alternate Member of J27
4 year mandate
Submission of 
resignation (Government 
Gazette, vol. C, no 341, 
4.8.2008
Appointment of LM39 to 
the vacant post
Honorary Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law 
(Areopagitis).
He retired from the service 
on July 1, 2006
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C’, no 20.7.2006)
Member of the 
Special legislative drafting 
committee on the processing of 
legal regulations for the 
establishment of measures and 
procedures for the assessment 
and  ranking of infrastructures and 
needs of the judicial buildings 
throughout the territory 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1531, 14.10.2004)
Member of the Supreme 
Disciplinary Council of Lawyers 
for the year 2003 (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 144, 
11.2.2003)
35 A-I. M. (U35) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008
Regular Member 4 year mandate
Professor Emeritus, 
Athens University (Political 
Scientist)
Member of the Management 
Board of Peristeri 
Development SA (Peristeri is 
a Municipality in Athens). The 
company has undertaken 
actions of the European 
project URBAN. Source, the 
official website of the 
Company, available at: 
http://www.peristeri.gr/index.p
hp?option=com_content&task
=view&id=110&Itemid=149, 
date of access: 20.5.2010
Member of the Governing 
Board of the University of 
Peloponnisos (22.6.2009-
14.12.2009)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 265, 22.6.2009, no 
13, 20.1.2010)
President of the Management 
Board of the Hellenic Radio and 
Television 
President of the National Centre 
for Social Research (EKKE)
Source, Official Website of the 
Department of Political Science 
and Public Administration, Athens 
University, available at: 
http://www.pspa.uoa.gr/node.php?
n=0_1_5_metaxas&lang=el, date 
of access, 20.5.2010
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36 G. L. (FP36) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008
Alternate Member of U35
4 year mandate
Party affiliation 
7/2002-2/2004: 
Scientific 
Collaborator of 
the Deputy of the 
First Constituency 
of Athens and 
Parliamentary 
Representative of 
the Party of New 
Democracy 
Professor 
Prokopis 
Pavlopoulos 
Source: CV, 
Personal 
Webpage, 
available at: 
http://www.lazara
kos.gr/, date of 
access: 
26.3.2011
Lawyer, PhD in 
Law
Law Office, 
Source: CV, 
Personal 
Webpage, 
available at: 
http://www.lazara
kos.gr/, date of 
access: 
26.3.2011
Member of the permanent 
Working Group on issues 
related to logistics at the 
Ministry of Transport and 
Communications
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 442, 24.10.2008)
Adjunct Professor at the 
Department of Political 
Science and International 
Relations, University of 
Peloponnese, for the 
academic year 2008-2009 
Source: The Official Website 
of the University of 
Peleponnese, available at: 
http://pedis.uop.gr/joomla/inde
x.php?option=com_content&vi
ew=article&id=125&Itemid=3&
lang=el, date of access: 
26.3.2011
7/2002   2/2004: 
Scientific Collaborator of the 
Deputy of the First Constituency 
of Athens and Parliamentary 
Representative of the Party of 
New Democracy Professor 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos Source: 
CV, Personal Webpage, available 
at: http://www.lazarakos.gr/, date 
of access: 26.3.2011
Revocable Director at the Political 
Bureau of the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation 2004-24.8.2007
(Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
80, 24.3.2004)
NGOs Scientific 
Collaborator of 
the think tank  
Institute for 
Democracy-
Konstantinos 
Karamanlis 
Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Institiute for 
Democracy, 
available at: 
http://www.idkara
manlis.gr/hr/108, 
date of access: 
15.6.2011
Since 2003-? adjunct 
professor at the Department 
of Marketing and 
Communication,  Athens 
University of Economics and 
Business
The Official Website of the 
Athens University of 
Economics and Business
Available at: 
http://195.251.250.184/greek/
human.htm, and CV, Personal 
Webpage, available at: 
http://www.lazarakos.gr/, date 
of access: 26.3.2011
Revocable employee at the 
Political Bureau of the Caretaker 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation before the 
national elections of 2007 
Mandate: 25.8.2007-19.9.2007
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 423, 5.10.2007)
Member of the Group of Project 
Management regarding “the 
establishment of mechanisms for 
effective and sustainable 
implementation of readmission 
agreements between Albania, EU, 
and interested third countries” 
approved under the first call for 
the Project AENEAS (20.4.2006-
20.4.2008)
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 70, 9.11.2006
He was replaced (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 188, 
2.5.2008)
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36 G. L. (FP36) Member of the Project 
Management Group regarding the 
procedure of issuing residence 
permits of uniform type with the 
form of stand-alone document
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 77, 27.2.2007). He was 
replaced 
(Government Gazette, vol YODD, 
no 526, 10.12.2007)
37 A. R. (FP37) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
125, 20.3.2008
Regular Member, mandate until 
October 13, 2009 for the rest of 
the mandate of the resigned U31
Mandate should have 
ended on 13.10.2009
Trade Unionism
Former Vice- 
President of the 
Athens Bar 
Association (1993-
1996)
Former President 
of the Athens Bar 
Association
1996-2002
His candidacy 
was supported by 
the political party 
of Synaspismos
Sources: 
Newspaper  
Makedonia, 
available at: 
http://www.hyper.
gr/makthes/96030
5/60305f10.htmlw
ebsite, date of 
access: 
24.5.2010 
Website Nooz.gr, 
available at: 
www.nooz.gr/pag
e.ashx?pid=9&aid
=14835, date of 
access: 
24.5.2010
Lawyer Member of the National 
Committee on Human Rights 
representing the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 236, 30.5.2008, vol. YODD no 
108, 13.3.2009)
Member of the permanent legislative 
drafting committee of the Ministry of 
Justice, 1993-1999
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 875, 2.12.1993, no 380, 
23.5.1994, no 430 17.5.1995, no 
498, 25.6.1996
no 79, 7.2.1997)
no 133, 18.2.1998, no 2101, 
1.12.1999)
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee on the new Code 
of Lawyers (Government Gazette, 
vol. B, 
no 2101, 1.12.1999, no 91, 
11.2.1997)
President of the special legislative 
drafting committee on the final 
elaboration of the draft law “Code of 
Lawyers” (Government Gazette, vol. 
B, 
no 152, 15.2.2001)
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38 D. L. (U38) Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 341, 4.8.2008
Alternate Member of Leonidas 
Kotsalis after the resignation of I. 
Giannidis
Mandate should have 
ended on 13.10.2009
Lecturer of Civil 
Law at the 
Department of 
Law, Athens 
University,
Law Office 
Member of the Committee for 
the examination of requests 
regarding the granting of the 
postponement of ranking in 
the armed forces for PhD 
holders or those who excel at 
scientific work or research 
abroad 
(2008-2010)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 447, 30.10.2008)
Member of the Working Group 
assigned to answer the 
questionnaire of the Green Paper 
of the European Commission on 
damages actions for breach of 
antitrust rules of the European 
Communities (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 484, 
18.4.2006)
Member of the Committee for the 
examination of requests regarding 
the granting of the postponement 
of ranking in the armed forces for 
PhD holders or those who excel at 
scientific work or research abroad 
(2006-2008)
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 11, 14.9.2006)  
39 P. T. (LM39) Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 341, 4.8.2008
Alternate Member of 
J27 after the resignation of J34 
Mandate shall end on 
20.03.2012
Member of the Scientific 
Staff of the Greek 
Ombudsman (2003-2007). 
He retired from the post 
during 2007.
Lawyer, PhD in 
Social Law, 
Lawyer with a 
salary mandate at 
the General 
Hospital of 
Athens 
“Hippokrateion”
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 522, 
30.7.2007)
Special Collaborator at the 
Political Bureau of the 
Minister of Internal Affairs, 
Public Administration and 
Decentralization, P. 
Pavlopoulos, 
while exercising his main 
duties as lawyer with a salary 
mandate at the General 
Hospital of Athens 
“Hippokrateion” (Government 
Gazette,  vol. YODD, no 488, 
16.11.2007)
Submission of resignation 
3.2.2009 (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 115, 
18.3.2009)
Member of the Working 
Group on the monitoring of 
the projects under the action 
“Support of the pre-
contractual procedure for the 
partnerships between the 
local authorities and the 
private sector”. Duration of 
the work of the Committee: 
1.1.2008-31.12.2009
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 134, 31.3.2008)
Member of the Scientific Staff of 
the Greek Ombudsman (2003-
2007). He retired from the post 
during 2007. The annual reports 
for the years 2005 and 2006 
mention that he served on 
secondment to another public 
service. On secondment Special 
Adviser of the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Public Administration and 
Decentralization (the information 
is indirect). Source, Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 616, 17.5.2006 
Source: AnnualReports for the 
years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 
2007 Annexes, p. 337 (2003),  
Annexes, p. 299, (2004), 
Annexes, p. 341 (2005), Annexes, 
p. 381 (2006),  Annexes, p. 343 
(2007), available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual_2
003_gr.htm and 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual_2
004_gr.htm, date of access: 
23.12.2010, 
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39 P. T. (LM39) Member of the Project 
Management Group at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
Public Administration and 
Decentralization for the 
elaboration of the Integrated 
Action Plan for the smooth 
adaptation and integration of 
third country nationals into the 
Greek society 
End of the work of the 
Committee: 31.12.2008
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 211, 14.5.2008)
End of mandate due to his 
resignation from the post of 
Special Adviser (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 220, 
27.5.2009)
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual_0
5/10_parartima_kp.pdf, date of 
access: 23.12.2010, 
http://www.synigoros.gr/pdfs/annu
al_06_pdfs/annual_p_kprosopiko
u_06.pdf, date of access: 
23.12.2010, 
http://www.synigoros.gr/pdf_01/an
nual_07/katastasi_proswpikou.pdf
, date of access: 
23.12.2010Special Collaborator at 
the Political Office of the Minister 
of  Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralization (Caretaker 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation, S. Flogaitis, 
appointed before 
the national elections of 2007), 
with parallel exercise of his main 
duties as lawyer with a salary 
mandate at the General Hospital 
of Athens “Hippokrateion”. He was 
appointed for the period 
24.8.2007-19.9.2007 
(Appointment: Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 372, 
27.8.2007, Dismissal:  
Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 423, 5.10.2007)
Vice-President of the 
Management Board of the 
National Centre for Social 
Emergency Assistance (2004-
2006)
(Government Gazette, vol. NPDD, 
no 119, 18.5.2004)
Special Rapporteur of the 
Committee on the elaboration of 
the new Municipal and Community 
Code. Duration of the work of the 
Committee : 31.12.2004 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1395, 13.9.2004)
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39 P. T. (LM39) Member of the Working Groups 
(Group of Administrative 
Organisation) for the collection 
and codification of the 
administrative and social security 
legislation (2004-2006)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1734, 23.11.2004, 310, 
15.3.2006)
Member of the Working Group on 
the monitoring of the projects 
under the action “Support of the 
pre-contractual procedure for the 
partnerships between the local 
authorities and the private sector”. 
Duration of the work of the 
Committee: 1.1.2006-31.12.2007
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
616, 17.5.2006) 
Member of the Project 
Management Group at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralization for the 
elaboration of the Integrated 
Action Plan for the smooth 
adaptation and integration of third 
country nationals into the Greek 
society 
Duration of the work of the 
Committee (25.9.2006-25.4.2007)
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 28, 2.10.2006
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39 P. T. (LM39) Member of the teaching staff of 
the University of Peloponnese 
under contract pursuant to the 
Presidential Decree 407/80  
(adjunct professor) during the 
academic year 2007-2008. 
Source: Official Website of the 
University of Peloponnese, 
available at: 
http://depts.uop.gr/departments/d
epart8/odig2007-2008.doc, date 
of access: 25.12.2010
Member of the Project 
Management Group in/at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralization for the 
implementation of the new 
European Programme – 
Framework for the solidarity and 
management of Migration Flows in 
Greece for the period 2007-2013
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 164, 24.4.2007)
Member of the Project 
Management Group in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralization regarding the 
procedure of issuing residence 
permits of uniform type with the 
form of stand-alone document
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 77, 27.2.2007).
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APPENDIX 3
Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
1 N. D. (U1) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
57, 24.3.1998
(5 year mandate)
The Greek Ombudsman
End of mandate: 2003 Professor of 
Political Science 
at the Department 
of Political 
Science and 
Public 
Administration, 
Athens University. 
Suspension of 
duties
Appointed in 
1993 and retired 
from the service 
on August 31, 
2009 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C’, 
no 366, 
18.5.2009) under 
suspension of 
duties 
Member of the Management 
Board of the Cultural 
Foundation of the National 
Bank of Greece (1999-2005) 
Publication of the end of his 
mandate in the Government 
Gazette (Government 
Gazette, vol. NPDD, no 90, 
4.4.2006)
Ex Officio Member of the 
National Committee for 
Human Rights representing 
the institution of the Greek 
Ombudsman (Government 
Gazette, vol. B’, no 1833, 
1.10.1999)
Member of the National 
Council on Public 
Administration Reform (2000)
Source: The Annual Report of 
the Greek Ombudsman for 
the year 2001,Curricula Vitae 
of the Greek Ombudsman and 
the Deputy Ombudsmen, p. 
193, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annua
l01_en/en_2001.pdf, date of 
access: 4.3.2011
Director of the Hellenic Foundation 
for European and Foreign Policy 
(think tank) 
1988-1991 Source: The Annual 
Report of the Greek Ombudsman 
for the year 2001,Curricula Vitae of 
the Greek Ombudsman and the 
Deputy Ombudsmen, p. 193, 
available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual01_
en/en_2001.pdf, date of access: 
4.3.2011
Member of the Scientific Council of 
the National Centre for Social 
Research (EKKE) (3-year 
mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
457, 24.6.1993)
Member of the National Advisory 
Board of Research 
1994-1998
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
129, 24.2.1994, vol. B’, no 785, 
12.9.1995)
Director of the National Centre for 
Social Research (EKKE)
1995-1998
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
850, 11.10.1995)
European Ombudsman (2003) 
2003/158/EC,Euratom: Decision of 
the European Parliament of 15 
January 2003 appointing the 
European Ombudsman
OJ L 65, 8.3.2003, p. 26–26, 
available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSer
v.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:065:0026:0026:
EN:PDF, date of access: 26.12.2010
European Ombudsman (2005)
Decision of the European Parliament 
of 11 January 2005 appointing the 
European Ombudsman (2005/46/EC, 
Euratom), in  Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJEU). 
25.01.2005, No L 21,  p. 8, available 
at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Result.do?aaaa=2005
&mm=01&jj=25&type=&nnn=&pppp=
8&RechType=RECH_reference_pub
&Submit=%CE%91%CE%BD%CE%
B1%CE%B6%CE%AE%CF%84%CE
%B7%CF%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 26.12.2010
European Ombudsman 2010,
European Parliament Decision of 20 
January 2010 electing the European 
Ombudsman,
OJ C 305E , 11.11.2010, p. 19–20, 
available at: 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSer
v.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:305E:0019:002
0:EN:PDF, date of access: 
26.12.2010
Career Paths of the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
1 N. D. (U1) Alternate Member of the 
Management Board of the Hellenic 
Data Protection Authority
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
184, 3.9.1997).
Submission of  resignation after his 
appointment to the post of the 
Greek Ombudsman on April 30, 
1998
(Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
96, 7.5.1999)
European Ombudsman (2005)
Decision of the European Parliament 
of 11 January 2005 appointing the 
European Ombudsman (2005/46/EC, 
Euratom), in  Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJEU). 
25.01.2005, No L 21,  p. 8, available 
at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Result.do?aaaa=2005
&mm=01&jj=25&type=&nnn=&pppp=
8&RechType=RECH_reference_pub
&Submit=%CE%91%CE%BD%CE%
B1%CE%B6%CE%AE%CF%84%CE
%B7%CF%83%CE%B7, date of 
access: 26.12.2010
European Ombudsman 2010,
European Parliament Decision of 20 
January 2010 electing the European 
Ombudsman,
OJ C 305E , 11.11.2010, p. 19–20, 
available at: 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSer
v.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:305E:0019:002
0:EN:PDF, date of access: 
26.12.2010
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
2 G. K. (U2) Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
203, 29.10.1998
Deputy Ombudsman, 
Department of Human Rights 
(5 year mandate) 
He will be elected Ombudsman 
in 2003
(Government Gazette vol. C, no 
96, 24.3.2003)
Government Gazette vol. C, no 
96, 24.3.2003
(4 year mandate)
The Greek Ombudsman
Renewal of mandate
Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 72, 21.2.2008
(4 year mandate)
Submission of 
resignation from the post 
of the Ombudsman 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 333, 
13.10.2010)
He ran for the 
municipality of Athens 
during the Regional and 
Municipal Elections of 
2010.
Party affiliation
Kaminis’ 
candidacy for the 
municipality of 
Athens was 
supported by the 
following political 
parties: 
Democratic Left 
(Dimokratiki 
Aristera), 
available at:  
http://www.anane
otiki.gr/el/readTex
t.asp?textID=503
2
Action 
(Drassi), available 
at:
http://www.drassi.
gr/index.php?id=1
151&title=Η%20∆
ράση%20για%20τ
ους%20δήµους%
20Αθήνας%20και
%20Θεσσαλονίκη
ς
under suspension 
of duties
Assistant Professor of 
Constitutional Law at the 
Department of Law, Athens 
University (June 1998). 
Source: Kaminis’ facebook, 
available at: 
http://www.facebook.com/kami
nisG, date of access: 
26.12.2010
Under suspension of duties
                                                 
Lecturer of Constitutional Law 
at Athens University (1991-
1998).
Scientific Collaborator at the 
Second Chair of 
Constitutional Law at Athens 
University (November 1982).
Source: The Annual Report of 
the Greek Ombudsman for 
the year 2001, Curricula Vitae 
of the Greek Ombudsman and 
the Deputy Ombudsmen, p. 
194, available at 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annua
l01_en/en_2001.pdf, date of 
access, 4.3.2011
Since September 1989 and for 
fifteen years he has worked as 
Scientific Collaborator (research 
fellow) at the Department of 
Parliamentary Studies and 
Research of the Directorate of 
Scientific Studies at the Scientific 
Service of the Hellenic Parliament. 
Sources: Kaminis’ facebook, 
available at: 
http://www.facebook.com/kaminisG
, date of access: 26.12.2010. 
Press release of the Hellenic 
Parliament dated 3.4.2003 
announcing the election of G. 
Kaminis to the post of the Greek 
Ombudsman, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/En
imerosi/Deltia-
Typou/?press=33fdd293-b800-
424c-b4cd-4e7d0a31ee82, date of 
access: 26.12.2010
He was elected Mayor of Athens on 
14.11.2010 with 51,95% of the 
votes.
(Registered voters: 488.150, voted: 
167.104 (34,23%), invalid votes: 
5,44%, blank votes: 5,67% votes for 
Kaminis: 77.165
Source: Ministry of the Interior, 
Decentralisation and Electronic 
Governance, available at: 
http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/dn2010/public/i
ndex.html#{"page":"level","params":{
"level":"dhm_d","id":9186}}, date of 
access: 27.12.2010
540
Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
2 G. K. (U2) Ecologists – 
Greens, available 
at: 
http://www.ecoath
ens.gr/blog/2010/
09/συµµετοχή-
στην-κίνηση-
καµίνη-έµφαση-σ/
- Panhellenic  
Socialist 
Moverment 
(PASOK)
available at: 
http://www.pasok.
gr/portal/resource
/contentObject/id/
5c0aa8e0-a435-
429b-bd62-
d80e99a63ac1
Source: Kaminis’ 
facebook, 
available at: 
http://www.facebo
ok.com/kaminisG, 
date of access: 
26.12.2010
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
3 M. M. (FP3) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
158, 27.8.1998
(5 year mandate)
Deputy Ombudswoman, 
Department of Health and Social 
Welfare
End of mandate Lawyer, PhD in Law 
specialized in health and 
welfare issues
NGOs
Member of NGOs 
in Greece and 
abroad 
Source: The 
Greek 
Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for 
the year 1999, 
Annexes, p. 331, 
available at: 
http://www.synigo
ros.gr/annual99/3
08-344.pdf, date 
of access: 
27.12.2010
External 
Collaborator of 
NGO on issues of 
health and social 
protection 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Technological 
Educational 
Foundation of 
Athens, available 
at: 
http://www.teiath.
gr/userfiles/martsi
/cv_mitrosili.pdf, 
date of access: 
4.3.2011
Member of the Special 
Control  Committee for the  
Protection of the Rights of 
People with Psychological  
Disorders (1999-2006) 
Source: Official Website of 
the Technological Educational 
Foundation of Athens, 
available at: 
http://www.teiath.gr/userfiles/
martsi/cv_mitrosili.pdf, date of 
access: 4.3.2011
Expert of the European 
Commission in the health and 
welfare sector (1989-1998)  
Member of three legislative 
drafting committees at the Ministry 
of Health and Welfare during 
1989-1998
1983   1998: Member of the Athens 
Bar Association,
1989-1998: Has lectured at the 
Technological Educational 
Foundation of Athens (Health and 
Welfare Education); the Medical 
School, Psychiatric Sector  Athens 
University; the National School of 
Public Administration; the National 
School of Public Health; the Police 
Academy; University Research 
Institutes
Source: The Annual Report of the 
Greek Ombudsman for the year 
2001, Curricula Vitae of the Greek 
Ombudsman and the Deputy 
Ombudsmen, p. 195, available at 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual01_
en/en_2001.pdf, date of access, 
4.3.2011
Member of the teaching staff under 
contract (adjunct professor) at the 
Department of the Administration of 
Health and Welfare Units of the 
Technological Educational 
Foundation of Athens (2003-2010)
Member of the teaching staff under 
contract (adjunct professor) at the 
Department of Nursing, Athens 
University
(2006-)
Post-graduate Programmes: 1983-
Department of Nursing; Department 
of Political Science and Public 
Administration; Department of 
Pedagogy (Athens University)
School of Medicine, Psychiatric 
Sector (University of Thessaloniki)
Source: The Official Website of the 
Technological Educational 
Foundation of Athens, available at: 
http://www.teiath.gr/userfiles/martsi/c
v_mitrosili.pdf, date of access: 
4.3.2011
Lawyer 2003
Source: Official Website of the 
Technological Educational 
Foundation of Athens, available at: 
http://www.teiath.gr/userfiles/martsi/c
v_mitrosili.pdf, date of access: 
4.3.2011
Assistant Professor at the 
Department of the Administration of 
Health and Welfare Units, 
Technological Educational 
Foundation of Athens (Government 
Gazette, vol. C, no 425, 26.5.2010)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
3 M. M. (FP3) Post-graduate Programmes: 1983-
Department of Nursing, 
Department of Political Science 
and Public Administration, 
Department of Pedagogy (Athens 
University)
School of Medicine, Psychiatric 
Sector (University of Thessaloniki) 
Source: The Official Website of the 
Technological Educational 
Foundation of Athens, available at: 
http://www.teiath.gr/userfiles/martsi
/cv_mitrosili.pdf, date of access: 
4.3.2011
4 I. M. (CS4) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
158, 27.8.1998
(5 year mandate)
Deputy Ombudsman, 
Department of the Quality of Life
End of mandate Architect/Planner, PhD in 
City Planning
Director of the subsidiaries 
of the Mortgage Bank 
(National Mortgage Bank 
of Greece SA, 
Construction Mortgage 
EKTENEPOL) 1972-1995
Source: The Greek 
Ombudsman, Annual 
Report for the year 1999, 
Annexes, p. 331-332, 
available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/an
nual99/308-344.pdf, date 
of access: 27.12.2010
Collaborator of  Prof. D. Zivas for 
the Plaka-Athens Historical Centre 
Rehabilitation Study carried out by 
the Ministry for the Environment, 
Physical Planning, and Public 
Works 1979-1982) (“Europa 
Nostra”Prize -1982)
Source: 
The Annual Report of the Greek 
Ombudsman for the year 2001, 
Curricula Vitae of the Greek 
Ombudsman and the Deputy 
Ombudsmen, p. 195, available at 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual01_
en/en_2001.pdf, date of access, 
4.3.2011
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
5 A. K. (CS5) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
158, 27.8.1998
(5 year marndate)
Deputy Ombudswoman, 
Department of State-Citizen 
Relations
End of mandate Director General  at the 
Directorate General of 
Administrative 
Organisation and 
Procedures, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation
Submission of resignation 
from the public service due 
to her appointment as 
Deputy Ombudswoman 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 175, 17.9.1998)
Legal Adviser at the 
Ministry of Coordination 
1964-1967
Ministry of the Presidency:  
1967-1998
Party affiliation 
(trade-unionist)
Founding 
Member-
President of the 
Association of the 
Employees of the 
Ministry of the 
Presidency of the 
Government
- President of the 
Federation of the 
Employees of the 
Ministry of the 
Presidency of the 
Government
 Source: The 
Greek 
Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for 
the year 1999, 
Annexes, p. 332, 
available at: 
http://www.synigo
ros.gr/annual99/3
08-344.pdf, date 
of access: 
27.12.2010
Head of the Project 
Management Group for the 
Programme “Quality for the 
Citizen”
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 251, 13.3.1998)
Member of the Monitoring 
Committee of the Programme 
“Polity” (Politeia) constituted 
by the Ministry of the Interior 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 192, 20.2.2002)
Member of the teaching staff 
(under contract) of the National 
Centre for Public Administration
Member of the legislative drafting 
committee on the elaboration of 
the Code of Administrative 
Procedures in Public 
Administration
Greek representative in the 
Committee of Public 
Administration, Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) 
Source: 
The Annual Report of the Greek 
Ombudsman for the year 2001, 
Curricula Vitae of the Greek 
Ombudsman and the Deputy 
Ombudsmen, p. 196, available at 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual01_
en/en_2001.pdf, date of access, 
4.3.2011
Member of the Working Group 
constituted by the Centre of 
Planning and Economic Research 
(KEPE) within the framework of the 
elaboration of the Five Year 
Programme of Economic and 
Social Development 1988-1992 on 
the study of issues related to 
Public Administration 
(no 3617/27.4.1987 Joint 
Ministerial Decision of the 
Ministers of National Economy and 
the Presidency of the Government 
and Interior)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
5 A. K. (CS5) Member of the Working Group 
constituted by the Ministry of the 
Presidency of the Government on 
the elaboration of a Report on the 
Reform and Modernisation of 
Public Administration published in 
1990
Source: Makrydemetris A., 
Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) Reports of 
Experts on Public Administration, 
Papazisis Editions, Athens 2000)
6 G. G. (LM6) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
148, 27.6.2003
Deputy  
Ombudswoman, Department of 
the Quality of Life
Submission of 
resignation:
Government Gazette vol. 
C, no 92, 11.4.2005
CS11, member of the 
scientific staff of the 
Ombudsman, was 
appointed to the vacant 
post
Lawyer specialized in Law 
on spatial and urban 
Planning, 
PhD in Law on urban 
planning
Lawyer with a 
salary mandate at 
the Ministry of 
Environment, 
Physical  
Planning, and 
Public Works 
(March 1989-Jyly 
2003)
Source: The 
Greek 
Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for 
the year 2003, 
Annexes, pp 325-
326, available at: 
http://www.synigo
ros.gr/annual03/1
0pararthmata.pdf, 
date of access: 
27.12.2010 under 
suspension of 
duties
Member of the Management 
Board, representing the 
shareholders, of the Public 
Enterprise for Urban Planning 
and Housing – DEPOS S.A.) 
5-year mandate
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 693, 6.6.2002, vol. B, no 
547, 7.5.2003)
The anonymous public 
enterprise DEPOS S.A. was 
abolished (Law 3895/2010).
Legal Collaborator at the Worker’s 
Housing Organisation (1988)
Member of the Scientific Council of 
the National Centre for Public 
Administration (1998-2003)
Member of the teaching staff under 
contract at the University of 
Thessaly (1994-1997) and 
Panteion University (post-graduate 
programme/1999-2001), 
undergraduate programme (2000-
2001). 
Member of the teaching staff under 
contract at the Department of Local 
Authorities and Regional 
Development of the National 
School for Public Administration 
(1999-2003) 
Sources: Department of Political 
Science and Public Administration 
of Athens University
http://www.pspa.uoa.gr/node.php?
n=0_4_13_giannakourou&lang=el, 
date of access: 27.12.2010
The Greek Ombudsman, Annual 
Report for the year 2003, Annexes, 
pp 325-326, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual03/1
0pararthmata.pdf, date of access: 
27.12.2010
Associate Professor of Law on 
Spatial Planning at the University of 
Thessaly
Government (Gazette vol. C, no 41, 
25.2.2005)
Member of the Committee of Experts 
of the Economic and Social 
Committee who contributed to the 
study “Environment, Spatial and 
Urban Planning”
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 360, 18.8.2008)
Associate Professor on the subject 
“Institutions and Spatial, Urban and 
Environmental Policies” at Athens 
University
(Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
754, 7.9.2009)
President of the Management Board 
of the National Centre for the 
Environment and Sustainable 
Development (EKPAA)
3-year mandate
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 35, 3.2.2010)
Submission of resignation from the 
post of the President on 24.8.2010, 
and appointment as member of the 
management board (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 304, 
13.9.2010)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
7 G. M. (FP7) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
148, 27.6.2003
Deputy  
Ombudsman, Department of 
Children’s rights
Renewal of mandate 
Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 204, 8.5.2008
Lawyer, Criminologist (M. 
Phil.-London School of 
Economics)
Civil 
Society/NGOs
Founding member 
(1992) and 
member of the 
management 
board of the NGO 
“ARSIS-Social 
Organisation for 
the Support of 
Youth” 
Sources: 
Newpaper, To 
Paron, Article 
entitled “All the 
Men of the 
NGOs” 3.7.2005, 
available at: 
http://www.paron.
gr/v3/new.php?id
=4056&colid=37&
catid=34&dt=200
5-07-03%200:0:0, 
date of access: 
27.12.2010
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
8 P. P. (FP8) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
148, 27.6.2003
Deputy  
Ombudswoman, Department of 
Department of Social Welfare
Submission of 
resignation due to her 
appointment as Assistant 
Professor at the Law 
School of Athens 
University:
(Government Gazette 
vol. YODD, no 10, 
14.1.2008)
Civil 
Society/NGOs
Member of the 
Scientific 
Committee of the 
NGO “Union for 
the protection of 
Social Rights” 
founded in 2009 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
NGO, available 
at: 
http://www.epkodi
.gr/site/index.php/-
topmenu-76/-
topmenu-77, date 
of access: 
4.3.2011
Lawyer 
(suspension of 
duties)
PhD in Law, 
Source: The 
Greek 
Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for 
the year 2003, 
available at: 
http://www.synigo
ros.gr/annual03/1
0pararthmata.pdf, 
date of access: 
27.12.2010
Member of the teaching staff 
under contract pursuant to the 
Presidential Degree 407/80 at 
the Law School (Social 
Security Law) of Athens 
University  Academic Years 
2003-2004, 2004-2005, 2005-
2006, 2006-2007. In October 
2007 she was elected 
assistant professor at the law 
school of Athens University.
Source: The Greek 
Ombudsman, Annual Reports 
for the years 2003, 2004, 
2005, and 2006 available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annua
l03/10pararthmata.pdf, 
http://new.synigoros.gr/resour
ces/docs/618_09-parartimata-
bios.pdf, 
http://new.synigoros.gr/resour
ces/docs/634_10_parartima_
bs.pdf, 
http://new.synigoros.gr/resour
ces/docs/17_annual_p_biogra
fika_06.pdf date of access: 
27.12.2010
Special Adviser of the Deputy 
Minister of Labour and Social 
Security 
Source: The Greek Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for the year 2003, 
Annexes, p. 325, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual03/1
0pararthmata.pdf, date of access: 
27.12.2010
                                                        
Member of the Working Group for 
the review and approval of Balance-
Sheet reports of the former uses of 
Social Security Organisations and 
processing of the Chartered 
Accountants’ reports over these 
uses in order to be communicated 
to the President of the Hellenic 
Parliament in accordance with the 
law 2084/1992 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
387, 2.4.2003)
Associate Professor of Public Law 
emphasizing on Social Security Law 
at Athens University (Government 
Gazette vol. C, no 1161, 29.12.2008)
Member of the Working 
Group for the review and 
approval of Balance-Sheet 
reports of the former uses of 
Social Security Organisations 
and processing of the 
Chartered Accountants’ 
reports over these uses in 
order to be communicated to 
the President of the Hellenic 
Parliament in accordance with 
the law 2084/1992 
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, 
no 387, 2.4.2003)
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9 K. S. (U9) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
148, 27.6.2003
Deputy  
Ombudswoman, Department of 
State-Citizen Relations
Renewal of mandate 
Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 204, 8.5.2008
Alternate Ombudswoman 
(September 2010-May 2011) 
The Greek Ombudswoman (May 
2011-20.02.2012) Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 155, 
2.6.2011.
Associate 
Professor of 
Administrative 
Science at the 
Department of 
Political Science 
and Public 
Administration, 
Athens University 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 119, 
11.6.2001) 
[She was elected 
Professor in 
2006, 
Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 497, 
20.12.2006)
Member of the Central 
Committee for the 
Simplification of Procedures 
representing the institution of 
the Ombudsman (Government
Gazette, vol. B, no 1431, 
17.9.2004)
Member of the Committee 
constituted by the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of 
Personnel for the examination 
of the Special Written Test- 
Test of General Knowledge 
and Skills (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 244, 
10.6.2009)
Member of the Working Group 
constituted by the Ministry of the 
Presidency of the Government on 
the elaboration of a Report on the 
Reform and Modernisation of 
Public Administration published in 
1990
Source: Makrydimitris A., 
Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) Reports of 
Experts on Public Administration, 
Papazisis Editions, Athens 2000)
Advisor of Studies at the National 
Centre for Public Administration 
(1989-1991) 
Member of the teaching staff under 
contract of the National School of 
Public Administration
She assumed the duties of  
Substitute Ombudswoman after the 
resignation of Georgios Kaminis 
from the post of the Ombudsman 
which was published in the  
Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 
333, 13.10.2010. She issued an 
announcement, dated September 
15, 2010, stating that the resigned 
Ombudsman “is legally substituted 
by the Deputy Ombudswoman, Mrs 
Kalliope Spanou”. Source 
Available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/pdf_01/8748
_1_DELTIO_TYPOU_DIEYKRINISTI
KO.pdf, date of access: 27.12.2010. 
However, in our opinion, the 
procedure of the substitution is/was 
irregular according to article 2 of the 
Law 3094/2003  (Government 
Gazette, vol. A’, no 10, 22.1.2003)  
which reads as follows:  
Member of the Management Board 
of the National Centre for Public 
Administration
Advisor of the OECD (1988) 
Source: Source: The Greek 
Ombudsman, Annual Report for 
the year 2003, Annexes, p. 327, 
available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual03/1
0pararthmata.pdf, date of access: 
27.12.2010
“The Ombudsman may be replaced 
when absent or temporarily unable 
to
perform his duties for whatever 
reason. The Ombudsman shall 
appoint one of the
Deputy Ombudsmen as his 
substitute”.
Moreover, 
Article 2, par. 3, verse 2  of  Law 
3094/2003 (Government Gazette, 
vol. A’, no 10, 22.1.2003)
reads as follows: 
“The end of the Ombudsman’s 
mandate, for whatever reason, shall 
ipso iure/by right bring the end of the 
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9 K. S. (U9) Member of the Management Board 
of the National Centre for the 
Environment and Sustainable 
Development (Government 
Gazette, vol. A, no 44, 9.3.2001) 
Submission of resignation on 
2..4.2003 (Government Gazette, 
vol. A, no 211, 2.9.2003)
Member of the 
Assessment/Evaluation Committee 
regarding the evaluation and the 
formulation of an opinion for the 
selection of the personnel of the 
special services for the 
management and implementation 
of Operational Programmes 
financed by the European Union 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1586, 20.12.2002)
Deputy Ombudsmen’s term of office, 
who shall continue to perform their 
duties until the appointment of the 
new Deputy Ombudsmen and in any 
case, not later than three months 
following the appointment of the new 
Ombudsman”                                      
She was finally selected as the 
Greek Ombudswoman by the 
Conference of Presidents in May 
2011. She was appointed for the 
remainder of the mandate of the 
resigned Ombudman U2, that tis 
20.2.2012.                                           
Source: The Official Website of the 
Greek Ombudsman, available at: 
http://new.synigoros.gr/?i=stp.el.syni
goros, date of access: 14.6.2011
10 A. T. (CS10) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
148, 27.06.2003) 
Deputy  
Ombudsman, Department of 
Human Rights
Renewal of mandate in 2008
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 204, 8.5.2008)
Submission of 
resignation from the post 
of the Deputy 
Ombudsman “for 
personal reasons” as 
stated in the 
Government Gazette
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 528, 
16.12.2009). 
Suspension of duties 
from the post of the 
scientific staff of the 
Greek Ombudsman.
He was appointed 
Secretary General for 
Migration Policy 
Vassileios Karydis was 
appointed to the vacant 
post
Civil Society and 
NGOs
Member of the 
NGO: Research 
Centre for 
Minority Groups 
(KEMO), Source: 
Official Website 
of KEMO, 
available at: 
http://www.kemo.
gr/index.php?sec
=members, date 
of access: 
25.12.2010
Since December 
1998 member of 
the Scientific Staff 
(Senior 
Investigator) of 
the Greek 
Ombudsman, 
Department for 
Human Rights 
under suspension 
of duties
He obtained his 
PhD in 2006, 
Source: The 
Greek 
Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for 
the year 2006,  p. 
358, available at: 
http://www.synigo
ros.gr/pdfs/annual
_06_pdfs/annual_
p_biografika_06.p
df, date of 
access: 
27.12.2010
Ex officio alternate member of 
the National Committee for 
Human Rights representing 
the institution of the Greek 
Ombudsman (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1268, 
4.9.2003, vol. B, no 322, 
16.3.2006, vol. YODD, no 
108, 13.3.2009)
Lawyer,
Expert Legal Adviser at the 
Political Bureau of the Minister of 
the Press and Mass Media 
(24.6.1996-1998)
(Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
126, 28.6.1996)
Expert Collaborator for the Council 
Of Europe on matters of 
institutional guarantees for the 
protection of human rights. 
Source: The Greek Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for the year 2003,  
Annexes, p. 324, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual03/1
0pararthmata.pdf, date of access: 
27.12.2010
Revocable Secretary General for 
Migration Policy 
at the Ministry of the Interior, 
Decentralization and Electronic 
Governance, 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 92, 16.3.2010)
Ex officio member of the National 
Committee for Human Rights 
representing the Ministry of the 
Interior, Decentralization and 
Electronic Governance (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 231, 
1.7.2010)
Assistant Professor at the Aristotle 
University of Thessaloniki 
(Government Gazette, vol. C, no 
1252, 31.12.2010)
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11 C. C. (CS11) Government Gazette vol. C, no 
135, 1.6.2005
The mandate expires 
automatically at the end of the 
Ombudsman’s mandate 
whatever the reason of his 
retirement
Deputy  
Ombudswoman, Department of 
the Quality of Life
Renewal of mandate 
Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 204, 8.5.2008
Submission of 
resignation from the post 
of the Deputy 
Ombudsman “for 
personal reasons” as 
stated in the 
Government Gazette
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 470, 
29.10.2009)
Suspension of duties 
from the post of the 
scientific staff of the 
Greek Ombudsman.
She was appointed on 
secondment, as 
revocable employee, to 
the post of the Director 
of the Political Office of 
the Minister of 
Economics.
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 482, 
16.11.2009) Evangelia 
Balla was appointed to 
the vacant post
(Government                    
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 
505, 1.12.2009)
Civil Society- 
NGOs
Member of the 
Management 
Board of the 
NGO: Hellenic 
League for 
Human Rights 
(HLHR),
Party affiliation 
(trade-unionist)
Former President 
of the 
Management 
Board of the 
Association of the 
Staff of the Greek 
Ombudsman 
(2001-2003) and 
elected member 
at the Service 
Council of the 
Authority (2001-
2005)
Source: The 
Greek 
Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for 
the year 2005, 
Annexes, p. 318, 
available at: 
http://www.synigo
ros.gr/annual_05/
10_parartima_bs.
pdf, date of 
access: 
28.12.2010
Since 1999 
member of the 
Scientific Staff of 
the Greek 
Ombudsman – 
Under suspension 
of duties
Member of the Committee 
constituted by the Ministry of 
Employment and Social 
Protection – representing the 
Greek Ombudsman - 
regarding the harmonization 
of the national legislation with 
the provisions of the directive 
2002/73/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 September 2002
amending Council Directive 
76/207/EEC on the 
implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment
for men and women as 
regards access to 
employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and
working conditions
Deadline for the end of the 
work of the Committee: 
31.12.2005
(Government Gazette vol. B, 
no 764, 7.6.2005)
Member of the legislative 
drafting Committee – 
representing the Greek 
Ombudsman- constituted by 
the Ministry of Employment 
and Social Protection 
regarding the transposition of 
the Directive 2006/54/ECof 
the European Council and of 
Parliament of 5 July 2006
on the implementation of the 
principle of equal 
opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and
Special Collaborator of the 
Secretary General of the Ministry 
of Justice (1994-1995), 
Special Collaborator of the Minister 
of Development  (Vassiliki 
Papandreou served as Minister of 
Development from 22.1.1996 until 
18.2.1999)
Special Collaborator of the Minister 
of the Interior (Vassiliki 
Papandreou served as Minister of 
the Interior, Public Administration 
and Decentralisation from 
19.2.1999 until 19.3.2000)
(1996-1999)
Member of the legislative drafting 
committee on the executive law of 
the constitution 3051/2002 on the 
constitutionally consolidated 
independent authorities
Source: The Greek Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for the year 2005, 
Annexes, p. 318, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/annual_05/
10_parartima_bs.pdf, date of 
access: 28.12.2010
She was appointed on secondment, 
as revocable employee, to the post 
of the Director of the Political Bureau 
of the Minister of Economics.
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 482, 16.11.2009)
Suspension of duties from the post 
of the scientific staff of the Greek 
Ombudsman.
Member of the State Lottery 
Administration Committee (art. 93 of 
the Presidential Decree 284/1988)
Two year mandate (1.1.2010-
31.12.2011)
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 4, 12.1.2010)
Non Executive member of the 
Management Board of the 
Organisation of Football Prognostics 
S.A. (OPAP SA)*
End of Mandate: 30.6.2014 
(Government Gazette, vol. AE-EPE, 
no 458, 21.1.2010)
women in matters of 
employment and occupation 
into Greek legislation
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 445, 16.10.2007)
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12 S. G. (CS12) Government Gazette,  vol. 
YODD, no 204, 8.5.2008
Deputy  
Ombudswoman, Department of 
Gender Equality
Scientific 
Collaborator of 
the Economic and 
Social Committee, 
Lawyer, PhD in 
Labor Law. Under 
suspension of 
duties
Member of the Committee 
constituted at the Central 
Service of the Ministry of 
Employment and Social 
Protection regarding the 
consideration of the 
ratification of the Revised 
European Social Charter
The work of the Committee 
will have to be completed in 
50 sessions by 31.12.2008
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 213, 15.5.2008) 
Member of the Special 
Legislative Drafting 
Committee constituted by the 
Ministry of Justice regarding 
the elaboration of a draft law 
on the substantial gender 
equality. The Committee 
should complete its work 
within nine months
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 270, 4.8.2010) 
Special Collaborator of the 
Secretary General for Equality 
Source:
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
764, 7.6.2005) The Official 
Website of the General Secretariat 
for Equality, Periktioni Network, 
available at: 
http://www.gsrt.gr/default.asp?V_IT
EM_ID=5001, date of access, 
6.3.2011
Member of the Committee 
constituted at the Central Service 
of the Ministry of Employment and 
Social Protection regarding the 
harmonization of national 
legislation with the provisions of 
the directive 
2002/73/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 September 2002
amending Council Directive 
76/207/EEC on 
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12 S. G. (CS12) the implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment
for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and
working conditions
Deadline of the work of the 
committee: 31.12.2005
(Government Gazette vol. B, no 
764, 7.6.2005)
Member of the legislative drafting 
Committee constituted at the 
Central Service of the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Protection 
regarding the transposition of the 
Directive 2006/54/EC of the 
European Council and of 
Parliament of 5 July 2006
on the implementation of the 
principle of equal opportunities and 
equal treatment of men and
women in matters of employment 
and occupation into Greek 
legislation
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 445, 16.10.2007)
13 I. S. (U13) Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 204, 8.5.2008
Deputy  
Ombudsman, Department of 
Social Welfare
Professor of 
Economics of 
Labor and Social 
Policy at the 
Department of 
Social 
Anthropology 
Panteion 
University, of 
Social and 
Political Sciences
Member of the Working Group on 
the labor market and social 
security: determining the age 
structure of the insured and long-
term prospects 
The work of the group should be 
terminated by the end of March 
2000
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
180, 17.2.2000)
Member of the Expert Committee 
on the reform of the social security 
system 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
773, 19.6.2001)
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13 I. S. (U13) Director of the Institute for Social 
Policy of the National Centre for 
Social Research (EKKE)
5 year mandate
(Government Gazette, vol. NPDD, 
no 181, 10.8.2001)
Member of the Management Board 
of the National Centre for Social 
Research (EKKE)
(Government Gazette, vol. NPDD, 
no 194, 4.9.2001)
14 V. K. (U14) Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 19, 22.1.2010
He was appointed to the vacant 
post of the Deputy Ombudsman 
after  the resignation of CS10
Deputy  
Ombudsman, Department of 
Human Rights
Associate 
Professor of 
Criminology 
(subject: Social 
Control and State 
Power) at the 
Department of 
Social and 
Educational 
Policy, University 
of Peloponnese
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 200, 
vol. 17.8.2005)  
Alternate Member of the 
Management Board of the 
Society for the Protection of 
Minors of Corinth
Three year mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 510, 10.12.2008)
Ex officio alternate member of 
the National Committee for 
Human Rights representing 
the institution of the Greek 
Ombudsman (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 231, 
1.7.2010)
Lawyer
Defense Lawyer of the Terrorist D. 
Koufondinas at the trial of the 
terrorist organization “November 
17th”
Source, Newspaper Rizospastis, 
Friday, October 3, 2003, available 
at: 
http://www2.rizospastis.gr/wwwengi
ne/story.do?id=1981673&publDate
=, date of access, 10.1.2011 
Promoted to the tenured position of 
Assistant Professor at the 
Democriteion University of Thrace 
(Government Gazette, vol. NPDD, 
no 67, 30.3.2001)
 Alternate Member of the Central 
Scientific Council of Prisons 
(KESF)
Three year mandate
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
225, 28.2.2000)
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14 V. K. (U14) Alternate Member of the 
Management Board of the 
Organisation against Drugs 
(OKANA)
Three year mandate (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1711, 
20.12.2001)
He submitted his resignation 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
763, 24.5.2004)
 Member of the Project 
Management Team constituted by 
the Ministries of the Interior and 
Public Order for the formulation of 
a framework of action for a policy 
against crime with mid-term and 
long-term targets.
The work of the Team should be 
completed within 2 years with a 
maximum number of 50 sessions 
per year
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
49, 23.1.2002)
The work of the Team will be 
extended for one more year 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
179, 30.1.2004)
Member of the permanent 
Legislative Drafting Committee of 
the Ministry of Public Order
Two year mandate
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
610, 17.5.2002)
554
Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
15 E. B. (CS15) Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 505, 1.12.2009
She was appointed to the vacant 
post of the Deputy 
Ombudswoman after  the 
resignation of CS11
Deputy  
Ombudswoman, Department of 
the Quality of Life
Rural and
Surveying Engineer,
MSc in Urban and 
Regional Planning 
Executive officer at the 
Directorate of the 
Technical Services of the 
National Bank of Greece 
(1996-2008)
Director and Head of the 
Regional Centre of the 
Cadastre SA in 
Thessaloniki, (April 2008 
until her appointment as 
Deputy Ombudswoman) 
Source: Official Website of 
the Greek 
Ombudsman, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/or
g_pz_head.htm, date of 
access: 30.4.2010
Member of the Management Board 
of the National Centre for the 
Environment and Sustainable 
Development
(2005-2006)
(Government Gazette, vol. A, no 
51, 28.2.2005)
Submission of resignation on 
2.2.2006 (Government Gazette, 
vol. A, 45, 2.3.2006)
Member of the Management Board 
of the Hellenic Mapping and 
Cadastral Organisation (OKXE), 
(2006-2007)
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 12, 15.9.2006)
Member of the Management Board 
of the Cadastre SA (2006-2007)
Source: Official Website of the 
Greek Ombudsman, available at: 
http://www.synigoros.gr/org_pz_he
ad.htm, date of access: 30.4.2010
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1 A. L. (FP1) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(4 year mandate)
President
Renewal of mandate
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008)
Mechanical-Electrical 
Engineer
President of the Management Board 
of the Hellenic Railways 
Organisation (OSE) 1981-1985 and 
1987-1989  
Governor of the Hellenic Railways 
Organisation (OSE) 1981-1985
Director General of the Hellenic 
Railways Organisation (OSE) 1985-
1988
Source: Prodromos Mantzaridis, 
Brief History of the Greek Railways, 
Second Edition, Greek Railways 
Organisation, 1996
President of the Management Board 
of the Hellenic Telecommunications 
and Post Commission (5 year 
mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
29, 19.1.1995)
Submission of resignation: 8.5.2000
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
669, 30.5.2000)
Career Paths of the Members of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security, and Privacy 
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1 A. L. (FP1) President of the Management Board 
of the Hellenic Railways 
Organisation (OSE)
Mandate: 26.6.2000-30.1.2003
Appointment by the no 
39930/4298/26.6.2000 Joint 
Ministerial Decision of the Ministers 
of National Economy and 
Economics and Transports and 
Communications (direct 
appointment without the submission 
of the relevant report by the 
Committee of  Public Enterprises, 
Banks and Public Utilities of the 
Greek Parliament) after the 
resignation of N. Gratsias from the 
post of the President of the 
Management Board on June 23, 
2000 and for the rest of his 
mandate: Government Gazette, vol. 
B, no 788, 26.6.2000. 
Revocation of the appointment 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
820, 5.7.2000)
Reappointment after the 
communication of the relevant 
report of the Parliamentary 
Committee (no 1735/11.7.2000)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
859, 12.7.2000)
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2 V. K. (CS2) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(4 year mandate)
Vice-President
End of mandate,
not renewed.
J4 filled the vacant post 
of the Vice-President 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 256, 
12.6.2008)
Former alternate General 
Director of the Greek 
Telecommunications 
Organisation (OTE)
(He was defendant in the 
case of 57.4 million loss of 
OTE from Siemens and a 
subsequent benefit for 
Siemens estimated around 
632 million euros 
regarding the 
implementation of the 
Contract 8002 of the year 
1997 for the digitization of 
the telephone network. 
The fourth special 
investigator, Nikos 
Zagorianos, charged 
Koutris and nine former 
executives of OTE with the 
offences of passive 
corruption and money 
laundering)
3 P. G. (FP3) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(4 year mandate)
Alternate Vice-President
Submission of 
resignation, April 21, 
2004
Annual Report 2004, 
http://www.adae.gr/portal
/fileadmin/docs/pepragm
ena/2004/KEFAL1.pdf, 
date of access: 
12.1.2011
The post will be filled by 
U14 in 2007.
He ran for Mayor in the 
Municipal Elections of 2002. 
He was supported by the 
party of PASOK. He was 
elected Municipal Counselor. 
Sources: Official Website of 
the Ministry of the Interior, 
available at: 
http://www.ypes.gr/el/Election
s/CityElections/ResultsofElect
ions/2002/, date of access: 
19.1.2011
Personal Website of P. 
Gretzelias: 
http://www.gretzelias.gr/defaul
t.asp?ElementName=Bio, 
date of access: 19.1.2011
He was elected Mayor of the 
Municipality of Nea Philadelphia 
(suburb of Athens) three times and 
served from 1990 until 2002 
supported by the party of PASOK. 
Official Website of the Ministry of 
the Interior, available at:
http://www.ypes.gr/el/Elections/City
Elections/ResultsofElections/1998/, 
date of access: 19.1.2011
Member of the Management Board 
of the Anonymous Company under 
the name “Athletic Union of 
Constantinople, Anonymous 
Football Company*” 
(1995-1996)
(Government Gazette, vol. TAE-
EPE, no 7184, 20.12.1995, no 
2304, 28.5.1996)
He ran for Mayor in the Municipal 
Elections of 2006. He was supported 
by the party of PASOK
He was elected Municipal Counselor 
Sources: Ministry of the Interior, 
available at: 
http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/2006static/dim
os133.htm, 
The official website of the 
Municipality of Philadelphia, 
available at: http://www.filadelfeia-
dimos.gr/Default.aspx?pid=124&la=1
, date of access: 19.1.2011
He was elected Municipal Counselor 
of the Municipality of Philadelfia-
Chalkidona in the Municipal and 
Regional Elections of 2010. He was 
elected President of the Municipal 
Council 
Sources: Infoblog, available at:
http://www.infoblog.gr/?p=51092, 
http://filadelfia-
xalkidona.blogspot.com/2011/01/blo
g-post_02.html
date of access: 19.1.2011
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Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
Retirement Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
3 P. G. (FP3) Member of the Management Board 
of the Anonymous Company under 
the name “Athletic Union of 
Constantinople, Anonymous 
Football Company*” 
(2000-2001)
(Government Gazette, vol. AE-EPE, 
no 2174, 22.3.2000, no 2301, 
24.4.2001)
Submission of resignation: 
11.7.2001
(Government Gazette, no 8165, 
17.9.2001)
*(more commonly referred to as 
AEK or in European competitions 
as AEK Athens. The Sports Club 
was founded by Greek refugees 
from Constantinople in April 13, 
1924).
4 M. K. (J4) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(2 year mandate)
Regular Member
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 152, 13.4.2007) 
Renewal of mandate as Vice-
President to fill the vacant post 
of Vassilis Koutris’s whose 
appointment was not renewed 
 (Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008)
Former Judge of the 
Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law
Alternate Member of the Council for 
Citizenship constituted by the 
Ministry of the Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralization
2 year mandate: 1.1.1994-
31.12.1995)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 61, 
31.1.1994)
Renewal of mandate
1.1.1996-31.12.1997)
 (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
184, 20.3.1996)
Alternate Member of the Court for 
Mistrial for the year 1996 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
252, 11.4.1996)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
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the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
5 D. D. (J5) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(2 year mandate)
Alternate Member of J4
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 152, 13.4.2007)
4 year mandate
Active member until the 
expiration of his mandate in 
2011
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008)
Submission of 
resignation. 
FP18 was appointed to 
the vacant post
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 370, 
28.8.2008)
Honorary Counselor of the 
Court of Audit
He retired from the public 
service on 1.7.2003 
(pension)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
C, no 162, 11.7.2003)
Member of the Committee for the 
procurement of goods of significant 
financial or technological value. The 
Committee was competent for the 
procurement of railcars for the 
Greek Railways Organisation 
(Government Gazette, vol. A, no 
221, 13.10.2000) 
6 C. K. (U6) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(4 year mandate)
Regular Member
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008)
4 year mandate
He was elected 
Alternate 
President at the 
Department of 
Electrical and 
Computer 
Engineering of 
the National 
Technical 
University of 
Athens (NTUA)
Mandate: 
1.9.2004-
31.8.2006)
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 189, 
16.8.2004)             
Submission of 
resignation on 
25.10.2005 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 9, 
17.1.2006)
Professor at the 
National 
Technical 
University of 
Athens,  School 
of Electrical and 
Computer 
Engineering
Member of the Committee on the 
study and recommendation on 
issues of the Directorate of the 
Code of Accounting Books and 
Records at the Ministry of Finance
Duration of work: six months
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
163, 6.3.1997, vol. B, no 172, 
11.3.1997)
Ex officio alternate member of 
the Management Board of the 
Student Club of the National 
Technical University of 
Athens 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 246, 3.10.2005) 
560
Serial 
Number
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
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Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
6 C. K. (U6) Regular Member of the 
National Council for Research 
and Technology (E.S.E.T.) in 
the field of Informatics, 
Telecommunications, 
Systems
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 19, 13.1.2005)
Member of the Committee 
constituted by the Ministry of 
Finance and Economics for 
the specification and revision 
of the technical standards of 
the tax electronic mechanisms 
and systems and their 
implementation for the 
assurance of tax data of the 
Code of Accounting Books 
and Records
End of work: 31.10.2006
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 506, 20.4.2006)
Member of the Committee on the 
study, preparation and 
recommendation of standards on 
special 
Public finance systems for the 
buffering of data during the issue of 
computerized information at the 
Ministry of Finance 
End of work: 31.12.1998
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
557, 4.6.1998)
Member of the Committee for the 
revision of the technical standards 
of Cash Machines and Systems 
(Ministry of Finance)
End of work: 30.11.1998
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1171, 11.11.1998)
Member of the Committee at the 
Ministry of Finance for the study on 
the improvement, specification, 
adaptation, and revision of the 
existing technical standards of the 
Fiscal Cash Registers and the 
introduction of new ones, to deal 
with the current needs, and the 
expansion of the use of 
Fiscal Cash Registers, special 
taxation mechanisms and public 
finance Processing Units to other 
forms of transactions (electronic 
games, vending machines, taxi 
meters, gasoline pumps etc)
End of work: end of April 2002
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
255, 28.2.2002)
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Authority
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Resignation
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Parallel Main 
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
6 C. K. (U6) Regular Member of the 
Committee constituted by the 
Ministry of Transport and 
Communications to conduct 
the open tender for the 
selection of a contractor who 
will undertake the 
implementation of the project: 
“DORY-Development of 
infrastructure for the initial 
service needs of the Bodies of 
the Public Sector situated in 
remote areas for advanced 
communication technologies 
with the use of the Public 
Satellite System Hellas-Sat
(Budget: 9.256.000 E 
(including VAT)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 80, 16.11.2006)
Alternate President of the 
Committee constituted to 
conduct the open tender for 
the selection of a contractor 
who will undertake the 
implementation of the project: 
“Provision of consultancy 
Services for the development 
of a National Strategy in the 
field of Electronic 
Communications for the 
period 2007-2013”
Budget: 952.000 E (including 
VAT)
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD no 76 27 2 2007)
Member of the Committee 
constituted by joint ministerial 
decision by the Minister of 
Transport and 
Communications and the 
Minister of State for the 
organization, processing, and 
control of the parameters and 
preconditions for the release 
of frequencies by 
geographical region
End of the work: 30.12.2007
(Government Gazette, vol. 
531, 14.12.2007)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
6 C. K. (U6) Member of the Special 
Legislative Drafting 
Committee for the 
strengthening of the 
institutional framework of the 
functioning of the Hellenic 
Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy and the 
amendment of the law 
3115/2003
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 529, 17.12.2009)
7 G. S. (U7) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(4 year mandate)
Alternate Member of U6
His mandate expired on 
31.7.2007, and he 
denied its renewal.
Source: Annual Reports 
for the year 2007, 
available at: 
http://www.adae.gr/portal
/index.php?id=44, date 
of access: 20.1.2011
Professor at the 
National 
Technical 
University of 
Athens, School of 
Electrical and 
Computer 
Engineering
Member of the Committee for the 
Study and Assessment of the 
potential of the implementation of 
the Instant State Lottery by the 
interested enterprises participating 
at the open tender for the 
appointment of a contractor who will 
undertake the implementation of the 
new Instant State Lottery
Duration of work: 20 sessions
(Government Gazettte, vol. B, no 
757, 31.12.1992)
Member of the Extraordinary 
Special Committee for the selection 
of a contractor for the “Provision of 
services in human resources and 
means for the spread of the 
Demand  Management System for 
Health Services to fifty (50) 
additional  Health Care Units
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1048, 9.8.2002)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
8 I. V. (U8) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(2 year mandate)
Regular Member
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 152, 13.4.2007)
Active member until the 
expiration of his mandate in 
2011
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008)
Professor at the 
National 
Technical 
University of 
Athens, School of 
Electrical and 
Computer 
Engineering
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 166, 
16.7.2004)
[Associate 
Professor at the 
National 
Technical 
University of 
Athens, School of 
Electrical and 
Computer 
Engineering
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 161, 
28.6.2000)]
President of the Project 
Management Group for the 
Strategic Planning of the 
implementation of the 
Operational Programme of the 
Ministry of Justice for 
Information Society
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1205, 5.8.2004)
9 C. D. (U9) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(2 year mandate)
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 152, 13.4.2007)
Alternate Member of U8
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 152, 13.4.2007)
End of mandate-New 
appointments 
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 256, 
12.6.2008)
Associate 
Professor at the 
Department of 
Informatics, 
University of 
Piraeus
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 239, 
22.10.2002)
[Professor at the 
University of 
Piraeus
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 375, 
22.4.2008)]
Member of the Advisory 
Committee for the formulation 
of recommendations  over the 
proposals submitted under 
the framework of the Call 93 
of the Measure 4.2 
“Development of 
Infrastructures of Local 
Access Networks”, 
Operational Programme 
“Information Society” co-
funded by the European 
Union
Duration of the work: three 
months
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 1421, 16.9.2004)
Member of the Special Committee 
for the Procurements of the 
Agricultural Insurance Organisation 
(OGA) for the year 2001
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1269, 2.10.2001)
President of the Management Board 
of the public anonymous company 
under the name “Electronic 
Governance of Social Security 
(IDIKA S.A.)
No fixed mandate. The appointment 
may be revoked by joint ministerial 
decision
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 174, 21.4.2008)
Revocation of the appointment by 
the joint ministerial decision no 
Φ.80350/18707/135
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 241, 13.7.2010)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
9 C. D. (U9) Alternate Member of the 
Extraordinary Committee for 
the technical assessment of 
the bids of the open tender, 
Call for proposals 21/2006, 
for the “Development of the 
General Commercial Registry 
(GEMI), of the Ministry of 
Development, General 
Secretariat of Commerce
Duration of the work: two 
months
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 701/7.6.2006)
Member of the extraordinary 
Committee for the assessment of the 
results of the International 
Competition for the Study and 
Construction of a Fire Alarm System 
in the prefecture of Lakonia 
(Budget of the project: 4.000.000 E, 
Vat included)
Duration of the work: four months 
starting from 11.2.2009
No Γ.Ν/62 Decision of the Prefect of 
Lakonia
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD 
103, 11.3.2009)
Member of the Executive 
Committee of the National 
Council for Electronic 
Commerce
(Government Gazette, vol. 
982, 25.7.2006)
Regular Member of the 
Extraordinary Committee for 
the technical assessment of 
the bids of the open tender, 
Call for proposals 22/2006, 
for the “Development of the 
National System of Electronic 
Public Procurement 
(E.S.I.D.P.), of the Ministry of 
Development, General 
Secretariat of Commerce
Duration of the work: three 
months
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 700/7.6.2006)
Reconstitution of the 
Committee for the 
reassessment of complaints 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 561, 31.12.2007
Member of the National 
Council of Electronic 
Commerce (e-Commerce) 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 890, 12.7.2006)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
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the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
9 C. D. (U9) Member of the Management 
Board of the Research 
Academic Computer 
Technology Institute 
(Government Gazette, vol. C, 
no 484, 14.12.2006)
President of the Committee 
for the conduct of the open 
tender for the selection of the 
contractor who will undertake 
the implementation of the 
project: “Integrated 
Information System (OPS)” o 
the General Secretariat of 
Communications (Call for 
proposals no 2.2007)
Duration of the work: three 
working days
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 108, 14.3.2007)
10 S. S. (FP10) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(2 year mandate)
Regular Member
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 152, 13.4.2007)
Active member until the 
expiration of his mandate in 
2011
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008)
Lawyer Party affiliation
He signed, together with a 
group of lawyers of Athens, 
the Declaration of Support 
to the Greek Communist 
Party in the National 
Elections of 2007 The list 
of signatories was 
published in the 
Newspaper Rizospastis in 
the issue of August 5, 
2007
Source: Newspaper 
Rizospastis, available at: 
http://www1.rizospastis.gr/
wwwengine/story.do?id=41
55329, date of access: 
17.5.2010
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Number
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Authority
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Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
11 A. K. (FP11) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(2 year mandate)
Alternate Member of FP10
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 152, 13.4.2007)
Active member until the 
expiration of his mandate in 
2011
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008
Lawyer Party Affiliation
She ran for 
Prefectural 
Counselor in the 
Prefectural 
Department of 
Athens with the 
Communist Party 
of Greece in the 
Municipal and 
Prefectural 
Elections of 1998
Source: 
Newspaper 
Rizospastis*, 
available at: 
http://www2.rizos
pastis.gr/wwwengi
ne/story.do?id=37
41391, date of 
access: 
17.5.2010
*Organ of the 
Central 
Committee of the 
Communist Party 
of Greece
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Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
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Public Sector before the 
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
11 A. K. (FP11) She signed, 
together with a 
group of lawyers 
of Athens,  the 
Declaration of 
Support to the 
Communist Party 
in the National 
Elections of 2007 
The list of 
signatories was 
published in the 
Newspaper 
Rizospastis in the 
issue of August 5, 
2007
Source: 
Newspaper 
Rizospastis, 
available at: 
http://www1.rizos
pastis.gr/wwwengi
ne/story.do?id=41
55329, date of 
access: 
17.5.2010
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Number
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Authority
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Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
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the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
11 A. K. (FP11) NGO
Member of the 
Chair of the 
Greek Women 
Federation 
(OGE). 
Source: 
Newspaper 
Rizospastis*, 
available at: 
http://www2.rizos
pastis.gr/wwwengi
ne/story.do?id=37
41391, date of 
access: 
17.5.2010
OGE was 
founded in 1976 
and has a 
communist 
ideological 
orientation since 
“it is the only 
Women’s 
Organisation 
promoting the 
class character of 
women’s 
inequality” 
Source: OGE, 
available 
at:http://www.oge.
gr/index.php?opti
on=com_content&
view=article&id=4
6&Itemid=34, 
date of access: 
20.1.2011
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Public Sector after the 
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12 K. M. (CS12) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(4 year mandate)
Regular Member
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008
(4 year mandate)
Former Director of OTE 
(Hellenic 
Telecommunications 
Organisation)
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
the anonymous company under the 
name “Anonymous Greek Company 
for the provision of internet products 
and  services” with the distinctive 
title “OTEnet*”  (subsidiary 
company of the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organisation)
(1998-1999)
(Government Gazette, vol. AE-EPE, 
no 6211, 30.7.1998)
*The Company is supervised by the 
Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport 
and Networks
Source: Official Website of the 
Ministry, available at: 
http://www.yme.gr/index.php?tid=48
9, date of access: 20.1.2011
13 K. V. (CS13) Government Gazette vol. B, no 
1072, 1.8.2003
(4 year mandate)
Alternate Member of CS12
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008)
Former Director of OTE 
(Hellenic 
Telecommunications 
Organisation)
14 D. V.(U14) Government Gazette vol. YODD, 
no 336, 6.8.2007
(4 year mandate)
He was appointed to the vacant 
post of Alternate Vice-President 
three years after the resignation 
of FP3
Alternate Vice-President
Active member until the 
expiration of his mandate in 
2011
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008
Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Informatics and 
Telecommunicati
ons, Athens 
University
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 195, 
9.9.2005)
Civil Servant with a term of office 
(indefinite duration contract civil 
servants under private law/of 
indefinite duration)
with Specialty in Informatics at 
Athens University – Member of the 
administrative staff
(Government Gazette, vol. NPDD, 
no 94, 30.4.2002 
Member of the Teaching Staff under 
contract pursuant to the 
Presidential Decree 407/80 at 
Athens University
(2002-2005)
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14 D. V.(U14) Member of the Teaching Staff under 
contract pursuant to the 
Presidential Decree 407/80 (adjunct 
professor) at the University of 
Peloponnese
(2002-2005)
Sources: Official website of Athens 
University, available at:
http://www.di.uoa.gr/gr/dep_detail.p
hp?GetWhat=43, date of access: 
19.1.2011
Personal Website, available at: 
http://cgi.di.uoa.gr/~arkas/, date of 
access: 19.1.2011
Indirect information (Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 1421, 
16.9.2004)
Member of the Advisory Committee 
for the formulation of 
recommendations  over the 
proposals submitted under the 
framework of the Call 93 of the 
Measure 4.2 “Development of 
Infrastructures of Local Access 
Networks”, Operational Programme 
“Information Society” co-funded by 
the European Union
Duration of the work: three months
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1421, 16.9.2004)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
14 D. V. (U14) President of the Committee for the 
conduct of the no 
151.320/INFSOC697/27.1.2006 
International Open Tender for the 
project: “Technical and Managerial 
Support regarding the monitoring 
and control of the actions of the 
Operational Programme 
“Information Society” 
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 374, 
28.3.2006)
Member of the Committee 
constituted by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance for the 
conduct of a public open tender and 
assessment of the bids for the 
implementation of the Customs 
Electronic Services ICISnet
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
374, 28.3.2006)
15 N. N. (CS15) Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008
(4 year mandate)
Alternate Member of U6
Former Director of OTE 
(Hellenic 
Telecommunications 
Organisation)
Member of the Management Board 
of the Greek Company of 
Telecommunications through 
Submarine Cables SA 
(ELLTELKA)* (subsidiary company 
of the Hellenic Telecommunications 
Organisation)
(1994-
(Government Gazette, vol.  TAE-
EPE, no 1578, 22.3.1999, vol. TAE-
EPE, no 1654, 24.3.1999)
*The Company is supervised by the 
Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport 
and Networks
Source: Official Website of the 
Ministry, available at: 
http://www.yme.gr/index.php?tid=48
9, date of access: 20.1.2011
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
16 S. K. (U16) Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008
(4 year mandate)
Regular Member
Submission of 
resignation on 
18.11.2009 
after his appointment as 
Secretary General at the 
Ministry of 
Infrastructures, 
Transports, and 
Networks (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD, no 
492, 19.11.2009)
Source: Annual Report 
of ADAE for the year 
2009, available at: 
http://www.adae.gr/portal
/fileadmin/docs/pepragm
ena/2009/Pepragmena%
202009.pdf, date of 
access, 15.1.2011
Party affiliation
On 25.11.2007, 
by decision 
(25.11.2007) of 
the President of 
PASOK, Georgios 
Papandreou, he 
was appointed 
Member of the 
Working Group of 
Scientists of the 
Secretariat of the 
Central 
Organisational 
Committee for the 
preparation of the 
8th Conference of 
PASOK that took 
place on March 
13-16, 2008.
Sources: PASOK-
France, available 
at: 
http://ne.pasok.gr/
negallias/?p=13, 
date of access: 
17.6.2010 
Professor at the  
Department of 
Technology 
Education and 
Digital Systems, 
University of 
Piraeus
[Transfer from the 
University of the 
Aegean to the 
University of 
Piraeus in 2007
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 294, 
2.5.2007)]
Member of the Special 
Legislative Drafting 
Committee for the 
strengthening  the institutional 
framework on the functioning 
of the Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy (ADAE) and the 
amendment of the law 
3115/2003
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 389, 4.9.2009) 
He was replaced by Christos 
Kapsalis
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 529, 17.12.2009)
Member of the Monitoring 
Committee of the Programme 
“POLITEIA-(Polity)” at the Ministry 
of National Education and Religious 
Affairs
(2002-2003)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
503, 24.4.2002, vol. B, no 694, 
3.6.2003)
Revocable Secretary General-Head 
of the General Secretariat of 
Communications at the Ministry of 
Infrastructures, Transports and 
Networks (Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 492, 19.11.2009)
Alternate member 
of the Committee 
for the 
procurement of 
goods of 
important 
economic or 
technological 
value 
representing the 
party of PASOK 
in the Committee. 
He was proposed
President of the Working Group 
constituted at the General 
Secretariat of Social Security of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security within the framework of the 
operational programme “Information 
Society”
(2003-2004)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
481, 21.4.2003, vol. B, no 1509, 
7.10.2004)
573
Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
16 S. K. (U16) by the President 
of PASOK 
following the 
document 
122a/10.7.2000 
(G.G. vol. A, no 
221, 13.10.2000). 
The committee 
was competent 
for the 
procurement of 
radiocommunicati
ons at the Greek 
Police.
Member of the Committee for the 
assessment of the proposals 
submitted by the Greek Universities 
within the framework of the call for 
the expression of interest (reg. no 
16119/23.9.2004) “Laboratory 
Scientific Equipment of the 
Departments of Higher Education” 
within the framework of the Action 
5.2.7 co-funded by the European 
Union through EPEAEK II (EPEAEK 
stands for: Operational Programme 
for Education and Initial Vocational 
Training)
Duration of the work: 20.4.2005-
30.5.2005)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
667, 18.5.2005)
He was elected 
Vice-Rector of the 
University of the 
Aegean
(3 year mandate: 
1.9.2000-
31.8.2003)
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 170, 
7.7.2000)
He was elected 
Rector of the 
University of the 
Aegean 
(3 year mandate: 
1.9.2003-
31.8.2006)
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 121, 
30.5.2003, no 
137, 13.6.2003)
President of the Committee of 
Informatics for the assessment of 
the proposals of the Greek 
Universities submitted within the 
framework of the call (reg. no 
14173/6.8.2004) for the Acts 
2.2.3.xi “Enhancement of Research 
Groups in Universities”, 2.6.1.xiii 
“Enhancement of Research Groups 
in Universities on issues pertaining 
to the environment and ecology” 
and 4.2.e1 “Enhancement of 
Research Groups in Universities on 
issues of gender and equality” co-
funded by the European Union 
through EPEAEK
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
723, 30.5.2005)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
16 S. K. (U16) President of the Advisory 
Committee for the assessment of 
the proposal submitted within the 
framework of the Category of Acts 
2.4.1.a “Enhancement of the 
structures of Counseling and 
Career Guidance of the Action 2.4.1 
“Counseling and Career Guidance 
of Measure 2.4 of EPEAEK II, co-
funded by the European Union
Duration: 30 working days
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 13, 18.9.2006)
President of the Advisory 
Committee for the assessment of 
the proposals the framework of the 
Category of Acts 3.1.1.a 
“Establishment and functioning of 
nodes-boxes to  encourage 
entrepreneurship and support of 
youth  entrepreneurship” of the 
Measure 3.1 of EPEAEK II, co-
funded by the European Union
Duration: 60 working days
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 19, 25.9.2006)
President of the Advisory 
Committee for the assessment of 
the proposals submitted under the 
framework of Class Actions 3.1.2.a: 
“Establishment and operation of 
Observatory-monitoring Mechanism 
of the entrepreneurial landscape, 
evaluation and predictability 
policies” of Measure 3.1 of EPEAEK 
II co-funded by the European Union
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 36, 10.10.2006)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
16 S. K. (U16) President of the Committee for the 
Conducting and Assessment of the 
results of the International Open 
Tender for “the Supply and 
installation of equipment for the 
creation of School Libraries in 90 
TEE (Technical Vocational Schools)-
SEK (School Laboratory Centres)” 
call for tender no 22/2006 within the 
framework of the project: “Building 
Interventions and Supply of 
Equipment for the Housing and 
Operation of  a School Library in 
108 TEE – SEK” of EPEAEK II co-
funded by the European Union
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 93, 30.11.2006)
President of the Advisory 
Committee for the assessment of 
the proposals submitted under the 
framework of Class Actions 2.3.1.c: 
“Introduction of electronic learning 
(e-learning) in initial vocational 
training” Energy 2.3.1: “Upgrading 
of the Public Vocational Training 
Institutes (IEK)” of Measure 2.3 of 
EPEAEK II, co-funded by the 
European Union
Duration of the work: 1.6.2007-
15.7.2007
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 226, 1.6.2007)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
16 S. K. (U16) President of the Advisory 
Committee for the assessment of 
the proposals submitted under the 
Class Actions 2.3.1.d: “Assurance 
of the quality and accreditation of 
initial vocational education and 
training”, of the Energy 2.3.1 
“Upgrading of the Public Vocational 
Training Institutes (IEK)” of 
Measure 2.3 of EPEAEK II, co-
funded by the European Union
Duration of the work: 16.8.2007-
30.11.2007
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 349, 16.8.2007)
President of the re-established 
reconstituted Committee  initially 
established and constituted by the 
decision of the Minister of National 
Education and Religious Affairs 
6243/19.10.2006 (Gov. Gaz. 
YODD, 93, 30.11.2006) for the 
Conducting and Assessment of the 
results of the International Open 
Tender for “the Supply and 
installation of equipment for the 
creation of School Libraries in 90 
TEE (Technical Vocational Schools)-
SEK (School Laboratory Centres)” 
call for tender no 22/2006 within the 
framework of the project: “Building 
Interventions and Supply of 
Equipment for the Housing and 
Operation of  a School Library in 
108 TEE – SEK” of EPEAEK II co-
funded by the European Union
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 93, 30.11.2006)
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Serial 
Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
Occupation
Other parallel 
appointments/positions in 
the public sector
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
16 S. K. (U16) Member of the Hellenic Quality 
Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education (Independent Authority) 
representing the scientific field of 
Sciences and Informatics 
 (1.9.2006-30.6.2008)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1215, 1.9.2006, vol. YODD, no 92, 
24.11.2006, vol. YODD, no 347, 
7.8.2008) 
17 N. K.  (U17) Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 256, 12.6.2008
(4 year mandate)
Alternate Member of U8
Professor at the 
Department of 
Informatics and 
Telecommunicati
ons, Athens 
University
Regular Member of the 
Sectoral Scientific Council in 
the field of Informatics, 
Telecommunications, 
Systems at the Ministry of 
Development
(three year mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, 
no 19, 13.1.2005)
Renewal of mandate 
(Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 57, 14.2.2008)
President and member of 
committees for the assessment of 
major competitions
Member of the Management Board 
of the Hellenic Telecommunications 
Organisation S.A (OTE)
(1996-1999)
(Government Gazette, vol. AE-EPE, 
no 1356, 3.4.1996)
Advisor of the management of the 
Public Power Corporation on the 
development of its 
telecommunications activities and 
the establishment of TELLAS (2000-
2002)
Source: Official Website of the 
Department of Informatics and 
Telecommunications, Athens 
University, available at: 
http://cgi.di.uoa.gr/~kalou/cv_GR.ht
ml: date of access: 12.3.2011
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Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
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the public sector
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Public Sector before the 
Appointment to the Authority
Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
17 N. K. (U17) Member of the Management Board 
of the anonymous company under 
the name “Anonymous Greek 
Company for the provision of 
internet products and  services” 
with the distinctive title “OTEnet”  
(subsidiary company of the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organisation)
(1998-1999)
(Government Gazette, vol. AE-EPE, 
no 6211, 30.7.1998)
President of the Legislative Drafting 
Committee for the creation of a 
legal framework for the 
implementation of the General 
Commercial Registry (G.E.M.I.)
Duration of the work: 18.8.2004-
30.10.2004)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1271, 18.8.2004)
Regular Member of the National 
Council for Research and 
Technology (E.S.E.T.) in the field of 
Informatics, Telecommunications, 
Systems 2005-2007
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1276, 12.9.2005)
Vice-President of the Executive 
Committee of the National Council 
for Electronic Commerce
(Government Gazette, vol. 982, 
25.7.2006)
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Number
Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
Authority
End of mandate-
Resignation
Previous Position/Title Party 
Affiliation/NGOs/
Trade Unionism
Parallel Main 
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
18 C. V. (FP18) (Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 370, 28.8.2008)
He was appointed after the 
resignation of J5 (expiration of 
mandate: 12.4.2011)
Alternate Member  of U16
Submission of 
resignation on 11.9.2009
Source: Annual Report 
2009, available at: 
http://www.adae.gr/portal
/fileadmin/docs/pepragm
ena/2009/kefalaio%201.
pdf, date of access: 
14.5.2011
U20 was appointed to 
the vacant post
(Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 305, 
13.9.2010)
Lawyer, 
PhD in European 
Law
Alternate Member of the 
NATO Board of Appeals, 
Brussels (from 4/2009 
onwards)
Source: Cover Note to the 
Secretary General of the 
Council of the European 
Union for the Greek 
candidacy to the General 
Court of the European Union, 
Curriculum Vitae of Christos 
Vassilopoulos,
Available at: 
http://register.consilium.europ
a.eu/pdf/en/10/st06/st06125.e
n10.pdf, date of access: 
12.1.2011
Clerk (referendaire) at the Court of 
First Instance (CFI) of the European 
Communities (renamed the General 
Court of the European Union), 
Luxembourg (2/2001-7/2004)
Clerk (referendaire) at the Court of 
Justice of the European 
Communities (renamed the Court of 
Justice of the European Union), 
Luxembourg (7/2004-6/2008)
Director of the Political Bureau of the 
Caretaker Minister of the Interior, S. 
Flogaitis
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 414, 16.9.2009)
Ipso Iure end of the mandate: 
6.10.2009 (Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 452, 15.10.2009)
Head of the Bureau for the Support 
of Good Legislation at the General 
Secretariat of the Government
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 495, 20.11.2009). (Suspension of 
activities as a lawyer since 
November 2009 according to this 
CV)
Law firm Vassilopoulos and 
Partners, Athens 
(7/2008 to 11/2009)
Source: Cover Note to the 
Secretary General of the Council of 
the European Union, Curriculum 
Vitae of Christos Vassilopoulos,
Available at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/p
df/en/10/st06/st06125.en10.pdf, 
date of access: 12.1.2011
Revocation of the appointment by 
the Prime Minister Georgios 
Papandreou (Government Gazette, 
vol. YODD, no 196, 2.6.2010)             
Proposal for appointment as Judge 
of the General Court of the 
European Union by the Greek 
government. However, his name 
would not appear again since the 
Greek Government proposed a new 
candidate, Dimitrios Gratsias. The 
panel set up by article 255 of the 
Treaty on the functioning   of the 
European Union
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Name Surname Appointment/Position in the 
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Resignation
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Appointments/Positions in the 
Public Sector after the 
Appointment to the Authority
18 C. V. (FP18) approved his candidacy and gave an 
opinion on his suitability to perform 
the duties of Judge of the General 
Court. (Appointment of Gratsias 
published in the Official Journal of 
the EU, L278/29, 22.10.2010)
Sources: -Cover Note to the 
Secretary General of the Council of 
the European Union, February 9, 
2010, Available at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/p
df/en/10/st06/st06125.en10.pdf,  date 
of access: 12.1.2011, 
Newpaper, Eleftherotypia, Saturday, 
October 16, 2010, 
Available 
at:http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.artic
le&id=214092, date of access, 
12.1.2011, 
EU Law Blog, available at: 
http://eulaw.typad.com/eulawblog/20
10/07/index.html, date of access: 
12.1.2011
19 M. G. (U19) Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 305, 13.9.2010
Regular Member 
He filled the vacant post after 
the resignation of S. Katsikas 
until the rest of his mandate
Professor Emeritus, 
Department of Informatics, 
University of Piraeus 
Source: The Official 
Website of the University 
of Piraeus, available at: 
http://www.cs.unipi.gr/inde
x.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=64&Itemi
d=56&lang=el, date of 
access: 26.3.2011 [He 
retired from the service 
(pension) in 2008 (G.G. 
vol. C, no 986, 23.10.2010)
Member of the Management Board 
of the Greek Productivity Centre 
(ELKEPA)
(1994-1996)
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 6, 
11.1.1994, 186, 22.3.1994, 254, 
18.4.1996)
Submission of resignation 
19.11.1996
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1060, 26.11.1996)
Member of the Management Board 
of the Hellenic Telecommunications 
and Post Commission (5 year 
mandate)
(Government Gazette, vol. B’, no 
29, 19.1.1995)
Submission of resignation: 
22.5.2000
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
669, 30.5.2000)
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19 M. G. (U19) President of the Management Board 
of the National Accreditation Centre 
for Continuing Vocational Training 
and Accompanying Supportive 
Services” 
(1997-2004)
(Three year mandate. His mandate 
was renewed twice)
 (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
427, 27.5.1997, 768, 23.6.2000, 
859, 30.6.2003)
He submitted his resignation on 
10.3.2004
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
816, 2.6.2004)
Member of the Management Board 
of the Organisation for Vocational 
Education and Training (OEEK)
Three year mandate
(Government Gazette, vol. NPDD, 
no 191, 30.8.2001)
Member of the Working Group on 
the project for the elaboration of a 
plan linking the initial to the 
continuing vocational training with 
the aim to improve the functionality 
and effectiveness of vocational 
training in Greece 
Duration of work: 4.7.2002-
30.11.2002
(Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
249, 9.2.2004)
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20 K. L. (U20) Government Gazette, vol. 
YODD, no 305, 13.9.2010
Alternate Member of U19
He filled the vacant post after 
the resignation of FP18 until the 
rest of his mandate
Assistant 
Professor at the 
Department of 
Digital Systems, 
University of 
Piraeus (subject 
area: 
“Technologies for 
the Assurance of 
Privacy”)
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
no 353, 
12.5.2009)
[Lecturer at the 
University of the 
Aegean (subject 
area: 
“Architecture of 
Electronic 
Computer 
Systems”)
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
NPDD, no 270, 
14.11.2000)
Assistant 
Professor at the 
University of the 
Aegean (subject: 
“Electronic 
Computer 
Systems of 
Special Purpose 
with an emphasis 
to the 
Development of  
Smart Cards”
(Government 
Gazette, vol. C, 
856, 12.9.2008)]
Decision (1464 
Φ233.02/15.2.2011) for the 
assignment of Courses at the 
National Centre of Public 
Administration. Source: The 
Official Website of the 
National Centre of Public 
Administration, available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr/ekdda/Vie
wInstr.php, date of access: 
24.3.2011)
Member of the Technical Council of 
the University of the Aegean 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, 
no 42, 18.10.2006)
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APPENDIX 5 Full texts of the clauses on the members’ professional status, 
selection criteria, term of office, and functional accumulation status by authority 
 
1. Supreme Council for the selection of personnel 
 
Article 4, par. 2 of the law 2190/1990 
 
“Councillors shall be selected individuals of recognised standing, and professional 
sufficiency, and more specifically, individuals who currently serve or have served as high-
ranking public functionaries or public servants, professors or associate professors in 
institutions of higher education, or high-ranking officials of public organisations and 
enterprises or other legal entities [of the public sector] as defined in article 14 par. 1.  
Retired individuals may be appointed and obtain full salary”. . .  
 
“Councillor and President or Vice President shall be less than 70 or 75 years of age, 
respectively, at the time of their appointment. Each shall be appointed for a six-year term”.  
. . . The mandate of the members of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel may 
be renewed for a full or not a full mandate” [the last paragraph is set as amended by article 7 
par. 1 of the law 2527/1997]. . .  
 
“Up to five members of those appointed to the Council that come from the ranks of university 
professors, judges of the supreme courts, and high-ranking civil servants and currently 
exercise their functions may keep both posts for a three-year period, and select between the 
two posts after the expiration of that period. To the abovementioned shall be paid half of the 
full monthly salary as well as the regular allowances of the post they maintain [the last verse 
is set as amended by article 1 par. 5 of the law 2349/1995]1001.  
 
2. Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
 
Article 16, par. 1 of the law 2472/1997 
 
“1. The Authority shall be composed of a judge of a rank corresponding at least to that of a 
Conseiller d’État as President and six members as follows: a) A University, full or associate, 
professor specialized in law; b) A University, full or associate, professor specialized in 
information technology; c) A University, full or associate, professor; d) Three persons of high 
standing and experience in the field of the protection of personal data.”. . . 
5. The President and members of the Authority shall be appointed with an equal number of 
alternates who must have the same status and qualifications. The alternates of the President 
and the members will participate in the meetings of the Authority only if the corresponding 
ordinary member is provisionally absent or unable to participate. By means of a decision, the 
President of the Authority may delegate special duties to the alternates. 
 
Article 11, par. 3 of the law 2683/1998 
 
“4. The President and members of the Authority will be appointed for a specific term of 
office. Their term of office will be of four years and may be renewed only once. None may 
serve for a total period exceeding eight (8) years. Half of the six members of the Authority 
will be renewed every two years. In the first application of the present law the term of office 
of the six (6) members of the Authority shall be of four years. After the second constitution of 
the Authority, a draw of lots will take place among the six ordinary members so as to decide 
which three of them will serve for a four-year period and which for a two-year period”. 
                                                 
1001 The initial verse of the founding law read as follows: “They shall keep earning ½ of the salary of 
their main post”.   
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Article 16, par. 1 and 2 of the law 2472/1997 
 
“. . . The judge-President and the professors-members may be on active service or not. 2. The 
President of the Authority shall be employed on a full and exclusive time basis . . . If a judge 
on active service is selected for the position of the President, then a decision of the competent 
Supreme Judicial Council is also required1002. The same procedure is to be followed for the 
selection and appointment of the President’s alternate”. 
 
Article 17 of the law 2472/1997 
 
“1. No one may be appointed as a member of the Authority: a) If s/he is a Minister, Assistant 
Minister, Secretary-General to a Ministry or to an independent Secretariat General or a 
Member of Parliament. 
b) If s/he is a governor, manager, administrator, member of the Board of Directors or a 
person performing managerial duties, in general, in an enterprise producing, manufacturing, 
selling or trading in materials being used in information technology or telecommunications or 
rendering services in connection to information technology, telecommunications or personal 
data processing, as well as persons bound by a work contract to such an enterprise. 
2. Membership of the Authority is automatically forfeit for anyone who, following his/her 
appointment: 
a) acquires one of the positions impeding membership of the Authority by virtue of the 
preceding paragraph. 
b) performs any acts or undertakes any tasks or projects or acquires any other position 
which, at the Authority’s discretion, is incompatible with his/her duties as a member of the 
Authority. 
3. Evidence on the incompatibility, pursuant to the preceding paragraph, is taken by the 
Authority without the participation of the member, whose position may be incompatible. The 
Authority shall decide having previously heard the said member. The procedure may be 
initiated either by the President of the Authority or by the Minister of Justice. 
4. The loss of the qualifications on the basis of which a member of the Authority was 
appointed, pursuant to article 16 paragraph 1 of this law, shall entail his/her automatic 
forfeiture, if due to an irrevocable disciplinary or criminal conviction”. 
 
3. The Greek Ombudsman 
 
Article 2, par. 1 of the law 2477/1997 
 
“1. As Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen are selected individuals of acknowledged 
prestige, who have superior educational qualifications and enjoy broad social acceptance”. 
 
Article 2, par. 3 and 5 of the law 2477/1997 
 
“3. The term of office of the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen shall be for five years. 
Reappointment of the same individual as Ombudsman is not permitted. The premature 
termination of the Ombudsman’s term of office, for any reason, entails ipso jure the 
termination of office of the Deputy Ombudsmen”.  
                                                 
1002 By the time of the enactment of the law, article 89, par. 3 of the 1975/1986 Constitution permitted 
the assignment of administrative duties to judicial functionaries, either in parallel with the exercise of 
their main duties, or exclusively, for a certain period of time as defined by law. However, this clause 
was abolished by the revised Constitution of 2001. Instead, article 89, par. 2 provides that: 
“Exceptionally, judicial functionaries . . . may sit on councils or committees exercising competences of 
disciplinary, auditing or adjudicating nature and on legislative drafting committees, provided that this 
participation is specifically stipulated by the law”. 
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5. During the term of office of the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen, the exercise of any 
other public function is suspended. The Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen are not 
permitted to assume any other duties, whether paid or unpaid, in the public or private 
sector”. 
 
Article 2, par. 4 of the law 3094/2003    
 
“During the term of office of the Deputy Ombudsmen, the exercise of any other public office 
is suspended, as well as the exercise of any other duties in any position in the public sector, 
public law legal entities, and legal entities of the broader public sector. 
[This section of par. 4 was amended by article 284 par. 5 of the law 3852/2010 as follows: 
During the term of office of the Deputy Ombudsmen, the exercise of any other public office is 
suspended, as well as the exercise of any other duties in any position in the services 
contained in the first verse of par. 1 of article 3 of the present law1003]. Deputy Ombudsmen 
work under conditions of full-time and exclusive employment and may not assume any other 
professional activity. Deputy Ombudsmen may, however, work part-time as members of the 
teaching staff of universities”. 
 
Article 2 par. 3 of the law 3094/2003 
 
“The expiry of the Ombudsman's term of office, for whatever reason, shall ipso jure bring the 
end of the Deputy Ombudsmen's term of office, who shall continue to perform their duties 
until the appointment of the new Deputy Ombudsmen, and in any case not later than three 
months following the appointment of the new Ombudsman”. 
 
4. The Authority for Communication, Security, and Privacy. 
 
Article 2, par. 1 and 3 of the law 3115/2003 
 
“1. The Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy shall be made up of the 
President, Vice-President, and five other members as well as their respective alternates who 
must have the same status and qualifications. . . 
“3. The persons selected as members of the Authority shall enjoy broad social acceptance, 
and be distinguished for their scientific expertise and professional competence in the field of 
law or the technical field of communications”.    
 
Article 4, par. 3 of the law 3115/2003 
 
“During the term of office of the members of the Authority for Communication, Security, and 
Privacy the exercise of any other public office or profession is suspended, and it is not 
allowed to assume other duties, paid or not, in the public or the private sector. The members 
of the Authority, with the exception of the President who works under conditions of full-time 
and exclusive employment, may, however, exercise duties as members of a University faculty 
on a part-time basis”. 
 
                                                 
1003 Paragraph 1, Article 3 of the law 3094/2003 reads as follows: “Jurisdiction. 1. The Ombudsman has 
jurisdiction over issues involving services of: a) the public sector, b) first and second level local 
government, c) public law legal entities, d) private law legal entities of the public sector, public 
corporations, local government enterprises and companies whose management is directly or indirectly 
appointed by the state by means of an administrative decision or as a shareholder. Banks and the 
Athens Stock Exchange are exempted”. 
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Appendix 6 The Members’ Involvement in Public Life Index 
 
Career paths  
 
The members’ match with career paths by authority 
A. Political involvement Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel 
Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority  
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic Authority 
for Communication 
Security and Privacy 
Minister  U3   
Member of the European Parliament U7 U20   
Parliamentary candidate FP56 U26   
Candidate in local government elections   U17(2),    
Elected in local government elections    U2 FP3(6), FP11 
Governmental Posts 
 
CS9, U8, CS10, 
LC37, CS52 
 
J2, U4(3), U9, 
FP15, J19(2), U20, 
U29, FP36(2), 
LM39(3) 
FP8, CS10(2), 
CS11(4), CS12, 
 
U16, FP18(2) 
Scientific Collaborators of Deputies of the Hellenic Parliament  FP36   
Party affiliation FP56 U7, U20, U25, 
U28, FP36 
 FP3, FP10, FP11, 
U16 
Trade unionism FP43 FP37 CS5, CS11  
B. Institutional Involvement  
Positions in the European Union upon proposal of the Greek Government (the European 
Courts, the European Commission, National Delegation)  
U8, J27 FP12, J33  FP18(2) 
Appointments in the institutions of the European Union (e.g. the European Ombudsman)   U1  
Experts/Presidents/Members of Committees representing the Greece in international 
organizations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, National Committees (sections) 
of international or intergovernmental organisations 
 U4, U7, U9, FP11, 
FP12(2) 
FP3, CS5  
Experts, Judges in international organizations, Members of Boards in Intergovernmental 
organizations, Advisors of international organisations 
 U4 U9, CS10 FP18 
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Appendix 6 Continued 
 
Career paths  
 
The members’ match with career paths by authority 
 
B. Institutional Involvement Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel 
Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority  
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic Authority 
for Communication 
Security and Privacy 
Minister in Caretaker Government U7, U8(2) U7, J19   
President of Legislative Drafting Committees 
Member of Legislative Drafting Committees 
 
U7(3) 
U8(4), CS11, 
J15(3), J22, J23, 
LC37, J40 
J33(2), FP37 
J2(2), U7(3), 
U9(5), FP12, 
FP15(5), J19(2), 
FP24, U29(7), 
U30(3), U31(2), 
J34, FP37(2),  
 
FP3(3), CS5,  
CS11(2), CS12(2), 
U13, U14 
U17 
U6, U16 
President  of Working Groups/Monitoring Committees/Advisory Committees/Project 
Management Groups constituted by Ministries 
CS9(2) J2, U25  U8, U16(6) 
Member of Working Groups/Monitoring Committees/Advisory Committees/Scientific 
Councils-Committees/Project Management Groups constituted by Ministries or other legal 
entities of public law, studies-expertise carried out on behalf of ministries and other public 
bodies 
U8(2), CS9(8), 
CS10(4), CS11, 
CS17(2), U21, 
CS28, CS30(2), 
LC37, CS38(4), 
CS39, 
J45,CS51(2), 
CS52(7), J53, J54 
U3(3), U4(3), 
U6(4), U7(7), 
FP12, U14(4), 
FP15(2), U16, 
U18, U25, U29, 
U30(4), U32, 
FP36(3), U38(3), 
LM39(8) 
CS4, CS5(4), 
LM6(2), FP8, 
U9(3), CS11, 
CS12(2), U13(2), 
U14(2) 
J4, U6(5), U7, U8, 
U9, U14, U16, 
U17, U19 
Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Courts: The Hellenic Supreme Court of 
Civil and Penal Law, the Council of State (Supreme Administrative Court), the Court of 
Audit, General Commissioner of the Administrative Courts 
J1, J3, J4, J10, J12, 
J13, J15, J23, J34, 
J45, J53 
J1, J2, J19, J33   
President or Vice-President of the Legal Council of State LC16, LC33    
President of the Scientific Council of the Hellenic Parliament  U16   
Scientific Collaborator at the Scientific Service of the Hellenic Parliament   U2  
 589
Appendix 6 Continued 
Career paths  
 
The members’ match with career paths by authority 
B. Institutional Involvement Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel 
Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority  
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic Authority 
for Communication 
Security and Privacy 
President (alternate president) of Advisory Bodies in Public Administration 
Member (alternate member) of Advisory Bodies in Public Administration  
U6 
CS28(2), CS52(2) 
 
 
U8(2), U9, U20, 
U25(2), U28, U32 
 
U1 
 
U6, U9(2), U17(2) 
Ex officio member (alternate member) of the National Commission for Human Rights 
representing certain independent authorities, (the Greek Ombudsman, the National Council 
for Radio and Television, and the Hellenic Data Protection Authority), the Supreme 
Courts, certain Ministries pursuant to article 2 of the law 2667/1998 on the constitution of 
the National Committee for Human Rights 
J5, J53 U3, U4(2), U7, U8, 
FP11, FP12(2), 
U18, J19, FP24, 
FP37 
U1, CS10(2), U14  
Member of the Central Examination Committee of the National School of Public 
Administration or other examination committees (e.g. the National School of Judicial 
Officers), member of committees for the selection of personnel in the public sector, advisor 
of studies at the National Centre for Public Administration 
CS9(4), CS39, 
CS42(3), J45(2), 
J47 
U3, J27, U29, 
U30(3), U32 
U9(2)  
Members of Special Courts and Councils  related to judges’ responsibility and judges’ 
disciplinary issues pursuant to articles 99 and 91 of the Constitution  
(Special Court for Mistrial, and Supreme Disciplinary Council)  
Members of the Supreme Special Court pursuant to article 100 of the Constitution 
Court for the determination of Disputes (article 88 of the Constitution) 
J12(2), J15, J19(2), 
J20, J23(2), J24(2), 
J32, J45 
J1(2), J2, U3, 
U4(6), U7, U9, 
U16(2), J22(3), 
U29, U31(2) 
 J4 
President/Vice-President of various committees, councils exclusively or partly constituted 
by judges 
J3, J5    
Member of various committees, councils exclusively or partly constituted by judges J12, J25(2), J31, 
J49, J50, J53 
J1, J19(2), J34   
Member of the Disciplinary Council of the Athens Bar Association FP43    
Legal Adviser, Legal Collaborator, Adviser in the Public Sector  FP12, U30 LM6 U17 
Costumers’ Advocate (National Bank of Greece)  U30   
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Appendix 6 Continued 
Career paths  
 
The members’ match with career paths by authority 
C. Financial Involvement Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel  
Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority  
The Greek 
Ombudsman            
Hellenic Authority 
for Communication 
Security and Privacy 
President/Alternate President of Procurement Committees   U25  U6, U9, U14, 
U16(2), U17 
Member (alternate member) of Procurement Committees  FP56 U6(3), U14, U28  J5, U6, U7, U9(4), 
U14, U16, U17 
President/Vice-President of bodies (legal entities of public law, autonomous services or 
legal entities of private law supervised by a Ministry) related to economic appraisal,  the 
administration of public property (e.g. forests), Technical Councils of Universities 
J2, J12 U32   
Member of bodies (legal entities of public law or autonomous services or legal entities of 
private law supervised by a Ministry) related to economic appraisal or the administration of 
public property (e.g. forests), Technical Councils of Universities 
 U14  U20 
D. Institutional and Financial Involvement  
President/Vice-President of another Independent Authority J5 U8  FP1 
Member of another Independent Authority J19 U7, U9, U16, U32 U1 U16, U19 
Inspector General of Public Administration  J1   
President of Advisory or Arbitration and Mediation Bodies in Public Administration  U7(3), U8    
Member of the Management Board of Advisory or Arbitration and Mediation Bodies in 
Public Administration  
CS28    
President/Vice-President of the Management Boards of Public Utilities, Public Enterprises 
and Organisations under the legal status of public anonymous companies, legal entities of 
public law or entities of private law under the supervision of a Ministry, Project 
Management Units in Ministries  
U6, J23, J27, CS41 U3, U7, U14, U25, 
U32(2), U35, 
LM39 
LM6 FP1(2), U9, U19 
Member (alternate member) of the Management Boards of Public Utilities, Public 
Enterprises and Organisations under the legal status of public anonymous companies, legal 
entities of public law or entities of private law under the supervision of a Ministry, member 
of the management board of the Cultural foundation of the Bank of Greece 
CS17, CS39, 
CS41, CS51(2), 
CS55(3) 
J2, U3(3), U10, 
FP15(2), U16, 
U18, U20(2), 
U30(3), U31(2),  
U35 
U1, LM6(2), 
U9(2), CS11(2), 
U14(2), CS15(3) 
CS15, U17(2), 
U19(2) 
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Appendix 6 Continued 
 
Career paths  
 
The members’ match with career paths by authority 
D. Institutional and Financial Involvement Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel 
Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority  
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic Authority 
for Communication 
Security and Privacy 
CEO in an anonymous company of the public sector supervised by a ministry    CS12 
President/Vice-President of the Governing Board of Greek Universities U7    
Member of the Governing Board of Greek Universities U8 U25, U35   
Elected Rector of a Greek University  U3  U16 
Elected Vice-Rector of a Greek University    U16 
E. Scientific Involvement  
Experts representing Greece in international scientific organizations  U20   
President of Scientific Councils, President/Director of Research Centres/Institutes, legal 
entities of public law or entities of private law supervised by a Ministry with a scientific-
research character, Director of think tanks 
U6(2), U8(2) U6, U8(2), U25, 
U35 
U1, U13  
Member of Scientific Councils, Member of the Management Board of Research 
Centres/Institutes,  legal entities of public law or entities of private law supervised by a 
Ministry with a scientific-research- character, member of think tanks, Special Scientist, 
Special Scientist in Research Centres/Scientific Committees 
U6(2), U8 U6, U7(2), U8, 
U20, J33 
U1, U13 U9 
Members of the teaching staff of Greek Universities and Technological Educational 
Foundations (tenured positions) after resignation or end of mandate 
 FP15 FP3, LM6, FP8, 
CS10 
 
Members of the teaching staff of Greek Universities and Technological Educational 
Foundations (under contract) 
 LM39, FP36(2) FP3(7), LM6(2), 
FP8 
U14(2) 
Members of the teaching staff of the National School of Public Administration, the 
National Centre of Public Administration, Police Academy and other public educational 
centres (under contract) 
 J33(2) FP3(4), CS5, LM6, 
U9 
U20 
F. Civil Society Involvement  
Member of NGOs  U3, U7(2), FP11, 
FP12, U17, FP36 
FP3, FP7, FP8, 
CS10, CS11 
FP11 
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Abbreviations of Appendix 6 
 
U: University Professors 
J: Judges 
CS: High-ranking civil servants, that is, those possessing the degrees of Directors or Directors General, 
members of the Special Scientific Staff (experts), and executives of the Public Sector 
LC: High-ranking functionaries of the Legal Council of State 
FP: Free-lance professionals (lawyers, economists, experts in general) 
 
Numbers 
The numbers next to the abbreviations correspond to the serial number of each member of the 
authorities as presented in the appendices 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
The numbers in parentheses correspond to the number of appointments in the various posts, committees 
etc  
 
APPENDIX 7
Functional Accumulation and Types of 
Involvement 
FUNCTIONAL ACCUMULATION 
simultaneously keeping more than one public 
positions 
U6, U7, U8, CS9, 
CS11,   CS18     
J2, U3, U4, U5, 
U6, U7, U8, U9, 
U10,  U14,  U16, 
U17, U18, U20, 
U21, U25, U26, 
U28,U29, U30, 
U31, U32, U38
U9, U13, U14 U6, U7, U8, U9, 
U14, U16, U17, 
U20
TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
A. POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT  
Minister U3
Member of the European Parliament U7 U20
Parliamentary candidate FP6 U26
Candidate in local government elections U17(2), 
Elected in local government elections U2 FP3(3), FP11 FP3 FP(2)
Governmental Posts U8, CS10, LC37 CS9, CS52 J2, U4, J19, U29, 
FP36(2), LM39(2)
U9, FP15, LM39 U4, U20 FP8, CS10, 
CS11(3), CS12,
CS10, CS11, FP18(2) U16, 
Scientific Collaborators of Deputies of the 
Greek Parliament
FP36
                                                                                                The Members' Time-Dimension Involvement in Public Life Index                                                                            
Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy
Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy
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TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
B. INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENT 
Minister in Caretaker Government U7, U8 J19 U7
Posts in the European Union upon proposal of 
the Greek Government (the European Courts, 
the European Commission), member of the 
National Delegation in the European Union
 J27 U8 FP12, J33 FP18(2)
Appointments in the institutions of the 
European Union (e.g. the European 
Ombudsman)
U8 U1
Experts/Presidents/Members of Committees 
representing Greece in international 
organizations, the European Union, the Council 
of Europe, National Committees (sections) of 
international or intergovernmental 
organisations
U7, U9, FP11, 
FP12(2)
FP3, CS5
Experts in international organizations, 
Members of Boards in Intergovernmental 
organisations, Advisors of International 
Organisations
U9, CS10, FP18
President of Legislative Drafting Committees U7 U7 U7 J33(2), FP37 U29 FP15 U17
Member of Legislative Drafting Committees J15(2), J22, J23, 
J40
U8, CS11, J15 U8(2) U7, U9,  FP15, 
J19, FP24,  
U30(2), U31(2), 
J34, FP37(2), 
J2, U7(2), U9(2), 
FP12, U29(5), 
U30
U9, FP15(3), U30 FP3(3), CS5, 
CS11, CS12, 
U13, U14
CS11, CS12 U6, U16
President  of Working Groups/Monitoring 
Committees/Advisory Committees/Project 
Management Groups constituted by Ministries, 
President of National Councils on various 
policy issues
CS9(2) J2 U25 U8, U16(6) U8
Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy
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TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
B. Institutional Involvement
Member of Working Groups/Monitoring 
Committees/Advisory Committees/Scientific 
Councils-Committees/Project Management 
Groups constituted by Ministries or other legal 
entities of public law, studies-expertise carried 
out on behalf of ministries and other public 
bodies
CS9(2),  CS17, 
CS28, CS30(2), 
LC37, CS38(4), 
CS39, 
J45(2),CS51(2), 
CS52(7), J53, 
J54, J55
CS9(4), CS10(4), 
CS11, U21, 
CS39(2)
U8(2), CS9, CS17  U3, U7, U14(4), 
FP15, U16, U18,   
U30(2),  FP36(2), 
U38(2), LM39(6)
U3(2), U4(3), 
U6(3), U7(4), 
FP12, FP15, 
U14(2), U25, 
U29, U32, FP36, 
U38, LM39(2)
U7(2), U14(2) CS4, CS5(2), 
LM6(2), U9(2), 
CS11, CS12, 
U13(2), U14(2)
CS5(2), FP8, U9, 
CS12
J4, U6(3), U7, U8, 
U14, U16, U19
U6(2), U9, U17
Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the 
Supreme Courts: 
J1, J3, J4, J10, 
J12, J13, J15, 
J23, J34, J45, 
J53
J1, J19, J33 J2
President or Vice-President of the Legal 
Council of State
LC16, LC33
President of the Scientific Council of the 
Hellenic Parliament
U16
Scientific Collaborator (research fellow) at the 
Scientific Service of the Hellenic Parliament
U2
Advisory Bodies
Member (alternate president) of Advisory 
Bodies in Public Administration
U6
Member (alternate member) of Advisory 
Bodies in Public Administration (National 
Councils on various policy issues e.g. the 
National Bio-Ethics Committee, the Supreme 
Labour Council)
CS28(2), CS52(2) U28,U32 U8(2), U9, U20, 
U25(2)
U1 U17(2) U6, U9(2)
Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy
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TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
B. Institutional Involvement
Ex officio member (alternate member) of the 
National Commission for Human Rights 
representing certain independent authorities, 
(the Greek Ombudsman, the National Council 
for Radio and Television, and the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority), the Supreme Courts, 
certain Ministries pursuant to article 2 of the 
law 2667/1998 on the constitution of the 
National Committee for Human Rights
J53 J5 FP24, U3, U4(2), FP11, 
FP12(2), U18, 
J19, FP24, FP37
U7, U8 CS10 U1, U14 CS10
Member (alternate member) of the Central 
Examination Committee of the National School 
of Public Administration or other examination 
committees (e.g. the National School of 
Judicial Officers), member of committees for 
the selection of personnel in the public sector, 
advisor of studies at the National Centre for 
Public Administration
CS9(4), CS39, 
CS42(3), J45(2), 
J47
 J27, U3, U29, U32 U30(3), U9 U9
Members of Special Courts and Councils  
related to judges’responsibility and judges’ 
disciplinary issues pursuant to articles 99 and 
91 of the Constitution 
J12(2), J15, 
J19(2), J20, 
J23(2), J24(2), 
J32, J45
J1(2), J2, U3, 
U4(3), U16, 
J22(3), U29, 
U4, U7, U31(2) U9, U16 J4
(Special Court for Mistrial, and Supreme 
Disciplinary Council) 
Members of the Supreme Special Court 
pursuant to article 100 of the Constitution
President/Vice-President of various 
committees, councils exclusively or partly 
constituted by judges
J3, J5 J1, J19(2), J34
xxii) Member of various committees, councils 
exclusively or partly constituted by judges
J12, J25(2), J31, 
J49, J50, J53
Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy
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TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
B. Institutional Involvement
Member of the Disciplinary Council of the 
Athens Bar Association
FP43
Legal Adviser, Legal Collaborator, Adviser in 
the Public Sector
 U30 FP12, U30 U30 LM6 U17
Costumers’ Advocate (National Bank of 
Greece)
U30
C. FINANCIAL INVOLVEMENT 
President/Alternate President of Procurement 
Committees 
U25 U9, U14, U16(2), 
U17
U6, U9
Member (alternate member) of Procurement 
Committees 
FP56 U6, U14, U28 U6(2) J5, U6, U7, U9, 
U14, U16, U17
U6, U9(2) U9
President/Vice-President of bodies (legal 
entities of public law, autonomous services or 
legal entities of private law supervised by a 
Ministry) related to economic appraisal,  the 
administration of public property (e.g. forests), 
Technical Councils of Universities
J12 J2 U32
Member of bodies (legal entities of public law 
or  legal entities of private law supervised by a 
Ministry) related to economic appraisal or the 
administration of public property (e.g. forests), 
Technical Councils of Universities 
U14 U6, U20
D. INSTITUTIONAL + FINANCIAL 
INVOLVEMENT
President/Vice-President of another 
Independent Authority
J5 U8 U8 FP1
Member of another Independent Authority J19 U7, U16 U32 U9 U1 U16, U19
Inspector General of Public Administration J1
The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy
Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority
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TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
D. INSTITUTIONAL + FINANCIAL 
INVOLVEMENT
President of Advisory or Mediation and 
Arbitration Bodies in Public Administration (e.g. 
the Economic and Social Committee)
U7(2) U7, U8
Member of the Management Board of Advisory 
or Mediation and Arbitration Bodies in Public 
Administration (e.g. the Economic and Social 
Committee)
CS28
President/Vice-President of the Management 
Boards of Public Utilities, Public Enterprises 
and Organisations under the legal status of 
public anonymous companies, legal entities of 
public law or entities of private law under the 
supervision of a Ministry, Project Management 
Units in Ministries, autonomous services in 
Ministries  directly supervised by the Minister
U6, J23, CS41 J27  U14, U35, LM39 U3, U25, U32(2), U7 LM6 FP1(2), U19 U9
Member (alternate member) of the 
Management Boards of Public Utilities, Public 
Enterprises and Organisations under the legal 
status of public anonymous companies, legal 
entities of public law or entities of private law 
under the supervision of a Ministry, member of 
the management board of the Cultural 
foundation of the Bank of Greece
CS17, CS39, 
CS41, CS51(2), 
CS55(2)
CS55 U3, U14, U16,  
U30, U31, 
FP15, U30(2), 
U31, U35
J2, U3(2), U10, 
FP15, U18, 
U20(2) 
 U9(2), U14, 
CS15(3)
U1, LM6, U14 LM6, CS11(2), CS15, U17(2), 
U19(2)
CEO in an anonymous company of the public 
sector supervised by a ministry
CS12
President/Vice-President of the Governing 
Board of Greek Universities*
U7
(* in cases of newly established universities whose governing 
boards are appointed by the Minister of National Education and 
Religious Affairs)
Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy
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TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate 
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
D. INSTITUTIONAL + FINANCIAL 
INVOLVEMENT
Member of the Governing Board of Greek 
Universities*
U8 U35 U25
(* in cases of newly established universities 
whose governing boards are appointed by the 
Minister of National Education and Religious 
Affairs)
U3
Elected Rector of a Greek University U16
Elected Vice-Rector of a Greek University U16
E. SCIENTIFIC- CULTURAL INVOLVEMENT
Experts representing Greece in international 
organizations
U20
President of Scientific Councils, 
President/Director of Research 
Centres/Institutes, legal entities of public law or 
entities of private law supervised by a Ministry 
with a scientific-research character, Director of 
think tanks, 
U6(2) U8(2) U8(2), U35 U6 U6, U25 U1(2), U13
Member of Scientific Councils, Member of the 
Management Board of Research 
Centres/Institutes, legal entities of public law or 
entities of private law supervised by a Ministry 
with a scientific-research- character, member 
of think tanks, Special Scientist in Research 
Centres/Scientific Committees
 U8 U6(2), U8 U7, U8, U20, J33 U6, U7 U1, U13 U9
Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy
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TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
during the 
mandate
Involvement 
after the 
mandate
E. SCIENTIFIC
Members of the teaching staff of Greek 
Universities and Technological Educational 
Foundations (tenured positions) 
elected/appointed after their resignation or end 
of mandate
FP15  FP3, LM6, FP8, 
CS10
Members of the teaching staff of Greek 
Universities and Technological Educational 
Foundations (under contract) 
LM39, FP36(2) FP3(2), LM6(2), FP8 FP3(2), 
Members of the teaching staff of the National 
School for Public Administration, the National 
Centre of Public Administration, Police 
Academy and other public educational centres 
(under contract)
J33(2) FP3(4), CS5, 
LM6, U9
U14(2) U20
Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy
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Appendix 8 Tables on the variations and intensity of involvement, and functional 
accumulation status by authority 
 
1. Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
 
Table 1 
Variations of involvement in public life by professional status  
 
Judges Variations 
of 
involvement 
Univer
sity 
Profess
ors 
Variations 
of involvement 
High-
ranking 
Civil 
Servants 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
High-ranking 
functionaries 
of the Legal 
Council of 
State 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
Free-lance 
Profession
als 
Variations 
of 
involveme
nt 
J3, J4, 
J13, J15, 
J20, J24, 
J25, J31, 
J32, J40, 
J45, J47, 
J49, J50, 
J53, J54 
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I+IF+S CS9, 
CS10, 
CS52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P+I LC16, 
LC33,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I FP43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P+I 
J2 
 
 
F U7 
 
 
       
P+I+IF CS11, 
CS30, 
CS38, 
CS42 
I LC37 
 
 
 
P+I FP56 
 
 
 
P+F 
J12  I+F         
J5, J19, 
J23, J27 
 
 
I+IF U8 
 
 
P+I+IF+CS CS17, 
CS39, 
CS28, 
CS51 
I+IF     
  U21 
 
I CS41, 
CS55 
IF     
Total: 22  Total: 4  Total: 13  Total: 3  Total: 2  
The letters A, B, C, D, E and F correspond to the thematic dimensions of involvement: Political (A), Institutional 
(B), Financial (C), Institutional and Financial (D), Scientific (E), and Civil Society (F) 
Total number of members: 44 
Table 2  
Intensity of involvement  
Professional status Intensity 
 low medium high 
Judges 22   
University professors 1 2 1 
Civil servants 11 1 1 
Legal Councillors of State 3   
Free lance professionals 2   
total 39 3 2 
Intensity of involvement: low, medium, high 
1-5 low 
6-10 medium 
11-  high 
 
Table 3  
Functional Accumulation by professional status  
Judges Variation
s and 
intensity 
of 
involvem
ent 
Universit
y 
Professor
s 
Variations 
and 
intensity  
of 
involvemen
t 
High-
ranking 
Civil 
Servants 
Variations 
and 
intensity 
of 
involvemen
t 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Variations 
and intensity  
of 
involvement 
J2 F U6 S(4) CS9 I(4) FP56 F 
J15 I U7 I+IF(2) CS10 I(4)   
  U8 S CS11 I(2)   
  U21 I CS39 I(2)   
    CS55 IF   
Total: 2  Total: 4  Total: 5  Total: 1  
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2. Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
 
Table 4 
Variations of involvement in public life by professional status  
 
Judges Variations 
of 
involvement 
University 
Professors 
Variations 
of involvement 
Lawyer
s with a 
salary 
mandat
e 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
J1 I+IF U3,U7 P+I+IF+S+CS LM39 
 
P+I+IF+S 
 
FP11, FP12 
 
I+CS 
 
J19 
 
 
P+I U4, U9, 
U29 
P+I   FP15 
 
P+I+S 
J22, J27, 
J34 
I U6 I+F+S   FP24 
 
I 
J33  I+S U8, U30 I+IF+S   FP36  P+I+CS 
J2  P+I+IF U38 I   FP37 P+I  
  U10 IF     
  U14, U32 I+F+IF     
  U16, U18, 
U31 
I+IF     
  U17 P+SC     
  U20 P+I+IF+SC     
  U25 P+I+F+IF+S     
  U26 P     
  U28 P+I+F     
  U35 IF+SC     
TOTAL: 
7 
 TOTAL:      
21 
 TOTA
L: 1 
 TOTAL: 6  
Total number of members: 35 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Intensity of Involvement by professional status  
 
Professional status Intensity 
 low medium high 
Judges 3 4  
University professors 7 8 6 
Lawyer with a salary 
mandate 
  1 
Free lance 
professionals 
3 3  
total 13 15 7 
 
Intensity of involvement: low, medium, high 
1-5 low 
6-10 medium 
11-  high 
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Table 6 
Functional Accumulation by professional status  
 
Judges Variations 
of 
involvement 
University 
Professors 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
Lawyers 
with a 
salary 
mandate 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
J2 I(3) U3 I(4)+IF LM39 P+I(2) FP11 I(2) 
J19 I U4 I(8)   FP12 I(7) 
  U6 I(3)+F(2)+S(
2) 
  FP15 P+IF 
  U7 I(8)+S   FP24 I 
  U9 P+I(3)   FP36 I+S(2) 
  U14 I(2)+F(2)   FP37 I 
  U16 , U18, 
U38 
I     
  U25 I+IF     
  U26 P     
  U28 I+F     
  U29 P+I(8)     
  U30 I(2)+IF(2)     
  U31 I(2)+IF     
  U32 I(3)+F+IF(2)     
  U35 IF(2)     
TOTAL: 2  TOTAL:  17      TOTAL: 
1 
 TOTAL: 6  
The letters A, B, C, D, E and F correspond to the thematic dimensions of involvement: Political (A), Institutional 
(B), Financial (C), Institutional and Financial (D), Scientific (E), and Civil Society (F) 
Total number of members: 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 604
3. The Greek Ombudsman 
 
Table 7 
Variations of involvement by professional status  
Universit
y 
Professo
rs 
 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
High-
ranking 
Civil 
Servants 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
Lawyers 
with a 
salary 
mandate 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Variation
s 
of 
involvem
ent 
U1, U9 I+IF+S CS4 I LM6 I+IF+S FP3 I+S+SC 
U2 P+I CS5 P+I +S   FP7 SC 
U13 I+S CS10 P+S+SCS   FP8 P+I+S+C
S 
U14 I+IF CS11 P+I+IF+CS     
  CS12 P+I     
  CS15 IF     
TOTAL:    
5 
 TOTAL:      
6 
 TOTAL:      
1 
 TOTAL:             
3 
 
The letters A, B, C, D, E and F correspond to the thematic dimensions of involvement: Political (A), Institutional 
(B), Financial (C), Institutional and Financial (D), Scientific (E), and Civil Society (F) 
Total number of members: 15 
 
Table 8 
Intensity of involvement by professional status  
Professional status Intensity 
 low medium high 
University professors 2 3 - 
Civil servants 3 2 1 
Lawyer with a salary 
mandate 
 1  
Free lance 
professionals 
2 - 1 
total 7 6 2 
 
Intensity of involvement: low, medium, high 
1-5 low 
6-10 medium 
10-  high 
 
Table 9 
Functional Accumulation by professional status  
University 
Professors 
 
Variations 
of 
involveme
nt 
High-
ranking 
Civil 
Servants 
Variations 
of 
involveme
nt 
Lawyers 
with a 
salary 
mandate 
Variations 
of 
involveme
nt 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Variations 
of involvement 
U1 I(2)+IF CS5, 
CS12 
I(2) LM6 IF FP3 I 
U9 I(2) CS11 I   FP8 I+S 
U14 I+IF       
TOTAL:   3     TOTAL:  3        TOTAL: 1         TOTAL: 2         
Total number of members:  9 
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4. The Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy 
 
TABLE 10  
Variations of involvement in public life by professional status  
Judges  Variations 
of 
involveme
nt 
University 
Professors 
Variations 
of 
involvement 
High-
ranking 
Civil 
Servants 
Variations 
of 
involveme
nt 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Variations 
of involvement 
J4 I U6, U7 I+F CS12, 
CS15 
IF FP1 IF 
J5 F U8 I   FP3, FP10 P 
  U9 I+F+IF+S   FP11 P+CS 
  U14 B+C+E   FP18 A+B 
  U16 P+I+F+IF     
  U17 I+F+IF     
  U19 I+IF     
  U20 F+S     
TOTAL:         
2 
 TOTAL:           
9 
 TOTAL:      
2 
 TOTAL:           
5       
 
The letters A, B, C, D, E and F correspond to the thematic dimensions of involvement: Political (A), Institutional 
(B), Financial (C), Institutional and Financial (D), Scientific (E), and Civil Society (F) 
Total number of members: 18 
 
Table 11  
Intensity of involvement by professional status                                    
Professional status Intensity 
 low medium high 
Judges 2 -  
University professors 5 3 1 
Civil Servants 2 - - 
Free lance 
professionals 
4 1 - 
total 13 4 1 
Intensity of involvement: low, medium, high 
1-5 low 
6-10 medium 
10-  high 
 
Table 12  
Functional Accumulation by professional status  
University 
Professors 
 
Variations 
of involvement 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Variations 
of involvement 
U6 I(4)+F(2) FP3 P 
U8, U16, U17 I FP18 P(2) 
U9 I(3)+F(3)   
U20 S   
TOTAL:  6          TOTAL:   2           
Total number of members: 8 
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Appendix 9 Data Overview 
 
University Professors and Judges constitute the predominant professional categories 
in the authorities as shown in Table 1. High-ranking civil servants and free-lance 
professionals represent 19% and 13%, respectively, of the total number of the 
members. Legal Councillors of State (3 of 130) were only appointed to the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel, whereas lawyers with a salary mandate are 
equally weakly represented (2 of 130).  
 
Table 1 The members’ Professional Status 
University 
Professors 
Judges High-ranking 
Civil Servants 
Free-lance 
Professionals 
Legal 
Councillors 
of State 
Lawyers with a salary 
mandate 
42  
(32%) 
41 
(32%) 
25 
(19%) 
17 
(13%) 
3 
(2%) 
2 
(2%) 
Sources: The Government Gazette and Annual Reports 
 
Gender distribution in the authorities is shown in Table 2. It is far from clear that the 
overwhelming majority of the members are men. More specifically, men represent 
85% of the total number of the members, whereas women reach 15%. Interestingly 
enough, these results are only reversed in the case of the Greek Ombudsman since we 
have 8 women and 7 men. Finally, women are less represented in the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority and the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and 
Privacy. 
 
Table 2 Gender distribution in the four independent constitutional authorities 
 Supreme 
Council for 
the Selection 
of Personnel 
 
Hellenic Data 
Protection 
Authority 
 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
 
Hellenic 
Authority for 
Communication, 
Security, and 
Privacy 
 
TOTAL 
Men  
 
49  36 7 19 111 
(85%) 
Women  7 3 8 1 19 
(15%) 
Sources: The Government Gazette and Annual Reports 
 
The average tenure of the members in all four independent constitutional authorities is 
high, and ranges from 4.7 years to 6.4 years, as shown in Table 3. Thus, it greatly 
exceeds that of a minister or a government. This trend is explained by the practices of 
reappointments, and long delays in the replacement of the members after the 
expiration of their term of office. However, irregular cases extending the members’ 
mandates have also been found. 
 
Premature departure from office is quite often, and ranges from 20% to 33% of the 
total number of the members for each authority, as shown in Table 4. On many 
occasions, resignations before the expiration of a member’s mandate have often been 
for professional reasons, namely appointments to other attractive public posts. The 
resignations due to the Cameras case are of great interest. Two out of the seven 
resigned members of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority accepted to be 
reappointed two months after the submission of their resignation, whereas one 
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member proceeded to the revocation of his resignation, and continued to serve for the 
remainder of his mandate. 
 
TABLE 3 Average Length of Tenure of the Members of the four Constitutional 
Independent Authorities 
 Supreme Council 
for the Selection 
of Personnel 
 
 
 
1994-31.12.2010 
Hellenic Data 
Protection 
Authority 
 
 
 
1997-31.12.2010 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
 
 
 
 
1997-31.12.2010 
Hellenic 
Authority for 
Communication, 
Security, and 
Privacy 
 
2003-31.12.2010 
Average tenure 6.4 years 
(55) 
4.7 years 
(38) 
4.8 
(15) 
5.1 
(20) 
Average tenure: all members, that is, (heads, members and alternate members) appointed and 
reappointed; where term of office ends after December 31st 2010, time is included; excludes those 
deceased in office 
 
TABLE 4 Resignations of the Members of the four Constitutional Independent 
Authorities before the End of term  
Authority 
 
 
 
 
Period 
Supreme Council 
for the Selection 
of Personnel 
 
 
1994-31.12.2010 
Hellenic Data 
Protection 
Authority 
 
 
1997-31.12.2010 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
 
 
 
1997-31.12.2010 
Hellenic 
Authority for 
Communication, 
Security, and 
Privacy 
2003-31.12.2010 
%resigning before 
end of term 
 
% resigning due 
to the expiration 
of  their mandate 
(age limit) 
20% (11 of 55) 
 
 
9% (5 of 55) 
 
(5 Judges) 
 
32% (12 of 38) 
 
 
- 
 
33% (5 of 15) 
 
 
- 
 
 
25% (5 of 20) 
 
 
- 
 
Main Occupation 
of the resigned 
members 
2 High ranking 
Civil Servants 
3 University 
Professors 
1 high ranking 
functionary of the 
Legal Council of 
State 
5 Judges 
2 Free lance 
Professionals, 
7 University 
Professors 
3 Judges 
 
2 High ranking 
Civil Servants 
1 University 
Professors 
1 Free Lance 
Professional 
1 Lawyer with a 
salary mandate 
 
2 University 
Professors, 2 Free 
lance 
Professionals, 1 
Judge 
 
It should be noted that the alternate member FP15 of the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority, and the Deputy Ombudspersons FP3, LM6, FP8, and CS10 followed 
academic careers after the end of their mandate or their resignation from the authority. 
 
The broadness of the members’ involvement in public life, that is, the combinations of 
the thematic dimensions of the involvement index in which they participate, is 
presented by professional status in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. The University 
Professors’ career paths are extremely rich, and their involvement in public life is the 
broadest compared to that of the other professional categories. We should also point 
out that they participate in the financial and institutional-financial dimensions more 
than any other professional category. More specifically, five participate in one 
dimension of the index; fifteen participate in two dimensions; twelve participate in 
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three dimensions; four participate in four dimensions; three participate in five 
dimensions.  
 
Table 5 University Professors’ broadness of involvement in public life 
Variation of 
involvement 
Suprem
e 
Council 
for the 
Selectio
n of 
Personn
el 
Hellenic 
Data 
Protection 
Authority 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic 
Authority for 
Communication, 
Security, and 
Privacy 
Subtotal Total 
P - 1 - - 1 
I 1 1 - 1 3 
IF - 1 - - 1 
 
 
5 
P+I - 3 1 - 4 
I+IF - 3 1 1 5 
P+CS - 1 - - 1 
IF+S - 1 - - 1 
I+S - - 1 - 1 
F+S - - - 1 1 
I+F - - - 2 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
P+I+IF 1 - - - 1 
I+IF+S 1 2 2 - 5 
I+F+S - 1 - 1 2 
I+F+IF - 2 - 1 3 
P+I+F - 1 - - 1 
 
 
 
 
12 
P+I+IF+S 1 1 - - 2 
P+I+F+IF - - - 1 1 
I+F+IF+S - - - 1 1 
 
 
4 
P+I+IF+S+C
S 
- 2 - - 2 
P+I+F+IF+S - 1 - - 1 
 
 
3 
 
The Judges’ career paths are not rich. Their involvement in public life is mainly 
institutional. More specifically, twenty-two participate in one dimension; six 
participate in two dimensions, and only one judge participates in three dimensions. 
However, we should point out that fourteen of forty-one judges were promoted to the 
ranks of Vice-Presidents or President of the Supreme Courts by the executive. 
Therefore, their institutional involvement is relevant. 
 
Table  6 Judges’ broadness of involvement in public life 
Variation of 
involvement 
Suprem
e 
Council 
for the 
Selectio
n of 
Personn
el 
Hellenic 
Data 
Protection 
Authority 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic 
Authority for 
Communication, 
Security, and 
Privacy 
Subtotal  Total  
I 16 3 - 1 20 
F 1 - - 1 2 
 
22 
I+IF 3 1 - - 4 
P+I - 1 - - 1 
I+S - 1 - - 1 
 
 
6 
P+I+IF - 1 - - 1 1 
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High-ranking civil servants’ career paths are quite rich. Their involvement in public 
life is significant since they participate in relevant dimensions of the index, that is, the 
political (7 of 21), and the institutional-financial dimensions (10 of 21). Interestingly 
enough, three high-ranking civil-servants combine the political and the civil society 
dimension. More specifically, ten participate in one dimension of the index; eight 
participate in two dimensions; two in three dimensions, and one in four dimensions. 
 
Table 7 High-ranking civil servants’ broadness of involvement in public life 
Variation of 
involvement 
Supreme 
Council 
for the 
Selection 
of 
Personnel 
Hellenic 
Data 
Protection 
Authority 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic 
Authority for 
Communicatio
n, Security, 
and Privacy 
Subtotal Total 
I 4 - 1 - 5 
IF 2 - 1 2 5 
 
10 
P+I 3 - 1 - 4 
I+IF 4 - - - 4 
 
8 
P+I+S - - - - 1 
P+S+CS - - 1 - 1 
 
2 
P+I+IF+CS - - 1 - 1 1 
 
Free-lance professionals’ career paths are quite rich. The combinations of their 
participation in the dimensions of the involvement index are interesting since they 
participate in the political (10 of 15) and the civil society dimensions (6 of 15). In 
three cases the political and civil society dimensions are combined. More specifically, 
two participate in four dimensions and one participates in three dimensions of the 
index; seven participate in two dimensions; and five participate in one dimension of 
the index. 
 
Table 8 Free-lance professionals’ broadness of involvement in public life 
Variation of 
involvement 
Suprem
e 
Council 
for the 
Selectio
n of 
Personn
el 
Hellenic 
Data 
Protection 
Authority 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic 
Authority for 
Communication, 
Security, and 
Privacy 
TOTAL Involveme
nt 
Accumula
tion 
P - - - 2 2 
IF - - 1 1 1 
CS - - - 1 1 
I 1 - - - 1 
 
 
 
5 
P+I 1 1 - 1 3 
P+F 1 - - - 1 
P+CS - - - 1 1 
I+CS - 1 - - 1 
 
 
 
6 
 
I+S+CS - - 1 - 1 
P+I+CS - 1 - - - 
 
2 
P+I+IF+S - - 1 - 1  
P+I+S+CS - - 1 - 1 2 
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The career paths of the lawyers’ with a salary mandate are rich. They equally 
participate in important dimensions of the involvement index, that is, the political (1 
of 2), and the institutional-financial (2 of 2). More specifically, one participates in 
three dimensions of the index and one participates in four dimensions. 
 
Table  9 Lawyers’ with a salary mandate broadness of involvement in public life 
Variation of 
involvement 
Suprem
e 
Council 
for the 
Selectio
n of 
Personn
el 
Hellenic 
Data 
Protection 
Authority 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic 
Authority for 
Communication, 
Security, and 
Privacy 
TOTAL Involveme
nt 
Accumula
tion 
I+IF+S - - 1 - 1 1 
P+I+IF+S - 1 - - 1 1 
 
The career paths of the legal Councillors of State are not rich. Their involvement is 
mainly institutional. However, we should also point out that two of three were 
appointed to the rank of Vice-President of the Legal Council of State by the Cabinet. 
Therefore, their institutional involvement is relevant. 
 
Table 10 Legal Councillors’ of State involvement in public life 
Variation of 
involvement 
Suprem
e 
Council 
for the 
Selectio
n of 
Personn
el 
Hellenic 
Data 
Protection 
Authority 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic 
Authority for 
Communication, 
Security, and 
Privacy 
Subtotal 
 
Total 
I 2 - - - 2 2 
P+I 1 - - - 1 1 
 
The intensity of involvement in public life measures how many times a member 
appears in the index, irrespective of the type of involvement. Table 11 shows the 
intensity of involvement in public life by professional status. Judges are not present in 
the high scale, whereas Legal Councillors of State appear only in the low scale. 
University Professors once more surpass the other professional categories since the 
majority pertain to the medium and high scales. Lawyers with a salary mandate also 
have presence only in the medium and high scales despite their small number. Finally, 
the overwhelming majority pertain to the low scale, whereas 28 members appear in 
the medium scale and 12 members appear in the high scale. 
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Table 11 The members’ Intensity of Involvement in public life by professional 
status 
 
Intensity of involvement 
Professional status low medium high 
Judges 27 4 - 
University professors 15 16 8 
High-ranking Civil 
Servants 
16 3 2 
Legal Councillors of 
state 
3 - - 
Free-lance 
professionals 
11 4 1 
Lawyers with a salary 
mandate 
- 1 1 
total 72 28 12 
 
As for the functional accumulation status, university professors is the only 
professional category that simultaneously combines the two facets of the concept of 
functional accumulation, that is, cases according to which the members, while serving 
on the authorities, exercise a public function and a private profession combined with 
appointments to the various public posts comprised in the involvement in public life 
index. The high-ranking civil servants CS9, CS11 from the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel equally combine the two facets of functional accumulation. 
The members coming from the other professional categories fulfill the requirements 
of the second facet of the functional accumulation status, that is, they appear in the 
involvement in public life index during their mandate in the authorities. Furthermore, 
we should point out that the administrative acts published in the government gazette 
regarding the members’ appointments to the various posts in the public sector as 
comprised in the involvement in public life index also provide for the remuneration of 
the appointees. 
 
However, irregular cases of functional accumulation in relation to the 
incompatibilities set out in legislation are not missing. Some striking cases are 
presented hereafter. During her mandate, the alternate member FP15 of the Hellenic 
Data Protection Authority simultaneously served as special adviser on issues of 
Organisation and Management on the Political Bureau of the Prime Minister 
Konstantinos Simitis. The alternate member FP36 of the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority was simultaneously a member of the teaching staff under contract i) at the 
Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of 
Peloponnese, and ii) the Department of Marketing and Communication, Athens 
University of Economics and Business. The alternate member LM39 of the Hellenic 
Data Protection Authority simultaneously served as special collaborator at the 
Political Bureau of the Minister of the Interior1004 while exercising his main duties as 
lawyer with a salary mandate at the General Hospital of Athens Hippokrateion. In our 
opinion, par. 5, article 3 of the executive law of the constitution on the independent 
constitutional authorities 3051/2002 was violated in all the above mentioned cases. 
The article provides that “the members are suspended from the exercise of any public 
function, as well as the exercise of duties in public services, public law legal entities, 
and legal entities of the broader public sector”.   
 
                                                 
1004 He submitted his resignation six months after his appointment to the authority. 
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The Deputy Ombudswomen LM6 and FP8 seem to have violated the relevant clause 
provided for in law 3094/20031005. During her mandate, the Deputy Ombudswoman 
LM6 was member of the management board of the Public Enterprise for Urban 
Planning and Housing, whereas the Deputy Ombudswoman FP8 was a member of the 
teaching staff under contract at the Athens Law School. Finally, the alternate member 
FP18 of the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy worked as a 
lawyer during his mandate. However, according to article 4 par. 3 of the law 
3115/2003 the exercise of any other public office or profession is suspended, and it is 
not allowed to assume other duties, paid or not, in the public or the private sector.  
 
                                                 
1005 Article 2 par. 4 of the law 3094/2003 reads as follows: “During the term of office of the Deputy 
Ombudsmen, the exercise of any other public office is suspended, as well as the exercise of any other 
duties in any position in the public sector, public law legal entities, and legal entities of the broader 
public sector.Deputy Ombudsmen work under conditions of full-time and exclusive employment and 
may not assume any other professional activity. Deputy Ombudsmen may, however, work part-time as 
members of the teaching staff of universities”. 
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1 1995 C40   
24.2.1995
M. P. ? ? ? Greek Technology
and Constructions 
S.A.
Industry, Energy 
and Technology 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular ? U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Presidency&Industry, 
Energy and Technology
NO
2 1995 C40   
24.2.1995
E.K.-K ? ? ? Greek Technology
and Constructions 
S.A.
Industry, Energy 
and Technology 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular ? U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Presidency&Industry, 
Energy and Technology
NO
3 1995 C40   
24.2.1995
A. G. ? ? ? Greek Technology
and Constructions 
S.A.
Industry, Energy 
and Technology 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular ? S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Presidency&Industry, 
Energy and Technology
NO
4 1995 C121   
8.6.1995
K. S-K. Regular B U.E. Administration-
Finance
General Navy 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Presidency&Defence
YES
5 1995 C121   
8.6.1995
E.T. Regular C U.E. Informatics General Navy 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular C U.E. Informatics Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Presidency&Defence
YES
6 1995 C121   
8.6.1995
S.P. Regular B S.E. Administration-
Accounting
General Navy 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular B S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Presidency&Defence
YES
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel
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7 1995 C137 
29.6.1995
A. D. Regular A ? Office of the 
Prosecutor of the 
Hellenic Supreme 
Court of Civil and 
Penal Law
Ministry of Justice Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular A ? Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Presidency&Justice
C.C. Since 
1998 
Councill
or of 
Asep 
(G. G. 
vol. C, 
no 20, 
9.02.19
98) 
Retime
nt from 
the 
Public 
Service
(G.G. 
vol. C, 
no 135, 
17.6.20
03) 
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Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
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nts from 
ASEP/New 
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nts in the 
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Sector
8 1995 C172 
17.8.1995
S. T. Regular B U.E. Administration-
Finance
Pension Fund of 
Motorists of the 
Prefecture of 
Serres 
Health, Welfare 
and Social 
Security
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Presidency&Health, 
Welfare and Social 
Security
YES                 
*
9 1996 C7 16.1.1996 G.B. Regular D C.E. Cleansing Ministry of 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation(
General 
Secretariat of 
Public 
Administration)
Ministry of 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation(
General 
Secretariat of 
Public 
Administration)
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular D C.E. Cleansing 
Personnel
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of Interior, 
Public Administration 
and Decentralisation
YES
10 1996 C41 29.2.1996 E.S. Regular B U.E. Administration Organisation for 
the Publishing of 
School Books
Mininstry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Education and 
Religious Affairs 
YES
11 1996 C97 16.5.1996 A. M. Regular C C.E. Caretaker General Army 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular C C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  
&Defence
YES
12 1996 C107 5.6.1996 S. G. Employee 
with 
mandate
? S.E. No Branch General 
Secretariat of the 
Cabinet
The Prime 
Minister
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular C S.E. Typists S.E. Computer 
Operators              
G.G. vol. 156, 
30.7.1997
Decision signed 
by the Prime 
Minister and the 
Minister of Interior 
Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation
General Secretariat of 
the Cabinet and 
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration 
and Decentralisation
NO
*8. Transfer to the Region of Central Macedonia (1999). Prefectural Councillor of Serres with the party of PASOK (2003-2010) Collaborator of two parliamentarians of Serres from the party of PASOK. General Secretary of the Municipality of Serres (January 2011). Source: Official Website of the Prefectural 
Self-Administration of Serres, available at: http://www.naserron.gr/epafes.php?id=1086&sub=show, date of access: 9.4.2011  
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13 1996 C108 5.6.1996 M. G. Employee 
with 
mandate
? S.E. No Branch General 
Secretariat of the 
Cabinet
The Prime 
Minister
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular C S.E. Typists S.E. Computer 
Operators              
G.G. vol. 156, 
30.7.1998
Decision signed 
by the Prime 
Minister and the 
Minister of Interior 
Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation
General Secretariat of 
the Cabinet (Prime 
Minister) and Ministry 
of the Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation
NO Transfer to 
the 
Prefecture 
of Fthiotida 
(Since 2011:
Region of 
Central 
Greece) 
Source: The 
Officila 
Website of 
the 
Prefecture 
of 
Phthiotida, 
available at: 
http://portal.
nafthiotidas.
gr/media/file
s/Topothetis
i_Ypallilon_
Perif_Sterea
s_se_Dief_
Perif_Enot_
Viotias.pdf, 
date of 
access: 
8.4.2011
14 1996 C252 
27.12.1996
M. L. Regular B U.E. Informatics Ministry of 
National Defence
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. Informatics Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  
&Defence
YES
15 1996 C252 
27.12.1996
M.-M.D. Regular B U.E. Administration Ministry of 
National Defence
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  
YES
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16 1996 C253 
27.12.1996
E. S. ? ? ? Greek Iron 
Mixtures S.A.
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
17 1996 C253 
27.12.1996
M. K. ? ? ? Greek Iron 
Mixtures S.A.
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular
D
S.E. Computer 
Programmers-
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development NO
18 1996 C253 
27.12.1996
E. P. Regular B U.E. Administration Ministry of Public 
Order
Ministry of Public 
Order
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular
B
U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Public Order YES
19 1996 253 
27.12.1996
A.  K. Regular C S.E. Administration National 
Intelligence 
Service 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation
Public 
Autonomous 
Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular C S.E. 
Administration 
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
NO Transfer to 
the Greek 
Parliament 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 136 
11.5.2004)
20 1997 C12 22.1.1997 S. A. ? ? ? Piraiki-Patraiki SA Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
21 1997 C12 22.1.1997 D. A. ? ? ? Greek Company 
of Industrial and 
Mining Activities 
SA (ELEVME)
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Programmers-
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
22 1997 C23 17.2.1997 K. D. Regular B U.E. Informatics Ministry of 
National Defence
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. Informatics Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
23 1997 C23 17.2.1997 S. P. Regular C U.E. Administration Ministry of 
National Defence
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular C U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
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24 1997 C69 1.4.1997 E. B. Regular A U.E. Administration-
Finance
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation
Public Service vacant chart 
position of 
Director at the 
Directorate A of 
ASEP
Regular A U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
YES  *  
25 1997 C86 23.4.1997 K. S. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
No 
grad
e
S.E. Administration Centre of 
Innovation SA 
(KEKA)
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal position 
beyond  the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG S.E. 
Administration 
Regular. 
Grade C 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 48, 
6.3.2000)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO Retirement 
from the 
service 
(31.12.2008
) G.G. vol. 
C, no 7, 
7.1.2009)
26 1997 C87 23.4.1997 K. P. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
No 
grad
e
S.E. Administration Centre of 
Innovation SA 
(KEKA)
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal position 
beyond the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
27 1997 C133 2.7.1997 G. L. ? ? ? Computer Centre 
for Social 
Services
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. Informatics Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Services
NO
28 1997 C133 2.7.1997 N. M. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? ? Shipyards of 
Elefsina SA
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal position 
beyond the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG S.E. 
Administration 
Regular 
Grade B 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 48, 
6.3.2000)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
29 1997 C133 2.7.1997 I. T. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? ? Shipyards of 
Elefsina SA
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal position 
beyond the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Regular 
Grade B 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 48, 
6.3.2000)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
* 24 Member of the Working Group constituted at the Ministry of the Presidency of the Government on the elaboration of a Report on the Reform and Modernisation of Public Administration published in 1990 Source: Makrydimitris A., Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) Reports of Experts on Public Administration, 
Papazisis Editions, Athens 2000)Source: Makrydimitris A., Michalopoulos, N, (ed.) Reports of Experts on Public Administration, Papazisis Editions, Athens 2000)
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30 1997 C133 2.7.1997 G. L. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? ? Shipyards of 
Elefsina SA
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal position 
beyond the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG S.E. 
Administration 
Regular. 
Grade B 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 48, 
6.3.2000)
S.E. Computer 
Programmers 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
135, 17.6.2003)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
31 1997 C133 2.7.1997 V. M. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? ? Shipyards of 
Elefsina SA
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal position 
beyond the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG S.E. 
Administration T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting (G.G. 
vol. C, no 133, 
12.5.2000
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
32 1997 C143 
11.7.1997
E. L. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? ? Shipyards of 
Elefsina SA
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal position 
beyond the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG ? Regular. S.E. 
Administratio
n ,                   
Grade C         
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 48, 
6.3.2000)       
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
33 1997 C166 
14.8.1997
A. V. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? ? Foundation of 
Mediterranean 
Studies 
Ministry of Culture Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. Informatics Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Culture
NO Transfer to 
the Ministry 
of Economy 
and Finance 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 296, 
29.12.2003)
34 1998 C5 15.1.1998 G. B. ? ? U.E. Graduate of 
the Panteion 
University School of 
Social and Political 
Sciences
Ministry of 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation
Ministry of 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular ? U.E. 
Administration
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of Interior, 
Public Administration 
and Decentralisation
C.C. Appointed in 
the Public 
Primary 
Education 
G.G. vol. C, 
no 191, 
20.9.1999 
35 1998 C16 30.1.1998 C. V. Regular D C.E. Worker General Army 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular D C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
C.C.
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S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
36 1998 C16 30.1.1998 I. G. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
No 
grad
e
C.E. Worker of 
General Duties
General Army 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular E C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
NO
37 1998 C16 30.1.1998 S. B. Regular A U.E. 9 
Managemement
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular A U.E. 
Administration
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Agriculture
YES
38 1998 C22 10.2.1998 E. P. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
No 
grad
e
C.E. Cleansing Organisation of 
the Central 
Market of Athens 
(OKAA)
Ministry of 
Development - 
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular E C.E. Cleansing 
Personnel
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Agriculture & 
Development
NO
39 1998 C28 16.2.1998 I. M. ? ? ? Hellenic 
Organisation of 
Small and 
Medium 
Enterprises and 
Handicraft 
(EOMMEX)
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
40 1998 C33 24.2.1998 P.G. Regular B ? General Army 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
41 1998 C33 24.2.1998 A. T. Regular B ? General Army 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
42 1998 C33 24.2.1998 S. M. Regular B ? General Army 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
43 1998 C33 24.2.1998 A. V. Regular A ? General Army 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular A U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
621
S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
44 1998 C33 24.2.1998 E. L. Regular B ? General Navy 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
45 1998 C39 3.3.1998 G. K. Regular B T.E. Administration-
Accounting 
General Air Force 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular B T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
46 1998 C39 3.3.1998 N. A. Regular B T.E. Administration-
Accounting 
General Air Force 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular B T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
47 1998 C42 5.3.1998 L. F.-P. ? ? ? Foundation of 
Mediterranean 
Studies 
Ministry of 
Finance
Public benefit non-
profit foundation
vacant chart 
position
Regular D T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence & Culture
NO
48 1998 C42 5.3.1998 K. T. ? ? ? General Mining 
and Metallurgical 
Company SA 
(LARKO)  
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
49 1998 C42 5.3.1998 I. P. ? ? ? Athens Paper Mill 
SA
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
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S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
50 1998 C42 5.3.1998 A.  B. ? ? ? Athens Paper Mill 
SA
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO Secondment
to the 
Political 
Bureau of 
the Minister 
of Finance 
and 
Economicss
tarting from 
11.2.2002 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 35, 
13.2.2002) 
Renewal of 
the 
secondment 
starting from 
29.12.2003 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 5, 
13.1.2004) 
Transfer to 
the Ministry 
of Economy 
and Finance 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 296, 
29.12.2003)
51 1998 C42 5.3.1998 N. L. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
private  law legal 
entity (public 
benefit non-profit 
foundation)
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
623
S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
52 1998 C43 5.3.1998 V. M. Regular A U.E. Administration-
Finance
Army Pension 
Fund
Ministry of 
Defence
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular A U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
53 1998 C43 5.3.1998 D. S. Regular B U.E. Administration-
Finance
Band Staff of the 
Minister of 
Defence 
(EPYETHA)
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
54 1998 C43 5.3.1998 M. K. Regular B U.E. Administration-
Finance
General Air Force 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
55 1998 C43 5.3.1998 K. M. Regular B U.E. Administration-
Finance
General Air Force 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Defence
YES
56 1998 C51 13.3.1998 D. T. ? ? ? Tzaneio Regional 
General Hospital 
of Piraeus
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular C S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
C.C.
57 1998 C51 13.3.1998 G. A. ? ? ? Third Athens 
Hospital of 
Chronic Diseases 
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
C.C.
58 1998 67 9.4.1998 A. F. ? ? ? Public Power 
Enterprise 
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
59 1998 C67 9.4.1998 M. A. ? ? ? Athens Paper Mill 
SA
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists - 
Word 
Processing 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
60 1998 C67 9.4.1998 M.  A. ? ? ? Public Power 
Enterprise SA
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
624
S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
61 1998 C67 9.4.1998 D. M. ? ? ? Organisation for 
the Economic 
Reconstruction of 
Enterprises SA
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists - 
Word 
Processing 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
62 1998 C67 9.4.1998 E. L. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Ministry of 
Development
Ministry of 
Development
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
YES Secondment
to the Office 
of 
Organisatio
n and 
Managemen
et of the 
Prime 
Minister 
(1998-2003) 
(G.G. vol. 
74, 
23.4.1998) 
Secondment
to the 
General 
Secretariat 
of the 
Cabinet as 
Special 
Collaborator 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 77, 
31.3.2003) 
Revocation 
of the 
secondment 
by the new 
Prime 
Minister K. 
Karamanlis 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 73, 
17.3.2004)
625
S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
63 1998 C72 23.4.1998 E. C. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists - 
Word 
Processing 
U.E Management-
Economics (G.G. 
vol. C, no 986, 
10.12.2009)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
64 1998 C72 23.4.1998 Z. P. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists - 
Word 
Processing 
S.E. Computer 
Operators (G.G. 
vol. C, no 219, 
20.8.2004)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
65 1998 C72 23.4.1998 N. P. ? ? ? Company for 
Agricultural 
Development 
"Evritania SA"
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Agriculture
NO
66 1998 C87 15.5.1998 D. K. ? ? ? Foundation of 
Social Work
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public benefit non-
profit foundation 
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
NO
67 1998 C90 19.5.1998 N. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Regional General 
Hospital  for 
Thoracic (Chest) 
Diseases "The 
Salvation" 
(Sotiria)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
YES
68 1998   C106 
11.6.1998
M. S. ? ? ? Court of First 
Instance of 
Athens
Ministry of Justice Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular A U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Justice
C.C.
626
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No of issue-
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G
r
a
d
e
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Organisational 
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Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
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New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
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Type of transfer 
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Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
69 1998 C116 
24.6.1998
A. S. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
No 
grad
e
? Hellenic 
Shipyards SA
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal position 
beyond the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG ? Regular. S.E. 
Administratio
n , Grade B 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 48, 
6.3.2000)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
70 1998 C116 
24.6.1998
P. A. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
No 
grad
e
? Hellenic 
Shipyards SA
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal position 
beyond the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG ? Regular, S.E. 
Administratio
n                     
Grade B         
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 48, 
6.3.2000)       
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
71 1999 C103 
17.5.1999
A. T. ? ? ? Greek Arms 
Industry SA
Ministry of 
Defence
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Programmers
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
72 1999 C103 
17.5.1999
M. V. ? ? ? Computer Centre 
for Social 
Services
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
73 1999 C115 7.6.1999 C. K. ? ? ? ETHNODATA SA Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Programmers
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
NO
74 1999 C115 7.6.2000 K. D. ? ? ? Centre for 
Infectious 
Diseases Control 
(KEELPNO)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
NO
75 1999 C122 
15.6.1999
K. T. ? ? ? Company for 
Agricultural 
Development 
"Evritania SA"
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Agriculture
NO
76 1999 C122 
15.6.1999
I. C. ? ? ? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular C T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
C.C.
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Sector
77 1999 C122 
15.6.1999
C. M. ? ? ? Ministry of Culture Ministry of Culture Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular C T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Culture
C.C.
78 1999 C125 
21.6.1999
E. Z. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
private  law legal 
entity (public 
benefit non-profit 
foundation)
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
79 1999 C125 
21.6.1999 
Corrected G.G:
140, 8.7.1999
A. M. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
private  law legal 
entity (public 
benefit non-profit 
foundation)
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
80 1999 C125 
21.6.1999 
Corrected: 
140, 8.7.1999
K. P. ? ? ? Export Credit 
Insurance 
Organisation 
Ministry of 
Finance
Private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Economy
NO
81 1999 C125 
21.6.1999
A. P. Regular The 
grad
e  
pos
ses
sed
? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
YES
82 1999 C125 
21.6.1999
G. V. Regular The 
grad
e  
pos
ses
sed
? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
YES
628
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83 1999 C125 
21.6.1999
I. L. Regular  The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
YES
84 1999 C125 
21.6.1999
K. M. Regular The 
grad
e 
they 
pos
ses
s
? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
YES
85 1999 C125 
21.6.1999
E. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
YES
86 1999 C125 
21.6.1999
C. T. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
YES
87 1999 C125 
21.6.1999
E. D. ? ? ? Organisation 
Against Drugs
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
NO
88 1999 C134 1.7.1999 G. P. ? ? ? Greek Radio and 
Television SA
Ministry of Press 
and Mass Media
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Press and Mass Media
NO
89 1999 C134 1.7.1999 M. P. ? ? ? Greek Post S.A. Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
629
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90 1999 C134 1.7.1999 E. P. ? ? ? Hellenic 
Railways 
Organisation SA
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
91 1999 C134 1.7.1999 M. S. ? Gra
de 
pos
ses
sed 
? Piraeus Port 
Authority 
Ministry of 
Commercial 
Shipping
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Commercial 
Maritime/Shipping
C.C.
92 1999 C134 1.7.1999 C. K.- T. ? ? ? Olympic Airways 
SA
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
93 1999 C134 1.7.1999 D. L. ? ? ? Greek Salt Pits 
SA
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
94 1999 C145 
15.7.1999
D. G. ? ? ? Greek Arms 
Industry SA
Ministry of 
Defence
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Defence
NO
95 1999 C145 
15.7.1999
O.  N. ? ? ? Greek Salt Pits 
SA
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
96 1999 C153 
27.7.1999
I. B. ? ? ? Greek Arms 
Industry SA
Ministry of 
Defence
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Defence
NO
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97 1999 C153 
27.7.1999
M. P. ? ? ? Athens Hospital 
of Chronic 
Diseases for 
Children
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular C S.E. Typists Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
C.C.
98 1999 C183 6.9.1999 A. D. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
private  law legal 
entity (public 
benefit non-profit 
foundation)
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
99 1999 C183 6.9.1999 E. F. ? ? ? General Mining 
and Metallurgical 
Company SA 
(LARKO)  
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
100 1999 C199 
4.10.1999
M. K. ? ? ? Organisation of 
the Central 
Market of Athens 
(OKAA)
Ministry of 
Development - 
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular C S.E. Typists U.E. 
Administration-
Finance (G.G. 
vol. C, no 160, 
11.6.2004)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Agriculture & 
Development & 
Finance
NO
101 1999 C199 
4.10.1999
K. A. ? The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
Regular? Organisation of 
the Central 
Market of Athens 
(OKAA)
Ministry of 
Development - 
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Agriculture & 
Development & 
Finance
C.C.
102 1999 C215 
27.10.1999
G. B. ? ? ? National 
Statistical Service 
of Greece
Ministry of 
Finance
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Finance
C.C.
103 1999 C252 
15.12.1999
O. A. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? General Air Force 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Defence
YES
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transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
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104 2000 C20 3.2.2000 A. D. ? ? ? State Nursery 
Station of 
Rethymnon  
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
C.C. Transfer to 
the Region 
of Epirus 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 45, 
4.3.2003)
105 2000 C159 6.6.2000 V. R. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Court of First 
Instance of 
Thessaloniki 
Ministry of Justice Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Justice
C.C.
106 2000 C159 6.6.2000 G. T. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Court of First 
Instance of 
Athens
Ministry of Justice Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Justice
C.C.
107 2000 C183 
27.6.2000
M. F. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? General Navy 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Defence
YES Transfer to 
the General 
Accounting 
Office of the 
State 
(Ministry of 
Economy 
and Finance 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 10, 
16.1.2004)
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108 2000 C297 
20.10.2000 
M. C. ? ? ? Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
C.C. Revocation 
of the 
appointment
. Decision 
17 of ASEP 
in Plenum  
Source: 
Annual 
Report of 
ASEP for 
the year 
2001 (G.G. 
vol. B, no 
1427, 
13.11.2002)
109 2000 C360 
29.12.2000
M. K. ? ? ? Agricultural 
Insurance 
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Agriculture
NO Submission 
of 
resignation: 
2.5.2008 
(G.G. vol. C. 
no 528, 
5.6.2008)
110 2000 C86 20.3.2001 G. K. ? ? ? Centre for 
Infectious 
Diseases Control 
(KEELPNO)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
NO
111 2001 C77 9.3.2001 K. A. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
private  law legal 
entity (public 
benefit non-profit 
foundation)
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
633
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112 2001 C77 9.3.2001 M. D. Regular Gra
de 
pos
ses
sed 
? Court of First 
Instance of 
Athens
Ministry of Justice Autonomous 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Justice
C.C.
113 2001 C143 
24/5/2001
D. S. ? ? ? Athens Paper Mill 
SA
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D T.E. Informatics 
(Hardware)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
114 2001 C146 
30.5.2001 
Corrected: 
G.G. C172, 
29.6.2001
D. D. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Postal Savings Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Decentralised 
Public Service
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
YES
115 2001 C146 
30.5.2001 
E. C. ? ? ? Export Credit 
Insurance 
Organisation 
Ministry of 
Finance
Private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Economy
NO
116 2001 C146 
30.5.2002
K. T. ? ? ? Export Credit 
Insurance 
Organisation 
Ministry of 
Finance
Private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Economy
NO
117 2001 C259 
22.10.2001
D.  R. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Hellenic Centre 
for Marine 
Research
Ministry of 
Development
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Typists Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
YES
118 2001 C262  
22.10.2001
M.  V. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Typists Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Secutiry
YES
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119 2001 C262  
22.10.2001 
Corrected:GG, 
C292, 
26.11.2001
G. C. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? ? Greek National 
Tourism 
Organisation 
(EOT-GNTO)
Ministry of  
Finance
Public law legal 
entity
Personal position 
beyond the chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
NG C.E. Caretakers Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development & 
Economics
C.C.
120 2001 C305 
10.12.2001
E. G. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Private  law legal 
entity (public 
benefit non-profit 
foundation)
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists S.E. Computer 
Operators (G.G. 
vol. C, no 219, 
20.8.2004)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
121 2001 C314 
14.12.2001
C. P. ? ? ? General Mining 
and Metallurgical 
Company SA 
(LARKO)  
Ministry of 
Development
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists S.E. Computer 
Operators (G.G. 
vol. C, no 219, 
20.8.2004)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development
NO
122 2001 C314 
14.12.2001
T. P. ? ? ? PINDOS SA Ministry of 
Agriculture
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Agriculture
NO
123 2001 C314 
14.12.2001
A. K. ? ? ? Olympic Airways 
SA
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists S.E. Computer 
Operators (G.G. 
vol. C, no 219, 
20.8.2004)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
124 2001 C314 
14.12.2001
S. G. ? ? ? Centre for 
Vocational 
Training and 
Research of the 
Prefecture of 
Magnesia 
Ministry of 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists U.E. 
Administration-
Finance (G.G. 
vol. C, no 158, 
11.6.2006)
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
NO
635
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125 2002 C22 31.1.2002 E. M. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Organisation of 
the Central 
Market of Athens 
(OKAA)
Ministry of 
Development - 
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Typists S.E. 
Administration  
(G.G. vol. C, 
no160, 11.6.2004)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Agriculture & 
Development & 
Finance
C.C. Retirement 
from the 
service 
(31.12.2008
) G.G. vol. 
C, no 7, 
7.1.2009)
126 2002 C75 13.3.2002 I. B. Regular  The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Ministry of 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation
Ministry of 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Drivers S.E. 
Administratio
n , with the 
duty to 
receive the 
public (G.G. 
vol. C, no 10, 
16.1.2004)
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
YES
127 2002 C75 13.3.2002 M. G. ? ? ? Prefecture of 
Athens
Ministry of 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. 
Administration 
U.E. 
Administration-
Finance (G.G. 
vol. C, no 158, 
11.6.2006)
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
128 2002 C79 21.3.2002 A. N-A. ? ? ? Traders' 
Insurance Fund
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular A S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Secutiry
C.C.
129 2002 C80 21.3.2002 M.  L. ? ? ? Economic and 
Social Committee
Ministry of 
Finance
Private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. 
Administration 
U.E. 
Administration-
Finance (G.G. 
vol. C, no 988, 
29.11.2007)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Economy and 
Finance
NO
130 2002 C80 21.3.2002 P. O. ? ? ? National Youth 
Foundation 
Ministry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
Private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Education and 
Religious Affairs
NO
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131 2002 C92 5.4.2002 G. C-A. ? ? ? Hellenic 
Aerospace 
Industry SA
Ministry of  
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. 
Administration 
U.E. 
Administration-
Finance (G.G. 
vol. C, no 117, 
1.3.2007)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Economy and 
Finance
NO
132 2002 C93 10.4.2002 E. R. ? ? ? Greek Post S.A. Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
133 2002 C119 
17.5.2002
A. G. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
private  law legal 
entity (public 
benefit non-profit 
foundation)
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
134 2002 C119 
17.5.2002
E. P. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Anonymous 
Company for the 
Exploitation and 
Management of 
Greek Highways 
(TEO SA)
Ministry of 
Environment, 
Planning and, 
Public Works
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Environment, Planning, 
and Public Works
C.C.
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135 2002 C119 
17.5.2002
K.  K. ? ? ? Athens Business 
Chamber 
Ministry of 
Development
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular A U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Environment, Planning, 
and Public Works
C.C. Transfer to 
the Office of 
the 
Directorate 
of 
Secondary 
Education of 
the island of 
Lesvos 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 181, 
7.7.2004)
136 2002 C119 
17.5.2002
D. S. Regular  The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Municipality of 
Loutropolis (island
of Lesvos)
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  & 
Environment, Planning, 
and Public Works
C.C.
137 2002 C119 
17.5.2002
E. K. ? ? ? National Youth 
Foundation 
Ministry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Education and 
Religious Affairs
NO
138 2002 C124 
29.5.2002
F. M. ? ? ? Ministry of Public 
Order
Ministry of Public 
Order
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular B S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Public Order
C.C.
139 2002 C129 5.6.2002 
Corrected: 
C160, 
15.7.2002
I. T. ? ? ? Organisation 
Against Drugs 
(OKANA)
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare
Private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular E C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
S.E. 
Administration  
(G.G. vol. C, 
no160, 11.6.2004)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Health and Welfare
NO
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140 2002 C129 5.6.2002 D. P. ? ? ? Greek Post S.A. 
(ELTA)
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
141 2002 C142 
21.6.2002
E. G. ? ? ? National 
Statistical Service 
of Greece
Ministry of 
Finance
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular C S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Economy and Finance
C.C.
142 2002 C143 
21.6.2002
T. K. ? ? ? Traders' 
Insurance Fund
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular A U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Security
C.C.
143 2002 C143 
21.6.2002
A. M. ? ? ? Computer Centre 
for Social 
Services
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Secutiry
NO
144 2002 C143 
21.6.2002
B. X. ? ? ? Computer Centre 
for Social 
Services
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
NO
145 2002 C143 
21.6.2002
M. O. ? ? ? Computer Centre 
for Social 
Services
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Secutiry
NO
146 2002 C143 
21.6.2002
E. L.-K. ? ? ? Computer Centre 
for Social 
Services
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Secutiry
NO
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147 2002 C143 
21.6.2002
M. P. ? ? ? Computer Centre 
for Social 
Services
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Secutiry
NO
148 2002 C143 
21.6.2002
E. D. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Insurance Fund of 
Professionals and 
Craftsmen 
(TEVE)
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Secutiry
YES
149 2002 C166 
18.7.2002 
Corrected: 
G.G.175, 
2.8.2002
A. A. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
Hellenic 
Competition 
Commission
Ministry of 
Development
Independent 
Authority 
(autonomous 
public service)
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development 
YES
150 2002 C166 
18.7.2002 
Corrected: 
G.G.175, 
2.8.2002
G. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
Hellenic 
Competition 
Commission
Ministry of 
Development
Independent 
Authority 
(autonomous 
public service)
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Development 
YES
151 2002 C166 
18.7.2002
A. G. ? ? ? Olympic Airways 
SA
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
152 2002 C166 
18.7.2002
I. G. ? ? ? Olympic Catering 
SA
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular E C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
S.E. 
Administration  
(G.G. vol. C, 
no160, 11.6.2004)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
153 2002 V. T. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? National Centre of 
Public 
Administration 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
YES
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transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
154 2002 C236 
16.10.2002
N. D. ? ? ? Greek Post S.A. 
(ELTA)
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular E C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
S.E Management 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
169, 11.6.2004) 
U.E. 
Administration-
Finance (G.G. 
vol. C, no 1150, 
23.12.2008)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
155 2003 C3 10.1.2003 D. N. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Prefectural Self-
Administration of 
Athens-Piraeus, 
Prefectural 
Department of 
Piraeus
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity 
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Computer 
Programmers
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
156 2003 C3 13.1.2003 S. L. ? ? ? Insurance Fund of 
Professionals and 
Craftsmen 
(TEVE)
Ministry of Labor 
and Social 
Security
Public law legal 
entity 
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Computer 
Programmers
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Secutiry
C.C.
157 2003 C37 21.2.2003 A. S. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
U.E. Administration -
Commercial
Ministry of 
Development 
(General 
Secretariat of 
Commerce) 
Ministry of 
Development 
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Labor and Social 
Secutiry
YES
158 2003 C40   
27.2.2003
D. I. ? ? ? National 
Foundation of 
Overseas 
Reception and 
Rehabilitation for 
Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
private  law legal 
entity (public 
benefit non-profit 
foundation)
vacant chart 
position
Regular C S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Foreign Affairs
NO
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159 2003 C51   
27.2.2003
G. K. ? ? ? National Youth 
Foundation 
Ministry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
Private  law 
legal entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular C ? U.E. 
Administratio
n-Finance 
G.G. vol. 
YODD, no 
24, 27.1.2009
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Education and 
Religious Affairs
NO
160 2003 C56   
11.3.2003
E.T. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
S.E. Administration-
Accounting
General Army 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Defence
YES
161 2003 C56   
11.3.2003
E. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
S.E. Typists General Army 
Staff
Ministry of 
Defence
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Typists Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Defence
YES
162 2003 C56   
11.3.2003
E. P. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
S.E. Administration-
Accounting
National 
Statistical Service 
of Greece
Ministry of 
Finance
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Economy and Finance
YES
163 2003 C56   
11.3.2003
M. M. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
T.E. Other 
Specialties
National 
Statistical Service 
of Greece
Ministry of 
Finance
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Economy and Finance
YES
164 2003 C56   
11.3.2003
E. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
S.E. Administration-
Accounting
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Economy and 
Agriculture
YES
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165 2003 C70   
21.3.2003
S. F. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Prefectural Self-
Administration of 
Thessaloniki
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
166 2003 C96 24.4.2003 A. A. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Army Pension 
Fund
Ministry of 
Defence
Public law legal 
entity 
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Defence
YES
167 2004 C160 
11.6.2004
M.  V. ? ? Computer 
Operators
Computer Centre 
for Social 
Services
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Private law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular B S.E. Computer 
Operators
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Employment and Social
Protection
NO
168 2004 C160 
11.6.2004
O. K. ? ? S.E. Greek Post S.A. 
(ELTA)
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular B S.E. 
Administration 
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
169 2005 C22 3.2.2005 K. G. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Prefecture of 
Piraeus
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP T.E. Informatics Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
170 2005 C30 14.2.2005 S.-A.M. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Municipality of 
Egaleo 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity 
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. Informatics Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
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S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
171 2005 C40 3.2.2005 M. T. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Ministry of the 
Interior (General 
Secretariat of 
Public 
Administration)
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
YES
172 2005 C40 3.2.2005 G. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Municipality 
Pylareon of the 
island of 
Kefallonia
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
173 2005 C89 5.4.2005 A. P. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? General Hospital 
"Evangelismos"
Ministry of Health 
and Solidarity
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Health and Solidarity  
YES
174 2005 C89 5.4.2005 I. S. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Ministry of Public 
Order
Ministry of Public 
Order
Public Service vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Public Order
YES
175 2005 C110 4.5.2005 A. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Traders' 
Insurance Fund
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Employment and Social
Protection
YES
176 2005 C110 4.5.2005 I. G. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Supplementary/A
uxiliary Security 
Fund for 
Employees of 
Pharmaceutical 
Operations
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Employment and Social
Protection
YES
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S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
177 2005 C110 4.5.2005 F. P. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Insurance Fund of 
Professionals and 
Craftsmen 
(TEVE)
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
In Service 
Transfer: Change 
of Category and 
Branch: S.E. 
Administration  
(G.G. vol. C, no 
324, 6.12.2005)
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Employment Social 
Protection
YES
178 2005 C110 4.5.2005 K. G. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
C.E. Water 
Workers
Municipality of 
Agii Theodori 
(Prefecture of 
Corinth)
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity 
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
179 2005 C110 4.5.2005 I. G. ? ? C.E. Cleansing 
Workers
Municipality of 
Athens
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity 
vacant chart 
position
Regular D C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
180 2005 C110 4.5.2005 C. T. ? ? C.E. Cleansing 
Workers
Municipality of 
Elliniko
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity 
vacant chart 
position
Regular E C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
In Service 
Transfer: Change 
of Category and 
Branch: S.E. 
Administration  
(G.G. vol. C, no 
1199, 17.12.2010)
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
181 2005 C159 1.7.2005 D. F. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Prefectural Self-
Administration of 
Kefallonia-Ithaka
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, 
and 
Decentralisation  
Public law legal 
entity 
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. Informatics Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
C.C.
182 2005 C254 
27.9.2005
E. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission 
Ministry of 
Finance
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation  
YES REVOCATI
ON
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S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
183 2005 C254 
27.9.2005
I. E. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? U.E. Olympic Airways 
SA
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Transport and 
Communications 
NO REVOCATI
ON of 
Appointment
, (G.G. vol. 
300, 
15.11.2005)
184 2005 C254 
27.9.2005
I. T. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? U.E. Olympic Aviation 
SA
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Transport and 
Communications 
NO
185 2005 C254 
27.9.2005
E. P. ? ? ? Olympic Airways 
Services  SA
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D S.E. Typists Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Transport and 
Communications 
NO
186 2005 C254 
27.9.2005
D. Z. ? ? U.E. Thermal Bus 
Company/SA 
(ETHEL)
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. Informatics Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Transport and 
Communications 
NO
187 2005 C270 
12.10.2005
A. A. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? U.E. Technological 
Educational 
Foundation of 
Athens (TEI)
Ministry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular B U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
NO
188 2005 C285 
27.10.2005
G. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Hellenic 
Telecommunicatio
ns and Post 
Commission
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Independent 
Authority 
(autonomous 
public service)
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Transport and 
Communications
YES
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S.N. Year Government 
Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category and 
Branch
Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status of 
the Agency
Position in the 
Organisational 
Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
Category amd  
Branch
New 
Working 
Status (after 
legislative 
regulation)
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty
Type of transfer 
decision
Competent Public 
Bodies for the 
transfer
Legalit
y of 
the 
transfe
r
Partici
pation 
in 
Commi
tees in 
the 
Public 
Sector
Transfers, 
Secondme
nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
189 2005 C285 
27.10.2005
E. B. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP S.E. Typists Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Employment and Social
Protection
YES
190 2005 C285 
27.10.2005
E. A. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? U.E. Organisation for 
the Payment and 
Control of 
Community Aid, 
Orientation and 
Guarantees 
(OPEKEPE)
Ministry of Rural 
Development and 
Food
Private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Rural Development and
Food
NO
191 2005 C285 
27.10.2005
A. C. ? ? ? Greek Company 
of Industrial and 
Mining Activities 
SA (ELEVME)
Ministry of 
Finance
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular E C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Economics and 
Finance
NO
192 2005 C326 
14.12.2005
E. Y. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Traders' 
Insurance Fund 
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Employment and Social
Protection
YES
193 2005 C337 
23.12.2005
M.  P. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Welfare Fund of 
Public Works 
Contractors
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministry of the Interior, 
Public Administration, 
and Decentralisation & 
Employment and Social
Protection
YES
194 2005 C347 
30.12.2005
S. D. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? ? Anonymous 
Company for the 
Exploitation and 
Management of 
Greek Highways 
(TEO SA)
Ministry of 
Environment, 
Planning and, 
Public Works
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Environment, Planning, 
and Public Works
NO
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Gazette, Vol, 
No of issue-
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Initials of the 
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Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e
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Releasing 
Agency
Supervising 
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Legal Status of 
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Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
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pation 
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Transfers, 
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nts from 
ASEP/New 
Appointme
nts in the 
Public 
Sector
195 2005 C347 
30.12.2005
T. K. Regular? C U.E. Administration-
Finance
Anonymous 
Company for the 
Exploitation and 
Management of 
Greek Highways 
(TEO SA)
Ministry of 
Environment, 
Planning and, 
Public Works
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
vacant chart 
position
Regular C U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Environment, Planning, 
and Public Works
C.C.
196 2005 C347 
30.12.2005
M-E. M. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Traders' 
Insurance Fund
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. Informatics Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Employment and Social
Protection
YES
197 2005 C347 
30.12.2005
P. K. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Civil Servants' 
Welfare Fund
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP T.E. Informatics Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Employment and Social
Protection
YES
198 2005 C347 
30.12.2005
G. P. Regular The 
grad
e 
pos
ses
sed
? Foundation of 
Social Security 
(IKA)
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Protection
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Employment and Social
Protection
YES
199 2005 C347 
30.12.2005
M. Z. Term of 
Office 
(Private Law 
of Indefinite 
Time)
? U.E. Greek Agricultural 
Insurance 
Organisation
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Private  law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
Employment and Social
Protection
NO
200 2007 C1072 
24.12.2007
E.K. Regular Gra
de 
pos
ses
sed 
? Athens School of 
Fine Arts
Ministry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
Public law legal 
entity
vacant chart 
position
Regular GP U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Joint Ministerial 
Decision
Ministries of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration, and 
Decentralisation  & 
National Education and 
Religious Affairs
YES
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APPENDIX 1, Table 2
S.N. YEAR Government Gazette, 
Vol, No of issue-Date
Initials of the Name-
Surname
Working 
Status
Category- Branch G
r
a
d
e Public 
Announce
ment
New 
Appointment/ 
Transfer
In Service 
Transfer
Previous 
position
1 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 M. A. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D no 1/2003 
(G.G. vol. 
ASEP, no 
532, 
17.10.2003
2 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 O. V. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
3 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 L. A. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
Secondment to 
the National 
Statistical 
Service of  
Greece (2008-), 
Source: 
Diavgeia, 
available at: 
static.diavgeia.g
ov.gr/doc/4ΑΓΞ6
ΣΙ-Υ, date of 
access: 
12.4.2011
4 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 K. I. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
5 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 P. K. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
6 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 E. L. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
7 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 A. S. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
8 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 K. K. Regular T.E. Management-
Accounting
D Ann. 
1/2003
9 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 S. K. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
10 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 A.  K. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
11 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 M. K. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
12 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 P. K. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
13 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 E.-A. V. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
Ipso iure 
termination of 
the employment 
relationship 
since she was 
appointed 
member of the 
Expert Scientific 
Staff of ASEP 
(G.G. vol. C. no 
951, 
15.10.2008)
14 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 P. D. Regular T.E. Informatics D Ann. 
1/2003
15 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 K.  N. Regular U.E. Informatics D Ann. 
1/2003
16 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 T. S. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2005
17 2004 C180, 6.7.2004 M. Z. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
18 2004 C207, 6.7.2004 A. X. Regular T.E. Administration-
Accounting
D Ann. 
1/2003
19 2004 C207, 6.7.2004 E. B. Regular T.E. Administration-
Accounting
D Ann. 
1/2003
Database on the Directly Hired Administrative Personnel
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel
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S.N. YEAR Government Gazette, 
Vol, No of issue-Date
Initials of the Name-
Surname
Working 
Status
Category- Specialty 
Branch
G
r
a
d
e
Public 
Announce
ment
New 
Appointment/ 
Transfer
In Service 
Transfer
Previous 
position
20 2004 C207, 6.7.2004 C.-K. K. Regular S.E. Typists D Ann. 
1/2003
U.E. 
Administration-
Finance (G.G. 
vol. C, no 291, 
27.4.2009)
Revocable 
employee 
to the 
Political 
Office of 
the Deputy 
Minister of 
National 
Education 
and 
Religious 
Affairs 
(G.G. vol. 
C, no 46, 
6.3.2000) 
21 2004 C207, 6.7.2004 A. K. Regular S.E. Typists D Ann. 
1/2003
22 2004 C280, 15.10.2004 A. L. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
1/2003
23 2004 C330, 17.12.2004 I. D. Regular U.E. Informatics D Ann. 
1/2003
24 2007 C862, 30.10.2007 T. A. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
13/2006
25 2007 C862, 30.10.2007 A. M. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
13/2006
26 2007 C862, 30.10.2007 I. P. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
13/2006
27 2007 C862, 30.10.2007 A. S. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
13/2006
28 2007 C862, 30.10.2007 L. S. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
13/2006
29 2007 C862, 30.10.2007 N. P. Regular U.E. Informatics D Ann. 
13/2006
30 2007 C862, 30.10.2007 E. L. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
13/2006
31 2007 C862, 30.10.2007 A. C. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
13/2006
32 2007 C1072, 24.12.2007 P. Z. Regular U.E. Informatics D Ann. 
13/2006
33 2008 C28, 16.1.2008 I. K. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
13/2006
34 2008 C209, 5.3.2008 G. S. Regular U.E. Informatics D Ann. 
13/2006
35 2009 C1069, 31.12.2009 S. P. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
11/2008
36 2009 C1069, 31.12.2009 M. P. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
11/2008
37 2009 C1069, 31.12.2009 E. G. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
11/2008
38 2009 C1069, 31.12.2009 K. T. Regular U.E. Administration-Finance D Ann. 
11/2008
39 2009 C1069, 31.12.2009 A. P. Regular S.E. Management D Ann. 
11/2008
Resigned 
from her 
position at 
the Athens 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
and 
Industry 
G.G. vol. C, 
no 127, 
23.2.2010)
40 2009 C1069, 31.12.2009 K. A. Regular S.E. Management D Ann. 
11/2008
41 2009 C1069, 31.12.2009 E. C. Regular S.E. Management D Ann. 
11/2008
42 2010 C1199, 17.12.2010 P. K. Regular S.E. Management D Ann. 
11/2008
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APPENDIX 1-Table 3
S.N. YEAR Vol, No of issue-Date Inititals of the 
Name-Surname
Working Status Category- Specialty 
Branch
Level of 
education
G
r
a
d
e Public 
Announce
ment
Previous/Parallel position(s)-appointments in the public/private 
sector/Professional Status
NGOs Resignation/Revoc
ation of the 
Appointment/New 
Appointment
1 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 E. A. Regular Administrative Law ? Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Member of the Thessaloniki Bar Association, Source: Official Website of 
the Thessaloniki Bar Association, available at: 
http://www.dsth.gr/web/guest/members-
phonebook?p_p_id=PA_CONTACTS&p_p_action=1&p_p_state=normal&p
_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-
2&p_p_col_pos=2&p_p_col_count=3&_PA_CONTACTS_struts_action=%2
Fext%2Fparties%2Fcontacts%2Fsearch&p_p_action=1&_PA_CONTACTS
_search=true&_PA_CONTACTS_name=%CE%91*&_PA_CONTACTS_d-
49489-s=5&_PA_CONTACTS_alphabet=true&_PA_CONTACTS_d-49489-
p=17&_PA_CONTACTS_d-49489-o=2#, date of access: 15.3.2011
2 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 E.-A. V. Regular Business 
Administration
PhD, Source: 
Official Website 
of the  National 
Documentation 
Centre, National 
Archive of PhD 
Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.
ekt.gr/eadd/bro
wse?type=autho
r&order=DESC&
rpp=20&value=
%CE%92%CE%
B1%CF%83%C
F%83%CE%AC
%CE%BB%CE
%BF%CF%85%
2C+%CE%95%
CF%85%CE%B
1%CE%B3%CE
%B3%CE%B5%
CE%BB%CE%A
F%CE%B1&sort
_by=2, date of 
access: 
14.11.2011
Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Member of the Administrative Staff of the Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel (G.G. C180, 6.7.2004)                                                                 
Decision (16341/14.12.2010) for the assignment of Courses at the National 
Centre of Public Administration. Source: The Official Website of the 
National Centre of Public Administration, available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr/ekdda/ViewInstr.php, date of access: 24.3.2011)
3 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 K. G. Regular Administrative Law ? Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel
Database on the Directly Hired Scientific Personnel
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4 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 G. D. Regular Public Administration PhD Candidate Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Special Scientist at the Political Bureau of the Deputy Minister of  of Health 
and Welfare: 2001-2003  (G.G.  Vol. C, no 314, 14.12.2001) Ipso iure 
termination of the mandate (G.G. vol. C, no 169, 21.7.2003)                           
Special Advisor at the Political Bureau of the Minister of Development: 
2004-2005 (G.G. vol. C, no 101, 6.4.2004)                                                      
Deputy Consumer Advocate (5 year mandate): 2005-2008 (G.G. vol. B, no 
564, 26.4.2005) Submission of resignation due to his appointment as 
member of the special scientific staff of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel (G.G. vol. YODD, no 411, 3.10.2008)                          
President and member of legislative drafting committees of various 
Ministries                                                                                                           
General Secretary of 
Caritas Hellas 
(International 
Organisation of the 
Catholic Church in 
the Service of 
People and Society)  
Member of the teaching staff under contract at the National Centre for 
Public Administration and Local Government Source: The Official Website 
of the Advocate Consumer, Annulal Report for the year 2008available at: 
sdfhttp://www.synigoroskatanaloti.gr/docs/StK-Etisia-Ekthesi-2008.pdf, date 
of access: 14.3.2011                                                                                         
Decision (3668/16.12.2010) for the assignment of Courses at the National 
Centre of Public Administration. Source: The Official Website of the 
National Centre of Public Administration, available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr/ekdda/ViewInstr.php, date of access: 24.3.2011)
Source: The Official 
Website of the 
Catholic Ecclesia 
News in Greece, 
available at: 
http://www.cen.gr/ind
ex.php?option=com_
content&task=view&i
d=771&Itemid=85, 
date of access: 
14.3.2011
5 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 E. Z. Regular Administrative Law ? Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Civil Servant at the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs 
(G.G. vol. C, no 21, 27.1.2004)
6 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 E.  Z. Regular Administrative Law ? Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Civil Servant at the Ministry of Foreign  Affairs (G.G. vol. C, no 317, 
19.12.2001)
7 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 A. K. Regular Constitutional Law PhD, Source: 
Official Website 
of the  National 
Documentation 
Centre, National 
Archive of PhD 
Theses, 
available at: 
http://thesis.ekt.
gr/thesisBookRe
ader/id/15365#p
age/1/mode/2up
, date of access: 
14.2.2011
Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Research Fellow at the Department of Law, University of Thessaloniki: 
2001-2003                                                                                                         
Research Fellow at the Centre of International and European Economic 
Law (2005-2006)                                                                                               
Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Thessaloniki (2005-2006) 
Source: Perizitito.gr, Books, available at: 
http://www.perizitito.gr/persons.php?personid=63039, date of access: 
14.3.2011                                                                                                          
Decision (16485/31.12.2010) for the assignment of Courses at the National 
Centre of Public Administration. Source: The Official Website of the 
National Centre of Public Administration, available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr/ekdda/ViewInstr.php, date of access: 24.3.2011)              
Member of the 
Scientific Staff of the 
Centre for European 
Constitutional Law 
(CECL) - Unit for 
Better Regulation 
Source: The Official 
Website of CECL, 
available at: 
http://www.cecl2.gr/h
tml/ent/693/ent.4693
.1.asp, date of 
access: 13.3.2011 
Lecturer at the 
Department of Law 
of the University of 
Thessaloniki (G.G. 
vol. C, no 1293, 
31.12.2010)
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8 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 S. K. Regular Public Administration ? Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Civil Servant at the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation (G.G. vol. C, no 14, 21.1.2004)                                              
Graduate of the National School of Public Administration
9 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 A. K. Regular Administrative Law ? Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Revocation of the 
appointment after 
her denial to 
undertake her duties 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
1043, 11.11.2008) 
Lawyer with a salary 
mandate at the 
Legal Service of   
the Greek 
Agricultural 
Insurance 
Organisation 
(ELGA)  Source: 
Official Website of 
ELGA, available at: 
http://www.elga.gr/in
dex.php?option=co
m_content&view=art
icle&id=89:2010-05-
26-10-46-
09&catid=57:2010-
05-26-10-42-
50&Itemid=94, date 
of access: 13.3.2011
10 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 A. N. Regular Administrative Law ? Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Civil Servant at the Ministry of Culture (G.G. vol. C, no 254, 22.9.2004)
11 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 K. S. Regular Work Management or 
Informatics Systems
PhD,Source: 
Official Website 
of the  National 
Documentation 
Centre, National 
Archive of PhD 
Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.
ekt.gr/eadd/han
dle/10442/1270
6, date of 
access: 
14.3.2011
Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Academic Activity: 2004-2009: Member of the teaching staff under contract 
at the Department of Business Management, Higher Technological 
Educational Institution of Chalkida                                                                    
2005-2006: Member of the teaching staff under contract at the Department 
of Automation, Higher Technological Educational Institution of Chalkida         
2005-2007: Member of the teaching staff under contract, School of 
Pedagogical and Technological Education                                                       
2006-2009: Member of the teaching staff under contract at the Department 
of Informatics, University of Piraeus (undergraduate programme)                   
2008-2009: Member of the teaching staff under contract at the Department 
of Informatics, University of Piraeus (postgraduate programme)                      
2007-2010: Member of the teaching staff under contract at the Department o
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11 K. S. 2007-2010: Member of the teaching staff under contract at the Department 
of Logistics Higher Technological Educational Institution of Chalkida              
2007-2009: Member of the teaching staff under contract at the Hellenic 
Naval Academy                                                                                                 
2009-2010: Member of the teaching staff under contract at the Greek Open 
University                                                                                                          
Source: CV at the Official Website of the Higher Technological Educational 
Institution of Chalkida, available at: 
http://62.103.78.248/page.asp?pageID=388,  the Official Website of the 
Greek Open University, available at: 
http://www2.eap.gr/frameset.jsp?locale=el, date of access: 13.3.2011            
Governmental appointments (Indirect Information):  Special Collaborator for 
the Strategic Planning of Operational Programmes of the Special 
Secretariat for Mental Health of the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity 
(G.G. vol. YODD, 164, 24.4.2007),                                                                   
Special Advisor at the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity (G.G vol. 
YODD, no 56, 12.2.2008)  
Alternate Member of the Project Management Group constituted by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Public Administration and Decentralization for 
the implementation of the new European Programme – Framework for the 
solidarity and management of Migration Flows in Greece for the period 
2007-2013
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD, no 164, 24.4.2007)
Member of the Project Management Group constituted by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Public Administration and Decentralization for the 
monitoring of the procedures for the implementation of the projects a. 
Electronic Health File, and b. Organisation and Operational Funciton of the 
Health Procurement System (G.G. vol. YODD, no 56, 12.2.2008)
12 2008 C885, 22.9.2008 G. C. Regular Public Administration PhD,                   
University of 
York, Source: 
Official Website 
of the Greek 
Open University, 
available at: 
http://www2.eap.
gr/frameset.jsp?l
ocale=el,  date 
of access: 
13.3.2011
Rapporteur 
of Order C
1A/2007 Academic Activity: 2010-2011: Member of the teaching staff under contract 
at the Greek Open University                                                                            
Spring Semester 2008: Member of the teaching staff under contract at the 
University of Peloponnese                                                                                
Appointments in Management Boards/Committees: Member of the Working 
Group on the elaboration of an instruction manual for completing the 
Reports on Regulation Impact Assessment (G.G. vol. YODD, no 57, 
15.2.2007)                                                                                                         
Member of the Management Board of the Industrial Property Organisation, 
three-year mandate, (G.G. vol. B, no 1783, 2.12.2004)
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13 2008 C459, 16.5.2008 A. S. Regular Administrative Law ? 1A/2007 Denial of the 
appointment. Lawyer 
with a salary 
mandate at the 
Legal Service of the 
Technical Chamber 
of Greece Source: 
Diavgeia, available 
at: 
static.diavgeia.gov.g
r/doc/4ΑΛΓ46Ψ842-
Β, 
static.diavgeia.gov.g
r/doc/4ΑΛΓ46Ψ842-
7, date of access: 
10.4.2012
14 2008 C459, 16.5.2008 K. G. Regular Administrative Law ? 1A/2007 Denial of the 
appointment. Lawyer 
with a salary 
mandate at the 
Legal Service of the 
Technical Chamber 
of GreeceSource: 
Diavgeia, available 
at: 
static.diavgeia.gov.g
r/doc/4ΑΛΓ46Ψ842-
7, date of 
access:10.4.2012
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15 2008 C459, 16.5.2008 S. K. Regular Administrative Law ? 1A/2007 Denial of the 
appointment. 
Suceeded in the 
entrance 
examination for 
Judicial Officials. 
Table of final results 
published in the 
Governemnt 
Gazette, vol. C, no 
238, 13.3.2008 
Administrative 
Judge  (Court of 
First Instance of 
Lamia), Decision of 
the Supreme 
Judicial Council of 
Administrative 
Justice, July 1, 
2010, Source: Union 
of Administrative 
Judges, available at: 
http://www.edd.gr/ne
ws/EkZlpZpkEACko
DKMQh.php, date of 
access: 10.4.2011
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APPENDIX 2-Table 1
S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette, Vol, No 
of issue-Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Transfer/
New 
Appoint
ment/Sec
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Retirement/R
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G
r
a
d
e
Category- 
Specialty 
Branch
Agency Supervising 
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Legal 
Status 
of the 
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Organisation
al Chart 
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G
r
a
d
e
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In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Branch
Type of the 
transfer 
decision
Competent 
Public Bodies 
for the transfer
Transfers, 
Secondments 
from Data 
Privacy/New 
Appointments to 
the Public 
Sector
1 1999 C2, 12.1.1999 E. K. Transfer Regular A U.E. - No 
specialty/Cour
t Employee
Prosecutio
n of the 
Hellenic 
Supreme 
Court of 
Civil and 
Penal Law
Ministry of 
Justice
Head of the 
Department 
of 
Communicati
on 
Regular A ? Ministerial 
Decision 
Minister of 
Justice 
2 1999 C46, 6.3.1999 E. C. Transfer Regular A U.E. 
Management
Ministry of 
Health and 
Welfare
Head of the 
Department 
of 
Administrativ
e and 
Financial 
Affairs
Regular A ? Joint 
Ministerial 
Decision 
Minister of 
Justice and 
Minister of 
Health and 
Welfare
3 1999 C60, 16.3.1999 A. P. Transfer Regular D C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
Prefectural 
General 
Hospital 
"Amalia 
Fleming"
Ministry of 
Health and 
Welfare
Public 
Law 
Legal 
Entity
? Regular D C.E. Curator S.E. Telephone 
Operators (G.G. 
vol. C, no 423, 
21.11.2006
Joint 
Ministerial 
Decision 
Minister of 
Justice and 
Minister of 
Health
4 1999 C107, 26.5.1999 E. T. Transfer Regular B S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Navy 
General 
Staff
Ministry of 
National 
Defence
? Regular B ? Joint 
Ministerial 
Decision 
Minister of 
Justice and 
Minister of 
National 
Defence
Secondment to 
the Greek 
Ombudsman        
(2002-2003) 
Source: Annual 
Reports of the 
Greek 
Ombudsman for 
the years 2002 
and 2003 
5 1999 C250, 14.12.1999 K. K. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D U.E. 
Communicatio
n
Regular
6 1999 C250, 14.12.1999 A. L. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D U.E. 
Communicatio
n
Regular
Hellenic Data Protection Authority
Database on the transferred and directly hired Administrative Personnel
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for the transfer
Transfers, 
Secondments 
from Data 
Privacy/New 
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Sector
7 1999 C250, 14.12.1999 A. A. New 
Appointm
ent
Resignation 
on 
19.11.2001 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 308, 
11.12.2001) 
Regular D U.E. 
Communicatio
n
Regular Secondment to 
the Political Office 
of the Minister of 
Culture (G.G.vol. 
C, no 205, 
18.7.2000). 
Revocation of the 
secondment  by 
the new Minister 
on 20.11.2000 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
336, 6.12.2000) 
and renewal of 
the secondment 
starting from 
20.11.2000 (G.G. 
vol. C, no 76, 
9.3.2001). 
Revocation of the 
secondment 
starting from 
15.11.2001 (G.G. 
vol. C, no 9, 
17.1.2002
8 1999 C250, 14.12.1999 I. A. New 
Appointm
ent
PhD Regular D U.E. 
Communicatio
n
Regular
9 1999 C250, 14.12.1999 K. K. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Regular Legal Controller 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
225, 2.10.2002)
10 1999 C250, 14.12.1999 M. G. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D U.E. 
Informatics
Regular
11 1999 C250, 14.12.1999 I. B. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D T.E. 
Informatics
Regular
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of the 
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G
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from Data 
Privacy/New 
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Sector
12 1999 C250, 14.12.1999 A. K. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Regular
13 2000 C250, 14.12.1999 M. T. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Regular
14 2001 C250, 14.12.1999 Y. P. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Regular
15 2002 C250, 14.12.1999 S. P. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular E C.E. Curator Regular S.E. Drivers, 
Grade D (G.G. 
vol. C, no 315, 
11.5.2997
16 2003 C250, 14.12.1999 S. A. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular E C.E. 
Cleansing 
Personnel
Regular
17 2004 C250, 14.12.1999 S. P. -K. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular E C.E. 
Cleansing 
Personnel
Regular
18 2005 C146, 15.6.2005 M. P. New 
Appointm
ent
PhD Regular D U.E. 
Communicatio
n
Regular
19 2005 C146, 15.6.2005 M. K. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Regular
20 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 Y. V. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Regular
21 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 M. Y. New 
Appointm
ent
Resignation 
on 18.1.2008 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 67, 
24.1.2008) 
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
Regular
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G
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d
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Public Bodies 
for the transfer
Transfers, 
Secondments 
from Data 
Privacy/New 
Appointments to 
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Sector
22 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 V. S. New 
Appointm
ent
PhD Regular D U.E. 
Communicatio
n
Regular Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Foreign 
Languages, 
Translation and 
Interpretation of   
the Ionian 
University (G.G. 
vol. C, no 463, 
7.6.2010)
23 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 V. G. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D U.E. 
Communicatio
n
Regular
24 2006 C49, 28.2.2006 K. A. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D T.E. 
Informatics
Regular
25 2008 C593, 25.6.2008 K. K. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular E C.E. Curators Regular
26 2008 C593, 25.6.2008 A. M. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular E C.E. Curators Regular
27 2009 C668, 25.8.2009 F. P. New 
Appointm
ent
Resignation 
on 
25.11.2009 
(G.G. vol. C, 
no 974, 
9.12.2009) 
Regular D S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Regular Appointment to 
the General 
Hospital of 
Thessaloniki 
"Papageorgiou" 
(S.E. Secretaries 
under a three-
year private law 
employment 
contract ). G.G. 
vol. C, no 614, 
6.8.2009)
28 2010 C1286, 
31.12.2010
E. P. New 
Appointm
ent
Regular D S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Regular
29 2009 ? Secondm
ent 
S.E. Ministry of 
Justice
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G
r
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G
r
a
d
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and Branch
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Branch
Type of the 
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Transfers, 
Secondments 
from Data 
Privacy/New 
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Sector
30 2009 I. P. Secondm
ent 
S.E. Typists University 
of the 
Aegean
Ministry of 
Nation al 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
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APPENDIX 2-Table 2
S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette, Vol, No 
of issue-Date   /   
Annual Report 
Initials of 
the Name-
Surname
Working 
Status
Legal / 
Informatics (ICT) 
Auditors
Category and 
Branch
Grade Level of 
Education
Resignation Denial 
of the 
appoint
ment
Transfers, 
Secondments 
from the Data 
Protection 
Authority to the 
public sector or 
services of the 
European Union 
or other 
European 
Agencies 
Previous positions 
in the public sector
New 
Appointments/P
ositions in the 
Public Sector
Positions 
Abroad in the 
Public or  
Private Sector, 
Organisations 
after resignation 
or denial of 
appointment
Parallel 
Occupation 
(Adjunct 
Professors, Ex 
Officio 
Participation in 
Legislative 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Trade 
Unionism/Civil 
Society
1 1999 C21, 8.2.1999 V. Z. Regular Informatics (ICT) Head of the 
Controllers' 
Department 
/U.E. Auditor
A PhD, Source:  
Official Website 
of the  National 
Documentation 
Centre, National 
Archive of PhD 
Theses, available 
at: 
http://phdtheses.
ekt.gr/eadd/handl
e/10442/4525, 
date of access: 
20.3.2011
Since 2000 
adjunct Professor 
at the Department 
of Informatics 
(ICT) of the Greek 
Open University, 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Greek Open 
University, 
available at: 
http://www2.eap.g
r/frameset.jsp?loc
ale=el and 
http://www.eap.gr/
ak_pros/plh22.ht
m, date of access: 
13.2.2011
Hellenic Data Protection Authority
Database on the directly hired Scientific Personnel (Auditors)
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Annual Report 
Initials of 
the Name-
Surname
Working 
Status
Legal / 
Informatics (ICT) 
Auditors
Category and 
Branch
Grade Level of 
Education
Resignation Denial 
of the 
appoint
ment
Transfers, 
Secondments 
from the Data 
Protection 
Authority to the 
public sector or 
services of the 
European Union 
or other 
European
Previous positions 
in the public sector
New 
Appointments/P
ositions in the 
Public Sector
Positions 
Abroad in the 
Public or  
Private Sector, 
Organisations 
after resignation 
or denial of 
appointment
Parallel 
Occupation 
(Adjunct 
Professors, Ex 
Officio 
Participation in 
Legislative 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Trade 
Unionism/Civil 
Society
1 V. Z. Decision (250 
Φ233.02/14.1.201
1) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre 
of Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website 
of the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.g
r/ekdda/ViewInstr.
php, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
2 1999 C21, 8.2.1999 P. D. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD Resignation 
on 14.7.2006 
(G.G. vol. C, 
262, 
14.9.2006)
Since 2006 officer 
within Europol 
Data Protection 
Unit, Source: 
European 
Parliament, Public 
Hearing on the 
future of Europol 
http://www.europa
rl.europa.eu/heari
ngs/20070410/lib
e/minutes_en.pdf, 
date of access: 
9.2.2011
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3 1999 C21, 8.2.1999 K. M. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source:  
Official Website 
of the  National 
Documentation 
Centre, National 
Archive of PhD 
Theses, available 
at: 
http://phdtheses.
ekt.gr/eadd/handl
e/10442/17694, 
date of access: 
20.3.2011
4 1999 C21, 8.2.1999 F. M. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate, 
Degree, MSc, 
(DEA ): Source: 
Journal: 
Implementations 
of Public Law, 
http://www.efdimd
ik.gr/arxeio/1s_20
05.html, date of 
access: 
20.3.2011
Seconded 
National Expert at 
the European 
Commission 
(2007-), Data 
Protection Unit, 
DG Justice, 
Freedom and 
Security, Source: 
To Vima Ideon, 
Insert of the 
Newspaper To 
Vima,  Issue 
1.2.2008, 
available at: 
http://www.vimaid
eon.gr//Article.as
px?d=20080201&
nid=7342424&sn
=ΚΥΡΙΟ 
ΤΕΥΧΟΣ&spid=1
478, date of 
access: 
14.6.2010
NGOs - Civil 
Society Vice-
President of the 
Executive Board 
of the European 
Association for 
the Defence of 
Human Rights 
(AEDH) for the 
period 2008-
2010, Official 
Website of the 
AEDH, available 
at: 
http://www.aedh.e
u/-Executive-
committee-.html, 
date of access: 
27.2.2011 
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4 F. M. Member of the 
Hellenic League 
for Human Rights, 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Hellenic League 
for Human Rights, 
available at: 
www.hlhr.gr/confe
rence/prosklisi - 8-
12-05.doc, date of 
access: 7.6.2010
5 1999 C21, 8.2.1999 E. S. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
Decision (250 
Φ233.02/14.1.201
1) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre 
of Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website 
of the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.g
r/ekdda/ViewInstr.
php, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
6 1999 C21, 8.2.1999 K. L. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
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7 1999 C21, 8.2.1999 K. K. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree,  MSc, 
Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Ministry of 
the Interior, 
Administrative 
Reform, available 
at: 
http://www.admini
strativereform.gr/i
ndex.php?option
=com_content&vi
ew=category&lay
out=blog&id=6&It
emid=11&lang=el
, date of access: 
20.3.2011
On secondment 
as National 
Expert on data 
protection and 
informatics at the 
Council of Europe 
(Brussels) for two 
years                     
Seconded at the 
Ministry of the 
Interior, 
Decentralisation, 
and Electronic 
Governance 
Source: The 
Official Website   
of the Ministry of 
the Interior, 
Decentralisation 
and Electronic 
Governance, 
Administrative 
Reform, available 
at: 
http://www.admini
strativereform.gr/i
ndex.php?option=
com_content&vie
w=category&layo
ut=blog&id=6&Ite
mid=11&lang=el, 
date of access: 
20.3.2011
8 1999 C21, 8.2.1999 Y. L. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
Resignation 
on 30.1.2001 
(G.G. vol. C, 
40, 
14.2.2001)
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9 1999 C21, 8.2.1999 K. B. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: CV 
at Wiley Editions, 
available at:  
http://onlinelibrar
y.wiley.com/doi/1
0.1002/97804700
99742.about/pdf, 
date of access: 
11.2.2011
YES Since 1999 Head 
of the  Access 
Network Lab at 
the Hellenic 
Telecommunicati
ons Organisation 
(Greek PTT) 
R&D, Between 
1997-2002 
adjunct Professor 
at various 
universities in 
Greece, Source: 
CV at Wiley 
Editions, 
available at:  
http://onlinelibrary
.wiley.com/doi/10.
1002/9780470099
742.about/pdf, 
date of access: 
11.2.2011
10 2002 C225, 2.10.2002 K. K. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor D Postgraduate 
Degree
U.E. Management-
Economics at the 
Department of 
Management-
Economics of the 
Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority 
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11 2003 C291, 19.12.2003 Z. K. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Hellenic 
Data Protection 
Authority, 
available at:  
http://www.dpa.gr
/portal/page?_pa
geid=33,43469&_
dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL, 
date of access: 
20.3.2011
Member of the 
Special 
Legislative 
Drafting 
Committee, 
representing the 
Hellenic Data 
Protection 
Authority on the 
study and 
elaboration for 
the transposition 
in national 
legislation of the 
Directive 
2006/24/EC of the 
European 
Parliament and 
the Council of 
March 15, 2006
on the retention 
of data generated 
or processed in 
connection with 
the provision of 
publicly available 
electronic 
communications 
services or of 
public 
communications 
networks and 
amending 
Directive 
2002/58/EC (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 42, 
4.2.2008)
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11 Z.  K. Alternate Member 
of the special 
legislative 
drafting 
committee 
(Ministry of 
Justice, 
Transparency and 
Human Rights) 
for the final 
elaboration of the 
draft law on the 
transposition of 
the Directive 
2006/24/EC on 
the retention of 
data generated or 
processed in 
connection with 
the provision of 
publicly available 
electronic 
communications 
networks and 
amending 
Directive 
2002/58/EC 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 72, 
1.3.2010)
12 2003 C291, 19.12.2003 I.-E. T. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
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13 2003 C291, 19.12.2003 A. B. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source:  
Official Website 
of the  National 
Documentation 
Centre, National 
Archive of PhD 
Theses, available 
at: 
http://phdtheses.
ekt.gr/eadd/handl
e/10442/17017, 
date of access: 
20.3.2011
Member of the 
special legislative 
drafting 
committee 
(Ministry of 
Justice, 
Transparency and 
Human Rights) 
for the final 
elaboration of the 
draft law on the 
transposition of 
the Directive 
2006/24/EC on 
the retention of 
data generated or 
processed in 
connection with 
the provision of 
publicly available 
electronic 
communications 
networks and 
amending 
Directive 
2002/58/EC 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 72, 
1.3.2010)
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14 2003 C291, 19.12.2003 P.  N. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source:  
Official Website 
of the  National 
Documentation 
Centre, National 
Archive of PhD 
Theses, available 
at: 
http://phdtheses.
ekt.gr/eadd/handl
e/10442/11268, 
date of access: 
20.3.2011
Resignation 
on 26.9.2007 
(G.G. vol. C, 
777, 
10.10.2007)
Lecturer  
(Department of 
Mathematics) at 
the University of 
the Aegean (G.G. 
vol. C, no 642, 
17.8.2007)
15 2005 C89, 5.4.2005 K. M. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
16 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 E. M. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree, LLM 
Resignation 
on 22.7.2008 
(G.G. vol. C, 
703, 
30.7.2008)
Head of the Office 
for  International 
and European 
Union Issues at 
the General 
Secretariat of the 
Government by 
decision of the 
Prime Minister 
Georgios 
Papandreou, 
(G.G. vol. YODD, 
no 201, 7.6.2010)  
Member of the 
Teaching Staff at 
the Law 
Department of the 
American 
University in 
Cairo as the 
Richard A. 
Bartlett Yale Law 
School Fellow in 
Law (2008-2010)   
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16 E. M. Richard A. 
Bartlett Yale Law 
School Fellow in 
Law, Sources: 
Yale Law School, 
http://www.law.yal
e.edu/faculty/EMa
rtsoukou.htm,  
Official Website 
of  the American 
University in 
Cairo, available at 
: 
http://www1.auce
gypt.edu/ncd/cam
pusnews/, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011 
17 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 E. L. Regular ? U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: 
Official Website 
of the Greek 
Ombudsman, 
Annual Report for 
the year 2006, 
available at: 
http://www.synigo
ros.gr/pdfs/annua
l_06_pdfs/annual
_p_kprosopikou_
06.pdf, date of 
access: 
20.3.2011
Resignation 
on 14.7.2006 
(G.G. vol. C, 
272, 
14.9.2006)
Member of the 
Special Scientific 
Staff of the Greek 
Ombudsman. 
Source: Annual 
Report of the 
Greek 
Ombudsman for 
the year 2006 
http://www.synigo
ros.gr/pdfs/annual
_06_pdfs/annual_
p_kprosopikou_0
6.pdf, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011
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18 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 Z. T. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: 
Noerr Group, 
available at: 
http://www.noerr.
com/en/pdfprint/?
id=1621&lang=2, 
date of access: 
11.2.2011
Resignation 
on 12.3.2007 
(G.G. vol. C, 
207, 
28.3.2007)
Seconded 
Trainee at the 
European Data 
Protection 
Supervisor (Oct. 
2006-Feb. 2007), 
Annual Report of 
the EDPS for the 
year 2005, 
available at: 
http://www.edps.e
uropa.eu/EDPSW
EB/edps/site/mySi
te/AR, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011
Since 2008 
Lawyer  at the 
Noerr* European 
Law Firm               
* Noerr develops 
comprehensive 
legal, tax, finance 
and management 
solutions Source: 
Noerr Group, 
available at: 
http://www.noerr.c
om/en/pdfprint/?id
=1621&lang=2, 
date of access: 
11.2.2011
19 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 D. Z. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Hellenic 
Data Protection 
Authority, 
available at:  
http://www.dpa.gr
/portal/page?_pa
geid=33,43469&_
dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL, 
date of access: 
20.3.2011
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20 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 E. C. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
Member of the 
Special 
Legislative 
Drafting 
Committee, 
representing the 
Hellenic Data 
Protection 
Authority, on the 
study and 
elaboration for 
the transposition 
in national 
legislation of the 
Directive 
2006/24/EC of the 
European 
Parliament and 
the Council of 
March 15, 2006
on the retention 
of data generated 
or processed in 
connection with 
the provision of 
publicly available 
electronic 
communications 
services or of 
public 
communications 
networks and 
amending 
Directive 
2002/58/EC (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 42, 
4.2.2008)
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21 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 K. B. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: 
Eleftheroudakis 
Books, available 
at: 
http://www.books.
gr/ViewAuthor.as
px?AuthorId=196
3552, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011
Resignation 
on 23.2.2006 
(G.G. vol. C, 
49, 
28.2.2006)
For many years 
he has worked as 
adjunct Professor 
(under contract 
pursuant to the 
Presidential 
Decree 407/80) at 
the Department of 
Social 
Administration at 
the University of 
Thrace), Source: 
http://www.socad
m.duth.gr/index.p
hp?rm=1&pm=80
&sm=96, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011 
Member of the 
teaching staff 
under contract at 
the Greek Police 
Academy, 
Parliamentary 
Candidate in the 
National Elections 
of 2004, 2007 
with the party of 
New Democracy. 
He demissioned  
from  his 
candidacy in the 
National Elections 
of 2010. Source: 
Newspaper 
Ethnos, available 
at: 
http://www.ethnos
.gr/general2.asp?
catid=11378&subi
d=20110&pubid=
6000838, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011, 
Official Website 
of the party of 
New Democracy
Source: 
Eleftheroudakis 
Books, available 
at: 
http://www.books.
gr/ViewAuthor.as
px?AuthorId=196
3552, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011
, available at: 
http://www.nd.gr/i
ndex.php?option=
com_content&tas
k=view&id=32636
&Itemid=9999999
9, date of access: 
11.2.2011
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21 K. B. Member of the 
Management 
Board - 
representing the 
Ministry of 
National 
Education and  
Religious Affairs- 
of the non-profit 
Public Entity 
under Private 
Law, Centre for 
the Re-integration 
of ex-prisoners,  
Three-year 
mandate, G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 
165, 15.4.2009)
Member of the 
Management 
Board of the 
Institute for 
Defense 
Analyses, G.G. 
vol. B, no 803, 
3.7.2006, vol. 
YODD, no 263, 
28.6.2007) 
Member of the 
Scientific Council 
of the Institute for 
Defence 
Analyses, (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 
333, 30.7.2008)
22 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 V. V. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
YES
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23 2006 C8, 16.1.2006 M. A. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
Candidate at the 
elections of the 
Thessaloniki Bar 
Association with 
the party "Avant 
Garde Lawyers" 
in 2004. Source: 
The Official 
Website of the 
Avant Garde 
Lawyers, 
available at: 
http://www.dikigor
ikiprotoporia.gr/ip
opsifii.html, date 
of access: 
14.6.2010
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24 2006 C49, 28.2.2006 K. R. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: E-
security Forum, 
Conference 
Speakers CVs;\' 
http://www.esecur
ityforum.org/Porta
ls/5/presentations
/conference_cv.ht
ml, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011
YES Adjunct Professor at 
the Industrial 
Informatics (ICT) 
and Information 
Management 
Department of the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institution of Kavala, 
at the Department of 
Electrical and 
Computer 
Engineering at the 
Democritus 
University of Thrace, 
at the Department of 
Informatics (ICT) 
with Appliances in 
Biomedicine at the 
University of Central 
Greece, 
Member of the 
Special Scientific 
Staff at the 
Informatics (ICT) 
Development 
Agency of the 
General 
Secretariat of 
Public 
Administration 
and Electronic 
Governance at 
the Ministry of 
Interior (G.G. 
vol.C, no 346, 
17.10.2006) 
Source: E 
security Forum, 
Conference 
Speakers CVs;\' 
http://www.esecur
ityforum.org/Porta
ls/5/presentations
/conference_cv.ht
ml, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011
Source: E-security 
Forum, Conference 
Speakers CVs, 
available at: 
http://www.esecurityf
orum.org/Portals/5/p
resentations/confere
nce_cv.html, date of 
access: 11.2.2011
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25 2006 C49, 28.2.2006 N. B. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: 
Tutorial on 
Applied 
Computing 
Conference (ACC 
'09), available at: 
http://www.itr.gr/e
vents.cfm?id=11&
lang=gr, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011
YES Sources: Official 
Website of 
Democritos, 
http://www.itr.gr/eve
nts.cfm?id=11&lang
=gr 
http://www.iit.demokr
itos.gr/docs/reports/
annual2008.pdf, 
date of access: 
11.2.2011.
Associate 
Professor at the 
Greek Military 
Academy   (G.G. 
vol. C, no 1210, 
23.12.2010) 
Scientific 
Collaborator 
(under contract) 
at the Higher 
Technological 
Institute of 
Chalkida, 
Researcher under 
work contract at 
the Net Media 
Lab at the 
National Centre 
for Scientific 
Research 
Democritos, 
Sources: Official 
Website of 
Democritos, 
available at: 
http://imm.demokr
itos.gr/staff.asp, 
Official Website 
of the Higher 
Technological 
Institution of 
Chalkida, 
available at: 
http://eclass.teihal
.gr/modules/auth/
opencourses.php
?fc=8, date of 
access: 
11.2.2011
26 2006 C49, 28.2.2006 I. L. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
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27 2006 C49, 28.2.2006 Y. R. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source:  
Official Website 
of the  National 
Documentation 
Centre, National 
Archive of PhD 
Theses, available 
at: 
http://phdtheses.
ekt.gr/eadd/handl
e/10442/12365, 
date of access: 
20.3.2011
28 2006 C49, 28.2.2006 A. A. Regular ? U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
Resignation 
on 
15.10.2007 
(G.G. vol. C, 
842, 
24.10.2007)
29 2006 C49, 28.2.2006 A. P. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
YES Member of the 
Special Scientific 
Staff at the 
Ministry of 
Economy and 
Finance (subject 
area: Computer 
Networks)  G.G. 
vol. C, no 102, 
6.4.2006)
30 2006 C173, 5.7.2006 Y. P. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
31 2006 C173, 5.7.2006 V. L. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
Resignation 
on 
30.11.2006 
(G.G. vol. C, 
485, 
14.12.2006)
Succeeded in the 
Notaries 2006 
exam for the 
County Court of 
Kavala and was 
appointed Notary 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
107, 22.2.2007)
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32 2006 C173, 5.7.2006 F. K. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
Alternate Member 
of the Special 
Legislative 
Drafting 
Committee, 
representing the 
Hellenic Data 
Protection 
Authority, on the 
study and 
elaboration for 
the transposition 
in national 
legislation of the 
Directive 
2006/24/EC of the 
European 
Parliament and 
the Council of 
March 15, 2006
on the retention 
of data generated 
or processed in 
connection with 
the provision of 
publicly available 
electronic 
communications 
services or of 
public 
communications 
networks and 
amending 
Directive 
2002/58/EC (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 42, 
4.2.2008)
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33 2006 C387, 3.11.2006 E. B. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
Resignation 
on 2.8.2007 
(G.G. vol. C, 
596, 
16.8.2007)
PhD Candidate at 
the Centre for 
Studies and 
Research in 
Public Economic 
Law at Sorbonne-
Paris Source: 
Official Website 
of the Centre for 
Studies and 
Research in 
Public Economic 
Law, available at: 
http://www.univ-
paris1.fr/centres-
de-
recherche/cerdpe-
centre-detudes-et-
de-recherche-en-
droit-public-
economique/les-
doctorants/, date 
of access: 
11.2.2011
34 2008 C419, 13.5.2008 E. M. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Hellenic 
Data Protection 
Authority, 
available at:  
http://www.dpa.gr
/portal/page?_pa
geid=33,43469&_
dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL, 
date of access: 
20.3.2011
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35 2008 C419, 13.5.2008 C. L. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Hellenic 
Data Protection 
Authority, 
available at:  
http://www.dpa.gr
/portal/page?_pa
geid=33,43469&_
dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL, 
date of access: 
20.3.2012
36 2008 C419, 13.5.2008 T. T. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
Seconded 
Trainee at the 
European Data 
Protection 
Supervisor Oct. 
2005-Feb. 2006), 
Annual Report of 
EDPS for the year 
2005, available 
at: 
http://www.edps.e
uropa.eu/EDPSW
EB/webdav/site/m
ySite/shared/Doc
uments/EDPS/Pu
blications/Annualr
eport/2006/AR_2
006_EN.pdf, date 
of access: 
21.3.2011
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37 2008 C419, 13.5.2008 Anargyros 
Chryssanth
ou
Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree, MSc, 
The Official 
Website of the 
University of 
Thrace, available 
at: 
http://pericles.ee.
duth.gr/new_site/
el/leptomereies.ht
ml, date of 
access: 
21.3.2011
38 2008 C1134, 
17.12.2008
L. R. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B Postgraduate 
Degree
39 2009 C668, 25.8.2009 E. D-L. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Hellenic 
Data Protection 
Authority, 
available at: 
http://www.dpa.gr
/portal/page?_pa
geid=33,23184&_
dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL, 
date of access: 
21.3.2011
Alternate Member 
of the special 
legislative 
drafting 
committee 
(Ministry of 
Justice, 
Transparency and 
Human Rights) 
for the final 
elaboration of the 
draft law on the 
transposition of 
the PNR 
(Passenger Name 
Record) 
Agreements of 
the European 
Union and the 
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39 E.  D.-L. Governments of 
U.S.A., Canada 
and Australia on 
the processing 
and transfer of 
passengers’ data 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. 
YODD’, no 165, 
7.5.2010)
40 2009 C668, 25.8.2009 K.  K. Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Hellenic 
Data Protection 
Authority, 
available at: 
http://www.dpa.gr
/portal/page?_pa
geid=33,23184&_
dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL, 
date of access: 
21.3.2011
41 2009 C668, 25.8.2009 Fereniki 
Panagopoul
ou
Regular Legal U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Hellenic 
Data Protection 
Authority, 
available at: 
http://www.dpa.gr
/portal/page?_pa
geid=33,23184&_
dad=portal&_sch
ema=PORTAL, 
date of access: 
21.3.2011
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42 2009 C668, 25.8.2009 K. L. Regular Informatics (ICT) U.E. Auditor B PhD, Source: The 
Official Website 
of Athens 
University, 
available at: 
http://cgi.di.uoa.g
r/~klimn/CV.html, 
date of access: 
21.3.2011
Academic Activity : 
Sep.2005-Sep. 2007 
& Sep. 2008-June 
2009: Adjunct 
Professor at the 
Dptm of Informatics 
and Computer 
Technology, 
Technological 
Educational 
Institution of Lamia, 
Sep. 2008-June 
2009, Academic 
Year: 2010-
2011:Dptm of 
Informatics at the 
Technological 
Educational 
Foundation of 
Athens, Source: The 
Official Website of 
Athens University, 
CV, available at: 
http://cgi.di.uoa.gr/~
klimn/CV.html,date 
of access:21.3.2011
and the Official 
Website of the Dptm 
of Informatics of the 
Technological 
Educational 
Foundation of 
Athens, available at: 
http://www.cs.teiath.
gr/images/stories/su
nergates.pdf, date of 
access: 21.3.2011
686
APPENDIX 3-Table 1
S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette, Vol, No 
of issue-Date
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Seco
ndme
nt
Conversi
on to 
transfer/
Direct 
Transfer
Level 
of 
Educ
ation
Revoca
tion of 
second
ment
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e Category- 
Specialty 
Branch
Service Supervising 
Ministry
Legal Status 
of the 
Agency
Position 
of the 
Organisati
onal Chart
Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
eCategory 
and  
Branch
In Service 
Transfers 
(Official/Unoffici
al) /New 
Category 
Type of 
decision for 
the transfer
Competent 
Public Bodies 
for the 
transfer
Previous 
positions in the 
Public 
Sector/Parallel 
Occupation 
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1 1998 NPDD158, 
3.7.2003
K. V. YES YES S.E. Regular A S.E. Typists National Centre 
for Social 
Research 
Ministry of 
Development
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular A S.E. 
Typists
Decision of 
the Vice-
President of 
the 
Managemen
t Board of 
National 
Centre of 
Social 
Research 
Secondment to 
the Inspector 
General of Public 
Administration 
Source: Diavgeia, 
static.diavgeia.go
v.gr/doc/4ΙΗ5ΟΡΡ
6-Υ, date of 
access: 
17.4.2011
2 1998 S. K. YES C.E. 2006 C.E. Usher Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
3 1998 E. K. YES S.E. 2004 S.E. Driver Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
4 1998 V. M. YES S.E./D
eree 
Colleg
e 
Gradu
ate
1999 Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
5 1998 Y. B. YES S.E. 2003 S.E. Driver Greek Post S.A. Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Legal Entity 
of Private 
Law 
(Anonymous 
Company)
Database on the seconded and transferred Administrative Personnel
The Greek Ombudsman
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6 1998 NPDD192, 
11.8.2003
V. N. YES YES T.E. Regular C T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Pension Fund 
and Health 
Insurance of 
doctors, 
dentists, 
pharmacists and 
veterinarians
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular C T.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Decision of 
the 
President of 
the 
Managemen
t Board of  
Pension 
Fund and 
Health 
Insurance of 
doctors, 
dentists, 
pharmacists 
and 
veterinarian
s
7 1998 P. P. YES T.E. 1999 Fund of 
Merchants and 
Craftsmen
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
8 1998 A. T. YES Post-
gradu
ate 
degre
e
Until 
now
General Hospital 
of Athens 
"Laiko"
Ministry of Health Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Unofficial 
Transfer: 
Department of  
Health and Social 
Welfare
9 1999 E. K. YES U.E. 2000 Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
10 1999 V. D. YES C.E. Pension
: 2006
Auxiliary Staff Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
11 1999 E. T. YES U.E. 2003 Prefecture of 
Piraeus
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
Local 
Authority of 
Second 
Degree
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12 2000 C140, 24.6.2003 E. K. YES YES U.E. Regular A Administration 
Organisation
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular Dir
ect
or
Administra
tion 
Organisati
on
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisatio
n 
Member of the 
Special Scientific 
Staff of the Greek 
Ombudsman: 
1998-1999 
(Department of 
State-Citizens 
Relations) Annual 
Reports of the 
Greek 
Ombudsman for 
the Years 1998-
1999 On 
secondment 
Director of the 
Secretariat: 2000-
2003
13 2000 NPDD158, 
3.7.2003
M. A.-K. YES YES S.E./D
eree 
Colleg
e 
Gradu
ate
Regular B Administration-
Accounting
Childen's 
Hospital "P. and 
A. Kyriakou" 
Ministry of Health Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Regular B S.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Unofficial 
transfer: 
Department of 
Quality of Life
Decision of 
the 
Governor of 
the 
Childen's 
Hospital "P. 
and A. 
Kyriakou"
Source: 
Makrydimitris A., 
Michalopoulos, N, 
(ed.) Reports of 
Experts on Public 
Administration, 
Papazisis 
Editions, Athens 
2000)
Secondment to 
the Political Office 
of the Minister of 
Economics 
starting from 
28.12.2009, G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 3, 
12.1.2010
14 2000 C140, 24.6.2003 D. A. YES YES S.E. Regular A Administration-
Accounting
Prefectural Self-
Administration of 
Athens-Piraeus 
Prefectural 
Department of 
Piraeus 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
Public Law 
Legal Entity  
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular A S.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisatio
n 
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15 2000 NPDD158, 
3.7.2003
S. A. YES YES S.E Regular B Administration-
Accounting
National 
Institution for the 
Rehabilitation of 
Handicapped 
Ministry of Health Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular B S.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Decision of 
the 
President of 
the 
Managemen
t Board of 
the National 
Institution 
for the 
Rehabilitatio
n of 
Handicappe
d
16 2000 NPDD158, 
3.7.2003
T.  E. YES YES U.E. Regular A Administration-
Finance
Prefectural 
General Hospital 
of Melissia 
"Amalia 
Fleming" 
Ministry of Health Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular A U.E. 
Administra
tion-
Finance
Decision of 
the 
President-
General 
Director of 
the Second 
Regional 
Health 
Council of 
Attica
17 2000 NPDD177, 
24.7.2003 
Retirement from 
service 
(pension?) G.G. 
vol. C, no 216, 
18.3.2010
M. K. YES YES U.E. Regular A Administration-
Finance
Foundation for 
Social Security
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular A U.E. 
Administra
tion-
Finance
Decision of 
the 
Governor of 
the 
Foundation 
for Social 
Security 
18 2000 C650, 17.8.2007 L. K. YES YES U.E. Regular A Administration-
Finance
Headquarters of 
the Greek Police
Ministry of Public 
Order
Personal 
position 
beyond 
the Chart 
Law 
3345/200
5
A U.E. 
Administra
tion-
Finance
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of 
Public Order
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19 2000 NPDD158, 
3.7.2003
Y. K. YES YES S.E Regular B Administration-
Accounting
General Hospital 
of Athens 
"Laiko"
Ministry of Health Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular B S.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Decision of 
the 
President-
General 
Director of 
the First 
Regional 
Health 
Council of 
Attica
20 2000 C157, 3.7.2003 K. K. -T. YES YES U.E. Regular A Press Ministry of Press 
and Mass Media
Ministry of Press 
and Mass Media
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular A U.E. 
Communic
ation
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of 
Press and 
Mass Media
21 2000 NPDD177, 
24.7.2003
E.  L. YES YES U.E. Regular C S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Foundation for 
Social Security 
(Regional 
Branch)
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular C S.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
U.E. 
Administration-
Finance    G.G. 
vol. C, no 26, 
3.2.2006
Decision of 
the 
Governor of 
the 
Foundation 
for Social 
Security
22 2000 A. D. YES U.E. 2002 Regular/N
ational 
School of 
Public 
Administr
ation
Ministry of 
Development
Ministry of 
Development
23 2000 NPDD171, 
17.7.2003
D. P. YES YES S.E. Regular B S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Equity Aviation 
Fund
Ministry of National 
Defence
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular B S.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Decision of 
the 
President of 
the 
Managemen
t Board of 
the Equity 
Aviation 
Fund 
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24 2000 NPDD177, 
24.7.2003
P. S. YES YES S.E. Regular B S.E. Computer 
Operators
Supplementary 
Insurance Fund 
of the 
Employees of  
Pharmaceutical 
Operations
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular B S.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
S.E. Informatics 
G.G. vol. C, no 
1054, 13.11.2008
Decision of 
the 
President of 
the 
Managemen
t Board of 
the  
Supplement
ary 
Insurance 
Fund of the 
Employees 
of  
Pharmaceuti
cal 
Operations
25 2000 M. S. YES U.E. 2001 Ministry of 
National 
Economy
Ministry of National 
Economy
26 2000 F.  T. YES S.E. 2001 Ministry of 
Health and 
Welfare
Ministry of Health Public Law 
Legal Entity 
27 2000 A. F. YES T.E. Until 
now
T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Agricultural 
Security 
OrganisationSub
mission of 
resignation, 
available at: 
static.diavgeia.g
ov.gr/doc/4ΙΗΜ4
691Ω∆-Ρ, date 
of access: 
17.4.2011
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Unofficial 
Transfer: 
Secretary of th 
Deputy 
Ombudman at the 
Department of 
Citizen-State 
Relations
28 2000 C157, 3.7.2003 T.  F. YES YES U.E. Regular A U.E. 
Informatics
Ministry of 
National 
Defence
Ministry of National 
Defence
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular A U.E. 
Informatics
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of 
National 
Defence
29 2000 I. C. YES T.E. 2003 National 
Statistical 
Service of 
Greece 
Ministry of National 
Economy
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
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30 2001 Y. A. YES 2002 Municipality of 
Egaleo
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
Local 
Authority of 
First Degree
31 2001 M-A. K. YES S.E. Until 
now
Agricultural 
Security 
Organisation
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
32 2001 C240, 10.10.2003 P. B. YES YES S.E. Regular A S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting
Headquarters of 
the Greek Police
Ministry of Public 
Order
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular A S.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of 
Public Order
33 2001 NPDD158, 
3.7.2003
D. P. YES YES S.E. Regular C C.E. Watchman-
Nightwatchman
Prefectural 
General Hospital 
of Melissia 
"Amalia 
Fleming" 
Ministry of Health Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular C C.E. 
Auxiliary 
Staff
S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting            
(G.G. Vol. C, no 
125, 8.5.2006)
Decision of 
the 
President-
General 
Director of 
the Second 
Regional 
Health 
Council of 
Attica
34 2002 A. N. YES PhD 2003 Foundation of 
Social Security
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security
Public Law 
Legal Entity 
35 2002 A. T. YES S.E. Until 
now
Ministry of 
Public Order
Ministry of Public 
Order
Unofficial 
Transfer: 
Secretary of the 
Deputy 
Ombudsman of 
the Department of 
Human Rights
36 2002 E. T. YES S.E. 2004 Hellenic Data 
Protection 
Authority 
Ministry of Justice Independent 
Authority
Unofficial 
Transfer: 
Children's Rights
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37 2003 C303, 9.4.2008 G.  K. YES YES T.E. Regular A Technicians Prefectural Self-
Administration of 
Athens-Piraeus 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
Local 
Authority of 
Second 
Degree
Personal 
position 
beyond the 
Chart Law 
3345/2005
Regular A T.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisatio
n
38 2003 E. P. YES Post-
gradu
ate 
degre
e
Until 
now
Archaeologist Credit 
Management 
Fund for the 
Implementation 
of 
Archaeological 
Projects 
Ministry of Culture Private Law 
Legal Entity
Unofficial 
Transfer: 
Secretary of the 
Deputy 
Ombudsman of 
the Department of 
Children's Rights
Secondment to 
the Political 
Bureau of the 
Deputy Minister of 
Health and 
Welfare, G.G. vol. 
C, no 171, 
14.6.2000 
Revocation of the 
secondment: 
1.8.2002, G.G. 
241, 23.10.2002
39 2003 N. A. YES U.E. 
D.E.A. 
Degre
e
2007 French 
Language
Secondary 
Education 
Teacher 
Ministry of National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
Unofficial 
Transfer: 
Department of  
Health and Social 
Welfare
40 2003 D. K. YES S.E. Until 
now
Driver Electric Buses of 
Athens-Piraeus
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
Anonymous 
Public 
Company
41 2004 I. V. YES S.E. Until 
now
Driver Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation 
Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
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42 2004 S. K. YES U.E. Until 
now
Engineer Region of Attica Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration and 
Decentralisation 
43 2005 G. C. YES U.E. Until 
now
Librarian Athens 
University
Ministry of National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
44 2009 C66, 29.1.2009 V. T. YES C.E. Regular D Auxiliary  
Sanitary Staff
General Hospital 
"Korialeneio-
Benakeio 
Ministry of Health Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular D C.E. 
Auxiliary 
Staff
Joint 
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of the 
Interior and 
Minister of 
Health and 
Social 
Solidarity
45 2009 C66, 29.1.2009 V. Z. YES T.E. Regular A Management of 
Health Units
General Hospital 
of Athens 
"Laiko"
Ministry of Health Public Law 
Legal Entity 
Vacant 
Chart 
Position
Regular A T.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Joint 
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of the 
Interior and 
Minister of 
Health and 
Social 
Solidarity
46 2009 C151, 3.3.2009 V. K. YES C.E. Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
No 
Gra
de
Usher Anonymous 
Company for the 
Exploitation and 
Management of 
Greek Highways
Ministry of 
Environment, 
Planning and 
Public Works
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal 
position 
beyond the 
Organisati
onal Chart
Term of 
Office 
(Private 
Law of 
Indefinite 
Time)
No 
Gr
ad
e
C.E. Usher Joint 
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of the 
Interior and 
Minister of 
Environment, 
Planning and 
Public Works
47 2009 C164, 4.3.2009 M. L. YES U.E. Regular? B Administration-
Finance
Anonymous 
Company for the 
Exploitation and 
Management of 
Greek Highways
Ministry of 
Environment, 
Planning and 
Public Works
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Personal 
position 
beyond the 
Organisati
onal Chart
Regular B U.E. 
Administra
tion-
Finance
Joint 
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of the 
Interior and 
Minister of 
Environment, 
Planning and 
Public Works
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48 2010 C1241, 
31.12.2010
T. P. YES T.E. Regular C Administration-
Accounting
Health 
Procurement 
Committee
Ministry of Health Autonomous 
public service
Regular C T.E. 
Administra
tion-
Accountin
g
Joint 
Ministerial 
Decision
Minister of the 
Interior, 
Decentralisatio
n and 
Electronic 
Governance 
and Minister of 
Health and 
Social 
Solidarity
49 2006 E. V. YES S.E. Athens Water 
Supply and 
Sewerage 
Company 
(EYDAP S.A.)
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position in the 
public sector
1 2007 C594, 16.8.2007 E. V. Postgraduate 
degree
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
2 2007 C594, 16.8.2007 S. K. Postgraduate 
degree
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
3 2007 C594, 16.8.2007 P. P. Postgraduate 
degree
Regular D U.E. 
Communication
4 2007 C594, 16.8.2007 A.  T. Postgraduate 
degree
Regular D U.E. 
Communication
5 2007 C594, 16.8.2007 R. A. Postgraduate 
degree
Regular D T.E. Informatics Commercial and 
Industrial 
Chamber of 
Athens-End of 
working 
relationship G.G. 
vol.. C, no 718, 
14.9.2007
6 2007 C594, 16.8.2007 A. Z. Postgraduate 
degree
Regular D T.E. Informatics
7 2007 C594, 16.8.2007 D.  V. Postgraduate 
degree
Regular D U.E. Informatics
8 2007 C594, 16.8.2007 I. V. Postgraduate 
degree
Regular D U.E. Informatics Civil Servants'
Sickness 
Insurance Fund 
(OPAD)
-End of working 
relationship G.G. 
vol.. C, no 714, 
14.9.2007
9 2009 C296, 28.4.2009 A.  A. Compulsory 
Education
Regular D C.E. Auxiliary 
Staff
10 2009 C475, 22.6.2009 M. K. Postgraduate 
degree
Regular D U.E. 
Administration-
Finance
The Greek Ombudsman
Database on the Directly Hired Administrative Personnel
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Ombudsman and 
Deputy 
Ombudsmen
Retirement In Service 
Transfer
Previous 
positions
New 
appointments/po
sts
1 1998 1998 M. C. PhD (1999) Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Human Rights)
2000 Member of the 
Teaching 
Personnel under 
contract at the 
National School 
of Public 
Administration 
(1989-1992) 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
University of 
Cyprus, available 
at: 
http://www.test.uc
y.ac.cy/dir/188_2
010%20avril%20
CV%20May%20F
R%20%20WEB%
20Copy.pdf, date 
of access: 
8.2.2011
Member of the 
Teaching 
Personnel of the 
University of 
Cyprus.                 
(Sep. 2000-)          
Currently: 
Associate 
Professor  
Source: Official 
Website of the 
University of 
Cyprus, available 
at: 
http://www.test.uc
y.ac.cy/dir/188_2
010%20avril%20
CV%20May%20F
R%20%20WEB%
20Copy.pdf, date 
of access: 
8.2.2011
2 1998 1998 E. G. Secondary 
Education
Seconded from 
the Ministry of 
Finance
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Health and Social 
Welfare)
2000
3 1998 1998 M. A. University 
Degree/Post-
Graduate 
Seminaire 
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Quality of Life)
2003 Member of the 
Auxiliary 
Scientific 
Personnel of the 
Greek 
Ombudsman 
since 2003. Since 
2006 member of 
the Special 
Scientific 
Personnel 
Source: Annual 
Reports of the 
Greek 
Ombudsman 
(2003-2007)
4 1998 1998 M. T. Secondary 
Education
Seconded from 
the Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of State-
Citizens Relations)
2003
5 1998 1998 I. P. University Degree Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Ombudsman 
1999
6 1998 1998 D. P. Secondary 
Education
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Ombudsman 
2000
7 1999 1999 E. G. Secondary 
Education/Post-
Graduate 
Degree/Deree 
College
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Ombudsman 
2003
8 1999 1999 V. P. Secondary 
Education
Seconded from 
the National 
Centre for Social 
Research
Secretary of the 
Ombudsman 
2003
9 2000 2000 E. M. Secondary 
Education
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Human Rights)
Secretary of the 
Ombudsman 
(2003)
The Greek Ombudsman
Database on the seconded or directly hired secretaries of the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen
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10 2000 2000 E. K. Postgraduate 
Degree
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Health and Social 
Welfare)
2003
11 2000 2000 M. K. University Degree Seconded from 
the Publlic Debt 
Management 
Organisation 
(Ministry of 
Finance) 
Secretary of the 
Ombudsman 
2003
12 2002 2002 E. A. Secondary 
Education/Deree 
College
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Ombudsman 
2003
13 2003 2003 C. V. Technological 
Education Degree
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Human Rights)
? 2010
14 2003 2003 E. K. University Degree Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Health and Social 
Welfare)
? 2008
15 2003 2003 V. T. University Degree Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Quality of Life)
16 2003 2003 M. N. Postgraduate 
Degree
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of State-
Citizens Relations)
17 2003 2003 E. P. Posgraduate 
Degree
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Children's Rights) 
18 2003 2003 D. K. Secondary 
Education
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Ombudsman 
19 2003 2003 M.-A. P. University Degree Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Ombudsman 
20 A. T. University 
Degree, 
Postgraduate 
Student at the 
Departement of 
Political Science 
and Public 
Administration, 
Athens University 
(Academic Year 
2009-2010), 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
University of  
Athens, available 
at: 
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Gender Equality) 
http://kdp.pspa.uo
a.gr/Anakoinwsi%
20SYMBOYLOI%
20SPOYDWN.do
c
date of access: 
8.2.2011
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Deputy 
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sts
21 D. Y. University 
Degree, 
Postgraduate 
Student Source: 
Official Website 
of the Greek 
National Centre 
for Social 
Research, 
Campaing 
Support Against 
the closure of the 
Greek National 
Centre for Social 
Research 
http://www2.ekke.
gr/~ekkegr/signat
ures.php?s=2&pa
ge=70, date of 
access: 
18.4.2011
Private law 
employment 
contract 
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Human Rights)
22 E. G. ? Seconded from 
the Ministry of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation
Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Quality of Life)
? Secretariat
23 E. A. ? ? Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Quality of Life)
? Secretariat
24 E. K. ? ? Secretary of the 
Deputy Ombudsman 
(Department of 
Quality of Life)
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1 1998 A.R. 1998 S. V. Human Rights 2001 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Political Science 
and Public 
Administration of 
Athens University 
(subject: 
International and 
European Studies 
with an emphasis 
on Modern 
Policies and their 
Institutional 
Dimensions) G.G. 
vol. NPDD, no 72, 
5.4.2001
2 1998 A.R. 1998 A. D. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Secondment to 
the Political Office 
of the Prime 
Minister as 
Special Adviser 
(G.G. vol. YODD, 
no 456, 
20.10.2009)
3 1998 A.R. 1998 M. K. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Annuled Ministry of 
the Interior
4 1998 A.R. 1998 M. K. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Annuled Ministry of 
Developme
nt
Database on the seconded and directly hired Scientific Personnel
The Greek Ombudsman 
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5 1998 A.R. 1998 P. L. Human Rights Passe
d away 
in 
1999/   
A.R. 
1999
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES National 
Statistical 
Service of 
Greece 
Ministry of 
Economics
6 1998 A.R. 1998 I. M. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Ministry of 
National 
Economy
Ministry of 
National 
Economy
7 1998 A.R. 1998 I. M. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES YES Prefecture 
of Athens
Ministry of the 
Interior
8 1998 A.R. 1998 K. B. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Secondment as 
Special 
Collaborator at the 
General 
Secretariat of the 
Government by 
decision of the 
Prime Minister 
Konstantinos 
Karamanlis (2004-
2008) G.G. vol. C, 
no 79, 23.3.2004 
Revocation of the 
secondment by 
decision of the 
Prime Minister 
Georgios 
Papandreou (G.G. 
YODD, vol. 493, 
20.11.2009)
Member of the 
Committee for the 
modernisation and 
review of the legal 
framework of 
Regions            
End of work: 
31.12.2004 (G.G. 
vol. B, no 1345, 
31.8.2004) 
Member of the 
Special Legislative 
Drafting 
Committee for the 
final processing 
and formulation of 
the draft law on 
the establishment 
of the Judicial 
Police (G.G. vol. 
B, no 701, 
25.5.2005)
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8 K. B. Member of the 
Working Group for 
the conduct of 
preliminary works 
on the codification 
of the legislation 
regarding Primary 
and Secondary 
Education      End 
of work: 31.3.2007 
(G.G. vol. B, no 
1607, 1.11.2006)
Member of the 
Committee for the 
modernisation and 
review of the legal 
framework on 
Regions           
End of work: 
30.9.2007              
(G.G. vol. B, no 
77, 27.2.2007)
Member of the 
Committee for the 
modernisation and 
review of the legal 
framework on 
Regions           
End of work: 
31.12.2008            
(G.G. vol. B, no 
233, 28.5.2008)
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9 1998 A.R. 1998 A. T. Human Rights 2010 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate 
Degree/PhD 
2006
YES Deputy 
Ombudsman of 
the Department of 
Human Rights 
(G.G. vol. C,  no 
148, 27.6.2003) 
Assumption of 
duties: 3.7.2003 
10 1998 A.R. 1998 M. T. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Member of  the 
Hellenic League 
for Human Rights 
(HLHR), Source: 
Newspaper 
Kathimerini, 
available at: 
http://news.kathim
erini.gr/4Dcgi/4Dc
gi/_w_articles_civ
_118_28/03/2009_
309181, date of 
access: 6.6.2010
11 1999 A.R. 1999 C.C. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Deputy 
Ombudswoman of 
the Department of 
Quality of Life 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
135, 1.6.2005) 
Assumption of 
duties: 6.6.2005
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12 2001 A.R. 2001 C. S. Human Rights 2010 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES YES Ministry of 
National 
Economy 
and 
Finance
Decision 
(3680/21.1.2011) 
for the assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
13 2003 A.R. 2003 L. B. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
University  
Degree
YES Decision 
(16763/29.12.201
0) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
NGOs                    
Member of the 
Research Centre 
for Minority 
Groups (KEMO) 
Source: Official 
Website of KEMO, 
available at: 
http://www.kemo.g
r/index.php?sec=
members, date of 
access: 2.5.2010
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14 2003 A.R. 2003 C. P. Human Rights 2009 Special Scientific 
Personnel
YES Vice-President 
of the 
Management 
Board of the 
National Centre 
for Vocational 
Guidance Three-
year mandate 
(G.G. vol. B, no 
721, 22.8.1996)
Assistant 
Professor at the 
Department of 
Law of the 
University of 
Cyprus (subject: 
Penal Law)  
Source: Decision 
14 of the Senate 
of the University of 
Cyprus dated July 
1, 2009, available 
at: 
http://194.42.1.1/~
rector/summaries/
senate/Sen14200
9.htm, date of 
access: 2.5.2010
Member of the 
Working Group 
in his capacity 
as Adviser of the 
Minister of 
Justice for the 
amendment of 
law 927/79 
regarding the 
punishment of 
acts aiming at 
racial 
discrimination 
(G.G. vol. B, no 
278, 20.3.1998)
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14 C. P. Member of the 
Working Group 
in his capacity 
as Adviser of the 
Minister of 
Justice on the 
codification of 
provisions 
regarding the 
punishment of 
the violators of 
drug legislation 
and the 
collection of 
international 
conventions 
referring to 
these criminal 
acts  (G.G. vol. 
B, no 291, 
24.3.1998)
Member of the 
Legislative 
Drafting 
Committee in his 
capacity as 
Adviser of the 
Minister of 
Justice on the 
final elaboration 
of the draft law 
Prison Code 
(G.G. vol. B, no 
1232, 
4.12.1998)
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14 C. P. Member of the 
Working Group 
in his capacity 
as Adviser of the 
Minister of 
Justice on the 
study and 
elaboration of 
issues regarding 
child 
pornography 
(G.G. vol. B, no 
1253, 
14.12.1998) 
Ex officio 
member of the 
National 
Committee for 
Human Rights 
representing the 
Ministry of 
Justice (G.G. 
vol. B, no 1833, 
1.10.1999) 
Revocation of 
the appointment 
(G.G. vol. B, no 
269, 15.3.2001)
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14 C. P. Special 
Collaborator at 
the Political 
Office of the 
Minister of 
Justice      (G.G. 
vol. C, no 104, 
27.4.2000) 
Revocation of 
the appointment: 
31.3.2001  (G.G. 
vol. C, no 86, 
20.3.2001)
Member of the  
Working Group 
on the 
elaboration, 
study and 
formulation of 
the draft of the 
ratifying law and 
the necessary 
adjustments of 
the national 
legislation for 
the Convention 
on Corruption of 
the Council of 
Europe (G.G. 
vol. B, no 1167, 
21.9.2000)
15 2005 A.R. 2005 E. K. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
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Party 
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16 2006 A.R. 2006 I. D. Human 
Rights/Gender 
Equality 2010
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES YES Corps of 
Labour 
Inspection
Ministry of 
Labour and 
Social Security
17 1998 A.R. 1998 K. L. Human Rights Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2003
Alternate Member 
of the  Committee 
for the Evaluation 
of Proposals for 
the 2009 Annual 
Programme of our 
country within the 
framework of the 
European 
Integration Fund. 
Action 09/2.1 
entitled: 
Elaboration of a 
study on the 
issue: Women's 
Migration in 
Greece (G.G. vol. 
YODD, no 337, 
18.10.2010) 
18 1998 A.R. 1998 A. M. Human Rights State-Citizen 
Relations/200
4
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate Degree 
(2002)
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2003
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19 1998 A.R. 1998 A. P. Human Rights Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2004
Regular Member 
of the Project 
Management 
Group for the 
codification of the 
existing legislation 
on the 
establishment, 
maintenance and 
operation of 
cemeteries and 
the formulation 
and elaboration of 
proposals for 
reforming and 
streamlining the 
current legal 
framework End of 
work: 31.6.2009     
(G.G. vol. YODD, 
no 171, 
16.4.2009)
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19 A. P. Decision (250 
Φ33.02/14.1.2011
) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
20 1998 A.R. 1998 A. S. Human Rights Quality of 
Life/2003
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate Degree 
(2000)
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2003
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21 1998 A.R. 1998 K.  S. Human Rights 2006 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2003
2006: Director of 
the Sector for the 
Protection of 
Refugees at the 
United Nations 
Refugee Agency 
in Athens,  
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the Greek 
Ombudsman, 
available at: 
http://www.synigor
os.gr/allodapoi/ne
ws_archive.htm, 
date of access: 
1.2.2011
22 2001 A.R. 2001 E. P. Human Rights Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Unpaid leave of 18
months in order to 
work as an 
employee of 
auxiliary duties 
(agent auxiliaire A)
at the General 
Directorate of 
Research of the 
European 
Commission (Unit 
A2-Support for 
Research 
Programme 
Implementation) in 
Brussels
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23 2003 A.R. 2003 M. V. Human Rights Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
24 2003 A.R. 2003 E. M. Human Rights Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
25 2003 A.R. 2003 D. M. Human Rights Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
26 2003 A.R. 2003 A. -G. R. Human Rights 2005 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Candidate at the 
elections of the 
Athens Bar 
Association in 
2002. Source: 
Newspaper 
Imerisia on Line, 
available at: 
http://www.imerisi
a.gr/article.asp?ca
tid=12305&subid=
2&pubid=49419, 
date of access: 
22.3.2011
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27 2003 A.R. 2003 I. T. Human Rights 2011 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree/PhD 
Source: The 
Official Website
of Harvard 
University, 
available at: 
http://socialstu
dies.fas.harvar
d.edu/icb/icb.d
o?keyword=k66
535&tabgroupi
d=icb.tabgroup
99354, date of 
access: 
29.4.2011
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
Lecturer at 
Harvard University 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
Harvard 
University, 
available at: 
http://socialstudies
.fas.harvard.edu/ic
b/icb.do?keyword=
k66535&tabgroupi
d=icb.tabgroup993
54, date of 
access: 29.4.2011 
Submission of 
resignation from 
the Greek 
Ombudsman on 
January 2, 2011. 
Source: Diavgeia, 
available at: 
static.diavgeia.gov
.gr/doc/4ΑΡΩΙΜ0-
9, date of access: 
29.4.2011
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28 2003 A.R. 2003 G. T. Human Rights Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
On secondment 
as Advisor of the 
Secretary General 
for Migration 
Policy 
(renamed as 
General 
Secretariat for 
Population and 
Social Cohesion) 
at the Ministry of 
the Interior, 
Decentralization 
and Electronic 
Governance, 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Independent 
Ecumenical 
Newspaper for the 
Greeks of North 
Epirus, To Orama, 
Independent 
available at: 
http://toorama.blo
gspot.com/2010/1
2/blog-
post_30.html, date 
of access: 
17.4.2011
Alternate Member 
of the Project 
Management 
Team for the 
codification of the 
existing legislation 
on the 
establishment, 
maintenance and 
operation of 
cemeteries and 
the formulation 
and elaboration of 
proposals for 
reforming and 
streamlining the 
current legal 
framework              
End of work: 
31.6.2009          
(G.G. vol. YODD, 
no 171, 
16.4.2009)
Member of  the 
Hellenic League 
for Human Rights 
(HLHR), Source: 
Official Website of 
the HLHR, 
available at: 
http://webcache.g
oogleusercontent.
com/search?q=ca
che:http://www.hlh
r.gr/press/Europea
nIntegrationForum
brussels11.2009.d
oc, date of 
access: 1.2.2011
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29 1998 A.R. 1998 I. A. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Secondment: 
President of the 
Second Regional 
Health Council of 
South Aegean, 
five-year mandate, 
G.G. vol. NPDD, 
no 87, 27.4.2001
30 1998 A.R. 1998 Z. A. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
31 1998 A.R. 1998 A. V. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES YES Ministry of 
Health and 
Welfare
32 1998 A.R. 1998 D. G. Health and 
Social Welfare
2001 Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES YES Ministry of 
National 
Economy
33 1998 A.R. 1998 T. G. Health and 
Social Welfare
2004 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES YES Ministry of 
the Interior
34 1998 A.R. 1998 S. K. Health and 
Social Welfare
2005 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES YES Agricultural 
Security 
Organisatio
n
Ministry of Labor
and Social 
Security and 
Welfare
35 1998 A.R. 1998 C. M. Health and 
Social Welfare
1999 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Lecturer at the 
General 
Department of 
Law, Panteion 
University of 
Political and 
Social Sciences 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
357, 1.6.2007)
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36 1998 A.R. 1998 V. B. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/PhD 
2001
YES Secondment at 
the Political Office 
of the Minister of 
Development 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
300, 10.11.2004)   
De iure end of the 
secondment from 
26.4.2005 after 
her appointment 
as Deputy 
Ombudswoman of 
the Consumer 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
137, 2.6.2005)  
Deputy 
Ombudswoman of 
the Consumer 5 
year mandate 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
137, 2.6.2005)
37 1998 A.R. 1998 R. P. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Ministry of 
Public 
Order
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38 1998 A.R. 1998 K.  P. Health and 
Social Welfare
State-Citizen 
Relations/200
4
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/PhD 
2005
YES YES Agricultural 
Security 
Organisatio
n
Ministry of 
Labor, Social 
Secutity and 
Welfare
Scientific 
Collaborator 
(member of the 
teaching 
Personnel under 
contract) of the 
Department of 
Local Authorities 
of the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institute of 
Kalamata 
Academic Years 
2009-2010, 2010-
2011 Source: 
Official Website of 
the Educational 
Institute of 
Kalamata, 
available at: 
http://195.130.95.
180/unistudent/Pe
rsonnellist.asp?lev
el=2&mnuid=progr
am;submnu2&prID
, date of access: 
7.6.2010, 
http://195.130.95.
7/attachments/arti
cle/51/pr_ta_10-
11_xeim.doc, date 
of access: 
3.2.2011
39 1998 A.R. 1998 P.  T. Health and 
Social Welfare
2001 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
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40 1999 A.R. 1999 I. K. Health and 
Social Welfare
2000 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Special Legal 
Service at the 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (G.G. vol. 
C, no 33, 
17.2.2000)
41 1999 A.R. 1999 M. P. Health and 
Social Welfare
2003/Children
's Rights
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate 
Degree(2000)
YES NGOs                   
Alternate Member 
of the 
Management 
Board of  the 
Hellenic League 
for Human Rights 
(HLHR), Source: 
Official Website of 
the HLHR, 
available at: 
http://www.hlhr.gr/
details.php?id=18, 
date of access: 
1.2.2011 Member 
of the Research 
Centre for Minority 
Groups (KEMO) 
Source: Official 
Website of KEMO, 
available at: 
http://www.kemo.g
r/index.php?sec=
members, date of 
access: 2.5.2010
720
S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette: Vol, 
No of issue-
Date   /           
Annual 
Report A.R.
Name-
Surname
Department Transfer to 
another 
Department
Retire
ment
Category of 
Scientific 
Personnel
Level of 
Education
Graduate of 
the National 
School of 
Public 
Administratio
n
New 
appoint
ment
Secon
dment 
from 
anoth
er 
civil 
servic
e 
posts 
Impleme
ntation 
of the 
secondm
ent
Service Supervising 
Ministry
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category 
Transfers, 
Secondments 
from the 
Ombudsman to 
the public sector
Previous 
positions in the 
public sector
New 
Appointments in 
the Public Sector
Parallel 
Occupation 
(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society/Trade 
Unionism
42 1999 A.R. 1999 E. F. Health and 
Social Welfare
Human 
Rights/2004
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Member of the 
teaching 
Personnel under 
contract of the 
Greek Open 
University (2001-) 
Source: Greek 
Open University, 
available at: 
http://www.eap.gr/
ak_pros/deo10.ht
m, date of access: 
2.2.2011                
Member of the 
Special Legislative 
Drafting 
Committee for the 
reform of the 
Prison Code 
ratified by the law 
2776/1999 End of 
work: 31.12.2010 
(G.G. vol. YODD, 
no 96, 17.3.2010)
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42 E. F. Decision 
(16485/31.12.201
0) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
43 2001 A.R. 2001 P. G. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES YES Ministry of 
Health and 
Welfare
44 2001 A.R. 2001 P. K. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
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45 2001 A.R. 2001 I. K. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES YES General 
Secreetaria
t of the 
National 
Statistical 
Service of 
Greece
Ministry of 
Economics
Decision (250 
Φ233.02/14.1.201
1) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
46 2001 A.R. 2001 A. M. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES YES Ministry of 
Developme
nt
47 2003 A.R. 2003 S. A. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES
48 2003 A.R. 2003 A. M.-N. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
49 2003 A.R. 2003 K. B. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
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50 2003 A.R. 2003 E. P. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Decision 
(16485/31.12.201
0) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
51 2003 A.R. 2003 E.  S. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
52 2003 A.R. 2003 P. T. Health and 
Social Welfare
2007 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Lawyer with a 
salary mandate at 
the General 
Hospital of Athens 
“Hippokrateion”(G
overnment 
Gazette, vol. C, no 
522, 30.7.2007)
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53 2005 A.R. 2005 P. Z. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Decision 
(3680/21.1.2011) 
for the assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
54 2005 A.R. 2005 V. T. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Adjunct Professor 
at the Police 
Officers School 
and the  Further 
Education and 
Training School of 
the Hellenic Police 
Academy 
Academic Years 
2003-2009  
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54 V. T. Adjunct Professor 
at the University of 
Aegean (Dptm of 
Product and 
Systems Design 
Engineering)  
Academic Year 
2004-2005,   
University of 
Patras (Dptm of 
Business 
Administration) 
Academic Year 
2006-2008  
Source: CV, 
Official Website of 
the Department of 
Political Science 
of the Demokritos 
University of 
Thrace, available 
at:http://www.pols
ci.duth.gr/user/69, 
date of access: 
6.6.2010
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54 V. T. Adjunct Professor 
at the University of 
Central Greece 
(Dptm of 
Economic and 
Regional 
Development), 
Academic Years: 
2007-2010 
http://www.poa.uc
g.gr/upload/11114
5_livadia.pdf, date 
of access: 
6.6.2010
Adjunct Professor 
at the Demokritos 
University of 
Thrace (Dptm of 
Political Science) 
Academic Year: 
2009-2010 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Department of 
Political Science 
of the Demokritos 
University of 
Thrace, available 
at:http://www.pols
ci.duth.gr/user/69, 
date of access: 
6.6.2010 
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54 V. T. Scientific 
Collaborator under 
constract at the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institute of Athens 
(TEI) 
(Departments of 
Social Work and 
Department 
Commerce and 
Marketing) 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institute of 
Athens, Academic 
Years 2008-2010 
available at: 
www.teiath.gr/user
files/jgialpas/docu
ments/.../marketin
g.pdf, 
https://estudy.teiat
h.gr/unistudent/Pe
rsonnellist.asp?lev
el=2&mnuid=progr
am;submnu2&prID
=112
date of access: 
6.6.2010
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54 V. T. Expert - Assessor, 
member of the 
Unified Assessors 
Register for the 
technical 
assessment of the 
bids of the 
international open 
tender for the 
selection of 
contractors for the 
project "Training of
unemployed in 
certified Centres 
of Vocational 
Training for the 
period 2006-2008 
following the Call 
for Proposals 
(ministerial 
decision no 
184090/25.8.2006 
of the Minister of 
Development and 
Social Protection 
within the 
framework of the 
Operational 
Programme 
"Employement 
and Vocational 
Training" co-
financed by the 
European Union 
(G.G. vol. B, no 
278, 2.3.2007)
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54 V. T. Decision 
(3680/21.1.2011) 
for the assignment 
of Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
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54 V. T. Member of the 
hourly paid 
teaching 
Personnel for the 
training of the 
special unifromed 
personnel of the 
Municipal Police 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Ministry of the 
Interior, available 
at: 
http://webcache.g
oogleusercontent.
com/search?q=ca
che:http://www.yp
es.gr/UserFiles/e5
0fe769-b130-4051-
aac3-
a2d281ea9393/an
akoinosi_apoteles
mata_4_2009n.do
c, date of access: 
9.4.2011 
55 2006 A.R. 2006 I. K. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
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56 2006 A.R. 2006 E.  L. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Member of the 
Personnel of 
Auditors of the 
Hellenic Data 
Protection 
Authority (G.G. 
vol. C, no 8, 
16.1.2006) 
Submission of 
resignation on 
23.6.2006 (G.G. 
vol. C, 272, 
14.9.2006) 
Member of the 
working group for 
the conduct of  
preliminary works  
regarding the 
elaboration of a 
Code on the 
legislation on the 
National Health 
System End of 
work: 30.11.2006 
(G.G. vol. B, no 
727, 15.6.2006)
Adjunct Professor 
at the Department 
of Law of the 
Demokritus 
University of 
Thrace. Source: 
Official Website of 
Department of 
Law of the 
Demokritus 
University of 
Thrace, available 
at: 
http://www.law.dut
h.gr/index.php?rm
=30&pr=5&srm=1, 
date of access: 
2.2.2011
57 2006 A.R. 2006 K-E. T. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
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58 2006 A.R. 2006 I. T. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Security 
Fund of 
Marine 
Agents and 
Employees
Ministry of 
Employment 
and Social 
Protection
Decision (250 
Φ233.02/14.1.201
1) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
59 1998 A.R. 1998 E. G. Health and 
Social Welfare
Children's 
Rights/ 2004
2010 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
60 1998 A.R. 1998 C.  D. Health and 
Social Welfare
2000 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Appointment at 
the Ministry of 
Economics as 
U.E. Tax Officer 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
153, 30.5.2000)
61 1998 A.R. 1998 V. M. Health and 
Social Welfare
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
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62 1998 A.R. 1998 E. M. Health and 
Social Welfare
2003/Children
's Rights - 
Human 
Rights/2006
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2003
63 1998 A.R. 1998 E. S. Health and 
Social Welfare
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2003
64 1998 A.R. 1998 A.  T. Health and 
Social Welfare
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
65 1999 A.R. 1999 E. V. Health and 
Social Welfare
2001 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree-DESS
YES
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66 1999 A.R. 1999 K. M. Health and 
Social Welfare
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Special Scientific 
Personnel-2001
On Secondment 
to  the Political 
Office of the 
Minister of Health 
and Social 
Solidarity from 
25.10.2004 (G.G. 
vol. C, no 330, 
17.12.2004) 
Renewal of the 
Secondment at 
the Political Office 
of the Minister of 
Health and Social 
Solidarity from 
16.2.2006 (G.G. 
vol. C, no 107, 
11.4.2006) 
Revocation of the 
secondment (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 
111, 19.3.2007)
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66 K. M. Legal Advisor of 
the Mayor of 
Athens (indirect 
information) (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 
299, 18.7.2007) 
Member of the 
Management 
Board of the 
Society for the 
Protection of 
Minors of Athens, 
representing the 
Municipality of 
Athens, Source: 
The Official 
Website of the 
Society for the 
Protection of 
Minors of Athens, 
available at: 
http://www.epaa.g
r/, date of access: 
17.4.2011, 
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66 K. M. Member of the 
Management 
Board of the 
Athens Municipal 
Radio Enterprise, 
Athens 9.84, 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the Radio Station, 
available at: 
http://athina984.gr
/node/2118, date 
of access: 
17.4.2011
Revocation of the 
appointment: 
10.2.2011, 
Source: 
http://www.athina9
84.gr/node/13693
4, date of access: 
17.4.2011 
Member of the 
National 
Commission for 
the Social 
Integration of 
Migrants, 2 year 
mandate. G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 
299, 18.7.2007 
67 2001 A.R. 2001 D.  P. Health and 
Social Welfare
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel-2003
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68 2003 A.R. 2003 A. A. Health and 
Social Welfare
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
69 2003 A.R. 2003 E. G. Health and 
Social Welfare
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
70 2003 A.R. 2003 E. K. Health and 
Social Welfare
2007 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
Succeeded in the 
entrance 
examinations for 
the National 
School of Judicial 
Officials, (G.G. 
vol. C, no 118, 
1.3.2007)               
Appointed to the 
Court of Audit, 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
1106, 4.12.2008) 
71 2003 A.R. 2003 E. M. Health and 
Social Welfare
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
On Secondment 
to the Political 
Office of the 
Minister of Health 
and Social 
Solidarity (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 
504, 1.12.2009)
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72 2003 A.R. 2003 E. P. Health and 
Social Welfare
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
73 2003 A.R. 2003 F. P. Health and 
Social Welfare
Human 
Rights/2006
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
74 2003 A.R. 2003 S.  C. Health and 
Social Welfare
2004 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Ministry of 
Transport as U.E. 
Chemist. Source: 
Diavgeia, 
static.diavgeia.gov
.gr/doc/4Ι091-9, 
date of access: 
18.4.2011
75 1998 A.R. 1998 C. A. Quality of Life 2002 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Constructio
ns - 
EKTENEP
OL 
Anonymous 
Company of the 
National 
Insurance
76 1998 A.R. 1998 K. A. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
77 1998 A.R. 1998 M. V. Quality of Life 2004 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES YES Civil 
Aviation 
Authority
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communication
s
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78 1998 A.R. 1998 N. V. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate Degree 
2004
YES On Secondment 
to the Office of the 
Minister of 
Environment, 
Energy and 
Climatic Change 
as Special Adviser 
(G.G. vol. YODD, 
no 64, 22.2.2010)
Member of the 
Management 
Board of the 
Hellenic Mapping 
and Cadastral 
Organisation 
(OKXE) (three 
year-mandate) 
(G.G. vol. YODD, 
no 5, 17.1.2011)
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78 N. V. Member of the 
Working Group for 
the submission of 
a recommendation 
upon the 
necessary 
amendments 
regarding the legal 
framework on 
quarries. Source: 
Diavgeia, 
Ministerial 
Decision, available
at: 
static.diavgeia.gov
.gr/doc/4ΑΛΑ0-Ψ, 
date of access: 
22.3.2011
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79 1998 A.R. 1998 K. L. Quality of Life 2001 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Ministry of 
the Interior. 
Appointme
nt at the 
Greek 
Ombudsma
n in 2003
Special Scientist 
of  the Unit of 
Strategic 
Planning and 
Policy Analysis 
of the Ministry of 
the Interior 
Source: Who is 
who in Greece, 
available at: 
http://www.whoi
swho-verlag.gr, 
date of access: 
7.6.2010
Since 1994 
external 
collaborator of the 
Third Programme 
of the Greek 
Radio, responsible 
for the opera 
broadcasts of the 
radio station. 
Since 1997 he has 
been writing 
articles as music 
critic for the 
newspaper AVGI -
Sunday issue 
(expressing the 
party of the left, 
Coalition) Source: 
Who is who in 
Greece, available 
at: 
http://www.whoisw
ho-verlag.gr, date 
of access: 
7.6.2010
Trade-unionist  He 
served as Vice-
President and is 
member of the 
Management 
Board of the 
Association of the 
Employees of the 
Greek 
Ombudsman 
Source: Who is 
who in Greece, 
available at: 
http://www.whoisw
ho-verlag.gr, date 
of access: 
7.6.2010
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80 1998 A.R. 1998 V. B. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Member of the 
teaching 
Personnel under 
contract of the 
Greek Open 
University 
(Academic Year: 
2006-2007) 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Greek Open 
University, 
available at: 
http://www.eap.gr/
programmes/diplo
matikes/pse/stoixe
ia_sep_de_2006_
2007.xls, date of 
access: 8.6.2010
81 1998 A.R. 1998 A. N. Quality of Life 2004 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Ministry of 
Environme
nt, 
Planning 
and Public 
Works
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82 1998 A.R. 1998 A. O. Quality of Life 1999 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Member the 
special scientific 
Personnel at the 
National Council 
for Radio and 
Television Source: 
Diavgeia, Decision 
9/2011, available 
at: 
static.diavgeia.gov
.gr/doc/4A1ΘΙΜΕ-
4, date of access: 
22.3.2011
83 1998 A.R. 1998 M. P. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
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84 1998 A.R. 1998 A. P. Quality of Life 2002 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Special 
Collaborator at 
the Ministry of 
Culture (starting 
from 
11.12.2000) 
G.G. vol. C, no 
79, 23.3.2004. 
Revocation of 
the appointment: 
18.3.2004 (G.G. 
vol. C, no 348, 
19.12.2004)
Member of the  
Personnel of the 
Management 
Organisation Unit 
of Development 
Programmes 
(MOU) S.A. 
supervised by the 
Ministry of 
Economy (April 
2002)                     
Legal Adviser at 
the Managing 
Authority of the 
Operational 
Programme 
"Education and 
Initial Vocational 
Training" of the 
Ministry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs 
(October 2005)     
Member of the 
Scientific 
Committee 
constituted by the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration 
regarding the 
reforming of the 
legislation of the 
Centre  
Appointed as 
Associate 
Professor (Human 
Rights Unit) at the 
School of Officers 
of the Greek 
Police pursuant to 
the no 
6501/5/83b/20.8.1
998 decision of 
the Chief of the 
Greek Police 
(academic year: 
1998-1999)  
Member of the 
Teaching 
Personnel under 
contract at the 
University of 
Thessaly for the 
Academic Year 
2000-2001 Legal 
Adviser of the 
Research Group 
regarding the 
promotion of the 
archaelogical sites 
of the city of Argos 
and their 
harmonious 
incorporation  into 
the urban web 
(March 2000)
Member of the 
Council of 
Students of the 
Political Youth 
"Rigas Feraios" 
(1985-1987) 
(Party of the 
Greek Left)          
Secretary of the 
association of the 
scientific 
Personnel of the 
Greek 
Ombudsman  
Member of the 
Sector on Gender 
Equality of the 
Central Committee
of PASOK (2003-
2004)                     
President of the  
Institute of 
Strategic and 
Development 
Studies - Andreas 
Papandreou 
(ISTAME) of 
Magnessia (2004)  
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84 A.  P. Source: 
Papatolias CV, 
available at: 
http://papatolias.w
ordpress.com/abo
ut/, date of 
access: 2.5.2010 
Member of the 
Committee for the 
conduct of a 
tender and the 
assessment of the 
bids for the project 
"Technical Adviser 
for the Support of 
the Special 
Service for the 
Implementation of 
Programmes of 
the Third 
Community 
Support 
Framework
Special Adviser at 
the Municipality of 
Haidari on issues 
regarding the 
implementation of 
European Projects 
and the 
elaboration of 
studies for the 
promotion of 
programmes 
related to the 
Olympic Games of 
2004 (June 2001)  
Source: 
Papatolias CV, 
available at: 
http://papatolias.w
ordpress.com/abo
ut/, date of 
access: 2.5.2011
Parliamentary 
Candidate of 
PASOK in 
Magnessia in the 
National Elections 
of 2000 (2nd 
Runner-up)  
Imposition of a 
fine to 
Parliamentary 
Candidates of the 
National Elections 
of 2000 for not 
publishing their 
electoral income 
and expenses in a 
newspaper of their 
electoral 
constituency 
(Apostoloa 
Papatolias, no 
1148 of the 
relevant list  
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84 A. P. of the Ministry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs 
as final beneficiary 
of the projects of 
Operational 
Programme 
"Education and 
Initial Vocational 
Training" (G.G. 
vol. B, no 187, 
13.2.2006) 
Member of the 
Work 
Management 
Group for the 
Simplification of 
Procedures and 
Forms in Public 
Administration 
(G.G. vol. B, no 
192, 20.2.2002)
for the imposition 
of a fine) G.G. vol. 
B, no 411, 
11.4.2001. 
Moreover, it 
seems that he did 
not resign from his 
post at the Greek 
Ombudsman  prior 
to his nomination 
as parliamentary 
candidate 
pursuant to article 
56 of the 
1975/1986 
Constitution
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84 A. P. He was elected 
Prefect of 
Magnessia in the 
Prefectural and 
Municipal 
Elections of 2006, 
Source: Ministry of 
the Interior, 
http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.
eu/2006static/nom
arxia37.htm, date 
of access, 
31.1.2011              
He ran for 
Regional  
Commissioner of 
the region of 
Thessaly in the 
Municipal and 
Regional Elections 
of 2010. Member 
of the Regional 
Council  Source: 
Ministry of the 
Interior, available 
at: http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.
eu/dn2010/public/i
ndex.html#{"page"
:"level","params":{"
level":"snom_n","id
":5}}, date of 
access: 31.1.2011
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84 A.P. Founder of the 
NGO "Network of 
Voluntary 
Organisations of 
Magnessia" 
(2000)                    
Member of the 
Events 
Committees of 
"Citizen 
Everyday", a non-
profit corporation 
for th e promotion 
of participatory 
democracy  
founded in 2005 
by the Network 
Volunteers of 
PASOK Source: 
Papatolias CV, 
available at: 
http://papatolias.w
ordpress.com/abo
ut/, date of 
access: 2.5.2010
85 1999 A.R. 1999 A. K. Quality of Life 2000 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Special Legal 
Service at the 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (G.G. vol. 
C, no 33, 
17.2.2000)
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86 1999 A.R. 1999 E. L. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Secondment to 
the Political Office 
of the Deputy 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (G.G. vol. 
YODD, no 520, 
11.12.2009)
Member of the 
Sector for the 
Environment and 
Planning of the 
party of PASOK, 
date of publication 
of the composition 
of the Sector: 
8.12.2008 Source: 
Official Website of 
PASOK, available 
at: 
http://www.pasok.
gr/portal/resource/
contentObject/id/7
d45db1b-7f0c-
426d-a97b-
a72139975caf, 
date of access: 
8.6.2010
87 1999 A.R. 1999 Angeliki 
Bosdogianni
Quality of Life 2000 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Appointment at 
the Ministry of 
Finance as U.E. 
Engineers (G.G. 
vol. C, no 17, 
27.1.2000)
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88 2000 A.R. 1999 K. P. Quality of Life Chrildren's 
Rights/2004
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES YES Ministry of 
the Interior
      
Second Vice-
President of the 
Union of the 
Graduates of the 
National Schools 
of Public 
Administration and 
Local 
Government. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the Union, 
available at: 
http://nspa.gr/nom
othesia.htm, date 
of access: 
22.3.2011
89 2001 A.R. 2001 Charikleia 
Athanassopo
ulou
Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
90 2001 A.R. 2001 M. G. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Ministry of 
Environme
nt, 
Planning 
and Public 
Works
91 2001 A.R. 2001 Z. K-R. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Ministry of 
Environme
nt, 
Planning 
and Public 
Works
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92 2001 A.R. 2001 C. T. Quality of Life 2009 Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/             
PhD  (2007)
YES Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Law of the 
University of 
Cyprus (subject: 
Human Rights)  
Source: Decision 
14 of the Senate 
of the University of 
Cyprus dated July 
1, 2009, available 
at: 
http://194.42.1.1/~
rector/summaries/
senate/Sen14200
9.htm, date of 
access: 2.5.2010
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93 2002 A.R. 2002 K. P. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Ministry of 
National 
Defence 
(Appointme
nt: G.G. 
vol. C, no 
175, 
20.6.2000)
Member of the 
Teaching 
Personnel under 
contract pursuant 
to the Presidential 
Decree 407/80 at 
the Department of 
Ichthyology and 
Aquatic 
Environment of 
the University of 
Thessaly (Spring 
Semester, 
Academic Year 
2009-2010) 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
University of 
Thessaly, 
available at: 
http://www.apae.ut
h.gr/prosopiko_did
pd_407.html, date 
of access: 
7.6.2010
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93 K. P. Decision 
(2299/8.3.2011) 
for the assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
94 2003 A.R. 2003 E. M. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
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95 2003 A.R. 2003 E. S. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Member of the 
teaching 
Personnel under 
contract of the 
Greek Open 
University 
Academic Years: 
2009-2010, 2010-
2011 Source: 
Official Webpage 
of the Greek Open 
University, 
available at: 
http://www1.eap.g
r/images/pspde_k
atanomi_2009_10
_F11545.xls, 
http://www2.eap.g
r/frameset.jsp?loc
ale=el, date of 
access: 3.2.2011
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96 2003 A.R. 2003 S. S. Quality of Life Health and 
Social 
Welfare/2005
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Laboratory 
Collaborator at the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institution of 
Athens (TEI) 
(Department of 
Public Health) for 
the Academic 
Year 2009-2010 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institution of 
Athens, available 
at: 
https://estudy.teiat
h.gr/unistudent/Pe
rsonnellist.asp?lev
el=2&mnuid=progr
am;submnu2&prID
=74, date of 
access: 8.6.2010
97 2003 A.R. 2003 E.  F. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
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98 2005 A.R. 2005 V. K. Quality of Life 2010 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Lecturer at the 
Departement of 
General Law of 
the Panteion 
University for 
Social and 
Political Sciences 
(subject: 
European 
Administrative 
Law) G.G. vol. C, 
no 463, 7.6.2010)
Decision (1464 
Φ.233.02/15.2.201
1) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
Alternate 
representative of 
the party of 
PASOK in the 
Committee 
constituted for the 
Control of 
Electoral 
Violations in the 
Prefectures of the 
Region of 
Thessaly 
(Prefecture of 
Larissa) G.G. vol. 
B, no 1659, 
21.8.2007
99 2005 A.R. 2005 M. M. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
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100 1998 A.R. 1998 M. G. Quality of Life 1999 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Appointment at 
the Greek 
Agricultural 
Insurance 
Organisation as 
U.E. Agronomist 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the Greek 
Agricultural 
Insurance 
Organisation, 
available at: 
http://www.elga.gr/
index.php?option=
com_content&vie
w=article&id=176:
2010-09-22-11-19-
32&catid=92:2010-
09-22-11-17-
13&Itemid=136, 
date of access: 
22.3.2011
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101 1998 A.R. 1998 Z. K. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
On Secondment 
to  the Office of 
the Secretary 
General of the 
Ministry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs 
as Head of the 
Office (starting 
from 2.6.2003) 
Source: Annual 
Report of the 
Greek 
Ombudsman for 
the Year 2003, 
available at: 
http://www.synigor
os.gr/annual03/10
pararthmata.pdf, 
date of access: 
1.2.2011 
Revocation of the 
secondment (G.G. 
vol. C, no 7, 
14.1.2004)
Decision (250 
Φ23.02/14.1.2011
) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
102 1998 A.R. 1998 I. K. Quality of Life Chrildren's 
Rights/2003
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/             
Postgraduate 
Degree (2007)
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
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103 1998 A.R. 1998 V. D. Quality of Life 2000 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Legal Collaborator 
(permanent post) 
at the Ministry of 
the Interior, 
Source: Paper 
Bookland, 
available at 
http://www.paper-
bookland.gr/books
.asp?action=autho
r&authorID=20952
, date of access: 
22.3.2011
Adjunct Professor 
at the University of 
the Aegean, the 
Higher 
Technological 
Educational 
Institute of 
Herakleion, the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration.  
Since 2001 
adjunct Professor 
of the Open 
University of 
Greece. Source: 
Source: Paper 
Bookland, 
available at 
http://www.paper-
bookland.gr/books
.asp?action=autho
r&authorID=20952
, date of access: 
22.3.2011
104 1998 A.R. 1998 D. P. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
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105 1998 A.R. 1998 M. P. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree/PhD 
2006
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
Decision (250 
Φ233.02/14.1.201
1) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
NGO                      
Vice-President of 
the Greek Centre 
for the Protection 
of the 
Environment-
Ecosystem
106 1999 A.R. 1999 K. V. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
107 1999 A.R. 1999 A. P. Quality of Life 2001/State-
Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 368, 
5.3.2008)
108 1999 A.R. 1999 K. S. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate Degree 
2001
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2005
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109 2001 A.R. 2001 V.  V. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
110 2001 A.R. 2001 I. K. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2003
111 2003 A.R. 2003 M. A. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
Secretary of the 
Deputy 
Ombudsman at 
the Department 
of Quality of Life 
(1998-2003)
112 2003 A.R. 2003 D. V. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
Decision 
(16341/14.12.201
0) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
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113 2003 A.R. 2003 A. P. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
114 2003 A.R. 2003 M. R. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
115 2003 A.R. 2003 K. S. Quality of Life 2005 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Judge at the 
Council of State 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
280, 25.10.2005)
116 2003 A.R. 2003 D. F. Quality of Life Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
117 2004 A.R. 2004 E. A. Quality of Life Human 
Rights/2006
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 368, 
5.3.2008)
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118 1998 A.R. 1998 P. A. State-Citizen 
Relations
2003 Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Ministry of 
the Interior
Secondment to 
the Office of the 
Inspector General 
of Public 
Administration 
(2003-) as Head 
of the Directorate 
of the Secretariat, 
Source: Report of 
the Special 
Parliamentary 
Committee on 
Institutions and 
Transparency, 
available at: 
http://www.dee.gr/
dee/mediaupload/
pdf_files/EPITRO
PH%20THESMO
N-
DIAFANEIAS.pdf, 
date of access: 
1.2.2011
119 1998 A.R. 1998 Efstratios 
Georgoulas
State-Citizen 
Relations
2001 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Sociology, 
University of 
Aegean (G.G. vol. 
NPDD, no 70, 
3.4.2001)
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120 1998 A.R. 1998 S. D. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree/PhD 
2003
YES Secondment to 
the Office of the 
Inspector General 
of Public 
Administration 
2007-2009, 
Annual Reports of 
the Inspector 
General of Public 
Administration,ava
ilable at: 
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/49/Ekthes
hGEDD2007.pdf, 
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/68/Ekthes
hGEDD2008final.p
df, 
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/79/Ekthes
h2009GEDDfinal.p
df, date of access: 
1.2.2011
Decision 
(16763/29.12.201
0) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
121 1998 A.R. 1998 E. T. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate Degree 
1999
YES YES Ministry of 
the Interior
122 1998 A.R. 1998 Ekaterini 
Kalliontzi
State-Citizen 
Relations
1999 Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Ministry of 
the Interior
Transfer to the 
Secretariat of the 
Ombudsman as 
Director,          
G.G. Vol. C, no 
140, 24.6.2003
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123 1998 A.R. 1998 E. K. State-Citizen 
Relations
2001 Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Agricultural 
Bank of 
Greece
124 1998 A.R. 1998 M. L. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Secondment to 
the Office of the 
Inspector General 
of Public 
Administration 
2003-2005, 
Annual Reports of 
the Inspector 
General of Public 
Administration, 
Annual Report of 
the Greek 
Ombudsman for 
the Year 2003 
available at: 
http://www.synigor
os.gr/annual03/10
pararthmata.pdf, 
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/20/Ekthes
hGEDD2004.pdf  
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/21/Ekthes
hGEDD2005.pdf, 
date of access: 
1.2.2011
Decision (250 
Φ233.02/14.1.201
1) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
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125 1998 A.R. 1998 C. L. State-Citizen 
Relations
2000 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Teacher  in 
Secondary 
Education
Decision 
(16763/29.12.201
0) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
126 1998 A.R. 1998 Y. M. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Annuled Ministry of 
National 
Economy 
and 
Finance
127 1998 A.R. 1998 P. P. State-Citizen 
Relations
2007 Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Ministry of 
Environme
nt, 
Planning 
and Public 
Works
Secondment at 
the Political 
Bureau of the 
Minister of Justice 
from 27.9.2007 
until 31.3.2008 
G.G. vol. YODD, 
no 451, 
22.10.2007, 
revocation of the 
secondment G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 
166, 16.4.2008
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128 1998 A.R. 1998 M. P. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
Alternate ex officio 
member of the 
Central Committee
for the 
Simplification of 
Procedures 
representing the 
institution of the 
Ombudsman 
(Government 
Gazette, vol. B, no 
1431, 17.9.2004)
Decision 
(16763/29.12.201
0) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
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129 1999 A.R. 1999 S. M. State-Citizen 
Relations
2000 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Special 
Collaborator at the 
Ministry of Culture 
(starting from 
11.12.2000) G.G. 
vol. C, no 79, 
23.3.2004. 
Revocation of the 
appointment:  
18.3.2004 (G.G. 
vol. C, no 348, 
19.12.2004)
Candidate 
Counselor at the 
elections of the 
Athens Bar 
Association in 
2010. Source: The 
Official Website of 
the Candidate 
President Vassilis 
Katsafadas, 
http://www.dsa-
katsafados.gr/Can
didates.htm, date 
of access: 
23.3.2011 
Member of 
Amnesty 
International. 
Member of the 
Political Party 
Union of 
Independent 
Citizens Source: 
CV, The Official 
Website of the 
Candidate 
President Vassilis 
Katsafadas, 
http://www.dsa-
katsafados.gr/Can
didates.htm, date 
of access: 
23.3.2011  
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129 S.  M. Lawyer with a 
salary mandate at 
the Regulatory 
Authority for 
Energy (RAE) 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
RAE, available at: 
http://www.rae.gr/
site/categories_ne
w/about_rae/organ
ization/secretary.c
sp, date of 
access: 23.3.2011
130 1999 A.R. 1999 K. P. State-Citizen 
Relations
2004 Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Appointment at 
the Ministry of 
Economics and 
Finance as U.E. 
Customs Officer 
(G.G. vol. C, no 8, 
15.1.2004)
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131 1999 A.R. 1999 D. C. State-Citizen 
Relations
2003 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Political Science 
and History of 
Panteion 
University of 
Social and 
Political Sciences 
(subject: 
Comparative 
Politics: Europe-
Minorities) G.G. 
vol. NPDD, no 
288, 20.11.2003    
b Since 2003 he 
has been 
responsible for the 
Eunomia Project 
coordinated by the 
Greek 
Ombudsman 
Source:Annual 
Reports of the 
Greek 
Ombudsman for 
the years, 2003-
2007
Civil Society-
NGOs                    
Since 1996 
founding member 
and administrative 
secretary of the 
Research Centre 
for Minority 
Groups (KEMO) 
Since 2003            
Source: KEMO 
Official Website, 
available at: 
http://www.kemo.g
r/index.php?sec=
members&item=5
2, date of access: 
1.2.2011                
Since 2003 
President of the 
Management 
Board of  the 
Hellenic League 
for Human Rights 
(HLHR), Source: 
Official Website of 
the HLHR, 
available at: 
http://www.hlhr.gr/
details.php?id=18, 
date of access: 
1.2.2011
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132 2001 A.R. 2001 E.G. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Ministry of 
National 
Economy 
and 
Finance
133 2001 A.R. 2001 C. Z. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate 
Degree(2006)
YES YES Ministry of 
National 
Economy 
and 
Finance
134 2001 A.R. 2001 P. M. State-Citizen 
Relations
2003 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Law, Athens 
University (G.G. 
vol. NPDD, no 2, 
8.1.2003)
135 2003 A.R. 2003 D. A. State-Citizen 
Relations
2005 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Balkan, Slavic and 
Oriental Studies of 
the University of 
Macedonia 
(subject: 
Comparative 
Politics: 
Communist and 
Post-Communist 
Regimes in 
Eastern Europe 
and the Former 
USSR) G.G. vol. 
NPDD, no 228, 
13.9.2005) 
NGOs Member of 
the Research 
Centre for Minority 
Groups (KEMO) 
Source: Official 
Website of KEMO, 
available at: 
http://www.kemo.g
r/index.php?sec=
members, date of 
access: 2.5.2010
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136 2003 A.R. 2003 K. D. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Decision (16763-
29.12.2010) for 
the assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
137 2003 A.R. 2003 T. Z. State-Citizen 
Relations
2007 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Assistant 
Professor at the 
Department of 
Electricity of the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institution of 
Chalkida (subject: 
Electronics) G.G. 
vol. NPDD, no 
171, 22.6.2006)
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138 2003 A.R. 2003 A. K. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate   
Degree(2004)
YES NGOs         
Regular Member 
of the Governing 
Board of the 
Special Synodical 
Committee for 
Migrants, 
Refugees, and 
Repatriated 
(Church of 
Greece) Three-
year mandate: 
2006-2009  
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Church of Greece, 
available at: 
http://www.ecclesi
a.gr/greek/holysyn
od/commitees/met
anastes/kanonism
os.htm, date of 
access: 8.6.2010
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138 A.  K. General Secretary 
of the Governing 
Committee of the 
Greek Young 
Women's 
Christian 
Association 
Source: Official 
Website of the 
Young Women's 
Christian 
Association, 
available at: 
http://www.xen.gr/
organization.html, 
date of access: 
8.6.2010
139 2003 A.R. 2003 I. K. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
140 2003 A.R. 2003 A. K. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
141 2003 A.R. 2003 L. B.-D. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
142 2003 A.R. 2003 E. P. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES
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143 2003 A.R. 2003 C. P. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Civil Society-
NGOs                    
Member of  the 
Hellenic League 
for Human Rights 
(HLHR), Source: 
Official Website of 
the HLHR, 
available at: 
http://webcache.g
oogleusercontent.
com/search?q=ca
che:http://www.hlh
r.gr/press/hlhr-
neoDS-plan2010-
2011.doc, date of 
access: 7.6.2010
144 2003 A.R. 2003 M. R. State-Citizen 
Relations
2005 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Assistant 
Professor at the 
Department of 
Business 
Administration of 
the University of 
the Aegean 
(subject: Theory of 
Law and social 
responsibility of 
businesses) G.G. 
vol. NPDD, no 
199, 17.8.2005)
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145 2003 A.R. 2003 C. S. State-Citizen 
Relations
2008 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Informatics with 
Applications in 
Biomedicine of the 
University of 
Central Greece 
(subject: Broad 
Band Wireless 
Networks) G.G. 
vol. C, no 1161, 
29.12.2008
146 2003 A.R. 2003 C. F. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
147 2003 A.R. 2003 K. L. State-Citizen 
Relations
Health and 
Social 
Welfare/2004
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
148 2005 A.R. 2005 T.  V. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
149 2005 A.R. 2005 K. Z. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
150 1998 A.R. 1998 D. A. State-Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate 
Degree(2002)
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
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151 1998 A.R. 1998 K. A. State-Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate 
Degree(2001)
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
Decision 
(3680/21.1.2011) 
for the assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
152 1998 A.R. 1998 M.  K. State-Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree/Postgr
aduate 
Degree(2001)
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
153 1998 A.R. 1998 M. K. State-Citizen 
Relations
2000 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Appointment at 
the Ministry of 
Economics as 
U.E. Tax Officer 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
153, 30.5.2000)
154 2006 A.R. 2006 M. K. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Ministry 
of 
National 
Economy 
and 
Finance
Ministry of 
National 
Economy 
and 
Finance
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155 1998 A.R. 1998 P. K. State-Citizen 
Relations
2000 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES YES Ministry 
of 
National 
Economy 
and 
Finance
Ministry of 
National 
Economy 
and 
Finance
156 1998 A.R. 1998 M. M. State-Citizen 
Relations
2002 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Appointment at 
the Regulatory 
Authority for 
Energy (RAE) 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
RAE, available at: 
http://www.rae.gr/
site/categories_ne
w/about_rae/organ
ization/secretary.c
sp, date of 
access: 23.3.2011
157 1998 A.R. 1998 S. S. State-Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2003
158 1999 A.R. 1998 C. A. State-Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no1394, 
14.9.2006)
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159 2001 A.R. 2001 N. D. State-Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel/2003
Secondment at 
the Office of the 
Inspector General 
of Public 
Administration 
2004-2009, 
Annual Reports of 
the Inspector 
General of Public 
Administration,ava
ilable at: 
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/20/Ekthes
hGEDD2004.pdf, 
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/21/Ekthes
hGEDD2005.pdf, 
date of access: 
24.3.2011
Decision 
(16763/29.12.201
0) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
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159 N. D. http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/22/Ekthes
hGEDD2006.pdf, 
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/49/Ekthes
hGEDD2007.pdf, 
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/68/Ekthes
hGEDD2008final.p
df, 
http://www.gedd.g
r/article_data/Link
ed_files/79/Ekthes
h2009GEDDfinal.p
df, date of access: 
1.2.2011
160 2003 A.R. 2003 Vassilis 
Anastassopo
ulos
State-Citizen 
Relations
Human 
Rights/2007
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
161 2003 A.R. 2003 D. V. State-Citizen 
Relations
Human 
Rights/2006
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
162 2003 A.R. 2003 P. V. State-Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
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163 2003 A.R. 2003 I. D. State-Citizen 
Relations
2005 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree/PhD 
2005 Source: 
The Official 
Website of the 
Hellenic Centre 
for Marine 
Research, 
available at: 
http://www.hcm
r.gr/listview3_el
.php?id=1064, 
date of access: 
23.3.2011
YES Researcher of 
Grade C at the 
Hellenic Centre for 
Marine Research, 
(G.G. vol. C., no 
1047, 14.12.2007) 
Academic Year: 
2007-2008: 
Adjunct Professor 
at the University of 
Ioannina, Source: 
The Official 
Website of the 
Hellenic Centre for 
Marine Research, 
available at: 
http://www.hcmr.g
r/listview3_el.php?
id=1064, date of 
access: 23.3.2011
2000-2003: 
Scientific 
Collaborator at the 
National Centre 
for Marine 
Research 
(participation at 
European and 
National Research 
Programmes) 
2003-2007: 
Scientific 
Collaborator at the 
Hellenic Centre for 
Marine Research 
(Programme 
Management)
164 2003 A.R. 2003 A. K. State-Citizen 
Relations
Quality of 
Life/2007
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
165 2003 A.R. 2003 K. M. State-Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
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166 2003 A.R. 2003 E. B. State-Citizen 
Relations
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
167 2003 A.R. 2003 O. T. Children's 
Rights
2007 Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Psychology of the 
University of Crete 
(subject: Forensic 
Psychology) G.G. 
vol. C, no 230, 
11.4.2007
168 2003 A.R. 2003 N. B. Children's 
Rights
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Decision 
(717/Φ233.02/25.
1.2011) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
169 2003 A.R. 2003 M. B. Children's 
Rights
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
170 2003 A.R. 2003 S.-L.. S Children's 
Rights
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
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171 2003 A.R. 2003 M. T. Children's 
Rights
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES
172 2005 A.R. 2005 A.  M. Children's 
Rights
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES Decision (1464  
Φ233.02/15.2.201
1) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
173 2006 A.R. 2006 A. B. Children's 
Rights
2010? Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Department
of Foreing 
Languages
, 
Translation 
and 
Interpretati
on of the 
Ionian 
University
Ministry of 
National 
Education and 
Religious Affairs
174 2003 A.R. 2003 M. K. Children's 
Rights
Health and 
Social 
Welfare/2004
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
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175 2003 A.R. 2003 S. P. Children's 
Rights
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
176 2003 A.R. 2003 S. P. Children's 
Rights
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree/(PhD 
2004)
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
Decision 
(16485/31.12.201
0) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
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177 2003 A.R. 2003 A.  R. Children's 
Rights
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
Decision (250 
Φ233.02/14.1.201
1) for the 
assignment 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
178 2003 A.R. 2003 A. S. Children's 
Rights
2007 Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Judge at the 
Council of State 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
852, 26.10.2007)
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179 2001 A.R. 2001 D. C. Stability Pact for
Southeast 
Europe - 
Council of 
Europe-Bureau 
of the Council of
Europe 
Commissioner 
for Human 
Rights Eunomia 
Project 
Human 
Rights/2003
Auxiliary Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Special Scientific 
Personnel (G.G. 
vol. B., no 371, 
16.3.2007)
NGOs Member of 
the Research 
Centre for Minority 
Groups (KEMO) 
Source: Official 
Website of KEMO, 
available at: 
http://www.kemo.g
r/index.php?sec=
members, date of 
access: 2.5.2010
180 2003 A.R. 2003 M. K. State-Citizen 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate   
Degree
YES Decision (1464 
Φ233.02/15.2.201
1) for the 
assignment of 
Courses at the 
National Centre of 
Public 
Administration. 
Source: The 
Official Website of 
the National 
Centre of Public 
Administration, 
available at: 
http://www.ekdd.gr
/ekdda/ViewInstr.p
hp, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011)
181 2006 A,R, 2006 E.  T. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES YES Region of 
Attica 
Ministry of 
the Interior
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182 2006 A.R. 2006 A.  A. State-Citizen 
Relations/Healt
h and Social 
Welfare 2010
Special Scientific 
Personnel
PhD YES YES Ministry of 
the Interior
183 C.  S. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree YES
Region of 
Attica
Ministry of the 
Interior
184 I. B. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
? YES Information and 
Communication 
Officer at the 
Directorate-
General for 
Regional Policy 
of the European 
Commission, 
Source: 
European Policy 
Summit 
Organised by 
the Friends of 
Europe 
(December 4, 
2007), List of 
Participants, 
http://www.kas.d
e/wf/doc/kas_12
561-1522-2-
30.pdf?0712051
73618, date of 
access: 
24.3.2011
185 O. L. Human Rights Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate 
Degree
YES
186 K. S. State-Citizens 
Relations
Special Scientific 
Personnel
Postgraduate 
Degree
YES
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Secon
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Committees etc)
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Society/Trade 
Unionism
187 E. P. Quality of Life Special Scientific 
Personnel
? ? Special 
Collaborator at 
the Political 
Bureau of the 
Minister of the 
Interior, Public 
Administration 
and 
Decentralisation 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
121, 28.4.2004)
188 C. A. Gender Equality Special Scientific 
Personnel
? ? Alternate Member 
of the  Committee 
for the Evaluation 
of Proposals for 
the 2009 Annual 
Programme of our 
country within the 
framework of the 
European 
Integration Fund. 
Action 09/2.1 
entitled: 
"Elaboration of a 
study on the 
issue: Women's 
Migration in 
Greece"  (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 
337, 18.10.2010) 
189 L. D. Health and 
Social Welfare
Special Scientific 
Personnel
? YES Ministry of 
Labour and 
Social 
Security 
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Secon
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er 
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e 
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of the 
secondm
ent
Service Supervising 
Ministry
In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category 
Transfers, 
Secondments 
from the 
Ombudsman to 
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Society/Trade 
Unionism
190 2002 A.R. 2002 M. G. Human 
Rights/Quality 
of Life 2003
Special Scientific 
Personnel
University 
Degree
YES YES Ministry of 
Culture
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APPENDIX 4-Table 1
S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette, Vol, No 
of issue-Date
Initials of the Name-
Surname
Level of Education Working 
Status
G
r
a
d
e Category- Specialty 
Branch
Revocation/Denial of 
the appointment
Resignation Replacement New Appointment/ 
Transfer
In Service 
Transfer
1 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 A. K. Graduate of Higher Technological 
Educational Institutions
Regular D T.E. Technological 
Applications
2 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 A. V. Graduate of Higher Technological 
Educational Institution
Regular D T.E. Technological 
Applications
3 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 I. Y. Graduate of Higher Technological 
Educational Institution
Regular D T.E. Technological 
Applications
4 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 S. T. Graduate of Higher Technological 
Educational Institution
Regular D T.E. Technological 
Applications
YES Ministry of National Defence- 
General Army Staff (G.G. 
vol. C, no 249, 22.9.2004)
5 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 M. S. Graduate of Higher Technological 
Educational Institution
Regular D T.E. Technological 
Applications
6 2004 C233, 6.9.2005 A. C. Graduate of Higher Technological 
Educational Institution
Regular D T.E. Administration-
Accounting
7 2004 C344, 31.12.2004 G. A. (Appointed to the 
vacant post of AP4)
Graduate of Higher Technological 
Educational Institution
Regular D T.E. Technological 
Applications
8 2005 C78, 23.3.2005 P. O. Secondary Education Regular D S.E. ?
9 2005 C78, 23.3.2005 K. R. Secondary Education Regular D S.E. ?
10 2005 C78, 23.3.2005 D. K. Secondary Education Regular D S.E. ? Submission of 
resignation (G.G. 
vol. C, no 294, 
14.9.2006)
Teacher in Secondary 
Education (G.G. vol. C, no 
294, 14.9.2006)
11 2005 C78, 23.3.2005 C. P. Secondary Education Regular D S.E. ?
12 2005 C78, 23.3.2005 A. F. Secondary Education Regular D S.E. ?
13 2005 C78, 23.3.2005 A. K. Secondary Education Regular ? S.E. Driver YES YES Ministry of Environment, 
Planning and Public Works, 
(G.G. vol. C, no 516, 
29.12.2006)
14 2005 C78, 23.3.2005 M. M. Compulsory  Education Regular E C.E. Auxiliary Staff Submission of 
resignation (G.G. 
vol. C, no 335, 
21.12.2005)
YES Piraeus Administrative Court 
of First Instance (G.G. vol. 
C, no 310, 21.11.2005)
Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security, and Privacy
Database on the directly hired Administrative Personnel
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Resignation Replacement New Appointment/ 
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Transfer
15 2005 C118, 6.5.2005 K. G. (Appointed to the 
vacant post of AP13)
Secondary Education Regular ? S.E. Driver
16 2005 C122, 18.5.2005 V. P. University Degree Regular D U.E. Administration-
Finance
17 2005 C122, 18.5.2005 E. A. University Degree Regular D U.E. Administration-
Finance
18 2005 C172, 12.7.2005 A. K. Graduate of Higher Technological 
Educational Institution
Regular D T.E. Administration-
Accounting
19 2005 C172, 12.7.2005 E. A. Graduate of Higher Technological 
Educational Institution
Regular D T.E. Administration-
Accounting
20 2006 C2, 5.1.2006 V. A.                                     
Appointed to the vacant 
post of AP14
Compulsory  Education Regular E C.E. Auxiliary Staff
21 2008 C413, 7.5.2008 E. K. Secondary Education Regular D S.E. ? Submission of 
resignation: 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
67, 8.2.2011)
Ministry of Economy, 
Competitiveness, and 
Marine (G.G. vol. C, 1184, 
13.12.2010) 
22 2008 C413, 7.5.2008 I. D. Secondary Education Regular D S.E. ? YES YES Deposits and Loans Fund 
(G.G. vol. C, no 253, 
6.4.2009)
23 2008 C614, 3.7.2008 S. B. (Appointed to the 
vacant post of AP22)
Secondary Education Regular D S.E. ?  
24 2005 C247, 12.9.2006 D. C. Secondary Education On 
secondment- 
Renewal of 
secondment 
until 2007
S.E. Driver
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S.N. YEAR Vol, No of issue-
Date/                    
Annual Report 
A.R.
Initials of 
the Name-
Surname
Subject area Working 
Status
Level of Education Resignation/Reti
rement
Denial/Revoca
tion of the 
appointment
Replacement In Service 
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Specialty/Promo
tion
Previous 
positions in the 
public sector
New 
Appointments in 
the Public - 
Private Sector
Parallel Occupation 
(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society
1 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 S. P. Technological 
and Management 
Infrastructures for 
Security 
Accreditation
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, 
Archive of PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/11766, 
date of access: 18.3.2011
YES  SP13 was 
appointed to the 
vacant post (G. 
G. vol. C, no 
344, 
31.12.2004)
Member of the 
Scientific Staff of 
the Hellenic 
Telecommunicati
ons and Post 
Commission 2001-
2008 Source: The 
Official Website 
of the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institution of the 
Ionian Islands, 
CV, available at: 
de.teiion.gr/el/plir
ofories/arxeia/doc
_download/23---
.html/ , date of 
access: 
18.3.2011
Assistant 
Professor at the 
Technological 
Educational 
Institution of the 
Ionian Islands 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
146, 25.2.2008) 
2 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 I. M. Security of 
Information 
Systems
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
? YES SP15 was 
appointed to the 
vacant post 
(G.G. C152, 
24.6.2005) 
3 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 P. K. Implementation 
and Services 
Security
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the 
Department of 
Informatics, University of 
Piraeus, 
http://www.cs.unipi.gr/pko
tzani/index.php/19-
main/24-pkotzanikolaou, 
date of access: 18.3.2011
Resignation (G.G. 
vol. C, no 612, 
16.7.2010) 
Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Informatics, 
University of 
Piraeus (G.G. vol. 
C, no 466, 
7.6.2010)
Database on the directly hired Scientific Personnel
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(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society
4 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 V. S. Implementation 
and Services 
Security
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, 
Archive of PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/13287, 
date of access: 18.3.2011
Member of the special 
legislative drafting committee 
(Ministry of Justice, 
Transparency and Human 
Rights) for the final 
elaboration of the draft law on 
the transposition of the 
Directive 2006/24/EC on the 
retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with 
the provision of publicly 
available electronic 
communications networks and 
amending Directive 
2002/58/EC (Government 
Gazette, vol. YODD’, no 72, 
1.3.2010)
5 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 Y.B. Networks Security 
with an emphasis 
on Internet
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, 
Archive of PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/11772, 
date of access: 18.3.2012
Resignation (G.G. 
vol. C, no 22, 
16.1.2008) 
HD5 was 
appointed to the 
vacant post 
(G.G. vol. C, no 
19, 15.1.2008)
Head of the 
Directorate for the 
Infrastructures 
Assurance, 
Infrastructures, 
Services Secrecy, 
Internet 
Implementations
Post in the 
Private Sector: 
Director of 
Access Backbone 
Networks, 
Ontelecoms, a 
Greek 
Telecommunicati
ons Company, 
Source: Mailman, 
available at: 
https://mailman2.
grnet.gr/pipermail
/gr6/2008-
December/00002
0.html, date of 
access: 
18.3.2011
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the Public - 
Private Sector
Parallel Occupation 
(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society
6 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 E. N. Networks Security 
with an emphasis 
on Internet
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, 
Archive of PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/16504, 
date of access: 18.3.2013
7 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 S.M. Networks Security 
with an emphasis 
on Internet
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, 
Archive of PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/16542, 
date of access: 18.3.2014
8 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 P. T. Systems Security 
for information 
transmission
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, 
Archive of PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/12700, 
date of access: 18.3.2015
9 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 P.B. Systems Security 
for information 
transmission
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, 
Archive of PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/13314, 
date of access: 18.3.2016
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S.N. YEAR Vol, No of issue-
Date/                    
Annual Report 
A.R.
Initials of 
the Name-
Surname
Subject area Working 
Status
Level of Education Resignation/Reti
rement
Denial/Revoca
tion of the 
appointment
Replacement In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty/Promo
tion
Previous 
positions in the 
public sector
New 
Appointments in 
the Public - 
Private Sector
Parallel Occupation 
(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society
10 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 A. P. Systems Security 
for information 
transmission
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, 
Archive of PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/13316, 
and 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/13301d
ate of access: 18.3.2017
Resignation (G.G. 
vol. C, no 475, 
21.5.2008)
Lecturer at the 
Department of 
Information 
Transmission 
Systems and 
Material 
Technology, 
National 
Technical 
University of 
Athens (G.G. vol. 
C, no 358, 
18.4.2008)
11 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 A. M. Law Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the European 
Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA), 
available at: 
http://www.enisa.europa.
eu/about-enisa/structure-
organization/executive-
director/my-
team/cv_mitrakas.pdf, 
date of access: 18.3.2011
YES SP14 was 
appointed to the 
vacant post (G. 
G. vol. C, no 
344, 
31.12.2004)
Head of 
Administration at 
the European 
Network and 
Information 
Security Agency, 
Source: The 
Official Website 
of the European 
Network and 
Information 
Security Agency 
(ENISA), 
available at: 
http://www.enisa.
europa.eu/about-
enisa/structure-
organization/exec
utive-director/my-
team/cv_mitrakas.
pdf, date of 
access: 
18.3.2011
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A.R.
Initials of 
the Name-
Surname
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Level of Education Resignation/Reti
rement
Denial/Revoca
tion of the 
appointment
Replacement In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty/Promo
tion
Previous 
positions in the 
public sector
New 
Appointments in 
the Public - 
Private Sector
Parallel Occupation 
(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society
12 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 F. T. Law Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
?  Member of the Special 
Legislative Drafting 
Committee, representing the 
Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy on the study and 
elaboration for the 
transposition in national 
legislation of the Directive 
2006/24/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 
March 15, 2006 
on the retention of data 
generated or processed in 
connection with the provision 
of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of 
public communications 
networks and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 42, 4.2.2008)
13 2004 C344, 31.12.2004 V. D. 
Appointed to 
the vacant 
post of SP1
Technological 
and Management 
Infrastructures for 
Security 
Accreditation
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
? Resignation (G.G. 
vol. C, no 282, 
26.10.2005)
YES
14 2004 C344, 31.12.2004 M. K. 
Appointed to 
the vacant 
post of SP11
Law Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
?
15 2005 C152, 24.6.2005 N. A. 
(Appointed to 
the vacant 
post of SP2)
Security of 
Information 
Systems
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
?
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New 
Appointments in 
the Public - 
Private Sector
Parallel Occupation 
(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society
16 2006 C21, 31.1.2006 G. B. 
(Appointed to 
the vacant 
post of 
SP13)
Technological 
and Management 
Infrastructures for 
Security 
Accreditation
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of the National 
Documentation Centre, 
Archive of PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.ekt.gr/ea
dd/handle/10442/13300 
date of access: 19.3.2015
17 2007 C267, 29.6.2007 E. V. International 
Collaborations 
and Public 
Relations
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
?
18 2009 C500, 27.11.2009 C. Z. Security of 
Telecommunicati
ons 
Infrastructures, 
Systems, and 
Services
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The Official 
Website of George 
Mason University (USA), 
available at: 
http://ece.gmu.edu/semin
ars/seminars_2007_pdf/z
ouridaki.pdf, date of 
access: 18.3.2011
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Date/                    
Annual Report 
A.R.
Initials of 
the Name-
Surname
Subject area Working 
Status
Level of Education Resignation/Reti
rement
Denial/Revoca
tion of the 
appointment
Replacement In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty/Promo
tion
Previous 
positions in the 
public sector
New 
Appointments in 
the Public - 
Private Sector
Parallel Occupation 
(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society
19 2009 C500, 27.11.2009 P. K. Security of 
Telecommunicati
ons 
Infrastructures, 
Systems, and 
Services
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
Msc: 1989-1990, 
Cranfield University (UK), 
Source: Lindekin, 
available at: 
http://www.linkedin.com/p
ub/panagiotis-
kanakaris/2/936/6b3, 
date of access: 18.3.2011
2009-2010: 
Internal Auditor at 
ERGOSE, a 
subsidiary of the 
Greek Railways 
Organisation 
(public company)  
1994-2007: Wind 
Hellas (private 
telecommunicatio
ns company)    
1993-1994: 
Alcatel (public 
company)  1992-
1993: Intracom 
(private software 
company)      
Source: Lindekin, 
available at: 
http://www.linkedi
n.com/pub/panagi
otis-
kanakaris/2/936/6
b3, date of 
access: 
18.3.2011
20 2009 C500, 27.11.2009 V. D. Security of 
Information 
Systems, and 
Implementations
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
? YES SP21 was 
appointed to the 
vacant post (G. 
G. vol. C, no 
375, 12.5.2010) 
21 2010 C375, 12.5.2010 I. M. Security of 
Information 
Systems, and 
Implementations
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
?
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S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette, Vol, No 
of issue-Date/      
Annual Report 
A.R.
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Subject area Working Status Level of 
Education
Resignation/Reti
rement
Denial/Revocatio
n of the 
appointment
Subsitution In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty/Promo
tion
Previous 
positions in the 
public sector
New 
Appointments in 
the Public - 
Private Sector
Parallel 
Occupation 
(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society
1 2004 C233, 6.9.2004 Y. B. Networks Security 
with an emphasis 
on Internet
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
indefinite time
PhD, Source: The 
Official Website 
of the National 
Documentation 
Centre, Archive of 
PhD Theses, 
available at: 
http://phdtheses.e
kt.gr/eadd/handle/
10442/11772, 
date of access: 
18.3.2012
Resignation (G.G. 
vol. C, no 22, 
16.1.2008) 
HD5  was 
appointed to the 
vacant post (G.G. 
vol. C, no 19, 
15.1.2008)
Head of the 
Directorate for the 
Infrastructures 
Assurance, 
Infrastructures, 
Services Secrecy, 
Internet 
Implementations
Post in the 
Private Sector: 
Director of 
Access Backbone 
Networks, 
Ontelecoms, a 
Greek 
Telecommunicati
ons Company, 
Source: Mailman, 
available at: 
https://mailman2.
grnet.gr/pipermail
/gr6/2008-
December/00002
0.html, date of 
access: 
18.3.2011
2 2007 C333, 21.5.2007 Y. B. Head of the 
Directorate for the 
Assurance of 
Infrastructure and 
Secrecy of 
Telecommunicati
on Services
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
definite time
?
3 2007 C333, 21.5.2007 D. V. Head of the 
Directorate for the 
Assurance of the 
Secrecy of 
Mailing Services
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
definite time
? Submission of 
resignation (G.G. 
vol. YODD, no 
516, 4.12.2007)
Lawyer
4 2007 C333, 21.5.2007 A. L. Head of the 
Independent 
Department of 
International 
Collaborations 
and Public 
Relations
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
definite time
?
Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security, and Privacy
Database on the directly hired Heads of the Directorates and the Department of International Collaborations and Public Relations
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S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette, Vol, No 
of issue-Date/      
Annual Report 
A.R.
Initials of the 
Name-Surname
Subject area Working Status Level of 
Education
Resignation/Reti
rement
Denial/Revocatio
n of the 
appointment
Subsitution In Service 
Transfers/New 
Category and/or 
Specialty/Promo
tion
Previous 
positions in the 
public sector
New 
Appointments in 
the Public - 
Private Sector
Parallel 
Occupation 
(Participation in 
Committees etc)
Party 
affiliation/Civil 
Society
5 2008 C19/15.1.2008 I. P. Head of the 
Directorate for the 
Infrastructures 
Assurance, 
Infrastructures, 
Services Secrecy, 
Internet 
Implementations
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
definite time
Msc: Source: 
Competition No 
1/386M/2007, 
Candidate for the 
post of regular 
employee at the 
Prefectural Self-
administration of  
Athens-Piraeus, 
available at: 
http://ypernomarhi
agr/.../KATASTAS
H_YPOPSIFIWN
_ 
PE%20PLHROF
ORIKIS.rtf date of 
access: 
18.3.2011
6 2010 C639, 22.7.2010 A. M. Head of the 
Directorate for the 
Assurance of the 
Secrecy of 
Mailing Services
Private law 
employment 
contract of 
definite time
?
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APPENDIX 4-Table 4
S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette, Vol, No 
of issue-Date
Initials of Name-
Surname
Level of 
Education
Working Status Category- 
Specialty 
Branch
Denial of the 
appointment
Resignation New 
Appointment/ 
Transfer
Previous position in the public Sector Member of Committees in the 
public sector
1 2005 C172, 12.7.2005 I. T. PhD                       
Source: G.G. vol. 
B, no 797, 
27.5.2004
Legal Adviser Adviser at the Ministry of State (G.G. vol. B, no 797, 
27.5.2004)   Special Collaborator of the Minister of 
National Education and Religious Affairs,  (G.G. vol. 
B, no 358, 13.4.1999)                                    Member 
of the Committee of Legislative Initiative constituted 
by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (G.G. vol. B, 
no 87, 11.2.1997)      Lawyer of the Organizing 
Committee of the Athens Olympics 2004, Source: 
Source: Newspaper Eleptherotypia, 24.9.2004, 
available at: 
http://archive.enet.gr/online/online_text/c=115,dt=24.0
9.2004,id=87203364, date of access: 18.3.2011
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee (Ministry of 
Justice, Transparency and Human 
Rights) for the final elaboration of 
the draft law on the transposition of 
the Directive 2006/24/EC on the 
retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available 
electronic communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD’, 
no 72, 1.3.2010)
2 2005 C277, 20.10.2005 G. T.              L3 
was appointed to 
the vacant post
MSc, Source: 
Journal: Penal 
Justice, available 
at: 
https://www.nbonli
ne.gr/images/cred
its/6.pdf, date of 
access: 
18.3.2011
Under contract 
mandate 
remuneration
Lawyer Submission of 
resignation: (G.G. 
vol. C, no 512, 
25.7.2007)
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee (Ministry of 
Justice, Transparency and Human 
Rights) for the final elaboration of 
the draft law on the transposition of 
the Directive 2006/24/EC on the 
retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available 
electronic communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD’, 
no 72, 1.3.2010)
Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee (Ministry of 
Justice, Transparency and Human 
Rights) for the amendment of the 
provisions of the Code of Laws on 
Drugs ratified by the law 3459/2006 
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD’, 
no 17..3.2010)
Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security, and Privacy
Database on the Legal Service Personnel
802
S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette, Vol, No 
of issue-Date
Initials of Name-
Surname
Level of 
Education
Working Status Category- 
Specialty 
Branch
Denial of the 
appointment
Resignation New 
Appointment/ 
Transfer
Previous position in the public Sector Member of Committees in the 
public sector
2 G. T Member of the special legislative 
drafting committee (Ministry of 
Justice, Transparency and Human 
Rights) for the final elaboration of 
the draft law on the transposition of 
the PNR (Passenger Name Record) 
Agreements of the European Union 
and the Governments of U.S.A., 
Canada and Australia on the 
processing and transfer of 
passengers’ data
(Government Gazette, vol. YODD’, 
no 165, 7.5.2010)
Alternate Member of the Special 
Legislative Drafting Committee  on 
the study and elaboration -for the 
transposition in national legislation- 
of the Directive 2006/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and the 
Council of March 15, 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services 
or of public communications 
networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC (G.G. vol. YODD, no 
42, 4.2.2008)
Member of the Special Legislative 
Drafting Committee for the 
strengthening  the institutional 
framework on the functioning of the 
Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy (ADAE) and the amendment 
of the law 3115/2003 (Government 
Gazette, vol. 107, 12.3.2009) 
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S.N. YEAR Government 
Gazette, Vol, No 
of issue-Date
Initials of Name-
Surname
Level of 
Education
Working Status Category- 
Specialty 
Branch
Denial of the 
appointment
Resignation New 
Appointment/ 
Transfer
Previous position in the public Sector Member of Committees in the 
public sector
3 2008 C413, 7.5.2008 A. A. Postgraduate 
Degree, DEA, 
Source: The 
Official Website 
of the Law Office 
Oikonomou and 
Partners, 
http://www.elo.gr/
members_gr.php, 
date of access: 
18.3.2011
Under contract 
mandate 
remuneration
Lawyer 
(Appellate 
Attorney)
4 2009 C233, 30.3.2009 A. K. ? Under contract 
mandate 
remuneration
Lawyer
804
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APPENDIX 5 
 
The Scientific Personnel’s Involvement in Public Life Index 
 
Career paths Scientific Personnel’s match with career paths by authority 
A. Political involvement  Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel 
 
 
Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority  
 
 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic Authority 
for Communication 
Security and Privacy 
Minister     
Member of the European Parliament     
Parliamentary candidate  21(2) 84  
Elected in local government elections    84(2)  
Governmental Posts 
 
4(2), 11(2) 
 
16 9(2), 11(4), 14(2), 
29, 129, 187, 84 
 
 
On secondment to governmental posts  12 2, 8, 37, 53, 68, 73, 
80, 87, 103 
 
Party affiliation  21 84, 86, 98, 129  
Trade unionism  23 11, 26, 79, 84, 129  
B. Institutional involvement  
Previous permanent position in the Public Sector  2, 5, 6, 8, 10 10,  57, 79  1 
On secondment from the authority to the Public Sector  7 122, 126, 161  
On secondment from the Public Sector to the authority   3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 16, 
32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 
44, 46, 47, 60, 77, 
79, 81, 83, 92, 93, 
95, 120, 123, 124, 
125, 127, 128, 129, 
134, 135, 156, 157, 
175, 185, 191 
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Career paths Scientific Personnel’s match with career paths by authority 
B. Institutional  involvement  Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel 
 
Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority  
 
 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic Authority 
for Communication 
Security and Privacy 
New secondment after the termination of the secondment to the authority   118, 122, 127  
Position in the Public Sector after denial of appointment or resignation from the position 9, 13,14,15 17, 24, 29 41, 62, 72, 76, 84, 
87, 102, 105, 117, 
124, 131, 132, 158, 
180,  
 
Position in the Public Sector under contract (public services, organizations, companies)   86(2), 113 19(2) 
Positions in the European Union (European Commission, Agencies of the European 
Union) after their denial of appointment or resignation from the authorities 
 2  11  
Seconded trainees, Seconded National Experts at the European Commission or Agencies of 
the European Union, international organisations 
 4, 7, 18, 36 22  
Member of the staff of the European Union (Commission)   184  
Positions in international organizations agencies in Greece after resignation   21  
Member (alternate member) of Legislative Drafting Committees* 
(*ad hoc legislative drafting committees, ex officio members of legislative drafting committees) 
4 11(2), 13, 20, 32, 
39 
8, 11(2), 14, 43 4, 12 
President  of Working Groups/Monitoring Committees/Advisory Committees/Project 
Management Groups constituted by Ministries  
11(2)    
Member/(ex officio members) of Working Groups/Committees/Monitoring 
Committees/Advisory Committees/Scientific Councils/Project Management Groups 
constituted by Ministries or other legal entities of public law 
12  8(3), 11, 14(4), 17, 
19, 28, 56, 78, 
84(2), 128 
 
Ex officio member of the National Commission for Human Rights representing certain 
independent authorities, or Ministries  
   
9(2), 14 
 
Legal Adviser, Legal Collaborator, Adviser in the Public Sector   84(2)  
C. Financial Involvement  
Member of Procurement Committees    54, 84  
D. Institutional and Financial Involvement  
President/Vice-President of another Independent Authority 4    
Member of the management board of another Independent Authority   36, 53  
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Career paths Scientific Personnel’s match with career paths by authority 
D. Institutional-Financial Involvement Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel 
 
 
Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority  
 
 
The Greek 
Ombudsman 
Hellenic Authority 
for Communication 
Security and Privacy 
Member of the management board of the same Independent Authority   9, 11  
President/Vice-President of the Management Boards of Public Utilities, Public Enterprises 
and Organisations under the legal status of public anonymous companies, legal entities of 
public law or entities of private law under the supervision of a Ministry 
  14  
Member (alternate member) of the Management Boards of Public Utilities, Public 
Enterprises and Organisations under the legal status of public anonymous companies, legal 
entities of public law or entities of private law under the supervision of a Ministry, member 
of the management board of the Cultural foundation of the Bank of Greece 
12 21 11(2), 78  
On secondment President of a body of the public sector   29  
E. Scientific Involvement  
Experts representing Greece in international organizations     
President of Scientific Councils, President/Director of Research Centres/Institutes, legal 
entities of public law or entities of private law supervised by a Ministry with a scientific-
research character, Director/President of think tanks,  
  84  
Member of Scientific Councils, Research Centres/Institutes, legal entities of public law or 
entities of private law supervised by a Ministry with a scientific-research- character, 
member of think tanks 
 21(2)   
Members of the teaching staff of Greek Universities and Technological Educational 
Foundations (tenured positions) after their resignation from the authorities 
7 14 1, 9, 35, 98, 119, 
131, 134, 135, 137, 
144, 145, 167 
1, 3, 10, 
Members of the teaching staff of Foreign Universities (tenured positions) after their 
resignation from the authorities 
  14, 27, 92   
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Career paths Scientific Personnel’s match with career paths by authority 
E. Scientific  Involvement Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel 
 
 
C. Financial 
Involvement 
Supreme Council for 
the Selection of 
Personnel 
 
 
C. Financial 
Involvement 
Adjunct Professor (members of the teaching staff of Greek Universities and Technological 
Educational Foundations under contract) 
11(7), 12(2) 1, 16, 21, 24(3), 
25, 42(2) 
38, 42, 54(6), 80, 
84, 95, 96, 98, 
103(3) 
 
Member of the teaching staff of academies of the armed forces after their 
resignation/denial of appointment from the authorities (tenured posititons) 
 25   
Members of the teaching staff of the National School of Public Administration, National 
Centre of Public Administration, Police Academy and academies of the armed forces, and 
other public educational centres (under contract) 
4, 11 1, 5, 21 55(2), 86, 105  
Members of the teaching staff of the National Centre of Public Administration (under 
contract) 
2, 4, 7 1, 5 13, 19, 42, 45, 50, 
53, 54, 58, 93, 98, 
101, 105, 112, 120, 
124, 128, 136, 151, 
159, 168, 172, 176, 
177, 180 
 
Research Fellow/Collaborator in universities, research centres, post doctoral researcher, 
research (under contract)  
7(3) 25 165(2)  
Researchers after their resignation/denial of appointment from the authorities (tenured 
posititons) 
  163  
Radio producer (under contract)   79  
F. Civil Society  
Member of NGOs 
 
4, 7 4(2) 9, 10, 11, 13, 28, 
41(2), 84(2), 105, 
129, 131(2), 135, 
138(2), 143, 179 
 
 
APPENDIX 6
Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
A. Political Involvement
Parliamentary candidate 21 21 84
Elected in local government 
elections (mayor, municipal 
counselor, prefect, prefectural 
counselor, regional 
commissioner, regional 
counselor)
84(2)
Governmental Posts 4(2), 11(2) 16 9, 11, 14(2), 84, 
187
29 129
On secondment to governmental 
posts
12 2, 8, 11, 37, 53, 68, 
73, 80, 87, 103  
B. Institutional Involvement
Previous permanent position in 
the Public Sector 
2, 5, 6, 8,10 10 57, 79 1
On secondment from the 
authority to the Public Sector
7
122, 126, 161
The Scientific Personnel's Time-dimension Involvement in Public Life Index
Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy
809
Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
B. Institutional Involvement
On secondment from the Public 
Sector to the authority
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 16, 
32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 
44, 46, 47, 60, 77, 
79, 81, 83, 92, 93, 
95, 120, 123, 124, 
125, 127, 128, 129, 
134, 135, 156, 157, 
175, 185, 191
New secondment after the 
termination of the secondment to 
the authority
119, 122, 127
Position in the Public Sector 
after denial of appointment or 
resignation from the position
9, 13, 14, 15 17, 24, 29 41, 62, 72, 76, 
84, 87, 102, 105, 
117, 124, 131, 
132, 158, 180, 
Position in the Public Sector 
under contract (public services, 
organizations, companies)
113 86(2) 19(2)
Positions in the European Union 
(European Commission, 
Agencies of the European Union) 
after their denial of appointment 
or resignation from the 
authorities)
2 11
Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy
810
Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
B. Institutional Involvement
Seconded trainees, Seconded 
National Experts at the European 
Commission or Agencies of the 
European Union, international 
organisations
4, 7, 18, 36 22
Member of the staff of the 
European Union (Commission)
184
Experts of international 
organizations agencies in Greece, 
(Members of Boards in 
Intergovernmental organizations) 
after resignation
21
Member (alternate member) of 
Legislative Drafting 
Committees*
11(2), 13, 20, 32, 
39
14 8, 11(2), 43, 57 4, 12
(*ad hoc legislative drafting 
committees, ex officio members 
of legislative drafting 
committees)
4
Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy
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Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
B. Institutional Involvement
Member/(ex officio members) of 
Working 
Groups/Committees/Monitoring 
Committees/Advisory 
Committees/Scientific 
Councils/Project Management 
Groups constituted by Ministries 
or other legal entities of public 
law,
11(2), 12 14(4) 8(3), 11, 14(4), 17, 
19, 28, 78, 128
84(2)
Ex officio member of the 
National Commission for Human 
Rights representing independent 
authorities or certain Ministries 
14 9(2)
Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy
812
Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
B. Institutional Involvement
Member of the Central 
Examination Committee of the 
National School of Public 
Administration or other 
examination committees (e.g. the 
National School of Judicial 
Officers), member of committees 
for the selection of personnel in 
the public sector, advisor of 
studies at the National Centre for 
Public Administration
Legal Adviser, Legal 
Collaborator, Adviser in the 
Public Sector
84(2)
C. Financial Involvement
Member of Procurement 
Committees 
55 84
D. Institutional and Financial 
Involvement
President/Vice-President of 
another Independent Authority
4
Member of another Independent 
Authority
36 53
Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy
813
Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
D. Institutional and Financial 
Involvement
Member of the same Independent 
Authority
9, 11 9,11
President/Vice-President of the 
Management Boards of Public 
Utilities, Public Enterprises and 
Organisations under the legal 
status of public anonymous 
companies, legal entities of 
public law or entities of private 
law under the supervision of a 
Ministry
14
Member (alternate member) of 
the Management Boards of 
Public Utilities, Public 
Enterprises and Organisations 
under the legal status of public 
anonymous companies, legal 
entities of public law or entities 
of private law under the 
supervision of a Ministry, 
12 21 78, 11(2)
Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy
814
Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
D. Institutional and Financial 
Involvement
29
On secondment President of a 
body of the public sector
E. Scientific Involvement
President of Scientific Councils, 
President/Director of Research 
Centres/Institutes, legal entities 
of public law or entities of 
private law supervised by a 
Ministry with a scientific-
research character, 
84
Member of Scientific Councils, 
Research Centres/Institutes, legal 
entities of public law or entities 
of private law supervised by a 
Ministry with a scientific-
research- character, member of 
21(2)
Members of the teaching staff of 
Greek Universities and 
Technological Educational 
Foundations (tenured positions) 
after their resignation/denial of 
appointment from the authorities
7 14 1, 9, 35, 98, 119, 
133, 136, 137, 
139, 146, 147, 
169
1, 3, 10
Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy
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Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
E. Scientific Involvement
Members of the teaching staff of 
Foreign Universities (tenured 
positions) after their 
resignation/denial of appointment 
from the authorities
14, 27, 92
Adjunct Professor (members of 
the teaching staff of Greek and 
foreign Universities and 
Technological Educational 
Foundations under contract)
12 11(5), 12 24(3), 25, 42 1, 21, 42 16 38, 42, 54(6), 80, 
84, 95, 96, 98 
105(3)
Member of the teaching staff of 
academies of the armed forces 
after their resignation/denial of 
appointment from the authorities 
(tenured posititons)
25
Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy
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Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
E. Scientific Involvement
Members of the teaching staff of 
the National School of Public 
Administration, National Centre 
of Public Administration, Police 
Academy and academies of the 
armed forces, and other public 
educational centres (under 
contract)
4 11 1, 5, 21 55(2), 86 105
Members of the teaching staff of 
the National Centre of Public 
Administration (under contract)
2, 4 7 1, 5 55 13, 19, 42, 45, 
50, 53, 54, 58, 
93, 98, 101, 105, 
112, 120, 124, 
128, 136, 151, 
159, 168, 172, 
176, 177, 180
Research Fellow/Collaborator in 
universities, research centres, 
post doctoral researcher, research 
(under contract) 
7(3) 25 163(2)
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Type of involvement Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvemen
t after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointmen
t 
Involvement 
before the 
appointment
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation 
or denial of 
appointment
Involvement 
before the 
mandate
Functional 
Accumulation 
while in 
service 
Suspension 
from duties 
(only 
secondment 
cases)
Involvement 
after 
revocation or 
denial of 
appointment
Radio producer (under contract) 79
Supreme Council for the Selection 
of Personnel
Hellenic Data Protection Authority The Greek Ombudsman Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and 
Privacy
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APPENDIX 7 
Explanatory text on basic concepts in the Greek Public Administration 
a. the legal definition of the public sector, 
b. the working status of the employees in the public sector, and  
c. the mobility rules for civil servants (transfers, secondments, reclassifications)  
 
 The legal definition of the “public sector” 
 
The Greek Constitution does not contain a precise definition for the concept of 
“public sector”. The term was first introduced in legislation with the law 1256/1982 
regarding the scope of application of the multiple office-holding in the public sector. 
Another paradigm is that of article 14, par. 1 of the law 2190/1994, as amended, 
defining the scope of application of the recruitment system in the public sector. On 
the other hand, the version “broader public sector” is found in articles 14, subpar. 9, 
verse e, and 103 par. 7, and 8 of the Constitution of 2001. In general, according to the 
Scientific Report of Parliament on the draft law on the reformation of the recruitment 
system in the public sector1006, the term “is the special legal regime resulting from 
individual laws concerning limitations that are proper or relevant to the concept of 
the public service pertaining either to the recruitment or the service status of its 
personnel, or the acquisition and use of sources for the attainment of the public 
purpose they aspire”. Indeed, since legislation does not offer a general definition of 
the term, and after having combined the relevant individual laws, the following bodies 
pertain to the public sector (Spyropoulos, 2009): 
 
• Public services of the State; 
• First and second-level local government agencies; 
• Public law legal entities, with the exception of the Capital Market 
Commission, the Stock Exchange, and the Private Insurance Supervisory 
Committee; 
• All kinds of state or public enterprises and organizations, and enterprises and 
organizations operating state concessions, as well as private law legal entities 
which have a public character and pursue objectives in the public interest; 
• Banks belonging to the state, and 
• All kinds of subsidiaries of public law legal entities, and public enterprises and 
organizations, with the exception of local government enterprises 
 
b. The working status of the personnel in the public sector 
 
According to the constitutional and ordinary legislator, the personnel employed in the 
civil service may be classified in the following categories with respect to the four 
internationally recognized systems of employment relationships, that is, with tenure, 
without tenure, career, and specific posts, or a combination of their individual features 
(Chryssanthakis, 2001):  
 
                                                 
1006 Scientific Report of Parliament on the draft law on the reformation of the recruitment system in the 
public sector, (Law 3812/1999), dated December 14, 2009, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/7b24652e-78eb-4807-9d68-e9a5d4576eff/a-asep-
epi_XPress_Hamster_temp.qxp.pdf, date of access: 23.6.2011. 
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i) Permanent civil servants, who are linked with a public law employment 
relationship, possess a position in the organisational chart, and enjoy the guarantee of 
permanent tenure (article 103, par. 2 and 4 of the Constitution). Moreover, their 
grades evolve in accordance with the career system. The public services of the State, 
first and second-level local government agencies, and public law legal entities are 
staffed with permanent civil servants. This category of personnel plays a central role 
in the organisational structure of the public administration, and, according to the 
jurisprudence of the Council of State (Decision 1603/1991), the Constitution, in 
principal, imposes the organization and staffing of public administration with 
permanent employees, and only exceptionally with non-tenured employees.  
 
ii) Civil servants on private law contract of indefinite time, possessing positions in the 
organisational charts, whereas their working status is protected by almost similar legal 
guarantees with respect to those enjoyed by the permanent civil servants. This 
category may be further subdivided into three particular categories of civil servants on 
private law contracts of indefinite time. The first subcategory comprises the special 
scientific, auxiliary or technical personnel that cover permanent and durable needs 
which are supported by their expertise (article 103, par. 3, subpar. a of the 
Constitution). They equally possess positions in the organisational charts. However, 
depending on the will of the legislator, these positions may be filled by personnel 
hired on private law contracts of definite time, which may be renewed, pursuant to 
article 3, par. 1 of the Presidential Decree 410/1988 on the Code of personnel on 
private law contract1007.  
 
The second subcategory is constituted by former temporary employees whose time-
limited contracts were converted to private law contracts of indefinite time through 
special legislative regulation. This was a widespread recruitment policy that co-
existed, and, in parallel, circumvented the official recruitment system1008. It should be 
noted that temporary employees and personnel with private contracts of indefinite 
time were further upgraded since they were awarded permanent tenure. As Spanou 
(1996) states commenting on the relevant policy: “Both parties [PASOK and New 
Democracy] had taken advantage of the state resources for clientelistic purposes”. 
This category of personnel possesses positions in the ogranisational charts which are 
constituted ad hoc, and thus will become vacant after their retirement. However, they 
possess no grades, and consequently cannot be promoted to the hierarchical positions 
of the civil service.  In September 2009, the law 3801/2009 came into force, and 
finally regulated the issue1009. The third subcategory comprises the personnel of the 
                                                 
1007 The issue of hiring special scientific personnel on private law contract of definite time has raised 
controversy in legal theory over its constitutionality.  
1008 The presidential decree 164/2004 was the last legislative regulation that converted private law 
contracts of definite time to private law contracts of indefinite time. It should also be noted that this 
legislative settlement raised intense controversy since article 103, par. 8 of the revised constitution of 
2001 provided that “Conversion by law of the employees under the first section to permanent civil 
servants or conversion by law of their employment contracts into contracts of indefinite time is 
prohibited. The prohibitions of the present paragraph also apply to those employed on the basis of 
services for the performance of a specific task”. 
1009 For many years, the Union of Civil Servants (ADEDY) was unofficially reluctant to accept the 
legislative regulation of the issue since their members, that is, the permanent civil servants felt that they 
would be threatened in the battle for promotions by the thousands of employees under private law 
contracts of indefinite time since it was publicly known that many of them were better qualified. 
Interestingly enough, the relevant law was discussed and voted one month before the national elections 
of October 7, 2009.  
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private law legal entities of the public sector, public organizations and enterprises 
included, who are equally employed with private law contracts of indefinite time. 
Their working status is explicitly defined in their founding laws, and the General 
Regulations or Regulations of the Personnel Status1010. The structure of these texts is 
almost identical to that of the Civil Servants’ Code, and sometimes they invoke 
provisions that apply to employees of public law legal entities (Symeonides, 1991). 
 
iii) Revocable, non-tenured civil servants on a private law contract of indefinite1011 or 
definite time (article 103, par. 5 of the Constitution). This category comprises the 
administrative personnel, and high-raniking employees holding posts beyond the civil 
service hierarchy1012. They are directly appointed by the elected politicians and the 
political staff, thus enjoying their personal trust, and can be dismissed at any time 
without special guarantees and compensation.                           
 
iv) Non-tenured civil servants with a mandate. Their posts are provided for as an 
exception in relation to those occupied by permanent civil servants. They equally 
enjoy the guarantees of tenure during their mandate. 
 
v) Civil servants on a private law contract of definite time in order to fill 
unforeseeable and urgent needs. 
 
Mobility rules for civil servants (transfers, secondments, reclassifications) 
 
The practice of transfers, that is, permanently posting civil servants from one Ministry 
to another, or to another public service, or to a public law legal entity and vice-versa, 
was first introduced in the Civil Servants’ Code in 2007 (Law 3528/2007, Civil 
Servants’ Code of 2007, article 71).  Moreover, according to circulars of the Ministry 
of the Interior1013, employees of first and second-level local government agencies as 
well as employees of local government enterprises, which do not pertain to the public 
sector pursuant to article 51 of the law 1892/1990, do not fall under the ambit of 
article 71. As for the procedure to be followed, a public service intending to fill 
vacant positions of the organisational chart proceeds to a public announcement, and 
the interested employees submit their applications. The service defines the formal 
qualifications or additional ones, and the employee is transferred upon the opinion of 
the service council of the receiving service. This new regulation actually broadened 
the transfers system in relation to the past since transfers were only permitted within 
the same service, that is, either within the service-unit, or to and from regional offices. 
Interestingly enough, despite the fact that transfers from one service to another were 
not provided for in the Civil Servants’ Codes of 1951, 1977 and 1999, a series of 
special provisions on transfers were promulgated. The relevant laws either referred to 
                                                 
1010 Public Enterprises and Organisations adopt General Regulations which are foreseen in their 
founding laws. They are approved, in turn, by the competent Minister and have the force of a 
substantial law. 
1011 The duration of their contract actually coincides with the mandate of those who appointed them.  
1012 This category comprises the personnel appointed to the political bureaus of the Prime Minister, 
Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and the general and special secretaries of ministries, the Presidency of the 
Republic, the regions of the State, as well as those appointed as ambassadors and do not pertain to the 
diplomatic corps. Apart from the revocable administrative staff, the other high-ranking employees are 
divided into three categories: the Special Advisors, the Special Collaborators, and the Scientific 
Collaborators. 
1013 Circulars: ∆Ι∆Α∆/Φ.35.14/916/4084/15.2.2007  and ∆Ι∆Α∆/Φ.48/31/οικ.9253/12.4.2007. 
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specific services and ministries, or regulated issues of personnel surplus in private law 
legal entities of the public sector, that is, through their transfer to public services or 
public law legal entities.  
 
The law 2266/1994 attempted to systematize the procedure of transfers for all the civil 
servants employed in the public services, public law legal entities, and first and 
second-level local government agencies. It created a quite complicated transfer 
system, whereas it set the precondition that before the application of the measure all 
the services had to compile new organizational charts. The transfers would take place 
every three years. In reality, this transfer scheme was never implemented in an 
organized manner. Instead, as the Explanatory Report of Parliament1014 states 
regarding the new article 71 of the Civil Servants’ Code of 2007, there was no 
transparency in the past, and transfers took occasionally place, and under secrecy. In 
April 2011, the Minister of the Interior, Ioannis Ragoussis, announced the elaboration 
of a draft law regarding the establishment of a credible transfers system based on 
merit. He also denounced the clientelistic and corrupt practices of the past in relation 
to transfers. According to this new scheme, the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel shall be responsible for its implementation1015.  
 
One general principle deriving from the constitution and common legislation is that 
the transferred employees’ working status does not change, that is, it is not permitted 
to transfer employees on private law contract of indefinite time to permanent positions 
of the organisational chart, and vice-versa1016 (Tachos and Symeonides, 2004). In 
cases of compulsory transfers, namely when there is personnel surplus in private law 
legal entities of the broader public sector1017 or in cases of privatizations1018, the 
employees on private law contracts of indefinite time are transferred to their new 
services under the same working status. If there are no vacant positions of private law 
in the organisational chart, they fill positions of the organisational chart which are 
created ad hoc. These rules are explicitly set forth in the relevant legislation providing 
for such transfers.  
 
Interestingly enough, a few months after the promulgation of the Civil Servants’ Code 
in 2007, article 71 on transfers was supplemented by article 6 of the law 3613/2007. 
This article provides that employees from state private law legal entities and public 
                                                 
1014 Explanatory Report of Parliament on the draft law “Ratification of the Code of status of the Public 
Civil Administrative Servants and Employees of Public Law Legal Entities”, dated December 4, 2006, 
available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/2f026f42-950c-4efc-b950-340c4fb76a24/K-
DHMYPA-eis.pdf, date of access: 26.6.2011. 
1015 Source: Article of the newspaper “To Vima” entitled “Civil Servants’ transfers through the 
Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel”, dated: April 6, 2011, available at: 
http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=394160, date of access: 12.4.2011 
1016 Decision 4930/1996 of the Council of State, Decisions 150/1973 and 1784/1972 of the Supreme 
Council of Public Services (ASDY), Opinion 401/2008 of the Legal Council of State. 
1017 See article 56 of the law 1943/1991 
1018 We refer to the privatization of Olympic Airways. Article 1 of the Act of Legislative Content 
(Government Gazette, vol. A, no 181, 16.9.2009) supplementing and amending the provisions of the 
law 3717/2008 on “Social regulations for the employees of the companies “Olympic Airlines S.A.”, 
“Olympic Airways-Services S.A.” and “Olympic Aviation S.A.” and other provisions” provided that 
the personnel “are transferred with the same working status to private law legal entities supervised by 
the Ministry of Transport and Communication, public services, autonomous or independent authorities, 
public law legal entities and first and second-level local government agencies”.  
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utilities (DEKO)1019 may equally participate in the transfer procedure of article 71 in 
order to fill permanent vacant positions of the organisational charts of state services 
and public law legal entities. In our opinion, it is far from clear that this 
supplementary provision is unconstitutional, and rather serves clientelistic purposes. 
More specifically, it violated article 103, par. 8 of the Constitution since conversion 
by law of those employed on private law contracts in the Public Administration and 
the broader public sector to permanent civil servants is prohibited. In our case, the 
working status changed indirectly, through the transfer procedure. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the trend towards further privatizations of public utilities, and the 
probability of the disbandment of a number of state private law legal entities in the 
future led political decision-makers to proceed to this legislative regulation. It would 
serve as a means to calm the employees’ insecurity, and thus satisfy the demands of a 
part of their political clientele through transfers to services pertaining to the core of 
the State guaranteeing tenure.   
 
We should point out that, before the promulgation of article 71 of the Civil Servants’ 
Code in 2007, all transfers, with the exception of the compulsory ones, were effected 
upon the agreement of the service councils of the releasing and receiving agencies. 
Finally, the administrative act of the transfer is signed by the competent ministers of 
the receiving and releasing agencies, and is published in the government gazette. 
 
According to the Civil Servants’ Code, secondments concern temporary removals, 
either from one unit to another within the same ministry or public law legal entity, or 
from public services or public law legal entities to another public service or public 
law legal entity, in order to meet serious and urgent service needs of a temporary 
character by decision of the competent minister/s upon the opinion of the relevant 
service councils. The Civil Servants’ Code does not provide for a public 
announcement for the submission of candidacies for the secondments. Thus, it could 
be argued that they are part of the clientelistic practices in the Greek public 
administration. Finally, secondment is a temporary measure which should not be used 
for the fulfillment of permanent service needs, namely secondments of unlimited time 
(Decision of the Council of State, 420/1991). 
 
Reclassifications concern changes in the employee’s service status, and are linked to 
his formal qualifications. Before explaining the procedure, it is necessary to clarify 
the classification of the positions in the Greek Civil Service in categories and 
branches. According to the Civil Servants’ Code, the positions of the personnel are 
classified in the following categories which are linked to the civil servants’ formal 
qualifications: 
 
i. Special Positions (SP); they are provided for in special provisions 
ii. University Education positions (UE); the formal appointment qualification is a 
degree or diploma from a Greek University School or Department, or an equivalent 
foreign educational institute. 
iii. Technological Education positions (TE); the formal appointment qualification is a 
certificate or diploma from a Greek technological educational institute or an 
equivalent Greek or foreign certificate or diploma or a Centre of Higher Technical 
                                                 
1019 The clause explicitly refers to those public utilities that are not entered the Stock Exchange Market, 
whereas the State possesses the majority of their shares.  
 824
and Vocational Education (KATEE) diploma or an equivalent Greek or foreign 
certificate diploma. 
iv. Secondary Education positions (SE); the formal appointment qualification is a 
graduation certificate or diploma from a secondary education school or other 
equivalent school. 
v. Compulsory Education positions (CE); the formal appointment qualification is a 
compulsory education graduation certificate or a graduation certificate from an 
equivalent lower technical school. 
  
 The categories of each position are further classified in branches corresponding to 
field specializations. The classification and distribution of positions by categories, and 
branch specializations as well as the description of the formal qualifications required 
for the appointment to the posts are defined in the relevant organizational charts. The 
Presidential Decree 50/20011020, as amended, sets the qualifications for appointment 
in positions of the public sector by category and branch, and serves as a source for the 
drafting of the organizational chart of each service.   
 
A civil servant may be reclassified i) from one branch to another within the same 
category either upon the initiative of the service or upon the civil servant’s request, 
and ii) from a lower category and branch to a superior category and branch upon the 
civil servant’s request. The employee may apply for reclassification under the 
preconditions that the relevant positions are vacant, and the applicant possesses the 
required formal qualifications.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1020 The Presidential Decree 50/2001 regarding the qualifications in the public sector replaced the 
Presidential Decree 194/1988. 
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APPENDIX 8 
Complementary texts and tables on the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel  
 
Text 1: Decodification of the transfer decisions 
 
The information contained in the transfer decisions combined with the legal status of 
the agencies of provenance constitute the main criteria to test the legality of transfers. 
Indeed, information gaps in the texts of the transfer decisions unravel the 
embarrassment regarding their formulation as well as their inconsistencies. In Tables 
1 and 2 there is an attempt to decode the legal aspect of the employment relationship -
public or private law contract- of the transferred personnel before and after their 
transfer as formulated in the text of the transfer decisions published in the 
Government Gazette.  
 
More specifically, Table 1 describes the variations in the formulation of the two parts 
of the transfer decisions in relation to regular employees. The term “regular 
employees” refers to their working status before the transfer. Their working status in 
the releasing and receiving agencies is not explicitly written in the text of the transfer 
decisions1021. However, apart from the criterion of the legal status of the releasing 
agency, the other main criterion that permits us classify an employee as regular is 
whether he possesses a grade. This information is either explicitly written in the first 
part of the transfer decision, e.g. grade C, or indirectly formulated under the 
expression “with the grade he possesses”, namely he is transferred with the grade he 
possessed at the releasing agency. 
 
It should be noted that employees on private law contracts of indefinite time working 
in public services, public and private law legal entities do not possess grades. Grade 
systems may exist in some public enterprises and organizations. However, they are 
not compatible with the ones provided for in the Civil Servants’ Code. Finally, 
according to table 1, all the regular employees filled vacant permanent positions of the 
organisational chart of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel.  
 
Table 2 describes the variations in the formulation of the two parts of the transfer 
decisions in relation to employees on private law contracts of indefinite time. The 
term “employees on private law contracts of indefinite time” refers to their working 
status before the transfer. This category of personnel raises the issue of the legality of 
the transfers. Following the structure of Table 2, they may be divided into three 
subcategories sharing two common characteristics: i) all the releasing agencies are 
private law legal entities, and ii) all the employees do not possess grades in the first 
part of the transfer decisions.  
 
The first subcategory comprises employees on private law contracts of indefinite time, 
whose working status, category, branch and grade are not described in the first part of 
the transfer decision, that is, their status at the releasing agency. In other words, the 
first part of the transfer decision remains silent on their status at the releasing agency.  
                                                 
1021 The transferred to the receiving agency, the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, fill 
vacant permanent positions since the organizational chart of the authority only foresees positions for 
regular civil servants. 
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Table A Variations in the formulation of the text of transfer decisions for the regular 
employees 
General Status in the releasing agency 
(before the transfer) 
General Status in the receiving agency 
(after the transfer) 
Working 
Status 
Grade Category & 
Branch 
Working 
Status 
Grade Category & 
Branch 
 “employee” Yes* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* only regular 
civil servants 
possess grades 
Yes Not explicitly 
written. 
“transfer to 
the post of the 
branch  and 
category . . . 
of  the 
Supreme 
Council for 
the Selection 
of Personnel”  
Not written  
(it is understood 
that it will be the 
same with the one 
in the previous 
post) 
Yes 
“judicial 
employee”  
Yes* 
 
 
 
* only regular 
civil servants 
possess grades 
No Not explicitly 
written. 
“transfer to 
the Supreme 
Council for 
the Selection 
of Personnel”  
Not written  
(it is understood 
that it will be the 
same with the one 
in the previous 
post) 
No 
“Regular 
employee” or 
“employee” 
Yes* 
 
* only regular 
civil servants 
possess grades 
Yes “Transfer to a  
vacant 
position” 
Yes Yes 
“employee” Yes 
 
 
 
* only regular 
civil servants 
possess grades 
Yes “Transfer to a  
vacant 
position of 
equivalent 
grade”, that is, 
regular 
employee 
“Equivalent 
Grade” (with 
the one in the 
previous 
position) 
Yes 
name Yes 
* only regular 
civil servants 
possess grades 
Yes “Transfer to a  
vacant 
position” 
“With the 
grade he/she 
possesses” 
Yes 
name No 
(it is not explicitly 
written) 
No “Transfer to a  
vacant 
position” 
“With the 
grade he/she 
possesses” 
Yes 
 
 However, in the second part of the transfer decisions it is explicitly written that they 
fill vacant permanent positions of the organisational chart of the Secretariat, whereas 
their categories, branches and grades are equally defined. In a few cases, the grades 
are missing in the second part of the transfer decisions. It is rather obvious that we 
have a tacit conversion of the working relationship, whereas the existent 
inconsistencies between the two working relationships related to categories, branches 
and grades may explain why there is no information in the first part of the transfer 
decisions. 
 
The second subcategory comprises employees on private law contracts of indefinite 
time, whose working status is explicitly written in the first part of the transfer 
decisions, whereas they do not fill vacant permanent positions of the organizational 
chart of the Secretariat.  
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Table B Variations in the formulation of the text of transfer decisions for the 
employees on private law contract of indefinite time 
General Status in the previous position 
(before the transfer) 
General Status in the new position 
(after the transfer) 
Working Status Grade Category & 
Branch 
Working Status Grade Category & 
Branch 
Undefined 
working status -
“employee” 
No 
 
No Not explicitly written. 
“Transferred to the Secretariat 
of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel” 
[However,it is understood that it 
is a vacant position since  the 
organizational  chart foresees 
only regular personnel]. 
No Yes 
Undefined 
working status -
“employee” 
No No Not explicitly written. 
“Transferred to the Secretariat 
of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel” 
[However,it is understood that it 
is a vacant position since  the 
organizational chart foresees 
only regular personnel]. 
Yes  Yes 
Undefined 
working status -
“employee” 
No  No Transfer to a vacant position No  Yes 
Employee with 
mandate 
No Only 
category. No 
Branch 
Transfer to a vacant position Yes Yes 
Name  No  No  Transfer to a vacant position Yes Yes 
Employee with a 
private law 
contract of 
indefinite time 
No Yes Personal position beyond the 
organizational chart on a private 
law contract of indefinite time. 
No No. It is 
understood that it 
will be the same. 
Employee with a 
private law 
contract of 
indefinite time 
No No Personal position beyond the 
organizational chart on a private 
law contract of indefinite time.  
No No 
Employee with a 
private law 
contract of 
indefinite time 
No No Not explicitly written. 
“Transferred to a position of the 
personnel of the Secretariat of 
the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel” 
[However,it is understood that it 
is a vacant position since  the 
organizational  chart foresees 
only regular personnel].  
Yes  Yes 
Employee with a 
private law 
contract of 
indefinite time 
No No Personal position beyond the 
organizational chart with the 
same working relationship 
(private law contract of 
indefinite time) 
No  Yes 
Employee with a 
private law 
contract of 
indefinite time 
No No Vacant position Yes  Yes 
Employee with a 
private law 
contract of 
indefinite time 
No Yes Vacant position Yes “the same branch 
and category” 
Employee with a 
private law 
contract of 
indefinite time 
No Yes Vacant position Yes Yes 
Employee with a 
private law 
contract of 
indefinite time 
No Category.  
No branch 
Vacant position of a regular 
employee 
Yes Yes 
Employee with a 
private law 
contract of 
indefinite time 
No No Vacant position of a regular 
employee 
Yes Yes 
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Instead, they keep their previous working status, and they fill personal positions, 
which are created ad hoc, beyond the positions provided for in the organizational 
chart. These positions are abolished after their retirement from the authority. The third 
subcategory comprises employees on private law contracts of indefinite  time, whose 
working status is explicitly written in the first part of the transfer decisions. Thus, the 
transfer decision by describing their previous working status openly converts their 
working relationship since the transferred employees fill vacant permanent positions 
of the organisational chart according to the second part of the transfer decisions. 
 
Finally, the case of “the employee with mandate” was incorporated in Table 2 without 
actually pertaining to the category of employees on private law contracts of indefinite 
time. It refers to the case of the transfer of two revocable civil servants on private law 
contract with a three-year mandate. This extraordinary case will be analysed later on. 
 
 
TABLE 1 Releasing agencies by categories 
The transferred personnel’s  agencies of provenance by 
categories 
% Transferred personnel by category of 
agency 
Public Enterprises and Organisations 28% (58 of  200) 
Various Private Law Legal Entities  14% (30 of 200) 
Social Security-Pension Funds 11% (24 of 200) 
Armed Forces 9% (19 of 200) 
Central Services of Ministries  9% (18 of 200) 
First and Second-level local government agencies  6% (11 of 200) 
Various Public Law Legal Entities  5% (10 of 200) 
Hospitals and public health bodies 5% (9 of 200) 
Courts 3% (5 of 200) 
Autonomous Services 2% (4 of 200) 
Second level local government enterprises  2% (3 of 200) 
Independent Authorities 2% (3 of 200) 
Subsidiaries of Public Banks 2% (3 of 200) 
Higher Education Institutions  1% (2 of 200) 
Source: The Government Gazette  
 
Table 2 Supervising Ministries of the releasing agencies*  
The transferred personnel’s agencies of provenance  by 
supervising Ministry 
% Transferred personnel by supervising 
Ministry 
Ministry of Development  16% (32 of  200) 
Ministry of Defence 15% (29 of 200) 
Ministry of Finance 11% (22 of 200) 
Ministry of Employment  9% (21 of 200) 
Ministry of Health and Welfare  10% (20 of 200) 
Ministry of the Interior 10% (19 of 200) 
Ministry of Transport and Communications 8% (16 of 200) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 6% (11 of 200) 
Ministry of Agriculture 4% (7 of 200) 
Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs  3% (6 of 200) 
Ministry of Justice 3% (5 of 200) 
Ministry of Public Works 2% (3 of 200) 
Ministry of Public Order 2% (3 of 200) 
Ministry of Culture 1% (2 of 200) 
Ministry of Press and Mass Media 1% (1 of 200) 
General Secretariat of the Cabinet 1% (2 of 200) 
Ministry of Commercial Shipping 1% (1 of 200) 
* The central services of Ministries are also included 
Source: The Government Gazette  
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Text 2: Analysis of the controversial and extraordinarily irregular cases of 
transfers 
 
We have located the following controversial cases: 
i) Employees transferred from public services and public law legal entities, whose 
working relationship in the releasing agency is not defined since they possess no 
grade in the first part of the transfer decision. These might be cases of tacit conversion  
since the working status in the previous position is not revealed. We have identified 
13 cases1022.  
ii) The transfer of judicial employees pursuant to article 1, par. 6 of the law 
2349/1995 might be considered as unconstitutional, as previously analyzed. We have 
identified five cases1023. 
 
iii) The possibility of transferring employees coming from first and second level local 
government agencies could be considered dubious. The Code of Municipalities and 
Communities of 1981 did not provide for transfers from local government agencies to 
the other public services and public law legal entities. On the other hand, the 
Presidential Decree 33/1996 on the Code of Second level local government authorities 
allows for such transfers. However, if we apply in the case of transfers to the 
Secretariat of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel the interpretation of 
the clause 71 of the Civil Servants’ Code of 2007 regarding its scope of 
implementation, as formulated in the circulars of the Ministry of the Interior, the 
employees of first and second-level local government agencies do not fall under the 
ambit of the regulation. We have identified eleven cases, namely five employees 
transferred from prefectures1024, and six employees transferred from 
municipalities1025. Within this category, there might be three cases1026 of tacit 
conversion of the employees’ working status. 
 
iv) Cases of transfers which occur simultaneously with a reclassification procedure to 
another branch within the same category. More specifically, the employees before the 
transfer pertained to the category and branch of C.E. Worker (case 35), C.E. Water 
Worker (case 178), and C.E. Cleansing Workers (179 and 180), whereas their branch 
was converted to that of C.E. Auxiliary Staff through their transfer. However, the 
public announcement for the submission of candidacies in the three last cases1027 
announced the filling of vacant positions of C.E. Auxiliary Staff1028, and not C.E. 
Workers.  
 
v) Cases of transfers from former public law legal entities converted to public 
anonymous companies by the time of the transfer. More specifically, after the 
conversion of the public law legal entities, Organisation of the Central Market of 
                                                 
1022 Cases 34, and 108 refer to employees coming from public services. Cases 56, 57, 76, 97, 102, 104, 
128, 135, 141, 142, 156 refer to employees coming from public law legal entities.  
1023 Cases 7, 68, 105, 106, and 112. 
1024 Cases 127, 155, 165, 169, and 181. 
1025 Cases 136, 170, 172, 178, 179 and 180. 
1026 Cases 127, 179, and 180. 
1027 We do not have information on the public announcement of the first case. However, we suppose 
that the public announcement provided for the submission of candidacies for C.E. Auxiliary Staff.  
1028 Source: Press Releases of ASEP, available at: http://www.asep.gr/deltyp.htm, date of access: 
25.5.2004 
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Athens, and the National Road Fund1029, to anonymous companies, the regular 
employees of the former public law legal entities filled personal permanent positions 
created ad hoc by the General Personnel Regulations. These positions would be 
abolished after the retirement of the employees for whatever reason. In other words, 
the employees kept the previous status of regular civil servants after the conversion of 
the public law legal entities to anonymous companies1030.  
 
However, legal theory (Tachos, 2004) challenges relevant legislative regulations, and 
considers them as unconstitutional in two respects. First, these clauses actually 
provide for the phenomenon according to which permanent employees serve in public 
anonymous companies, namely private law legal entities, whereas the Constitution 
explicitly provides that permanent civil servants serve in the State, local government 
agencies, and public law legal entities (article 103, par. 6). Second, permanent tenure 
pursuant to article 103 par. 2 of the Constitution,1031 and article 39, par. 1 of the Civil 
Servants’ Code1032 presupposes the existence of a position in the organisational chart 
as provided by law. However, these positions of the organisational chart of the 
permanent personnel serving in these public law legal entities were abolished since 
the Service, that is, the public law legal entity, was abolished and converted to an 
anonymous company, that is, a private law legal entity. Moreover, the jurisprudence 
of the Council of State (Decision 867/2002)1033 has ruled that the working regime of 
the personnel of public law legal entities undergoing conversion may not be other 
than that regulated by private law since a public law working relationship is 
incompatible with the legal status of private law legal entities. Consequently, the 
transfer of four employees, two from the Organisation of the Central Market of 
Athens (Cases 101, and 125), and two from the Anonymous Company for the 
Exploitation and Management of Greek Highways (Cases 134, 195) who were 
considered as regular civil servants despite the fact that the transfer took place after 
the conversion of the legal status of these agencies, could be considered as dubious. 
 
c. The category of extraordinarily irregular transfer cases refers to cases that present 
special interest in relation to the violation of legislation. The following cases were 
located:  
 
i) The transfer of two employees with a three-year mandate from the General 
Secretariat of the Cabinet1034 (Cases 12 and 13) was illegal. As already stated, 
                                                 
1029 It was renamed as “Anonymous Company for the Exploitation and Management of Greek 
Highways” (TEO S.A.) after its conversion to an anonymous public company. 
1030 Interestingly enough, the working status of the employees of the Postal Savings SA, a former 
public law legal entity converted to an anonymous public company by law 3082/2002, was regulated in 
a different manner, which, in our opinion, was consistent with the constitutional demands. Thus, 
according to article 5 par. 1 of the said law the permanent personnel were transferred ipso jure to the 
Company on private law contract, whereas par. 4 provided for guarantees similar to those for civil 
servants in relation to the termination of the personnel’s working relationship. 
1031 Article 103 par. 2 of the Constitution reads as follows: “No one may be appointed to a post not 
provided by law”. 
1032 Article 39, par. 1 of the Civil Servants’ Code reads as follows: “Civil servants and employees of 
public law legal entities possessing positions of the organisational chart provided by law are permanent 
as long as these positions exist”. 
1033 Council of State, Department D, Decision 867/2002, Source: The Official Website of the Athens 
Bar Association, available at: http://www.dsanet.gr/1024x768Auth.htm, date of access: 11.07.2011. 
1034 These positions are provided for in article 4 entitled “personnel with mandate” of the Act of the 
Cabinet 154/13.12.1985 regarding the “Structure, competences and personnel of the Secretariat of the 
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revocable civil servants of article 103, par. 5 of the Constitution do not have tenure, 
and therefore, even if a mandate is provided for, they are dismissed after the 
expiration of their mandate without special guarantees and compensation. These two 
cases are not simply transfer cases. They actually conceal new appointments through 
a transfer procedure, namely these individuals were transferred as if they were civil 
servants which was not the case. In this sense, they were appointed in a public service, 
thus bypassing the relevant legislation for recruitments in the public sector. 
 
ii) The transfer of a permanent civil servant pertaining to the civilian personnel of the 
National Intelligence Service (Case 19) was irregular in two respects. First, the 
National Intelligence Service is exempted from the scope of implementation of article 
14 of the law 2190/1994 according to the list of the exempted public bodies. 
Therefore, transfers are also exempted pursuant to par. 2, subpara. v of the said 
article. Second, transfers from the National Intelligence Service are provided for in 
case of personnel surplus or when the NIS estimates that one of its employees can no 
longer work there in case his presence is not in the interest of the service pursuant to 
article 10 par. 2 of the law 1645/1986. Therefore, accepting a candidature from a 
member of the civilian personnel of the NIS, after a public announcement, as is the 
case with the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, seems problematic. 
Finally, all individual administrative acts regarding the service status (appointments, 
transfers etc) of the personnel of the NIS are not published in the Government Gazette 
pursuant to article 11 of the law 1645/1986. Nevertheless, the transfer to the Supreme 
Council for the Selection of Personnel was published in the Government Gazette. 
 
iii) The transfer of employees from the Organisation Against Drugs (Cases 87 and 
139), and the Centre for Infectious Diseases Control (Cases 74 and 110) was irregular 
in two respects. First, these agencies were both exempted from the scope of 
implementation of article 14 of the law 2190/1994 according to the list of the 
exempted public bodies. Therefore, transfers are also exempted pursuant to par. 2, 
subpara. iv of the said article. Second, these agencies were private law legal entities, 
and thus the employees’ working status was converted.   
 
iv) The transfer of nine (9) employees from the Centre of Innovation SA (Cases 25 
and 26), the Shipyards of Elefsina (Cases 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32), and the Hellenic 
Shipyards (Cases 69 and 70), which were private law legal entities, is equally 
problematic. The working relationship of the transferred employees, that is, private 
law contract of indefinite time, was not converted to a public law working 
relationship. All the employees filled personal positions of private law beyond those 
provided for in the organizational chart of the authority. However, these transfers had 
a compulsory character since the Centre of Innovation SA was disbanded, whereas the 
Shipyards of Elefsina SA and the Hellenic Shipyards SA were privatized by the time 
these transfers occurred. Special provisions in legislation1035 and ministerial 
                                                                                                                                            
Cabinet”. The appointment and dismissal of the personnel of the General Secretariat of the Cabinet are 
effected by decision of the Prime Minister published in the Government Gazette. Flogaitis (1986) states 
that the personnel serve a three-year mandate which corresponds to the average term of office of a 
government supported by the same composition in Parliament. However, in his view, the capacity of a 
revocable employee would have been more consistent with the logic of the law. 
1035 Article 8 of the law 2436/1996 regulates the issue of the transfer of the personnel of the Centre of 
Innovation SA. Article 20 of the law 2414/1996 and article 13 of the law 2367/1995, as replaced by 
article 18 of the law 2446/1996, provide for the transfer of the personnel of the Shipyards of Elefsina 
and the Hellenic Shipyards, respectively.  
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decisions1036 regulated the procedure for the transfer of the personnel of these 
agencies. The transfer procedures did not have a competitive character since they 
were compulsory1037. On the other hand, these legislative initiatives explicitly 
specified that the transferred employees would fill personal positions of private law 
which would be created ad hoc beyond those provided for in the relevant 
organizational charts of the receiving agencies. The issue raised by these cases is that 
there is high probability that the authority bypassed the competitive character of its 
own transfer system.  Interestingly enough, these are the only transfer cases where the 
working status of employees on private law contracts of indefinite time coming from 
private law legal entities is not converted to a public law working relationship. And 
this proves our point that all the other conversions of the working status of the 
employees coming from private law legal entities were irregular.   
 
v) The transfer of one employee (Case 20) from the ailing firm “Piraiki-Patraiki SA”, 
an over-indebted cotton manufacturing firm, nationalized in the early 1980s, is 
equally puzzling. In 1984, the company fell under the jurisdiction of the Organisation 
for the Economic Reconstruction of Enterprises, a private law legal entity, which was 
established in 1983 as a holding company for ailing firms, whereas the debt of Piraiki-
Patraiki then amounted to 50 billion drachmas. However, the firm finally closed on 
December 31, 1992 with a multiplied debt of 240 billion drachmas. The liquidation 
process lasted four years, that is, from 1992 until 1996. The working relationship of 
the personnel was terminated. The liquidator kept 34 employees for the needs of 
liquidation, whereas three hundred employees were hired during the period of 
liquidation after the victory of PASOK in the national elections of October 10, 
19931038.  The transfer under question took place in January 1997. The employee 
seems to have been one of those three hundred hired for the special liquidation 
process since she was given grade D according to the second part of the transfer 
                                                 
1036 The joint ministerial decision No ∆ΙΠΙ∆∆/Φ22Α/682/15793 defines the procedure for the transfer 
of the employees of the Shipyards of Elefsina S.A. (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 582, 17.7.1996). 
The joint ministerial decision, published in the Government Gazette, vol. B, no 128, 27.2.1997, defines 
the procedure for the transfer of the employees of the Hellenic Shipyards SA. 
1037 In the case of the Shipyards of Elefsina SA and the Hellenic Shipyards SA it was the Ministry of 
the Interior that centrally handled the transfer procedure. These enterprises had the obligation to send 
lists containing information on the employees’ service and family status to the Ministry of the Interior. 
On the other hand, the public services, public law legal entities, first and second-level local government 
agencies, public enterprises and organizations had to inform the Ministry of the Interior of their vacant 
positions by specialization or their service needs beyond vacant positions they intended to fill through 
the transfer of employees from these enterprises. In the case of the Centre of Innovation SA, article 8 of 
the law 2436/1996 did not give detailed information on the transfer procedure. It simply stated that the 
“transfer takes place upon a joint ministerial decision of the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of 
Development, and the Minister supervising the public body to which the employee is transferred, on 
the proposal of the Management Board of the Centre of Innovation SA, to existent vacant positions of 
the organisational chart on private law contract of indefinite time, and if there are no vacant positions 
of the organisational chart, to personal positions created by the transfer decision”. However, transfers 
to the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel do not provide for the concurrent opinion of the 
service council of the releasing agency. 
1038 Source: Question of the MP Michalis Bekiris (New Democracy) addressed to the Minister of 
Justice, dated March 6, 2008, on the issue of thirteen employees of Piraiki-Patraiki who had been 
selected for the process of liquidation, and were unexpectedly fired on December 31, 1993. The MP 
claimed that they were fired for political reasons. After their dismissal, they appealed to the Courts, and 
won their case. However, according to the MP, the State refused to compensate them. Information 
available at: http://www.bekiris.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=40:2010-05-
10-07-56-19&id=552:2010-07-06-08-15-41, date of access: 16.2.2010. 
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decision. Consequently, following the grade system in force, she must have been 
working for two years at the most before her transfer to the authority. Nevertheless, 
there was no special legislative regulation for the possibility of transferring the 
personnel whose working relationship had been terminated, those responsible for the 
liquidation process included. More specifically, par. 5 of article 34 of the law 
1876/1990, as replaced by par. 5, article 56 of the law 1943/1991 provided that 
transfer procedures regarding the surplus personnel of the public sector did not apply 
in the following public bodies: the Public Power Corporation, the Greek 
Telecommunications Organisation, banks of the public sector, enterprises under the 
jurisdiction of the Organisation for the Economic Reconstruction of Enterprises, as 
well as enterprises of the public sector which were not viable, especially those under 
bankruptcy or liquidation. Furthermore, pursuant to article 33 of the law 1892/1990, 
all the employees of the ailing companies under the jurisdiction of the Organisation 
for the Economic Reconstruction of Enterprises, whose employment relationship had 
been terminated, could participate in integration unemployment programmes. Finally, 
pursuant to article 19 of Law 2548/1997 unemployed employees1039 of the Piraiki-
Patraiki, who fulfilled special preconditions, namely those close to pension age, 
would receive special unemployment benefits until their retirement. 
 
Similar cases are those of two employees from the Greek Iron Mixtures SA and two 
employees from the Greek Company of Industrial and Mining Activities SA which 
seem problematic in relation to the permissibility of the transfer. Both public 
enterprises were under liquidation when the transfer occurred. 
 
Finally, the case of one transferred employee from the Hellenic Railways 
Organisation SA (case 90) confirms our view for the irregular conversion of the 
working relationship of the employees coming from private law legal entities. Article 
12 of the law 2671/1998 regulated the transfer of the surplus personnel of the 
organization to other agencies, namely “services of Ministries, autonomous services 
or independent authorities included, regions, public law legal entities, first and 
second-level local government agencies, and other agencies of the broader public 
sector”. The article provided for a certain procedure for the transfers, which was 
centrally handled by the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration, and 
Decentralisation. However, this procedure bypassed the competitive procedure 
provided for the transfer of personnel to the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel since employees could also be transferred to independent authorities. On 
the other hand, par. 5 of article 12 explicitly provided that the personnel were 
transferred to vacant positions on private law contract of indefinite time. In case there 
were no vacant positions, personal positions were constituted with the act of the 
transfer. The transfer of the employee from the Hellenic Railways Organisation SA to 
the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel was published in the government 
gazette on July 1, 1999, that is, six months after the promulgation of the law 
2671/1998. It is unclear whether the transfer was effected according to the provisions 
of the law 2671/1998 regarding the surplus personnel of the Hellenic Railways 
Organisation SA or according to the competitive procedure provided for in the 
relevant legislation for the transfer of personnel to the Supreme Council for the 
                                                 
1039 According to the clause, the term “unemployed employees” encompasses those who were fired in 
1992 as well as those hired for the special liquidation process, and fired in 1997. 
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Selection of Personnel. Irrespective of the procedure followed, the employee was 
irregularly transferred to a permanent vacant position of the organisational chart. 
 
Text 3 and Table 3: The status of the releasing agencies by the time of the 
transfers 
 
The empirical data derived from the government gazette relating to the releasing 
agencies permitted the construction of Table 3 containing information on the status of 
each releasing agency (legal status, under liquidation, trade sales) by the time of the 
transfer or shortly afterwards, the number of employees transferred by agency, and, in 
some cases, crucial dates of transfers in relation to any change in the status of an 
agency.  
 
One group of the releasing agencies comprises public anonymous companies which 
were under liquidation when the transfers took place (Greek Technology and 
Constructions S.A., Greek Iron Mixtures SA, Piraiki-Patraiki SA, Greek Company of 
Industrial and Mining Activities SA), whereas there was no special legislative 
regulation for the transfer of the personnel. Only in the case of Greek Technology and 
Constructions SA the law 2364/1995 promulgated ten months after the transfer of 
three of its employees to the authority provided that the personnel of the public 
anonymous company would be transferred to the Public Power Corporation SA. Some 
transfers occurred shortly before the trade sale or the disbandment of public 
anonymous companies or private law legal entities (Athens Paper Mill SA, Industrial 
Reconstruction Organisation SA1040, Pindos SA, National Foundation of Overseas 
Reception and Rehabilitation for Repatriated Expatriate Greeks). In one case the 
transfer seems to have taken place after the trade sale (Athens Paper Mill SA). It 
should be noted that there was no legislative regulation for the transfer of the 
personnel of Athens Paper Mill SA after the trade sale in 19991041. The company was 
resold in 2002. This was also the case with Pindos SA1042 which was disbanded in 
December 2001. 
 
The transfer of ten employees from the public benefit non-profit foundation “National 
Foundation of Overseas Reception and Rehabilitation for Repatriated Expatriate 
Greeks” (EIYAPOE) is of interest. Their transfer was gradual. It started in 1998 and 
ended in 2003. As for the way of their recruitment to the Foundation, the MP of 
PASOK, Christos Kipouros, denounced in Parliament during discussions and debates 
                                                 
1040 The organisation was disbanded by the law 2741/1999. Article 29 of the said law provided the 
transfer of the personnel of the Organisation as well as that of its ailing public companies under 
liquidation to the Ministry of Development or other public bodies supervised by the said Ministry. 
1041 The unemployed personnel of the company could participate in special local programmes for re-
specialization, training and acquisition of professional experience according to article 50 of the law 
3427/2005. Interestingly enough 
1042 Founded around 1989, the company pertained to the State through the Agricultural Bank of Greece 
and the Greek Industrial Development Bank, whereas three agricultural cooperatives held 46,5% of the 
shares. The company was disbanded in December 2001, and sold in 2003. There was no legislative 
regulation for the transfer of the personnel to other services of the public sector. The unemployed 
personnel (100 persons) received an extraordinary financial support (733 EURO), and special 
employment allowance, and could participate in integration unemployment programmes (Ministerial 
Decision regarding the extraordinary financial support published in the Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1811, 31.12.2001, and Laws 2956/2001 and  3144/2003 regarding the prolongation of the payment of 
the special employment allowance). 
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on the draft law1043 “Establishment of an independent authority for the selection of 
personnel and regulation of public administration issues”, on February 2, 1994, that 
the majority of the personnel of the Foundation were appointed by Mr Samaras1044 
and came from his electoral constituency. The MP, in order to support his claims, 
submitted to Parliament an article published in the newspaper Eleftherotypia written 
by Michalis Charalambidis1045 who revealed that event. However, we have evidence 
that the transferred employees were not appointed to the agency when the government 
of New Democracy was in power. According to their transfer decisions they were all 
given grade D with the exception of one who was given grade C. This means that they 
had served in the agency for two years at the most. All these transfers took place after 
1998. Therefore, they were hired in 1996 onwards. The way of their recruitment is 
unknown1046.  
 
The foundation was established in 1990 and started its official operation on January 1, 
1991. It was supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Finance, and was disbanded in 2002 (Law 3072/2002). The staff could be transferred 
to several Ministries under the working status of an employee of private law contract 
of indefinite time1047. However, the founding Presidential Decree as of 13.12.1990 
(G.G. vol. B, no 782, 13.12.1990) provided that all the staff would be ipso jure fired 
from the foundation after the end of its operation1048. The Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel was not included in the list of the agencies where the 
employees could be transferred. On the other hand, there was a conversion of the 
working status of those transferred to the authority despite the fact that the personnel 
of the foundation were employees on private law contract of indefinite time and 
should fill personal positions in the organisational chart with the same working 
relationship according to article 17 of the law 3072/2002. 
 
                                                 
1043 Minutes of Parliament, 8th Period (of Presidential Parliamentary Democracy), First Assembly, 
Session 53, discussion and debate in principal, February 2nd, 1994, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-
Olomeleias?search=on&DateFrom=01%2F02%2F1994&DateTo=10%2F02%2F1994&SessionPeriod=
92766fef-d4d2-4a56-a754-3081dfb67589, date of access: 25.06.2010. 
1044 Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Coalition Government, the Oecumenical Government, and 
the New Democracy government (1989-1992). In 1993 he created the political party of Political 
Spring. His party did not participate in the national elections of 2000, whereas he publicly supported 
the party of New Democracy. He was elected President of the party of New Democracy on November 
29, 2009. 
1045 Michalis Charalambidis was a founding member of the party of PASOK. He retired from the party 
in 1999 due to serious political disputes. 
1046 According to article 1, par. 1 of the law 2527/1997 the foundation fell under the ambit of the 
general recruitment system of the law 2190/1994. 
1047 Article 17, par. 2 of the law 3072/2002 reads as follows: “Within the exclusive deadline of one 
month from the publication of the act of the appointment of the liquidation committee, the employees on 
private law contract of indefinite time have the right, upon request submitted to the committee, to pick, 
instead of their indemnification resulting from the termination of their working relationship, the 
transfer under the same working relationship to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Public 
Administration and Decentralisation, National Education and Religious Affairs, Macedonia-Thrace, 
the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad, the Regions, as well as Higher Education Institutions 
according to their needs. .  .” 
1048 Article 4 par. a of the Presidential Decree reads as follows: “a. The personnel are hired on a 
private law contract of indefinite time or, if this is not possible, are seconded from the broader public 
sector. The hiring contract explicitly states that after the termination of the work of the foundation the 
personnel are ipso jure fired, or in case of secondments, they return to the service they belong”. 
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The releasing agencies whose public law legal status was converted to private law 
shortly after or before the transfer constitute another group (Organisation of the 
Central Market of Athens, Greek Postal Savings Bank, Piraeus Port Authority, and 
Anonymous Company for the Exploitation and Management of Greek Highways). 
The case of two transferred employees from the Company for Agricultural 
Development “Evritania SA” is also characteristic. The company was established in 
1978 by the Agricultural Bank of Greece and the Greek Industrial Development Bank 
for the development of the region of Evritania. In 1998, it passed under the authority 
of the Prefectural self-administration of Evritania -second-level local government- 
which kept the majority of the shares (70.34%). The transfers took place in 1998, that 
is, when the company became a second-level local government enterprise. However, 
since then the enterprise has faced severe financial problems, and its sixteen 
employees had been unpaid for seven years according to the employees’ 
memorandum addressed to the competent Minister of the Interior, Public 
Administration, and Decentralisation, Mr Prokopis Pavlopoulos, dated March 3, 
20061049. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1049 The full text of the memorandum was uploaded at the electronic edition of the local newspaper 
“Evritanika Nea”, dated March 15, 2006, available at: http://www.evrytanika.gr/0161-
0180/0174/reportaz1.htm, date of access: 3.9.2011. 
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Dates of transfers
Ministry of Development
Central Service 2
Greek Technology and 
Constructions S.A.
3 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
under 
liquidation
Transfer of Personnel to Public Power Enterprise, Law 
2364/6.12.1995
24.2.1995
Greek Iron Mixtures 2 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
under 
liquidation
Under liquidation in 1991, Law 2000/1991, Still under liquidation in 
2011 (Source: State Budget for the Year 2011, Ministry of Finance, 
available at: 
http://www.minfin.gr/budget/2011/proyp/PDFProyp/1.0.pdf, date of 
access: 4.4.2011)
27.12.1996
Piraiki Patraiki 1 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
(Industrial 
Reconstructi
on 
Organisation
) - Closed
1992-1996: Under liquidation. Pursuant to article 33 of the Law 
1892/1990 all employees of the ailing companies of the 
Organisation for the Economic Reconstruction of Enterprises 
whose employement relationship was terminated could participate 
in integration unemployment programmes. Pursuant to article 19 
of Law 2548/1997 unemployed employees of the Company who 
fulfilled special conditions (close to the age to receive pension) 
would receive special unemployement benefit.
22.1.1997
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Greek Company of Industrial 
and Mining Activities SA 
(ELEVME)
2 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
under 
liquidation
Under liquidation in 1991, Law 2000/1991. Still under liquidation in 
2002, (Law 3066/18.10.2002), and 2011 (State Budget for the year 
2011, Source: Ministry of Finance, available at: 
http://www.minfin.gr/budget/2011/proyp/PDFProyp/1.0.pdf, date of 
access: 4.4.2011)
22.1.1997, 27.10.2005
Hellenic Organisation of 
Small and Medium 
Enterprises and Handicraft 
(EOMMEX)
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
1977: Private Law Legal Person                                                        
1997: Public Anonymous Company (Presidential Decree: 
159/1996) Conversion to an anonymous company according to the 
Law 2414/1996
16.2.1998
General Mining and 
Metallurgical Company SA 
(LARKO)  
3 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
The Company was nationalised in 1989 (Shareholders:National 
Bank of Greece, Public Power Corporation, and the Industrial 
Reconstruction Organisation)
Athens Paper Mill SA 4 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
(Industrial 
Reconstructi
on 
Organisation
)
Trade Sale in 1999. Resold in 2002. 5.3.1998, 9.4.1998, 24.5.2002
Public Power Corporation SA 2 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
1950: Private Law Legal Person                                                        
2000: Public Anonymous Company (Presidential Decree: 
333/2000) Conversion to an anonymous company according to the 
Laws 2414/1996 and 2773/1999. The Company entered the 
Athens and London Stock Exchanges in 12.12.2001. Source: The 
Official Website of the Public Power Corporation, available at: 
http://www.dei.gr/Default.aspx?id=1001&nt=18&lang=1, date of 
access: 5.3.2011 
9.4.1998
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Organisation for the 
Economic Reconstruction of 
Enterprises SA
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Law 1386/1983: Public Anonymous Company                                  
Law 2741/28.9.1999: Disbandment of the company. Transfer of 
the Personnel of the Organisation and the personnel of its ailing 
public companies under liquidation to the Ministry of Development 
or other public bodies supervised by the said Ministry
9.4.1998
ETHNODATA SA 1 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Founded in 1981, specialises in Informatics Consultancy, the 
development of software, and training on issues of informatics and 
multimedia. Subsidiary of the National Bank of Greece which is the 
main shareholder. Since 1999 the shares of the National Bank of 
Greece are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Source: 
National Bank of Greece, available at: 
www.nbg.gr/wps/wcm/connect/.../DELTIO_TELIKO.zip?MOD..., 
date of access: 5.3.2011
7.6.1999
Greek Salt Pits SA 2 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Founded in 1988, the Greek State is the main shareholder (the 
Greek State holds 55% of the shares, local authorities hold 25%, 
and KALLAS corporation holds 25%)
1.7.1999, 15.7.1999
Hellenic Centre for Marine 
Research
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Greek National Tourism 
Organisation (EOT-GNTO)
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
The GNTO was included in the group of public entities (public law 
and private law) that would be converted to public anonymous 
companies under the law 2414/1996. However, it remained a 
public law legal entity (Presidential Decrees 365/1997, 343/2001)
22.10.2001
Athens Business Chamber 1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Hellenic Competition 
Commission
2 Independent 
Authority
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Ministry of Agriculture
Central Service 2 Public 
Service
Company for Agricultural 
Development "Evritania SA"
2 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Second 
Level Local 
Government 
Enterprise
Founded in 1978 by the Agricultural Bank of Greece and the 
Greek Industrial Development Bank for the development of the 
region of Evritania. In 1998, it passed under the authority of the 
Prefectural self-administration (Second Level Local Government) 
of Evritania which kept the majority of the shares (70,34%). 
23.4.1998, 15.6.1999
Agricultural Insurance 1 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Subsidiary of 
a public bank
Founded in 1980 as a subsidiary of the public Bank "Agricultural 
Bank of Greece". In 1999 the company entered the Athens Stock 
Exchange. Source: The official website of Agricultural Insurance, 
available at: 
http://www.ateinsurance.gr/Company/Pages/default.aspx, date of 
access: 5.3.2011
29.12.2000
PINDOS SA 1 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Founded around 1989, the company pertained to the State through 
the Agricultural Bank of Greece and the Greek Industrial 
Development Bank, whereas three agricultural cooperatives held 
46,5% of the shares. The company was disbanded in December 
2001, and sold in 2003. There was no legislative regulation for the 
transfer of the personnel to other services of the public sector. The 
unemployed personnel (100 persons) received an extraordinary 
financial support (733 EURO) and could participate in  integration 
unemployment programmes (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 
1811, 31.12.2001, Law 3144/2003).
14.12.2001
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Organisation for the Payment 
and Control of the European 
Community Aid, Orientation 
and Guarantees (OPEKEPE)
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Greek Agricultural Insurance 
Organisation (ELGA)
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Ministry of Development - 
Ministry of Agriculture
Organisation of the Central 
Market of Athens (OKAA)
4 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
1963: Public Law Legal Entity                                                            
1998: Public Anonymous Company (Presidential Decree: 
286/21.12.1998) Conversion to an anonymous company according 
to the Law 2414/1996
10.2.1998, 4.10.1999, 31.1.2002
Ministry of Justice-Courts
Office of the Prosecutor of 
the Hellenic Supreme Court 
of Civil and Penal Law
1 Public 
Service
Court of First Instance of 
Thessaloniki 
1 Public 
Service
Court of First Instance of 
Athens
3 Public 
Service
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Central Service 1 Public 
Service
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National Foundation of 
Overseas Reception and 
Rehabilitation for Repatriated 
Expatriate Greeks 
(EIYAPOE)
10 Private Law 
Legal Entity 
Public 
Benefit Non-
Profit 
Foundation
Founded in 1990 and supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Finance. It was disbanded in 2001 (Law 
3072/2001), whereas the staff could be transferred to several 
Ministries under the working status of an employee of private law 
of indefinite time. However, its founding Presidential Decree as of 
13.12.1990 (G.G. vol. B, no 782, 13.12.1990) provided that all the 
staff would be ipso iure fired from the body.
5.3.1998, 3.4.1998, 21.6.1999, 6.9.1999, 
9.3.2001, 10.12.2001, 17.5.2002, 27.2.2003
Ministry of Health and 
Welfare
Pension Fund of Motorists of 
the Prefecture of Serres 
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Tzaneio Regional General 
Hospital of Piraeus
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Third Athens Hospital of 
Chronic Diseases 
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Regional General Hospital  
for Thoracic (Chest) Diseases 
"The Salvation" (Sotiria)
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
General Hospital 
"Evangelismos"
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Foundation of Social Work 1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Benefit Non-
Profit 
Foundation
Foundation of Social Security 
(IKA)
10 Public Law 
Legal Entity
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Centre for Infectious 
Diseases Control (KEELPNO)
2 Private Law 
Legal Entity
The personnel of KEELPNO was exempted from law 2190/1994 
Organisation Against Drugs 2 Private Law 
Legal Entity
The personnel of OKANA was exempted from law 2190/1994
Athens Hospital of Chronic 
Diseases for Children
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
State Nursery Station of 
Rethymnon  
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Nursery Stations are Public Law Legal Entities belonging to First 
Level Local Authorities
Ministry of National 
Education and Religious 
Affairs
Organisation for the 
Publishing of School Books
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Technological Educational 
Foundation of Athens (TEI)
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Athens School of Fine Arts 1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
National Youth Foundation 3 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Ministry of Defence
Central Service 4 Public 
Service
General Army Staff 9 Public 
Service
General Navy Staff 5 Public 
Service
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General Air Force Staff 5 Public 
Service
Greek Arms Industry SA 3 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Band Staff of the Minister of 
Defence (EPYETHA)
1 Autonomous 
Public 
Service
Founded in 1995 (Law 2292/1995), it is an organ under the direct 
authority of the Minister of Defence. 
Army Pension Fund 2 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Prime Minister
Secretariat of the Cabinet 2 Public 
Autonomous 
Service
 The Secretariat of the Cabinet is an autonomous public service 
under the direct authority of the Prime Minister who appoints and 
dismisses its staff. The personnel of the Secretariat are appointed 
for a three-year mandate.   The Prime Minister's decisions 
regarding their appointment and dismissal    are published in the 
Government Gazette, and are effectuated by exemption from any 
other provision in force (Law 1558/1985, Acts of the Cabinet 
154/13.12.1985, 65/23.5.1986)
Ministry of the Interior 
Central Service 5 Public 
Service
National Intelligence Service 1 Autonomous 
Public 
Service
The personnel of the National Intelligence Service was exempted 
from law 2190/1994 
Prefecture of Piraeus 2 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Prefectural Self-
Administration of 
Thessaloniki
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
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Municipality of Egaleo 1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Municipality Pylareon of the 
island of Kefallonia
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Municipality of Loutropolis 
(island of Lesvos)
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Municipality of Agii Theodori 
(Prefecture of Corinth)
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Municipality of Athens 1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Municipality of Elliniko 1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Prefectural Self-
Administration of Kefallonia-
Ithaka
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Prefecture of Athens 1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
National Centre of Public 
Administration 
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Centre for Vocational Training 
and Research of the 
Prefecture of Magnesia 
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company 
Local government enterprises do not belong to the public sector 
(Law 1892/1990)
Ministry of Press and Mass 
Media
Greek Radio and Television 
SA
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
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Ministry of Finance
Centre of Innovation SA 
(KEKA)
2 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Disbanded in 1996 (Law 2436/21.8.1996). The Law provided that 
the staff would be transferred to the other services of the public 
sector
23.4.1997
Shipyards of Elefsina SA 5 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Founded in 1969 by the shipowners Andreadis, they pass under 
the control of the Greek State from 1975 until 1992.They were sold 
in 1992, and resold in 1997. The staff could be transferred to other 
services of the public sector pursuant to the specific procedure 
provided for in article 20 of the Law 2414/25.6.1996.
2.7.1997
Hellenic Shipyards SA 2 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Founded by Stavros Niarchos, the Company was bought by the 
Greek Industrial Development Bank in 1985. In 1995  the 
Company was privatized by 50% under the form of a cooperative. 
The staff could be transferred to other services of the public sector 
pursuant to the specific procedure provided for in article 13 of the 
Law 2367/29.12.1995. 
24.6.1998
National Statistical Service of 
Greece
4 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Export Credit Insurance 
Organisation 
3 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Economic and Social 
Committee
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Hellenic Aerospace Industry 
SA
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
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Ministry of Employment 
and Social Protection
Computer Centre for Social 
Services
8 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Founded in 1969 (Legislative Decree 390/1969) as a private law 
legal entity, it was converted to an anonymous public company in 
2007 (Law 3607/2007)
17.5.1999, 21.6.2002, 11.6.2004, 2.7.1997
Traders' Insurance Fund 5 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Insurance Fund of 
Professionals and Craftsmen 
3 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Supplementary/Auxiliary 
Security Fund for Employees 
of Pharmaceutical Operations
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Welfare Fund of Public 
Works Contractors
1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Civil Servants' Welfare Fund 1 Public Law 
Legal Entity
Ministry of Culture
Central Service 1 Public 
Service
Ministry of Transport and 
Communications
Hellenic Railways 
Organisation SA
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Special provisions for the transfer of surplus personnel to other 
services of the public sector, independent authorities included 
pursuant to article 12 of Law 2671/1998
1.7.1999
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Olympic Airways SA 4 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Founded by Aristotelis Onassis in 1957, the company will pass 
under the control of the Greek State in 1975. It was finally 
privatized in 2009, after previous unsuccessful privatization efforts 
during the last decade.
1.7.1999, 14.12.2001, 5.6.2002, 16.7.2002, 
27.9.2005
Olympic Aviation SA 1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Since 2003 until the privatization of Olympic Airways the company 
operated as a subsidiary of Olympic Airways - Services and 
provided technical support to aircrafts and helicopters, helicopter 
chartering, pilots training, and ground support services.
27.9.2005
Olympic Catering SA 1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Subsidiary of Olympic Airways, it was founded in 1976 as a public 
anonymous company, and was privatized in 2002. 
18.7.2002
Olympic Airways-Services SA 1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
It was created in 2003 as a result of the restructuring scheme of 
Olympic Airways dictated by the European Commission. The 
Olympic Airways Group was divided into two groups: Olympic 
Airlines, which took up flight operations, and Olympic Airways-
Services, which provided ground handling services.
Thermal Bus Company/SA 
(ETHEL)
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Greek Post S.A. (ELTA) 5 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Since 1970 the Greek Post S.A. operates as a public anonymous 
company pursuant to the Legislative Decree 496/1970
Greek Postal Savings Bank 
SA
1 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Founded in 1909 as a decentralised public service, it was 
converted to a public anonymous company (Law 3082/2002)
30.5.2001
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Ministry of Commercial 
Shipping
Piraeus Port Authority SA 1 Private law 
legal entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Founded in 1930 as a public law legal entity, it was converted to a 
public anonymous company (Law 2688/1999)  
1.7.1999
Hellenic Telecommunications 
and Post Commission
1 Independent 
Authority
Ministry of Environment, 
Planning, and Public Works
Anonymous Company for the 
Exploitation and Management 
of Greek Highways (TEO SA)
3 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Anonymous 
Company
Founded in 1929 as a public law legal entity, it was converted to a 
public anonymous company pursuant to Law 2938/2001. The 
company was privatized in 2007 (Law 3555/2007)
17.5.2002, 30.12.2005
Ministry of Public Order
Central Service 3 Public 
Service
Ministry of Culture and 
Ministry of Finance
Foundation of Meditteranean 
Studies 
2 Private Law 
Legal Entity
Public 
Benefit Non-
Profit 
Foundation
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Table 4 The specialization of the transferred personnel (Category and Branch) 
 
Transferred personnel’s Categories and 
Branches Number of personnel by Category and Branch  
U.E. Administration-Finance 79 
U.E. Administration 11 
U.E. Informatics 9 
T.E. Administration-Accounting 13 
T.E. Administration 1 
T.E Informatics 3 
S.E. Administration  30 
S.E. Typists 9 
S.E. Typists-Word Processing 4 
S.E. Computer Programmers-Operators 2 
S.E. Computer Programmers 5 
S.E. Computer Operators 24 
C.E. Auxiliary Staff 7 
C.E. Cleansing Staff 2 
C.E. Caretakers 1 
Total  200 
 
 
 
Table 5 Reclassification from one Branch to another within the same Category 
Number of 
employees 
Former Branch New Branch 
6  S.E. Typists Computer Operators 
1 S.E. Administration Computer Programmers 
1 S.E. Typist S.E. Administration 
1 S.E. Driver  S.E. Administration 
 
Table 6 Reclassification to a branch in a superior Category 
Number of 
employees 
Former Category and Branch New Category and Branch 
2 S.E. Typists U.E. Administration-Finance 
5 S.E. Administration U.E. Administration-Finance 
1 S.E. Administration T.E. Administration-Accounting 
5 C.E. Auxiliary Personnel S.E. Administration 
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Table 7 Mobility of the transferred personnel after the transfer 
Type of mobility 
of the personnel 
after the transfer  
Number of 
employees 
Service of new appointment/transfer/secondment  
New appointments 1  Teacher in Primary Education 
Appointment as 
member of the 
management 
board of the 
Supreme Council 
for the Selection 
of Personnel 
1 Since 1998 Councillor of Asep. First elected as Councilor through 
the co-optation system (G. G. vol. C, no 20, 9.02.1998) while 
keeping the post of Director General of the Secretariat. The 
mandate as Director General was irregularly renewed until 2003. 
Appointed as Councillor by the Conference of Presidents 
(Government Gazette vol. B, no 486, 21.4.2003). The mandate 
was renewed in 2006 (Government Gazette, vol. B, no 953, 
19.7.2006). She was replaced in 2011 (Government Gazettte, vol. 
YODD, no 55, 8.3.2011) 
Transfers  7 - Hellenic Parliament (1) 
- Region of Epirus (1) 
- Region of Central Macedonia (1) 
- Office of the Directorate of Secondary   Education of the island 
of Lesvos (1) 
- Ministry of Finance (2) 
- Prefecture of Fthiotida (1) 
Secondments 4 - Political Bureau of the Minister of Finance (1) 
- On secondment to the Office of Organisation and Management 
of the Prime Minister (1998-2003) Secondment to the General 
Secretariat of the Cabinet as Special Collaborator  (2003-2004) 
(1) 
- Secondment to the National Statistical Service of  Greece (2008-
), Source: Diavgeia, available at: 
static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/4ΑΓΞ6ΣΙ-Υ, date of access: 12.4.2011 
- Secondment to the Special Managing Service of the Operational 
Programme “Administrative Reform 2007-2013” at the Ministry 
of the Interior 2008-  Head of Unit A2 (G.G. vol. YODD, no 529, 
23.12.2008, no 49, 11.2.2009, no 28, 1.2.2010) 
Source: The Government Gazette, Programme “Clarity” (diavgeia)  
 
 
Table 8 Seconded employees to the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
(1994-31.10.2010) 
Year Category Total number of  
seconded employees 
 U.E. T.E. S.E. C.E.  
1994 4 - - - 4 
1995 8 1 5 - 14 
1996 13 - 11 1 25 
1997 The category is not indicated 26 
1998 The category is not indicated 26 
1999 The category is not indicated 40 
2000 The category is not indicated 37 
2001 12 1 24 2 39 
2002 7 3 20 2 32 
2003 2 1 22 3 28 
2004 7 2 25 3 37 
2005 The category is not indicated 43 
2006 The category is not indicated 43 
2007 The category is not indicated 44 
2008 The category is not indicated 43 
2009 The category is not indicated 54 
2010 ? ? 
Source: The Annual Reports (1994-2010) 
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Text 4: Presentation of the public announcements for the selection of the 
administrative personnel through direct hiring 
The first public announcement regarding the direct hiring of administrative personnel 
to the Secretariat of the authority was published in the government gazette in 20031050. 
The 21 vacant positions of the organisational chart to be filled were distributed as 
follows: 13 U.E. Administration-Finance, 2 U.E. Informatics, 2 T.E. Administration-
Accounting, 2 T.E. Informatics, and 2 S.E. Typists. The candidates for the categories 
of University and Technological Education were selected by a three-member 
committee constituted by the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel 
pursuant to par. 1 of article 4 of the law 3051/2002.  
The public announcement defined the special appointment qualifications, that is, the 
required diplomas corresponding to each educational category, the required additional 
qualifications, that is, the good knowledge of computer programmes (word and excel), 
and the optional additional qualifications, that is, postgraduate and PhD degrees, 
knowledge of foreign languages, and experience for the position1051. The selection 
committee judged and defined its decision based on the graduate and postgraduate 
degrees, the grades of these diplomas, the knowledge of foreign languages, the 
experience, if there was any, the scientific works, and other relevant activities of the 
candidates as well as the results from the personal interview of each one of them with 
the committee. Contrary to the positions of secondary education, where each one of 
the selection criteria was awarded points which were explicitly presented in tables in 
the public announcement, no such grading system was provided for the positions of 
university and technological education. 
 
The second public announcement was published in the government gazette in 
20061052. 
The 10 vacant positions of the organisational chart to be filled were distributed as 
follows: 7 U.E. Administration-Finance, and 3 U.E. Informatics. This time the criteria 
were explicitly defined, whereas a grading system for these criteria was adopted. 
Apart from the main university degree, the additional required qualifications for the 
positions of the category and branch U.E. Administration-Finance were classified as 
follows: i) a postgraduate degree in the field of public or private law (4 positions), ii) 
a postgraduate degree in the field of business administration (1 position), iii) a 
postgraduate degree in public relations or a two-year experience in public relations, 
and iv) a postgraduate degree in the field of statistics (1 position). The knowledge of 
word processing, excel, and internet were also additional required qualifications. 
 
Apart from the main university degree, the additional required qualifications for the 
positions of the category and branch U.E. Informatics were classified as follows: i) at 
least a three-year experience in SQL, PLSQL, ORACLE, BACK-UP Recovery, Data 
Base Administration, ii) at least a three-year experience in Oracle Programming 
(SQL-PLSQL, DEVELOPER SUITE), iii) at least a three-year experience in 
                                                 
1050 Public Announcement 1/2003, Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel (ASEP), no 532, 17.10.2003. 
1051 The candidates who did not fulfill the preconditions of the necessary diplomas and the knowledge 
of computer programmes were excluded from the procedure. 
1052 Public Announcement 13/2006, Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel (ASEP), no 629, 20.12.2006. 
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Administration in UNIX or SOLARIS. The knowledge of foreign languages and 
previous experience in the public or private sector were equally assessed. Interestingly 
enough, candidates who had previous relevant experience equal to or more than two 
years in various agencies of the public sector would receive grades increased by 50%. 
Finally, a public interview was provided for the preselected candidates. 
 
The third public announcement was published in the government gazette in 20081053. 
The 7 vacant positions of the organisational chart to be filled were distributed as 
follows: 4 U.E. Administration-Finance, and 3 S.E. Administration. The criteria were 
explicitly defined, whereas a grading system for these criteria was adopted. Apart 
from the main university degree, the additional required qualifications for the 
positions of the category and branch U.E. Administration-Finance were as follows: i) 
the knowledge of word processing excel, and internet, ii) a postgraduate degree in 
workforce management or the administration of human resources, and iii) at least one-
year experience in personnel assessment. Finally, an interview was provided for the 
preselected candidates of this category. The knowledge of foreign languages and 
previous experience in the public or private sector were equally assessed. Candidates 
who had previous relevant experience equal to or more than two years in various 
agencies of the public sector would receive grades increased by 50%. 
 
Interestingly enough, the fourth public announcement was published in the 
government gazette on December 30, 20091054, namely after the outbreak of the Greek 
debt crisis. All public announcements for appointments in the public sector had been 
annulled with the exception of the personnel for hospitals, and the police. The 19 
vacant positions of the organisational chart to be filled were distributed as follows: 5 
U.E. Administration-Finance, 1 T.E. Administration-Accounting, 2 T.E. Informatics 
(Software), 1 T.E. Informatics (Hardware), 5 S.E. Administration, and 5 S.E. 
Computer Operators. The criteria were explicitly defined, whereas a grading system 
for these criteria was adopted. Nevertheless, only the knowledge of word processing, 
excel, and internet were considered as additional required qualifications for the 5 
positions of U.E. Administration-Finance. Specific fields of postgraduate degrees 
were not defined. Postgraduate degrees and PhDs within the subject matter of the 
position or any other field would be rated, whereas previous experience, the 
knowledge of foreign languages, and the candidates’ performance at the special 
writing skills test would be equally assessed for the categories of University and 
Technological Education. Other required additional qualifications were defined for 
the category of Technological Education1055. No interview was provided for the 
                                                 
1053 Public Announcement 11/2008, Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel (ASEP), no 689, 29.12.2008. 
1054 Public Announcement 6K/2008, Government Gazette, vol. Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel (ASEP), no 689, 29.12.2008. The acts of appointment of those who had succeeded in the 
procedure of the public announcement 6K/2008 had not been published in the government gazette by 
31.12.2010.  
1055 The required additional qualifications were as follows: i) the knowledge of word processing, excel, 
and internet for the position T.E. Administration-Accounting, ii) at least one-year experience in 
programming environment  ORACLE RDBMS (PL/SQL) and the tools ORACLE FORMS BUILDER 
and REPORTS BUILDER for the position T.E. Informatics (Software), iii) at least one-year experience 
in computer networks, structured cabling and systems Windows and Unix for the position T.E. 
Informatics (Hardware), and iv) at least two-year experience in the design and programming of 
multilevel web applications (multi-tier web-bases applications) in UNIX-LINUX environment with 
technologies (JAVA, JSP, JDBC, XML, XSL, HTML/CSS, OC4J, PORTLET, SERVLET, 
HIBERNATE). 
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categories of University and Technological Education. Finally, in our opinion, the 
percentage of secondary education positions to be filled, as provided for in the third 
and fourth public announcements, was unjustifiably high. 
 
Table 9 The specialization of the directly hired personnel (Category and Branch) 
Newly hired personnel’s Categories and 
Branches 
Number of newly hired personnel by 
Category and Branch  
U.E. Administration-Finance 27 
U.E. Informatics 5 
T.E. Administration-Accounting 3 
T.E Informatics 1 
S.E. Administration  4 
S.E. Typists 2 
Total  42 
 
Finally, Tables 10 and 11 show the level of education and the specialisation of the 
total number of the administrative personnel, transferred and newly hired. A third of 
the administrative personnel are secondary education graduates, whereas the exact 
number of master degree holders may not be defined.  
 
Table 10 Level of education of the total number of the administrative personnel by 
category  
 University 
Education 
Technological 
Education 
Secondary 
Education 
Compulsory 
Education 
% of the 
administrative 
personnel by level 
of education 
54% (131 of 242) 9% (21 of 242) 33% (80 of 242) 4% (10 of 242) 
 
As for their specialisation, the overwhelming majority of University Education 
graduates pertain to the category of Administration-Finance, whereas a large number 
of secondary education graduates pertain to the categories of computer programmers, 
computer operators, and typists. 
 
Table 11 The specialization of the total number of the administrative personnel  
Administrative personnel’s Categories 
and Branches Number of personnel by Category and Branch  
U.E. Administration-Finance 117 
U.E. Informatics 14 
T.E. Administration-Accounting 16 
T.E Informatics 4 
S.E. Administration 35 
S.E. Typists 15 
S.E. Computer Programmers 7 
S.E. Computer Operators 24 
C.E. Auxiliary Staff 7 
C.E. Cleansing Staff 2 
C.E. Caretakers 1 
Total  242 
 
 
Finally, Table 12 shows the gender distribution of the personnel by category, whereas 
the total gender distribution is as follows: 175 women (69%), and 79 men (31%). 
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Table 12 Gender distribution by category of personnel  
 Transferred personnel New appointments Specialized Scientific 
Personnel 
% of gender 
distribution by 
category of 
personnel  
Men 
 
 33% 
65 
Women 
 
67% 
135 
Men 
 
24% 
10 
Women 
 
76% 
32 
Men 
 
33% 
4 
Women 
 
67% 
8 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
Complementary tables on the Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
 
Table 1 The specialization of the administrative personnel 
 
Categories and Branches of the administrative 
personnel Number of personnel by Category and Branch  
U.E. Administration-Finance 5 
U.E. Communication 7 
U.E. Informatics 1 
T.E Informatics 2 
S.E. Administration  7 
S.E. Drivers 1 
S.E. Telephone-Operators 1 
C.E. Cleansing Personnel 2 
C.E. Curators 2 
Total  28 
Source: The Government Gazette 
 
Table 2 Reclassification to a branch in a superior Category 
Number of 
employees 
Previous Branch New Branch 
1 (AP3) C.E. Curator  S.E. Telephone Operator (the position was created in 
2004 with the amendment of the Organisational 
Chart of 1998).  
1 (AP15) C.E. Curator S.E. Driver (the position was created in 2004 with 
the amendment of the Organisational Chart of 1998). 
1 (AP9) U.E. Management U.E. Legal Auditor, in-service transfer pursuant to 
article 9 of the Organisational Chart (Presidential 
Decree 207/1998) 
Source: The Government Gazette  
 
Table 3 The Auditors’ career paths after their resignation from the authority 
Number of 
Auditors 
The Auditors’ career paths 
1 (SP8) Free-lance lawyer 
1 (SP16) Member of the Teaching Staff at the Law Department of the American University in 
Cairo as the Richard A. Bartlett Yale Law School Fellow in Law (2008-2010)  
Political Appointee as Head of the Office for  International and European Union Issues 
at the General Secretariat of the Government (2009-) 
1 (SP17) Member of the Scientific Personnel of the Greek Ombudsman 
1 (SP21) Parliamentary Candidate with the party of New Democracy in the national elections of 
2007, Adjunct Professor, Appointee in various Committees 
1 (SP18) Lawyer at a German Law Firm 
1 (SP14) Lecturer at the Department of Mathematics of the University of the Aegean 
1 (SP2) Officer of the Data Protection Unit of EUROPOL 
1 (SP33) PhD Candidate at the Centre for Studies and Research in Public Economic Law at 
Sorbonne-Paris  
1 (SP31) Notary  
1 (SP28) Unknown 
Source: The Government Gazette, and various websites through the google search engine 
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Table 4 The Auditors’ career paths after their denial to assume duties   
Number of 
Auditors 
The Auditors’ career paths 
1 (SP9) Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation 
1 (SP22) Free-lance Lawyer 
1 (SP25) Associate Professor at the Greek Military Academy 
1 (SP24) Special Scientific Personnel at the Informatics (ICT) Development Agency of the 
General Secretariat of Public Administration and Electronic Governance at the Ministry 
of Interior  
1 (SP29) Member of the Special Scientific Personnel at the Ministry of Finance 
Source: The Government Gazette, and various websites through the google search engine 
 
Table 5 The level of education of the Auditors serving in the authority by 31.12.2010 
Auditors’ 
Specialty/Specialization 
Postgraduate degrees PhD degrees 
Legal Auditors 9 7 
Informatics Auditors 6 5 
 
Table 6 The level of education of the Auditors who resigned or denied the 
appointment 
Auditors’ 
Specialty/Specialization 
Postgraduate degrees PhD degrees 
Legal Auditors 6 4 
Informatics Auditors 1 4 
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Appendix 10  
Complementary tables on the Greek Ombudsman 
 
Table 1 Active secondments of the administrative personnel by 31.12.2010  
Period of 
secondment 
Code of the 
seconded 
employees 
Category and Branch Agency of provenance 
1998-31.12.2010 SAP8 U.E. Administration-
Finance 
General Hospital of Athens “Laiko” 
2000-9.11.2010 SAP27 T.E. Administration-
Accounting 
Agricultural Security Organisation 
2001-31.12.2010 SAP31 S.E.? Agricultural Security Organisation 
2002-31.12.2010 SAP35 S.E.? Ministry of Public Order 
2003-31.12.2010 
 
SAP38 U.E. Archaeologist Credit Management Fund for the 
Implementation of Archaeological Projects 
(Private Law Legal Entity supervised by 
the Ministry of Culture)  
2003-31.12.2010 SAP40 S.E. Drivers Electric Buses of Athens-Piraeus 
2004-31.12.2010 SAP41 S.E. Drivers Ministry of the Interior, Public 
Administration and Decentralisation 
2004-31.12.2010 SAP42 U.E. Engineers Region of Attica 
2005-31.12.2010 SP43 U.E. Librarian Athens University 
2006-31.12.2010 SP49 S.E.? Athens Water Supply and Sewerage 
Company (EYDAP SA) 
SAP: Seconded Administrative Personnel, 10 employees in total 
Source: The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman (1998-2010) 
 
Table 2 Revoked secondments of the administrative personnel 
Period of 
secondment 
Code of the 
seconded 
employees 
Category and Branch Agency of provenance 
1998-2006 SAP2 C.E. Usher Ministry of the Interior 
1999-2006 SAP10 C.E. Usher Ministry of the Interior 
1998-2004 SAP3 S.E. Drivers Ministry of the Interior  
1998-2003 SAP5 S.E. Drivers Ministry of the Interior 
1998-1999 SAP4 S.E.? Ministry of the Interior 
2000-2001 SAP26 S.E.? Ministry of Health 
2002-2004 SAP36 S.E. Administration-
Accounting 
Hellenic Data Protection Authority 
1998-1999 SAP7 T.E.? Fund of Merchants and Craftsmen 
2000-2003 SAP29 T.E.? National Statistical Service of Greece 
1999-2000 SAP9 U.E.? Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1999-2003 SAP11 U.E.? Prefecture of Piraeus 
2000-2002 SAP22 U.E.? National 
School of Public 
Administration 
Graduate 
Ministry of Development 
2000-2001 SAP25 U.E.? Ministry of National Economy 
2001-2002 SAP30 U.E.?  Municipality of Egaleo 
2002-2003 SAP34 U.E.? PhD holder Foundation of Social Security 
2003-2007 SAP39 U.E. French language 
D.E.A  degree 
Teacher of French in Secondary Education 
2nd Highschool of Amphissa 
SAP: Seconded Administrative Personnel, 16 employees in total 
Source: The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman (1998-2010) 
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Table 3 Secondments converted to transfers 
Period of 
secondment 
Year of 
transfer 
Code of 
the 
seconded 
employees 
Category and 
Branch 
Agency of provenance 
2001-2003 2003 TAP33 C.E. Auxiliary 
Personnel 
Prefectural General Hospital  of Melissia 
“Amalia Fleming” 
2000-2003 2003 TAP13 S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Children’s Hospital “P. and A. Kyriakou” 
2000-2003 2003 TAP14 S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Prefectural Self-Administration of 
Athens-Piraeus. Prefectural Department 
of Piraeus 
2000-2003 2003 TAP15 S.E. 
Administration 
Accounting 
National Institution for the Rehabilitation 
of the Handicapped 
2000-2003 2003 TAP19 S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
General Hospital of Athens “Laiko” 
2000-2003 2003 TAP21 S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Foundation for Social Security 
2000-2003 2003 TAP23 S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Equity Aviation Fund 
2001-2003 2003 TAP32 S.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Headquarters of the Greek Police 
1998-2003 2003 TAP1 S.E. Typists National Centre for Social Research 
2000-2003 2003 TAP24 S.E. Computer 
Operators 
Supplementary Insurance Fund of the 
Employees of Pharmaceutical Operations 
1998-2003 2003 TAP6 T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Pension Fund and Health Insurance of 
doctors, dentists, pharmacists, and 
veterinarians 
2003-2008 2008 TAP37 T.E. 
Administration-
Accounting 
Prefectural Self-Administration of 
Athens-Piraeus 
2000-2003 2003 TAP12 U.E. 
Administrative 
Organisation, 
Director of the 
Secretatiat 
Ministry of the Interior 
2000-2003 2003 TAP16 U.E. 
Administration-
Finance 
Prefectural General Hospital of Melissia 
“Amalia Fleming” 
2000-2003 2003 TAP17 U.E. 
Administration-
Finance 
Foundation for Social Security 
2000-2007 2007 TAP18 U.E. 
Administration-
Finance 
Headquarters of the Greek Police 
2000-2003 2003 TAP20 U.E. 
Communication 
Ministry of Press and Mass Media 
2000-2003 2003 TAP28 U.E. Informatics Ministry of National Defence 
TAP: Transferred Administrative Personnel, 18 employees in total 
Source: The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman (1998-2010), and the Government Gazette 
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Tables 4, 5, and 6 contain the following information regarding the total number of the 
23 transferred employees, that is, those transferred through secondments, and those 
directly transferred: i) the employees’ experience through the grades system, ii) 
employees’ specialization and level of education, and iii) the employees’ releasing 
agencies by categories. The majority of the transferred personnel, that is, 75% (17 of 
23) are experienced since they possess grades A and B. As for their level of 
education, the number of secondary education graduates is unjustifiably high.  
 
Table  4 The experience of the transferred personnel 
 
 
Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D No grade 
% of the 
transferred 
administrative 
personnel in 
relation to 
their grades 
49%  
(11 of 23) 
26%  
(6 of 23) 
17%  
(4 of 23) 
4%  
(1 of 23) 
4%  
(1 of 23) 
Source: The Government Gazette 
 
Table 5 The level of education and specialization of the transferred administrative 
personnel 
 
Categories and Branches of the administrative 
personnel Number of personnel by Category and Branch  
U.E. Administration-Finance 6 
U.E. Communication 1 
U.E. Informatics 1 
T.E Administration-Accounting 4 
S.E. Administration-Accounting 7 
S.E. Typists 1 
S.E. Auxiliary Personnel 3 
Total  23 
Source: The Government Gazette 
 
The majority of the releasing agencies pertain to the category of hospitals, and social 
security-pension funds.  
 
TABLE 6 The transferred personnel’s agencies of provenance by categories 
The transferred personnel’s  agencies of 
provenance by categories 
% Transferred personnel by category of 
agency 
Hospitals 25% (6 of  23) 
Social Security-Pension Funds 22% (5 of 23) 
Central Services of Ministries 13% (3 of 23) 
Second-level local government agencies 9% (2 of 23) 
Headquarters of the Greek Police 9% (2 of 23) 
Various Public Law Legal Entities 9% (2 of 23) 
Various Private Law Legal Entities  9% (2 of 23) 
Autonomous Services 4% (1 of 23) 
     Source: The Government Gazette 
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Table 7 Reclassification from one Branch to another within the same Category 
 
Number of 
employees 
Current Branch New Branch 
1 (TAP24) S.E. Administration-Accounting S.E. Informatics 
 
Table 8 Reclassification to a branch in a superior Category 
 
Number of 
employees 
Current Category and Branch New Category and Branch 
1 (TAP21) S.E. Administration-Accounting U.E. Administration-Finance 
1 (TAP33) C.E. Auxiliary Personnel S.E. Administration-Accounting 
 
 
Table 9 The specialization of the directly hired administrative personnel 
Categories and Branches of the administrative 
personnel Number of personnel by Category and Branch  
U.E. Administration-Finance 3 
U.E. Communication 2 
U.E. Informatics 2 
T.E Informatics 2 
C.E. Auxiliary Personnel 1 
Total  10 
Source: The Government Gazette 
 
Table 10 The recruitment system of the Secretaries of the Ombudsman and the 
Deputy Ombudsmen 
 
 New 
appointments 
Secondments- 
Agencies of Provenance of the 
seconded Secretaries 
Unknown 
% of Secretaries by system of 
recruitment  
71% (17 of 24) 21% (5 of 24) 
 
Ministry of Finance (S2) 
Ministry of the Interior (S4, 
S22) 
National Centre for Social 
Research (S8) 
Public Debt Management 
Organisation (S11) 
8% (2 of 24) 
Source: The Annual Reports of the Greek Ombudsman  
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Table 11 Period of secondment and agencies of provenance of the seconded scientific 
personnel serving in the Greek Ombudsman by 31.12.2010 
Period of 
secondment 
Code of the 
seconded 
members of 
the 
scientific 
personnel 
Agency of Provenance 
1998-31.12.2010 SP6 Ministry of Finance 
1998-31.12.2010 SP7 Prefecture of Athens 
1998-31.12.2010 SP31 Ministry of Health 
1998-31.12.2010 SP37 Ministry of Public Order 
1998-31.12.2010 SP121 Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation  
1998-31.12.2010 SP38 Agricultural Security Organisation 
1999-31.12.2010 SP88 Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation 
2001-31.12.2010 SP43 Ministry of Health 
2001-31.12.2010 SP45 National Statistical Service of Greece 
2001-31.12.2010 SP46 Ministry of Development 
2001-31.12.2010 SP91, SP90 Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works 
2001-31.12.2010 SP132, 
SP133 
Ministry of Finance 
2002-31.12.2010 SP190 Ministry of Culture 
2002-31.12.2010 SP93 Ministry of Defence 
2006-31.12.2010 SP182 Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation 
2006-31.12.2010 SP58 Security Fund of Marine Agents and Employees 
2006-31.12.2010 SP181 Region of Attica 
2006-31.12.2010 SP154 Ministry of Finance 
2006-31.12.2010 SP16 Corps of Labour Inspection 
After 2007-
31.12.2010 
SP183 Region of Attica 
After 2007-
31.12.2010 
SP189 Ministry of Employment 
 
Source: The Annual Reports 
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Table 12 Agencies of provenance of the terminated or revoked secondments of the 
scientific personnel 
Period of 
secondment 
Code of 
the 
seconded 
members 
of the 
special 
scientific 
personnel 
SSP* 
Agency of provenance of the seconded members of the scientific 
personnel 
1998 Annuled SSP3 Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation 
1998 Annuled SSP4 Ministry of Development 
1998 Annuled SSP126 Ministry of Finance 
1998-1999 SSP5 National Statistical Service of Greece 
1998-2001 SSP32 Ministry of Finance 
1998-2000 SSP155 Ministry of Finance 
1998-2004 SSP33 Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation 
1998-2005 SSP34 Agricultural Security Organition 
1998-2002 SSP75 Constructions EKTENEPOL (Subsidiary of the National Bank of 
Greece) 
1998-2004 SSP77 Civil Aviation Authority 
1998-2001 SSP79 Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation 
1998-2004 SSP81 Ministry of the Environment, Planning and Public Works 
1998-2003 SSP118 Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation 
1998-1999 SSP122 Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation 
1998-2001 SSP123 Agricultural Bank of Greece 
1998-2000 SSP125 Teacher in Secondary Education 
1998-2007 SSP127 Ministry of the Environment, Planning and Public Works 
2001-2010 SSP12 Ministry of Finance 
2006-2010 SSP173 Member of the Special Scientific Teaching Personnel of the Ionian 
University 
*SSP: Seconded Special Scientific Personnel 
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Table 13 Resigned members of the scientific personnel appointed to Higher Education 
Institutions 
Year of 
appointment/ 
Code 
of the member 
Higher Education Institutions 
2001 (SP1) Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration,  
Athens University 
2001 (SP119) Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, University of the Aegean  
2003 (SP131) Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and History,  
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences 
2003 (SP134) Lecturer at the Department of Law, Athens University 
2005 (SP135) Lecturer at the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies,   
University of Macedonia 
2005 (SP144) Assistant Professor at the Department of Business Administration,  
University of the Aegean 
 2007 (SP35) Lecturer at the General Department of Law,  
Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences 
2007 (SP137) Assistant Professor at the Department of Electricity of the Technological 
Educational Institution of Chalkida 
2007 (SP167) Lecturer at the Department of Psychology, University of Crete 
2008 (SP145) Lecturer at the Department of Informatics with Applications in Biomedicine, 
University of Central Greece 
2009 (SP14) Assistant Professor at the Department of Law, University of Cyprus 
2009 (SP92) Lecturer at the Department of Law, University of Cyprus 
2010 (SP98) Lecturer at the Departement of General Law,  
Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences 
2010 (SP9) Assistant Professor at the Department of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki  
 2011 (SP27) Lecturer at Harvard University 
Source: The Government Gazette and google search engine 
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Table 14 Resigned members of the special and auxiliary scientific personnel hired to 
other positions of the public sector 
Year of 
appointment/ 
Code 
of the member 
New Position in the public sector 
1999 (SP82) Member of the special scientific staff at the National Council for Radio and 
Television 
1999 (ASP100) Appointed to the Greek Agricultural Insurance Organisation as U.E. Agronomist 
2000 (ASP153) Appointed to the Ministry of Finance as U.E. Tax Officer 
2000 (SP87) Appointed to the Ministry of Finance as U.E. Engineers 
2000 (ASP60) Appointed to the Ministry of Finance as U.E. Tax Officer 
2000 (SP40) Appointed to the Special Legal Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 2000 (SP85) Appointed to the Special Legal Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2000 (ASP103) Legal Collaborator (tenured position) at the Ministry of the Interior 
2000 (SP129) Special Collaborator at the Ministry of Culture (2000-2004)  
Since 2004, lawyer with a salary mandate at the Regulatory Authority for Energy 
(RAE) 
2002-2006  
 
 
 
2006-2010 
(SP84) 
Member of the  Staff of the Management Organisation Unit of Development 
Programmes (MOU) S.A. supervised by the Ministry of Finance (April 2002),   
Legal Adviser at the Managing Authority of the Operational Programme 
"Education and Initial Vocational Training" of the Ministry of National Education 
and Religious Affairs (October 2005),  
Prefect of Magnessia in the Prefectural and Municipal Elections of 2006 
2002 (ASP156) Appointed to the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) 
2004 (SP130) Appointed to the Ministry of Finance as U.E. Customs 
2004 (ASP74) Appointed to the Ministry of Transport as U.E. Chemist 
2005 (ASP115) Judge at the Council of State 
2005 (ASP163) Researcher of Grade C at the Hellenic Centre for Marine Research 
2006 (SP21) Director of the Sector for the Protection of Refugees at the United Nations Refugee 
Agency in Athens 
2007 (SP52) Lawyer with a salary mandate at the General Hospital of Athens “Hippokrateion” 
2007 (ASP178) Judge at the Council of State 
2007 (SP70) Judge at the Court of Audit 
Source: The Government Gazette and google search engine 
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Table 15 Secondments of the scientific personnel to political positions  
Period of 
secondment 
Code of the 
seconded 
members of 
the 
scientific 
personnel 
Position 
2001-? SP29 President of the Second Regional Health Council of South Aegean 
2003-2004 SP101 Secondment to  the Bureau of the Secretary General of the Ministry 
of National Education and Religious Affairs as Head of the Bureau 
2004-2009 SP8 Special Collaborator at the General Secretariat of the government 
2004-2005 
 
2005-2010 
SP36 Seconded to the Political Bureau of the Minister of Development 
(2004)     
Deputy Ombudswoman of the Consumer 
2004-2007 
 
2007-2010 
SP66 Seconded to the Political Bureau of the Minister of Health and 
Social Solidarity  
Legal Advisor of the Mayor of Athens   
2005-2007 SP52 Seconded as Special Adviser of the Minister of the Interior, Public 
Administration and Decentralization 
2009- SP2 Special Advisor at the Political Bureau of the Prime Minister 
Georgios Papandreou 
2009- SP71 Seconded to the Political Bureau of the Minister of Health and 
Social Solidarity 
2009 SP86 Seconded to the Political Bureau of the Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
2009- SP11 Seconded to the Political Bureau of the Minister of Finance as 
Director 
2010 SP78 Seconded as Special Adviser to the Bureau of the Minister of 
Environment, Energy and Climatic Change as Special Adviser  
2010 SP10 Secretary General for Migration Policy  
at the Ministry of the Interior, Decentralization and Electronic 
Governance 
2010- SP28 Seconded as Advisor of the Secretary General for Migration Policy 
(renamed Secretary General for Population and Social Cohesion, 
G.G. vol. A, no 170, 28.9.2010) 
Source: The Government Gazette and google search engine 
 
 
Table  16 Secondments of the scientific personnel to other public services 
Period of 
secondment 
Code of the 
seconded 
members of 
the 
scientific 
personnel 
Position 
2003-2005 SP124 Seconded to the Bureau of the Inspector General of Public 
Administration  
2004- SP159 Seconded to the Bureau of the Inspector General of Public 
Administration  
2007- SP120 Seconded to the Bureau of the Inspector General of Public 
Administration  
Source: The Annual Reports of the Inspector General of Public Administration 
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Appendix 11  
Complementary tables on the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security, 
and Privacy 
 
Table 1 The specialization of the administrative personnel 
 
Categories and Branches of the administrative 
personnel Number of personnel by Category and Branch  
U.E. Administration-Finance 2 
T.E Administration-Accounting 3 
T.E. Technological Applications 6 
S.E. ? 5 
S.E. Drivers 1 
C.E. Auxiliary Personnel 1 
Total  17 
Source: The Government Gazette 
 
Table 2 The Administrative Personnel’s career paths after their resignation from the 
authority 
Code and 
Number of 
Personnel 
Category and Branch in the 
authority 
The Administrative Personnel’s career paths 
1 (AP10) S.E.? Teacher of Physical Education in Secondary 
Education 
1 (AP14) C.E. Auxiliary Personnel Piraeus Administrative Court of First Instance 
1 (AP21) S.E.? Ministry of Finance 
Source: The Government Gazette  
 
Table 3 The career paths of the Administrative Personnel who denied their 
appointment to the authority  
Code and 
Number of 
Personnel 
Category and Branch according 
to the appointment decisions in 
the government gazette 
The Administrative Personnel’s  career paths 
1 (AP4) T.E. Technological Applications Ministry of Defence-General Army Staff 
1 (AP13) S.E. Driver Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public 
Works 
1 (AP22) S.E.? Deposits and Loans Fund (Public Law Legal Entity) 
Ministry of Finance 
Source: The Government Gazette  
 
Table 4 The Scientific Personnel’s career paths after their resignation from the 
authority 
Number of 
Auditors 
The Auditors’ career paths 
1 (SP3) Lecturer at the Department of Informatics, University of Piraeus 
1 (SP5) Executive Position in the Private Sector: Director of Access Backbone Networks, 
Ontelecoms, a Greek Telecommunications Company 
1 (SP10) Lecturer at the Department of Information Transmission Systems and Material 
Technology, National Technical University of Athens 
1 (SP13) Unkown 
Source: The Government Gazette, and various websites through the google search engine 
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Table 5 The career paths of the Scientific Personnel who denied their appointment to 
the authority  
Number of 
Auditors 
The Auditors’ career paths 
1 (SP1) Simply submitted the candidacy, and denied the appointment. He was already member 
of the scientific staff of the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission (2001-
2008). He was elected Assistant Professor at the Technological Educational Institute of 
the Ionian Islands in 2008  
1 (SP11) Head of Administration at the European Network and Information Security Agency 
2 (SP2), 
(SP20) 
Unknown 
Source: The Government Gazette, and various websites through the google search engine 
 
Table 6 The level of education of the scientific personnel serving in the authority by 
31.12.2010 
Unknown Postgraduate degrees PhD degrees 
38% (5 of 13) 8% (1 of 13) 54% (7 of 13) 
 
Table 7 The level of education of the scientific personnel who resigned or denied the 
appointment 
Unknown Postgraduate degrees PhD degrees 
29% (3 of 8) - 71% (5 of 8) 
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Appendices 
 
Chapter 4 
 870
APPENDIX 1 
 
Text 1 
Theoretical approaches regarding the control of the constitutionality of laws by the 
independent authorities and the case of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel 
 
The views expressed by legal theorists opposed to the control of the constitutionality 
of laws by the administrative organs are based on arguments arising from the 
combined interpretation of certain provisions of the Constitution. Following the 
principle of the legality of the Administration1056, and the constitutional principle of 
the rule-of-law state1057, the Administration is bound by the law and has to implement 
it since neither the Constitution nor the law assigns it the competence to control the 
constitutionality of a law in its implementation. This argumentation is combined with 
the exclusive assignment of the control of the constitutionality of laws to the judiciary 
on the one hand, and the presumption of the constitutionality of the law according to 
which the law is judged unconstitutional and is applied by the Administration until it 
is ruled unconstitutional by the competent court (Vogiatzoglou, 2005; Mathioudakis, 
2006). In other words, the Administration, bound by the principle of the legality, 
cannot interpret the constitutional dicta; it simply implements the law.  
 
Interestingly enough, the supporters of the positive approach, that is, the right of the 
control of the constitutionality of laws by the Administration, base their 
argumentation on the same principle of the legality, albeit interpreted in combination 
with article 103, par. 1, subpara. a of the Constitution1058. More specifically, the 
Public Administration is not only bound by the law since it is previously bound by the 
Constitution, namely, it exercises the competences that are explicitly assigned to it 
“by the Constitution and the laws concurrent with it”. In addition, according to article 
103, par. 1, subpara. a of the Constitution, public servants owe loyalty to the 
Constitution. Therefore, within the context of this loyalty they also have the 
obligation to control the constitutionality of laws, and should not implement a law that 
is unconstitutional (Tachos, 2005). However, Chrysogonos (2010) argues that two 
preconditions must disjunctively occur so that the control of the constitutionality of 
the provisions of a law by the Administration may be feasible. First, the 
administrative organs should not be under hierarchical dependence, namely, the 
Ministers, the supreme organs of self-administered public law legal entities (e.g. 
Universities), and the independent auhorities. Second, other administrative organs 
may equally proceed to that control in cases of obvious unconstitutionality. Finally, 
the control of the constitutionality of the provisions of a formal law by the 
Administration is also acceptable by the jurisprudence1059 (Tachos, 2005).  
                                                 
1056 Article 50 of the Constitution reads as follows: “The President of the Republic shall have no 
powers other than those explicitly conferred upon him by the Constitution and the laws concurrent 
herewith”. The President of the Democracy is schematically the personification of Public 
Administration.  
1057 Article 25, par. 1, subpara. a reads as follows: “The rights of the human being as an individual and 
as a member of the society and the principle of the welfare state rule of law are guaranteed by the 
State”. 
1058 Article 103 par. 1, subpara. a  reads as follows: “Civil servants shall be the executors of the will of 
the State and shall serve the people, owing allegiance to the Constitution and devotion to the 
Fatherland”. 
1059 Decisions of the Council of State 1497, 1498, 2102/1967, 1805/2008.  
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The issue of the control of the constitutionality of laws by the independent authorities 
is of great interest. Most legal theorists (Tachos, 2005; Spiliotopoulos, 2005; 
Chrysogonos, 1989, 2010; Tsiliotis, 2010) consider that the personal and functional 
independence of the members of the independent constitutional authorities, as 
enshrined in article 101A of the revised Constitution of 2001, reflects the will of the 
constitutional legislator to give them, at least partly, the prestige of judges, albeit 
without ceasing to be organs of the executive function. Spiliotopoulos (2005) as well 
as Spyropoulos and Fortsakis (2009) define the functional independence of the 
members of the constitutional independent authorities, as with the case of judicial 
officials, as i) “the obligation to examine the constitutionality of legislative acts and 
not to implement those whose regulatory content is deemed to contravene the 
Constitution, and ii) freedom from hierarchical control (whether preventive or 
repressive, of legality or merit) by government bodies, and more generally freedom 
from any control by organs of the executive branch related to the substance of the 
work involved in their area of competence”.   
On the contrary, Voyatzoglou (2005) and Mathioudakis (2006) support the view that 
the principle of the legality, that is, the duty to implement the law, also applies in the 
case of the independent constitutional authorities since the common legislator 
exhaustively describes their competences in the relevant statutes. Mathioudakis 
(2006) also argues that despite the members’ personal and functional independence, 
these authorities do not dispose of any jurisdictional power which is exclusively 
reserved for the courts.  However, Tsiliotis (2010) points out that the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights extends the concept of the term “court” under 
article 6 par. 1 of the European Convention for Human Rights to administrative and 
stricto sensu non judicial organs under certain preconditions1060.  
Within this approach, the Council of State in Plenum in its judgement 3319/20101061 
ruled that “the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy offers 
certain guarantees permitting to be considered as “court” for the needs of 
implementation of article 6 par. 1 of the European Convention for Human Rights”. 
Nevertheless, the formulated dissenting opinions held that i) “the common legislator 
acknowledging, indirectly but clearly, that the Hellenic Authority for Communication, 
Security and Privacy does not constitute a “court”, within the meaning of article 6 
par. 1 of the European Convention for Human Rights, established against its 
                                                 
1060 Abstract from the case Belilos v. Switzerland, Application No. 10328/83, Judgement of 29 April 
1988 of the European Court of Human Rights “64. According to the Court's case-law, a "tribunal" is 
characterised in the substantive sense of the term by its judicial function, that is to say determining 
matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a 
prescribed manner (see, as the most recent authority, the judgment of 30 November 1987 in the case of 
H v Belgium, Series A no. 127, p. 34, § 50). It must also satisfy a series of further requirements - 
independence, in particular of the executive; impartiality; duration of its members' terms of office; 
guarantees afforded by its procedure - several of which appear in the text of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) 
itself (see, inter alia, the Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A 
no. 43, p. 24, § 55)”. Source: Icelandic Human Rights Centre, available at: 
http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/451, date of 
access: 20.10.2011. 
1061 Source: The Official Website of the Athens Bar Association, available at – for subscribers only - 
http://www.dsanet.gr/1024x768Auth.htm, date of access: 17.5.2011 
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decisions, permitting the imposition of sanctions to the aforementioned providers, 
legal redress before a court of full jurisdiction, in order that the whole procedure may 
provide the guarantees of a “fair trial”, and ii) “the interpretative version adopted by 
the majority opinion unjustifiably equates, from that point of view, without any 
constitutional indication for this, the independent authorities with the courts, thus 
accentuating their anyway tricky classification within the whole system of intersection 
and mutual control of functions of the greek constitutional order”. 
The supporters of the positive approach argue that all the independent authorities, 
whose function is provided for in legislation irrespectective of their consolidation in 
the Constitution, may proceed to such a control as long as they fulfill those 
preconditions according to which administrative organs resemble to judicial ones 
(Tachos, 2005; Tsiliotis, 2010). Beyond these theoretical views, two independent 
constitutional authorities, the Hellenic Data Protection Authority and the National 
Council for Radio and Television, proceeded to that control, and refused to apply 
provisions related to their regulatory field by ruling them unconstitutional1062. It 
should also be noted that such decisions of the independent authorities may be 
appealed to Courts by the interested parties, whereas the competent Minister may also 
use legal remedies against them pursuant to article 2 par. 8 of the law 3051/2002 
(Tachos, 2005). 
 
Tachos (2005) in his observations on the Minutes 262/2004 of the National Council 
for Radio and Television applies the aforementioned argumentation of the positive 
approach, and proposes that the Public Administration and especially the Independent 
Administrative Authorities should control the constitutionality of laws1063. As we 
have earlier stated, article 101A of the revised Constitution of 2001 explicitly 
introduced the term “functional independence” for the members of the constitutional 
independent authorities. However, the term does not appear in the founding law 
2190/1994 of the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel; it exists indirectly. 
Indeed, article 2, par. 1 refers to one aspect of functional independence, that is, the 
lack of hierarchical control from the government or any other administrative 
authority. Interestingly enough, the decision 37/2000 of the Major Plenary of the 
authority, interpreting the legal status and competences of the authority as prescribed 
                                                 
1062 The Decision 17/2008 of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority exercises direct control of the 
constitutionality of article 7 par. 2, subpara. 7 of the law 2472/1997 stating: “The Authority does not 
apply the provision of article 7 par. 2, subpara. 7 of the law 2472/1997 in case it [the provision] 
demands permission of the Authority for the processing of data of public faces in the exercise of the 
journalistic profession. And this is because the required permission of the Authority provided for in the 
provision constitutes a preventing measure against the freedom of Press, and, as such, it is prohibited 
according to the provision of article 14 par. 2 of the Constitution (See also the Decision of the 
Authority 26/2007). As for the rest, the provision of article 7 par. 2, subpara. 7 of the law 2472/1997, is 
applicable, since it sets substantial criteria for the exercise of the constitutionally consolidated (under 
article 14 of the Constitution) journalistic function” (Tsiliotis, 2010). Following the minutes 262/2004 
of the National Council for Radio and Television, the Authority ruled the provision of article 2 par. 2 
subpara. a as contrary to article 14, par. 9 of the Constitution (Tsiliotis, 2010). 
1063 More specifically, Tachos states: “e. [The Minutes] serve as a paradigm for imitation from other 
organs of the Public Administration, and especially from other Independent Administrative Authorities, 
so that the autonomy – independence, as much and as defined in the Constitution, of the Executive-
Administrative Function is defended towards the Legislative and the Judicial [Functions], according to 
the basic explicit separation [of powers] of article 26, . . . in combination with articles 50 and 103, par. 
1, subpara. a of the Constitution”. 
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in the relevant legislation, uses the term “functional independence”. The term refers to 
the lack of hierarchical control on the one hand, and the members’ selection through 
the cooptation system. Neverthless, point 4 of the decision presents great interest in 
relation to the meaning of the term “functional independence” since it considers that 
the Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel essentially constitutes “an 
idiosyncratic form of administrative court1064”. Beyond this interpretation, it should 
also be reminded that “functional independence” is a two-faceted concept according 
to administritative law. It safeguards independence from the executive power through 
the lack of hierarchical control on the one hand, and independence from the legislative 
power through the control of provisions that are contrary to the constitution 
(Spiliotopoulos, 2005). Therefore, we could assume that the authority may proceed to 
the control of the constitutionality of the provisions relating to its mission, namely its 
jurisdiction over recruitments in the public sector. 
 
Text 2  
The rationale of the judgements 2396-2398/2004 of the Council of State in Plenum 
 
First, the provisions of article 16, par. 5 and 6 of the law 2190/1994, as in force at the 
time the examination took place, limited the candidates to express a preference for 
only one prefecture. The Court judged that the said provision was incompatible with 
the constitutional principle of meritocracy and the democratic principle of one’s 
career according to his personal value stemming from the constitutional principle of 
equality. According to the judgement, these constitutional principles impose, in the 
case of a written examination on panhellenic level on the same topics for all the 
candidates, the appointment of those candidates who have achieved the best 
performance in the examination, thus gathering the higher scores. On the contrary, the 
contested provision permitted the appointment of candidates with lower scores from 
those received by other competitors, who, despite the fact that they were competing in 
the same courses and performed better, were finally not appointed because of the 
accidental and coincidental fact that they opted for a prefecture for which it was 
finally proved by the results that a higher score was required. Furhthemore, in the 
opinion of the Court, that regulation was not justified on the grounds of obvious 
interest, whereas it led many candidates to submit applications to the prefectures with 
the larger number of positions, since they considered that they had more chances to 
succeed. On the other hand, the large number of positions is found in big urban areas, 
and as a result the positions of the other prefectures of the territory remained vacant, 
since the candidates, despite the fact that it was a panhellenic examination, lacked the 
possibility of more options.  
 
Second, the provision of article 16, par. 5 of the law 2160/1994, as in force at the time 
the examination took place, was contrary to the constitutional principles of equality 
and meritocracy since it additionally restricted the candidates to declare a preference 
for maximum ten public sector agencies within the one prefecture they opted for 
appointment. Third, the provision of article 17, par. 13 of the law 1586/1986 as 
amended by article 18 par. 9 of the law 2503/1997, was ruled incompatible with the 
constitutional principles of meritocracy and equality. The contested provision led to 
                                                 
1064 Point 4 of the Decision 37/2000 of the Major Plenary of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel reads as follows: “The Supreme Council for the Selection of Personnel, due to the previously 
described overall mission, substantially constitutes, with more than 70% of its activity, an idiosyncratic 
form of administrative court”.   
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the unequal treatment of the competitors. More specifically, while the graduates of 
technical lyceum and the graduates of general lyceum were examined in the same 
written examination on common topics, the quota provided for in the aforementioned 
provision, which was unjustifiably determined to 50%, permitted the appointment of 
candidates of one type of lyceum (technical) who received lower scores towards 
candidates of another type of lyceum (general), despite the fact that they competed on 
the same courses. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to evaluate the special 
knowledge and skills of the graduates of these two types of lyceums that would finally 
allow the appointment of the best performing candidates, irrespective of the type of 
lyceum.  
 
APPENDIX 2 
 
Abstract 1 
“. . . the control function, which a mechanism of mediation such as the 
Ombudsman is called upon to carry out, must, in order to be effective, 
become identified with the logic of resolution and not the logic of 
denunciation1065. In other words, it must, above all, function as an 
institution designed to advance solutions promoting consensus and 
adhering to positive sum logics and not as a punitive institution, driven 
by the logic of denunciation and of conflict. From its inception, the 
Ombudsman has been committed to demonstrating the multiple 
benefits of this alternative cultural model for dealing with differences 
and to promoting its diffusion throughout the public administration”.  
Abstract 2  
“So, there is no rivalry between the Ombudsman and public 
administration – they both have the constitutional obligation to serve 
society, each one from their own position. . .The Ombudsman should 
consolidate the first term’s acquis, namely defending the legal claims 
of citizens finding recourse to the Ombudsman, while at the same time 
keeping all channels open for communication and cooperation with the 
administration. Society and the public administration are, for that 
matter, the two main “interlocutors” of the Ombudsman”.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1065 The argumentation on the logic of resolution versus the logic of denunciation is analysed in the 
annual report for the year 1999 as follows: “The logic of resolution and the compromises it entails 
stand sharply at odds with the dominant cultural logic of Greek society. I will call this latter logic the 
“logic of denunciation”, precisely to indicate the total absence from this stance of a predisposition to 
approach differences and to seek solutions from the perspective of a positive sum or “win-win logic”, 
designed to search for outcomes satisfactory, even partly, for both sides. On the contrary, inherent in 
the logic of denunciation is a fixation upon  a “zero sum logic”, of the principle, that is, according to 
which one or the other of two sides involved in a dispute necessarily must lose. In this sense, 
denunciation essentially undermines and, in the final analysis, negates the meaning of mediation, 
whose aim is to search for effective ways to resolve differences and to enhance the legitimacy of 
dispute resolution mechanisms in as broad a segment of society as possible”. 
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Text 1: The four diachronic causes of maladministation 
 
In the annual report for the year 20021066, the Greek Ombudsman identified the four 
diachronic causes of maladministration in the country which are briefly presented 
hereafter. First, the selection of personnel in public administration was based on 
clientelistic practices before the introduction of the general recruitment system in 
1994. As a result of the lack of meritocracy, the personnel are not properly skilled and 
qualified, and therefore cannot respond to the needs of a modern and complex state, as 
well as to the requirements of the European integration and the international 
environment. Second, the novel ideology formulated in the post-junta period invoked 
democracy and its “human face” in order to justify the non-implementation of 
legislation in case of infringement of the applicable provisions. Under such 
circumstances, the state machinery shows a systematic relaxation in relation to the 
implementation of the law. Third, the overregulation of the post-junta period 
consisting of imperfect and obscure provisions, ministerial decisions and circulars, as 
well as the survival of a sufficient number of anachronistic provisions are in direct 
conflict with the rule of law and democracy. The combination of these attributes of 
the legislation leads to overlapping, the lack of clarity and precision, which, in turn, 
promote opacity and work against good administration. At the same time, the 
obscurity of the provisions allows for the creation of a particular “oligopoly” through 
which a small number of public officials may take advantage of their familiarisation 
with the complex landscape formulated by the overregulation and the lack of 
transparency. Therefore, they might proceed to a selective case handling with the 
intention to obtain lawless and illegal advantages for themselves by securing the 
settlement of some cases while putting unsurmountable barriers to the handling of 
others. Fourth, the aforementioned causes are directly linked with the long delays in 
resolving individual complaints. These long delays facilitate the creation of sources of 
potential corruption, thus permitting the development of illicit transactions between 
citizens, and civil servants or officials. 
 
Abstract 3 
“ . . .As I have repeatedly pointed out, the Ombudsman does not deal 
directly with cases related to corruption. The Authority’s founding law 
expressly provides that, should there be tangible evidence that a 
criminal act has been committed, the case must be immediately 
referred to the relevant public prosecutor. From a moment that a case 
has been turned over to justice, the Ombudsman has no authority to 
intervene or even follow to it.  
Even though these conditions preclude direct intervention in cases of 
corruption, the Ombudsman’s daily experience of systemic 
administrative malfunction, which is linked to the hard core of 
maladministration, brings the Ombudsman into extensive indirect 
contact with instances of corruption within his field of competence. 
More specifically, the cumulative experience gained from over 30,000 
citizens’ complaints during the three years of the Ombudsman’s 
operation, leads effortlessly to the conclusion that the traditional form 
                                                 
1066 Source: The official website of the Greek Ombudsman, the introductive text of the Annual Report 
for the year 2002, available at: http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/580_01.pdf, date of access: 
26.10.2011. 
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of maladministration, as represented by long delays in resolving 
individual complaints, fosters an environment that is undoubtedly 
conducive to the development of illicit transactions between citizens 
and civil servants or officials, in order to speed up the processing of an 
individual case by the administration. In other words, corruption, 
which provides the civil servants concerned with all manner of 
“incentives”, material or immaterial, in order to ensure a quicker 
resolution of citizens’ requests, is thriving in those services of the 
central administration and local government authorities, where long 
delays in dealing with citizens’ applications are common. . . Urban 
planning authorities, tax offices, insurance funds, and the health care 
system are examples of areas in the public sector that are liable to 
foster illicit dealings and potential corruption . . .”  
The Annual Report for the year 2001, p. 14-15 
 
Abstract 4 
“. . .The clientelistic phenomena both inside and outside public 
administration are reproduced mutually fuelled, and some of these are 
upgraded and consolidated as corruption networks. The clientelistic 
relationships, corruption, and the lack of transparency affect the 
cohesion of society, and keep the country away from the international 
developments. . .”  
The Annual Report for the year 2009, p. 11 
Abstract 5 
“Despite the often supported view that the overall management 
of the recruitment procedures in the public sector should be 
under the full jurisdiction of the Supreme Council for the 
Selection of Personnel, this is not technically feasible. The full 
concentration of the control of the procedures secondarily 
produces another kind of rigidities impeding the smooth function 
of administration. The necessary flexibility of the system was 
already foreseen by the law 2190/1994, thus giving the 
possibility of exceptions from the procedures that are under the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Council for the Selection of 
Personnel, exceptions that were incorporated into the revised 
Constitution of 2001”. 
Text 2 
Exceptions from the general recruitment system according to the law 3812/2009  
 
The exceptions from the general recruitment system are purely restricted to the 
following categories of personnel: i. judges, the main personnel of the Legal Council 
of State, and coroners, ii. university professors, iii. researchers, iv. military officers, 
the non-political personnel of the Ministry for Citizens’ protection, the personnel of 
the National Intelligence Service, as well as the special uniformed staff of the 
municipal police, v. diplomats, the experts, the personnel of the Special Legal Service 
and the Special Legal Service of the European Communities of the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs, vi. the medical personnel of the National Health System, vii. 
Ministers of religion, viii. writers, artists and journalists, ix. Pilots and navigators, x. 
revocable employees, special consultants and special collaborators, xi. those 
providing services with a salary mandate, xii. the candidates for the National School 
of Public Administration and the National School of Local Government Authorities, 
xii. the personnel hired from public enterprises or banks and their subsidiaries to work 
abroad where these agencies have investments, xiii. the personnel hired on private law 
contracts for a maximum period of two months to fill unforeseeable and urgent needs, 
xiv. The medical and nursing staff of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
the Addiction Treatment Centre, the Organisation against Drugs, the Psychiatric 
Hospitals of Attica and Thessaloniki, xv. the personnel of non-profitable private law 
legal entities active in the field of mental health, and xvi. the personnel hired for 
carrying out the special employment programme for unemployed disabled individuals 
launched and subsidized by the Manpower Employement Organisation. 
 
Abstract 5 
The summary-Principal facts of the case Tsourlakis v. Greece 
“The applicant, Mr Konstantinos Tsourlakis, was born in 1956 and 
lives in Athens. In 1989 he married and the couple had a son. In 
August 2000 he and his wife separated. By a judgment of 21 
November 2001 the applicant’s wife was awarded sole custody of the 
child, while the applicant was given the use of the matrimonial home. 
The applicant and his wife appealed. In an interlocutory decision of 31 
March 2004 a welfare report was ordered, to be prepared by the Athens 
Child Welfare Society (“the Society”). In November 2004 the 
Society’s report was filed at the hearing before the Court of Appeal. In 
a judgment of 19 May 2005 the Court of Appeal granted permanent 
custody of the child to his mother.  
Mr Tsourlakis attempted to obtain a copy of the Society’s report. The 
Society informed him that the report was a confidential document 
prepared for the exclusive attention of the Court of Appeal. After 
applying to the Ombudsman’s office, which informed him that he 
could not obtain a copy of the report because he had not addressed his 
request via the competent prosecutor, Mr Tsourlakis applied to the 
prosecutor at the Criminal Court. The latter rejected his request, 
indicating in two sentences added by hand to the applicant’s letter that 
the request concerned personal information about a minor, of which the 
applicant had no legitimate interest in being apprised”. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Text 1 
The full text of the decision 27/2007 
 “Athens, 02.04.2007                                                                                                                                                      
File no: 2444                                                      
Decision no 27/2007 
The Hellenic Data Protection Authority met upon invitation of its President to a regular 
meeting on June 15, 2006 at its establishment consisting of D.G.1067, President, the regular 
members F. D., who was defined as Rapporteur1068, L.K.1069, A.P.1070, and N. F.1071, and the 
alternate members A.P.1072 and G. P.1073 substituting the members S. S and A. P. respectively, 
who, although legally invited, did not appear due to impediment, in order to examine the case 
referred to the history of this decision. There were also present without the right to vote E. M., 
Auditor1074, as Assistant Rapporteur, and G. P., employee of the Administration-Finance 
Department of the Authrority, as secretary ordered by the President 
The authority took into consideration the following:  
The President of the Department . . . of the University . . . (A) Professor G.M. submitted a 
request with file no  . . .dated 15.02.2006 to the authority asking to give its opinion on 
whether the publication of the introductory reports and the minutes of the election and 
promotion of the members of the Teaching Research Staff (hereinafter TRS) i) in the form of 
their publication as a book in multiple copies, or ii) furthermore in the form of their uploading 
to the Internet is consistent with law 2472/1997 for the protection of personal data. 
The request was completed by the supplementary document with file no . . . dated 22.03.2006, 
the supplementary documents with file no . . . dated 03.04.2006 by the Professor Mr N. Th., 
President of the Department of the University (B), as well as the answers of the British, 
Norwegian, Polish, and Spanish (Madrid) Authority to the general question. 
After examination of all the information of the file, and following interactive discussionTHE 
AUTHORITY CONSIDERED UNDER THE LAW 
1. Pursuant to article 6 chapter D (F) par. 8 of the law 2083/1992 on the Higher Education 
Modernisation “The minutes of the election procedures of a member of the TRS shall be 
published each year in a special volume with the responsibility of the respective Department, 
and shall be accessible to any interested person”. 
                                                 
1067 J19: Honorary Vice-President of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law 
1068 U31: Professor of Civil Law at the Department of Law, Athens University 
1069 U29: Professor of Penal Law at the Department of law, Athens University 
1070 U17: Associate Professor of Penal Law at the Department of General Law, Panteion University of 
Social and Political Sciences 
1071 FP12: Lawyer 
1072 J27: Former Judge of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law 
1073 U21: Professor of Informatics at the Technological Educational Institute of Athens 
1074 SP16: She submitted her resignation from the authority on 22.7.2008 (G.G. vol. C, 703, 30.7.2008). 
She was appointed Head of the Office for International and European Union Issues at the General 
Secretariat of the Government by decision of the Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, (G.G. vol. 
YODD, no 201, 7.6.2010).   
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Article 4 par. 1, subparagraphs a and b of the law 2472/1997 reads as follows: “The personal 
data, in order to be lawfully processed, must be: 
a) collected fairly and lawfully for specific, explicit, and legitimate purposes and fairly and 
lawfully processed in view of these purposes. 
b) relevant, adequate, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
processed at any given time”. 
2. In the introductory reports and the minutes of the election of the members of the TRS 
reference is made to the candidates’ personal data as well as to those of the members already 
serving as is information but also assessments of their curriculum vitae, studies, scientific 
progress, professional and teaching experience. They are mainly simple personal data 
pursuant to article 2a of the law 2472/19971075 (see the relevant Decision of the Authority 
56/2003). Sensitive personal data referred to in article 2b of the law 2472/19971076 may also 
be contained in the minutes. However, this case is considered extraordinary and rare, 
precisely because of the nature and the purpose of the procedures for the TRS members’ 
election, and the lack of relevance, in principle, of sensible personal data with these 
procedures.  
Processor of the personal data under article 2h of the law 2472/19971077 is the legal person of 
the University (A) where the Department pertains . . . . 
The publication of the minutes pursuant to article 6 Chapter D (F) par. 8 of the law 2083/1992 
constitutes a form of processing of personal data in accordance with article 2d of the law 
2472/19971078, and specifically it falls within the concept of “dissemination” which, contrary 
to “transmission”, is addressed to a potentially unlimited number of recipients.  
3. The concept of publication, as prescribed in article 6 Chapter D (F) par. 8 of the law 
2083/1992, correctly interpreted, refers to the publication in the book-special volume as 
explicitly provided for in the aforementioned law. Anyone has access to this specific book 
without invoking legitimate interest. Yet this does not mean that the foreseen publicity 
includes publication in more copies or a fortiori publication in Internet since such an 
interpretation infringes the principle of proportionality in relation to the processing of 
                                                 
1075 Article 2a of the law 2472/1997 reads as follows: “"Personal data" shall mean any information 
relating to the data subject. Personal data are not considered to be the consolidated data of a 
statistical nature whence data subjects may no longer be identified”. 
1076 Article 2b of the law 2472/1997 reads as follows: "Sensitive data" shall mean the data referring to 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, membership to a trade-
union, health, social welfare and sexual life, criminal charges or convictions as well as membership to 
societies dealing with the aforementioned areas. In particular, in cases of criminal charges or 
convictions, it is possible to allow their publication by the Public Prosecutor's Office for the offences 
referred to in item b, paragraph 2 of Article 3 following an order by the competent Public Prosecutor 
of the Court of First Instance or the chief Public Prosecutor if the case is pending before the Court of 
Appeal. The publication of criminal charges or convictions aims at the protection of the community, of 
minors and of vulnerable or disadvantaged groups, as well as at the facilitation of the punishment of 
those offences by the State”. 
1077 Article 2h of the law 2472/1997 reads as follows: "Processor" shall mean any person who 
processes personal data on behalf of a Controller, such as any natural person or legal person, public 
authority or agency or any other organisation”. 
1078 Article 2d of the law 2472/1997 reads as follows: "Processing of personal data" ("processing") 
shall mean any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data by Public 
Administration or by a public law entity or private law entity or an association or a natural person, 
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organisation, preservation or 
storage, modification, retrieval, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, correlation or combination, interconnection, blocking (locking), erasure or destruction”. 
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personal data and its scope established by article 4 par. 1 subparagraph b of the law 
2472/1997.  
The publication in the Internet differs particularly, not only quantitatively but also 
qualitatively, from the publication in a special volume provided for in article article 6 Chapter 
D (F) par. 8 of the law 2083/1992 since the Internet of its nature permits access to the 
candidates’ and TRS members’ personal data to an unlimited and undefined number of 
interested persons wherever they are, in Greece or abroad, and at any time. Thus, it goes 
beyond the purpose of the special volume previously mentioned, and consequently it is not 
necessary for its achievement. 
This judgement of the Authority is also in harmony with other previous decisions. More 
specifically, in a similar case of the publication in the Internet of the findings of a researcher’s 
assessment by the Institute he was working for, it was judged that the dissemination through 
the Internet is not absolutely necessary and infringes the principle of proportionality since in 
the balance of interests the protection of the subject’s personality and personal data prevails. 
In the aforementioned case of publishing in the Internet the findings of a researcher’s 
assessment, the balance of interests takes into consideration the protection of personal data 
and the informational self-determination on the one hand, and the freedom of information and 
the principle of transparency. The Authority concluded that the protection of personal data 
prevails, and did not permit the publication. By the same token, applying the principle of 
proportionality, the Authority did not permit the publication of the minutes of any procedure 
regarding hiring and promotion in the public and private sector since the purpose of the hiring 
and promotion procedures in labor relationships in general is finding the better qualified 
candidate, formally and substantially, for filling the position and not the disclosure of the 
qualifications to an unlimited number of recipients irrelevant with the procedures. The 
possible legitimate interest of third parties as that of the rejected fellow candidates is satisfied 
with the milder means of the grant of the data and the supporting documents that provided the 
basis for their assessment (see Decision of the Authority 56/2003). 
Finally, the Authority judged that the principle of transparency is fully served by publishing 
in the Internet only the names of the successful candidates, and considered that also 
announcing through Internet the names of the unsuccessful candidates exceeds this purpose, 
and infringes the principle of proportionality (see Decision of the Authority 62/2003). 
Based on these data, the Authority judges that both freedom of information and transparency 
are effectively served through the way of publication provided for in the law 2083/1992, that 
is, in a special volume, and consequently the publication of the introductory reports and the 
minutes of the TRS members’ election, either in more copies or the Internet, is 
disproportionate by comparison to the intended purposes of processing, and infringes the 
protection of the candidates’ and STS members’ personal data and informational self-
determination. 
FOR THESE REASONS 
1. It judges that the publication of the introductory reports and the minutes of the election of 
the candidates and the TRS members in more copies and in the Internet is contrary to the 
provisions of the law 2472/1997, and therefore it is not legal. 
The President      The Secretary 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .                                                                   . . . . . . . . . . . .” 
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Text 2 
Freedom of information legislation and relevant provisions of the revised 
Constitution of 2001 
 
The mode of action of the organs of the state and the three powers (legislative, 
executive, judicial) is governed by the principle of transparency. This principle, as far 
as Administration is concerned, is related to its duty to ensure the publicity of its 
decisions and actions (own initiative provision of information, publication of laws, 
regulatory acts, circulars, etc) on the one hand, and the citizens’ right of access to 
documents (granting of documents upon request). After the constitutional revision of 
2001, article 5A explicitly establishes the individual right to information and 
participation in the Information Society1079, and article 10 par. 3 provides for the 
obligation of granting public documents1080. To the extent that an original conflict 
with other constitutionally protected rights is caused, such as the individual’s private 
life and the protection of its personal data, it is, in principle, within the dominant 
power of the legislator to proceed to the relevant options, while respecting the 
principle of proportionality (article 25 par. 1 of the Constitution). According to this 
principle, all state organs are required to effectively safeguard the practical 
implementation of the citizens’ constitutional rights. 
 
At the time of the promulgation of the contested provision on the publication of the 
selection minutes in a special volume, freedom of information legislation had already 
been enacted in Greece under article 16 (Right of Access to Administrative 
Documents) of Law 1599/19861081 (State-citizenry Relationship). It introduced the 
right of all citizens to read most administrative documents drawn up by public sector 
entities, mainly reports, studies, minutes, statistical data, circulars, instructions, 
responses, consultatory responses, and decisions. However, citizens do not have 
access to administrative documents concerning the private or family lives of others, or 
if the document's confidentiality is safeguarded by specific legal provisions. Private 
documents stored by public services may only be accessible to citizens with a 
legitimate interest. This right is exercised either though the on-site study of the 
administrative documents or through copies obtained at the citizens’ expense. Article 
9 par. 2 of the law 3979/2011 provides that the study of the document or the granting 
of a copy may also be available through the use of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) when the documents are electronically kept. 
                                                 
1079 Article 5A of the Constitution reads as follows: “1. All persons have the right to information, as 
specified by law. Restrictions to this right may be imposed by law only insofar as they are absolutely 
necessary and justified for reasons of national security, of combating crime or of protecting rights and 
interests of third parties. 2. All persons have the right to participate in the Information Society. 
Facilitation of access to electronically transmitted information, as well as of the production, exchange 
and diffusion thereof, constitutes an obligation of the State, always in observance of the guarantees of 
articles 9, 9A and 19”. The latter articles refer to the protection and inviolability of private and family 
life, personal data, and secrecy of letters and all other forms of free correspondence or communication.  
1080 Article 10 par. 3 of the Constitution reads as follows: “The competent service or authority is 
obliged to reply to requests for the provision of information and for the supply of documents, especially 
certificates, supporting documents and attestations, within a set deadline not exceeding 60 days, as 
specified by law. In case this deadline elapses without action or in case of unlawful refusal, in 
addition to any other sanctions and consequences at law, special monetary compensation is also 
paid to the applicant, as specified by law.” 
1081 This right is now codified as article 5 (Access to documents) of the Administrative Procedural 
Code, Law 2690/1999. 
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Text 3 Testing the legality of the selection procedures in the Greek Universities  
 
The following tables contain a list of decisions of the Council of State regarding the 
appeals of candidates to fill positions in Greek Universities from 1990 to 2010. The 
data were collected with the use of keywords through the database of legal 
information of the official website of the Athens Bar Association, section 
jurisprudence, available at -subscribers only-: 
http://www.dsanet.gr/1024x768Auth.htm. The decisions are classified by university. 
The indication YES refers to decisions where the applicants -the candidates- win the 
case, whereas the indication NO refers to decisions where the candidates’ appeals 
were rejected. 
 
 
University of Athens     
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
3818/1990 Yes 3850/1996 Yes 2604/2004 Yes 
2840/1990 Yes 3697/1996 Yes 2390/2004 No 
3819/1992 Yes 3138/1996 Yes 2365/2004 Yes 
2772/1992 Yes 2931/1996 No 1010/2004 Yes 
2104/1992 Yes 2793/1996 Yes 257/2004 Yes 
1217/1992 Yes 2792/1996 Yes 253/2004 Yes 
1142/1992 Yes 2491/1996 Yes 3928/2005 Yes 
1141/1992 Yes 3519/1997 Yes 2373/2005 Yes 
2118/1993 Yes 1563/1997 No 984/2005 Yes 
2112/1993 Yes 1467/1997 No 1389/2006 Yes 
2109/1993 Yes 3167/1998 Yes 248/2006 Yes 
1539/1993 Yes 957/1998 Yes 183/2006 Yes 
1538/1993 Yes 3996/2000 Yes 3308/2007 No 
674/1993 Yes 3260/2000 Yes 2030/2007 No 
2352/1994 No 2711/2000 Yes 1469/2007 Yes 
2008/1994 No 2287/2000 Yes 498/2007 Yes 
1557/1994 Yes 1110/2000 Yes 1673/2008 Yes 
1556/1994 Yes 3702/2001 Yes 447/2009 No 
1044/1994 Yes 3069/2001 No 3674/2009 Yes 
979/1994 Yes 2913/2001 Yes 3003/2010 Yes 
978/1994 Yes 1752/2001 No 1662/2010 Yes 
6570/1995 Yes 2886/2001 Yes 1661/2010 Yes 
5046/1995 No 1178/2001 Yes 1406/2010 Yes 
4783/1995 Yes 713/2001 Yes 1147/2010 Yes 
3314/1995 Yes 429/2001 Yes 1033/2010 Yes 
2884/1995 Yes 3637/2002 Yes   
2867/1995 Yes 2905/2002 No   
1651/1995 Yes 2501/2002 Yes   
6033/1996 Yes 915/2002 No   
5710/1996 Yes 336/2002 Yes   
4441/1996 Yes 2853/2003 Yes   
4340/1996 Yes 515/2003 Yes   
Final result: 75 decisions YES (84%), 14 decisions NO (16%) 
National Technical University of Athens 
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
2877/1993 Yes 1404/1997 Yes 2380/2004 Yes 
1230/1993 Yes 1562/1999 Yes 1160/2004 Yes 
2867/1994 Yes 1728/2000 Yes 3575/2009 Yes 
1244/1994 Yes 122/2001 Yes   
Final result: 11 decisions YES (100%)  
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Aristotle University of Thessaloniki 
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
4076/1990 Yes 350/1995 Yes 1535/2002 Yes 
2315/1990 Yes 3592/1996 Yes 1204/2002 Yes 
2314/1990 Yes 808/1996 Yes 1094/2002 Yes 
507/1990 Yes 438/1996 Yes 759/2002 No 
2217/1991 Yes 3484/1997 Yes 2229/2005 Yes 
2041/1991 No 3053/1997 Yes 1853/2006 Yes 
1568/1992 Yes 2765/1997 No 1733/2006 Yes 
895/1992 No 1791/1997 Yes 417/2006 Yes 
2670/1993 Yes 1419/1997 Yes 416/2006 Yes 
1377/1993 Yes 1056/1997 Yes 2800/2007 No 
2964/1994 Yes 714/1997 Yes 1408/2007 Yes 
2291/1994 Yes 4476/1998 Yes 109/2007 Yes 
1938/1994 Yes 1978/1998 Yes 2657/2008 Yes 
266/1994 Yes 1775/1998 Yes 1196/2009 Yes 
249/1994 Yes 1069/1999 No 3192/2010 Yes 
2008/1994 No 3159/2000 Yes 1161/2010 No 
5808/1995 Yes 652/2000 Yes 1160/2010 No 
1248/1995 Yes 3275/2001 Yes   
725/1995 Yes 3736/2002 Yes   
Final result: 47 decisions YES (85%), 8 decisions NO (15%)  
 
University of Ioannina 
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
798/1991 No 2688/2003 Yes 2459/2010 Yes 
3234/1993 Yes 3136/2004 No 1886/2010 Yes 
4390/1995 Yes 3384/2005 Yes 1786/2010 No 
2731/1998 Yes 3720/2006 Yes 1541/1993 No 
3709/2002 Yes 2144/2006 Yes  Yes 
2988/2002 Yes 2460/2010 Yes  Yes 
Final result: 13 decisions YES (81%), 3 decisions NO (19%)  
 
University of Patras 
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
1715/1990 Yes 3724/1995 Yes 2924/2001 No 
3609/1992 No 3673/1996 Yes 436/2001 Yes 
2291/1993 Yes 888/1996 Yes 3263/2002 Yes 
2120/1993 Yes 628/1997 Yes 4114/2005 Yes 
1455/1993 Yes 2663/1998 Yes 2892/2007 Yes 
5541/1995 No 1225/1998 No 2398/2009 Yes 
5151/1995 Yes 3995/2000 Yes 4065/1998 Yes 
5150/1995 Yes 4102/2001 Yes 1455/1993 Yes 
Final result: 20 decisions YES (83%), 4 decisions NO (17%)  
 
Athens School of Fine Arts                    Athens University of Economics 
Decision No Result Decision No Result 
1264/1997 Yes 3724/1995 Yes 
2914/2000 Yes 3673/1996 Yes 
3507/2004 Yes 888/1996 Yes 
  628/1997 Yes 
  2663/1998 Yes 
  1225/1998 No 
Final result: 3 decisions YES (100%)      Final result: 5 decisions YES (83%),  
                                                                                     1 decision NO (17%) 
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Democritean University of Thrace 
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
517/1990 Yes 591/2000 Yes 2361/2004 Yes 
89/1994 Yes 4099/2001 Yes 2688/2005 Yes 
5410/1995 Yes 3491/2001 Yes 61/2005 Yes 
2747/1997 No 1783/2001 No 1542/2006 Yes 
3531/1999 Yes 1770/2001 No 2027/2007 Yes 
2584/1999 Yes 240/2002 Yes 1974/2007 Yes 
4108/2000 Yes 119/2002 Yes 1670/2008 Yes 
1534/2000 Yes 3735/2003 Yes   
Final result: 20 decisions YES (87%), 3 decisions NO (13%) 
 
University of Crete 
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
3131/1990 Yes 2741/1992 Yes 1178/2001 Yes 
2637/1990 Yes 5907/1995 Yes 964/2002 Yes 
1086/1991 No 1196/1996 Yes 3031/2004 Yes 
165/1991 Yes 3897/2000 Yes 2592/2009 Yes 
Final result: 11 decisions YES (92%), 1 decision NO (8%) 
 
Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences 
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
1449/1993 Yes 2161/2000 Yes 1149/1992 Yes 
2918/1994 Yes 15/2004 Yes 2405/2000 No 
4933/1995 Yes 1807/2007 Yes   
Final result: 7 decisions YES (87%), 1 decision NO (13%) 
 
University of Thessaly 
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
5700/1996 No 2214/2001 Yes 3493/2009 Yes 
611/1997 Yes 1334/2001 Yes 2700/2010 Yes 
498/1998 No 3271/2003 Yes 2461/2010 Yes 
3796/2000 Yes 2723/2004 Yes   
3697/2001 Yes 2719/2005 Yes   
Final result: 11 decisions YES (85%), 2 decision NO (15%) 
 
University of Macedonia                       Technical University of Crete 
Decision No Result Decision No Result 
1734/1998 No 2823/1990 Yes 
1733/1998 No 3703/1992 No 
2869/1995 Yes 5537/1995 Yes 
4012/2000 Yes 1118/2000 No 
250/2004 Yes 584/2003 No 
1661/2008 No   
4070/2009 Yes   
3228/2010 Yes   
Final result: 5decisions YES (62%)      Final result: 2 decisions YES (40%),  
                    3 decisions NO (38%)                           3 decision NO (60%) 
 
Agricultural University of Athens        University of Aegean 
Decision No Result Decision No Result 
3759/1992 No 139/1992 Yes 
2778/2006 Yes 2722/2007 No 
1563/2009 Yes   
Final result: 2 decisions YES (67%)      Final result: 1 decision YES (50%),  
                    1 decision NO (33%)                              1 decision NO (50%) 
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Ionian University 
Decision No Result Decision No Result Decision No Result 
2110/1997 No 3285/2005 Yes 3574/2010 3285/2005 
124/2001 No 2319/2006 Yes 3575/2010 2319/2006 
440/2002 Yes 1571/2006 Yes 3576/2010 Yes 
Final result: 6 decisions YES (67%), 3 decisions NO (33%) 
 
 
Text 4 
The “Clarity” programme, the law 4009/2011, and the validity of the decision 
27/2007 
 
The launching of the “Clarity” Programme provided for in law 3861/2010 directly 
challenges the rationale of the decision 27/2007. The Explanatory Report1082 on the 
draft law on the Clarity Programme noted that the broad internet publicity enables 
citizens to enjoy and exercise their constitutionally consolidated rights: primarily the 
right to information, as enshrined in article 5A par. 1 of the Constitution, and 
consequently and the constitutionally consolidated rights that are related to or and 
depend from this information, as the right to the development of personality, the 
participation in social, economic, and political life (article 5 par. 1 of the 
Constitution). The Ministry of Public Administrative Reform and e-Government 
describes the functions and objectives of the programme as follows1083: 
“Beginning October 1st 2010, all Ministries are obliged to 
upload their decisions on the Internet, through the «Clarity» 
program. Clarity is one of the major transparency initiatives of 
the Ministry of the Interior, Decentralization and e-Government. 
Henceforth, the decisions of the public entities can not be 
implemented if they are not uploaded on the Clarity websites, 
each document is digitally signed and assigned a transaction 
unique number automatically by the system. 
Clarity will cover all public institutions, regulatory authorities 
and local government. The Clarity program introduces for the 
first time in Greece the obligation to publish all the decisions on 
the Internet, with the exception of decisions that contain 
sensitive personal data and/or information on national security. It 
is quite an innovative program, even by European standards, 
aiming first of all to bring about the maximum publicity of the 
government policy and administrative action. The use of Internet 
guarantees wide publicity and access to information, 
progressively contributing to a culture change in the whole of the 
Public Administration. 
The full implementation of the Clarity program will contribute 
substantially to the creation of a more transparent relationship 
between the Citizens and the State. From the 1st of October 
                                                 
1082 The Explanatory Report on the draft law “Clarity Programme”, The Official Website of the 
Hellenic Parliament, available athttp://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/2f026f42-950c-4efc-b950-
340c4fb76a24/g-diavgia01-eis%20qxp.pdf, date of access: 30.11.2011. 
1083 The Official Website of the Ministry of Public Administrative Reform and e-Government, available 
at: http://diavgeia.gov.gr/en, date of access: 16.11.2011. 
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2010, citizens are able to fully exercise their constitutional 
rights, such as the right to be informed and to participate in the 
Information Society. At the same time, the compulsory 
uploading of all decisions by all institutions exercising public 
authority on the Internet leads to the reinforcement of 
responsibility and accountability”. 
Article 2, par. 13 of the law 3861/2010 regarding the scope of the “Clarity 
programme” provides that on the internet are uploaded “selection lists with the 
successful candidates, those to be appointed, and the runner-ups, following relevant 
public announcements for the selection of personnel in cases where their publication 
is foreseen under current legislation”. In its opinion 1/20101084 on the Clarity 
Programme the Hellenic Data Protection Authority generally acknowledged the 
increased demands for transparency in cases of public selection procedures for filling 
positions in public administration. Nevertheless, it expressed its reservations 
regarding the formulation of the aforementioned provision. It suggested that the 
selection lists should only contain the names and the scores of the successful 
candidates so that the personal data of the unsuccessful candidates would not be 
excessively affected1085. It judged that the transparency of the selection procedure 
would be safeguarded by other means of publicity (such as the announcement boards 
at the agencies of the prefectures). However, it seems that the common legislator 
disregarded the suggestion, and finally included the runner-ups in the electronic 
publication of the selection lists.  
 
The selection minutes of university professors may be considered as the equivalent of 
the selection lists of article 2, par. 13 of the law 3861/2010. In both cases, each 
candidate is entitled to know the justification according to which the order of priority 
was defined both his own and that of the fellow candidates. This justification consists 
of quoting to the relevant selection lists or minutes the evidence and criteria upon 
which each candidate’s order of priority was defined. Therefore, we could argue that 
based on the relevant provision of the Clarity Programme, the selection minutes of the 
university professors contained in the special volume could also be published in the 
Internet1086.  
 
                                                 
1084 The authority within the field of its competences delivers opinions with respect to any rules relating 
to the processing and protection of personal data pursuant to article 19, par. 1a of the law 2472/1997. 
The opinion 1/2010 on the “Clarity” programme is contained in the Annual Report of the authority for 
the year 2010, pp 244-253. Source: The official website of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, 
available at: 
http://www.dpa.gr/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/APDPX/ANNUALREPORTS/COPY_OF_AR2010/ETHSIA
%20EKTHESI%202010.PDF, date of access: 30.11.2011. 
1085 The authority invoked its own previous decisions (no 61/2004 and no 15/2005) 
1086 The Technological Educational Institute of Thessaloniki uploaded on the Internet via the Clarity 
Programme the Introductory Report for the assessment of the candidacies of the scientific and 
laboratory collaborators of the Department of Agricultural Products Marketing and Quality Control for 
the Academic Year 2010-2011, date of publication on the internet: 31.03.2011 Following article 2, par. 
4 of the Presidential Decree 149/2002, the Introductory Report is displayed at the announcement board 
of the Department. Information available at: 
http://et.diavgeia.gov.gr/f/teithe/ada/4%CE%91%CE%97%CE%9F4691%CE%9F%CE%94-1, datae of 
access: 17.11.2011. 
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The law 4009/2011, namely, the last reform on higher education, seems to have 
opened the way for the electronic publishing of the selection minutes as well as all the 
other administrative acts relating to the university professors’ selection procedures, 
albeit the formulation of the clause is not clear on the issue. Article 19 par. 9 provides 
for “the organization, monitoring, and publicisation of the university professors’ 
selection procedures . . . through an electronic integrated management system . . .”. 
Consequently, the clause on the publication of the selection minutes in a special 
volume is no longer in force. The Clarity Programme and the law 4009/2011 have 
weakened the validity of the decision 27/2007. The publication of the joint ministerial 
decision regulating the issues on the development and operation of the electronic 
integrated management system of the law 4009/2011, which is still pending, might 
probably solve the interpretative enigma of the publicization of the university 
professors’ selection procedures. 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 
Text 1  
The full text of the communication of NIS 
 
 “In relation to publications referring to today's briefing of the President of the 
Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy, Mr A. L., to the Special 
Permanent Standing Committee on Institutions and Transparency of Parliament, the 
National Intelligence Service announces the following: The Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and Privacy is responsible, according to the law 3115/2003, 
for the regular and extraordinary audit of the National Intelligence Service regarding 
the legal waiver of confidentiality of communications. The Hellenic Authority for 
Communication, Security and Privacy has not audited the NIS since the taking up of 
duties of the current administration on October 14, 2009. The last time the authority 
exercised its relevant competence on the NIS was on January 7, 2009, as the President 
said to the Committee. The National Intelligence Service operates in full respect of 
the laws of the State. We ask the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and 
Privacy to check on the NIS as soon as possible, so that there is no doubt among the 
Greek citizens that the Service operates in accordance with the Constitution and the 
laws. We assure that it will be provided any technical or other assistance to the audit, 
regular or extraordinary, so that the auditors’ task shall be successfully delivered. The 
NIS defends the national security, and accordingly informs the political leadership 
and the competent Authorities. The National Intelligence Service in cooperation with 
the competent prosecutorial authorities has achieved considerable successes in the 
combat against terrorism and organized crime (smuggling fuel, cigarettes, antiquities, 
parajudicial circuit, illegal football betting, etc.). The number of waivers of 
confidentiality is dictated by the need to safeguard the national issues and fight 
against crime. Moreover, the waiver of the secrecy of telephone conversations is 
effectuated, only if the procedure as provided for in legislation is followed, that is, 
only upon the issue of the relevant provision on the waiver of confidentiality by the 
prosecutor seconded to the NIS. He controls the legality of the special operational 
activities (Law 3649 Article 5 para 3). Subsequently, the relevant provision is 
approved by the Prosecutor of Appeals of Athens, and is then sent for execution to the 
relevant telephone companies whose archive systems contain the relevant telephone 
numbers. It is noted that any relevant provision on the waiver of confidentiality is 
communicated to the Hellenic Authority for Communication, Security and Privacy. 
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The relevant telephone numbers are equally kept to the archives of the Authority as 
well as to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. It is obvious that the NIS is subject to the 
Prosecutor’s control in relation to the identification of the numbers, whose 
confidentiality is waived, with the persons to whom they belong”. Source: The official 
website of NIS, available at: 
http://www.nis.gr/portal/page/portal/NIS/News/LatestNews?newid=178531, date of 
access: 11.12.2011. 
 
Text 2 
Summary of the content and accompanying questionnaire on the category 
communications interception according to Privacy International 
 
“Interception is generally considered amongst the most intrusive forms of 
surveillance.  Countries that understand this will implement it under extremely strict 
conditions of law and will apply stringent controls.  Interception must be done 
sparingly, once other methods of investigation have been tried, and failed; and 
authorised by an independent judge, with regular oversight of the activities of the state 
agencies.  Increasingly governments are resorting to unwarranted surveillance. 
? Are there adequate laws protecting against abuse? 
? When can police intercept? e.g. only when investigating specific types of 
crimes, 'serious crimes', etc. 
? Do state security agencies have to follow similar rules? 
? Who authorises?  a judge? a politician? ['judicial warrants' does not mean 
the same in all countries, where sometimes judges have investigatory powers, 
but we do our best to note this]” 
 
Text 3 
Summary of the content and accompanying questionnaire on the category 
surveillance oversight according to Privacy International 
 
Many governments are allowing their security services to circumvent constitutional 
and statutory protections and safeguards.  The trump card of 'national security' is now 
being used as commonly as 'terrorism' to justify further encroachments on due process 
and the rule of law.  History has shown that secret surveillance done by security 
services has caused great harms and led to abuses.  Many governments are now 
returning to these practices where they are allowing their security services to 
circumvent constitutional and statutory protections and safeguards, avoiding warrant 
requirements, preventing oversight, and exempting these agencies from the law.   
? Are national security agencies exempted from privacy laws? 
? Are there appropriate reporting and oversight mechanisms for secret 
surveillance? 
? Have there been cases of abuse and if so, has there been sufficient 
safeguards put in place? 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
T A B L E S 
SUMMARISING LEGISLATION  
ON IMMUNITY REGIMES   
IN THE INSTITUTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN 
IN COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES 
 
ALBANIA 
The People’s Advocate 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Constitution approved by the 
Albanian Parliament 21.10.1998 
(art. 137, par. 1 & 2) Statute No. 
8454, art. 6, par. 3, (4.2.1999) 
Constitution approved by the 
Albanian Parliament 21.10.1998 
(art. 137, par. 1 & 2) Statute No. 
8454, art. 6, par. 3, (4.2.1999) 
Scope of immunity Functional 
The People's Advocate enjoys the 
immunity of a judge of the High 
Court.  
He may be criminally prosecuted 
only with the approval of the 
Assembly. He cannot be detained or 
arrested unless apprehended in the 
course of committing a crime or 
immediately after its commission. 
The competent organ immediately 
notifies the Constitutional Court. If 
the Constitutional Court does not 
consent within 24 hours to the 
sending of the arrested People’s 
Advocate before a court, the 
competent organ is obliged to 
release him. 
Extra-functional 
The People's Advocate enjoys the 
immunity of a judge of the High 
Court.  
He may be criminally prosecuted 
only with the approval of the 
Assembly. He cannot be detained or 
arrested unless apprehended in the 
course of committing a crime or 
immediately after its commission. 
The competent organ immediately 
notifies the Constitutional Court. If 
the Constitutional Court does not 
consent within 24 hours to the 
sending of the arrested People’s 
Advocate before a court, the 
competent organ is obliged to 
release him. 
Acts covered by immunity All acts for which he may be 
criminally prosecuted in his 
capacity as the People’s Advocate 
All acts for which he may be 
criminally prosecuted. 
Persons covered 
 
The People’s Advocate The People’s Advocate 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By whom? Yes, with the authorisation of the 
Assembly 
 
Yes, with the authorisation of the 
Assembly 
 
In cases of flagrante delicto, with 
the consent of the Constitutional 
Court within 24 hours 
Procedure for lifting immunity - The Public Prosecutor submits a 
proposal to lift immunity to 
Parliament according to the 
conditions laid down in 
constitutional law 
- The proposal is examined by a 
plenary session of the Assembly. 
- The decision to lift immunity is 
taken by a majority of the deputies 
present (not less than one third of 
them). 
- The Public Prosecutor submits a 
proposal to lift immunity to 
Parliament according to the 
conditions laid down in 
constitutional law 
- The proposal is examined by a 
plenary session of the Assembly. 
- The decision to lift immunity is 
taken by a majority of the deputies 
present (not less than one third of 
them). 
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ARMENIA 
The Human Rights Defender 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Constitution “The Human Rights’ 
Defender shall be endowed with the 
immunity envisaged for the 
Deputy” art. 83.1.6Law on the 
Human Rights Defender of 
01.01.2004 as amended and 
supplemented in  
01.06.06, art. 19 par. 1 and 23.5* 
 Law on the Human Rights 
Defender of 01.01.2004 as amended 
and supplemented in  
01.06.06, art. 19 par. 2 and 23.5 
Scope of immunity Functional- Absolute immunity 
No criminal prosecution or bringing 
to account shall be brought against 
the Defender for the actions 
including for the opinion expressed 
at the National Assembly, if it does 
not contain slander or offence 
Staff 
Functional immunity 
All persons holding any position in 
the Defender’s staff cannot be 
convicted, persecuted, detained, 
arrested or brought to court for any 
action performed, opinion 
expressed or decision made while 
performing their responsibilities 
under the Defender’s instructions 
Extra-functional immunity 
He shall not be involved as a 
defendant, be detained, arrested  or 
called to the administrative account 
without the consent of the national 
Assembly 
- except in cases of flagrante 
delicto.   
In this case the President of the 
National Assembly shall be 
informed immediately. 
 
Acts covered by immunity All actions and opinion expressed in 
Parliament except in cases of 
slander or offence  
(The Defender) 
All actions, opinions and decisions 
under the Defender’s instructions 
(the Staff of the Defender) 
All offences which may lead to the 
above-mentioned measures save in 
cases of flagrante delicto. In such a 
case the competent authority shall 
inform immediately the President of 
the National Assembly. 
 
Persons covered The Defender and his/her Staff The Defender  
Duration of immunity Perpetual (for the Defender) 
During the period of tenure (for the 
Staff) 
For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By whom? Yes, with the authorisation of the 
Defender 
Yes, with the authorisation of the 
Assembly 
Procedure for lifting immunity The procedure for waiving the 
staff’s immunity is not precise (See 
opinion of the Venice Commission 
on the Law on the Human Rights 
Defender of Armenia (CDL-
AD(2006)038) 
Rules of Procedure of the National 
Assembly Art. 98 “The petition to 
give consent for bringing charges to 
arrest, to involve as a defendant, to 
take a deputy (in our case the 
Defender) into custody and 
judicially institute administrative or 
criminal proceedings against 
him/her shall be submitted by the 
Prosecutor General to the President 
of the National Assembly. The 
resolutions shall be voted on by 
secret ballot and adopted by a 
majority vote from the number of 
deputies who voted, if more than 
half of the total number of the 
deputies have voted (Amended and 
added on 26.02.2007 LA-111). 
* According to the Joint Opinion No. 490 / 2008 adopted by the Venice Commission at its 76th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 
October 2008), following the submission of a letter dated 1 July 2008, by the Human Rights Defender of Armenia, Mr 
Harutyunyan, who requested from the Venice Commission an opinion on amendment to article 23(5) of the Law on the Protector 
of Human Rights and Freedoms, the  proposed amendment to deprive the staff of the immunity regime it enjoyed was 
inconsistent with the guarantees of independence that the institution requires. 
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AZERBAIJAN 
The Human Rights Commissioner 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Constitutional Law N. 246-IIKQ  
(adopted on 28.12.2001), art. 
6.5 
Constitutional Law N. 246-IIKQ  
(adopted on 28.12.2001)  
art. 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5    
Scope of immunity Functional 
Any former Commissioner shall 
remain inviolable for the 
activities conducted and the 
opinions expressed while 
performing the powers of 
Commissioner. Criminal or 
administrative proceedings with 
regard to offences committed by 
the Commissioner in that period 
shall be carried out as provided 
for in Art. 6.3 of the present 
Law. 
 
Extended Extra-functional 
immunity 
with respect to criminal or 
administrative proceedings, 
arrest, detention, search, and 
examination without the consent 
of the Parliament  
-save in cases of flagrante 
delicto 
It extends also to his or her 
home, service premises, means 
of transport and communication, 
correspondence, private 
property and documents.   
 
Acts covered by immunity All activities conducted and all 
opinions expressed while 
performing the powers of 
Commissioner. 
All offences which may lead to 
the above-mentioned measures, 
save in cases of flagrante 
delicto. The competent authority 
that has arrested the 
Commissioner, shall, within 24 
hours, inform the Milli Mejlis of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan 
(Parliament) and the Prosecutor-
General of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. 
 
Persons covered 
 
The Commissioner The Commissioner 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
Yes, with the authorisation of 
the Assembly 
Yes, with the authorisation of 
the Assembly 
Procedure for lifting immunity - The inviolability of the 
Commissioner may be 
terminated only on a decision of 
the Milli Mejlis of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan taken by 83 votes 
majority following a motion of 
the Prosecutor-General of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. 
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BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA 
The Ombudsman of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Dimensions of immunity in 
the institution of the 
Ombudsman 
 
Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law on the Ombudsman of  22.01.2004, art. 
16.1 and art. 16.4 
http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/cedir/cedir/Lex-
doc/Bos_l-2004b.pdf 
 
Law on the Ombudsman of  
22.01.2004, art. 16.2 and art. 
16.4 
 
Scope of immunity Ombudsman 
Divided functional i) No prosecution, no 
investigation, arrest, detention or trial for the 
opinions expressed or for the decisions taken in 
the exercise of powers associated with his or 
her duties (no waiver), and ii) all other acts in 
the discharge of his duties (with waiver) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staff 
Functional immunity 
Persons holding any office or appointment 
under the institution shall not be prosecuted, 
subjected to investigation, arrested, detained or 
tried for any action, opinion or decision taken 
while performing their duties upon office or 
appointment     
Extra functional immunity 
He shall not be detained, 
arrested   
- except in cases of flagrante 
delicto relating to an offence 
punishable with a term of 
imprisonment greater than five 
years 
 
Decisions to prosecute, to 
detain or to refer an 
Ombudsman to a court 
charged with a criminal 
offence shall be taken only for 
offences punishable by a term 
of imprisonment greater than 
five years, and only after both 
the House of Representatives 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the House of Peoples of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
so decided. Solely a court at 
the level of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shall be 
competent to try him or her. 
 
Extra-functional immunity:  
Whenever members of the 
staff are arrested, detained or 
tried for all those acts not 
connected to their official 
function, the prosecuting 
authorities shall duly and 
promptly inform the 
institution. 
Acts covered by immunity Ombudsman 
All opinions and decisions  
in the discharge of his duties (without waiver) 
All other acts in the discharge of his duties 
(with waiver) 
 
 
 
 
Staff 
All actions, opinions and decisions under the 
Defender’s instructions (without waiver) 
Ombudsman 
All offences which may lead 
to the above-mentioned 
measures save in cases of 
flagrante delicto relating to an 
offence punishable with a term 
of imprisonment greater than 
five years. 
 
Staff 
Acts not connected to their 
official function. 
Persons covered 
 
The Ombudsman and his/her Staff The Ombudsman and his/her 
Staff 
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BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA 
The Ombudsman of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Dimensions of immunity in 
the institution of the 
Ombudsman 
 
Non-liability Inviolability 
Duration of immunity Ombudsman 
Perpetual for the opinions and decisions  
For the duration of the mandate for all other 
acts  
 
Staff 
For the duration of the mandate 
For the duration of the 
mandate (The Ombudsman 
and the Staff) 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
The Defender 
Yes, with the authorisation of the Assembly 
for all other acts in the discharge of the 
Ombudsman’s duties 
Yes, with the authorisation of 
the Assembly 
 
 
Procedure for lifting 
immunity 
The consent of both the House of 
Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the House of Peoples of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
 
The consent of both the House 
of Representatives of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the 
House of Peoples of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
The procedure for waiving the 
staff’s immunity is not 
precise 
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BULGARIA 
The Bulgarian Ombudsman 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Constitution (Art. 69) Law on 
the Ombudsman (State Gazette 
No. 48 of May 23, 2003, in 
force since January 1, 2004),  
art. 16.1 
Constitution (Art. 70); Rules of 
Procedure of the National 
Assembly (Art. 
105), Law on the Ombudsman 
(State Gazette No. 48 of May 
23, 2003, in force since January 
1, 2004),   art. 16.2 
Scope of immunity Functional  
Art. 16.1 “The Ombudsman 
shall enjoy the same immunity 
as a Member of Parliament” 
 
Extra-functional immunity 
- with respect to the initiation of 
any 
investigation, arrest, criminal 
proceedings; 
- except when arrested in the act 
of committing a serious crime. 
Acts covered by immunity Immunity for all opinions 
expressed and acts performed  
in the discharge of his duties 
“All acts that may lead to arrest 
or criminal 
proceedings, 
- except serious crimes, with the 
Assembly's authorization; 
- except in the case of arrest 
when committing a serious 
crime”. Report on the RPI 
Persons covered 
 
The Ombudsman The Ombudsman 
Duration of immunity Perpetual For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
- Yes, with the authorization of 
the National Assembly or, if it is 
sitting, its Speaker, to institute 
an investigation. 
Procedure for lifting immunity - “Where the Ombudsman is 
arrested in the act of committing 
a crime, the Assembly is 
immediately notified. 
- The Public Prosecutor submits 
the proposal to lift immunity, 
with grounds, to the National 
Assembly, or to the Speaker if it 
is not sitting. 
- It is examined by the 
Commission for Parliamentary 
Ethics. 
- The decision is taken by the 
Assembly or, if it is not sitting, 
by the Speaker, whose decision 
it later confirms or overturns”. 
Report on the RPI 
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CZECH REPUBLIC 
The Public Defender of Rights 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Constitution (Art. 27), Law on 
the Public Defender of Rights 
(8.12.1999) art. 7.1 
 
Constitution (Art. 27), Law on 
the Public Defender of Rights 
(8.12.1999) art. 7.1 
Scope of immunity Functional 
He may be criminally 
prosecuted only with the 
approval of the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
Extra-Functional  
He may be criminally 
prosecuted only with the 
approval of the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
Acts covered by immunity All acts for which he may be 
criminally prosecuted. 
All acts for which he may be 
criminally prosecuted. 
Persons covered 
 
The Public Defender of Rights The Public Defender of Rights 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
Yes, with the authorization of 
the Chamber of Deputies 
 
Yes, with the authorization of 
the Chamber of Deputies 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity “The proposal to lift immunity 
is submitted by the 
Parliamentary 
Committee on Immunities. 
- The Chamber takes the 
decision in accordance with 
Article 27 of the Constitution”. 
Report on the RPI 
“The proposal to lift immunity 
is submitted by the 
Parliamentary 
Committee on Immunities. 
- The Chamber takes the 
decision in accordance with 
Article 27 of the Constitution”. 
Report on the RPI 
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ESTONIA 
The Chancellor of Justice 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Chancellor of Justice Act Passed 
on 25 February 1999 (RT* I 
1999, 29, 406), entered into 
force 1 June 1999, Chapter 2, 
par. 11.1  
Chancellor of Justice Act Passed 
on 25 February 1999 (RT* I 
1999, 29, 406), entered into 
force 1 June 1999, Chapter 2, 
par. 11.1  
Scope of immunity Functional 
He may be criminally 
prosecuted only with the 
approval of the Parliament 
Extra-functional  
He may be criminally 
prosecuted only with the 
approval of the Parliament 
Acts covered by immunity  All acts for which he may be 
criminally prosecuted. 
Persons covered 
 
The Chancellor of Justice The Chancellor of Justice 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
Yes, with the authorization of 
the Parliament 
 
Yes, with the authorization of 
the Parliament 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity Criminal charges may be 
brought against the Legal 
Chancellor only on the proposal 
of the President of the Republic 
and with the consent of the 
majority of the membership of 
the Riigikogu (Parliament). 
Criminal charges may be 
brought against the Legal 
Chancellor only on the proposal 
of the President of the Republic 
and with the consent of the 
majority of the membership of 
the Riigikogu (Parliament). 
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FINLAND 
The Ombudsman of the Parliament/ 
Chancellor of Justice 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 
Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Constitution Act of Finland 
Issued on 17 July 1919 
(as amended) section 114, 115, 
and 117 
 
- 
Scope of immunity Functional immunity. 
He may be (legally) prosecuted 
only with the approval of 
Parliament. 
- 
Acts covered by immunity All acts for which he may be 
legally prosecuted in the 
performance of his duties. 
- 
Persons covered 
 
The Ombudsman of the 
Parliament, the Deputy 
Ombudsman of the Parliament 
or the Deputy Ombudsman's 
substitute 
- 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate - 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
Yes, with the authorization of 
the Parliament 
 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity The decision to bring a charge is 
made by the Parliament, after 
having obtained an opinion from 
the Constitutional Law 
Committee concerning the 
unlawfulness of the actions of 
the Ombudsman. Before the 
Parliament decides to bring 
charges or not, it shall allow the 
Ombudsman an opportunity to 
give an explanation. When 
considering a matter of this kind 
the Committee shall have a 
quorum when all of its members 
are present. If a decision to 
waive immunity is taken, the 
matter is handled in a special 
tribunal, the High Court of 
Impeachment, in regard to 
which special constitutional 
provisions have been enacted.  
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FRANCE 
The Mediator 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law no. 73-6 of 3rd January 
1973 establishing a Mediator of 
the French Republic 
(Supplemented by law no. 76-
1211 of 24th December 1976 
and by law no. 89-18 of 13th 
January 1989 and modified by 
law no. 92-125 of 6th February 
1992), Section 3 
 
- 
Scope of immunity Functional – Absolute immunity 
The Mediator of the French 
Republic shall be immune from 
prosecution, arrest, detention 
and judgement in respect of any 
opinions he may voice or any 
acts he may accomplish in the 
performance of his duties. 
 - 
Acts covered by immunity All opinions and acts in the 
discharge of his duties.  
- 
Persons covered 
 
The Mediator - 
Duration of immunity Perpetual - 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
- - 
Procedure for lifting immunity - - 
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FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA 
The Public Attorney (Ombudsman) 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 
Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law on the Public Attorney 
(Ombudsman) of 13 February 
1997, art. 38 
 
- 
Scope of immunity Functional – Absolute immunity 
The Ombudsman and his 
deputies cannot be called to 
account for opinions, actions, 
measures and activities in the 
discharge of their duties. 
 - 
Acts covered by immunity Any opinions, actions, measures 
and activities in the discharge of 
his duties.  
- 
Persons covered 
 
The Ombudsman and his 
deputies 
- 
Duration of immunity Perpetual - 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
- - 
Procedure for lifting immunity - - 
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GEORGIA 
The Public Defender of Georgia 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law on Public Defender of 
Georgia (16.05.1996) Art. 5. 5 
 Law on Public Defender of 
Georgia (16.05.1996) Art. 5. 2, 
5.3  
Scope of immunity Divided functional i) in criminal 
proceedings for the opinions and 
views expressed within his term 
of reference (without waiver), 
and ii) all other acts within his 
term of reference (with waiver) 
 
 
Extended extra-functional 
immunity 
with respect to criminal 
proceedings, arrest or 
imprisonment. His apartment, 
motorcar, work place as well as 
he himself cannot be searched 
without consent of the 
Parliament. 
Acts covered by immunity All opinions and views 
expressed within his term of 
reference  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All other acts (with waiver) 
All offences which may lead to 
the above-mentioned measures, 
save in cases of flagrante 
delicto. The competent authority 
must immediately report the 
event to Parliament. If the 
Parliament does not give its 
consent the arrested or 
imprisoned Public Defender of 
Georgia shall be discharged 
without delay. The Parliament 
of Georgia shall make decision 
on this question not later than 14 
days following the appeal of the 
Prosecutor General of Georgia. 
 
 
Persons covered 
 
The Public Defender of Georgia The Public Defender of Georgia 
Duration of immunity Perpetual (for views and 
opinions) 
For the duration of the mandate 
(for the acts) 
For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
Yes, with the authorisation of 
the Parliament 
Yes, with the authorisation of 
the Parliament 
Procedure for lifting immunity “The decision to lift immunity is 
taken by the Parliament of 
Georgia” Report on the RPI 
“The decision to lift immunity is 
taken by the Parliament of 
Georgia” Report on the RPI  
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GREECE 
The Greek Ombudsman 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law No. 3094, 22 January 2003
The Ombudsman and other 
provisions, art. 1, par. 2 
- 
Scope of immunity Functional –  almost Absolute  
The Ombudsman and the 
Deputy Ombudsmen are not 
held responsible, prosecuted or 
subjected to inquiry for any 
opinion expressed or act 
committed in the discharge of 
their duties. Prosecution is 
permissible only following an 
accusation for slander, libel or 
violation of confidentiality 
 - 
Acts covered by immunity All opinions and acts in the 
discharge of their duties save in 
cases of slander, libel or 
violation of confidentiality 
- 
Persons covered 
 
The Ombudsman and the 
Deputy Ombudsmen 
- 
Duration of immunity Perpetual - 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
- - 
Procedure for lifting immunity - - 
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HUNGARY 
The Ombudsman for Civil Rights 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Act LIX on the Ombudsman 
(Parliamentary Commissioner) for 
Civil Rights (1.6.1993) Section 11 
 Act LIX on the Ombudsman 
(Parliamentary Commissioner) for 
Civil Rights (1.6.1993) Sections 
12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 13.1, 
13.2, 14 
Scope of immunity Divided Functional i) “for any fact 
or opinion communicated by him in 
the course of the exercise of his 
mandate”. 
(without waiver), and ii) all other 
acts in the discharge of his duties 
(with waiver) 
 
Extra – functional immunity 
- with respect to any "arrest", 
"criminal proceedings or 
contraventions" and coercive 
measures of criminal proceedings, 
- Without the Assembly's consent to 
lift immunity. 
- In case of flagrante delicto, the 
deputy may be arrested but 
application for his immunity to be 
lifted must be made as 
soon as possible. 
 
Acts covered by immunity He enjoys immunity “in court or 
before any other authority for any 
fact or opinion communicated by 
him in the course of the exercise of 
his mandate”. Proceedings may, 
however, be initiated for slander 
and libel. He is also responsible 
under civil law.   
 
For all other acts a waiver 
procedure should be followed 
All offences which may lead to the 
above-mentioned measures, save in 
cases of flagrante delicto.   
 
“The Ombudsman may not waive 
his immunity – with the exception 
of proceedings for contravention” 
Section 13 (1) 
Persons covered 
 
The Ombudsman for Civil Rights The Ombudsman for Civil Rights 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By whom? Yes, with the authorisation of the 
Parliament for all other acts  
Yes, with the authorisation of the 
Parliament 
Procedure for lifting immunity “The motion for the suspension of 
immunity is submitted to the 
Speaker of the Assembly by the 
Chief Public Prosecutor, but after 
the submission or the presentation 
of the private accusation, it is the 
court that is competent to propose 
lifting immunity. In a case of 
contravention the suspension of 
immunity is submitted to the 
Speaker of the Assembly by the 
Chief Public Prosecutor on the basis 
of the request of the authority of 
contraventions. In a case of 
flagrante delicto, the motion must 
be submitted without delay. 
- The request is examined by the 
Parliamentary Committee on 
Immunities and conflict of interest 
matters and a proposal to decision is 
submitted to Parliament within 
thirty days. 
- The decision is taken by the 
Assembly, 
without debate, and requires a two-
thirds 
majority of deputies present”. 
Report on the RPI 
“The motion for the suspension of 
immunity is submitted to the 
Speaker of the Assembly by the 
Chief Public Prosecutor, but after 
the submission or the presentation 
of the private accusation, it is the 
court that is competent to propose 
lifting immunity. In a case of 
contravention the suspension of 
immunity is submitted to the 
Speaker of the Assembly by the 
Chief Public Prosecutor on the basis 
of the request of the authority of 
contraventions. In a case of 
flagrante delicto, the motion must 
be submitted without delay. 
- The request is examined by the 
Parliamentary Committee on 
Immunities and conflict of interest 
matters and a proposal to decision is 
submitted to Parliament within 
thirty days. 
- The decision is taken by the 
Assembly, 
without debate, and requires a two-
thirds 
majority of deputies present”. 
Report on the RPI 
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MOLDOVA 
Parliamentary Advocates  
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law 1349-XIII of 17th October 
1997 on Parliamentary Advocates,   
art. 12.1, 12.2, 12.3 
 
Law 1349-XIII of 17th October 
1997 on Parliamentary Advocates,   
art. 12.1, 12.2, 12.3 
Scope of immunity Functional  
All acts in the discharge of their 
duties 
Extended Extra-functional (They 
enjoy) immunity 
with respect to criminal or 
administrative proceedings, arrest, 
detention, search without the prior 
consent of the Parliament. 
- Except in the case of flagrante 
delicto. 
- Inviolability extends to their 
residence, offices, transportation 
and communication means, 
correspondence, documents and 
personal property. 
 
Acts covered by immunity All acts in the discharge of their 
duties 
All acts liable to search, arrest, 
detention, 
criminal and administrative  
proceedings, except: 
- cases of flagrante delicto.  
Persons covered 
 
The Parliamentary Advocate The Parliamentary Advocate 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By whom? Yes, with the authorization of the 
Parliament 
 
Yes, with the authorization of the 
Parliament 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity “In the case of flagrante delicto, a 
member may be detained in his 
home for 24 hours on the authority 
of the Public Prosecutor. The 
Speaker must be informed 
immediately; he informs Parliament 
which may then suspend detention. 
As a general rule, the procedure for 
obtaining lifting of immunity is as 
follows: 
- The proposal is made by the 
Public Prosecutor. 
- It is examined by the Permanent 
Committee on Legal Affairs, 
Appointments and Immunities 
which submits a report. 
- Parliament votes by secret ballot 
on the Committee's report. 
- The Public Prosecutor, and he 
alone, may prosecute a Member of 
Parliament”. Report on the RPI 
“In the case of flagrante delicto, a 
member may be detained in his 
home for 24 hours on the authority 
of the Public Prosecutor. The 
Speaker must be informed 
immediately; he informs Parliament 
which may then suspend detention. 
As a general rule, the procedure for 
obtaining lifting of immunity is as 
follows: 
- The proposal is made by the 
Public Prosecutor. 
- It is examined by the Permanent 
Committee on Legal Affairs, 
Appointments and Immunities 
which submits a report. 
- Parliament votes by secret ballot 
on the Committee's report. 
- The Public Prosecutor, and he 
alone,  may prosecute a Member of 
Parliament”. Report on the RPI 
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MONTENEGRO 
Law on the Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms 
 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 
Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law of July 8, 2003 on the 
Protector of Human Rights and 
Freedom* art. 14.2 
 
Law of July 8, 2003 on the 
Protector of Human Rights and 
Freedom* art. 14.1  
  
Scope of immunity Divided functional i) “for opinion 
expressed or for recommendation 
given in the exercise of his or her 
duties” (Without waiver), and ii) all 
other acts in the discharge of his 
duties (with waiver) 
 
The Protector and the Deputy shall 
enjoy the same immunity as 
accorded to the 
Representatives. 
Extra-functional. According to 
article 86 of the Constitution 
concerning the Representatives no 
detention and no penal proceedings 
may be initiated without the consent 
of the Parliament, except in cases of 
flagrante delicto for which there is 
a prescribed sentence of over five 
years of imprisonment.   
  
Acts covered by immunity All opinions and recommendations 
expressed in the exercise of their 
mandate. 
All other acts in the discharge of 
their duties (with waiver) 
All acts liable to detention  
and criminal proceedings, except: 
- cases of flagrante delicto for 
which there is a prescribed sentence 
of over five years of imprisonment. 
Persons covered 
 
The Protector and the Deputy  The Protector and the Deputy 
Duration of immunity Perpetual for opinions and 
recommendations 
For the duration of their mandate 
for all other acts 
For the duration of their mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By whom? Yes, with the authorization of the 
Parliament 
 
Yes, with the authorization of the 
Parliament 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity -  
 
 
* According to the Joint Opinion No. 540 / 2009 adopted by the Venice Commission at its 80th Plenary 
Session (Venice, 9-10 October 2009), following the submission of a letter dated 23 March 2009, by the 
Minister for the Protection of Human and Minority Rights of Montenegro, Mr Fuad Nimani, who 
requested from the Venice Commission an opinion on amendments to the Law on the Protector of 
Human Rights and Freedoms, the proposed amendment of article 26 of the Law reads as follows: “The 
Protector and his/her Deputies, but also his/her staff should have immunity from legal process in 
respect of words spoken or written and acts performed by them in their official capacity. Such 
immunity shall continue to be accorded even after the end of the Protector’s mandate or after the 
members of staff cease their employment with the Protector’s institution. This immunity should also 
include baggage, correspondence and means of communication belonging to the Protector”. Available 
at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL-AD(2009)043-e.pdf, date of access: 06.01.2010. 
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POLAND 
The Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection 
 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 
Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis - 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitution signed by the President 
of the Republic of Poland 
on july 16, 1997, art. 210 and 211  
Act of 15 July 1987 on 
Commissioner for Civil Rights 
Protection (art. 6.2) 
Scope of immunity Functional  
All acts in the discharge of their 
duties 
Extra-functional with respect to 
criminal proceedings, arrest or 
detention without the prior consent 
of the Parliament  
- Except in the case of flagrante 
delicto and in case his detention is 
indispensable to secure correct 
proceedings.  
- The detention shall be 
immediately notified to the Speaker 
of the Sejm, who may order 
immediate release of the detained 
 
Acts covered by immunity All acts in the discharge of their 
duties 
All acts liable to arrest, detention  
and criminal proceedings, except: 
- cases of flagrante delicto or  in 
case his detention is indispensable 
to secure correct proceedings 
Persons covered 
 
The Commissioner for Civil Rights 
Protection 
 The Commissioner for Civil Rights 
Protection 
Duration of immunity For the duration of his mandate For the duration of his mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By whom? Yes, with the authorization of the 
Parliament 
 
Yes, with the authorization of the 
Parliament 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity Procedure (Art. 10 (2) to (5) of the 
Act on the Exercise of the Mandate 
of a Deputy or Senator, Art. 73 to 
74 of the Standing Orders of the 
Sejm of the Republic of Poland). In 
this case, MPs must be heard. They 
do not have means of appeal. 
Procedure (Art. 10 (2) to (5) of the 
Act on the Exercise of the Mandate 
of a Deputy or Senator, Art. 73 to 
74 of the Standing Orders of the 
Sejm of the Republic of Poland). In 
this case, MPs must be heard. They 
do not have means of appeal. 
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ROMANIA 
The Advocate of the People 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law No. 35/1997 on the 
organization and functioning of 
the People’s Advocate 
institution, art. 30 
Law No. 35/1997 on the 
organization and functioning of 
the People’s Advocate 
institution, art. 31.1, 31.2, 31.3 
Scope of immunity Qualified Immunity-The 
principle of good faith  
The Advocate of the People and 
his/her deputies cannot be 
prosecuted for any opinions or 
acts legally performed while 
exercising their duties 
Extra-functional immunity 
against search, arrest , detention, 
arraignment without the 
approval of the presidents of the 
Chambers of Parliament (for the 
Advocate of the People) 
 
Extra-functional immunity 
against search, arrest , detention, 
arraignment without prior 
information of the Advocate of 
the People (for the Advocate’s 
deputies) 
 
Acts covered by immunity Any opinions or acts legally 
performed in the discharge of 
their duties.  
All offences which may lead to 
the above-mentioned measures 
Persons covered 
 
The Advocate of the People and 
his/her deputies 
The Advocate of the People and 
his/her deputies 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
- Yes, with the authorisation of 
the presidents of the Chambers 
of Parliament (for the Advocate 
of the People) 
- with the authorisation of the 
Advocate (for the Advocate’s 
deputies) 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity - No precise provisions for both 
procedures 
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SWEDEN 
The Parliamentary Ombudsman 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis The Rikstag Act, Chapter 9, art. 
8.2 
- 
Scope of immunity Functional immunity. 
He may be (legally) prosecuted 
only with the approval of 
Parliament. 
- 
Acts covered by immunity All acts for which he may be 
legally prosecuted in the 
performance of his duties. 
- 
Persons covered 
 
The Parliamentary Ombudsmen  - 
Duration of immunity For the duration of their 
mandate 
- 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
Yes, with the authorization of 
the Parliament 
 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity The decision to bring a charge is 
made by the Parliament, after 
having obtained an opinion from 
the Constitutional Law 
Committee.  
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RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Federal Constitutional Law on the 
Commissioner for Human Rights in 
the Russian Federation (1997), Art. 
12.1, 12.2 
 
Federal Constitutional Law on the 
Commissioner for Human Rights in 
the Russian Federation (1997), Art. 
12.1, 12.2 
Scope of immunity Functional  
All acts in the discharge of his 
duties. 
Extra-functional immunity against 
criminal or administrative charges, 
court procedures, personal and 
other searches, detention and arrest, 
search, personal interrogation 
(except 
in cases provided for by law to 
ensure the 
safety of third parties)  
-  without the 
consent of the State Duma, 
except in cases of flagrante delicto. 
In the case of the detention of the 
commissioner at the scene of a 
crime, the official who conducted 
the detention shall immediately 
notify this to the State Duma, which 
must take a decision on giving 
consent on the further use of the 
procedural measure. If within 24 
hours the consent of the State Duma 
is not received, the Commissioner 
must be released immediately. 
The deputy's inviolability applies 
also to his residential and work 
premises,  baggage, personal and 
work means of transport, 
correspondence,  
communication, and documents. 
Acts covered by immunity All acts in the discharge of his 
duties. 
All acts liable to the 
abovementioned 
measures except, 
- offences committed in flagrante 
delicto and after the consent of the 
State Duma 
Persons covered 
 
The Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
The Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
Duration of immunity For the duration of his mandate For the duration of his mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By whom? Yes, with the authorization of the 
State Duma 
 
Yes, with the authorization of the 
State Duma 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity “The proposal is submitted to the 
Chamber by the Public Prosecutor 
of the Russian Federation. 
- The request is examined by a 
special committee in the State 
Duma which produces an opinion, 
with grounds, within five days. 
- The decision is taken by the State 
Duma a majority of the total 
number of deputies is required in 
the State Duma, within seven 
days).”. Report on the RPI 
“The proposal is submitted to the 
Chamber by the Public Prosecutor 
of the Russian Federation. 
- The request is examined by a 
special committee in the State 
Duma which produces an opinion, 
with grounds, within five days. 
- The decision is taken by the State 
Duma a majority of the total 
number of deputies is required in 
the State Duma, within seven 
days).” Report on the RPI 
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SPAIN 
The Defender of the People 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Organic Act concerning the 
Defender of the People 
(Defensor del Pueblo) of April 
6, 1981, art. 6.2, 6.4 
 
Organic Act concerning the 
Defender of the People 
(Defensor del Pueblo) of April 
6, 1981, art. 6.2, 6.3 
 
Scope of immunity Functional – Absolute immunity 
The Defender of the People and 
his/her Assistants cannot be 
arrested, placed under enquiry, 
fined, prosecuted or judged on 
account of the opinions he 
expresses or the acts he carries 
out within the scope of his 
duties.  
Extra-functional immunity 
against arrest, detention,  
except in cases of flagrante 
delicto. 
The decision regarding his 
accusation, prison, prosecution 
and trial falls exclusively to the 
Penal Division of the High Court. 
Acts covered by immunity Any opinions or acts performed 
in the discharge of their duties.  
All offences which may lead to 
the above-mentioned measures 
Persons covered 
 
The Defender of the People and 
his/her Assistants 
The Defender of the People and 
his/her Assistants 
Duration of immunity Perpetual For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
- Yes, the decision falls 
exclusively to the Penal 
Division of the High Court. 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity - - 
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PORTUGAL 
The Ombudsman 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Statute of the Ombudsman, Law 
nr. 9/91, of 9 April 1991 
(modified by Law nr. 30/96, of 
14 August 1996), art. 8.1 
 
Statute of the Ombudsman, Law 
nr. 9/91, of 9 April 1991 
(modified by Law nr. 30/96, of 
14 August 1996), art. 8.2 
 
Scope of immunity Functional – Absolute immunity 
The Ombudsman will not be 
held responsible on civil or 
criminal grounds for his 
recommendations, remarks, 
opinions and acts in the exercise 
of his functions. 
Extra-functional immunity 
against arrest, or imprisonment 
without the consent of the 
Parliament 
- except in cases of flagrante 
delicto for the commission of a 
crime that carries a prison 
sentence of over three years  
 
Acts covered by immunity Any recommendations, remarks, 
opinions and acts performed in 
the discharge of his duties.  
All offences which may lead to 
the above-mentioned measures 
Persons covered 
 
The Ombudsman The Ombudsman 
Duration of immunity Perpetual For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
- Yes, with the authorization of 
the Parliament 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity - “The competent authorities 
submit the proposal to the 
Speaker of the Assembly. 
The judge then requests the 
suspension of the deputy's 
mandate. 
- The request is examined by the 
Committee on the Rules of 
Procedure and Parliamentary 
Mandates which hears the 
deputy and then gives an 
opinion. 
- The decision to consent to the 
imprisonment of a deputy or to 
suspend proceedings is taken by 
secret ballot. An absolute 
majority of deputies present is 
required”. Report on the RPI 
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SERBIA 
The Protector of Citizens 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law* on the Protector of 
Citizens 
(Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Serbia” No. 
79/2005, 16 September 2005) 
art., 10** 
- 
Scope of immunity Functional immunity 
The Protector of Citizens and 
his/her Deputies shall not be 
held accountable 
for opinion, criticism or 
recommendation they made 
while performing their function. 
 - 
Acts covered by immunity Any opinion, criticism, 
recommendation in the 
discharge of their duties.  
- 
Persons covered 
 
The Protector and his Deputies - 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate - 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
- - 
Procedure for lifting immunity - - 
 
 
* available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,NATLEGBOD,,SRB,,43e7573c4,0.html, date 
of access: 06.01.2010. 
** In the Joint Opinion No 318/2004 of the Venice Commission (adopted by the 61st Session, 3-4 
December 2004) on the Draft Law of the Ombudsman of Serbia, the proposed provision for the 
immunity of the Ombudsman read as follows: “The Ombudsperson his or her deputies and the staff of 
the Secretariat should be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts 
performed by them in their official capacity and within the limit of their authority”  
(functional immunity) available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-AD(2004)041-e.pdf, 
date of access: 06.01.2010. 
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SLOVENIA 
Human Rights Ombudsman 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Human Rights Ombudsman Act 
of December 20, 1993, art. 20, 
par. 1 
 
- 
Scope of immunity Divided functional  i) The 
Ombudsman shall not be held 
responsible for the opinion or 
recommendation given while 
performing his function 
(without waiver), and ii) he shall 
not be held in custody in the 
criminal proceedings instituted 
against him for having 
performed his function, without 
the prior consent of the 
Parliament  (with waiver) 
- 
Acts covered by immunity Any opinion and 
recommendation in the 
discharge of his duties.  
 
All other acts in the discharge of 
his duties  
- 
 
 
Persons covered 
 
The Ombudsman  
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate  
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
- 
 
Yes, with the authorization of 
the Parliament for all other acts 
 
 
Procedure for lifting immunity Not specified  
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UKRAINE 
The Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights 
Dimensions of immunity in the 
institution of the Ombudsman 
 Non-liability Inviolability 
Legal basis Law No. 35/1997 on the 
organization and functioning of 
the People’s Advocate 
institution, art. 31.1, 31.2, 31.3 
Law No. 35/1997 on the 
organization and functioning of 
the People’s Advocate 
institution, art. 31.1, 31.2, 31.3 
Scope of immunity Functional for all the acts in the 
discharge of his duties  
Extra-functional  immunity: 
- from criminal responsibility, 
administrative punishment 
imposed in accordance with 
judicial procedure, detention, 
arrest, search, as well as 
personal examination. 
- without the approval of 
Parliament  
 
Acts covered by immunity All the acts in the discharge of 
his duties 
All offences which may lead to 
the above-mentioned measures 
Persons covered 
 
The Ukrainian Parliament 
Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
The Ukrainian Parliament 
Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
Duration of immunity For the duration of the mandate For the duration of the mandate 
Can immunity be lifted? By 
whom? 
Yes, with the authorisation of 
the Assembly  
 
Yes, with the authorisation of 
the Assembly  
 
Procedure for lifting immunity “The proposal is submitted to 
Parliament by the Public 
Prosecutor or the President 
of the Supreme Court. 
Parliament must reply within a 
month. 
- The Committee of 
Parliamentary Ethics 
draws up a report, after hearing 
the deputy in the presence of the 
Public Prosecutor or the 
President of the Supreme Court. 
- The decision is taken and 
grounds given for it by 
Parliament by a two-thirds 
majority of members of the 
Chamber”. Report on the RPI 
“The proposal is submitted to 
Parliament by the Public 
Prosecutor or the President 
of the Supreme Court. 
Parliament must reply within a 
month. 
- The Committee of 
Parliamentary Ethics 
draws up a report, after hearing 
the deputy in the presence of the 
Public Prosecutor or the 
President of the Supreme Court. 
- The decision is taken and 
grounds given for it by 
Parliament by a two-thirds 
majority of members of the 
Chamber”. Report on the RPI 
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APPENDIX 2  
 
A Typology of immunities in the institution of the Ombudsman based on the tables 
summarizing legislation on immunity regimes in the institution of the Ombudsman in 
Council of Europe Member States 
 
 
MODEL 1: The Broad Model 
based on the French System of Parliamentary Immunity 
Non-liability (variations) Inviolability (variations) 
1. Functional in respect of legal/court proceedings over 
opinions, recommendations, views, decisions, acts in 
the discharge of duties  
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the 
competent authority/body (Parliament) 
 
 
1. Extra-functional: protection against prosecution for 
all other acts not related to the function, that is, 
legal/court proceedings, including arrest, detention, 
personal search, preliminary enquiries, investigations 
Duration: During mandate 
 Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the 
competent authority/body (Parliament), except in cases 
of flagrante delicto.  
Cells: A1+B9 
Council of Europe Member States: Albania, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Ukraine 
2. Functional in respect of legal/court proceedings over 
opinions, recommendations, views, decisions, acts in 
the discharge of duties  
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the 
competent authority/body (Parliament) 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Extended extra-functional: protection against 
prosecution for all other acts not related to the function, 
that is, legal/court proceedings, including arrest, 
detention, personal search, preliminary enquiries, 
investigations. 
Inviolability extends to search of residential and work 
premises, baggage, personal and work means of 
transport, correspondence, means of communication, 
documents.   
Duration: During mandate 
 Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the 
competent authority/body (Parliament), except in cases 
of flagrante delicto. 
Cells: A1+D25 
Council of Europe Member States: Azerbaijan, Moldova, Russian Federation 
3. Absolute Functional: in respect of legal/court 
proceedings over opinions, recommendations, views, 
decisions, acts in the discharge of duties. Slander or 
offence are exempted from the scope of immunity in 
the case of Armenia 
Duration: Perpetual 
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
 
3. Extra-functional: protection against prosecution for 
all other acts not related to the function, that is, 
legal/court proceedings, including arrest, detention, 
personal search, preliminary enquiries, investigations 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the 
competent authority/body (Parliament), except in cases 
of flagrante delicto. 
Cells: A7+B9 
Council of Europe Member States: Bulgaria, Spain, Portugal 
4. Divided Functional i)  in respect of legal/court 
proceedings over opinions, recommendations, views, 
decisions in the discharge of duties  
Duration: Perpetual  
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
 
ii) in respect of legal/court proceedings over acts in the 
discharge of duties 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the 
competent authority/body (Parliament) 
4. Extra-functional: protection against prosecution for 
all other acts not related to the function, that is, 
legal/court proceedings, including arrest, detention, 
personal search, preliminary enquiries, investigations 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the 
competent authority/body (Parliament), except in cases 
of flagrante delicto. 
Cells: C17+C23+B9 
Council of Europe Member States: Montenegro 
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5. Divided Functional i)  in respect of legal/court 
proceedings over opinions, recommendations, views 
in the discharge of duties. Slander and libel are 
exempted from the scope of immunity. 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
 
ii) in respect of legal/court proceedings over acts in the 
discharge of duties 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the 
competent authority/body (Parliament) 
5. Extra-functional: protection against prosecution for 
all other acts not related to the function, that is, 
legal/court proceedings, including arrest, detention, 
personal search, preliminary enquiries, investigations 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the 
competent authority/body (Parliament), except in cases 
of flagrante delicto. 
Cells: C17+C19+B9 
Council of Europe Member States: Hungary 
6. Divided Functional i)  in respect of legal/court proceedings 
over opinions, recommendations, views, decisions in the 
discharge of duties  
Duration: Perpetual  
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
 
ii) in respect of legal/court proceedings over acts in the 
discharge of duties 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the competent 
authority/body (Parliament) 
6. Extended extra-functional: protection against prosecution 
for all other acts not related to the function, that is, legal/court 
proceedings, including arrest, detention, personal search, 
preliminary enquiries, investigations. 
Inviolability extends to search of residential and work 
premises, baggage, personal and work means of transport, 
correspondence, means of communication, documents.   
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the competent 
authority/body (Parliament), except in cases of flagrante 
delicto. 
Cells: C17+C23+D25 
Council of Europe Member States: Georgia 
MODEL 2: The Narrow Model 
Non-liability 
1. Absolute Functional: in respect of legal/court proceedings over opinions, recommendations, views, decisions, acts in the 
discharge of duties. Slander, libel, and breach of confidentiality are exempted from the scope of immunity in the case of Greece. 
Duration: Perpetual 
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
Cells: A7 
Council of Europe Member States: France, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece 
2. Functional: in respect of legal/court proceedings over opinions, recommendations, views, decisions, acts in the discharge of 
duties  
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the competent authority/body (Parliament) 
Cells: A1 
Countries: Finland, Sweden 
3. Divided Functional i)  in respect of legal/court proceedings over opinions, recommendations, views in the discharge of 
duties  
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
 
ii) in respect of legal/court proceedings over acts in the discharge of duties 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the competent authority/body (Parliament) 
Cells: C17+C19 
Council of Europe Member States: Slovenia 
4. Functional: in respect of legal/court proceedings over opinions, recommendations, views in the discharge of duties  
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
Cells: A3 
Council of Europe Member States: Serbia 
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MODEL 3: The Hybrid Immunity Model 
Combination of parliamentary immunity and immunity of international organisations 
OMBUDSPERSONS 
Non-liability  Inviolability  
1. Absolute Functional: in respect of legal/court proceedings 
over opinions, recommendations, views, decisions, acts in the 
discharge of duties. Slander or offence are exempted from the 
scope of immunity in the case of Armenia 
Duration: Perpetual 
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
 
 
 
1. Extra-functional: protection against prosecution for all 
other acts not related to the function, that is, legal/court 
proceedings, including arrest, detention, personal search, 
preliminary enquiries, investigations 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the competent 
authority/body (Parliament), except in cases of flagrante 
delicto. 
Cells: A7+B9 
Council of Europe Member States: Armenia 
STAFF 
Non-liability 
1. Functional: in respect of legal/court proceedings over all actions, opinions, and decisions 
Duration: During Mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the competent authority/body (Ombudsperson). The procedure is not precise. 
Cells: A4 
Council of Europe Member States: Armenia 
OMBUDSPERSONS 
Non-liability  Inviolability  
2. Divided Functional i)  in respect of legal/court proceedings 
over opinions, recommendations, views, decisions in the 
discharge of duties  
Duration: Perpetual  
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
 
ii) in respect of legal/court proceedings over acts in the 
discharge of duties 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the competent 
authority/body (Parliament) 
2. Extra-functional: protection against prosecution for all 
other acts not related to the function, that is, legal/court 
proceedings, including arrest, detention, personal search, 
preliminary enquiries, investigations 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the competent 
authority/body (Parliament), except in cases of flagrante 
delicto. 
Cells: C17+C23+B9  
Council of Europe Member States: Bosnia-Herzegovina  
 
STAFF 
Non-liability  Inviolability  
2. Functional Persons holding any office or appointment 
under the institution shall not be prosecuted, subjected to 
investigation, arrested, detained or tried for any action, opinion 
or decision taken while performing their duties upon office or 
appointment 
Duration: During mandate 
Waiving procedure: No waiving procedure is provided 
 
2. Extra-functional: Acts not connected to the staff’s official 
function  
Duration: During mandate 
 Waiving procedure: Immunity is waived by the competent 
authority/body (Ombudsperson). The procedure is not precise. 
Cells: A2+B12 
Council of Europe Member States: Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
 
MODEL 4: The Qualified Immunity Model 
based on the principle of good faith 
Qualified immunity*: Courts decide upon the matter based on 
the principle of good faith1087 
 
*”No legal proceedings may be brought against the 
Commissioner in relation to any act done by him or any 
opinion expressed by him or report submitted by him in the 
exercise of his functions, provided that he has exercised his 
functions and powers under this Law in good faith and within 
their limits” (The Commissioner for Administration Law, 1991 
(L.3/1991), as amended)  
 
Council of Europe Member States: Cyprus  
Qualified immunity for official acts combined with 
inviolability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council of Europe Member States: Romania 
                                                 
1087 In the Ombudsman Act of 1976 for the Commonwealth Ombudsman of Australia, Part IV-Miscellaneous, 33, 
entitled “Ombudsman not to be sued”, reads as follows: “Subject to section 35, neither the Ombudsman nor a 
person acting under his or her direction or authority is liable to an action, suit or proceeding for or in relation to 
an act done or omitted to be done in good faith in exercise or purported exercise of any power or authority 
conferred by this Act or Division 7 of Part V of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979”.  
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